UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931

January 25, 2002

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
ATTN: Mr. D. N. Morey
Vice President
P. O. Box 1295
Birmingham, AL 35201-1295

SUBJECT: JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 50-348/01-05 and 50-364/01-05

Dear Mr. Morey:

On December 29, 2001, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Farley Nuclear Plant. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings discussed on January 4, 2002, with Mr. Mike Stinson and other members of your staff.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license relating to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

No findings of significance were identified.

Immediately following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the NRC issued an advisory recommending that nuclear power plant licensees go to the highest level of security, and all promptly did so. With continued uncertainty about the possibility of additional terrorist activities, the Nation's nuclear power plants remain at the highest level of security and the NRC continues to monitor the situation. This advisory was followed by additional advisories, and although the specific actions are not releasable to the public, they generally include increased patrols, augmented security forces and capabilities, additional security posts, heightened coordination with law enforcement and military authorities, and more limited access of personnel and vehicles to the sites. The NRC has conducted various audits of the Southern Nuclear Operating Company's response to these advisories and Farley Nuclear Plant's ability to respond to terrorist attacks with the capabilities of the current design basis threat. From these audits, the NRC has concluded that the Farley Nuclear Plant's security program is adequate at this time.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be publicly available in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at *http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html* (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Stephen J. Cahill, Chief
Reactor Projects, Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364
License Nos. NPF-2 and NPF-8

Enclosure: NRC Integrated Inspection
Report 50-348/01-05 and 50-364/01-05
w/Attachment

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC)

REGION II

Docket Nos.:	50-348 and 50-364
License Nos.:	NPF-2 and NPF-8
Report Nos.:	50-348/01-05 and 50-364/01-05
Licensee:	Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC)
Facility:	Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2
Location:	7388 N. State Highway 95 Columbia, AL 36319
Dates:	September 30 to December 29, 2001
Inspectors:	T. Johnson, Sr. Resident Inspector (SRI) R. Caldwell, Resident Inspector (RI) R. Chou, Reactor Inspector (Section 1R02) D. Forbes, Radiation Specialist (Section 2OS1)
Approved by:	Stephen J. Cahill, Chief Reactor Projects, Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000348-01-05, IR 05000364-01-05, on 9/30-12/29/2001, Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2, routine resident report.

The inspection was conducted by resident inspectors, a regional radiation specialist, and a regional engineering inspector. No findings of significance were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website.

A. Inspector Identified Findings

None

B. Licensee Identified Violations

None

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 operated at 100% rated thermal power (RTP) during the period, except for a scheduled refueling outage during the period October 6 to November 16, 2001, and for a main turbine balance adjustment for high vibration during the period December 1 to 3, 2001.

Unit 2 operated at 100% RTP throughout the report period except for brief periods during scheduled testing and maintenance.

1. REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's implementation of the adverse weather preparation Procedure FNP-0-AP-21.0, Severe Weather, and Procedure FNP-0-SOP-0.12, Cold Weather Contingencies, to determine if required compensatory measures for equipment affected by cold weather were satisfactory completed. The inspectors reviewed the implementation of Electrical Maintenance Procedures (EMPs) FNP-1(2)-1383.01, Freeze Protection Inspections, which check the units' freeze protection circuit thermostats.

The inspectors walked down vulnerable safety-related equipment, risk significant equipment, and fire protection equipment to verify adequate cold weather protection measures were taken. The inspectors concentrated their walk downs on the Unit 1 & 2 Condensate Storage Tanks and associated instrumentation, Unit 1 & 2 Reactor Water Storage Tanks, Fire Protection Tanks and associated pump house, Unit 1 & 2 Plant Vent Stack Radiation Monitors, Unit 1 Circulating Water Structure, Unit 1 & 2 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) Flow Transmitters, and Unit 1 & 2 Steam Generator pressure transmitters.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R02 Evaluations of Changes, Tests or Experiments

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the 11 safety evaluations (SE's) and the supporting documents listed in the attachment to verify that the licensee had appropriately considered the conditions under which changes to the facility or procedures may be made, and tests conducted, without prior NRC approval. The inspectors also reviewed the 14 design/engineering modifications and procedure changes listed in the attachment which

the licensee had concluded that SE's were not required to verify that the licensee's conclusions were consistent with 10 CFR 50.59.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial system walk downs to verify the systems listed below were properly aligned when redundant systems or trains were out of service as required by licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-16, Conduct of Operations - Operations Group, and FNP-0-SOP-0, General Instructions to Operations Personnel. The walk downs included reviewing the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), plant procedures and drawings, and control room and infield checks of valves, switches, components, electrical power line-ups, support equipment, and instrumentation.

