# ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PROCESSES PROGRAM IN TIMOR-LESTE

**EVALUATION REPORT** 

February 2008



## **Table of Contents**

Abbreviations Executive Summary

## PART ONE: BACKGROUND

- 1. Political and electoral processes in Timor-Leste
- 2. Donor assistance
- 3. USAID electoral and political processes assistance program
- 4. EPP Evaluation

### PART TWO: EVALUATION

- 1. PROGRAM ACTIVITIES AND RESULTS
  - 1.1 Electoral framework, administration and oversight
    - 1.1.1 Electoral framework
    - 1.1.2 Electoral administration
    - 1.1.3 Oversight
  - 1.2 Political Party Strengthening
    - 1.2.1 Party strengthening
    - 1.2.2 Pollwatching
  - 1.3 Strengthened elected governance
    - 1.3.1 National level
    - 1.3.2 Suco level
  - 1.4 Citizen participation
    - 1.4.1 Civic and voter education
    - 1.4.2 National dialogue
    - 1.4.3 Domestic observation

### 2. PROGRAM DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

- 2.1 Program design
- 2.2 Technical assistance
- 2.3 Training
- 2.4 Coordination
- 2.5 Program management

## 3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- 3.1 Lessons learned
- 3.2 Programmatic recommendations

#### Annexes

- 1. Agreement-Level Results and Status
- 2. USAID's Results Framework and Indicator

- Technical missions and experts of IFES Parties Assisted by IRI Sucos assisted by NDI 3.
- 4.
- 5.

## Attachments

- Scope of Work Methodology Persons Met Α.
- B.
- C.
- D. References

## **ABBREVIATIONS**

AMP	Alliance for a Parliamentary	IT	Internet Technology
	Majority (CNRT, ASDT/PSD, PD)	KAP	Knowledge, Attitude and Practices
ANFREL	Asian Network for Free Elections	KKPP	Working Group on Voter
APSOC	Asian Pacific Solidarity Coalition		Education
ASDT	Associação Social Democratica	KOTA	Klibur Oan Timor Asuwain
	Timorence	MOJ	Ministry of Justice
СВО	Community Based Organization	MOSA	Ministry of State Administration
CEPPS	Consortium for Electoral and	MP	Minister of Parliament
	Political Processes	NDI	National Democratic Institute for
CDA	Center for Democracy in Action		International Studies
CJP	Commission on Justice and Peace	NGO	NonGovernmental Organization
CNE	National Elections Commission	NZAID	New Zealand Aid
CNRT	Congresso Nacional de	OIPAS	Church Observers for Social Action
	Reconstrução de Timor-Leste	PD	Partido Democratico
CSO	Civil Society Organization	PL	Partido Liberal
DAI	Development Alternatives Inc.	PMD	Partido Mauberre Democratica
DCHA	Office of Democracy, Conflict and	PMP	Performance Monitoring Plan
	Humanitarian Assistance (USAID)	PNT	Partido Nacionalista Timorense
DG	Democracy and Governance	PPT	Partido Povo Timor
DRL	Department of Human Rights and	PR	Partido Republikanu
	Labor	PSD	Partido Sosial Democratico
EAD	Elections Assistance Division (UN)	PUN	Partido Unidade Nacional
EMB	Electoral Management Body	RENETIL	Resistencia Nacional dos
EPP	Electoral and Political Processes		Estudantes Timor-Leste
ETPA	East Timor People's Action	SO	Strategic Objective
ETSG	East Timor Study Group	STAE	Secretariado Tecnico de
FOKUPERS	Forum Komunikasi Perempuan		Administacao Eleitoral
	Timor-Leste	ST TA	Short Term Technical Assistance
FONGTIL	Forum Organisão Non	ТА	Technical Assistance
	Governmental Timor-Leste	TAF	The Asia Foundation
FRETILIN	Frente Revolucionaria de Timor-	TOT	Training of Trainers
	Leste Independente	UNDERTIM	Unidade Nacional
GFFTL	East Timor Women's Group		Democratica de Resistencia
GOITL	Grupo Observadores Independente		Timorense
	Timor Leste	UDT	União Democratica Timorense
GOTL	Government of Timor-Leste	UNDP	United Nations Development
ICFJ	International Center for Journalists		Programme
IDP	Internally Displaced Person	UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund
IFES	International Foundation for		for Women
	Election Systems	UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission
INAP	National Institute for Public		in Timor-Leste
	Administration	UNV	United Nations Volunteer
IR	Intermediate Results	USAID	United States Agency for
IRI	International Republican Institute		International Development
	i.		i

#### Notes:

The term "UN assistance" is used to denote assistance provided by the UN system whether it was by a UN mission or organization.


The term "elected governance" is used to denote governance by elected bodies/officials at both the national (parliament) and local (suco) levels.

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

USAID has supported the development of the electoral and political processes (EPP) in Timor-Leste since 1999. Since that time Timor-Leste developed its democratic framework, became independent and administered local and national elections. Although Timor-Leste continues to suffer from periodic violence, it has still made significant steps towards the consolidation of its democratic institutions and systems, including the transfer of power from one democratically elected government to another. USAID's programs contributed to meeting these important milestones. With a new government in place and its current EPP programs ending, it is an opportune time for USAID to undertake a systematic review of the current electoral and political situation and develop its strategic framework for its next phase of assistance.


## BACKGROUND

USAID's EPP support was provided through a series of agreements with a number of implementers. The five agreements covered under this evaluation were implemented by IFES (formerly the International Foundation for Election Systems), the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI). Although all the implementers worked towards the common goal of strengthening democratic governance, each implementer focused on certain areas. IFES' focus was on the electoral framework and process. IRI concentrated on political party strengthening and NDI focused on strengthening citizen participation and improving governance at the local level. The programs under evaluation started in 2001 and will end in March 2008.<sup>1</sup> The main focus of the evaluation is on activities done after independence.



USAID/Timor-Leste commissioned this evaluation to assess the impact of its EPP program, identify lessons learned and to make recommendations for future assistance. As USAID used two strategic frameworks for the period under evaluation, and as there were many different component-level indicators among the five agreements, the evaluation findings are consolidated around the primary EPP programmatic areas funded by USAID: electoral framework and management, political parties, elected governance and citizen participation. The results are evaluated in terms of meeting the objectives of each agreement as well as their contribution towards meeting USAID's strategic objective of *Key Foundations of Good Governance Strengthened*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Subsequent to the evaluation, IFES requested an extension to August 2008.



## FINDINGS

The evaluation found that the **EPP programs contributed towards the achievement of all seven** election milestones<sup>2</sup> identified in USAID's performance monitoring plan. Achievement of these milestones, which focused primarily on a credible electoral process, contributed towards meeting USAID's intermediate result of *More Effective Democratic Governance* and its strategic objective of *Key Foundations of Good Governance Strengthened*. However, these results need to be considered within the context of the large-scale assistance provided by the international community and the continuing needs of the post-conflict environment.

## Strengthening the electoral framework, its administration and oversight

IFES programming targeted the development of election laws and regulations, choice of election systems and procedures, developing the voter registry and its IT components, and strengthening election administration oversight by the National Elections Commission (CNE). It primarily used short-term experts for technical assistance and held workshops and trainings with stakeholders to implement its assistance from 2001 to the present. IRI assisted this process through a Working Group of political party, civil society and others that reviewed and made recommendations on proposed legislation for the 2007 elections.

The evaluation found that the electoral process benefited from the expertise and assistance provided. The legal framework for competitive multiparty elections was established in the constitution and legislation that enabled successful local elections in 2004-2005 and national elections in 2007. It is difficult to attribute results at these more strategic levels to individual organizations because of the volume of international assistance, but **USAID-funded programs appear to have been instrumental in:** 

- **increasing the fairness of the electoral process** by addressing playing field issues such as parliamentary thresholds during legislative drafting and empowering parties to successfully use institutional channels to challenge arbitrary decisions through the provision of timely and accurate technical information; and
- **increasing the credibility of the elections** through the development of an efficient and sustainable computerized voter registration system and by strengthening the capacity of the CNE and its oversight.

### Strengthening political parties and their participation

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Impartial framework, even playing field, independent CNE, issue based campaigning, appropriate elections administration, good citizen participation and elections rated as free and fair by observers.

IRI's programs focused on strengthening the institutional capacity of political parties to develop stable, grassroots-oriented, well-organized and idea-based parties. Since 2001, IRI's activities targeted party sustainability, internal democracy and expanding outreach to women and youth. During the election cycles it provided election-related training including message development and pollwatcher trainings. Parties were assisted on a single and multi-party basis through direct training, subgrants to civil society organizations (CSOs) and mentoring. Most of its work to increase the political participation of women was done through the CSO Women's Caucus which originated from a 2001 IRI women's candidate training.

The evaluation found that some progress was made towards meeting IRI's objective of more stable, issue based parties but attributing the results is difficult given the large peace- and nation-building efforts done by the UN and bilateral missions. However, **USAID-funded programs contributed towards** the achievement of these strategic-level results:

- **transformation of a resistance movement into political parties** that were able to organize, monitor and compete peacefully in elections and run the government;
- **safeguarding the concept of a multi-party system** through strengthening of new parties so they were credible, able to organize, monitor the elections and win seats against a well-established dominant party; and
- **developing a core group of capable women political leaders** who are starting to change political dynamics and the party system.

At the same time, serious issues remain. The parties remain predominately personality-based and have not yet developed into the mature issue-based parties anticipated in IRI's program, and the conflict surrounding the formation of the new government after the 2007 elections is indicative of the fragile nature of the political process and the amount of work remaining to be done.

## Strengthening elected governance

After the 2001 elections, IRI worked through political parties with the elected leaders in Parliament to develop their constituency relations and improve their effectiveness in policy development. IRI facilitated visits of the 13 directly-elected MPs to their districts, encouraged the development of legislative alliances among opposition parties and provided leadership training to women MPs through the Caucus. NDI also facilitated visits of directly elected district MPs, and after the suco (local-level) elections, worked to strengthen newly elected suco councils in coordination with the government-administered orientation program. NDI targeted the suco and village heads, two women representative and two youth representatives in 83 sucos by providing training on roles and responsibilities, problem solving and collaborative identification of community needs.

The evaluation found that the **national-level activities strategically targeted critical needs within Parliament and set precedents for constituency outreach** for the new institution which lacked a representative focus. While the party alliance building did not result in policy changes in the majorityparty dominated parliament, the process of multi-party collaboration was formative. Local-level training provided new sucos with essential information needed for the first-time elected councils, but the evaluation found little difference between the sucos trained by NDI and those reached directly by government training. NDI did target potential agents of change (women/youth) in its trainings, but its indicators were not adequate to capture any changes that might have occurred.

### Increasing citizen's informed participation

NDI directly worked on civic education through its grass-roots civic forum. From 2001 - 2005 it worked in 77 villages, linking them in 2003 and 2005 to their MPs with a series of community meetings. IRI

helped organize dialogues between citizens, the parties and government using public forums and the media in 2002 – 2004, culminating in a week of National Dialogue on the meaning of democracy. Both IRI and NDI targeted increasing women's participation throughout the evaluation period, with IRI working through the Caucus. Increasing participation in domestic observation was assisted by NDI through its technical and financial assistance to KOMEG, a nonpartisan coalition of NGO that fielded over 1,000 observers for the 2007 elections<sup>3</sup>, and by IFES that directly trained over 1,000 stakeholders on election law and management topics. In response to the USAID Conflict Vulnerability Assessment findings, IFES also used USAID funding to start its DRL (Department of Human Rights and Labor) funded program to monitor and prevent election-related violence.

The evaluation found it difficult to assess the impact of civic education programs given the dearth of comparative baseline data. Attribution is also difficult given the multitude of civic education efforts undertaken by the international community. However, **USAID implementers contributed to:** 

- **continued citizen interest in the political process** reflected by high turnout rates for all of the elections and the relatively low rate of invalid ballots;
- **expanding the pool of women candidates and developing a competent national CSO** with a vision and nationwide networks working for the participation of women; and
- good participation of youth as election observers and civic educators.

The evaluation found, however that the lack of accurate information and understanding of the political process and its meaning among all groups in Timor-Leste is still a critical need, as is the political empowerment of women and citizens beyond the elite.

Direct results that can be attributed to USAID-funded programs for domestic observation:

- **increased professionalism of the domestic observation effort**, including the use of a uniform check list and the issuance of joint statements;
- timely information on election-related security concerns and incidents, and
- increased credibility of the process and the reliability of the results.

### Program design and implementation issues

The EPP program today is the continuation of programs started in 2001 in the lead up to the constituent elections, consolidated after 2004 under the Consortium for Electoral and Political Process (CEPPS) mechanism. Although the individual activities achieved many of their stated objectives, by the time of the evaluation, their strategic purpose and targeting were no longer clear. The program was also not grounded in the Timor-Leste context or its volatile political climate. Timor-Leste is emerging from 25 years of conflict yet the programs could have been those used in a stable developing state. Once USAID's 2006 conflict assessment identified the primary driver of conflict in East Timor as the "*unresolved divisions and rivalries among senior political leaders that intensifies competition and distrust among state institutions, political parties and social groups*"<sup>4</sup> the EPP program should have been assessed to ensure it was addressing these critical issues and the other root causes of conflict identified - four out of the six EPP-related.

Other design and implementation issues that affected the quality of the program and its effectiveness included:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Which was about half of all national observers.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> USAID, *The Crisis in Timor-Leste, Causes, Consequences and Options for Conflict Management and Mitigation.* August 2006 p 17

- a disconnect between some of the agreements' objectives and what was realistically achievable given the means and activities chosen;
- heavy reliance on short term experts to implement a program or impart knowledge and affect attitude change;
- lack of context-appropriate training, targeting and monitoring for effectiveness;
- need for more systematic and broadened coordination, with high level policy engagement<sup>5</sup>;
- lack of appropriate indicators and the monitoring and evaluation necessary to keep a program on track and capture its results; and
- lack of consistent funding allowing for long-term targeted strategic planning.

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The evaluation found that the EPP program contributed towards the achievement of all seven electoral milestones used by USAID to measure progress of its EPP activities. These milestones contributed towards more effective democratic governance helping USAID to meet its *Strategic Objective 2: Key Foundations of Good Governance Strengthened.* However these milestones and their achievement are more a reflection of the overall results of the international effort as some of the indicators used to measure the milestones were not activities assisted by the EPP program.

## **Programmatic Recommendations**

With the end of the 2007 national electoral cycle and with the current EPP program ending in March 2008, the evaluation team recommends USAID undertake a strategic review of the current electoral and political context within Timor-Leste and determine how it can best address its challenges going into the future. The continuing need for accountability and checks and balances was evident during the evaluation as was the "*unhealthy*" political dynamics<sup>6</sup> which led to conflict and undermined democratic consolidation. These areas should be directly targeted as well as the other critical issues identified by the 2006 *Conflict Assessment*, such as the divisions among the population, fostering a national vision and a new generation of political leaders. In the Timor-Leste context, the UN system has the overall comparative advantage for many EPP programs, and especially for increasing the participation of women. USAID's comparative advantage is its relative flexibility and ability to work on politically sensitive issues in an impartial and technical manner that helps depoliticize technical processes and moves the political process forward.

