June 7, 2002

Dr. Robert C. Mecredy
Vice President, Nuclear Operations
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation
89 East Avenue
Rochester, New York 14649

SUBJECT: R. E. GINNA - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-244/02-03

Dear Dr. Mecredy:

On May 18, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection of your R. E. Ginna facility. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on May 23, 2002, with Mr. Joseph Widay and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, the inspectors identified one issue of very low safety significance (Green) which was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance and because the issue has been entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this issue as a non-cited violation, in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. If you deny the non-cited violation, you should provide a response with the basis of your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region 1; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Ginna facility.

Immediately following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the NRC issued an advisory recommending that nuclear power plant licensees go to the highest level of security, and all promptly did so. With continued uncertainty about the possibility of additional terrorist activities, the Nation's nuclear power plants remain at the highest level of security and the NRC continues to monitor the situation. This advisory was followed by additional advisories, and although the specific actions are not releasable to the public, they generally include increased patrols, augmented security forces and capabilities, additional security posts, heightened coordination with law enforcement and military authorities, and more limited access of personnel and vehicles to the sites. The NRC has conducted various audits of your response to these advisories and your ability to respond to terrorist attacks with the capabilities of the current design basis threat (DBT). On February 25, 2002, the NRC issued an Order to all nuclear power plant licensees, requiring them to take certain additional interim compensatory measures to address the generalized high-level threat environment. With the issuance of the Order, we will evaluate Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation's (RG&E) compliance with these interim requirements.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publically Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document management system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website in the Public Electronic Reading Room, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Michele G. Evans, Chief
Projects Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 50-244
License No. DPR-18

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-244/02-03

Attachment 1: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl:
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P. Eddy, Electric Division, Department of Public Service, State of New York
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Docket No: 50-244

License No: DPR-18

Report No: 50-244/02-03

Licensee: Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (RG&E)

Facility: R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant

Location: 1503 Lake Road
Ontario, New York 14519

Dates: March 31 through May 18, 2002

Inspectors: C. Welch, Senior Resident Inspector
L. Scholl, Senior Reactor Inspector
W. Cook, Senior Project Engineer
T. Jackson, Reactor Engineer
K. Young, Reactor Engineer
J. Carrasco, Reactor Engineer
T. Moslak, Health Physicist

Approved by: M. Evans, Chief
Projects Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000244-02-03, 03/31-05/18/2002; Rochester Gas & Electric; R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant. Fire Protection.

The inspection was conducted by resident inspectors, a regional health physicist, and engineering specialist inspectors. This inspection identified one Green finding, which was a non-cited violation. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process (SDP)." Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by "No Color" or by the severity level of the applicable violation. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at: http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

A. Inspector Identified Findings

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green. The inspectors identified a Non-cited Violation (NCV) involving the failure to formally control and evaluate a compensatory fire protection measure installed to provide a temporary water supply to the containment fire hose reels.

B. Licensee Identified Violations

The inspectors reviewed a violation of very low significance that was identified by RG&E. Associated corrective actions appeared reasonable. The violation is listed in section 4OA7 of this report.

Report Details

SUMMARY OF PLANT STATUS

Ginna began the inspection period in Mode 6 (refueling). The outage was completed on April 19, 2002, and the unit was restored to approximately 80% power on April 22 at 2300 hours. Power remained restricted to 80% until April 24, when the second main circulating water pump was restored to operation. Full power was achieved at 2300 hours on April 24, 2002.

1. REACTOR SAFETY
Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity [Reactor - R]

R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

During maintenance on the B train of the residual heat removal (RHR) system, the inspectors verified that the A train was available and properly aligned based on a review of the main control board indicators. Following the maintenance, the accessible portions of both trains of the RHR system were walked down to verify that critical valves and electrical breakers were in the proper position, as described in plant procedure S-30.2, "RHR System Valve and Breaker Position Verification." Station drawings, Technical Specification surveillance requirement 3.5.2.1, and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report were also used as references for this inspection.

