July 26, 2000

Mr. William O'Connor, Jr.
Vice President
Nuclear Generation
Detroit Edison Company
6400 North Dixie Highway
Newport, MI 48166

SUBJECT: FERMI INSPECTION REPORT 50-341/2000006(DRP)

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

On July 6, 2000, the NRC completed an inspection at your Fermi 2 reactor facility. The results were discussed with you and other members of your staff. The enclosed report presents the results of that inspection.

The inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and to compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. Within these areas the inspection consisted of a selective examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel. Specifically, this inspection focused on resident inspection activities.

Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC did not identify any issues which were categorized as being risk significant.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available **electronically** for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room **or** from the *Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from* the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.

Sincerely,

Original signed by
Mark A. Ring, Chief

Mark A. Ring, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 1

Docket No. 50-341
License No. NPF-43

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-341/2000006(DRP)

See Attached Distribution

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket No:	50-341
License No:	DPR-43
Report No:	50-341/2000006(DRP)
Licensee:	Detroit Edison Company
Facility:	Enrico Fermi, Unit 2
Location:	6400 N. Dixie Highway Newport, MI 48166
Dates:	May 20 through July 6, 2000
Inspectors:	S. Campbell, Senior Resident Inspector J. Larizza, Resident Inspector
Approved by:	Mark A. Ring, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects

NRC's REVISED REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS

The federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recently revamped its inspection, assessment, and enforcement programs for commercial nuclear power plants. The new process takes into account improvements in the performance of the nuclear industry over the past 25 . years and improved approaches of inspecting and assessing safety performance at NRC licensed plants.

The new process monitors licensee performance in three broad areas (called strategic performance areas): reactor safety (avoiding accidents and reducing the consequences of accidents if they occur), radiation safety (protecting plant employees and the public during routine operations), and safeguards (protecting the plant against sabotage or other security threats). The process focuses on licensee performance within each of seven cornerstones of safety in the three areas:

Reactor Safety	Radiation Safety	Safeguards
● Initiating Events	● Occupational	● Physical Protection
● Mitigating Systems	● Public	
● Barrier Integrity		
● Emergency Preparedness		

To monitor these seven cornerstones of safety, the NRC uses two processes that generate information about the safety significance of plant operations: inspections and performance indicators. Inspection findings will be evaluated according to their potential significance for safety, using the Significance Determination Process, and assigned colors of GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW, or RED. GREEN findings are indicative of issues that, while they may not be desirable, represent very low safety significance. WHITE findings indicate issues that are of low to moderate safety significance. YELLOW findings are issues that are of substantial safety significance. RED findings represent issues that are of high safety significance with a significant reduction in safety margin.

Performance indicator data will be compared to established criteria for measuring licensee performance in terms of potential safety. Based on prescribed thresholds, the indicators will be classified by color representing varying levels of performance and incremental degradation in safety: GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW, and RED. GREEN indicators represent performance at a level requiring no additional NRC oversight beyond the baseline inspections. WHITE corresponds to performance that may result in increased NRC oversight. YELLOW represents performance that minimally reduces safety margin and requires even more NRC oversight. And RED indicates performance that represents a significant reduction in safety margin but still provides adequate protection to public health and safety.

The assessment process integrates performance indicators and inspection so the agency can reach objective conclusions regarding overall plant performance. The agency will use an Action Matrix to determine in a systematic, predictable manner which regulatory actions should be taken based on a licensee's performance. The NRC's actions in response to the significance (as represented by the color) of issues will be the same for performance indicators as for inspection findings. As a licensee's safety performance degrades, the NRC will take more and increasingly significant action, which can include shutting down a plant, as described in the Action Matrix.

More information can be found at: http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000341-00-06, on 5/20 - 7/6/00; Detroit Edison; Fermi 2; Resident Operations Report.

The inspection was conducted by the resident inspectors. The significance of issues is indicated by their color (green, white, yellow, red) and was determined by the Significance Determination Process. Based on the results of this inspection, there were no findings identified.