As a result of its findings, the evaluation recommends the following as **priority areas for any future USAID EPP programming**:

- **Political parties:** strengthening the political party system and its interactions; addressing the divisions among parties and their leaderships; and promoting constructive dialogue, accountability and less partisan governance.
- **Governance:** strengthening elected governance with synergistic programming that strengthens the ability of parties to govern, develop effective policies, represent their constituents and promote national reconciliation and dialogue. In the current context, Parliament is the first priority. Assistance to strengthen local government should be designed only after updated DG analytical assessments are done and in conjunction with a specific program such as decentralization.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> By both the USAID mission and the implementers and their headquarters.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Democracy and Governance Assessment for Timor-Leste, 2004 p iii

• **Electoral processes:** developing the organizational and management systems for the CNE/STAE that will be required if the STAE is moved under direct CNE authority;<sup>7</sup> and addressing other issues of electoral governance in coordination with other donor efforts.

The priority cross cutting issues that should be integrated into EPP program design and implementation recommended are conflict mitigation and management, widespread dissemination of information, CSO strengthening, women and youth participation.

# PART ONE: BACKGROUND

## 1. Political and electoral processes in East Timor

Timor-Leste is a multi-party constitutional democracy with elected offices for president, parliament and local officials. Although its systems are relatively new and still in transition, it has already successfully held two cycles of parliamentary and presidential elections- - the first under United Nations (UN) supervision and the second independently done but still with large-scale international assistance.

Since independence, and for the period under evaluation, election administration is done by a Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE) staffed by civil servants under the Ministry of State Administration (MoSA). The STAE is responsible for all aspects of electoral operations including voter and candidate registration, polling and the count, and voter education. The process is supervised by an independent Electoral Commission (CNE) made up of 15 commissioners<sup>9</sup> serving six year terms. The CNE's supervision authority includes: approving STAE regulations, the electoral calendar and codes of conduct; certifying party lists for parliamentary elections; ensuring equal

ELECTIONS IN TIMOR-LESTE						
Election	Date	Administration	Turnout			
Independence referendum	8/30/99	UN	98.6%			
Constituent Assembly <sup>8</sup>	8/30/01	UN	91%			
Presidential Elections	4/14/02	UN	86.2%			
INDEPENDENCE 5/20/02						
Local (Suco) Elections	12/04 - 9/05	Temporary CNE 2004 – 2005 STAE (4/03)	83.4%			
Presidential 1 <sup>st</sup> Round	4/09/07		82%			
Presidential 2 <sup>nd</sup> Round	5/09/07	Permanent CNE 1/15/07	81%			
Parliamentary Elections	6/30/07	STAE	80.5%			
Suco Elections	11/08		-			

opportunities for parties during the campaign; hearing complaints not regulated through the CNE complaint process; and preparing preliminary results to submit to the Court of Appeals for the declaration of the final results. The CNE has little power to sanction and electoral offenses are referred to the public prosecutor.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> A move that is under discussion in the current legislative review and which would bring the process into alignment with international norms.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The constituent assembly became the first national parliament upon adoption of the Timorese constitution in 2002. 75 seats were elected from national party lists and 13 seats were elected directly (one from each district).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Composition of the CNE: 3 members appointed by the President, 3 elected by Parliament, 3 appointed by the Government (1 of each of these groups must be a woman), 1 judge elected by judges, 1 public prosecutor elected by prosecutors, 1 public defender elected by the defenders and 3 representatives of civil society (1 from the Catholic Church, 1 from other religions and 1 from women's organizations).

Elections are held every five years with the president directly elected and a party list system used for Parliament. Local elections are for suco councils, suco council heads and village heads. Suffrage is universal at 17 years of age and voter registration is compulsory. Almost 523,000 voters are registered. There is a computerized voter registry and card system with photo and thumb print. Timor-Leste is divided into 13 administrative districts, with polling done in about 700 polling stations. Elections are observed by domestic and international groups with around 10,000 observers present for the 2007 elections.<sup>10</sup> Timor-Leste has a population of 1.067 million, of which 45% are under the age of 15.<sup>11</sup>

The legal framework includes the Law on Electoral Administration Bodies (2006), Presidential Election Law (2006), Parliamentary Election Law (2006), Political Parties Law (2004) and Freedom of Assembly

Law (2005). STAE regulations govern polling and count procedures and the timetable. The national elections were originally supposed to have been held in 2006/2007 but were delayed to 2007 because of the 2006 crisis.<sup>15</sup> The laws include gender requirements for elected offices with one in four candidates on a party list for Parliament a woman and three seats on each of the 442 suco councils (approximate 25% of the elected seats).

There are more than 18 political parties registered with 16 competing in the 2007 elections. The first parties were created after the April 1974 revolution in Portugal and became leaders in the resistance movement against the Indonesian occupation. The largest was FRETILIN, a pro- independence party committed to radical social, economic and political change. Its social movement status and strong grassroots support enabled it to easily win the majority of seats in the 2001 elections and run the government. New parties were created before the 2001 and 2007 elections, some of them splintered from FRETILIN and most personality-driven.

POLITICAL PARTIES IN TIMOR-LESTE WITH ELECTED SEATS					
	NUMBER OF SEATS <sup>12</sup>				
PARTY	DATE FOUNDED	2001 Constituent Assembly	2007 Parliament Elections	2005 Suco Elections	
OCCUPATIO	N AND RESIS	STANCE-ERA F	PARTIES		
ASDT	1974	6		37	
FRETILIN	1974	55	21	2,964	
KOTA	1974	2			
UDT	1974	2			
INDEPENDE	NCE-ERA PAF	RTIES			
PNT	1999	2			
PDC	2000	313			
PPT	2000	2			
PSD	2000	6		130	
PST	2000	1		79	
PD	2001	7	8	387	
PL		1			
POST-INDEP	ENDENCE PA	RTIES			
PMD	2005			1	
CNRT	200		18		
PR	2005				
UNDERTIM	2005		2		
PUN	2006		3		
ASDT/PSD			11		
KOTA/PPT			$2^{14}$		
Independents		1		1,234	
Undecided				57	
Total Seats		88	65	4,889	

Timor-Leste has a volatile political climate with recurrent episodes of political violence. The most recent in August 2007 was triggered by the announcement that an Alliance for Parliamentary Majority (AMP) coalition government would be formed (made up of CNRT, ASDT/PSD and PD) rather than the FRETILIN party which won the most votes (but not the majority). This followed violence in April 2006

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> There were approximate 2,000 domestic observers 8,000 political party monitors and 500 international observers for the 2007 elections. UNDP Project: Support to the Timorese Elections Cycle. *Final Statistics of Electoral Observation Groups*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> UNP Human Development Report 2007/2008

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> European Union Election Observation Mission Timor-Leste.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> PDC merged with UDC in 2006. 3 seats in 2001 breaks down 2 from PDC and 1 from UDC

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> 2 seats each

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Violence in April 2006 triggered by government dismissal of soldiers from the defense force.

that was triggered by the dismissal of soldiers, known as the "petitioners," from the defense force. The 2006 violence resulted in the internal displacement of 150,000 persons with another 4,000 displaced in 2007. USAID's *Conflict Assessment* identified the primary driver of conflict in East Timor as the "*unresolved divisions and rivalries among senior political leaders that intensifies competition and distrust among state institutions, political parties and social groups.*"<sup>16</sup> Political divisions in the pre-2007 election period were aggravated by FRETILIN's dominance of the state apparatus and its style of majoritarian rule that marginalized opposition parties and left the perception of a state serving the party rather than the people.<sup>17</sup> Perceived differences between eastern and western Timorese were also exploited for political purposes leaving an uneasy divide. At the time of the evaluation there were still an estimated 100,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs).<sup>18</sup>

## 2. Donor assistance

The electoral and political processes in Timor-Leste received large scale donor assistance. The initial elections were undertaken as part of a UN peacekeeping mission and Timor-Leste still has a sizeable international presence. The current United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) mandate runs through February 26, 2008 and is expected to be extended. Its mandate includes support to the Government of Timor-Leste (GOTL) to consolidate security, enhance democratic governance and facilitate political dialogue. It included support to all aspects of the presidential and parliamentary

electoral process including technical and logistical support, electoral policy advice and verification. It had a large electoral presence including more than 1,635 UN police officers. UNDP supported this effort through its project *Support to the Timorese Electoral Cycle* that provided technical experts, logistical support and the provision of UNVs who worked nationwide. Verification was done by a UN Independent Electoral

INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE ELECTORAL AND POLITICAL PROCESSES <sup>19</sup>					
Donors         2003- 2005 Suco Elections         2006 - 2007 National Elections         2007-2008 Consolidation <sup>20</sup>					
UN system	UNDP, UNIFEM: training	UNDP: 11 TA + 160 UNVs + commodities UNMIT:450 TA UNIFEM: training	UNMIT: 10 TA UNDP: 3 TA UNIFEM: training		
EU		International observation			
Bilateral		Portugal: 1 TA (legal) JICA AEC: BRIDGE	Portugal: 1 TA AEC: BRIDGE		
U.S.	IRI, NDI, IFES, DAI, TAF	IRI, NDI, ICFJ IFES: 7 ST TA	IRI, NDI, IFES <sup>21</sup>		

Certification Team which made 8 supervision visits during the process to certify the meeting of specific benchmarks for a free and fair electoral process.

### 3. USAID electoral and political processes assistance program

USAID supported electoral and political processes programming starting in 1999 with programs from its Office of Transition Initiative (OTI). The USAID program was managed out of the USAID/Indonesia office until 2005 when the mission opened in Timor-Leste. USAID operated under a *Transitional Country Strategy* that supported Timor-Leste's post-conflict democratic development until 2005 when it adopted a five-year country strategy. The transitional strategy included the strategic objective (SO) *Democratic Development Strengthened*. The activities to achieve the SO were clustered around:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> USAID, *The Crisis in Timor-Leste, Causes, Consequences and Options for Conflict Management and Mitigation.* August 2006 p 17

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Op Cit p 9

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Statistics from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> From best information available. Purpose of chart is to illustrate the comparative levels of international assistance to Timor-Leste for EPP and is not complete.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Includes assistance to upcoming Suco election cycle.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> CEPPS agreement ends 3/31/08

- Increasing public participation in governance by strengthening independent media; political parties; civil society organization's ability to participate in national and local governance; and civilian oversight of uniformed forces; and
- Strengthening government and independent institutions to implement democratic processes, adopt effective legislation and enhance capacity for service delivery to local communities.<sup>22</sup>

For the electoral and political process (EPP) programs under evaluation, these were to be measured through achievement of the following intermediate results (IR):

- IR3.1 Increased Public Participation in Governance
  - o IR3.13 Strengthened Political Parties
- IR3.3 Strengthened Independent Institutions
   IR3.3.2 Independent Electoral Commission

This framework was replaced in 2005 by a five year country strategy with the *SO Key Foundations of Good Governance Strengthened*. USAID focused on three areas to carry out its program: developing local governance, increasing oversight and transparency in government and laying the foundations for democratic elections. Progress made for the EPP programs was to be measured on the achievement of seven milestones. Each of the milestones included a list of indicators to determine a yes/no achievement.<sup>23</sup>

#### **IR.5.2.2 Election Milestones**

- Impartial framework
- Even playing field
- Independent CNE
- Issue based campaigning
- Appropriate election administration
- Good citizen participation; and,
- Observers judge elections as free & fair.

The EPP programs covered by this evaluation are listed in the table below:

USAID/TIMOR LESTE ELECTORAL AND POLITICAL PROCESSES PROGRAMS <sup>24</sup>						
Implementer	Title	Number	Dates	\$		
CEPPS (IFES, IRI, NDI)	Electoral Support & Local Governance	497-A-00-05-00025	02/25/05 - 03/31/08	3,950,000		
IRI	East Timor Political Parties	497-A-00-02-00053	09/30/02 - 01/31/05	1,557,134		
IFES	Elections Support in East Timor	497-G-00-01-00039	07/23/01 - 03/31/05	499,997		
NDI	Citizen Participation & Political Party Development, Civic Forum	497-G-00-01-00015	03/31/01 - 06/30/06	2,736,490		
IRI	Elections Support for East Timor Political Party Training & Supporting Women's Leadership	497-G-00-01-00013	03/22/01 - 10/15/02	820,000		
TOTAL			03/22/01 - 03/31/08	9,563,621		

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> USAID /Timor-Leste, Scope of Work for an Associate Agreement with the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS), East Timor: Development of National Electoral Framework, 2004

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> USAID subsequently adopted an "F" framework with specific program elements for budget allocation and program planning purposes. This framework has not been used by USAID/Timor-Leste for the programs covered under this evaluation but future EPP programming will need to be reconciled with F.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Covered under this Evaluation

Other related EPP programming not included in this evaluation include: a grant to the International Center for Journalists (ICFJ) to train journalists in election coverage for 2007;<sup>25</sup> earlier agreements for the 2001-2002 and first suco elections to The Carter Center for international election observation; The Asia Foundation for domestic election monitoring; Internews for media and the elections; and a small grants fund managed by Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI).

## 4. EPP Evaluation

USAID/Timor-Leste commissioned this evaluation to assess the impact of its principal elections and political processes programming in Timor-Leste since 2002. This assistance was provided primarily through a series of cooperative agreements and grants to the IFES, International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute for International Studies (NDI). The programs were evaluated according to the results anticipated in each agreement (Annex 1) and to their contribution towards meeting USAID/Timor-Leste's democracy and governance (DG) strategic objectives and intermediate results (Annex 2).

The Evaluation was undertaken in Timor-Leste in November – December 2007 by an independent team of experts in electoral assistance and political processes (EPP). It was comprised of representatives of USAID/Philippines DG Office, USAID/Timor-Leste Program Office, USAID/DCHA/DG and an external consultant. Interviews were held with key stakeholders, participants and beneficiaries in both the capital Dili and in site visits throughout the country (Attachment C). Additional interviews were held with partners in Washington and available documentation reviewed (Attachment D). The Team was also able to observe voter registration and political party trainings that were underway during the evaluation. The Scope of Work for the evaluation is in Attachment A and the Methodology is explained more fully in Attachment B.


## PART TWO: EVALUATION

The evaluation period covers the five USAID/Timor-Leste agreements implemented by IRI, IFES and NDI. As there are different sets of objectives and indicators for each agreement (and three sets within the CEPPS agreement), and as the USAID objectives listed in the evaluation scope of work<sup>26</sup> refer only to USAID's program descriptions for the CEPPS proposal requests, the evaluation findings are consolidated around the primary EPP programmatic areas assisted by USAID/Timor-Leste since 2001, specifically:

- strengthening the electoral framework, administration and oversight;
- strengthening political parties and their participation;
- strengthening elected governance; and
- increasing citizen's informed participation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> \$30,000 per undated AID information sheet.


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> 1. Develop an impartial electoral framework that achieves broad consensus; 2. improve political parties' capacity to engage in developing the national electoral laws, compete in the 2007 elections and support *suco* level elected leaders; 3. develop the oversight role of independent electoral commission; 4. improve electoral administration through the government department responsible for managing the elections; 5. strengthen elected local governance bodies and the role and capacity of women and young adults in local governance; 6. increase citizens' informed participation in the national elections as voters, monitors and/or candidates.