- Unit 1 and Unit 2 A and B train Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs)
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFW Systems
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 Component Cooling Water (CCW) Systems

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a walk down of six fire areas located in the auxiliary, diesel, and service water buildings to verify the licensee's control of transient combustibles, the operational readiness of the fire suppression system, and the material condition and status of fire dampers, doors, and barriers. The inspectors also verified adequate compensatory measures, including fire watches, were in place for degraded fire barriers. These requirements are described in licensee Procedures FNP-0-AP-36, Fire Surveillance and Inspection, FNP-0-AP-38, Use of Open Flame, and FNP-0-AP-39, Fire Patrols and Watches.

The inspectors observed a fire drill, with off-site participation by the Dothan, Alabama Fire Department, to verify the licensee's implementation of Procedures FNP-0-AP-37, Fire Brigade Organization, and FNP-0-TCP-17.21, Fire Brigade Training Initial/Retraining Program Administration, including the approved Appendix A, Fire Drill Package, and UFSAR Appendix 9B, Fire Protection Program. The inspectors observed the actions of the Fire Brigade, Fire Drill monitors, and the Dothan Fire Department and attended the drill critique.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed portions of the licensed operator training and testing program to verify implementation of Procedure FNP-0-AP-45, Farley Nuclear Plant Training Program. The inspectors observed scenarios for a loss of off site power, a total loss of all AC power, a loss of reactor coolant pump at low power, and a large break loss of coolant accident. The inspectors assessed high risk operator actions, overall performance, self-critiques, training feedback, and management oversight.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation of functional failures, maintenance preventable functional failures, repetitive failures, availability and reliability monitoring, and system specialist involvement. The inspectors interviewed maintenance personnel, system specialists, the maintenance rule (MR) coordinator, and operations personnel. The following conditions were evaluated for compliance with 10 CFR 50.65 and licensee Procedures FNP-0-M-87, Maintenance Rule Scoping Manual, FNP-0-SYP-19, Maintenance Rule Performance Criteria, FNP-0-M-89, and FNP Maintenance Rule Site Implementation Manual:

- 1B EDG exhaust cylinder belleville washers
- Turbine Driven AFW (TDAFW) Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS) failures
- EDG air start system failures
- TDAFW bearing failure
- Service Water (SW) valve failure
- 1C charging pump breaker failure

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed licensee activities against the requirements in Procedures FNP-0-ACP-52.1, Guidelines for Scheduling of On-Line Maintenance, AP-FNP-0-AP-52,

Equipment Status Control and Maintenance Authorization, and FNP-0-AP-16, Conduct of Operations - Operations Group. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's planning and control of these work activities and assessed if the licensee had adequately identified and resolved risk challenges for the following emergent work:

- 1B and 1-2A EDG belleville washer replacements
- 2B Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump outage and testing
- 2B CCW pump outage and testing
- 2A SW pump outage and testing
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 High Voltage Switch Yard Work
- 1A CCW pump and heat exchanger

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operability evaluations to assess the technical adequacy, consideration of degraded conditions, and identification of compensatory measures. Inspectors reviewed the evaluations against the design bases as stated in the UFSAR and Functional System Descriptions. The licensee's evaluations were compared to the requirements of licensee Procedures FNP-0-AP-16 and FNP-0-ACP-9.2, Operability Determination (OD), for the following:

- OD-01-11, SW B Train PS502 Degraded Base Plate Anchors
- OD-01-12, 2B and 1-2A EDG Operability
- OD-01-13, Unit 2 Rod Cluster Control Assembly (RCCA) Operability
- OD-01-14, Unit 1 A CCW Heat Exchanger Service Water Through Wall Leaks
- OD-01-16, 1C EDG Jacket Cooling Water System

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Work-Arounds

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operator work-arounds to assess if system functional capability or human performance were affected. The inspectors reviewed the cumulative effects of the operator work-arounds on the operators' ability to implement abnormal or emergency operating procedures, potential to increase an initiating event frequency, and potential to affect multiple mitigating systems. Additionally, the prioritization and actions required to address the operator work-arounds as required by licensee Procedure FNP-0-ACP-17, Operator Work-Arounds, were evaluated for the following:

