May 11, 2001

Mr. John H. Mueller
Chief Nuclear Officer
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station
Operations Building, 2nd Floor
P.O. Box 63
Lycoming, NY 13093

SUBJECT: NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION- NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000220/2001-002, 05000410/2001-002

Dear Mr. Mueller:

On March 31, 2001, the NRC completed an inspection of your Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on April 6, 2001, with Mr. J. Conway and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

No findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publically Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document management system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Michele G. Evans, Chief
Projects Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 05000220
05000410

License Nos. DPR-63
NPF-69

Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000220/2001-002, 05000410/2001-002

Attachment (1) Supplemental Information

cc w/encl:
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I

Docket Nos:	50-220, 50-0410
License Nos:	DPR-63, NPF-69
Report No:	50-220/01-02, 50-410/01-02
Licensee:	Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC)
Facility:	Nine Mile Point, Units 1 and 2
Location:	P. O. Box 63 Lycoming, NY 13093
Dates:	February 11, 2001 - March 31, 2001
Inspectors:	G. Hunegs, Senior Resident Inspector R. Fernandes, Resident Inspector B. Fuller, Resident Inspector M. Buckley, Resident Inspector T. Burns, Reactor Inspector W. Cook, Project Engineer J. Jang, Senior Health Physicist C. Sisco, Operations Engineer
Approved by:	Michele G. Evans, Chief Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects

Summary of Findings

IR 05000220-01-02, 05000410-01-02; on 02/11 - 03/31/2001; Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation; Nine Mile Point, Units 1 & 2.

This inspection was conducted by resident inspectors and four region based inspectors. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red) using IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by "No Color" or by the severity level of the applicable violation. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at htpp://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html.

A. Inspector Identified Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

B. Licensee Identified Violations

Violations of very low significance which were identified by the licensee have been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee appear reasonable. These violations are listed in section 4OA7 of this report.

Report Details

SUMMARY OF PLANT STATUS

Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (Unit 1) began this inspection report period at 100 percent power. On March 18, 2001, Unit 1 shutdown for a scheduled refueling outage and remained shutdown through the end of the inspection period.

Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (Unit 2) began this inspection report period at 100 percent power. On February 25, Unit 2 was shutdown for a planned maintenance outage. Major activities included installation of a modification for the reactor recirculation flow control valve position indication and repairs on a degraded main generator output disconnect switch. Unit 2 was started up on March 2 and returned to service on March 3. Unit 2 was returned to 100 percent power on March 4 and remained at 100 percent power through the end of the inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector performed a complete walkdown of the instrument air system in Unit 2. The inspector utilized the individual plant examination to identify the risk significant equipment to inspect and procedures to review. The inspector reviewed the system health report and maintenance rule status. Open work orders and deviation/event reports (DERs) were reviewed to assess system material condition. The inspector performed a walkdown using plant drawings and checked for proper valve position and material condition of the system. The inspector verified that the switch line-up was in accordance with operating procedures.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted walk-downs of fire areas to determine if there was adequate control of transient combustibles and ignition sources. The condition of fire detection devices, the readiness of the sprinkler fire suppression systems and the fire doors were also inspected. In addition, the passive fire protection features were inspected, including the ventilation system fire dampers, structural steel fire proofing, and electrical penetration seals. The following plant areas were inspected:

- General area reactor building (Unit 1).
- General area turbine building (Unit 1).
- Control room (Unit 2).
- General area reactor building (Unit 2).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R08 Inservice Inspection (ISI)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector observed selected samples of nondestructive examination (NDE) activities in progress. The inspector reviewed selected samples of NDE and repair/replacement activities. The sample selection was based on the inspection procedure objectives and risk priority of those components and systems where degradation would result in a significant increase in risk of core damage. The observations and documentation review was performed to verify the activities were performed in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code requirements. The inspector reviewed a sample of inspection reports and deviation reports initiated as a result of problems identified during ISI examinations. In addition, the inspector evaluated the effectiveness of resolution of problems identified during selected ISI activities.