A walkdown was performed on the containment recirculation fan coolers (CRFC) and post-accident charcoal filters. During the walkdown, the inspectors evaluated the material condition of the systems and verified that the cooling water was properly aligned to the fan coolers. The systems' conditions were also evaluated through review of ACTION reports, work orders, maintenance rule records, and discussions with engineering personnel. Test results for the post-accident charcoal filters charcoal efficiency and high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter efficiency were reviewed in addition to the results for the safeguards logic testing applicable to the systems. Station drawings, technical specifications, and the updated final safety analysis report were used as references for this inspection.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors toured the following plant areas to assess RG&E's control of combustible materials and ignition sources, and the physical condition of installed fire suppression and detection systems.

- Containment

- Screen house
- Intermediate building clean side
- Control building air handling room
- Cable tunnel

These inspections verified that no uncontrolled transient combustibles were present, that sprinkler heads and installed fire/smoke detectors were clean and unobstructed, that fire barriers and penetration seals were properly maintained, and that portable fire extinguishers and fire hose stations were in good condition. Ginna's Technical Requirements Manual and station procedures A-54.7, "Fire Protection Tour," FPS-1, "Fire Barrier Control Procedure," FPS-2, "Ginna Station Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Program," and FPS-16, "Bulk Storage of Combustible Materials and Transient Fire Loads," were used as references.

b. Findings

Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) involving the failure to formally control and evaluate a compensatory fire protection measure installed to provide a temporary water supply to the containment fire hose reels.

The temporary water supply was provided by running 250 feet of three inch fire hose from the fire water header in the auxiliary building to hose reel 33 in containment near the equipment hatch. Inside containment, the three inch hose was fitted with a wye connector with shutoffs. One side of the wye fed the 100 foot 1½ inch hose which had been removed from reel 33. The other side fed approximately ten feet of 1½ inch hose which was connected to reel 33 to back feed the containment fire header and supply water to the other five containment fire hose reels.

A sketch of the installation had been provided to operations but there were no operating instructions on how to align the system for use in the event of a fire. Additionally, an engineering review had not been performed to evaluate the adequacy of the system, and in particular, to determine if the temporary feed would provide adequate pressure and flow to the hose stations.

The finding was determined to have a credible impact on safety because the failure to formally control and evaluate the compensatory measure resulted in flow restrictions being unevaluated and operating instructions not being issued. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 609, Appendix F, "Determining Potential Risk Significance of Fire Protection and Post-Fire and Safe Shutdown Inspection Findings," the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). At the time this condition existed, the plant was shutdown and none of the safe shutdown equipment in containment was necessary to support shutdown cooling operations.

Contrary to the requirements of Technical Specification 5.4.1.d, which required written procedures be established, implemented and maintained covering the Fire Protection Program; RG&E did not evaluate and implement a compensatory measure using an approved procedure, e.g. procedure IP-DES-3, "Temporary Modifications." However, because of the very low safety significance (Green) of this violation and because RG&E has entered the issue into their corrective action program (ARs 2002-0821 and 0822)

this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement policy. **(NCV 50-244/02-003-01)**

R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed RG&E's maintenance rule implementation for the following equipment problems. This inspection evaluated system scoping, performance criteria/goal monitoring, and problem classification. The inspectors referenced station procedures and industry guidance documents for this inspection.

- AR 2002-0525 MOV 4007 would not close
- AR 2001-1682 Pressurizer Safety Valve Position Indicator ZT-435 reading high
- AR 2002-0779 Incorrect DC fuses installed

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of RG&E's maintenance risk assessments required by paragraph a(4) of 10 CFR 50.65. This inspection included discussions with control room operators and scheduling department personnel regarding the use of RG&E's online risk monitoring software. The inspectors reviewed equipment tracking documentation, daily work schedules, and performed plant tours to gain reasonable assurance that actual plant configuration matched the assessed configuration. Additionally, the inspectors verified that RG&E's risk management actions, for both planned and/or emergent work, were consistent with those described in procedure IP-PSH-2, "Integrated Work Schedule Risk Management." Risk assessments for the following out of service systems, structures, and/or components were reviewed.