- Unit A Steam Generator feedwater regulating valve
- 1B containment spray pump room cooler

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee Procedures FNP-0-ACP-52.1, Guidelines for Scheduling of On-Line Maintenance, and AP-FNP-0-AP-52, Equipment Status Control and Maintenance Authorization, to verify post-maintenance test procedures and test activities were adequate to verify system operability and functional capability for the following:

- 1-2A and 1B EDGs
- Unit 1 RCCA testing and inspections
- FP-ALA-R17, Unit 1 Reactor Disassembly, Rod Latching/Unlatching (Westinghouse)
- FP-ALA-R16, Unit 1 Reactor Disassembly, Rod Latching/Unlatching (Westinghouse)
- FP-ALA-R14, Unit 2 Reactor Disassembly, Rod Latching/Unlatching (Westinghouse)
- 1A RHR pump

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following activities related to the Unit 1 Fall 2001 1R17 refueling outage for conformance to licensee Procedures FNP-O-UOP-4.0, General Outage Operations Guideline, and FNP-2-UOP-4.1, Refueling Outage Operation. Surveillance tests were reviewed to verify results were within the Technical Specification (TS) required specification. Shut down risk, management oversight, procedural compliance, and operator awareness were evaluated for each of the following activities:

- Decay heat removal and spent fuel pool cooling (SFP) systems operations (FNP-1-SOP-7, Residual Heat Removal, FNP-1-SOP-54, SFP Cooling and Purification)
- Initial criticality and reactor startup testing (FNP-1-STP-101, Zero Power Reactor Physics Testing)
- Core reload refueling operations (Westinghouse Unit 1 Cycle 17 Core Reload Manual)
- Outage-related surveillance tests (FNP-1-STP-40.1, Train A Load Shed Test, FNP-1-STP-170, Check Valve Inservice Test, and FNP-1-STP-151.4, Turbine Generator Overspeed Test)
- Reactor coolant drain down and reduced inventory activities (FNP-1-SOP-1.5, Draining the RCS, and FNP-1-UOP-4.3, Midloop Operations)

- Mode changes (FNP-1-UOP-1.2, Startup of Unit from Hot Standby to Minimum Load, and FNP-1-SOP-28.1, Turbine Generator System Startup)
- Work and test control, task manager conduct, outage control center oversight and communications, clearance activities, inventory and reactivity control, and operations outage conduct (FNP-0-ACP-47, Outage Implementation)
- Refueling outage risk and safety oversight (FNP-0-AP-94, Outage Nuclear Safety)
- Electrical system alignments and availability
- Problem identification and resolution activities
- Reactor vessel head penetration inspections (see Section 4OA5)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed surveillance test procedures and either witnessed the test or reviewed test records to determine if the test adequately demonstrated equipment operability. The inspectors reviewed the activities to assess for preconditioning of equipment, procedural adherence, and valve alignment following completion of the surveillance. The inspectors reviewed licensee Procedures FNP-0-AP-24, Test Control, FNP-0-M-050, Master List of Surveillance Requirements, and FNP-0-AP-16 and attended selected briefings to determine if procedure requirements were met. Surveillance tests either witnessed or reviewed included the following:

- FNP-1-STP-112, Rod Drop Time Measurement
- FNP-1-STP-608.1, Main Steam Safety Valve Operational Test
- FNP-2-STP-112, Rod Drop Time Measurement
- FNP-1-STP-151.4, Turbine Generator Overspeed Test
- FNP-1-STP-170, Check Valve Test
- FNP-1-STP-16.1, 1A Containment Spray Pump Quarterly Inservice Test

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed open temporary modification MD-01-2687, Unit 2 Main Steam (MS) Supports' Repair, and associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening criteria against the system design bases information and documentation and licensee Procedure FNP-0-AP-8, Design Modification Control. The inspectors reviewed implementation,

configuration control, post-installation test activities, drawing and procedure updates, and operator awareness for this temporary modification.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness (EP)

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed two emergency drills on December 6 and 13 to verify the licensee was properly classifying the event, making required notifications, making protective action recommendations, and conducting self-assessments. The inspectors used Procedure FNP-0-EIP-15.0, Emergency Drills, as the inspection criteria.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2. RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety (OS)

