UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
61 FORSYTH STREET SW SUITE 23T85
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931

October 17, 2003

Mr. H. L. Sumner, Jr.
Vice President, Hatch Plant
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
P. O. Box 1295
Birmingham, AL 35201-1295

SUBJECT: EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000321/2003004, 05000366/2003004

Dear Mr. Sumner:

On September 27, 2003, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on September 30, 2003, with Mr. George Frederick and other members of your staff.

The inspections examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html (the Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Brian R. Bonser, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 50-321, 50-366
License Nos.: DPR-57, NPF-5

Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000321/2003004
and 05000366/2003004
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl: (See page 2)

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REGION II

Docket Nos:	50-321, 50-366
License Nos:	DPR-57, NPF-5
Report Nos:	05000321/2003004 and 05000366/2003004
Licensee:	Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC)
Facility:	E. I. Hatch Nuclear Plant
Location:	P.O. Box 2010 Baxley, Georgia 31515
Dates:	June 29, 2003 - September 27, 2003
Inspectors:	D. Simpkins, Senior Resident Inspector N. Garrett, Resident Inspector L. Mellen, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector (Sections 1EP1, 1EP4, and 4OA1) B. Sartor, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector (Sections 1EP1, 1EP4, and 4OA1) R. Baldwin, Senior Operations Engineer (Sections 1EP1, 1EP4, and 4OA1)
Approved By:	Brian R. Bonser, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000321/2003-04, 05000366/2003-04; 06/29/2003 - 09/27/2003; Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2; routine integrated report.

The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and an announced inspection by regional emergency preparedness inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.

A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

None

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 operated at or near full Rated Thermal Power (RTP) during the inspection period, except for a brief power reduction following the loss of the Baxely loop on August 9.

Unit 2 operated at or near full RTP until July 22, 2003, when power was reduced to 86 percent RTP following trip of the 'A' condensate pump. On July 23, power was increased to 92.5 percent RTP and the unit was returned to full RTP on July 26 following replacement of the 'A' condensate pump motor. The unit operated at or near full RTP for the remainder of the inspection period except for a brief power reduction on August 9, following the loss of the Baxley loop.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed three partial system walkdowns of the following redundant trains or systems. The inspectors checked system valve position, electrical breaker positions, and operating switch positions to evaluate the operability of the redundant trains or components by comparing the position listed in the system operating procedure to the actual position. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

- Unit 1 'B' standby gas train (SBGT) and the Unit 2 'A' and 'B' SBGT when the Unit 1 'A' SBGT was removed from service for maintenance
- Unit 1 'A' and 'B' emergency diesel generators (EDG) when the Unit 1 'C' EDG was removed for maintenance
- Unit 1 'B' loop of residual heat removal (RHR) and the Unit 1 'A' and 'B' loop of core spray when the Unit 1 'A' loop of RHR was removed for maintenance

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors walked down nine risk significant areas, as identified in the licensee's Independent Plant Evaluation for External Events, to assess the material condition of the fire protection and detection equipment and to verify fire protection equipment was not obstructed. The inspectors reviewed licensee Procedure 40AC-ENG-008-OS, Fire Protection Program, and conducted area walkdowns to assess the licensee's control of transient combustibles. The inspectors also reviewed the Site Fire Hazards Analysis and applicable Pre-Fire Plan drawings to verify that the necessary fire fighting equipment, such as fire extinguishers, hose stations, ladders, and communications equipment, was in place.

- Unit 1 Turbine Lubricating oil storage tank room - elevation 112'
- Unit 2 Turbine Lubricating oil storage tank room - elevation 112'
- Control Building air compressors - elevation 112'
- Control Building cableways - elevations 112' and 130'
- Control Building carbon dioxide and computer rooms - elevation 147'
- Control Building Reactor Protection System (RPS) Battery rooms - elevation 112'
- Control Building station battery rooms - elevation 112'
- Control Building equipment rooms - elevations 112' and 130'
- Control Building Health Physics areas - elevation 130'