The entire list of objectives and indicators for each agreement and their end-of-project status are detailed Annex 1. The estimated funding figures used in the charts throughout the evaluation report are illustrative and are estimates only.<sup>27</sup>

## 1. **PROGRAM ACTIVITIES AND RESULTS**

## 1.1 Electoral framework, administration and oversight



## 1.1.1 Electoral framework

**Activity.** IFES, and to a lesser extent IRI, implemented activities towards developing a "*national electoral framework* [that] *receives support from political parties, civil society groups and citizens.*"<sup>28</sup> Under the CEPPS agreement, IRI focused on a party-led process that engaged civil society and others, such as the CNE to debate the merits of different electoral models.<sup>29</sup> It used a working group (WG) mechanism comprised of political party representatives, women's groups and CSOs. This started in May 2005 and included a study tour for four participants (including one CNE representative) to the electoral management bodies (EMB) in New Zealand. Eight university interns provided research for the WG and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Estimates were provided by IFES and NDI for their programs. IRI did not respond to the requests for estimates so the best-guess estimates were done by the evaluation based on the level of effort apparent for each component in IRI's activity reporting.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> IRI Objective 1, CEPPS Agreement amendment.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Initial participants included ASDT, PD,PSD, PST, HAK, Women's Caucus and Dili Institute for Technology. Two CNE members wrote a report on the suco level elections for the Working Group and IRI kept the STAE Director apprised of Working Group discussions.

some of the WG members testified at Parliament Committee A's hearing on the draft legislation as well as IRI's sub-grantee, Caucus.

IFES directly targeted legislative development and choice of election systems and procedures through the provision of analysis, comments, briefing papers and recommendations. Early in the evaluation period, IFES' objective was to assist the Constituent Assembly to initiate development of "*a legal framework and other constitutional considerations related to elections, political parties and relevant government institutions*." <sup>30</sup> This became developing "*the national electoral framework in a participatory and transparent manner to ensure broad consensus and support for the electoral process*" in the CEPPS agreement. IFES used workshops and short-term experts to hold discussions with the CNE, STAE, political parties and civil society on the substance of draft legislation, made recommendations for improvements and informed key stakeholders on the content of legislation adopted. IFES also collected data and lessons learned during and after the elections to inform electoral reform efforts for the next electoral cycle. This was done in part through a subgrant to ETPA (East Timor People's Action) for a workshop on the content of the framework, a subgrant to two former CNE commissioners from the first CNE to develop lessons learned for the permanent CNE and a TV program on the topic.

**Findings.** The evaluation found that the **initial objectives were met.** The legal framework for competitive multiparty elections was established in the constitution and legislation and which enabled the successful local elections in 2004-2005 and national elections in 2007. The **later objective**, which focused **on the quality of the process** as well as its output, **was partially met**. Although the framework for the 2007 elections was perceived retrospectively by most during the evaluation as a non-issue, there were still issues cited on its timing and implementation. The laws were adopted late which compressed the electoral calendar and impacted the quality of preparations (for electoral operations, party campaigning and monitoring among others). The late amendment for the parliamentary elections that changed the counting location to the district level<sup>31</sup> was still perceived negatively by many parties and CSOs. Most thought this change limited the transparency of the process and opened up the possibility for fraud. Implementation of the law was seen as uneven and non-FRETILIN supporters claimed its administration was partisan.<sup>32</sup> Other framework issues were the lack of enforcement powers by the CNE and the ambiguity within the constitutional and legislative framework that gave rise to FRETILIN's challenge of the legitimacy of the formation of the AMP government.

**Among the accomplishments** that are attributable in part to IFES and IRI efforts was the **reduction of the parliamentary threshold from 5% to 3%.** The higher the threshold the more difficult it is for smaller parties to win seats, and according to IFES, this change enabled two additional parties and one coalition to gain seats in the 2007 elections.<sup>33</sup> The written technical explanations of key provisions within the laws enabled parties to understand them and defend their rights. As an example, PUN's party registration application was rejected by the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) because it had not yet held its

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Grant 497-G-00-01-00039

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> The amendment was passed a month before the election date. It received 45 votes out of the 45 (all FRETILIN) MPs present during the vote. The EU observation mission report highlights its concern that the law was enacted *"without agreement among the parties, with no public debate." EU Observation Report Parliamentary Elections*, p

<sup>3.</sup> The UN Certification Team thought its security rationale was based on a false premise and added a "discriminatory element into the process.. that would generate further distrust" and saw it as a "major retrograde step." Certification of the 2007 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections in Timor-Leste. Seventh Report, p 7, 2007

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> More because it reported to a government ministry than because of any specific actions although a few examples of bias were provided to the evaluation team.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> At the same time, too low a threshold can also result in parties fracturing or insignificant parties winning seats. In the case of these early elections in Timor-Leste's nation building process and its post-conflict nature, the evaluation team believes a process that is seen as inclusive is better than one perceived as exclusionary.

national party congress which the MOJ said was a prerequisite. Using IFES' information, PUN challenged the decision in court and won. It now has 3 seats in Parliament. Parties still do not have the internal capacity to be able to do these technical analyses by themselves, and their ability to access this expertise from USAID implementers during the evaluation period helped to consolidate the democratic processes, have the electoral process be perceived as free and fair and gave the parties a feeling of empowerment. This is a good example of how a small strategically targeted effort can make a significant difference.

In the post-2007 electoral period, IFES continued assistance to improve the legal framework through its objective: "Develop an impartial framework that achieves broad consensus" with the following outcome: "Parliament and the EMB are prepared to modify the election law based on an informed analysis of the recent experience in the 2007 elections."<sup>34</sup> An **indicator geared towards Parliament** "*identifying electoral reform as one of its early legislative objectives*" has already been met. Assisted by IFES, the Parliamentary Committee A actively took up electoral reform as its first item on its legislative agenda. Committee A and Parliament are beginning to work through six election laws for consideration and revision with IFES assistance. But this indicator cannot capture the actual impact of assistance. IFES' technical assistance is helping to shape the future form and direction of the permanent electoral system in Timor-Leste.

Among some of the important decisions being made now is whether the STAE will move out of the MoSA and come under the direct supervision of the CNE and the determination of which offices are to be elected at the district level. There are also the very technical yet polarizing issues to be tackled such as political financing regulations and disclosure requirements. However, IFES assistance is focused on Parliament and not to the STAE as framed in its objective. The STAE, with UN assistance, is working on two bills with participation from the CNE and executive branch.<sup>35</sup> While multiple versions of draft legislation can lead to healthy discussion, uncoordinated efforts can also result in mixed messages and duplication of efforts.<sup>36</sup> The lack of coordination between these two efforts raises questions for donors about the best use of resources in a dwindling funding environment. Coordination for EMB assistance was found to be a systemic issue which is discussed in Section 2.4.

### 1.1.2 Electoral Administration

Activities. IFES assistance to strengthen electoral administration started before the evaluation period and included technical assessments of the 2001 constituent and presidential elections. In November 2002 it participated in a joint electoral needs assessment with the UN Electoral Assistance Division (EAD) from which it identified voter registration as an area for assistance. Its objective became developing "*the government's capacity to manage the national voter registration process and data base in a transparent and sustainable way*." To do this it provided technical assistance to the STAE on the design and development of an IT system for voter registration. It also facilitated the computerization of the voters list in 2003 by hiring students to enter the data and training of STAE IT staff. In 2006, an IFES expert mapped the longer-term voter registry needs which the UN used to provide needed equipment. Most of the other assistance to strengthen electoral administration was done indirectly, such as strengthening CNE oversight of STAE operations and mapping the invalid votes for the 1<sup>st</sup> round presidential elections for the STAE and CSOs to use to improve procedures and to better target voter information programs. Before the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Added during a cost- and time-extension of the CEPPS agreement.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> Interview with UN experts.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> IFES does not agree with the way this finding is characterized. It believes there is no duplication of effort as it is not drafting and has commented on the STAE version. However, the finding is directed at the issue of coordination and prioritization of donor funding and not the quality of the TA provided to Committee A which was evident during the evaluation.

end of the project, IFES intends to train STAE IT/database staff in conducting quality control tests on the voter registry to evaluate and maintain its accuracy.

**Findings.** The evaluation found that **the objective of voter registration management was met**. IFES provided the expertise and systems needed for the STAE to develop a credible and sustainable computerized voter registration system. The evaluation team found widespread public and party acceptance of the process and its lists. Voters are not assigned to polling stations which makes registration and voting easier (except for local level elections) but which makes multiple registrations relatively easy and the local checking of names difficult. The lists have never been audited so it is not possible to determine their accuracy. The planned computerized test of the list will check for statistical anomalies. IFES initial assistance to help computerize the voter registration process illustrates a best practice, whereby the UN and a bilaterally-funded implementer undertake a joint assessment, identify needs and develop complementary and mutually synergistic assistance strategies rather than working separately which can result in duplication or incompatible systems.

In the broader perspective, IFES' ability to help strengthen the electoral administration after 2005 was tempered by the nature of the large-scale assistance provided through the UN system and the later **lack of constructive coordination** between them. Competition among experts and agencies is often an issue, especially in large-scale operations such as this, but in this case the evaluation team believes it prevented IFES from strategically targeting its assistance to the STAE or helping out in other areas where it might have contributed to better STAE management of the process and its operations.<sup>37</sup> The evaluation found this still adversely affecting institutional working relationships and perspectives. **Neither the CNE's nor the STAE's perspectives matched the reality of what had been provided by donors or its actual value.** The CNE is discussed below in Section 1.1.3, but in the case of the STAE, in evaluation interviews it elaborated profusely on the valuable assistance provided by NDI while IFES assistance was barely acknowledged and only when the evaluators asked directly about IFES assistance for registration.<sup>38</sup> The issue of short-term vs. long term technical assistance is discussed in Section 2.2.

## 1.1.3 Oversight

This section covers official oversight done by the CNE. Party monitoring and domestic observation activities are covered in the respective sections on political party and citizen participation.

**Activities.** IFES focused on "*strengthening the oversight role of the independent electoral commission*"<sup>39</sup> throughout the evaluation period. This was primarily done through the provision of short-term experts on an as needed basis.<sup>40</sup> These experts provided orientation and training on specific procedures to all 15 members of the CNE as well as for the 52 focal points assigned to the districts. It provided training and expert advice on issues such as vote counting, oversight, results, reporting system, election complaints system, campaign finance and reporting, candidate registration, seat allocation and media skills. IFES helped the CNE develop its media center for the presidential 2<sup>nd</sup> round and parliamentary elections. It helped to upgrade the CNE website design for its election results display and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> IFES and the USAID/Timor-Leste DG Office do not agree with the extent of this finding. USAID thought there was adequate coordination among donors and experts and that IFES helped the STAE for the suco elections before there was a large UN presence for the 2007 elections when the STAE felt it was well covered. IFES agrees that coordination could have been better but that IFES had made an effort to coordination, cooperate and communicate all of its activities and materials, but that this was rarely reciprocated by UN experts.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> NDI assistance to the STAE was in relation to the dissemination of voter information. The 9 coordinators from its civic networks coordinated with the STAE for the distribution of materials in 2005 and for a poster NDI developed for the 2005 and 2007 elections.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Objective 2 from the CEPPS cost- and time-extension amendment.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> IFES did not have an office or full-time person in country until 2006.

to ensure that results were posted in a timely manner. It provided the commissioners with assistance on developing the CNE budget for 2007 and the justifications for the budget for 2008. IFES trained and funded seven Timorese lawyers for the CNE who worked on complaint adjudication for the 2007 elections, and provided explanations on the seat allocations for Parliament to political parties and others. It also helped the permanent CNE design its organizational structure and departments. IFES assisted the first and second CNE with its official reporting on the suco and national elections. The use of short term vs long term experts is an issue discussed in Section 2.2.

Findings. IFES was the only international technical assistance (TA) available when the national electoral commissions were created. Although the assistance was only provided as short term TA (ST TA), the commissioners were inexperienced and forming new systems and procedures and the provision of technical expertise at these critical junctures helped inform their choices and develop an institution that was credible, responsible and perceived as nonpartisan. One of the critical points of any election is having the election results seen as accurate and widely accepted. IFES assistance helped ensure the CNE was able to effectively oversee the count and transmit timely results to the public, thus improving the legitimacy and transparency of the process. More still needs to be done on the complaint process as noted by the EU observation mission: "the CNE lacked transparency in publicizing decisions regarding complaints. Putting on the CNE website the classification and summary of the complaint does not provide enough information for the observers to make a rigorous analysis of the process."<sup>41</sup> Assistance to develop the budget and its justification was another key area assisted as the lack of adequate operating funds had severely hampered the ability of the temporary commission to undertake a credible oversight. The CNE website was not sustainable for lack of IT staff and budget in the CNE. The issues raised by IFES in its mentoring of commissioners, such as measures to strengthen reporting compliance for campaign finance reporting, are being taken up by the CNE in its discussions on electoral law reform.


IFES assistance was minute compared to the size of the UN effort for 2007. Nevertheless, it **left an indelible impression of value.** Commissioners perceive IFES as having been present when the CNE was nascent and looking for help while the UN was seen as having abandoned them after their administration of the 2002 elections ended, taking their equipment with them.<sup>42</sup> IFES was seen as responsive having helped the CNE to find other channels of USAID assistance to help replace some of the equipment, and to transfer skills to the CNE, while after its return the UN was seen as autocratic by selecting experts without their consultation and implementing activities themselves.<sup>43</sup> The end result was that even though IFES did not have a continuous presence and sent some experts that fell short of CNE expectations, it got an A+ while the UN assistance was discounted wholesale, and at the time of the evaluation, the CNE was sitting on a UNDP project proposal for continued assistance feeling that it had not been adequately consulted in its design or selection of experts. The lessons learned from this experience for program design and project management are self-evident. In terms of IFES assistance, the perception of a responsive and effective relationship created an institutional bond that increased CNE's receptiveness for its technical expertise and advice.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> EU Op Cit, p 5. According to IFES this was corrected by the CNE with its technical assistance for the parliamentary elections but was not covered by the EU in its reporting.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> CNE interview November 27, 2007

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Commissioners say the UN removed all of its materials after the 2001/2002 elections, even the wiring in the CNE building.

## 1.2 Political parties



## 1.2.1 Party Strengthening

Activities. IRI's primary focus throughout the evaluation period was to "strengthen political parties institutional capacity"<sup>44</sup> by increasing their sustainability, internal democracy, outreach and representation. It provided assistance on a single and multi-party basis using direct trainings, workshops and mentoring, and through subgrants to local organizations. It started working with the parties running for the Constituent Assembly (CA) and after its 2002 baseline showed "excessive weakness" in parties, focused on strengthening the four strongest parties in the CA: FRETILIN, PD, PSD and ASDT. Nationwide polls were conducted in 2003 and 2004 that were used individually with these parties to help with their platform and policy development. Smaller parties were assisted through multi-party trainings. Training continued through to the present on party building (organizational structures, party elections, message/platform development, internal and external communications, strategic planning and democratic leadership skills) and sustainability (coalition building, member recruitment and retention, effective constituent outreach and supporting elected representatives). District level trainings were done in 2004, 2006 and 2007. In the run up to the suco and national elections IRI provided campaign training to all participating parties and coalitions. National level consultations and trainings were done in 2006 on messaging. After the 2007 elections, IRI facilitated the visit of a former Australian MP to train the party benches. IRI promoted the development of women and youth by working with the relevant wings of parties and through subgrants to the national NGO Women's Caucus. The issue of women's and youth participation is discussed more in Section 1.4.1. The complete list of IRI party trainings is in Annex 4.