2OS1 Access Control To Radiologically Significant Areas

a. Inspection Scope

Licensee radiation protection activities for occupational radiation workers were evaluated against licensee procedures, the UFSAR, Technical Specification (TS), and 10 CFR Part 20 requirements. During tours of the Unit 1 Reactor Containment Building, the Unit 1 and Unit 2 spent fuel pool storage areas, and the Auxiliary Building, the inspectors observed dosimetry requirements, postings and control of access to radiologically control areas, high radiation areas, locked high radiation areas and very high radiation areas to evaluate the licensee's control of access to radiologically exposure significant areas and areas with transient dose rates. `Licensee surveillances of high radiation key controls and locked high radiation doors were also reviewed. During the Unit 1 Refueling Outage 17, the inspectors independently measured radiation dose rates at selected locations of the licensee facility to determine if survey results were adequate for posting and controlling entrances to high radiation, locked high radiation, and very high radiation areas.

The inspectors evaluated licensee engineering controls for individual worker internal exposure controls such as ventilation system operation and the use of respiratory protection for steam generator entry. The inspectors also reviewed personnel internal dose assessments, airborne survey results, and the location of air sampling equipment.

The inspectors observed and evaluated Radiation Work Permit (RWP) specified access controls for radiation workers and Health Physics (HP) technicians job coverage to determine if licensee controls during the Unit 1 outage were commensurate with licensee training and radiological procedures.

The inspectors observed and discussed with licensee management the licensee's programmatic controls for highly activated or contaminated materials (non-fuel) stored within spent fuel pools to determine if controls were adequate to prevent inadvertent exposures.

The inspectors also reviewed licensee self-assessments and radiological incidents identified in condition reports (CRs) to determine if licensee radiological events were being identified for corrective action.

Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation

.1 Area Radiation Monitors

a. Inspection Scope

The UFSAR was reviewed to identify radiation monitors associated with transient high and very high radiation areas including those used in remote emergency assessment. The inspectors evaluated the operability and response of four area radiation monitors located in the reactor and auxiliary buildings. The inspectors also reviewed the calibration procedures listed in the attachment for the four radiation monitors. The inspectors observed the calibration of a control room radiation monitor.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Portable Survey Instrumentation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the accuracy, operability, calibration, and storage of various types of portable survey instruments to determine licensee compliance with 10 CFR Part 20.1501. The inspectors evaluated the operability and response of the whole body friskers and portal monitors utilized for monitoring personnel released from the radiologically controlled area. The inspectors observed the source check of two portal monitors.

Whole body counter calibration records and daily quality control checks listed in the attachment were reviewed to evaluate the licensee's capability for assessing internal intakes of radioactive byproduct materials.

The inspectors observed source check performance for four portable survey instruments in use by the radiation protection staff to assess proper instrument response. Instruments included ion chambers, geiger muller, and neutron survey instruments. The inspectors also reviewed daily source checks for ten other instruments to verify the source check was current. The calibration of an alarming dosimeter was observed.

Radiation protection technician use of portable survey instrumentation was observed to determine if the appropriate instrumentation was selected and operability was verified prior to use.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Protective Equipment Respiratory Protection - Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) Equipment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's respiratory protection program and reviewed the status of SCBAs staged for use in the plant to determine licensee compliance with 10 CFR 20.1703. The inspectors reviewed training records listed in the attachment for operators and interviewed personnel to determine their level of knowledge of SCBA locations and proper use. SCBAs staged for control room emergency use were inspected for general condition, proper air pressure, and correct number of units available. The licensee's fit testing methods were reviewed. Licensee procedures related to respiratory protection use and maintenance were reviewed.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA5 Reactor Vessel Head Penetration (VHP) Visual Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the visual inspection program for reactor vessel head penetrations as discussed in the licensee's response to NRC Bulletin 2001-01. The inspection guidelines were provided in NRC Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/145, "Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles (NRC Bulletin 2001-01).

b. Issues and Findings

1) Verification that visual examination was performed by qualified and knowledgeable personnel:

The inspectors verified the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) visual test (VT)-2 qualifications for the personnel responsible for performance of the visual examinations. In addition, the inspectors verified that examination personnel had received specialized industry-developed training on the visual examination methods for leakage of reactor head penetrations and on the site specific procedures to be used for the examinations. The inspectors interviewed the examination personnel and noted that they were knowledgeable of the specialized qualification criteria. The inspectors verified that all examination personnel were certified as Level II or III, VT-2.