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed plant design features that protect against external flooding and related procedures to verify the licensee's flood mitigation plans and equipment were consistent with the design requirements and risk analysis assumptions. This included inspection of underground cable tunnels. The inspectors also reviewed condition reports and maintenance work orders to verify the licensee was identifying and resolving problems. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the performance of simulator scenario LT-SG-50343-10 which included a loss of 'B' recirculation pump, a fire in the cable spreading room and a loss of coolant accident in the drywell. The inspectors reviewed procedures 10AC-MGR-019-0S, Procedure Use and Adherence; and DI-OPS-59-0896N, Operations Management Expectations, to verify formality of communication, procedure usage, alarm response, control board manipulations, group dynamics, and supervisory oversight. The inspectors also reviewed procedure 73-EP-EIP-001-0, Emergency Classification and Initial Actions, to verify that the event action level was correctly identified and reported. The inspectors reviewed the previous crew critique report to identify continuing weaknesses. The inspectors attended the post exercise critique of operator performance to assess if the licensee identified performance issues were comparable to those identified by the inspectors.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Implementation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed two performance-based problems associated with structures, systems, and components to assess the licensee's implementation of the Maintenance Rule (MR) (10 CFR 50.65) with respect to the characterization of failures and the appropriateness of the associated (a)(1) or (a)(2) classification. The inspectors reviewed operator logs, associated condition reports (CR), maintenance work orders (MWO), and system health reports. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's MR reports and the MR scoping documents to determine that the systems were properly scoped, in the proper MR category, and appropriate actions were being taken on the systems. The review was conducted to determine if equipment failures were being identified, being properly assessed, and corrective actions were established to return the equipment to a satisfactory condition. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

- Unit 1 instrument and service air system
- Unit 2 residual heat removal service water system

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed five licensee Plan of the Day (POD) documents listed below to verify that risk assessments were performed prior to components being removed from service. In addition, when emergent work was identified, the inspectors held discussions with licensee personnel and walked down plant systems to verify that actions were taken to minimize the probability of an initiating event and maintain the functional capability of mitigating systems.

- POD for Week 7/12 - 7/18
- POD for Week 7/19 - 7/25 including failure of Unit 2 'A' condensate pump
- POD for Week 8/16 - 8/22
- POD for Week 9/6 - 9/12
- POD for Week 9/13 - 9/19

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Personnel Performance During Non-Routine Plant Evolutions

a. Inspection Scope

For the two non-routine events described below, the inspectors reviewed operator logs and plant computer data, as applicable, and reviewed plant procedures to verify proper operator actions were taken.

- On July 22, 2003, the Unit 2 'A' condensate pump tripped when a ground occured in the pump motor. The unit was derated to approximately 86 percent RTP. The inspectors reviewed procedure 34AR-650-901-2S, ARP's (Alarm Response Procedures) for Control Panel 2H11-P650 Alarm Panel 1.

- On August 9, 2003, area electrical transients caused a loss of the Baxley Loop electrical supply, resulting in a loss of the helper cooling towers, and a derating to approximately 92.5 percent. The inspectors reviewed procedures 34AB-R81-001-0, Loss of the Baxley Loop, 34AB-N71-001-2, Circulating Water System Failure, and 34AB-N61-002-2, Main Condenser Vacuum Low.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors compared the following five operability evaluations to the system requirements identified in the Technical Specifications (TS) and the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) to ensure operability was adequately assessed and the system or component remained available to perform it's intended function. In addition, the inspectors assessed the adequacy of compensatory measures implemented as a result of the condition. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

- Unit 1 Low Pressure Coolant Injection isolation valve 1E11F060A
- Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection Turbine Control Valve 2E41F3052
- Class 1E 250 VDC Station Service Batteries 1R42-S001B
- Class 1E 250 VDC Station Service Batteries 2R42-S001B
- Unit 2 Main Steam Isolation Valve 2B21F022C

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following five MWOs to verify the requirements of procedure 95IT-OTM-001-0, Maintenance Work Order Functional Test, were met. The

inspectors also reviewed the MWOs to determine if the scope of testing demonstrated that the work performed was correctly completed and the affected equipment was functional and operable. The inspectors reviewed equipment status and alignment to verify the system or component was available to perform the required safety function. Additional documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The MWO's reviewed included the following:

- MWO 20301959, Replacement of the 30 Amp Control Power Breaker in 2R22-S007 Frame 7
- MWO 10100626, Repair or Replace the Existing Seismic Breaker Supports for 1R22-S005 Frame 7 to Avoid Interference
- MWO 10102886, Replace Degraded Cables for the Unit 1 'A' RHRSW Pump
- MWO 20203333, Replace Unit 2 125V Vital AC Battery
- MWO 10203660, Inspect Unit 1 'C' Emergency Diesel Generator Intake Piping for Foreign Material