IFES provided information to parties upon request on the technical and legal aspects of the electoral process. Among these were explanations of parliamentary thresholds, registration requirements, and interpretations of the constitutional language for the formation of government. NDI did some work with parties early in the evaluation period but then focused on citizen participation to avoid duplication with IRI's work.

**Findings.** Some progress was made towards achieving IRI's overarching objective of the "development of stable, grassroots oriented, well-organized and idea based political parties committed to democracy and pluralism"<sup>45</sup> but the degree of progress is difficult to ascertain. Parties willingly participated in the 2004-2005 local and 2007 national elections and Timor-Leste saw the peaceful transfer of power from one democratically elected government to another. But as noted by IRI's last assessment development has been "incremental."<sup>46</sup> Parties are still predominately personality-based although some

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Cooperative Agreement No. 497-A-00-02-00053, 9/30/02 - 1/31/05

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> IRI Cooperative Agreement 497-G-00-01-00013.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> IRI, Final Report Agreement No. 497-A-00-02-0053, 2005

are starting to become more diversified, better organized with more sophisticated platforms.<sup>47</sup> According to IRI's baseline assessment in 2002 "*few*" party representatives at the national and district levels were able articulate their party's platform while in 2007 it noted cases where district-level party members knew the national platform and were adapting it to local circumstances. In 2002 some party organizations were based on shadow government structures and now they are more party-like with positions created in critical areas such as communications, membership recruitment, fundraising and outreach.

Political party strengthening programs are inherently political and easily politicized. From the 2007 perspective, the IRI program appears to have been able to maintain its neutrality in the polarized political climate and to have its work generally perceived as nonpartisan.<sup>48</sup> IRI was also the only organization that consistently worked on issues of party structure and strengthening, although UNDP did start providing assistance to parties in 2006 in coordination with IRI. As such, IRI was in a position to be able to influence the development of parties, many of which held their first national congresses during the evaluation period and were just establishing their party structures and systems. In this regard, in the initial years of assistance, IRI **effectively combined the use of nationwide polls with individual party mentoring** that helped raise their awareness of the need for outreach and more substantive platforms. This type of assistance enables parties to react proactively and constructively before an election to improve their constituent relations and platforms, diminishing their chances of being taken by surprise and reacting with violence or rejection of the election results. However, the use of polling data as a training tool did not continue after 2004.<sup>49</sup>

IRI's **objectives focused on party development and**, for the most part, used **standard party building models.** This approach did not necessarily fit the political context within which parties operated nor the differing levels of their size, maturity, needs and receptivity. Training materials and timing also tended to be standardized and did not necessarily reach the right people within parties. Parties would send anyone to training, and in the case of multi-stage trainings, the Internationals came to us with their model. In the model each candidate has a staff of 20. Here my staff is my nephew.

Party not in Parliament

We got IRI training in 2002 but it was only for one day. But it helped us get more votes. Out of 27,000 votes in our district, we got 3,000 in 2001 and 6,000 in 2007.

PSD VP, Bobonaro District

persons who attended the first stage were not always the same as those who came for the rest. **This approach had limited effectiveness** and in evaluation interviews many party members were unable to articulate what they had learned in trainings or identify what they had done with the information. **Results were more visible from the trainings perceived as directly linked to immediate needs** and some of the most effective interventions appear to have been the one-on-one work with parties, which was by its nature more tailored to individual needs. For example, a female party leader thought the most useful training for her was the chance to talk to a peer (a female national legislator) and exchange notes.<sup>50</sup>

Determining the actual impact of the program is difficult. The CEPPS agreement has some indicators that could measure qualitative changes over time but these required the continued use of polling or standardized assessments. Polling data is an essential tool for EPP programming and its monitoring and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> ALP, Political Parties and Groupings in Timor-Leste, 2007 p 6

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> However, there was some reluctance on the part of FRETILIN to participate in some trainings. In interviews some Timorese said the government's over-reaction to IRI's civic education book (see Section 1.4.2) was because of IRI's work with the opposition parties. IRI itself noted the issue in its reporting, concluding that a government invitation for an IRI Vice President to be a panelist at one of its events on political rights was a "sign that the government may be willing to legitimize IRI's mission in East Timor" IRI, USAID Final Narrative Report, Strengthening Democratic Institutions and Processes in East Timor, 2005

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> The USAID DG Office thought the polls were too politically sensitive.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> Done during IRI's 2007 bench trainings with a former Australian MP whose expenses were covered by her party.

there is no relevant data available after 2004. The evaluation team recommends IRI undertake a final written assessment of the status of the parties it assisted before the end of the CEPPS agreement so that it can document the impact of its program and the lessons learned for party assistance in Timor-Leste.

The early agreements also included the concept of "*peaceful elections and political tolerance*"<sup>51</sup> but this focus seems to have gotten lost early on. Political conflict was an issue throughout the evaluation period. In 2002 The Asia Foundation survey found that 44% of the population was opposed to multiparty competition, primarily because it feared it would lead to violence.<sup>52</sup> USAID's 2006 conflict assessment identified unresolved divisions and rivalries among senior political leaders as the number one driver of conflict in Timor-Leste.<sup>53</sup> The UN still classifies Timor-Leste's political situation as "*fragile*" as FRETLIN continues to consider the AMP-led government as unconstitutional.<sup>54</sup> Addressing the political context, rules of the game and the dynamics within which parties work should have remained a key focus of the EPP program<sup>55</sup> and are issues that should be directly addressed in the next EPP program design.

## **1.2.2** Pollwatching

Activity. IRI assisted political party pollwatching efforts for both the suco and national elections. It provided technical assistance on the organization and content of monitoring and trained party trainers. In total it trained 450 persons from 15 parties for the 2001 elections, 350 for the 2002 presidential elections and 1.290 persons from 17 parties for the 2007 elections. It held three rounds of training in 2007: the first 3 months before the elections with the second one month before the election. The late amendment to the parliamentary elections law required a third training one week before the elections. For each election it developed party training manuals and model checklists delivering 8,200 manuals in 2001, 3,000 in 2002 and 22,000 in 2007.

Findings. At the strategic level, the program met its objective: "the participation of political party pollwatchers contributes to the legitimacy of the electoral outcome." Political party agents from the parties competing in the elections actively monitored polling nationwide and their reporting helped ensure acceptance of the results. But as the IRI focus was on training the trainers for parties, its ability to impact the quality of the polling station monitors was limited. The evaluation found that the **program only** partially met its anticipated results at the indicator-level, in particular the ability of monitors "to identify and substantiate a range of possible electoral violations" and "to lodge legally sufficient claims for electoral offences." The CNE felt many parties did not understand the laws and that many complaints

received were not adequately documented so the dossiers could not be forwarded to the public prosecutors office for action. The performance of monitors also varied. In interviews, some were described as professional and well organized, while others were said to be unable to identify polling irregularities. A particular problem noted by international observers was their understanding of the procedures at the district tabulation centers  $56^{-1}$  - which was the change legislated one month before election day.

If we didn't have monitors trained or understand the election laws, it would have been disastrous as they kept changing the rules. IRI monitored the changes and had updated information. Parties didn't have the capacity to cover all of the changes.

Party in Parliament

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> NDI Agreement No. 497-G-00-01-00015, Objective No. 2

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> TAF Voter Survey, 2002

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> 2006 Conflict Assessment, p 17

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> United Nations, Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste for the *period 21 August 2007 to 7 January 2008,* 2008 p 3 <sup>55</sup> However, implementers were cognizant and careful of these issues in their program implementation.


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> EU Op Cit, p 4

IRI provided pollwatching training and manuals to the parties for every election starting in 2001 so it is not surprising that parties were able to mobilize, train and deploy pollwatchers. However, **monitoring has not moved beyond the stage of watching an event** (polling and counting). The evaluation team observed voter registration in five districts and found no evidence of any party monitoring or CSO observation.

Intimidation was a serious issue for the pollwatching efforts in some areas. In some cases, opposition party pollwatchers were threatened, in other cases, pollwatchers intimidated voters. The **value of international assistance** to pollwatching (and observation) was evident **in the politically tense areas** in the East. In Viqueque for instance, the opposition party trainers were afraid to come to the district to train so no training was being done in 2007. Parties were also unable to convince supporters to come out in the open to be a monitor. One party turned to IRI which arranged for a training directly within the district. The presence of internationals in these instances was reassuring to the parties and built their confidence to participate and mount a monitoring activity (albeit it severely limited). Follow up with IRI revealed it had facilitated a training and not done the training itself, so in this case, the perception of international assistance seems to have been just as important as their actual physical presence.

## **1.3 Strengthen elected governance**

Both IRI and NDI worked on issues of governance in the period under evaluation. IRI worked at the national level with parliamentarians following the 2001 elections and NDI worked at the suco level following the suco elections.



## 1.3.1 National level

Activities. IRI worked with elected officials at the national level in the CA through the political parties to provide them with strategic skills, focusing on political strategies, policy making skills and representation. In particular, it targeted the 13 district MP "deputados" on broad concepts of representation, providing trainings on how to organize and conduct a village meeting, work with the press and respond to constituent concerns. IRI acted as a facilitator to get these MPs out to their districts to meet their constituents in 60 villages. It worked with the Dili Institute of Technology to start a part-time internship program for students in order to expose students to the political process as well as for the interns to assist the MPs with the administrative arrangements for their district trips.

With the broader Parliament, IRI brought in high level officials from Cambodia and Lithuania during its national dialogue week in 2004 to discuss the roles of MPs in a functioning democracy. It also worked with opposition party members to encourage parliamentary alliances that could increase their effectiveness in influencing policies and legislation. Women's leadership training was provided to 14

women MPs and IRI financed the Women's Caucus to hold a series of monthly lunches for women MPs to strengthen women's representation. Five lunches were held from 2002 to 2003 and eventually included civil society activists and guest speakers, such as the November 2003 luncheon that included the STAE director. In 2007, IRI facilitated the training of the newly formed party benches by a former Australian MP.

Findings. The governance component of IRI's 2002-2005 agreement was designed to support legislative institutions and local governments in both technical and political areas.<sup>57</sup> The indicators focused on seeking constituent input into legislative and policy matters and establishing the "structures and programs to provide responsive constituent services and effective two way communication." The evaluation found that these indicators were only **partially met** as IRI did not continue its governance focus after 2004. According to IRI, this was because USAID instructed IRI to stop all direct party work and focus on elections, and so all of the work IRI had been doing on governance and political parties ceased from 2005 until the "elections" program description was released.<sup>58</sup> However, the evaluation found that IRI's early work with MPs strategically addressed a critical need within the institution-that of linking the elected representatives to their constituents and developing an understanding that they also had a representation role. This was not a role encouraged in the one-party dominated Parliament. IRI initially carried the logistics and reporting for these visits that increased in frequency as the MPs realized their benefits. The precedent set and momentum built resulted in Parliament releasing funds for these visits in late 2004 which had been budgeted but gone unspent for the previous two years. In the districts visited by the evaluation team, the consultative nature of these visits was still clearly remembered as was the IRI name- which was not the case in some of the discussions for its past party trainings.<sup>59</sup>

IRI felt its assistance to creating an opposition party alliance had "*no impact*"<sup>60</sup> on their ability to pass or amend legislation in the first Parliament. But there was evidence of collective action among opposition parties in some cases, such as garnering enough signatures to send a presidential veto on a controversial immigration law to the Court of Appeals to rule on its constitutionality and when an "*extremely well-organized*" boycott<sup>61</sup> of budget debate in Parliament was orchestrated. The zero sum nature of the first Parliament is reflected in these examples and the need to resort to such tactics as boycotts are indicative of the **need to address the root cause** of the problems. This also ties back into the need to develop a more constructive, issue based party system as discussed in Section 1.2 and as stated by IRI in its final report for the activity "… *opposition parties need to offer positive solutions to problems rather than merely condemning the government*.<sup>62</sup>

IRI also classified its internship program as "*not successful*" in helping MPs engage with their constituents because it felt that neither the MPs nor the students understood the broad intention of the program. The other problem was the part-time nature of the interns whose schedules did not match the MP timetable. Perhaps organization of the program could have been better, but the internship idea was a good one.<sup>63</sup> The Women Caucus lunches, although only attended by about half of the women MPs, did offer a forum that brought together women in politics from different parties enabling them to share experiences and build bonds which is an important element in a divided society.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> IRI's *RFA No. 02-009 Narrative Application*, p 8

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> IRI e-mail to USAID/Timor-Leste, February 19, 2007

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> Ruling party participation was low in these district-level trainings which may account for some of this finding.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup> IRI Final Report Agreement No. 497-A-00-0100053 2005.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> IRI Op Cit p 31. Entire quote: "FRETILIN leadership needs to handle criticism in a professional manner and the opposition parties also need to begin to offer positive solutions to problems rather than merely condemn the government."

*government.*" <sup>63</sup> Even during the evaluation, the press was reporting that President Horta and the AMP President wanted to establish a youth parliament.

### 1.3.2 Suco level

Activities: At the local level, NDI started working in 2005 to "to strengthen the capacity of suco councils to organize and represent their communities through orientation and skills building programs." Initially it anticipated developing and undertaking training on the roles and responsibilities for 12 suco councils from its civic forum areas and using them to deliver civic education messages (civic forum is discussed in Section 1.4.1). However, once the GOTL decided that the National Institute for Public Administration (INAP), which trains the civil service, would do nationwide training for all newly elected sucos, NDI

joined INAP in a collaborative effort. NDI provided its training modules to INAP which became incorporated into the larger training program. At INAP's request NDI expanded its target from 12 to 82 sucos with INAP training the

	NDI Suco-Council Trainings <sup>64</sup>						
Date				Number Districts	Nur F	nber Tr M	ained T
	Round 1 2005- 2006	82	13	4	179	145	324
	Round 2 2007	53	18	10	6	271	278

remainder using local NGOs. NDI targeted its 2006 trainings on the suco chiefs, the two women and two youth representatives, and its 2007 training on the traditional leaders and the heads of hamlets. This timing followed the GOTL's plan as requested of USAID/NDI. NDI's approach stressed consultations with constituents, problem solving, teamwork and identification of community needs through the development of suco profiles.

**Findings.** The evaluation found that NDI's **overall objective to strengthen councils through orientation and skill building programs was met**. All of the anticipated trainings were held and materials developed and used.<sup>65</sup> The evaluation team found that suco councils had a basic understanding

Training was useful (on roles) but it was not applicable in helping us change the manner of our consultations with the community.

Suco Council assisted by NDI

of their roles and responsibilities in relation to the state and their constituents. However, there was no baseline for this activity so it is **difficult to determine the actual impact** of the training by either NDI or INAP. The evaluation team also found little difference between the sucos assisted by NDI and INAP.<sup>66</sup> Most suco councils knew their roles and responsibilities and the variances found in terms of the depth of their understanding had to do in large part to their

different backgrounds. For example, the new suco chief for Baucau is a university graduate in public administration and brought many administrative and organizational skills with him to the job. The evaluation also found a relatively high volume of interaction and training between sucos and international agencies, especially on development issues.