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

During the inspection period, the plant was returned to 97 percent reactor power following the Cycle 8 Startup Test Program. On June 1, 2000, reactor power was increased to 100 percent at the completion of the Power Uprate Test Program. On June 24, reactor power was decreased to 60 percent to perform maintenance activities on the reactor building steam tunnel cooler, the No. 3 high pressure turbine stop valve AC1 power supply and cleanup of the northeast generator hydrogen cooler. The plant was returned to full power on June 25. On June 27, reactor power was decreased to 96 percent to perform control rod pattern adjustments. The plant was returned to full power the same day. On June 30, reactor power was decreased to 99 percent upon loss of the plant process computer. The plant was returned to full power the same day. On July 3, reactor power was decreased to 88 percent to investigate the cause of extinguished supervisory light for the power supply to the No. 2 high pressure turbine control valve. The plant was returned to full power the same day where it remained for the duration of the inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

1R04 Equipment Alignments

.1 Partial Walk Down of the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDGs) 11

a. Inspection Scope (71111-04)

On May 25, 2000, the inspectors used portions of the following procedures to verify proper alignment for standby condition of the EDG 11:

- 23.307, “EDG System, Attachment 1A, EDG 11 Valve Lineup,” and
- 24.307.14, “EDG 11 - Start and Load Test.”

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified.

.2 Partial Walk Down of the Combustion Turbine Generator (CTG) 11-1

a. Inspection Scope (71111-04)

On May 26, 2000, the inspectors used portions of the following procedure to verify proper lineup for standby conditions of CTG 11:

- 23.324, “Supervisory Control - 120V Switchyard and CTG 11,” Attachment 2A, “CTG-11 Unit 1 Auxiliary Electrical lineup”

The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's investigation results associated with Condition Assessment Resolution Document (CARD) 00-16754. Documented on the CARD was the indication of power supply position "CTG-1 AO-4 CKT 3" to have a required condition of "Off." The circuit is currently "On" with wires attached, although it was labeled "Spare."

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified.

.3 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Walk Down

a. Inspection Scope (71111-04)

On July 3, 2000, the inspectors used Drawing 6M721-5708-01, "HPCI Functional Operating Sketch," and Procedure 27.000.01, "Locked Valve Lineup Verification," Attachment 7, "E41 HPCI System Locked Valve Lineup," and conducted a walk down of the HPCI system piping to verify valve lineups.

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope (71111-05)

The inspectors reviewed procedure MOP 11, "Fire Protection," and walked down Divisions 1 and 2 electrical power subsystems consisting of the battery rooms, associated battery charger rooms and switchgear rooms. Inspection emphasis was on the control of transient combustible and ignition sources, the material condition and operational effectiveness of the fire protection system and, where applicable, verified operability of the fire suppression system, smoke detection system and manual fire fighting equipment.

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program

a. Inspection Scope (71111-11)

On June 22, 2000, the inspectors observed simulator evaluations performed for licensed operator requalification training. The simulator scenarios were reviewed for the appropriate scope, depth and complexity in the stated objectives as compared to the guidelines contained in NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors." In addition, the inspectors observed the licensee training instructors critique which assessed the operating crew performance during the simulator scenarios.

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

.1 Maintenance Rule Implementation for Licensee-Established Performance Criteria.

a. Inspection Scope (71111-12)

The inspectors reviewed licensee-established performance criteria for the following CARDs for proper maintenance rule classifications and disposition:

- CARD 00-15098, “Division 1 Automatic Depressurization System Logic Half Initiation,”
- CARD 99-13630, “Loss of Safety Relief Valve G Control on Dedicated Shutdown Panel H21P623 Due to High Impedance Faults,”
- CARD 99-15812, “Incorrect Fuse Installed, Also Not Fully Installed,”
- CARD 00-10863, “Blown Division 2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Logic Fuse Due to Shorting of Limit Switch Contacts,”
- CARD 00-11017, “Loss of Power to E1150-F015A; Motor Control Center (MCC) 72CF - Position 2C Open,”
- CARD 00-11190, “Operations Cannot Execute Technical Requirements Manual Limiting Condition for Operation,”
- CARD 00-11656, Error in Technical Requirements Manual,”
- CARD 00-14391, “Failed Local Leak Rate Testing of T4800F424 and T4800F426,"
- CARD 00-14399, “Moisture Barrier Separation from Metal Liner,”
- CARD 00-15107, “Uninterruptible Power Supply ‘B’ Rectifier Alternating Current Input Circuit Breaker Found Trip-Free,” and
- CARD 00-16045, “Unsatisfactory Electrical Connection.”

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified.

.2 Maintenance Rule Implementation for Risk-Significant Systems

a. Inspection Scope (71111-12)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee’s implementation of the maintenance rule requirements for the following systems:

- A7100, “Primary Containment Isolation,” and
- C1100, “Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Control System.”

These systems were selected based on their being designated as risk-significant under the maintenance rule, or their being placed in the increased monitoring Maintenance Rule Category (1) group. The inspectors reviewed the fourth quarter 1999 Performance

Report dated April 6, 2000, performance reports for the previous three quarters, as well as applicable work requests (WR) and CARDs associated with the systems.

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified.

