July 28, 2000

Mr. M. Wadley
President, Nuclear Generation
Northern States Power Company
414 Nicollet Mall
Minneapolis, MN 55401

SUBJECT: MONTICELLO NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-263/2000005(DRP)

Dear Mr. Wadley:

On June 30, 2000, the NRC completed a baseline inspection at your Monticello Nuclear Power Plant. The results of this inspection were discussed on June 27, 2000, with Mr. M. Hammer and other members of your staff. The enclosed report presents the results of that inspection.

The inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to reactor safety, verification of performance indicators, event followup, and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel. No findings were identified in any of the cornerstones of safety during our inspection.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available **electronically** for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room **or** from the *Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS)*. *ADAMS is accessible from* the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 5

Docket No. 50-263
License No. DPR-22

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-263/2000005(DRP)

See Attached Distribution

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket No:	50-263
License No:	DPR-22
Report No:	50-263/2000005(DRP)
Licensee:	Northern States Power Company
Facility:	Monticello Nuclear Power Plant
Location:	2807 West Highway 75 Monticello, MN 55362
Dates:	May 17 through June 30, 2000
Inspectors:	Stephen Burton, Senior Resident Inspector Thomas Fredrichs, Resident Inspector Michael Kunowski, Regional Inspector Paul Pelke, Regional Inspector Karla Stoedter, Regional Inspector
Approved by:	Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects

NRC's REVISED REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS

The federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recently revamped its inspection, assessment, and enforcement programs for commercial nuclear power plants. The new process takes into account improvements in the performance of the nuclear industry over the past 25 years and improved approaches of inspecting and assessing safety performance at NRC-licensed plants.

The new process monitors licensee performance in three broad areas (called strategic performance areas): reactor safety (avoiding accidents and reducing the consequences of accidents if they occur), radiation safety (protecting plant employees and the public during routine operations), and safeguards (protecting the plant against sabotage or other security threats). The process focuses on licensee performance within each of seven cornerstones of safety in the three areas:

Reactor Safety	Radiation Safety	Safeguards
● Initiating Events	● Occupational	● Physical Protection
● Mitigating Systems	● Public	
● Barrier Integrity		
● Emergency Preparedness		

To monitor these seven cornerstones of safety, the NRC uses two processes that generate information about the safety significance of plant operations: inspections and performance indicators. Inspection findings will be evaluated according to their potential significance for safety, using the Significance Determination Process, and assigned colors of GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW or RED. GREEN findings are indicative of issues that, while they may not be desirable, represent very low safety significance. WHITE findings indicate issues that are of low to moderate safety significance. YELLOW findings are issues that are of substantial safety significance. RED findings represent issues that are of high safety significance with a significant reduction in safety margin.

Performance indicator data will be compared to established criteria for measuring licensee performance in terms of potential safety. Based on prescribed thresholds, the indicators will be classified by color representing varying levels of performance and incremental degradation in safety: GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW, and RED. GREEN indicators represent performance at a level requiring no additional NRC oversight beyond the baseline inspections. WHITE corresponds to performance that may result in increased NRC oversight. YELLOW represents performance that minimally reduces safety margin and requires even more NRC oversight. And RED indicates performance that represents a significant reduction in safety margin but still provides adequate protection to public health and safety.

The assessment process integrates performance indicators and inspection so the agency can reach objective conclusions regarding overall plant performance. The agency will use an Action Matrix to determine in a systematic, predictable manner which regulatory actions should be taken based on a licensee's performance. The NRC's actions in response to the significance (as represented by the color) of issues will be the same for performance indicators as for inspection findings. As a licensee's safety performance degrades, the NRC will take more and increasingly significant action, which can include shutting down a plant, as described in the Action Matrix.

More information can be found at: http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Monticello Nuclear Power Plant
NRC Inspection Report 50-263/2000005(DRP)

IR 05000263-00-05, on 05/17-06/30/2000; Northern States Power Company; Monticello Nuclear Power Plant Resident Operations Report.

The inspection was conducted by resident inspectors and regional projects inspectors. The report covers a six and one half-week period of resident inspection. No findings were identified in any of the cornerstones of safety.

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status: Monticello operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period with one exception: on May 27, 2000, power was reduced to approximately 35 percent to accommodate condenser cleaning.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity.