Another factor was that the suco council and chief positions predated their current elected incarnation and many of the current suco chiefs held this position in the past. For instance, a suco chief interviewed in Lospalos district was a fisherman and suco chief since 1974. He knew the ins and outs of interaction with district authorities and was able to effectively articulate the needs of his community and provide examples of lobbying for improvements for his community over the years. Government incentives to be a suco leader are low (\$15 a month) and there are no formal accountability mechanisms, leaving suco leaders working on the moral responsibility given to them by their community. A difference for these elected

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> Per NDI charts provided to evaluation team. Number of women trained is much less in Round 2 which dealt with traditional leaders (1 per suco) and hamlet chiefs which have fewer women in these positions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>65</sup> Although the evaluation questions the use of Bahasa for the official INAP manual.


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup> The evaluation team was not able to visit some of the more remote areas assisted by the NDI suco trainings. According to NDI, these areas were hardly reached by government and would have been more likely to show more impact of the training than the more accessible sucos visited by the evaluation team.

councils was the mandatory inclusion of women and youth representatives who if empowered could change the dynamics of these councils, making them more representative and effective. **NDI's trainings targeted this group of potential agents of change, but its M&E plan was not able to capture its results.** It developed a slew of 19 indicators but no mechanism was put into place to collect the quantitative data needed to measure progress against those indicators<sup>67</sup> or to measure the qualitative changes expected over time which was the overall goal of the program. A KAP (knowledge, attitude and practices) study before assistance started could have provided a baseline against which future progress could have been measured. This could have also helped determine if NDI's approach and emphasis on developing learning tools such as a suco-profile and the more consultative approach was more effective than the INAP training.

IRI also had a component planned to support suco council development in its CEPPS proposal. After discussions with USAID that questioned the need for two CEPPS implementers to do suco-level training, IRI maintained the objective but agreed to do its training through the Caucus to avoid duplication with NDI. The evaluation team found this objective was met as most sucos visited remembered gender-specific training, but its attribution is difficult. In addition to INAP, UNIFEM had a large suco-level training program in which Caucus participated. Determining impact of this training is also difficult without pre-and post-training baselines.

## 1.4 Citizen participation

All three implementers worked on issues of strengthening citizen participation and voter information. NDI had a general focus on civic education and domestic observation, while IRI's focus was more on increasing the participation of women. Both programs included an aspect of CSO strengthening for the organizations they worked with and some work with youth.



## 1.4.1 Civic and voter education

Activities. From 2001 to 2005 NDI undertook a grassroots civic education program working with existing civil society organizations (CSOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs)<sup>68</sup> to expand citizen knowledge of basic democratic principles and practices and encourage the development of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>67</sup> Numbers of village meetings etc were collected by NDI during visits to that community for training for the time period immediately preceding its arrival. This could serve as a baseline against which to measure post-training behavior change but has little value as a stand alone measurement.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup> Initial partners were the Commission for Justice and Peace (CJP) for most of the eastern districts, Yayasan Hak and OPJATIL for Dili and the west and the Working Group on Voter Education (KKPP), the NGO Forum and TILMO for the remaining districts.

politically active citizens. In its civic forum<sup>69</sup> (2001-2004), small group discussions were organized on a monthly basis in 77 communities, reaching a total of 38,181 participants (of which approximately 46% were women).<sup>70</sup> In 2004 it consolidated its program in 29 of these communities with 9 field organizers selected from its original 29 facilitators and focused on community advocacy and monitoring of local initiatives (Annex 5). In 2003 and in 2005 it linked MPs with a series of community meetings in 65 civic forum subdistricts in order to increase citizen access to MPs and encourage MP outreach.<sup>71</sup> For the suco elections the STAE leveraged NDI's network, using its field organizers in 10 districts to pass voter information to 23 sucos.<sup>72</sup> It also used its facilitators and organizing committees as informal observers for the suco elections.

Both IRI and NDI targeted women in their programs, and to a lesser extent youth. As part of this effort, NDI worked with the East Timor Female Youth Group (GFFTL) in 2003 to conduct trainings for the women participants in their civic forum to become more actively involved in its organizing committees, "*primarily because the number of male participants far outnumbered the female participants*."<sup>73</sup> About 630 women received training which NDI reporting classified as an "*unabashed success*" reporting visible signs of empowerment and actions following the training.

Increasing women's political participation was an IRI objective throughout all of its agreements. Activities ranged from direct leadership training for women within parties and Parliament (discussed in Sections 1.2.1 and 1.3.1) to encouraging women at the grass roots levels to become candidates. Most of its outreach activities were done through the Caucus, which IRI housed, mentored and supported throughout the evaluation period. Over this time frame the Caucus implemented trainings and workshops both nationally and in the districts. In 2004 to reach more youth and women in the lead up to the suco elections the Caucus created an "Alliance for Promoting Women and Youth Participation in Suco Elections" with the national NGOS FOKUPERS and Men Against Violence. This alliance had difficulties and resulted in limited work done primarily by Caucus in 4 districts.

For youth, NDI targeted youth participation in the civic forums, suco council trainings and domestic observation. IRI did a training for RENETIL<sup>74</sup> members, sent a number of youth to an international youth conference in Bangkok in 2003 and undertook party training with youth wings in 2004. It created the Center for Democracy in Action (CDA) as a mechanism similar to the Caucus to work with youth and to serve as a liaison between Dili urban youth and international organizations with programs relevant to youth. Although CDA was primarily NED funded,<sup>75</sup> it was integrated into IRI's USAID-funded programs as IRI used CDA interns directly in its work and training (such as training for poll watchers). IRI also enabled the CDA to hold workshops and to do some training and hold workshops directly with youth. CDA created a resource center with EPP related materials located in the Xanana Gusmao Center in Dili.

In the 2007 elections, IFES directly trained over 1,000 stakeholders, including media representatives and observers, on election topics during the 2007 election cycle. IFES assisted the CNE in its media and public information functions, including 8 radio/TV programs on the parliamentary elections and support of the elections media center. IFES also produced voter education materials on the election complaint

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> 497-G-00-00015 was originally designed as a Civic Forum program, other EPP activities were added later in cost and time extensions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> NDI Final Report 497-G-00-01-00015 p 5

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> Some funded by UNDP.

 $<sup>^{72}</sup>$  For a total of 1,700 persons, 700 of which were women.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> NDI *Final Report* 497-G-00-01-00015, p 23

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> A youth resistance movement of university students studying in Indonesia.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> IRI Quarterly Report April-June 2007

process for STAE and CNE. NDI showed a short STAE voter informational film in 10 sucos reaching about 1,000 to 2,000 villagers.<sup>76</sup>

**Findings.** The **civic forum** was originally intended to be an 18 month voter education program in the lead up to the 2001 elections. But the long term nature of the approach required cost and time extensions

through 2004.<sup>79</sup> NDI's primary objective was to "*expand citizen knowledge and understanding of basic democratic concepts and encourage the development of an aware and active citizenship.*" This **objective was met** but, as found in the suco council training program, the extent of change resulting from the civic forum program is unknown. The evaluation team found that the sucos that participated in the civic forum were actively interested in democratic issues and the political process, but it also found this in the other sucos visited. There were also many education programs undertaken in Timor-Leste so attribution to any one organization is difficult. NDI kept a series of indicators for its civic forums from 2003-2004 that showed increased participation by organizing committee members and women

VOTER TURNOUT %					
Sucos <sup>77</sup> Participating in Civic Forum	Suco Elections	1 <sup>st</sup> Round Presidential			
Faturasa, Aileu	87.7	87.7			
Aitutu, Ainaro	90	58			
Bucoli, Baucau <sup>78</sup>	94	105			
Ritabou Bobonaro	70.7	76.4			
Leuro, Lautem	47.9	89.5			
Uma-tolu, Viqueque	81.5	76.2			
Sample Average	78.6	82.1			
National Average	82.4	82			

members but without a control group it is not possible to know if these results were attributable to the NDI program or to other factors. Using electoral statistics as a proxy to measure differences between program-assisted sucos and other sucos, from the information available, the evaluation team found no significant difference in terms of valid votes cast<sup>80</sup> or turnout.

#### **REMAINING NEED FOR EDUCATION**

An indication of remaining need is the mapping currently underway in the eastern districts by civic education NGOs. They have red flagged 75% of the sucos in Baucau district as having 60% of their population not understanding the meaning of democracy, and 50% of the sucos in Lospalos district with 50% of their population not understanding. Although all three implementers included civic/voter education indicators in their programs (including NDI for activities other than civic forum) the evaluation found none had undertaken any systematic education programs. Most of the activities undertaken were opportunistic and need driven. NDI had intended to do more voter education activities for the 2007 elections but put its resources elsewhere after seeing

the size and scope of the UNDP program. The evaluation team agrees that this was an appropriate decision. It is **difficult to determine the impact** from the one-off efforts done, such as NDI's poster on how to mark a valid ballot<sup>81</sup> and IRI's poster with the 14 party and coalition platforms.<sup>82</sup> But they were appropriately targeted and timed to have contributed to increased voter awareness and confidence at critical junctures and were appreciated by the STAE and parties.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> Target was 16 but rains made access to the other six impossible. *NDI Quarterly Report, April-June 2007* p11
 <sup>77</sup> Random sample of sucos. May not be representative of averages of entire group of sucos that participated in Civic Forum.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> Also an Organizing Committee location

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> USAID/Timor-Leste, Justification for a grant amendment to NDI to conduct a program of civil society development through civic forum in East Timor, August 2002

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>80</sup> In terms of invalid votes which were an issue for the first round elections in 2007 and for which suco level information is available, the national average for invalid ballots for the first round was 3.64% (EU Observer Mission). Sucos that participated in the civic forum and civic monitoring activities had invalid rates ranging from 2.2 % in Quequerasa, Aileu District to 5.8% in Samoro, Oecusse to 11.8% in Aituto, Ainaro District.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup> Done on NDI initiative after it saw the 5.45% spoilage rate (invalid and blank ballots) from the first round presidential elections. It distributed 25,000 copies through the STAE and KOMEG networks. Second round spoilage rate was reduced to 2.66% per NDI.
<sup>82</sup> Funded by NZAID

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>82</sup> Funded by NZAID

**Of note was** IFES 2007 post-election **efforts to provide accurate and digestible information** to parties and key government officials **on how the election results transferred to the formation of the government.** This, and other efforts undertaken by the international community at the policy levels, averted a political crisis that could have derailed the democratic process. IFES is continuing this effort at the citizen level through a pilot program funded by DRL in three of the five districts with the greatest amount of election-related violence as shown in the EVER project reports. The target group includes IDPs, suco councils and chiefs, students, teachers, party members in districts, district administrators and

other persons of influence. As discussed more in the Section 2.1, this type of **strategically targeted information program is a critical need** and something donors should pursue.

All three implementers made **efforts to include women and youth** in their activities. For women, in many cases, such as domestic observation, this was done on a 50-50 basis. In the civic forum, this was 45 (F) – 55 (M).<sup>84</sup> In other cases, such as women's leadership training, it was 100%. Measuring impact and attribution for results is much more difficult as the indicators do not take the variable of the quota systems into consideration or the scope of other assistance, in particular, UNIFEM. Its *Programme for Enhancing Rural Women's Leadership and Participation in Nation Building* (2005-2007) to increase women's participation in

PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNITY GROUPS <sup>83</sup>						
	2001 2007					
	National	National	Rural	Urban		
	WOM	EN				
Membership over previous year	0.9	0.8	0.7	1.1		
Paid memberships over previous year	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0		
No. meeting held in last 3 months	2.8	2.2	2.0	2.5		
Number of these attended	2.4	1.8	1.5	2.4		
	YOU	ſĦ				
Membership over previous year	2.5	1.0	1.0	0.9		
Paid memberships over previous year	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0		
No. meeting held during last 3 months	3.6	2.5	2.7	2.2		
Number of these attended	3.1	1.9	1.9	2.0		

the suco elections trained 657 women candidates (with 365 elected), and its *Integrated Program for Women in Politics and Decision Making* (2007-2011) worked with parties to adopt Women's Political Platforms within parties. UNIFEM used local NGOs including the Caucus to implement these programs. There were other international NGO efforts, such as Oxfam, that worked with CSOs with varying results.<sup>85</sup> Through its subgrants, the Women's Caucus trained 829 women candidates from 8 districts for the suco elections of which 815 were elected as suco council members, 6 as suco chiefs and 15 as Aldeia leaders,<sup>86</sup> and 18 out of the 65 women candidates for national office in 2007, 2 of which won.<sup>87</sup>

In terms of increasing women's participation within parties, IRI's 2005 assessment found "none of the political parties examined in this final assessment have made serious movements towards the inclusion of women into their mainstream activities ... in addition, few attempts have been made to include youth members into the party with any substantial impact."<sup>88</sup> At the December 2007 training of parties in Aileu observed by the evaluation team, only 4 of the 35 participants were women. In the larger picture, one of the few national statistics available on participation (detailed in the Table above) shows a decrease in the participation of women and youth from 2001. In terms of women in Parliament, there were 22 out of 88

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>83</sup> Directorate of National Statistics, *Timor Leste Survey of Living Standards*, 2007 p 148

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>84</sup> USAID/Timor-Leste, Action Memo to Cognizant Grant Officer dated 8/8/02

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>85</sup> Oxfam worked with FOKUPERS and Aliansi Feto to reach 5,000 women, 400 of which registered as candidates with 90 winning at the suco level in Cova Lima District. *Oxfam News*, 12/05

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>86</sup> IRI, Final Report, p 34

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>87</sup> Caucus, Program Report, Strengthen East Timor Women in Politics, July 2007 p 5

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>88</sup> IRI, Final report, Op Cit p 26

in 2001 and 18 out of 65 in 2007<sup>89</sup> which is actually a proportional increase in women's participation from 25% to 28%.

The evaluation did find however that IRI assistance provided through the Women's Caucus was effective in that it **facilitated the development of a competent national CSO with a vision, nationwide networks and the expertise** needed to work for the empowerment of women. The Caucus originated out of a 2001 IRI candidate training program that IRI mentored and assisted programmatically and financially. This assistance enabled Caucus' development and attracted other donor funding - - most notably UNIFEM - - which enabled the Caucus to expand its programming and depth of expertise. The long term sustainability of the Caucus was an objective of the earlier IRI program.<sup>90</sup> The Caucus has expanded its donor and activity base to the extent that it should now build its overhead into its projects costs and IRI should end its subsidy which now benefits other the donors as much as it does the Caucus.

CDA was not as successful in becoming an independent CSO. At the time of the evaluation it consisted of 5 interns and the primary mover in the organization had moved on to public office. It is housed in the IRI office and is dependent upon it. CDA's activities seemed to have been well targeted and attended, in particular the culture of peace activities funded by CRS. CDA also participated as one of six organizations doing voter education through the NGO Forum (FONGTIL) for the 2007 elections. The evaluation found that IRI used the internship concept in a number of its EPP activities which is a useful approach to linking institutions with youth and providing youth with constructive and practical EPP experience. However, these types of programs do not necessarily require the establishment of a CSO to ensure their sustainability, especially if they are institutionalized within the host organization, such as Parliament or the STAE.