- Planned maintenance for the week of May 13 which involved the auxiliary feedwater system, off-site power circuit 751, and the RHR system.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following operability evaluations to determine if system operability was properly justified.

- AR 2002-0525 MOV 4007
- AR 2001-2155 R-11 containment purge particulate sampler
- AR 2002-0208 480 Volt safeguards Bus 17 under-voltage (UV) trip relay

This inspection included discussion with plant personnel and reviews of applicable technical specifications and design bases information.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the post maintenance tests for the following work orders (WO) to verify that RG&E appropriately demonstrated the components' ability to perform their intended safety function.

- WO 20003315 Replacement of reactor protection system Train A relays.
- WO 20100916 Emergency Diesel Generator A instrumentation calibration.
- WO 20100725 Emergency Diesel Generator A mechanical preventive maintenance inspection.
- WO20101515 Emergency Diesel Generator A major electrical inspection.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

R20 Refueling and Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

Licensee Control of Outage Activities

This inspection involved frequent plant tours and observations of activities pertaining to plant configuration control, risk management, maintenance, testing, and equipment clearances (i.e. tagouts). The inspectors also performed walkdowns of equipment and associated instrumentation to verify that systems such as residual heat removal, spent fuel pool cooling, and electrical power and distribution were properly aligned and operating. Reactor coolant chemistry results were periodically reviewed to ensure that the proper boron concentration was maintained.

Refueling Activities

The inspectors observed portions of various refueling evolutions including reactor disassembly/reassembly, foreign material recovery operations, and fuel movement in containment and the spent fuel pool. This inspection also included a review of RG&E's compliance with refueling technical specifications.

Monitoring of Restart Activities

The inspectors observed portions of the following plant evolutions associated with restart activities:

- reactor coolant system evacuated fill and plant pressurization,
- reactor plant heatup and control rod testing,
- initial criticality, physics testing, and reactor plant startup.

The inspection consisted of direct observations in the control room, procedure reviews, review of test data, and a periodic check for compliance with technical specification requirements for various mode changes. A containment walkdown was completed prior to startup to verify that debris had not been left in containment which could adversely affect operation of the containment sumps.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors witnessed the performance of and/or reviewed test data for the following activities to verify that the tests demonstrated the associated system's functional capability and operational readiness.

•	PT-32.1	"Plant Safeguard Logic A or B Train."
•	RSSP 2.2	"Diesel Generator Load and Safeguard Sequence Test."
•	CPI-CV-4298	"Calibration of the Turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Discharge Control Valve."

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2. RADIATION SAFETY

Occupation Radiation Safety [OS]

OS2 ALARA Planning and Controls

a. Inspection Scope

During the period April 1 - 5, 2002, the inspector conducted the following activities to verify that RG&E was properly implementing physical, administrative, and engineering controls to maintain personnel exposure as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA) for tasks conducted during the refueling outage. Implementation of these controls was reviewed against the criteria contained in 10 CFR 20, applicable industry standards, and RG&E's procedures.

The inspector reviewed pertinent information regarding cumulative exposure history, current exposure trends, and ongoing activities in order to assess RG&E's effectiveness in establishing exposure goals and keeping actual personnel exposure ALARA when performing outage work activities. Also reviewed were the results of RG&E's efforts to reduce plant source terms by flushing the B Residual Heat Removal system heat exchanger, installing temporary shielding, and modifying shutdown chemistry controls.

Independent radiation surveys were performed in the Containment Vessel, Auxiliary Building and Intermediate Building (Hot Side) to confirm the accuracy of posted survey results, and assess the adequacy of radiation work permits (RWP), associated controls, and area postings. Keys to Technical Specification Locked High Radiation Areas (TSLHRA) were inventoried and these areas were verified to be properly secured and posted during plant tours.

