Library Introduction to:
Upon
the principles of the determination of Salaries, or Compensations
in a Republican Government.
An
Essay by
Ferdinand Rudolph Hassler,
Founder and First Superintendent of the United States Coast Survey
The following essay on the principles of compensating civil servants
was written by Ferdinand Hassler in late January of 1836. The essay,
although written in January, apparently was attached to a letter written
to Secretary of the Treasury Levi Woodbury upon the occasion of the
Coast Survey being transferred back to the Treasury Department on
March 27, 1836, from the Navy Department. In informing Secretary Woodbury
of his philosophy concerning compensation for a permanent civil service
work force, Hassler was fighting for a decent salary for employees
of the Coast Survey, adequate payment for his own services, and for
the recognition by the government and the general public that the
professions of scientist and engineer were deserving of society’s
respect.
Although the terminology used by Hassler is quaint and somewhat peculiar
by today’s standards, his message is quite clear. In reading
the essay, also recall that English was Hassler’s third language
as his native tongue was German and he also spoke French fluently.
Hassler made the point that to attract and retain qualified individuals
for government service, adequate remuneration must be paid to assure
competent, honorable public servants. He further suggested that to
assure the smooth running of government agencies, the spoils system
of hiring and firing personnel based on political affiliation and
the concept of “rotation” in office must cease. Hassler
pointed out that this system was detrimental to the smooth operation
of the government, had vast potential for corruption and mismanagement,
and also had an adverse effect on maintaining economical government
services. The spoils system was particularly harmful to an organization
such as the Coast Survey that required trained engineers and scientists
to perform its mission. Hassler even went so far in this essay as
to suggest that compensation for travel (today’s per diem rates)
be adjusted to reflect changes in expenses both as the result of changes
in modes of transportation and the circumstances of travel as well
as to reflect the changes in costs for similar goods and services
(inflation in today’s terms) over time.
The surprisingly modern concepts espoused in this essay mark it as
a pioneering work in the establishment of a modern professional civil
service work force. Ferdinand Hassler was successful in attaining
most of his goals in this battle and also managed to protect his force
of scientists and engineers from the abuses of the spoils system.
These policies continued under the second superintendent of the Coast
Survey, Alexander Dallas Bache, who publicly proclaimed that compensation
and promotion in the Coast Survey were based solely on merit. As such,
it becomes apparent that the Coast Survey under both Hassler and Bache
was a pioneer in the reform of the American civil service. It was
not until 1883 with the passage of the Pendleton Act that the American
Civil Service as a whole was placed firmly on a merit foundation.
The Coast Survey was a pioneer agency, if not the pioneer Federal
agency, in establishing a personnel system on the merit principle,
retaining qualified personnel, and making no appointments or removals
based on political affiliation. A careful reading of this essay also
makes it apparent that many of the concepts espoused by Hassler have
become the cornerstone of the American civil service system.
Upon
the principles of the determination of Salaries, or Compensations
in a Republican Government.
1 The
offices, or functions, to be performed in the administration of a
Republican Government, divide very strikingly in two distinct classes.
2 The first of such offices [elected offices], as are the gift of
the people, the appointment to which is therefore grounded upon the
credit of a man in his nation, and the confidence which is placed
in his intellectual capacities, moral character, fitness, and strength,
for the high trust committed to him.
3 Such a man in no case be a man, who has need to, or should, or would,
seek an office as a means of living, as such capacities will always
enable him to provide for himself and family, he can safely build
upon the broad base of the public, and the credit which he is able
to procure to himself, the same evidently, which fixed the eyes of
his fellow citizens upon him, for the election to a high trust.
4 In most cases even the very position in society which enabled him
to attain the intellectual improvements for which he is distinguished,
had determined his independence before, and his merit consists principally
in having made proper use of these means, already in youth, for which
he is so much more commendable, as there are more temptations in the
way of youth in that case. And if he is entirely the builder of his
high standing in society, no man will dispute his merit.