## 1.4.2 National Dialogue

Activities. Developing a national dialogue was not an explicit objective in agreements, however it was implicit in the design and nature of some of the activities undertaken in the initial years under evaluation and it is relevant to the evaluation team's findings. Both IRI and NDI undertook activities before 2005 that encouraged constructive dialogue between parties, between elected officials and constituents and the government, and between citizens. In addition to the efforts reported under the Governance Section (1.3) to link elected officials to constituents, IRI sponsored a community radio program where parties could speak on political topics of their choosing to generate issue-based discussions. Initially only the opposition parties participated, but FRETILIN joined after the third episode. IRI also organized a series of public forums with the University of Dili and the East Timor Study Group to give civil society, political parties and the government a mechanism to debate policy platforms and current issues. Among the issues debated were decentralization, education, corruption and freedom of expression. Freedom of expression was a topic chosen in June 2004 by the parties to call attention to the government's decision to fire civil servants for participating in opposition rallies. In 2004, IRI undertook a program called "National Dialogue/Road to Democracy." This was a week-long series of public forums that provided separate forums for political leaders, government, Parliament, the media, civil society and citizens. In each forum participants expressed their views on the important issues facing Timor-Leste and the meaning of democracy.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup> 2007: FRETILIN: 5, CNRT: 6, ASDT/PSD: 4, PD: 2, PUN: 1

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>90</sup> Its indicator was "*The Women's Caucus will continue to be a leading provider of women's political training in East Timor and will develop a self-sustaining network for politically active women*" in 497-A-00-02-00053. However, the definition of this objective was only that the Caucus be able to diversify its funding and seek grants directly from other donors.

**Findings.** The violence in 2006 and 2007 underscored the critical need to develop constructive, issue based dialogue that brings a polarized society together. Although this was initially included in the implementers' approach,<sup>91</sup> it was not continued after 2004 although it was identified as a focus area for IR2.2. *More Effective and Democratic Governance* in USAID's five year country strategy in 2005. In addition, strategic opportunities to use existing mechanisms for constructive dialogue and reconciliation were not leveraged. For example, the IRI Working Group which brought together parties and civil society to discuss electoral legislation which could have been used as an effective dialogue mechanism in the 2006 crisis.

The shift away from addressing the dynamics of the process coincides with an incident with IRI's 2004 civic education book designed for children. Its use of monkeys in its illustrations resulted in the presidency and Parliament denouncing IRI for calling Timorese monkeys and insulting the government.<sup>92</sup> IRI believes it repaired the damage by withdrawing its country director and issuing a formal apology and has since rebuilt its relationships. But in the immediate aftermath, the evaluation found that the political cold freeze affected IRI's ability to work with all of the parties and the government which would have made continued work on national dialogue difficult. **The need for constructive issue-based dialogue remains critical** and is a priority programmatic area of focus recommended by the evaluation team.

## 1.4.3 Domestic Observation

Activities. NDI assisted the creation and functioning of a nonpartisan coalition of NGOs called KOMEG to observe polling in the 2007 elections. NDI provided technical expertise to the founders of KOMEG and funded its 7 member secretariat for six months starting in January 2007. NDI helped train its 26 district coordinators, half of which were funded by NDI and the other half by UNIFEM (for a total of 14 women and 12 men). NDI provided templates for the manuals and monitoring checklists, the production of which were funded by UNDP for the parliamentary elections. KOMEG district coordinators recruited and trained over 1,000 observers who observed polling and the count during the parliamentary elections and two rounds of the presidential elections.

In addition, CEPPS program funding was provided to IFES for the start up of its DRL-funded election security observation program called EVER (Election Violence Education and Resolution). DRL funding arrived late (mid June) and USAID's funding allowed the program to start in May which gave them time to train monitors across the country before the parliamentary elections, inform stakeholders about the program and issue the first EVER report on the campaign period. Implemented through Belun, a national NGO created by international NGOs working in Timor-Leste, EVER used 35 monitors in 13 districts to track election-related violence. In total, it issued 6 reports which it sent to more than 1,000 persons of influence. Reports included advice on potential flashpoints for violence and recommendations to police, parties and other key players for prevention and intervention to reduce violence.

**Findings:** The evaluation found that NDI **met its objective** "to assist an emerging coalition of civil society organizations to monitor the 2007 elections, in order to help ensure the participation and confidence of voters in the electoral process."<sup>93</sup> It provided **timely and appropriate assistance** to the creation and functioning of KOMEG. NDI assisted the Peace and Justice Commission of the Catholic

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> In particular, IRI's 2002-2005 Agreement, where it's program description stated: "*The multi-party setting will* encourage communications among parties, political tolerance, and non-violent resolution of conflicts, as well as create opportunities for forging strategic alliances and coalitions among parties." Program Description, p 10.

 $<sup>\</sup>frac{92}{2}$  Letter from the President's Office, 2004

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>93</sup> Objective 4 of NDI's CEPPS Agreement.

Church<sup>94</sup> to create and operate a credible nonpartisan network of observers from 19 NGOs that effectively fulfilled its observation role. NDI's assistance also enabled KOMEG to expand its pool of observers by obtaining complementary funding a number of other organizations including UNIFEM and UNDP. This is a best practice where joint donor funding worked to complement and complete a common set of activities rather than recreating or duplicating efforts. So is the effort of supporting a coalition of NGOs involved in the observation effort, rather than targeting single organizations. This makes it more inclusive and a mutually reinforcing effort which is an important element in a post-conflict context.

KOMEG fielded about half of all national observation and received generally high marks in evaluation interviews and in the international observer reports. KOMEG observers were credited with professional behavior, understanding procedures better than most political party monitors and with accurately reporting their findings. KOMEG also **produced a joint statement** which is an important element for a coalition effort and difficult in a polarized environment. However, KOMEG observers felt there was a **lack of follow-up to the irregularities they reported** up their chain which left many frustrated. In addition, there was little KOMEG name recognition. Almost everyone outside of KOMEG itself knew them as "church" observers. For some this was an issue as they thought the church had taken sides and favored the opposition. The church networks provided the bulk of the observers and in interviews talked about the difficult nature of coalition building and the last minute joining of some organizations which created even more difficulties. Five organizations pulled out before the elections creating GOITL (Groupo Obsevadores Independente Timor-Leste) which fielded more than 500 observers. The KOMEG coalition ended after the parliamentary elections and the end of NDI funding for its secretariat.

It is unlikely that this coalition will reappear in its 2007 form for future elections. The Peace and Justice Commission decided it is easier to observe elections on its own and created a new network called OIPAS (Church Observation for Social Action). It will start looking for funding for OIPAS in January 2008. Nevertheless, the evaluation team found the experience of creating a coalition, observing according to a uniform check list and issuing joint statements a valuable experience for all institutions involved and that experience will be reused in future elections regardless of the configurations of the observer networks.

The evaluation also found that the IFES **EVER project strategically targeted the issue of election related conflict** which should have been a major focus area for USAID's EPP programs in Timor-Leste.

## 2. PROGRAM DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

## 2.1 Strategy and design

The EPP program in general was the continuation of activities started by each of the implementers from the lead in to the constituent elections. Their activities were then renewed through cost/time extensions and new agreements. In 2004 USAID decided to consolidate the individual programs into one program through the CEPPS mechanism. It identified a set of common sub-objectives in its request for proposals (RFP).<sup>95</sup> These were to:

- develop an impartial electoral framework that achieves broad consensus;
- improve political parties' capacity to engage in developing the national electoral laws, complete the 2007 elections and support suco level elected leaders;
- develop the oversight role of independent electoral commission;

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>94</sup> NDI was approached for assistance by a Filipino nun who was familiar with NAMFREL, a coalition of NGO domestic observers in the Philippines that was originally created with NDI assistance.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>95</sup> The three objectives in the initial 2004 RFP dealt primarily with IRI and IFES activities as NDI still had time remaining on its individual agreement. The other three were added in the 2005 RFP SOW when NDI activities came under the CEPPS umbrella.

- improve electoral administration through the government department responsible for managing • the elections;
- strengthen elected local governance bodies and the role and capacity of women and young adults • in local governance; and
- increase citizens informed participation in the national elections as voters.

The RFP used a best-practices, comparative advantage and sustainable system approach.<sup>96</sup> As CEPPS partners implement their programs individually, the proposals received and programs funded, were follow-ups and continuations of their existing programs- - with a focus on building sustainability of their activities.

During the evaluation it was apparent that the EPP program, as well as some of its individual components, had lost strategic focus. At the same time, many of the visible constraints to the

development of a stable, democratic and peaceful Timor-Leste were not being addressed. The program targeted the development of effective and sustainable systems for a newly independent country. but seemed to ignore Timor-Leste's postconflict nature and the correlations between political and electoral processes and conflict even in a stable state. Four of the six drivers of conflict identified by the 2006 USAID conflict assessment were EPP related.<sup>97</sup> Even if they had not been anticipated before the 2006 violence, once these issues became apparent, more strategic targeting of activities, locations

#### EPP DRIVERS AND TRIGGERS **OF CONFLICT**

- Unresolved divisions and rivalries among senior political leaders intensify competition and distrust among state institutions political parties and social groups.
- Many of the basic elements of a functioning and representative state are still in the early stages of development: They frequently fail to function properly and are vulnerable to partisanship.
- Increased factionalization within the FRETILIN party.
- An increasingly unhealthy and volatile rivalry between FRETILIN and other political parties and movements.
- A variety of unresolved political issues, including historical grievances as well as disagreements with the Constitutional framework and "rules of the game."

and participants within existing programs should have been done. Except for EVER, the evaluation found little indication of any retargeting or rethinking of the programs design or activities that were funded by USAID/Timor-Leste. IFES also started to implement other more specific conflict-responsive programs, but with other donor funding such as DRL.

Another design issue was the **disconnect between the objectives** of a component **and what was** 

We didn't agree with the timing of the elections, people weren't ready, they were conflicted. Their voice was not heard as most people thought the elections would solve the problems. But it made the crisis worse. Human Rights NGO

In Baucau, youth don't understand. In Vigueque, they don't even want to understand. 2007 is 1975. NGO Civic Educator

realistically achievable, given the activities chosen and the level of funding. For example, the objective would be a change of attitudes, but the means was a one-time training. There are also **no common indicators** for the EPP program across implementers that would have enabled the measurement of the cumulative effect of these programs or the comparison of results. Each agreement used a jumble of indicators some of which changed frequently. This becomes an issue beyond

tracking impact as it can result in shifting targets and activity-driven programs.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>96</sup> USAID/Timor-Leste, Scope of Work for an Associate Agreement with the Consortium for Elections and Political Process strengthening (CEPPS) 2004 p 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>97</sup> USAID, Conflict Assessment, 2006 p 17. Content of Table EPP Drives and Triggers of Conflict is also from the Conflict Assessment.

Most early agreements included a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) plan with the basics specified such as the collection of baseline data, midterm assessments and final evaluations, but these monitoring plans were not as evident after 2005. The quality of these M&E plans also varied. These are project design and management issues- rather than a reflection of cost issues. Some activities used indictors that were comparatively easy to track while others were not practical in terms of collecting the data needed to use them. The evaluation also found **few** examples where **targets** were set for an indicator over the life of an agreement **or a mechanism put into place for the systematic collection of the data** needed to measure the progress towards made meeting those targets.

**2.2** Technical assistance. All three programs focused primarily on providing services through technical assistance- - whether it was directly done by the implementer or through a subgrant to an NGO. Overall, this assistance was appreciated as was the dedication of the experts. The implementers used a capacity building approach in most cases which is a best practice. However, at the same time, there were other factors that impacted the overall effectiveness of the effort. These included:

- **length of assistance**. IFES provided short term TA rather than have a long term presence in country for financial and programmatic reasons. IRI also used short term experts. USAID encouraged this approach in the CEPPS RFP so as not to create dependencies and to give the parties and CNE time to "*reflect and develop their own ideas*."<sup>98</sup> While long-term experts are not always needed and dependency is to be avoided, programs need to balance what the job requires with the duration and frequency of their TA. Some of the CNE commissioners felt they were always "*bringing new short term experts up to speed which was not efficient*." However, the return visits by known and liked experts, such as the two IFES experts now assisting Parliament Committee A, and who can provide off-shore follow-up through the internet, can be an effective use of resources.
- selection of experts. Most of those interviewed at the national level felt the personal qualities and the experience of the expert should dictate the selection of experts, rather than other factors such as nationality or language capability. The CNE felt that some of the experts who did not meet their expectations were only chosen because they spoke Portuguese or Bahasa (this applied to the UN experts as well as to some of the IFES experts).<sup>99</sup>
- **follow through.** The differences in perception by the CNE towards the UN and IFES has to do in large part with the fact that IFES continued to provide technical experts after the 2001/2002 elections while the UN did not. The lesson learned by the UN is that elections assistance needs to be seen as a process, and not an event (and this time around has designed a sizeable post-elections assistance program). Even if funding is not available to continue the activity or keep an expert in country, virtual follow up can keep the institutional bonds intact and provide the longer-term mentoring needed to ensure its longer term sustainability.

**2.3 Training.** Many of the comments on technical assistance are also relevant to training. The EPP program included a large level of training. Some of these trainings are remembered in great detail by the participants, others are completely forgotten. Some of the factors seem to be:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>98</sup> Scope of Work for an Associate Agreement with CEPPS, September 28, 2004 p 6-7

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>99</sup> According to IFES, the CNE expressed a definite preference for language over expertise until 2007 when they realized that experience was more important than language. They also note that the English language skills of the CNE improved over time so that they now feel more comfortable communicating in English than they did in earlier years.

- **Cost.** Some of the implementers spoke of not having enough funding to do more trainings or longer ones. This is an issue related directly to the need to maintain strategic focus and prioritizing the use of available funds based on that strategic focus. It may mean fewer but more in depth trainings focused on a few key linchpins or agents of change or limiting trainings to a certain critical geographical area or population. This strategic targeting was not done in many cases.
- **Timing**. Some political parties commented about campaign training being given during the campaign period when they wanted to be out campaigning. IRI said this was because the election laws were finalized late and the only training done during the campaign period was party agent training. However, the timing of the training was an issue among some parties and their concerns should be factored into future trainings. Earlier trainings could have given parties the time to repeat trainings within their own organizations before the crunch time of a campaign. In the case of late legislation, another alternative might have been to provide the main training earlier with transfer of the updated information through discussion groups or other information dissemination methods. That could have had the advantage of repeating messages for reinforcement with the specifics of the legislation and regulations.
- **Content.** Trainings needed to be better tailored to the actual level of skills and needs of the group participating in the training. NDI addressed this issue for its civic forum activities after it was raised in its midterm evaluation. This was still an issue raised in evaluation interviews for the IRI party training which was perceived as generic by some and overly complicated by others.
- Language and context. In addition to the national context is the local context within Timor-Leste. Although 87% of the Timorese speak Tetum Praca/Dili, it is the mother tongue of only 18% of the population.<sup>100</sup> According to the Centro Nacional de Investigação Cientifica there are 32 dialects in Timor-Leste, each with its own cultural characteristics that have influenced its political character. Some materials and training may have been done in Tetum, but few were done in other languages. In addition, some materials and instructions done by program implementers were in English.<sup>101</sup> This is not effective at the district level and below. Training in most cases was standardized even though it was provided to a wide variety of participants, some whom were not literate.<sup>102</sup>
- **Targeting.** Strategic targeting seemed to be lacking in some cases for some of the IRI and NDI programs. Early programming used baselines and focus groups as a basis to target trainings, select participants and to develop content. But basic needs assessment for training, and strategic targeting of participants was less apparent in later years.
- **Testing.** Methodology and materials were not systematically tested for appropriateness before full-scale training was undertaken. It was done in some of the trainings, in particular for the civic forum and suco training, but was not evident in others. The reaction to IRI's civic education book is a good illustration of the need to field test a document before publication.
- **Practicality.** The most remembered training was linked to something practical, such as IRIs's message development course where parties developed flyers that were then printed by the UNDP

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>100</sup> USAID/Timor-Leste

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>101</sup> The UNDP party training observed by the evaluation team also used charts in English.