The inspector observed ultrasonic testing (UT) activities and reviewed surface and visual examination inspection reports to verify the effectiveness of these processes in identifying degradation of risk significant systems, structures, and components and to evaluate licensee compliance with the requirements of ASME Section XI of the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. The examination included the review of the disposition of non-conforming conditions and verifying that an appropriate analyses was performed for conditions that were determined to be acceptable for continued operation, without repair or rework. The inspector observed the ultrasonic tests performed on isolation condenser system welds 39-WD-014 and 39-WD-102 and reviewed the inspection reports of the liquid penetrant (LP) test for weld 81-H10-WD-001 and the magnetic particle (MT) test for weld 81-SS-8-WD-001 in the core spray system. In addition, the inspector reviewed the radiographs and interpretation of test results of four butt welds and two subsequent repair welds made during the installation of valve 33-01 in the safety related portion of the reactor water clean-up system.

The inspector reviewed a sample of video recordings of the remote in-vessel visual inspection (IVVI) of the core spray piping and associated butt welds and tee boxes. In addition, the inspector reviewed the remote visual inspection of the core shroud stabilizer assemblies. The inspector reviewed the test recordings to confirm the test conditions enabled the performance of an adequate VT-3 examination of the core spray system piping and components and the shroud stabilizer assemblies. Also, the inspector confirmed that the visual examination was in compliance with the requirements of ASME Section XI. The inspector reviewed a sample of visual examination reports and inspection reports for the containment liners produced as a result of the visual inspections performed during RFO16 for Unit 1 and RFO7 for Unit 2. The inspector verified the inspection reports addressed potential coating failure, liner corrosion, and potential damage to moisture barriers, as required by ASME Section XI, IWE (requirements for Class MC and metallic liners of Class CC components).

The inspector reviewed welding activities associated with the repair and replacement of selected components to verify the activities were performed in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section IX and XI. The inspector reviewed completed work order Nos. 99-02375-07 (replacement of valve 33-01, reactor water clean up system, safety related portion) and 99-02405-00 (replacement of valve IV-80-35, containment spray system). The inspector reviewed welding activities performed during the RFO 15 installation of valve 33-01 (welds 33-01RWD-047C1 and 33-01RWD-048C1) in the reactor water clean up system and the removal of a linear indication following the welding at valve IV-80-35 in the containment spray system. The inspector reviewed welding procedure specification 08-08-TS-701, Revision 0, for compliance with the qualification requirements of ASME Section IX.

The inspector interviewed radiography personnel responsible for the review and approval of test results. Radiographs of welding activities were reviewed to ensure proper identification, characterization, and size of rejectable indications for welds 33-WD-004B and 33-WD-004D (completed in RFO 16) and welds 33-01RWD-047C1 and 33-01RWD-048C1 (completed in RFO 15) in the reactor water clean up system. The review included the radiographs of two repairs (R1 and R2) made during the installation of valve 33-02 in the reactor water clean up system.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensed operator requalification training activities to assess the licensee's training effectiveness. The inspectors observed Unit 2 licensed operator simulator training on March 14, 2001. The inspectors reviewed performance in the areas of procedure use, self and peer-checking, completion of critical tasks, and training performance objectives. Following the simulator exercises, the inspector observed the training instructor's debrief and critique and reviewed simulator fidelity through a sampling process.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed performance based problems involving selected in-scope structures, systems, and components (SSCs) to assess the effectiveness of the maintenance program. Reviews focused on: (1) proper maintenance rule scoping, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65; (2) characterization of failed SSCs; (3) safety significance classifications; (4) 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) and (a)(2) classifications; and, (5) the appropriateness of performance criteria for SSCs classified as (a)(2), and goals and corrective actions for SSCs classified as (a)(1). The inspectors reviewed the licensee's system scoping documents and system health reports. The following DERs were reviewed:

- DER 2-2001-0842 Intermediate range monitor (IRM) F failed during startup on March 2, 2001 (Unit 2).
- DER 2-00-3062 Trip of Division II emergency diesel generator (EDG) on low oil pressure (Unit 2).
- DER 2-1998-1925 Division I EDG trip during monthly run (Unit 2).
- DER 1-2001-0633 Containment hydrogen monitoring (Unit 1).
- DER 1-2001-0625 Remote shutdown panel reliability exceeding maintenance rule criteria (Unit 1).
- DER 1-2000-3136 Failure of post accident sampling system gas evacuation pump (Unit 1).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Personnel Performance During Non-Routine Plant Evolutions and Events

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed selected Licensee Event Reports (LERs) to ensure that licensee staff actions taken in response to the events were in accordance with station procedures and regulatory requirements. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's analysis of the event and associated corrective actions to ensure that appropriate measures were implemented to address any personnel performance concerns and that equipment problems were adequately resolved to prevent a recurrence of the identified problems.