The inspector reviewed RWP's, ALARA Reviews, and associated radiation survey maps for various jobs performed during the inspection period. The inspector observed selected aspects of these work activities, attended selected pre-job briefings/job planning meetings, and interviewed workers on their knowledge of the relevant RWP, electronic dosimetry setpoints, and job site radiological conditions. Included in this review were Reactor Head Temporary Seal Plate Removal (RWP 02-1046), Insulation Repairs on Reactor Head (RWP 02-1069), Reactor Refueling (RWP 02-1042), cutting out of safety injection check valve 870B (RWP 02-1001), non-destructive examinations on valve DSW-V-3 and steam generator beltline welds (RWP 02-1018), Containment Vessel Moisture Barrier UT examination (RWP 02-1066), and Cavity Drain/Decon & Head Set (RWP 02-1044).

The inspector reviewed the exposure controls specified in ALARA Reviews for in-containment work activities and compared the estimated doses against the cumulative doses received by the involved workers. Work activities reviewed included Reactor Head Disassembly, Routine In-Containment Maintenance, In-service Inspections, Fuel Shuffle, Radiography of A Steam Generator Nozzles, Reactor Head Penetration Inspections, Valve Work, and Radiation Protection Support.

The inspector also reviewed exposure records for declared pregnant workers and contracted workers, personnel contamination dose evaluations, airborne exposure records, in-progress job reviews, and post-job reviews associated with outage work activities.

The inspector reviewed selected ACTION reports related to the implementation of the radiation protection program to evaluate the threshold for identifying performance problems, and the promptness and effectiveness of the resulting corrective actions. These ACTION reports were reviewed against the criteria contained in 10 CFR 20, Technical Specifications, and site procedures to determine the regulatory significance of the identified problem. Included in this review were 2002 ACTION reports, nos. 709, 680, 663, 580, 541, 538, 534, 524, 436, and 416.

Additionally, in evaluating the effectiveness of RG&E's problem identification program, the inspector attended refueling crew turnover and radiation protection technician shift turnover meetings, reviewed shift (Radiation Protection) technician daily logs, and Quality Assurance Surveillance Reports.

b. Findings:

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES [OA]

OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness performance indicator (PI) for the first quarter. Specifically, the inspector reviewed corrective action program records for occurrences involving locked high radiation areas, very high radiation areas, and unplanned personnel exposures. The inspector confirmed that the High Radiation Area (› 1 rem per hour), which was left unlocked (see 4OA7), would be reported in the next quarterly PI submittal and that the inclusion of this occurrence would not result in the PI exceeding a threshold.

The inspector reviewed the performance indicators and the associated raw data for the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity and RCS Identified Leak Rate PIs for the period August 2001 through March 2002. The inspector also observed the collection and analysis of an RCS sample.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

1. Westinghouse DB-50 an DB-75 Breaker Issues

a. Inspection Scope

In accordance with the guidance contained in Inspection Procedure (IP) 71152, the inspector selected several ACTION reports regarding Westinghouse DB-50 and DB-75 breaker failures for detailed review. These ARs were associated with alarm switch discrepancies, amptector issues, and post maintenance testing failures. The ARs were reviewed to ensure that the full extent of the issues was identified, that appropriate evaluations were performed, that appropriate extent of condition reviews were performed, and that appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized. The inspector also reviewed selected work orders to ensure that maintenance on breakers was completed when problems were identified. Additionally, the inspector reviewed breaker maintenance history and maintenance frequency requirements to ensure that the licensee was accomplishing breaker maintenance in an appropriate and timely manner.

The inspector reviewed Westinghouse's maintenance manual for DB breakers, RG&E's breaker inspection and maintenance procedures, and the breaker root cause evaluation procedure to ensure that these documents were updated and reflected the most recent guidance provided in the Westinghouse maintenance manual. The inspector also reviewed a sample of procedure change notices (PCNs) to ensure that new maintenance manual guidance had been planned to be incorporated into the DB breaker maintenance procedures.

The inspector reviewed RG&E's recently instituted breaker trending program in which the breaker maintenance shop measured primary breaker characteristics (open/close times, trip times, etc.). These characteristics were referenced when a specific breaker was refurbished to determine if any performance degradation had occurred. The inspector witnessed data being taken from a breaker undergoing the trending process.