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a walkdown of the licensee's preparations for adverse weather, including conditions that could lead to loss of offsite power and conditions that could result from high temperatures or high winds. The inspectors verified the licensee's procedures and preparation for the impending tornado season were adequate. The inspectors focused on design features and the licensee's procedures that mitigated or were used to respond to adverse weather conditions. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the Updated Safety Analysis Report and performance requirements for systems selected for inspection, and verified operator actions specified in procedures. Items and procedures reviewed included:

- Tornado protection for the emergency diesel generators (EDGs) and the spent fuel storage pool;
- Summer mode of operation for the Reactor Building Chill Water System and other systems;
- EDG building design requirements;
- Tornado qualifications for EDG: exhaust silencers, generator building roof, diesel fuel day tank vent pipes, diesel fuel day tank flame arrestors, and intake air piping;
- Monticello Updated Safety Analysis Report
  - Section 2.3, Revision 17, "Meteorology," and
  - Section 12.1, "Plant Structures and Shielding";
- Configuration Management Follow-On Item (FOI) No. 91-0267, "Qualification of the EDG Building for Tornado Generated Missiles";
- Configuration Management FOI No. 91-0266, "Qualification of the EDG Building for 100 MPH [mile per hour] Wind Forces and Tornado Generated Forces";
- Calculation/Analysis No. CA-92-258;

- General Electric (GE) Report APED - 5696, “Tornado Protection for the Spent Fuel Storage Pool”;
- Operations Manual A.6, Revision 11, “Acts of Nature”;
- Surveillance Procedure 1150, Revision 28, “Summer Checklist”; and
- Northern States Power (NSP) Memorandum from C. Schibonski to A. Ward dated September 19, 1991, “Design Basis Tornado for the EDG Building.”

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed two partial walkdowns of redundant equipment trains while the counterpart trains were disabled due to planned maintenance. These systems were selected due to the significant increase in core damage frequency caused by taking one train out-of-service for maintenance. The inspectors verified the position of critical portions of the redundant equipment and attempted to identify any discrepancies between the existing equipment lineup and the required lineup. The systems walked down and documents reviewed included:

- A partial walkdown of the ‘A’ train of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System while the ‘B’ train of the RHR System was out-of-service for the performance of emergent maintenance work;
- A partial walkdown of the ‘A’ and ‘B’ trains of the Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System while the Number 14 RHRSW Pump was out-of-service for planned maintenance, emergent work and associated modifications;
- Operations Manual B.08.01.03, “RHR Service Water”;
- Piping and Instrument Diagram M-112, Revision BA, “RHR Service Water and Emergency Service Water Systems”;
- Piping and Instrument Diagram M-120, Revision AF, “Residual Heat Removal System”; and
- Procedure 2154-23, Revision 20, “RHR Service Water System Prestart Valve Checklist.”

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

1R05 Fire Zone Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified the adequacy of the licensee's fire protection program in the areas listed below. The inspectors walked down selected risk significant areas in order to identify any fire protection issues related to: the control of transient combustibles, ignition sources, fire detection equipment manual suppression capabilities, passive suppression capabilities, automatic suppression capabilities, and barriers to fire propagation. The areas walked down and documents reviewed included:

- Fire Zone 7-C (125V [volt] Division II Battery Room)
- Fire Zone 3-A, (Recirculation Motor Generator Set Room);
- Fire Zone 3-D, (Reactor Building RBCCW [reactor building closed cooling water] Pump Area);
- Fire Zone 15-A, (#12 EDG Room);
- Fire Zone 15-B, (#11 EDG Room);
- Fire Zone 23-A, (Intake Structure Pump Room);
- Fire Zone 23-B, (Intake Structure Corridor);
- Procedure 4AWI [Administrative Work Instruction]-08.01.01, Revision 13, "Fire Prevention Practices";
- Procedure 4AWI-08.01.02, Revision 4, "Combustion Source Use Permit";
- Procedure 0271, Revision 24, "Fire Hose Station and Yard Hydrant Hose House Equipment Inspection";
- Technical Manual NX-16991 "Monticello Updated Fire Hazards Analysis";
- Surveillance Test Procedure 0275-2, Revision 14 "Fire Barrier Wall, Damper, and Floor Inspection"; and
- Monticello Fire Strategies:
  - A.3-07-C, Revision 2, "125V Division II Battery Room";
  - A.3-03-A, Revision 3, "Recirculation Motor Generator Set Room";
  - A.3-03-D, Revision 5, "Reactor Building RBCCW Pump Area";
  - A.3-15-A, Revision 2, "#12 Emergency Diesel Generator Room";
  - A.3-15-B, Revision 3, "#11 Emergency Diesel Generator Room";
  - A.3-23-A, Revision 3, "Intake Structure Pump Room"; and
  - A.3-23-B, Revision 2, "Intake Structure Corridor".