2) Verification that visual examination was performed in accordance with approved and adequate procedures:

The inspectors verified the adequacy of Westinghouse Field Service Procedure, MRS-SSP-1233, Reactor Vessel Head Penetration Remote Visual Inspections for J. M. Farley Unit 1, for conduct of the VHP visual examination. The inspectors observed that the examination was done using these procedures under Work Order 01004448. The inspectors verified by direct observation and in discussions with examination personnel that the approved acceptance criteria and/or critical parameters for VHP leakage were applied in accordance with the approved procedures.

3) Verification that the licensee was able to identify, disposition, and resolve deficiencies:

The inspectors verified that the licensee's inspection plan provided nozzle indexing and drawings with adequate guidance to ensure that the visual examinations included 100% circumferential coverage of each VHP. The inspectors verified that the examination result for each penetration was individually documented. The examination procedure provided acceptance criteria for the VT-2 examination with specific follow-up actions for the detection of boric acid residues or identified leakage. The procedure required that questionable control rod drive mechanism penetration leakage be identified as a leaking nozzle. No leaking nozzle penetrations were detected.

4) Verification that the licensee was capable of identifying the Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) phenomenon described in the bulletin:

The inspectors visually observed the vessel head prior to the licensee's examination; observed the licensee conduct portions of the examination; discussed the examination with the licensee examiners prior to, during, and following the examination; reviewed the documentation and verified 100% circumferential coverage of each VHP; and, verified the qualification of the licensee examination personnel. The inspectors concluded that the licensee would have identified any leakage resulting from PWSCC cracking of VHP nozzles.

5) Evaluate condition of the reactor vessel head (debris, insulation, dirt, boron from other sources, physical layout, viewing obstructions):

   The inspectors observed no significant examples of insulation, leakage sources, debris, dirt, or other physical impediments that prevented a thorough visual examination. The licensee was able to adequately view each of the 69 four inch penetrations and the reactor head vent penetration during the visual examinations.

6) Evaluate ability for small boron deposits, as described in the bulletin, to be identified and characterized:

   The inspectors observed that the reactor head was generally free of any deposits that would have hindered the visual examination. Some loose corrosion products possibly mixed with dark-colored boric acid flakes, old boron leakage deposits (from identified sources), and some insulation debris were observed, but were identifiable and did not impede the examination. In each case, these observations were noted in the examination record. No significant examples of boron were identified during the inspection.

7) Determine extent of material deficiencies (associated with the concerns identified in the bulletin) which were identified that required repair:

   No material deficiencies, as described in the bulletin were identified and therefore no repairs were required.

8) Determine any significant items that could impede effective examinations and/or ALARA issues encountered

   The inspectors noted no ALARA issues or examples of significant items that could impede the visual examination process.

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mike Stinson, Plant General Manager, and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on January 4, 2002. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

R. V. Badham, Administration Manager
C. L. Buck, Chemistry/Health Physics Manager
R. M. Coleman, Outage and Modification Manager
C. D. Collins, Operations Manager
K. C. Dyar, Security Manager
D. E. Grissette, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support
J. R. Johnson, Assistant General Manager - Operations
R. R. Martin, Engineering Support Manager
B. L. Moore, Maintenance Manager
C. D. Nesbitt, Training Recovery Manager
W. D. Oldfield, Safety Audit Engineering Review Supervisor
L. M. Stinson, Plant General Manager
R. J. Vanderbye, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
L. Williams, Training Manager

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Closed

Item Number	Item Type	Title
2515/145 (50-348)	TI	Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles (NRC Bulletin 2001-01) (Section 4OA5).

INSPECTION DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1R02

Safety Evaluations

SEC L-00-062, Evaluation of CCP/RHR ECCS Flow Balance Test Data - U1RF16
REA 2000-2294, Evaluation of CCP/RHR ECCS Balance Test Data - U2RF13
ABN 99-0-1527, Emergency Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Loads
DCP 90-0-7046, Replacement of Allis-Charmers 4160V Breakers
DCP 95-0-8955, 1-2A EDG Off-Skid Air Start System Modification
FNP-2-ETP-4439, Removal of Particulates from Unit 2 Component Cooling
ABN 99-0-1625, Review of Condensate Storage Tank Capacity
SEC L-01-002, RHR Butterfly Valve Test Criteria
DCP 97-2-9199, Replacement of Emergency Air to Atmospheric Relief Solenoid Valves
T.S. Bases Changes, RHR Pressure Isolation Valve Testing
DCP 01-2-9705, TDAF WP Monitoring and Testing System