The inspector toured the areas of the plant that safety related DB 50 and DB 75 breakers were installed to assess material condition of the switchgear. The inspector also toured the breaker maintenance shop to witness breaker maintenance, review maintenance practices, and determine knowledge of personnel performing maintenance on DB breakers.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

The inspector found that the corrective actions associated with the reviewed ARs were appropriate and appeared to be acceptable upon completion. Apparent cause evaluations were detailed and thorough. RG&E appropriately conducted extent of condition reviews when necessary.

2. Chemical And Volume Control System Issues

a. Inspection Scope

In accordance with the guidance contained in Inspection Procedure (IP) 71152 the inspector selected several ACTION reports regarding the chemical and volume control system (CVCS) for detailed review. Several of the ARs were associated with the CVCS system high vibration and weld failures. The ARs were reviewed to determine if the full extent of the issues was identified, appropriate evaluations were performed, appropriate extent of condition reviews were performed, and appropriate corrective actions were identified and prioritized.

The inspector walked down the CVCS system to assess the material condition of the charging pumps, auxiliary equipment, and associated piping. The inspector focused on the system's suction piping and welds which were affected by high vibration. This included an assessment of the piping supports and constraints. The inspector also discussed CVCS system vibration problems and corrective actions with RG&E's staff.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

The inspector found that RG&E's plans to acquire vibration monitoring equipment to further evaluate the CVCS system high vibration was appropriate. In addition, the inspector found that, following the most recent weld cracking, RG&E's actions to examine all of the smaller diameter pipe welds on the charging pumps discharge and suction piping was appropriate.

OA6 Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

On May 23, 2002, the inspectors presented their overall findings to members of RG&E management led by Mr. Joseph Widay. RG&E management acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identified.

RG&E/NRC Management Meeting

On April 2, 2002, the NRC met with RG&E management at the Ontario Golf Club located in Ontario, New York, to present the results of the NRC's annual performance assessment for the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, for the period April 1 through December 31, 2001. The meeting was open to public observation. The annual assessment letter, dated March 1, 2002, is available on the NRC's website.

OA7 Licensee Identified Violations

The following finding of low safety significance was identified by RG&E and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as a non-cited violation (NCV).

NCV Tracking Number	Requirement Licensee Failed To Meet
NCV 50-244/02-003-02	Technical Specification 5.7.2 requires that areas with radiation levels >1000 mrem/hr at a distance of 30 cm be locked or be continuously guarded to prevent unauthorized entry. Contrary to this requirement, the entrance to the Reactor Cavity, a Technical Specification Locked High Radiation Area, was left unlocked and unguarded for a period of about twelve (12) hours. RG&E concluded that no entry was made into this area during the time it was unlocked. Reference ACTION report 02-0358.

Attachment 1

Supplemental Information

a. Key Points of Contact

RG&E

P. Bamford	Primary Systems and Reactor Engineering Manager
J. Banke	System Engineer - RCS/CVCS
J. Bement	Foreman, Radiation Protection
R. Biedenbach	Safety/Fire Coordinator
D. Filkins	ALARA Technician
M. Flaherty	Nuclear Safety & Licensing Manger
A. Hedges	Radiation Protection Technician
A. Herman	Health Physicist
J. Hotchkiss	Mechanical Maintenance Manager
G. Jones	Radio-chemist, Primary Systems
M. Layton	ALARA Technician
N. Leoni	Quality Assessment Coordinator
C. Meighan	ALARA Coordinator
T. Miller	Systems Engineer
F. Mis	Acting Radiation Protection and Chemistry Manager
A. Patrzalek	Quality Assurance Engineer
T. Plantz	Maintenance Systems Manager
R. Ploof	Balance of Plant Systems Engineering Manager
P. Polfleit	Corporate Emergency Planner
R. Popp	Production Superintendent
M. Ruby	Licensing Engineer
J. Smith	Maintenance Superintendent
B. Standfield	Manager, Quality Assurance
W. Thomson	Manager, Radiation Protection
W. Tono	Primary Reactor Engineer
J. Wayland	I&C/Electrical Maintenance Manager
R. Westerbeck	Radiation Protection Technician
T. White	Operations Manager
J. Widay	VP, Plant Manager