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified the licensee's categorization of specific issues, including evaluation of the performance criteria and, when applicable, goal setting established for the systems listed below. The inspectors selected systems that were in an A1 maintenance rule status. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of the maintenance rule requirements, including a review of scoping, goal-setting, and performance monitoring, short-term and long-term corrective actions, functional failure determinations associated with the below-listed condition reports, and current equipment performance status. The systems selected for inspection were all classified as risk significant by the licensee's maintenance rule program. The systems evaluated and documents reviewed included:

- Primary Containment System;
- RHRSW System;
- 4kV (kilovolt) System;
- Engineering Work Instruction (EWI)-05.02.01, Revision 3, "Monticello Maintenance Rule Program Document";
- Monticello Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment Report, 4th Quarter - 1999;
- Monticello Maintenance Rule Program System Basis Document,
  - "Primary Containment System - B.4.1," Revision 2,
  - "RHR Service Water - B.8.1.3," Revision 1, and
  - "4kV System - B.9.6," Revision 3;
- Operations Manual B.09.06-01, Revision 4, "4.16kV Station Auxiliary";
- Monticello "Updated Safety Analysis Report";
- Condition Report (CR) 19991532, "Inoperable Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breaker Considered to Be a MRFF [maintenance rule functional failure]";
- CR 19992076, "Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Breaker Exceeded LST [Limiting Stroke Time] In Open Direction";
- CR 20000133, "Drywell-Torus Vacuum Breaker Exceeded 354 Inch-lbs During Performance of Procedure 0127";

- CR 20000303, “Close Stroke Time for AO [air-operated valve]-2379 Outside Acceptable Band of 10 to 16 Seconds with a Stroke Time of 16.5 Seconds”;

- CR 20000304, “Open Stroke Time for AO-2380 Exceeded Its LST Value of 44 Seconds with a Stroke Time of 44.3 Seconds”;

- CR 19992809, “Check Valve RHRSW-1-1 Fails to Close During Surv. Test 0255-05-IA-1";

- Condition Report 19993612, “#11 RHRSW Pump Did Not Meet Its Maintenance Rule Action Plan Goal”;

- CR 20002448, “ ‘A’ RHRSW Loop Inoperability Not Immediately Considered and CR Not Initiated in Response to Unexpected LCO [limiting condition for operation] Entry 9/17/99";

- CR 19993795, “Hanger SWH-180 Not Carrying Load”;

- CR 19992735, “Protective Relays As-Found Values Exceeded Acceptance Criteria during 4850-607PM”;

- CR 19992812, “2R Transformer has Exceeded its Maintenance Rule Unavailability Performance Criterion”;

- CR 20000601, “1R Transformer Capability With One of Twenty Cooling Fans Out of Service”;

- CR 19991578, “Grounds Hung on Wrong Side of the 2R Transformer”; and

- Work Order (WO) 0000462, “Breaker 152-308 Failed to Close.”

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed and observed emergent work, preventive maintenance activities, and associated documentation that involved risk significant systems. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee’s evaluation of plant risk, scheduling, and configuration control for these activities in coordination with other scheduled risk significant work. The inspectors verified that the licensee’s control of activities

considered assessment of baseline and cumulative risk, management of plant configuration, and control of maintenance. The work observed and documents reviewed included:

- WO 0002191, "[pressure control valve] PCV-4215 Overspeed Trip Mechanical Oil Supply PCV - Correct Oil Leaking On";
- WO 0002411, "Replace 14 RHRSW Pump Motor With Spare";
- WO 0002412, "Support Replacement of 14 RHRSW Pump Motor";
- Design Change 00Q220, "RHRSW Motor Cooling Coil Pipe Coupling P109D";
- Equipment Isolation 00-02411, Version 1, "Replace 14 RHRSW Pump Motor With Spare" ;
- Technical Specification MPS-0970, Revision 9, Specification E-100, "Technical Specification for Installation of Electrical Equipment, Raceway, Wire, and Cable";
- Preventative Maintenance Procedure 4140PM, Revision 3, "RHR Service Water Pump and Motor Inspection";
- Preventative Maintenance Procedure 4916-15PM, "Lubricate Intake"; and
- Technical Manual NX-7905-9, GEH 1897B, "Tri-Clad Vertical, High-Thrust Polyphase Induction Motors, General Electric."

