Message From the Director

Nothing in the history of mass fatality events prepared America’s forensic community for the task of identifying those who perished when terrorists attacked the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City on September 11, 2001. For the Nation’s forensic laboratories, the primary lesson of this monumental identification effort is clear: every jurisdiction—large and small, urban and rural—should have a plan for identifying mass disaster victims through DNA analysis.

This report was prepared by the Kinship and Data Analysis Panel (KADAP), a multidisciplinary group of outstanding scientists that the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) assembled to offer advice in the identification of those who died in the WTC. The report contains guidance for forensic laboratory directors on developing a mass fatality DNA identification plan. It should become an essential resource used by forensic laboratory directors and senior public safety officials at all levels of government.

Even before this report was published, NIJ used the work of the KADAP to assist officials involved in identifying the victims of the Southeast Asia tsunami (December 2004) and of Hurricane Katrina (August 2005), a disaster that revealed how any State or municipality can be overwhelmed by the operational requirements of responding to a mass fatality event. All of these events demonstrate that it is only through planning, training, and assessment of the capabilities of our public forensic laboratories that laboratory directors—and the policymakers who support them—can prepare for a mass fatality event. But such preparation is essential to ensure that our public resources are used as efficiently as possible.

The importance of such preparedness was again demonstrated only 2 months after the 9/11 attacks when, on November 12, 2001, American Airlines flight 587 crashed in Queens, New York, killing 265 people. Because of the administrative and analytical processes that were in place for the WTC identification effort, New York City’s Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (OCME) did not have to restructure its laboratory to handle the identifications of the airline crash victims. Historically, such a major identification response would have taken at least 3 months and even that would have been considered rapid. But because the OCME was prepared, all of the victims of the American Airlines crash—the second largest single-event transportation mass fatality in U.S. history—were identified within 1 month.

The challenges that accompany any large-scale DNA identification effort are substantial. Therefore, I encourage every jurisdiction to carefully consider the guidance in this report. The families of the victims of the next mass fatality disaster—indeed, the entire Nation—will need their public officials to be prepared. This guide will help us accomplish that mission.

Glenn R. Schmitt
Acting Director, National Institute of Justice