5 In both cases he must have acquired liberal feelings, such as would
not allow him to seek for any office of high trust in the nation,
for the sake of pecuniary gain, nor to refuse it, if liberally offered
by his fellow citizens. He will consider his exertions in the cause
of the public good, as a return due from him for the confidence which
he has received.
6 Thus the distinction received from his fellow citizens, is the principal
remuneration which he receives, and the satisfaction which he may
give in the execution of his trust, will not fail to place him in
such a situation, as to make his life happy and easy, if no ambition
for glory does intermix.
7 However, this man must be also compensated for his services, for
the public, as little as any man, has a right to his services, without
remuneration. His salary however shall be moderate, not with any allowance
for rank, otherwise but what is absolutely required; the numerical
amount is entirely dependent upon the habits of life in the society,
and varies therefore also with the time. It has generally been considered,
that it should be equal to the mean of a man’s earning in the
liberal professions, that is such as depend upon intellectual means,
and exertions; the highest and lowest results of such professions,
are actually the results of chance, which shall not come into consideration
in this determination.
8 It is further to be considered, that all such offices of high trust,
must necessarily in republics, be temporary, limited by law, and that
therefore the tacit contract made by the appointment between the nation
and the individual, has its predetermined limits, and the individual
is not kept under too long an obligation, if it should prove too detrimental
to him in economical respects.
9 To this class of public officers, belong all members of legislatures,
all higher executive or administrative offices, under whatever denomination
they may be habitual in a country, state, or union of states; only
with such dispositions, these bodies, or single men, can be expected
to act with that freedom, independence, and liberality, which is the
first element of the good which a government can, and shall do, in
a country. This is certainly too evident to need detailed deduction,
or demonstration, to count up the innumerable evils, which must necessarily
be the consequences of an opposite state of things, is certainly as
needless, as it would be too long.
10 None but a king may wish for high paid ministers. In some measure
it is necessary in that form of government, and just therefore it
is so highly to be deprecated in the republican form of government.
11 The second class of officers in a republican government, are, for
what might be called the work, which must be done for the government,
in all the varied parts of the administration of a country. The persons
engaged in them are seldom if ever elected by the people. These works
must be entrusted to such men as can be considered as deserving respect,
in proportion of the value of the services they are able to perform,
for which their qualifications, acquirements, and moral character
must render them desirable; but at the same time as working for the
government, like for every other man, for such an adequate remuneration,
as will secure to them and their family the same result of independence,
which they would have a right to expect in their pursuits from the
public generally; that is, they must be liberally paid in proportion
to their services; in fact the government should in each branch procure
the best services, therefore pay the best.
12 The highest class of these offices, are the judiciary officers,
in importance and respectability equal to the government itself; they
are seldom elected by the people at large, but always should emanate
directly from its representatives. (The so called prerogative of the
king, or executive government, to elect judges, which does not exist
in any of the old republican governments of Europe, is still a remaining
proof of the origin of the governments. A man distinguishing himself
in allaying the difficulties of misunderstanding between his neighbors,
came habitually to be called upon in his capacity of superior judgment;
and the trust laid in him gave him the means to govern his neighbors;
thus arose gradually governments, which circumstances extended, modified,
and ever after rendered obnoxious.)
13 The position of a judge must necessarily be entirely independant,
in intellectual, moral, and pecuniary respects; his income which must
be a regular salary, no fees, must place him in a respectable rank
in the society in which he has to move. This is in every respect and
in all countries so fully acknowledged, that no doubt can exist upon
it, but only to be lamented that it is so often disregarded, and particularly
where the executive authority of any kind, has the election, by which
it is led into the mistake of considering this prerogative as an acknowledgment
of its superiority.
14 All other offices are to be paid in proportion to the quality,
and as often as ever possible, also to the quantity of the work performed.
Thence for instance it is proper in all cases where public revenues
or expenditures are to be administered, so as to actually in some
way or other, be under the disposition or responsibility of an officer
accountable for it; he should be paid by percentage, calculated as
well in proportion to the labor required of him, as the weight of
his responsibility, and its possible chances. No officer in such a
case must be considered as simply engaged for services, whatever the
position may be; in fact, the universal habit in all social transactions
of the kind proves sufficiently the necessity of this principle.