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

1R14 Personnel Performance During Non-routine Plant Evolutions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to a failed annunciator card in the control room which resulted in a small open flame. The inspectors reviewed the operator response and operator logs, and evaluated that the licensee's response to the evolution was in accordance with station procedures and management expectations. The documents reviewed included:

- Procedure 4AWI-08.01.02, Revision 14, "Fire Prevention Practices";
- Procedure 4AWI-04.08.01, Revision 15, "Event Notifications";
- CR 21002536, "Annunciator Card C-06-B-1 Failed Causing Small Flame on the Annunciator Card. Promptly Extinguished by Operator";

- CR 20002542, “Failed Annunciator Event Not Promptly Identified as a Condition Report and Logged”; and

- Control Room Logs dated June 20, 2000.

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of operability evaluations to determine the impact on Technical Specifications, the significance of the evaluations, and that an adequate justification of operability was documented. Operability evaluations were selected based upon the relationship of the safety-related system, structure, or component to risk. The operability evaluations reviewed were:

- CR 20000304, “Open Stroke Time for AO-2380 Exceeded Its LST Value of 44 Seconds with a Stroke Time of 44.3 Seconds”; and

- CR 20001096, ”Primary Containment Isolation of TIP [transversing incore probe] Ball Valves Does Not Function Independently of Normal Controls.”

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the performance of post-maintenance testing activities including: integration of testing activities, applicability of acceptance criteria, test equipment calibration and control, procedural use, control of temporary modifications or jumpers required for test performance, documentation of test data, Technical Specification applicability, system restoration, and evaluation of test data. The inspectors verified that maintenance and post-maintenance testing activities were adequate and would detect deficiencies prior to returning the equipment to service. The post-maintenance testing observed and related documents reviewed included:

- Preventive Maintenance on the Control Room Ventilation System in accordance with WO 0002392, “Replace Temperature Indicator Controller TIC-9072 for Control Room Air Conditioning Unit V-EAC-14B”;

- Post-maintenance testing on the RHRSW System in accordance with Surveillance Test Procedure 0255-05-IA-1, Revision 39, “RHR Service Water Pump and Valve Tests”;

- Post-maintenance testing on the Reactor Manual Controls System (RMCS) in accordance with Surveillance Test Procedure 0074, Revision 26, “Control Rod Drive Exercise”;

- Post-maintenance testing on the Core Spray System in accordance with Surveillance Test Procedure 0255-03-IA-1, Revision 26, “Core Spray System Tests”;

- WO 0001454, “Perform PM [preventive maintenance] 4847 on MO [motor-operated valve]-1750 #12 Core Spray Test 480V Supply”;

- WO 0002467, “Replace Card in 3A-12 Relay Module”; and

- WO 0002471, “RMCS Control Rod 42-35 Insertion Anomaly.”

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the performance of surveillance testing activities including: reviews for preconditioning, integration of testing activities, applicability of acceptance criteria, test equipment calibration and control, procedural use, control of temporary modifications or jumpers required for test performance, documentation of test data, Technical Specification applicability, impact of testing relative to performance indicator reporting, and evaluation of test data. The inspectors verified that the surveillance test activities ensured that the safety systems were capable of performing their safety function. The work observed and documents reviewed included:

- Surveillance Test Procedure 0193-01, Revision 7, “No. 13 250 VDC [volt direct current] Battery Operability Check (Division I),” weekly;

- Surveillance Test Procedure 0193-02, Revision 7, “No. 16 250 VDC Battery Operability Check (Division II),” weekly;

- Surveillance Test Procedures 1035, Revision 12, “No. 11 and No. 12 125 VDC Battery Operability Check,” monthly;

- Surveillance Test Procedure 1036, Revision 10, “No. 14 and No. 15 24 VDC Battery Operability Check,” monthly;

- Surveillance Test Procedure 0002, Revision 11, “Reactor High Pressure Scram Instrument Test and Calibration Procedure”;

- Surveillance Test Procedure 0255-03-IA-1, Revision 26, “Core Spray System Tests”;

- Technical Specification Table 3.1.1, “Reactor Protection System Instrument Requirements”;
- Updated Safety Analysis Report, Section 7.6.1, “Reactor Protection System”;
- Calculation Analysis CA-95-047, Revision 0, “Instrument Setpoint Calculation, High Reactor Pressure Scram, PS-2-3-55A, B, C, and D”; and
- Calculation Analysis CA-90-007, “Calculate Required Pressure and Flow Criteria for Core Spray Monthly Surveillance Test.”