Design/Engineering Modifications and Procedure Changes

DCP 99-1-9514, SGR - Removal of Unit 1 Pressurizer Surge Line Whip Restraints
DCP 99-1-9555, Service Water Valve Replacement
DCP 97-0-9202, 4160 V Test Breaker at the SWIS
MD 00-2622, SIS Type Wiring Used in the 7300 Racks
FNP-1-ETP-4439, Removal of Particulates from Unit 1 Component Cooling Water System
NDR-129, Non Conformance Report to Allow Unit 2 Steam Generator to be Accepted
DCP 00-2-9578, Hammel Dahl Actuator Improvement
DCP 00-1-9579, Hammel Dahl Actuator Improvement
FNP-2-M-94, Pump and Valve Inservice Testing Program
FNP-1-M-94, Pump and Valve Inservice Testing Program
DCP 01-1-9704, TDAF WP Monitoring and Testing System
DCP 01-1-9754, Reactor Cooling Pump (RCP) Seal Water Heat Exchanger Inlet Nozzle
NDR-134, TDAF W Oscillator Assembly and Communication Module
MD 01-2681, Temporary Repair of the 2C Service Water Pump Discharge Check Valve

Procedures

FHP-0-AP-1, Development, Review, and Approval of Plant Procedures
FNP-0-AP-8, Design Modification Control
FNP-0-AP-88, 10CFR50.59 Screening and Evaluations
FNP-0-ACP-88.1, Applicability Determination
FNP-2-STP-11.15A, RHR HX Discharge Valve Q2E11HCV603A Mechanical Stop Position Verification

Other

Technical Evaluation TE-SE-90-7046-001, Siemens 4160V Vacuum Breaker Evaluation
Design Change Engineering Evaluation for DCR S97-2-9199
Calculation 36.13, Large Diesel Generator Jacket Water Exchanger Performance, Rev. 2
Calculation 36.14, Small Diesel Generator Jacket Water Exchanger Performance, Rev. 2
Calculation BM-95-0961-001, Verification of Condensate Storage Tank Sizing Basis

Section 2OS1

Audit No: 2001-RAD/02, Radiological Controls and Radioactive Waste Management
CR's 2000005851, 2000202089, 2000202090, 2000202091, 2000202092, 200100079, 200100073, 200100056, 2001001460, 2001001395
RWP-1705, Reactor Head Inspections
RWP-1731, Steam Generator Eddy Current Inspections
RWP-1488, Snubbers
RWP-1480, Scaffolding
RWP-1451, Valve Work in Auxiallary Building and Containment
RWP-1450, Maintenance Routine Work in Containment
ACP 7.0, Administrative Control Procedure
FNP-O-RCP-0.0, General Guidance and Special Instructions To Health Physics Personnel,

FNP-O-RCP-1.0, Key Control Program and health Physics Guidance For Control of High Radiation Areas, Radiological Exclusion Areas, and Very High Radiation Areas
FNP-O-DOS-1, Personnel Monitoring
FNP-O-RCP-3.0, Health Physics Documentation

Section 2OS3

FNP-O-RCP-367.0, Radiological Control Associated With Steam generator Channel Head Audit No: 2001-SGR/39
FNP-O-RCP-107, Use And Operation Of Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (Pressure Tank Type)
FNP-O-RCP-78, Operation And Calibration Of The Eberline Portal Monitors PCM-1B, PM-6, And PM-6A
FNP-O-RCP-214, Operation And Calibration Of Eberline Anolog Smart Portable Model ASP-1
FNP-O-RCP-225, Operation And Calibration Of Eberline RO-2/2A Ion Chamber
FNP-O-RCP-268, Operation And Calibration Of The Eberline Model RO-7 Ion Chamber
FNP-O-RCP-296, Operation And Calibration Of Eberline Model AMS-4 Beta Particulate Monitor
FNP-O-EIP-16.0, Emergency Equipment And Supplies
SCBA Training Attendance Sheet, December 4, 2001
FNP-1-STP-227.8A, Radiation Monitor Q1D11RE0025B Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation Isolation Calibration
FNP-1-STP-227.5A, Radiation Monitor Q1D11RE0024A, CTMT Purge And Exhaust Isolation Calibration