.3 Maintenance Rule Implementation for Safety Relief Valves (SRVs)

a. Inspection Scope (71111-12)

On July 5, 2000, the inspectors reviewed the fourth quarter system health report for SRVs. The inspectors also conducted a historical review of problem reports associated with SRVs that included CARDs 97-1316, 98-8735, 98-2413, and 00-6914 and Deviation Event Report 96-1484. These reports addressed leaking valves and the inability of the SRVs to lift within the Technical Specification (TS) set point.

b. Observations and Findings

There were no findings identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation

.1 Assessment and Management of Risk of Work on Several Systems

a. Inspection Scope (71111-13)

The inspectors attended the licensee's critical work activity review meeting of June 9, 2000, and reviewed the risk profile and work schedule for the week of June 19. That week work activity was chosen due to combination of work on three mitigating systems:

- Modular Power Unit - 120V Power Supply Inspection,
- Test Division 2 RHR Outage, and
- EDG 14, "Slow Start and Load Test."

The inspectors verified the availability of redundant trains, reviewed WRs and monitored the performance of the work. As part of this inspection, the inspectors reviewed the licensee risk assessment for the week of June 19, RHR Division 2 System Outage.

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified.

.2 Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope (71111-13)

The inspectors attended the licensee's critical work activity review meeting and evaluated the following emergent work activities, in combination with scheduled work, to verify that adequate controls were maintained and that adequate precautions were taken to limit risk and decrease the potential of an initialing event.

- Non-Interruptible air system Division 2 system outage, which included work on the compressor and dryer, solenoid valve replacement of the south and north dehydration unit exhaust cylinder, lubrication of motor and blower bearings, inspection of belts, inspection of the 480V MCC and post maintenance testing (PMT).

- Division 2 RHR safety system outage, which included emergency core cooling system RHR "B" and "D" pump discharge functional test, greasing, stem lube, packing torque checks and stroking of valves, inspection and testing of 480V MCC, performance of RHR service water pump and valves operability check, local breakers trip testing, samples of motor bearing oil, PMT and infrared inspection of mechanical components.

- Division 1 of control center heating ventilation and air conditioning system outage, which consisted of testing the heating coil temperature switches, ionizer in the electronic air filter, inspection and testing of 480V MCC, calibration of humidity sensor, emergency makeup and recirculation temperature switch and while performing the PMT, observing the operation of the precipitator and cooler initiation.

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified.

1R14 Personnel Performance During Nonroutine Plant Evolutions and Events

a. Inspection Scope (71111-14)

On June 13, 2000, during the swapping of reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) pumps for maintenance, Division 1 emergency equipment cooling water (EECW) and emergency equipment service water auto initiated during the shutdown of the north RBCCW pump. When the RBCCW pumps are swapped, unless the sequence of stopping one pump and starting another is performed within a certain time (a matter of technique), the system pressure response time is not fast enough to restore adequate differential pressure before the 11-second time delay times out and initiates EECW and EESW. The licensee determined this to be a non-reportable engineered safety feature actuation signal since the system was operated properly and within expected potential auto actuation.

The inspectors discussed this condition with the licensee and reviewed the following procedures and documents:

- Alarm Response Procedures 2D100, “RBCCW Recirculation Valve Open,”
- Alarm Response Procedures 2D104, “RBCCW Pump Recirculation Valve Closed,”
- Procedure 23.127, “RBCCW/EECW System,” and
- Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Section 7.1.2.1.18, “EECW System.”

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope (71111-15)

The inspectors reviewed a sampling of operability evaluations for risk-significant systems and conditions to determine justification of operability, that availability was assured and that no unrecognized increase in risk had occurred. The inspectors reviewed the following:

- CARD 00-10943, “Resistance Temperature Detector Loop Calibration As Found Data Unsatisfactory”
- CARD 00-10179, “Central Component Data Base Screens Have Incorrect Design Data for Motor Operated Valve P4400F603B”
- CARD 00-17603, “Drywell Floor Drain Sump Flow Recorder Not Responding”
- CARD 00-17602, “Control Center Pressure Boundary Engineering Evaluation for Operability of Control Center Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning May Be Inaccurate”
- CARD 00-15868, “Lack of Hydraulic, Thermal and Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning Analyses Justifying Actions required During Implementation of Procedure 20.000.18, ‘Control of the Plant from the Dedicated Shutdown Panel’”
- CARD 00-15866, “Lack of Analyses Supporting of Direct Current Supply to RHR Complex During Implementation of Procedure 20.000.18, ‘Control of the Plant from the Dedicated Shutdown Panel’”
- CARD 00-15865, “Procedural Discrepancies that may Prevent or Negate Actions Required for Procedure 20.000.18, ‘Control of the Plant from the Dedicated Shutdown Panel’”
- CARD 00-15864, “Lack of Analyses Supporting Adequacy of Division 1, Division 2 and Balance-of-Plant Batteries to Support Actions Required for Procedure 20.000.18, ‘Control of the Plant from the Dedicated Shutdown Panel,’”
- CARD 00-17596, P4400F603B, Division 2 EECW Supply Isolation Valve, Did Not Fully Stroke

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified.