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity

.1 Reactor Coolant System Activity

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified the accuracy and completeness of the “Reactor Coolant System Activity” performance indicator data submitted by the licensee for January 1, 2000, through March 31, 2000. The inspectors reviewed data reported to the NRC since the last verification. The review was accomplished, in part, through evaluation of the Technical Specification requirements, chemistry records, procedural reviews, and reactor coolant sample data. The procedures evaluated and documents reviewed included:

- “Monticello Performance Indicator Data Summary Report Q1/2000";
- Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Revision 0, “Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline”;
- “Monticello Digi*Chem System Parameter Data”;
- “Monticello Gamma Report,” Germanium detector sample results (multiple occurrences);
- “Monticello Nuclear Plant Comparison Data” (Germanium detector blind sample verification at Analytics Laboratory);
- Procedure I.3.13, Revision, 11, “Reactor Water and Cleanup System Iodine”;

- Monticello Technical Specifications, Section 3.6.C, ”Coolant Chemistry”;
- Radiation Protection Procedure RPGP-01.14, Revision 2, “Self Assessment Program”; and
- Monticello Form 3530-08, Revision 0, “Performance Indicator RCS [reactor coolant system] Activity Worksheet.”

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified during this inspection.

.2 (Closed) Unresolved Item (URI) 50-263/2000004-01(DRP): Potential error in performance indicator reporting data for “Safety System Unavailability - HPCI [high pressure coolant injection] System.” The inspectors identified that WO 20000636, “PCV-4214 Has A Diaphragm Leak,” was not evaluated for the failure of the diaphragm on past operability. Pressure control valve PCV-4214 was the HPCI system lubricating oil PCV. The inspectors determined that failure of the diaphragm in this valve could have resulted in a loss of lubricating oil and a loss of associated pressure control capabilities. The inspectors reviewed CR 20001977, “Documentation for Minor PCV-4214 Leak Corrected During 2000 Outage,” and found that the vendor stated that the wire mesh portion of the diaphragm could not experience a gross failure. Therefore, the condition did not impact past operability of the pressure control valve and had no impact on the performance indicator data.

4OA6 Meetings, including Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. M. Hammer and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on June 27, 2000. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

M. Hammer, Site Manager
B. Day, Plant Manager
J. Grubb, General Superintendent, Engineering
K. Jepson, Superintendent, Chemistry & Environmental Protection
B. Linde, Superintendent, Security
B. Sawatzke, General Superintendent, Maintenance
C. Schibonski, General Superintendent, Safety Assessment
E. Sopkin, General Superintendent, Operations
L. Wilkerson, Manager, Quality Services
J. Windschill, General Superintendent, Radiation Services

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

None

Closed

50-263/2000004-01(DRP)	URI	Potential error in performance indicator reporting data for "Safety System Unavailability - HPCI System"

Discussed

None

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

AO	Air-Operated Valve
ASME	American Society of Mechanical Engineers
AWI	Administrative Work Instruction
CR	Condition Report
DRP	Division of Reactor Projects
DRS	Division of Reactor Safety
EDG	Emergency Diesel Generator
EWI	Engineering Work Instruction
FOI	Follow-On Item
GE	General Electric
HPCI	High Pressure Coolant Injection
kV	Kilovolt
LCO	Limiting Condition for Operation
LST	Limiting Stroke Time
MC	Manual Chapter
MO	Motor-Operated Valve
MRFF	Maintenance Rule Functional Failure
NEI	Nuclear Energy Institute
NSP	Northern States Power
PCV	Pressure Control Valve
PM	Preventive Maintenance
PP	Physical Protection
RBCCW	Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water
RCS	Reactor Coolant System
RHR	Residual Heat Removal
RHRSW	Residual Heat Removal Service Water
RMCS	Reactor Manual Control System
TIP	Transversing Incore Probe
UFHA	Updated Fire Hazards Analysis
URI	Unresolved Item
V	Volt
VDC	Volt Direct Current
WO	Work Order