LERs Reviewed:

LER 50-410/2000-01, "Missed Response Time Testing of the High Pressure Core Spray Initiation Signals and the Main Steam Flow Channels as Required by Technical Specifications." On January 12, 2000, the licensee identified that the response time testing for the high pressure core spray initiation signals and the main steam flow channels were not being tested within the frequency required by Technical Specifications (TS) surveillance requirements 4.3.2.3 and 4.3.3.3. The cause was improper maintenance of the surveillance test database. The licensee's risk assessment and inspector evaluation of this issue identified this as very low safety significance (Green) as the required channels were subsequently tested satisfactorily. Accordingly this violation of TS 4.3.2.3 and 4.3.3.3 is being treated as a Non-cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, issued May 1, 2000, (65FR25368). (**NCV 05000410/2001-002-01**) This LER is closed.

LER 50-410/2000-02 Supplement 1, "Manual Reactor Trip Due to an External Steam Leak on the Reactor Feedwater Pump and Automatic Trip of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System." The details of this event and related LERs were discussed in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 05000410/2000-001 and 05000410/2000-003. This LER supplement is closed.

LER 50-410/2000-03, "Pre-outage Review of Previous Outage Inspection Data on Feedwater Nozzle to Safe-end Weld Revealed an Indication." This LER identified a minor inspection data review oversight from the previous inservice inspection. This LER is closed.

LER 50-220/2000-04 and Supplement 1, "Manual Reactor Scram and Unusual Event Declaration Due to Stuck Open Electromatic Relief Valve and Failed Vacuum Breaker on Electromatic Relief Valve Discharge Line." The details of this event and subject LERs were discussed in NRC Inspection Report 05000220/2000-008. These LERs are closed.

LER 50-410/2000-10, "Technical Specification Requirement Not Performed for the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System High Steam Flow Instrumentation Due to an Inadequate Work Package." During the refueling outage, maintenance was performed on both divisions of the RCIC high steam flow instruments which inadvertently rendered them inoperable by introducing air into the lines. The cause was that a previous work order did not include steps for refilling and venting instrument lines that were drained during maintenance. From April 18 to April 25, 2000, the licensee failed to enter Technical Specification 3.3.2.c, which requires the RCIC system to be isolated from the steam supply within one hour, with both high steam flow instruments inoperable. On April 25, the licensee declared the reactor core isolation cooling system high steam flow instrumentation inoperable due to erratic indication, and entered TS 3.3.2.c. This issue was of very low risk significance (Green) in that a redundant high pressure injection system was available, and the duration was less than the TS allowed outage time. This violation of TS 3.3.2.c is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, issued May 1, 2000, (65FR25368). **(NCV 05000410/2001-002-02)** This LER is closed.

LER 50-410/2000-11, "Missed Technical Specification for Primary Containment Integrity Due to a Failure to Revise a Surveillance Procedure After Issuing an Engineering

Change Notice." On May 12, 2000, the licensee identified that the Primary Containment Isolation Valve 2RHS*V192 was not being verified closed every 31 days as required by Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.1.b. In 1986, an engineering change notice changed the valve from a normally open valve to a normally locked valve. This change made the valve a containment isolation valve subject to position verification in accordance with TS. The valve position was subsequently checked and found to be closed. This issue was of very low risk significance (Green), in that, the valve was determined to be in the correct position.

The licensee attributed this surveillance omission to the failure to properly revise all affected documents when the engineering change request was issued. This violation of TS 4.6.1.1.b is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, issued May 1, 2000, (65FR25368). This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program under DER No. 2-2000-1762. **(NCV 05000410/2001-002-03)** This LER is closed.