b. List of Items Opened, Closed, and Discussed

Opened/Closed

NCV 50-244/02-003-01	Failure to formally control and evaluate a compensatory fire protection measure installed to provide a temporary water supply to the containment fire hose reels. (1RO5)
NCV 50-244/02-003-02	Unlocked Technical Specification Locked High Radiation Area. (4OA7)

b. List of Documents Reviewed

A-1, Revision 63, Radiation Control Manual
A-3, Revision 48, Containment Vessel Access Requirements
A-1.6, Revision 19, Station ALARA Committee
A-1.8, Revision 14, Radiation Work Permits
A-1.1, Revision 39, Access Control to Locked High Radiation and Very High Radiation Areas
A-1.6.1, Revision 26, ALARA Job Reviews,
IP-CAP-1, Revision 13, Abnormal Condition Tracking Initiation or Notification (ACTION) Report
IP-LPC-8, Revision 2, NRC Performance Indicator
RP-RPA-PERFORMANCE-IND, Revision 1, Radiation Protection Performance Indicator Guidelines
RP-JC-RADIOGRAPH, Revision 9, Support of Radiography Operations
RP-EXP-EXT-LIMIT, Revision 10, Determining External Exposure Control Levels
RP-SUR-POST, Revision 0, Radiological Postings and Boundary Control
RP-SUR-RADIATION, Revision 1, Performance of Radiation Surveys
RP-SUR-PERS-DECON, Revision 16, Personnel Contamination
RP-JC-JOB COVERAGE, Revision 1, Job Coverage
RP-SUR-HOTPART, Revision 0, Performance of Hot Particle Surveys
RP-JC-HOTPART-ASSESS, Revision 8, Hot Particle Dose Assessment
RP-SUR-CONTAM, Revision 0, Performance of Contamination Surveys
RP-ALA-REVIEW, Revision 6, ALARA Job Review Preparation
RP-ALA-SHIELD, Revision 9, Control of Temporary Lead Shielding
RP-SUR-LABEL, Revision 2, Labeling and Control of Radioactive Material
Ginna Station 2002 Personnel Contamination Log
Exposure Report for Current TLD Badged Personnel
RSSP 7.0, Revision 28, Control Rod Drop Test
PT-34.0, Revision 36, Startup Physics Test Program
PT-34.1, Revision 23, Initial Criticality and ARO Boron Concentration
PT-34.2, Revision 19, Moderator Temperature Coefficient Measurement
PT- 34.3, Revision 16, RCC Bank Worth Measurement
O-1, Revision 24, Plant Start-up Checklist
O-1B, Revision 6, Vacuum Refill of the Reactor Coolant System
O-1.2, Revision 155, Plant Start-up From Hot Shutdown to Full Load
O-2.3.1, Revision 69, Draining and Operation At Reduced Inventory of the Reactor Coolant System
480 Volt DB Breaker Failure Summary, 8/14/97 - 8/7/01
480 Volt DB Breaker Events, 6/30/93 - 12/5/01
RG&E Requirements for Boric Acid Storage "Boric Acid Injection Capability Cycle 30
DA-ME-99-053, Pipe Stress Analysis CVC-853 to Elimination of Pipe Support CVU-414
RGE-16, Training System Description Chemical and Volume Control System

ALARA REVIEWS:

020001, Cavity Sealant Project
020055, RHR Heat Exchanger B-Flange Inspection
020062, Valve Work

020068, Reactor Coolant Pump Work
020077, Moisture Barrier Inspection at Fuel Transfer Tube Area
020202, Radiography of A-Steam Generator Primary Nozzle Weld
020407, Steam Generator Upper Internals Inspection
020601, Reactor Head Disassembly
020603, Head Lift Cavity Flood
021065, Reactor Head Penetration Inspection
020200, In-service Inspections
020604, Fuel Shuffle
020201, Reactor Head Penetration Inspections
020062, Valve Work
0200066, Radiation Protection Support