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following five surveillance test procedures and either witnessed the test or reviewed test records to determine if the scope of the test adequately demonstrated the affected equipment was operable. The inspectors reviewed the activities to assess for pre-conditioning of equipment, procedural adherence, and valve alignment following completion of the surveillance. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure AG-MGR-21-0386N, Evolution and Pre-and Post-Job Brief Guidance, and attended briefings to determine if procedural requirements were met.

- 34SV-R43-005-2, Diesel Generator 1B Semi-Annual Test
- 57SV-CAL-003-1, Analog Transmitter Trip System Transmitter Calibration
- 34SV-E11-001-2, Residual Heat Removal Pump Operability (IST)
- 34SV-E41-002-1, HPCI Pump Operability
- 34SV-C41-002-2, Standby Liquid Control Pump Operability Test

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following two temporary modifications and assessed each using criteria as defined in licensee procedure 40AC-ENG-018-0, Temporary Modification Control. In addition, the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations were assessed using

the design basis information provided in the FSAR to verify the modifications did not affect the safety functions of these systems. The inspectors also verified the modifications were installed in accordance with the temporary modification requirements.

- TMM 01-03-010, 1N21/1P11/1P21 Condensate Pump Seal Water
- TMM 01-03-014, 1C71-K19A thru H, Install Metal Oxide Varistor Across SCRAM Reset Relays

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP1 Exercise Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the scope, objectives, and scenario for the 2003 biennial, full-participation emergency response exercise conducted on August 20 to verify that they were designed to suitably test major elements of the licensee's emergency plan in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix E Section IV.F.2.f requirements. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's performance in the exercise, as well as selected activities related to the licensee's conduct and self-assessment of the exercise. The inspectors observed the conduct of the exercise to ensure that employees of the licensee were familiar with their specific emergency response duties in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix E Section IV.F.1.(a). Licensee activities observed during the exercise included those occurring in the control room simulator, Technical Support Center, Operational Support Center, and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The inspectors evaluation focused on the risk significant activities of event classification, notification of governmental authorities, onsite protective actions, offsite protective action recommendations, and accident mitigation. The inspectors also evaluated command and control, the transfer of emergency responsibilities between facilities, communications, adherence to procedures, and the overall implementation of the emergency plan. The inspectors attended the post-exercise critique to evaluate the licensee's self-assessment process, as well as the presentation of critique results to plant management.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed changes to the Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) as contained in Revision 18, against the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q) to determine whether any of the changes decreased REP effectiveness.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed an emergency plan drill conducted on July 23, 2003. The inspectors observed licensee activities in the simulator and EOF to verify implementation of procedure 10AC-MGR-006-0S, Hatch Emergency Plan. The inspectors reviewed the classification of the simulated event and the development of protective action recommendations to verify these activities were conducted in accordance with procedure 73EP-EIP-001-0, Emergency Classification and Initial Actions. The inspectors also reviewed procedure 73EIP-073-0, Onsite Emergency Notification, to verify the proper offsite notifications were made. The inspectors attended the post-exercise critique to assess the licensee's effectiveness in identifying areas of improvement.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the performance indicators (PI) listed below to verify the accuracy of the data reported. The PI definitions and the guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Rev. 2 and licensee procedure 00AC-REG-005-0S, Preparation And Reporting Of NRC PI Data, were used to verify procedure and reporting requirements were met.

Barrier Integrity Cornerstone
• Unit 1 and Unit 2 RCS Leakage

The inspectors reviewed raw PI data collected between July 2002 and June 2003 for each of the indicators identified below and compared graphical representations from the most recent PI report to the raw data to verify the data was included in the report. The inspectors also examined a sampling of operations logs and procedures to verify the PI data was appropriately captured for inclusion into the PI report, and the individual PIs were calculated correctly.

Mitigating Systems Cornerstone
• Unit 1 and Unit 2 Safety Systems Unavailability - RHR and RHRSW Systems
• Unit 1 and Unit 2 Safety Systems Unavailability - Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System

The inspectors reviewed raw PI data collected between June 2002 and June 2003 and compared graphical representations from the most recent PI report to the raw data to verify it was correctly included in the report. The inspectors also examined a sampling of operations logs and procedures to verify the PI data was appropriately captured for inclusion into the PI report and calculated correctly.

Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone
• Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Drill/Exercise Performance
• ERO Drill Participation

The inspectors assessed the accuracy of the PI for ERO drill and exercise performance (DEP) over the past eight quarters through review of a sample of drill and event records. The inspectors reviewed training records to assess the accuracy of the PI for ERO drill participation during the previous eight quarters for personnel assigned to key positions in the ERO.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a detailed review of CR 2003000989. This CR was associated with a leaking outlet valve for the 2A emergency diesel generator cooling water (2P41F339A). The report was reviewed to ensure the full extent of the issue was identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized. The inspectors evaluated the report against the licensee's corrective action program as delineated in procedures 10AC-MGR-004-0, Corrective Action Program, and AG-MGR-64-1198N, Condition Report Processing; and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings of significance were identified. The inspectors noted the operability determination performed for this valve assumed the same failure mechanism as a similar valve, and subsequent operability based upon this assumption. However, upon disassembly of this valve, it was noted the failure mechanism was different than the similar valve. This called into question the validity of the operability determination for the valve being evaluated. Furthermore, it was noted the CR disposition had been changed, rather than updated, when additional information was found. This resulted in a loss of historical data for this valve failure, as well as the assumptions for the original operability determination.

Although the operability determination was incorrect, the valve function was determined to have remained operable. The inspectors verified the corrective actions associated with the CR revision had been appropriate and timely.

4OA3 Event Follow-up

1. (Closed) LER 05000321/2003001-00, Broken Reactor Protection System (RPS) Neutral Bolt Resulted in RPS Bus Trip

On June 6, 2003, the Unit 1 RPS bus 'A' tripped when the bolt connecting the neutral cable to the RPS bus broke removing the normal power source. The bus trip resulted in a half scram signal and the corresponding containment isolation and other automatic actions. The licensee aligned RPS power to the alternate power source and reset the half scram signal. The licensee subsequently replaced the bolt and returned RPS to the normal power source. No findings of significance were identified. The licensee documented the equipment failure in CR 2003006522.

2. (Closed) LER 05000366/2003002-00, High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable After Performing Major Maintenance

On March 29, 2003, surveillance procedure 34SV-E41-005-2, HPCI Pump Operability 165 PSIG Test, was being conducted after performing major maintenance on the system during the refueling outage. Upon receipt of an initiation signal, the turbine control valve did not open. Subsequent investigation showed two electrical links were found open from previous maintenance activities. These links were closed and the surveillance procedure performed again. However, the turbine control valve went to the fully open position. Investigations showed the magnetic speed pick-up sensor had been incorrectly set sending a speed value of zero to the governor control system. The sensor setting was adjusted and the surveillance completed successfully. No findings of significance were identified. The licensee documented the equipment failures in CR 2003004069 and 2003004076.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On September 30, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. George Frederick and the other members of his staff who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel
J. Betsill, Engineering Support Manager
V. Coleman, Safety Audit and Engineering Review Supervisor
D. Davis, Plant Administration Manager
R. Dedrickson, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support
G. Frederick, General Manager - Nuclear Plant
M. Googe, Performance Team Manager
J. Hammonds, Operations Manager
W. Kirkley, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager
J. Lewis, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager
D. Madison, Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations
R. Reddick, Site Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
J. Thompson, Nuclear Security Manager
S. Tipps, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager
R. Varnadore, Outage and Planning Manager

NRC Personnel
B. Bonser, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2
L. Plisco, Deputy Regional Administrator, Region II

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Closed

05000321/2003001-00	LER	Broken Reactor Protection System (RPS) Neutral Bolt Resulting in Bus Trip (Section 4OA3.1)
05000366/2003002-00	LER	High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable After Performing Major Maintenance (Section 4OA3.2)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment
Plant Procedures:
34SO-T46-001-1S/2, Standby Gas Treatment System
34SO-R43-001-1, Diesel Generator Standby AC System
34SO-E11-010-1, Residual Heat Removal
34SO-E21-001-1, Core Spray System
Plant Drawings H-11037, 11631 Sheets 1 & 2, H-11658 Sheets 1 & 2, H-16020, H-16174, H-26078, H-16329, H-16330, and H-16331

Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures
Procedure 34AB-Y22-002-0, Naturally Occurring Phenomena, Section III
Procedure 52PM-Y46-001-0, Inground Pullbox and Cable Duct Inspection for Water
Unit 1 UFSAR Section 1.6.10
Unit 2 UFSAR Section 2.4.2
Unit 2 UFSAR Section 3.4

HNP IPEEE Section 5.2
CRs 2003006911, 2002000532, 2002000690, 2003002751, 2003002220, 2003002217, 2003002214, 2003004529, 2003003420, 2002006607, 2002005472, 2001009222, 2001006762
Repetitive Task #N1R331

Section 1R12: Maintenance Rule Implementation
Plant Drawings H-11027, 11039, and H-21039

MWO's:
10303073, 10301954, 10301417, 10300141, 10300096, 10300076, 10300071, 10203678, 10203541, 10203411, 10203039, 10203027, 10202393, 10202156, 10202103, 10201925, 10201720, 10201586, 10200078, 10104591, 10103848, 10103461, 10103359, 10102073 10100689, 10102042, 20100882, 20100876 20100878, 20101011, 20101012, 20101023, 20101034, 20101322, 20101397, 20101438, 20101439, 20101440, 20101597, 20101598, 20101676, 20102296, 20102300, 20102302, 20102538, 20102581, 20103706, 20122547, 20200218, 20200219, 20200220, 20200221, 20200236, 20200427, 20200238, 20200404, 20200425, 20200426, 20200637, 20200721, 20200722, 20200723, 20200869, 20200901, 20200902, 20202093, 20202328, 20202329, 20202330, 20202331, 20202639, 20202640, 20202641, 20202645, 20202833, 20202886, 20202887, 20202888, 20202893 20202894, 20202915, 20202925, 20102944, 20202952, 20203021, 20203022, 20203083, 20203094, 20203095, 20203114, 20203149, 20203150, 20203151, 20203152, 20203157, 20203167, 20203168, 20203203, 20203214, 20203665, 20203666, 20203796, 20203832, 20203849, 20203850, 20203892, 20203913, 20203929 20203960, 20203962, 20203970, 20203996, 20204018, 20204026, 20300191, 20301175, 20301176, 20301177, 20301279, 20301280, 20301344, 20301432, 20301484, 20301529, 20301565, 20301585, 20301667, 20301682, 20301708

CR's:
2003007330, 2003007050, 2003007033, 2003006551, 2003005633, 2003004835, 2003003408, 2003003407, 2003002779, 2003001211, 2003000460, 2002011239, 2002011191, 2002011176, 2002009148, 2002007777, 2002007644, 2002006785, 2002006536, 2002005609, 2001002740, 1997002791, 2003009727, 2003009656, 2003009527, 2003006852, 2003006784, 2003006598, 2003004347, 2003000905, 2002012540, 2002011533, 2002010077, 2002011927, 2002010031, 2002009360, 2002009112, 2002009069, 2002008773, 2002008573, 2002008384, 2002008510, 2002007678, 2002007635, 2002007567, 2002007360, 2002007441, 2002006642, 2002006305, 2002000997, 2002000882, 2001011277, 2001010143, 2001007583, 2001006927, 2001004555, 2001006433

Section 1R15: Operability Evaluations
CRs 2002004440, 2003001606, 2003001972, 2003003401, 2003004977, 2000009658, 2000009674, 2003009690
MWOs 1-02-01673, 1-02-03004, 2-03-01002
Operating Order OO-03-0303N
50AC-MNT-001-0S, Maintenance Program
52CM-B21-001-2S, Main Steam Isolation Valve Corrective Maintenance
52CM-MME-001-0, Packing Valves, Adjusting Packing and Stroking Valves

Section 1R19: Post Maintenance Testing

34SV-R43-003-1, Diesel Generator 1C Monthly Test
42EN-R42-002-0N, Vital AC Battery Discharge Test
Plant Drawings H-13509, H-17781, H-23537, H-23358, and H-23635, Sheet 2,
DCR 1H97-011, Modification to 4160 Volt Westinghouse Switchgear
Temporary Modification 2-03-25, Support Work Required by MWO 2-03-1959