LER 50-410/2000-13, "Reactor Coolant Recirculation System Primary Containment Isolation Valves Not Tested as Required by Technical Specifications 4.0.5." On August 29, 2000, the licensee identified that the inservice testing requirements of TS 4.6.3.3 were not being met for 16 reactor coolant recirculation system primary containment isolation valves. Specifically, the valves were not timed individually but were timed in groups of four. On August 30, 2000, the licensee received NRC staff approval for the previous test methodology until the valves could be tested during the next scheduled outage. The test method was subsequently changed and proper testing was conducted with satisfactory results. This issue was of very low risk significance (Green), in that, the valve functioned properly when subjected to an appropriate stroke time test.

The licensee attributed this failure to properly inservice test the reactor coolant recirculation system primary containment isolation valves to misapplication or misinterpretation of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. This violation of TS 4.0.5 is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, issued May 1, 2000, (65FR25368). This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program under DER Nos. 2-2000-2925 and 3848. **(NCV 05000410/2001-002-04)** This LER is closed.

LER 50-410/2000-014, "Reactor Trip on Turbine Trip due to High Vibration." This event occurred on September 17, 2000, while conducting a unit start-up from a planned outage. The cause of the turbine bearing high vibration was attributed to oil whip/whirl. This lubricating oil condition was believed to have been caused by the temperature of the oil being maintained too low (111 degrees F) in the vendor prescribed temperature band (110-120 degrees F).

Licensee review identified that the turbine lubricating oil was replaced during the 2000 refueling outage with a slightly higher viscosity grade (Mobile DTE 832 vice DTE 797). Turbine lubricating oil temperature was maintained at 115 degrees F following start-up from the refueling outage until the planned outage in September 2000. Although the lubricating oil temperature was within the prescribed temperature band during start-up from the September outage, it appears to have been too low for the slightly higher viscosity oil. As corrective action, the licensee narrowed the allowed turbine lubricating oil temperature band to 117-120 degrees F and currently maintains a temperature of 118 degrees F.

The inspector verified this event was appropriately accounted for in the licensee's Performance Indicator for Unplanned Scrams. Additional inspector observations and performance assessments involving this event were documented in Inspection Report Nos. 05000410/2000-005 and 05000410/2000-008. This LER is closed.

LER 50-410/2000-015, "Failure to Enter TS Action Statement at the Correct Point in the Electrical Breaker Switching Sequence, Results in Exceeding Action Statement Allowed Time Frame." This event occurred on October 19, 2000, during the removal of a 115 Kv offsite power source (Line No. 6) from service for planned maintenance. Specifically, control room operators failed to take action in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1.1, action a., within one hour of rendering Line No. 6 inoperable. Action a. requires a check of the alignment of the remaining offsite power supplies.

The licensee identified this TS violation and determined the cause for the oversight as poor work practices, in that, both the specific work order (WO No. 99-16586-02) and governing operating procedure (N2-OP-72) Precautions and Limitations were not adhered to. The failure to take action in accordance with TS 3.8.1.1. is a violation of very low risk significance (Green), in that, the oversight was identified within 16 minutes of the one-hour time limit and the remaining offsite power sources were available and fully functional during this time interval. This issue is being treated as an NCV consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, issued on May 1, 2000, (65FR25368). This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program under DER No. 2-2000-3738. **(NCV 05000410/2001-002-05)** This LER is closed.

LER 50-410/2000-16 and Supplement 1, "Primary Containment Purge Supply Isolation Valves Failed their Leak Rate Test." As documented in the LER, the causes for this event included equipment problems (corrosion products on the valve seating surfaces) and personnel performance deficiencies (including operator failure to properly close 2CPS*AOV107 and poor management decision-making with respect to timely corrective actions to address identified equipment problems).

The licensee's failure to take appropriate and timely corrective actions to address identified containment isolation valve leakage problems resulted in violating the primary containment isolation valve allowed leakage limits per TS 3.6.1.1 and 3.6.1.2. Licensee analysis and inspector review confirmed that this event was of very low safety significance (Green). This analysis was based upon confirmatory leak rate testing of the non-credited downstream purge system piping isolation valves which identified leakage values of 7.1 and 5.8 standard cubic feet per hour (scfh) in the normal and vented configurations, respectively. The sum of these leakage values and the total known primary containment leakage rate of 140 scfh, is still significantly less than the regulatory acceptance criteria of 0.6 La (494 scfh). The failure to take appropriate corrective action is contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, and is a violation. This issue is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, issued May 1, 2000, (65FR25368). This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program under DER No. 2-2000-4463. **(NCV 05000410/2001-002-06)** These LERs are closed.