QA SURVEILLANCE REPORTS**:**

SQUA-2002-0024-TJD, Replace failed Loop B T-Hot RTD
SQUA-2002-0022-HMG, Foreign Object Retrieval - B Steam Generator
SQUA-2002-0018-TGT, Steam Generator Handcover Replacement
SQUA-2002-0017-TGT, Outage Activities
SQUA-2002-0015-HMG, A-Steam Generator Foreign Object Search and Retrieval
SQUA-2002-0009-PJH, Radiation Worker Knowledge

DEPARTMENTAL SELF-ASSESSMENTS:

Self-Assessment 2002-0031, Effectiveness Review on Contamination Control during RFO Cavity Decontamination (In-Progress)

Action Reports (AR) List 1/1/2000 - 5/2/2002 for Westinghouse DB Circuit Breakers

AR 2000-0254	AR 2000-0562	AR 2000-0857	AR 2000-0915
AR 2000-0930	AR 2000-0983	AR 2000-1059	AR 2000-1295
AR 2000-1414	AR 2000-1434	AR 2000-1699	AR 2000-1705
AR 2001-0048	AR 2001-0288	AR 2001-0433	AR 2001-0459
AR 2001-0909	AR 2001-1011	AR 2001-1404	AR 2001-1505
AR 2001-2131	AR 2001-2182	AR 2002-0108	AR 2002-0930
AR 2002-0970	AR 2002-1150		

Drawings

10905-0101 "480 V Bus 14 - Unit 18C Diesel Generator A SPLY BKR To Bus 14 52/EG1A1 Elementary Wiring Diagram," Rev. 12
33013-2539 "AC System Plant Load Distribution - One Line Wiring Diagram," Rev. 6

Maintenance Procedures and Maintenance Manual for DB Breakers

ELEC 98/12, "Ginna Station Breaker PM Program Matrix," Rev. 4
Ginna Station DB Breaker PM Schedule
GME-50-02-DBINSPECT, "Westinghouse, DB Breaker Inspection," Rev. 5

GME-50-02-DBTrouble, "Westinghouse, DB Breaker Troubleshooting," Rev. 3
GME-50-02-DB50, "Westinghouse, 480V Air Circuit Breaker, Type DB-50 Maintenance for Type DB-50 Breakers," Rev. 16
GME-50-02-DB75, "Westinghouse, 480V Air Circuit Breaker, Type DB-75 Maintenance for Type DB-75 Breakers," Rev. 16
Maintenance Program Manual MPM-DB, "Maintenance Program Manual for Westinghouse Type DB Circuit Breakers and Associated Switchgear," Rev. 0
RG&E Vendor Manual W120-0302.00, "Westinghouse Electric 480 Volt Switchgear & Breakers"

NRC Inspection Reports

50-244/98-13
50-244/99-07

Procedure Change Notices (PCNs)

2001-2438, 2001-2439, 2002-2103, 2002-2104

Work Orders

20001006, 20001532, 20002897, 20003559, 20101616, 20102623

Action Reports for Charging system inspection

2002-1032	Charging Pump "B" Replacement of valves HV141F005, F001, F002 with Anchor Darling valves
2002-1014	Cracked weld on "C" charging pump discharge, at Tee upstream of V-291, to line RV-283.
2001-1509	"C" Charging Pump Motor High Vibrations
2001-1420	"C" Charging Pump Takes Excessive Time to Stop
2000-1560	Minimum Charging Flow Acceptance Criteria
2000-1528	Charging Pump Leakoff Rate At .5 GPM for Charging Pump
2000-0090	Charging System Vibrations
2000-0027	"C" Charging Pump Discharge Manifold Leak
1999-0734	"C" Charging Pump V291 was Inadvertently Repacked with the Wrong Packing Material
1998-1739	Unfused Weld on 52 Charging Pump "C" Operating Mechanism

Maintenance Rule System Notebook

PSSL # 07 Chemical and Volume Control

Administrative Procedures

AP-CVCS.3	Loss of all Charging Flow
PART-I	Pump Instruction Manual Operation and Maintenance AJAX Iron works