1R16 Operator Work Around

a. Inspection Scope (71111-16)

The inspectors reviewed Operations Department Instruction 002, "Operator Work Arounds (OWAs)" and evaluated the following OWAs to determine if the applicable system function was impacted or if the OWA affected the operator's ability to execute abnormal or emergency operating procedures.

- OWA 96-010, "Divisions 1 and 2 RHR." The use of relay room RHR flow indication over Control Room indication while performing Surveillance 24.204.01, "Division 1 Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) and Suppression Pool Cooling/Spray Pump and Valve Operability Test," and 24.204.06, "Division 2 LPCI and Suppression Pool Cooling/Spray Pump and Valve Operability Test." An extra operator is needed to record flow measurements in the Relay Room.

- OWA 98-006, "Reactor Recirculation Valves B3105F031A and B." These valves have packing leakage along valve stems. Engineering Design Package 29258 replaced packing glands with improved model to eliminate this OWA. Valve B3105F031A has a scored stem which needs replacement.

- OWA 96-001, "Reactor Building and Turbine Building Heating Ventilation Air Conditioning Temperature Control." Manual control is required due to varied indicated temperature on inlet plenum depending on fan combination and outside air temperature.

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope (71111-19)

The inspectors witnessed portions of testing for the components and systems listed below to insure compliance with design and licensing bases and to assure that the testing demonstrated that the equipment and system was capable of performing its intended function.

- Performance of Surveillance Procedure 24.206.001, "Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Pump and Valve Operability Test," following the RCIC system outage to perform grease, stem lube, packing torque checks and strokes on valves, steam line flow trip functional test, motor operated valve dynamic testing, test line isolation valve testing, VOTES testing, sample of RCIC turbine oil and pump bearing oil.

- Performance of Surveillance Procedure 24.307.48, "EDG 14 Fast Start Followed by Load Reject" at the completion of WR 000Z00284, "Replacement of EDG 14 LR3 Linear Reactor."

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope (71111-22)

The inspectors observed and reviewed surveillance tests for the following risk-significant plant components or systems: EDG 12 run; RHR pump "D" and reactor protection system (RPS). The inspection included reviews of the applicable TSs, UFSAR, the risk assessment associated with the surveillance testing and where appropriate the design basis documents and vendor manuals.

The following surveillance test procedures and plant documents were reviewed:

- 24.307.31, "EDG 12 - 24 Hour Run Followed by Hot Fast Restart,"
- CARD 00-17422, "Revise TS Service Request 3.5.1.2 Note for LPCI Swing Bus Inoperability,"
- Procedure MCE03, "Chemistry Sampling and Analysis for EDG 12 Outboard Bearing Oil,"
- 44.030.220, "Emergency Core Cooling System RHR Pump 'D' Discharge Pressure (Automatic Depressurization System Permit) Division 2 Calibration/Functional,"
- 44.010.037, "RPS and Nuclear Steam Supply System - Drywell Pressure, Trip System 'A' Channel A1/A Calibration,"
- 44.010.039, "RPS and Nuclear Steam Supply System - Drywell Pressure, Trip System 'A' Channel A2/C Calibration," and
- Temporary Change Notice T-10769.

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modification

a. Inspection Scope (71111-23)

The inspectors reviewed Temporary Modification (TM) 00-0008, "Installation of Monitoring Instrumentation Onto the Reactor Recirculation 'B' Scoop Tube Positioner Circuitry." This TM has been initiated in response to the event of June 17, 2000, when the recirculation motor generator (RRMG) "B" scoop tube automatically locked due to a deviation between the demand signal from the digital control system and the RRMG "B" scoop tube position. In order to further troubleshoot this problem, additional monitoring instrumentation needed to be installed.

The inspectors spoke with the system engineer, reviewed the applicable portion of the TSs and the UFSAR and reviewed the following licensee documentation:

- CARD 00-17622, “Relay Room ‘B’ Motor Generator Set Walkaway,”
- CARD 00-17624, “Ru-Display Does Not Trigger the Tape Drive for Starting Display Flowchart,”
- CARD 00-17623, “Digital Control System Trend Function Not Working.”
- MES12, “Performing TMs,”
- MLS07, “Preliminary Evaluation and 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations.”