LER 50-410/2000-017, "Inadequate Test Methodology used for Reverse Flow Testing of Check Valve in Low Pressure Core Spray, Minimum-Flow Recirculation Line." On November 22, 2000, the licensee identified that the inservice testing requirements of TS 4.0.5 were not being met for valve 2CSL*V9. Specifically, the test pressure used was

insufficient to seat the check valve and verify the cessation of flow. The test method was changed and proper reverse flow testing was conducted with satisfactory results. This issue was of very low risk significance (Green), in that, the valve functioned properly when subjected to an appropriate reverse flow test.

The licensee attributed this failure to properly inservice test 2CSL*V9 to poor testing program management and improper validation of the test methodology. This violation of TS 4.0.5 is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, issued May 1, 2000, (65FR25368). This issue is in the licensee's corrective action program under DER No. 2-2000-4205. **(NCV 05000410/2001-002-07)** This LER is closed.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operability evaluations affecting risk significant mitigating systems, to assess: (1) the technical adequacy of the evaluation; (2) whether continued system operability evaluations were warranted; (3) whether other existing degraded systems adversely impacted the affected system or compensatory measures; (4) where compensatory measures were used, whether the measures were appropriate and properly controlled; and (5) the degraded system's impact on technical specifications (TS) limiting condition for operations. The following DER was reviewed:

- DER 2-2001-0462 Incorrect torque check method for emergency diesel generator governor actuator (Unit 2).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance testing (PMT) procedures and associated testing activities for selected risk significant mitigating systems to assess whether: (1) the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed by control room and engineering personnel; (2) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; (3) acceptance criteria were clear and adequately demonstrated operational readiness, consistent with the design and licensing basis documents; (4) test instrumentation had current calibrations, range, and accuracy for the application; (5) tests were performed, as written, with applicable prerequisites satisfied; (6) jumpers installed or leads lifted were properly controlled; (7) test equipment was removed following testing; and (8) equipment was returned to the status required to perform its safety function. The following items were reviewed:

- WO 00-08163-00, Scram air header pressure control valve replacement (Unit 1).

- WO 01-02528-00, Remove actuator and indicator to torque both stuffing box flange studs on feedwater system outside isolation check valve, 2FWS*AOV23B (Unit 2).

- Technical Surveillance Procedure (TSP) 210-001, Control Room Emergency Ventilation System and 202-001, Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation System (Unit 1).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors witnessed performance of surveillance test procedures and reviewed test data of selected risk significant SSCs to assess whether the SSCs satisfied Technical Specifications, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), and licensee procedure requirements; and to determine if the testing appropriately demonstrated that the SSCs were operationally ready and capable of performing their intended safety functions. The following tests were witnessed:

- N2-OSP-SWP-Q@003, Control Building Chiller Condensing Water Pump Operability Test and ASME Section XI Pressure Test (Unit 2).

- N1-ST-Q13, Emergency Service Water Pump Operability Test (Unit 1).

- N2-OSP-EGS-M@002, Diesel Generator and Diesel Air Start Valve Operability Test - Division III (Unit 2).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. The inspector reviewed Unit 1 temporary modification No. 00-022, installation of patches on the reactor building emergency ventilation system fan discharge coupling boots. The inspector verified that the installation was in accordance with the associated work order and that post-work testing was completed. The inspector verified that the safety evaluation was consistent with the design documentation.