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>102</sup> In the case of the NDI/INAP training, the training materials and curriculum was redesigned for the 2007 training of the traditional leaders who were older and less educated than the suco councils trained in 2006.

party resource centers. The more theoretical trainings were not seen as relevant and were not remembered.

• **Duration.** Many of the programs' stated objectives were to change attitudes and practices. Yet some of the training lasted a day or less. There was little follow up, and those that did were done months or more latter. This kind of training provides exposure to new ideas and systems but its effectiveness in changing attitudes or practices is limited.

2.4 **Coordination.** Although there were some regular forums, the evaluation found coordination needed to be more systematic and broadened, with more policy level engagement. Among the good examples of regular coordination was USAID's monthly meeting of its DG implementers which was seen as a useful mechanism for information sharing and coordination, and IRI's 2007 coordination with UNDP for its 2006-2007 party-related trainings was a best practice. The UN also held a series of coordination meetings at different levels for different aspects of the process, many of these for internal UN system coordination. But other needed coordination did not take place. The prime example is the technical assistance programs to the EMB where, as discussed in Section 1.1, the lack of coordination affected the ability of donors to provide harmonized and strategic assistance and adversely affected the perceptions of the recipient organizations.<sup>103</sup> Rivalries among experts and institutions is inherent in technical assistance programs but are usually checked through the donor coordination meetings, and in extreme cases at the policy level among the principles. This was missing for the 2007 electoral process. The process could have also benefited from a more systematic coordination of USAID's programmatic interventions with the Embassy's higher-level policy work. This was also identified as an important need by the 2006 conflict assessment.<sup>104</sup>

**2.5 Program administration and management.** The evaluation found that the USAID/Timor-Leste DG office provided due diligence in its review and management of the programmatic aspects of agreement management. It reviewed documents and commented on proposals appropriately and in a



timely manner. Some of their concerns for proposals and followups were adequately addressed by implementers in their programmatic activities and budgeting but others were not with the implementers maintaining their original position. Among the issues consistently raised by USAID with the implementers was the M&E plans and the need for better indicators and collection of data.<sup>105</sup> The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>103</sup> As noted earlier, IFES does not agree with this finding believing that the lack of reciprocation from the UN of their coordination efforts did not inhibit their ability to strategically place advisors in areas of need within the CNE such as election law, media and campaign finance.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>104</sup> Conflict Assessment p 38

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>105</sup> The issue of indicators and which ones to use was an issue throughout the project. IRI's memo responding to USAID's inquiry about its M&E plan to USAID's Grants Officer in 2002 states "IRI understands and accepts the need to further elaborate the M&E plan during the first month of programming and to establish benchmarks on the basis of its baseline assessment... We plan to elaborate the M&E plan, however we are hesitant to limit ourselves to only a few narrow indicators, particularly quantitative measures. With democracy assistance, progress is most accurately measured through a broad assessment of what program partners have done. Narrow indicators, particularly quantitative measures of program impact. Democracy assistance cannot be measured in the same way as vaccinations or literacy rate."

evaluation found this continued to be a systemic problem and one which needs to be seriously addressed in future EPP programs.

The DG office found it easier to manage the individual agreements than the CEPPS agreement as in either case it found it had to deal individually with each implementer. Project management for implementers was sometimes complicated by the shifting responsibilities among USAID missions for the East Timor program, which started under USAID/Indonesia with its contracting done first from the regional office in Manila and then from Bangkok. There were an inordinate number of amendments needed for some agreements. Many of these involved continued time or cost extensions which are indicative of both design and implementation issues.

# 3. Conclusions and Recommendations

The evaluation found that the **EPP program evaluated contributed towards the achievement of all seven milestones** used by USAID/Timor-Leste in its *IR.5.2.2 Election Milestones Achieved:* 

- Development of an impartial electoral framework;
- Political parties are not presented with unfair barriers to contest and monitor the elections;
- Electoral commission operates independently;
- Political parties conduct issue-oriented campaigns that directly address voter concerns;
- Electoral administration is adequate;
- Reports of international and domestic monitors indicate free and fair elections; and
- Citizens actively participate in elections.

For the most part the indicators for each of the milestones were met in terms of the yes/no scoring required by the index. Meeting these milestones definitely **contributed towards more effective democratic governance** helping USAID/Timor-Leste to meet its *Strategic Objective 2: Key Foundations* of Good Governance Strengthened.

However, **some of the indicators** used to determine if the milestones were met **were not activities assisted by the programs under evaluation**, such as *poll workers follow procedures* or *adequate judicial review*. As a result, the meeting of the Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP) electoral benchmarks is more a reflection of the results of the overall international effort to support the electoral and political process rather than the results from specific USAID-funded interventions. According to USAID, the PMP (done in 2005) was developed before the UN mission was defined and implementers refocused some of the programs so as not to duplicate. However, the lack of appropriate indicators and cumulative tracking of results at the implementer-level makes it difficult to attribute the degree to which USAID-funded programs contributed to the meeting of the PMP milestones.<sup>106</sup> USAID also adopted indicators that measure the steps necessary to hold a credible event rather than the progress made in the broader EPP processes assisted by implementers.

# 3.1. Lessons learned

The following table summarizes some of the lessons learned for EPP assistance in Timor-Leste.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>106</sup> The yes/no nature of the index also does not allow for the accurate portrayal of the electoral process itself which, if a 1-5 or other scale had been used for each indicator, could have also helped determine the depth of its freeness and fairness. As an example, the UN Electoral Certification Team used a similar system for its determinations but ranked them by *satisfied, partially satisfied, not satisfied* and *unable to make a finding*.

Area	Lessons Learned <sup>107</sup>
Electoral framework,	Need for better coordination among donors and their programs, and between the technical implementation and policy levels.
administration and oversight	Importance of strategically planning assistance to develop the systems for an electoral process rather than limiting assistance to the confines of an electoral event. (This is a UN lesson learned, as USAID did provide assistance to a process)
Political party strengthening	Need for context-specific programs for party strengthening in post-conflict assistance that directly address zero-sum mentalities, the political roots of conflict and the disparities between strongly rooted resistance-era parties and fragile emerging parties. Usefulness of international assistance in a polarized political climate as a neutral partner and observer, and as a technical resource for political and civil society actors.
Strengthening elected governance	To make a significant difference, local governance programs need to ensure they are not done in isolation of national-level governance efforts (such as with Parliament or ministries) and target geographic areas that are critical to the country's recovery and stability.
governance	Need to develop synergies between political party strengthening programs and better governance programs in terms of developing accountability, making public policy and helping to ensure a functioning checks and balance system.
Citizen participation	Need for timely and widespread dissemination of essential information, including the why's on critical EPP topics such as the establishment of a coalition government, to accompany politically sensitive decisions and processes. This can help defuse potentially destabilizing situations and promote alternative channels for constructive communication and participation.
	There is a continuing need for constructive national dialogue and nation building after the initial peacekeeping elections are over. This is a critical link in consolidating the democratic transition and in keeping the process from reverting and should be supported by donor programming.
Program design and implementation	Program design needs to be grounded in the country context and the country's place along the conflict/development spectrum. Post-conflict democratization and stabilization requires a long-term commitment by donors and donor programs should be reassessed after major events, such as the violence in 2006 and 2007, to ensure they are still targeting the root causes of the problems.
	Each project needs a strategic vision that is captured in its performance monitoring plan and used by the project to guide its implementation and prioritize its activities.

# **Programmatic recommendations**

The national electoral cycle ended in 2007 and USAID's current EPP program is scheduled to end in March 2008. It is a good time for USAID to undertake a systematic review of the electoral and political situation, identify the major constraints to Timor-Leste's continued democratic development and develop the strategic framework for its next phase of EPP assistance.

Thee evaluation team recommends this process start with:

- an updated democracy and governance assessment to identify the primary constraints to democratic development within Timor-Leste and to recommend priority areas for DG assistance;
- a political party assessment that examines the political parties, their interactions and impact and the incentive systems under which they work;<sup>108</sup>
- a gender assessment of political parties and Parliament; and
- a national survey of voter attitudes using many of the same questions<sup>109</sup> used in TAF's 2001 and 2002 surveys.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>107</sup> These lessons learned are from the broader context of EPP assistance to Timor-Leste so include lessons learned from UN assistance as well as USAID assistance.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>108</sup> This is not the end-of-project assessment that the team recommended that IRI take in Section 1.2.1. This is an external analytical assessment similar to a DG assessment.

A DG assessment was done in 2004 to inform the development of USAID's five-year strategic plan, but at that time the institutions and political practices were so new that the assessment thought it was too soon to distill the DG challenges. Instead it raised the significant DG issues found in three categories: rule of law, good governance, and competition. An updated assessment at this point would help to further define the DG problems and help USAID to prioritize and target its DG portfolio for the future.

The evaluation team believes that the strategic approach recommended by the DG assessment is still relevant:

The strategic approach is based on two complementary guiding themes that prioritize 1) establishing checks and balances on the power of the executive and central government because the concentration of power in the hands of a small group that controls the executive, the dominant majority party, and Parliament represents an unhealthy political dynamic that could undermine the country's democratic development in the coming years; and 2) laying strategic foundational building blocks for democratic governance because the country is in the earliest stages of nation building, and most of the institutional and legal foundations do not yet exist, or are not yet functioning properly.<sup>110</sup>

The continuing need for checks and balances and accountability was evident in the evaluation as was the "*unhealthy political dynamic*" which did undermine the country's democratic development. These are issues which EPP programming should directly target as well as the other critical EPP issues identified in the 2006 conflict assessment, such as supporting *dialogue* and a *national visioning process*, addressing the *east-west divide*,<sup>111</sup> *fostering a new generation of political leaders*, and *supporting a political party development program that includes training on constitutional governance and development issues*. In fact, "*ensuring commitment to political dialogue among key domestic stakeholders*"<sup>112</sup> is the top issue listed by the UN Security Council in its most recent deliberations on Timor-Leste, as is the need for "*political reconciliation*".<sup>113</sup> The Evaluation Team believes the **USAID EPP program could make a significant difference if it assisted this process** with complementary and mutually supporting activities.

In terms of comparative advantage, in the Timor-Leste context the UN system has the overall comparative advantage for many EPP programs- - especially for institution building and increasing the participation of women. The evaluation found USAID's comparative advantage was its relative flexibility and ability to work on politically sensitive issues in an impartial and technical manner that can help to depoliticize technical processes and move the political process forward.

A DG assessment would determine the priorities for the overall DG portfolio (which includes other areas such as the rule of law). However, given the findings of the evaluation, the following priority areas are recommended for any future EPP assistance (listed in order of priority):

**Political parties.** Political dynamics and developing accountability among party leadership need to be directly addressed through strengthening the political party system and its interactions. Objectives should directly target the divisions among parties and their leadership and promote constructive dialogue,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>109</sup> To enable comparisons and track difference over time.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>110</sup> Democracy and Governance Assessment for Timor-Leste, 2004, p iii

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>111</sup> The USAID mission feels this issue was overstated in the Conflict Assessment. However, the evaluation mission found definite tension related to this issue during its field work and believes it should be included as part of the overall issues raised in any dialogue process.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>112</sup> Conflict Assessment, p 45

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>113</sup> UNSC Updated Report No 2 on Timor Leste, 2007

accountability and less partisan governance. This requires a different approach than the one used in the past. The new strategy should be tailored to the specific needs identified in the assessments and directly target the roots of the problems and the incentive systems which perpetuate them. Components that appear most relevant to the evaluation team include:

- developing issue-based dialogue and policies among the parties and between the parties, civil society and government;
- promoting reconciliation and national unity through the development of regular forums and dissemination of information from multi-party contexts (recorded and distributed to the media and community radio stations, civic educators and think tanks);
- improving the parties' ability to govern and participate effectively in the checks and balances systems (with synergistic programming with the governance component);
- strengthening the incentive systems for democratic participation by parties;
- promoting accountability for party actions and campaign promises; and
- internal democracy from national to grassroots level.

This program should use strategic tools to help parties, government and civil society focus their debate and develop policies. This includes public policy research and polling information and ensuring its wide dissemination.

**Governance.** The evaluation team recommends governance as its second priority area for EPP programming. This effort should be directly linked to party development assistance with synergistic programming on strengthening the ability of parties to govern, developing effective policies and legislation and promoting national reconciliation and dialogue. The limited capacity of government to govern effectively was identified by the Conflict Assessment as the number two driver of conflict.

Governance is a broad area and to be effective assistance should be targeted according to the strategic framework developed and priorities identified in the larger DG assessment process. From the perspective of the evaluation, the team recommends:

• targeted assistance to Parliament to strengthen its checks and balance role in terms of checking the tendencies for partisan governance; producing and understand the complexities of EPP legislation; and strengthening constituency relations and outreach. There is also an immediate need to help address the new dynamics within Parliament of coalition government and the possible instability and political gridlock that could result. This recommendation is focused within the "governance" perspective and the need to develop political consensus-- not institutional development. Any standard institutional development programs contemplated in the DG sector should only be considered after the analytical assessments recommended above are undertaken.

USAID's five year strategy includes a focus on developing local governance. To be effective this assistance also needs to well designed and targeted. Local government capacity building will become extremely important for the new government decentralization plan. The evaluation team recommends USAID consider linking any further governance assistance at the local level to the decentralization process but within the parameters identified by the 2004 DG assessment: "Once certain key governmental initiatives have been developed further (regarding sub-national elections and decentralization of the public administration), it is probable that decentralization and local governance should receive priority support. A more focused assessment could determine the relevant interventions at a later date." It also needs to be informed by the 2006 Conflict Assessment and strategically target the geographic areas prone to political conflict and divide.

**Electoral process.** The electoral process is the team's third priority in the EPP sphere. The systems function fairly well and, beyond the legislative drafting currently underway, only requires refinements to improve them over time. This is not as critical a need as the political dynamics within which it works or the governance system which defines its parameters. It is also receiving a relatively large amount of UN attention which wants to ensure that the process does not backslide. However, the evaluation team anticipates that electoral legislation, at some point, will place the STAE under the direct supervision of the CNE. This institutional change will require technical expertise in EMB management and organizational systems. Bad organization and management of the elections in a politicized and conflict-prone environment can be as damaging as deliberate undermining. The team recommends that any future assistance be strategically targeted technical assistance that addresses the long term challenges of a CNE-STAE merger and issues of electoral governance and its framework, in coordination with other donor efforts.