The inspectors verified that the installed temporary modification did not degrade or affect the safety function of the RRMG “B” speed control system.

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA2 Performance Indicator Verification

.1 Unplanned Scrams Per 7000 Critical Hours

a. Inspection Scope (71151)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee operations logs, reports of monthly operating data and licensee event reports (LERs) for the period of May 1, 1999, to March 31, 2000, to verify the performance indicator regarding unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours.

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified.

.2 Scrams with Loss of Normal Heat Removal

a. Inspection Scope (71151)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee operations logs, reports of monthly operating data and LERs for the first quarter of 2000, to verify the performance indicator regarding scrams with loss of normal heat removal.

b. Issues and Findings

There were no findings identified.

.3 Review of HPCI Performance Indicators

a. Inspection Scope (71151)

The inspectors conducted a historical search of associated CARDs, LERs, WRs and control room logs to determine whether the licensee accurately reported the HPCI system performance indicators. The inspectors used the criteria set forth in Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment," as a guide for determining acceptability of meeting the criteria.

b. Observations and Findings

There were no findings identified.

.4 Review of Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope (71151)

On July 3, 2000, the inspectors toured the reactor building to determine if locked high radiation areas were properly secured and if any noted deficiencies were input to the Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness performance indicator.

b. Observations and Findings

There were no findings identified.

4OA3 Event Follow-up

a. Inspection Scope (71153)

The inspectors reviewed the following LER.

(Closed) LER (50-341/00-004): "Unplanned Manual Reactor Scram Following Recirculation Pump Trip During Plant Shutdown." During the reduction in power, operators lowered the reactor recirculation pump (RRP) speed. The "A" RRP speed oscillated. As a result of this, the "A" motor generator fluid coupler scoop tube was locked to maintain the "A" RRP constant. The scoop tube did not lock and the "A" RRP speed increased rapidly. The RRP was manually tripped. Because of the single loop operation and lacking specific procedural guidance at the existing power level, the reactor operators decided to manually trip the reactor. This item is closed.

4OA6 Management Meeting

Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. O'Connor and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on July 7, 2000. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identified.

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

W. O'Connor, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
P. Fessler, Assistant Vice President, Nuclear Operations
R. Libra, Director, System Engineering
R. DeLong, Director, System Engineering
S. Stasek, Manager, Nuclear Assessment
D. Cobb, Superintendent, Maintenance
P. Smith, Supervisor, ISEG
J. Davis, Outage Management
S. Booker, Work Control
K. Howard, Plant Support, Engineering
J. Pendergast, Principal Engineer, Licensing
P. Kusumawati, Licensing

NRC

M. Ring, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 1
S. Campbell, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Larizza, Resident Inspector

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

None

Closed

50-341/00-004-00	LER	Unplanned Manual Reactor Scram Following Recirculation Pump Trip During Plant Shutdown.

Discussed

None

LIST OF BASELINE INSPECTIONS PERFORMED

The following inspectable-area procedures were used to perform inspections during the report period. Documented findings are contained in the body of the report.

Inspection Procedure		Report Section
Number	Title	
71111-04	Equipment Alignment	1R04
71111-05	Fire Protection	1R05
71111-11	Licensed Operator Requalification	1R11
71111-12	Maintenance Rule Implementation	1R12
71111-13	Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation	1R13
71111-14	Personnel Performance During Nonroutine Plant Evolutions and Events.	1R14
71111-15	Operability Evaluations	1R15
71111-16	Operator Workarounds	1R16
71111-19	Post Maintenance Testing	1R19
71111-22	Surveillance Testing	1R22
71111-23	Temporary Plant Modifications	1R23
71151	Performance Indicator Verification	4OA1
71153	Event Follow-up	4OA3

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

CARD	Condition Assessment Resolution Document
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CTG	Combustion Turbine Generator
EDG	Emergency Diesel Generator
EECW	Emergency Equipment Cooling Water
LER	Licensee Event Report
HPCI	High Pressure Coolant Injection System
LPCI	Low Pressure Coolant Injection
MCC	Motor Control Center
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OWA	Operator Work Arounds
PMT	Post Maintenance Testing
RBCCW	Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water
RCIC	Reactor Coolant Isolation System
RHR	Residual Heat Removal
RPS	Reactor Protection System
RRMG	Recirculation Motor Generator
RRP	Reactor Recirculation Pump
SRV	Safety Relief Valves
TM	Temporary Modification
TS	Technical Specification
UFSAR	Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
WR	Work Request