During the Unit 2 planned outage, the licensee noted some minor leakage from the B outboard feedwater check valve. Following the repair of the leakage, NMPC determined that the valve disc would not close with the actuator attached. A temporary modification was processed to remove the actuator and to allow the disc to close with the assistance of a torque wrench. The inspector reviewed Unit 2 temporary modification No. 2001-005, removal of actuator drive linkage arm on 2FWS*AOV23B, feed water system outboard check valve. The inspector reviewed the document design change (DDC) 2F02322, applicability review (AR) 60211, disconnect actuator from valve, the ASME XI

program impact assessment, NMP2-IST-005, Rev. 0, FWS-CSJ-1, Cold shutdown test justification, engineering support analysis 2M01-01, design specification NMP2 P303W, and work order 01-02528-00, remove actuator and indicator to torque both stuffing boxes, and Safety Evaluation no: 2001-062, allow disconnecting the actuator of 2 FWS*AOV23B.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the following documents to ensure the licensee met all requirements of the performance indicator, "RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent Occurrences," from the first quarter 1999 to the fourth quarter 2000 (eight quarters) for both units:

- Monthly projected dose assessment results due to radioactive liquid and gaseous effluent releases; associated procedures.

- Quarterly projected dose assessment results due to radioactive liquid and gaseous effluent releases; and associated procedures.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Management Meetings - Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. J. Conway, Vice President, Nuclear Generation and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on April 6, 2001. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

4OA7 Licensee Identified Violations: The following findings of very low significance were identified by the licensee and are violations of NRC requirements which met the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as Non-cited Violations.

NCV Tracking Number	Requirement Licensee Failed to Meet
05000410/2001-002-01	The licensee did not complete TS surveillance requirements 4.3.2.3 and 4.3.3.3 to perform high pressure core spray initiation signals and main steam flow channel response time testing. (Reference Section 1R14)

05000410/2001-002-02	The licensee did not implement TS 3.3.2.c when both high steam flow instruments for RCIC were inoperable. (Reference Section 1R14)
05000410/2001-002-03	The licensee did not verify closed a primary containment isolation valve as required by TS surveillance requirement 4.6.1.1.b. (Reference Section 1R14)
05000410/2001-002-04	The licensee did not meet TS 4.6.3.3 requirements to test the reactor coolant recirculation system primary containment isolation valves. (Reference Section 1R14)
05000410/2001-002-05	Control room operators failed to take TS 3.8.1.1 actions during 115Kv line maintenance. (Reference Section 1R14)
05000410/2001-002-06	The licensee failed to take appropriate and timely corrective actions to address primary containment purge supply isolation valve leakage which resulted in a TS 3.6.1.1 and 3.6.1.2 violation. (Reference Section 1R14)
05000410/2001-002-07	The licensee did not meet TS 4.0.5 requirements due to an inadequate test methodology used for reverse flow testing for the low pressure core spray check valve. (Reference Section 1R14)

If you deny these Non-cited Violations, you should provide a response with the basis for your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Nine Mile Point facility.

ATTACHMENT 1

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

R. Abbott, Vice President Engineering
J. Conway, VP Nuclear Generation
L. Hopkins, Unit 1 Plant Manager
J. Mueller, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer
M. Peckham, Unit 2 Plant Manager
C. Terry, Vice President Quality Assurance Nuclear
D. Wolniak, Manager, Licensing

NRC

J. Trapp, Senior Reactor Analyst

ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED

Items Opened and Closed:

05000410/2001-002-01	NCV	Missed response time testing of the high pressure core spray initiation signals and the main steam flow channels.
05000410/2001-002-02	NCV	TS requirement not performed for RCIC due to an inadequate work package
05000410/2001-002-03	NCV	Missed TS entry for primary containment integrity.
05000410/2001-002-04	NCV	Reactor coolant recirculation system primary containment isolation valves not tested.
05000410/2001-002-05	NCV	Failure to enter TS at the correct point in the electrical breaker switching sequence.
05000410/2001-002-06	NCV	Primary containment purge supply isolation valves failed their leak rate test.
05000410/2001-002-07	NCV	Inadequate test methodology used for reverse flow testing of check valve in low pressure core spray.

Closed:

05000410/2000-001	LER	Missed Response Time Testing of High Pressure Core Spray Initiation Signals and Main Steam Flow Channels as Required by Technical Specifications.
05000410/2000-002	LER	Manual Reactor Trip Due to External Steam Leak on the Reactor Feedwater Pump and Automatic Trip of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System.