15 It is most generally, and with propriety, habitual, to request
in such cases a certain additional security from the officer thus
entrusted, the amount of which is based upon the probable amount for
which he may be liable at a time; no right can exist to request that,
unless the compensation be also based upon the same principle, that
is, a percentage; and no officer can be loaded with an additional
duty of accountability without that percentage, in whatever way he
may be otherwise engaged with the government.
16 In the case of the last two sections are all collectorships of
public money of any kind, and all disbursing officers of any kind,
postmasters, land office receivers, &c.
17 There are a great many of the services needed by the government,
which can be rated by the quantity of work that is performed, particularly
such as are in this respect variable, and dependent of incidental
circumstances and positions: in all such cases the only just, therefore
the most proper mode of compensation is by the quantity, after the
unit (as it might be called) of the work, has been properly estimated.
Such are for instance, surveying of public lands; in the custom houses,
weighers, measurers, guagers, discharging and boarding inspectors,
(which are by mistake not distinguished from the inspectors used to
go about as guards against smuggling, who cannot be paid but by the
day,) while the discharging officer would with greater advantage to
the merchant and to the government, be paid by the ton.
18 In all cases where the services rendered, imply necessarily others
than the mere domestic life of a man with his family, who working
a certain number of hours in a day, has time given to him to attend
to his domestic economy; the difference between such a life, and that
which the appointed man, or officer has to lead, is to be compensated
in full, and the best way to do it is, by an estimate upon the whole,
liberally calculated; for it must be observed, that in the manner
of living, which particularly in that case, a man cannot escape to
partake in, will gradually diminish the real value of such an estimate,
made at any time, and it will have to be augmented after a certain
time. In this predicament come all travelling expenses, mileages,
and such like, which are most likely now by no means adequate, for
having been determined some time ago; for it must be observed, that
with the increase of the facility of travelling the expenses do not
decrease, often rather the inverse if the case, and circumstances
even momentaneous, decide more in the case than is calculated upon.
19 Mere salary officers can only be clerkships, military and naval
service, in their common course of business. All extra office hours,
or special charge given to an officer, it is proper in justice to
pay to the respective man thus charged, as in justice they are only
bound to do that work, which is rated as comprehending their duty;
if not regarded in this way, it reduces them to a situation too much
approaching menial services, that the government could expect to keep
men of respectability satisfied in its services, the hard feelings
arising from such a state, are extremely detrimental to the works,
for no man works successfully if he does not work cheerfully, and
such ways taking away the satisfaction in the work, destroy also its
cheerful execution. That such a state of things is a direct loss for
the nation, and contrary to all economy, is evident.
20 In general in giving any office whatsoever, either civil, military
or naval, the government enters into a positive contract with the
man appointed; it is positively stated, or tacitly understood, what
shall be the services performed; more cannot be expected with justice,
and if exacted, the breach of contract on the part of the government
is so hard felt, that its service loses all respect, and officers,
whom their situation forces to submit to it, lose their respectability
among their fellow citizens, their own self esteem, and all attachment
to the government.
21 There are also such works needed by the government, which cannot
be made otherwise but by positive contract; in that case it is evident
that the government and the person contracting with it, stand exactly
level upon an equal footing, as any two citizens would in any case
of common life; every stipulation is equally binding on both sides,
the government must grant all that is stipulated in the detail arrangements,
as well as what relates to compensation, and even it is proper, nay
necessary, that the government give to every part the most liberal
explanation; it will always be to the advantage of the work, by tacitly
prescribing to the contracting individual equal liberality on his
part, besides that, as it must be supposed that the contracting individual
has used the proper delicacy of expression towards the government
in his stipulations, equal delicacy is to be returned in the application
of the expressions.