05000410/2000-002-01	LER	Manual Reactor Trip Due to External Steam Leak on the Reactor Feedwater Pump and Automatic Trip of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System.
05000410/2000-003	LER	Pre-outage Review of Previous Outage Inspection Data on Feedwater Nozzle to Safe-end Weld Revealed an Indication.
05000220/2000-004	LER	Manual Reactor Scram and Unusual Event Declaration Due to Stuck Open Electromatic Relief Valve and Failed Vacuum Breaker on Electromatic Relief Valve Discharge Line.
05000220/2000-004-01	LER	Manual Reactor Scram and Unusual Event Declaration Due to Stuck Open Electromatic Relief Valve and Failed Vacuum Breaker on Electromatic Relief Valve Discharge Line.
05000410/2000-010	LER	Technical Specification Requirement Not Performed for the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System High Steam Flow Instrumentation Due to an Inadequate Work Package.
05000410/2000-011	LER	Missed Technical Specification for Primary Containment Integrity Due to a Failure to Revise a Surveillance Procedure after Issuing an Engineering Change Notice.
05000410/2000-013	LER	Reactor Coolant Recirculation System Primary Containment Isolation Valves Not Tested as Required by Technical Specifications 4.0.5.
05000410/2000-014	LER	Reactor Trip on Turbine Trip Due to High Vibration.
05000410/2000-015	LER	Failure to enter TS Action Statement at the Correct Point in the Electrical Breaker Switching Sequence, Results in Exceeding Action Statement Allowed Time Frame.
05000410/2000-016	LER	Primary Containment Purge Supply Isolation Valves Failed their Leak Rate Test.
05000410/2000-016-01	LER	Primary Containment Purge Supply Isolation Valves Failed their Leak Rate Test.
05000410/2000-017	LER	Inadequate Test Methodology used for Reverse Flow Testing of Check Valve in Low Pressure Core Spray, Minimum-Flow Recirculation Line.

Documentation Review

Radiograph Review

33-WD-004B	Reactor Water Cleanup, 6 inch, carbon steel, valve replacement
33-WD-004BR1	Repair one of butt weld 33-WD-004B, valve replacement
33-WD-004D	Reactor Water Cleanup, 6 inch, carbon steel, valve replacement
33-WD-004DR1	Repair one of butt weld 33-WD-004D, Valve replacement
33-01RWD-047C1	Replacement of Valve 33-01, Isolation Condenser
33-01RWD-048C1	Replacement of Valve 33-01, Isolation Condenser

NDT Examination Reports

1-3.00-01-0127	Liquid Penetrant Examination, Spring Hanger Integral Attachment
1-4.00-01-0061	Magnetic Particle Examination, Sway Strut Integral Attachment
2-6.05-00-0030	Ultrasonic Examination Report, Containment Liner Thickness
2-2.05-00-0117	IWE Visual Exam, Unit 2 Containment Liner Zone IWE-240-006
1-2.05-01-0007,8,9	IWE Visual Exam, Unit 1 Containment Liner Zone 2,3,4
1-2.05-01-0002,3,4,5	IWE Visual Exam, Unit 1 Containment Liner Zones 5,6,7,8
QA-99058	Ultrasonic Examination Results-Unit 1 recirculation safe end to elbow
1-6.24-01-0062,64	Ultrasonic Examination Report Weld 39-WD-014 Iso Condenser
1-6.24-01-0065,66	Ultrasonic Examination Report Weld 39-WD-102 Iso Condenser

NDT Examination Procedures

NDEP-VT-2.05, Rev 00	Visual Examination (of structural components)
N1-MMP-GEN-013, Rev 3	Weld Preparation for Nondestructive Examinations
NDEP-UT-6.24, Rev 3	Ultrasonic Examination of Austenitic Piping Welds
NDEP-UT-6.05, Rev 11	Ultrasonic Wall Thickness (drywell liner)
NMP-IWE-003 Rev1	Containment Visual Inspection Program

In Vessel Remote Visual Examination

VT-3	Visual Examination of Core Shroud Restraint Device
VT-3	Visual Examination of Core Spray Piping, Spargers and TEE Boxes (Welds U3, U3A and U4)

Repair-Replacement Work Orders

99-02405-00	Containment Spray, replacement of isolation valve 80-35
99-02375-07	Reactor Water Cleanup, replacement of valve 33-01R