22 The principles of a republican government prescribe that the high
offices forming the first class quoted, be not attached to the persons,
but changing according to regular laws; the details how that is to
be done in the most advantageous manner, would be too long to discuss
here, and has besides a great deal that is local and and [sic] individual
to every country, and even different parts of the same country.
23 But for all officers of the second class, the case is different
entirely. The removal of an officer rendering good services in the
second class of offices, and without cause of dissatisfaction, under,
suppose, an idea of rotation in office, like in the offices of the
first class, can never be done without injustice and real damage to
the regular course of business; it is therefore highly uneconomical.
It has a greater disadvantage still, namely, the apprehension of the
officer of being removed from his situation unexpectedly, and unprepared,
cuts off in the most direct and full manner, all free intercourse
with his superior, to the evident detriment of the public business.
24 As for the amount of compensation for all the officers of the second
class, who are, as stated, to ground their whole living, or at least
the principal part of it upon this compensation, it must be deeply
impressed in a republican government, wishing to remain republican,
that the compensation must all be in due proportion liberal. It may
fit to a king, an aspirant at despotism, to have a number of low and
menial dependants at a cheap rate, just as well as ministers of a
high pay; but the republican government must keep up its respectability
in all its appointments; and considering the class of society in which,
or over which it places an officer, it must place that officer in
his proper rank to secure his respectability, otherwise the officer
is put in the impossibility to execute his duty with propriety; (as
for instance that the most of the customhouse officers in the main
parts, are now in pay below the habitual earnings of a cartman; while
their position obliges them often to try to take the command over
them, which of course becomes difficult for them with such men, feeling
their oats, as the expression is.)
25 The bad effect of the monarchical habits, of employing cheap menial
officers, is the most strikingly exemplified by the customhouse officers
on the Rhine, Holland, France, England, of which examples are to superabundance;
(when three officers board a barge, ask one french crown toll, and
three for themselves, when upon baggage the clerk’s fees being
considered regular, without a duty being paid. When in France the
word “gapian” means equally a customhouse officer, and
good-for-nothing fellow, &c.) On this point this country has always
been a favorable comparison, as the customhouse business was transacted
hitherto honestly, but if once spoiled, once the respectable officer
driven out, and the door opened to connivance with merchants, revenue
and smuggling will have a widely different proportion. The example
of the customhouses is here adduced, both because they are just now
in danger, and because in this part the comparison with other countries
lies nearest, and is the most apparent.
26 It must yet be observed, that the patronage in appointments, in
reference to its influence upon elections, of which much complaint
is made, does not depend upon the amount of emoluments thus distributed,
but is entirely regulated by the number of appointments; for, a small
salary purchases a cheap vote, just as well as a large one, under
equal venality, and all votes count equal; the reduction of salaries,
and necessarily consequent increase of numbers, gives the effect evident;
and above all the unfortunate law, limiting the duration of offices,
so as to place every one at least once, often twice, at the disposal
of the executive in each administration, render it actually a powerful
engine, of which any king might be jealous; it enlists the incumbent
by fear, and all applicants by expectation.
27 Not only for this special purpose, but also for many others, it
is necessary to render men employed in a republican government, more
independent in their public situation; the attachment to the business,
the regularity, which habit and time can alone establish, with proper
knowledge of the duties of an office, render an officer more efficient,
and keep up regularity and system; of which much of the respectability
of an office depends. The low salaries which of course only such people
accept as can do no better, will always purchase low, personal attachment,
never good services for a republic, which must be a general government
free from personal devotion. Such a course would soon collect around
the distributors of offices a numerous low class, ready to any thing,
and leadable without principles, as the French republic has experienced
at a certain time, with the most unfortunate consequences.
28 It has appeared proper to dwell more upon the consequences of an
unfortunate management of the second class of public officers, than
of those of the first class; because it rather can be the object of
legislative action, and can be less known in its details and ramification
of influence. To remedy the evils that may be apprehended in the first
class, would need treating the principles of constitutional questions,
which was not the intention here.
F. R.
HASSLER
Washington City, January 28, 1836.