# **Cross-cutting issues**

The following cross cutting issues should be systematically addressed by EPP programming and integrated into its design and implementation:

**Conflict mitigation.** EPP programs work in politically sensitive areas. The links between conflict and the issues and events supported by these programs need to be recognized and directly addressed in design and implementation. Strategies should incorporate objectives that will help mitigate the impact of existing conflict and prevent future conflict. The evaluation found **the use of the USAID-funded small grants fund facilitated the work of the EPP program** enabling it to take advantage of unexpected opportunities. This type of mechanism is extremely useful for the nature of EPP programming in the context of Timor-Leste's volatile environment.

**Information.** The evaluation found a critical lack of understanding of the electoral and political processes which undermines the ability of the EPP programs to make a substantive difference. Future EPP programs should systematically maximize opportunities to disseminate information and increase the broader understanding of the populace. This should be coordinated by the large civic education efforts being undertaken by the UN and others. EPP implementers should become active participants in the Civic Education Working Group so they can leverage existing programs and materials and use the working groups networks to disseminate information.

**CSO building.** CSOs involved in EPP require organizational development, advocacy skills and financial self-sustainability so they mature beyond project-focused institutions. The evaluation team agrees with the DG assessment that civil society organization building should not be the focus of activities<sup>114</sup> given the critical nature of other priorities in the EPP sector. But civil society strengthening should be an important by-product of EPP programs. It can be incorporated into the party, governance and electoral components through the use of CSOs and civil society as implementers, trainers, advocates, participants and monitors.

**Women's political participation.** Gender and women's empowerment needs to be mainstreamed into all EPP programs and processes. Increasing women's leadership and inclusion in the decision making processes is a key element that needs to be incorporated. In particular, UNIFEM has a large-scale program in place targeted at increasing women's meaningful participation in politics and decision making


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>114</sup> "De-emphasize support to civil society organizations, while maintaining flexibility for limited and targeted interventions in this area." DG Assessment 2004

by addressing their needs before, during and after elections. Other direct assistance to women's political empowerment should only be done in coordination with this program and only after the information is available from the analytical assessments for its design. This should include a gender analysis of political parties and elected offices that identify the critical barriers to equal participation and representation in both these arenas. A gap evident to the team in the UNIFEM program appeared to be the provision of EPP-related technical information to women MPs which is something that could easily be addressed within existing programs.

**Youth participation.** The evaluation found many youth engaged in the political and electoral processes and well represented in efforts such as the KOMEG observation and suco councils. They tended to be marginalized in political parties, although youth wings exist. Increasing the constructive participation of youth should be a cross-cutting element with the next generation of political leaders as an important target group.

Annex 1

ANNEX 2 USAID/Timor-Leste Strategic Framework and Results Framework



# USAID/TIMOR-LESTE PERFORMANCE INDICATOR ELECTION MILESTONES

1. Development of an impartial electoral framework: A. Opposition parties included in dialogue. B. Adequate complaint process. C. Adequate judicial review.

2. Political parties are not presented with unfair barriers to contest and monitor the elections: A. Protections for opposition parties contained in electoral framework are upheld in practice. B. Party agents have access to monitor polls. C. Parties have access to appropriate complaint mechanisms. D. State resources are not used to benefit particular candidates or parties.

3. Electoral Commission operates independently: A. Commission's role and procedures are clear. B. Commission is given necessary operating budget. C. Citizens have access to Commission. D. Complaints addressed fairly and in timely fashion. E. Commissions submits appropriate complaint to Court of Appeals. F. Commission's reports are valid.

4. Political parties conduct issue-oriented campaigns that directly address voter concerns: A. Party platforms are in public domain. B. Parties use mechanism to determine voter concerns. C. Issue oriented campaign material is developed and disseminated. D. Candidates participate in community-organized debates. E. Parties make use of media.

5. Electoral administration is adequate: A. Voters are educated. B. Candidates are registered fairly. C. Voter lists are credible. D. Poll workers follow procedures. E. Voter count is efficient. F. Electoral statistics are released.

6. Reports of international and domestic monitors indicate free and fair elections. A. State resources are not used to benefit parties or candidates. B. Voter turnout is strong. C. Counting is transparent. D. Election results accepted by voters.

7. Citizens actively participate in elections. A. Attendance at candidate debates is high. B. Volunteers participate in campaigning in large numbers. C. Voter turnout is high.

# ANNEX 3 IFES TECHNICAL EXPERTS

IFES EXPERTS AND MISSIONS							
Contract Dates	Expert	Purpose/Expertise					
10/07 - 11/07	Robert Dahl	Senior Legal Advisor-Election Law Reform					
6/07 - 8/07	Victor Butler	Technical Advisor-Election Administration					
5/07 - 7/07	Hank Valentino	Technical Advisor-Media and Public Outreach					
3/07 - 4/07	Grant Kippen	Technical Advisor-Election Complaints & Political Finance					
2/07 - 8/07	Michael Clegg	CNE Legal Advisor & Complaints Adjudication Specialist					
2/07	Victor Butler	CNE Trainer & Advisor (Election Administration)					
12/06 - 7/07	Mauricio Claudio Lopez-Rivera	Elections Technical Expert & Trainer - Operations & Election Admin.					
9/06 - 10/06	David Ennis	Legal Support Advisor - Representation Systems					
3/06- 4/06	Kare Vollan	Electoral Systems and Law Advisor					
3/05 - 2/06	Diana Serafini	Civic Education assessment - STAE and CNE March 2005					
3/05 - 2/06	Edward Bogado	Voter Education assessment - STAE and CNE March 2005					
3/05 - 2/06	Harun Din	Electoral Commission Advisor					
3/05 - 2/06	Jorge I. Tirado	IT/Voter Registration Specialist March 2005					
3/05 - 2/06	Paulo Sequeira	IT/Voter Registration Specialist					
5/05 - 2/06	Kerry Heisner	Election Commission Advisor					
4/05 - 12/05	Manuel da Cruz	Support for STAE Voter Registration					
7/05 - 10/05	Fernando LaTorre	Legal Advisor - CNE					
7/05 - 9/05	Sonia Cecilia Correia	Administrative Support to CNE					
12/04 - 1/05	Phylis Greenfield	Semi-Annual Report Writing					
6/04 -12/04	Harun Din	Election Commission Advisor					
4/04 - 5/04	Victor Butler	Election Administration Advisor					
11/03 - 3/04	Paulo Sequiera	IT/VR Advisor for STAE					
4/04	Elizabeth Ximenes Belo	Administrative Support for CNE					
8/03 - 12/03	Celio Santos	IT/VR Advisor for STAE					
6/03 - 7/03	Teresita Flores	Election Law/Admin Advisor - CNE					
11/02 - 12/02	Alan Wall	Election Administration Advisor - Assessment					
8/01 - 8/02	Victor Butler	Election Administration Advisor - Monitoring & Assessment					
3/02 - 7/02	Kerry Heisner	Election Administration Advisor - Assessment					
	Staff						
11/06 -present	Mary Lou Schramm	Country Director					
1/06 - 11/06	Mauricio Claudio	Country Director					
8/06 - present	Bernardo Cardoso	Program Officer					
2/07 - present	Nico Fonseca	Interpreter, Translator, Program Assistant					
	CEPPS funded 497-G-00-01-00039 funded						

# ANNEX 4 PARTIES ASSISTED BY IRI

	POLITICAL PARTIES IN PAR									EAST RTY BU				IRI AS	SIST	'ANC	E					
PARTY	Estb					SEA	TS				BA	SELI	INE				PAR	TY BU	ILDIN	NG		
					-	-	SUC	0	-	-					ts g		•	ce		ies	rty DP	Ich
		2001	2002	Chefe Suco	Traditional Leader	Male Youth	Female Youth	Adult Women	Chefe de Aldeia	TOTAL	2002	2003	2005	2002-2003 Leadership	2003 grassroots party training	2003 poll consultations	2003 Road to Democracy trainings	2004 party office training	2004 poll consultations	2004 Party rallies	2006 - 2007 party building w/ UNDP	2008 Party Bench Training
TOTAL		88	65	442	442	442	442	884	2237	4889	12	12	12	12 <sup>115</sup>	12	12	12	1	4	2	17	8
ASDT	1974	6		4	1	1		6	25	37	$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
FRETILIN	1974	55	21	258	276	266	278	567	1,319	2964	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
KOTA	1974	2								0	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$				$\checkmark$	
UDT	1974	2								0	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$				$\checkmark$	
PST	2001	1		2	7	8	9	14	39	79	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$				$\checkmark$	
PNT	1999	2								0	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$				$\checkmark$	
PDC	2000									0	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$				$\checkmark$	
UDC		1								0	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$				$\checkmark$	
PPT	2000	2								0	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$				$\checkmark$	
PSD	2000	6		9	8	12	8	26	67	130	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
PD	2001	7	8	34	27	35	27	56	208	387	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
PL		1								0	$\checkmark$			$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$				$\checkmark$	
PMD	2005							1		1											$\checkmark$	
CNRT	2007		18							0											$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
PR	2005									0											$\checkmark$	
Independents		1		134	122	111	116	202	528	1213												

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>115</sup> IRI focused on 4 parties with individual attention after 2002 baseline until 2004: ASDT, FRETILIN, PSD, PD

	POLITICAL PARTIES IN EAST TIMOR AND IRI ASSISTANCE																						
	PARTY BUILDING												1										
PARTY	Estb					SEA	TS				BA	SELI	INE				PAR	TY BU	ILDI	NG	r		
							SUC	0							S 50		-	ce		ies	'ty DP	ch	
		2001	2007	Chefe Suco	Traditional Leader	Male Youth	Female Youth	Adult Women	Chefe de Aldeia	TOTAL	2002	2003	2005	2002-2003 Leadership	2003 grassroots party training	2003 poll consultations	2003 Road to Democracy trainings	2004 party office training	2004 poll consultations	2004 Party rallies	2006 - 2007 party building w/ UNDP	2008 Party Bench Training	
TOTAL		88	65	442	442	442	442	884	2237	4889	12	12	12	12115	12	12	12	1	4	2	17	8	
UNDERTIM	2005		2							0											$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	
PUN	2006		3							0											$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	
ASDT/PSD			11							0												$\checkmark$	
KOTA/PPT			2							0													
APODETI										0													
PARENTIL										0													
TOTAL PERSONS																					M: 578 F: 140 T: 718	M: 40 F: 20 T: 60	

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	POLITICAL PARTIES IN EAST TIMOR AND IRI ASSISTANCE Election Related																			
PARTY	Estb				SE	ATS					WO	MEN			ELEC	FION I	RELA	TED		
							SUCO	)			0.	to	ing	ng	ing	dı	ing	gui	007	08
		2001	2007	Chefe Suco	Traditional Leader	Male Youth	Female Youth	Adult Women	Chefe de Aldeia	TOTAL	2003 WC/MP lunches	2003-4 WC MP to districts	Party agent training 2001	Coalition forming training 2003	Party agent training 2006	Working Group 2005	Campaign training 2006	Campaign training 2007	Agent training 2007 (2 rounds)	Post election 2008
TOTAL		88	65	441	441	433	438	872	2186	4811	5	5	15	5	13	3	13	17	17	4
ASDT	1974	6		4	1	1		6	25	37	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	
FRETILIN	1974	55	21	258	276	266	278	567	1,319	2964	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	
KOTA	1974	2								0					$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	
UDT	1974	2								0	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$			$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	
PST	2001	1		2	7	8	9	14	39	79			$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	
PNT	1999	2								0	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	
PDC	2000									0			$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	
UDC		1								0			$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	
PPT	2000	2								0			$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	
PSD	2000	6		9	8	12	8	26	67	130	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
PD	2001	7	8	34	27	35	27	56	208	387					$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
PL		1								0					$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	
PMD	2005							1		1					$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	
CNRT	2007		18							0								$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
PR	2005									0								$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	
Independent		1		134	122	111	116	202	528	1213			$\checkmark$							
UNDERTIM	2005		2							0								$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	
PUN	2006		3							0								$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
ASDT/PSD			11							0										

	POLITICAL PARTIES IN EAST TIMOR AND IRI ASSISTANCE Election Related																			
PARTY	PARTY Estb SEATS							SEATS WOMEN						ELECTION RELATED						
		SUCO				_	to	ing	gu	ing	d	ng	gu	2007	2008					
		2001	2007	Chefe Suco	Traditional Leader	Male Youth	Female Youth	Adult Women	Chefe de Aldeia	TOTAL	2003 WC/MP lunches	2003-4 WC MP to districts	Party agent training 2001	Coalition forming training 2003	Party agent training 2006	Working Group 2005	Campaign training 2006	Campaign training 2007	Agent training 2( (2 rounds)	Post election 20
TOTAL		88	65	441	441	433	438	872	2186	4811	5	5	15	5	13	3	13	17	17	4
KOTA/PPT			2							0										
APODETI										0										
PARENTIL										0			$\checkmark$							
TOTAL PERSONS													2001: 450 2002: 350					256		

# 

# ANNEX 5 SUCOS ASSISTED BY NDI

DISTRICT	# OCS	# OF CF GROUPS IN OCS	MEN	WOMEN
Ainaro	7	15	14	21
Aileu	7	18	22	16
Baucau	4	14	6	16
Maliana	8	19	34	24
Dili	1	2	4	1
Manufahi	8	13	25	13
Ermera	8	18	29	17
Liquica	6	18	9	2
Lautem	7	20	35	23
Viqueque	6	12	14	16
Oecussi	4	11	11	10
Manatuto	5	9	9	15
Suai	8	15	22	26
TOTALS	79	184	234	200

# I. List of Organizing Committees (OC) by district

# II. Location of Second Round Suco Council trainings

District	Sub-District	Suco	District	Sub-District	Suco
	Laulara	Talitu	- Ermera	Letefoho	Ducurai
	Liquidoe	Acubilitoho	Ermera	Leterono	Hatugau
Aileu	Liquidoe	Fahisoi	Lautem	Iliomar	Fuat
Alleu		Acumao	Lautem	momai	Tirilolo*
	Remixio	Faturasa	Liquica	Bazartete	Leorama
		Tulataqueo			Farumacerec
Baucau	Baguia	Alawa Kraik	Manatuto	Soibada	Manufahi
Daucau	Dagula	Larisula			Samoro
	Balibo	Balibo Villa			Beremana
	Cailaco	Atudara			Caimauk
	Callaco	Purugoa			Fatucalo
Bobonaro	Lolotoe	Opa		Turiscai*	Foholau
Doboliaro	Lolotoe	Lupal	Manufahi		Liurai
		Raifun			Mamumera
	Maliana	Ritubau			Orana
		Tapo Memo		Alas	Aituha
	Fatululik*	Fatululik		Alas	Taitudac
	Fatululik	Taroman	Viqueque	Uatucarbao	Afaloicai
		Belulik Leten	• iqueque	UatucalDao	Bahatata
Covalima	Fatumea	Fatumea	TOTAL	18	42
		Namu			
	Fohorem	Datorua			
	ronorem	Lactos			

District	Sub-District	Suco	District	Sub-District	Suco
		Cotolau		Cailaco	Atudara
		Fatisi		Callaco	Purugoa
	Laulara	Madabeno			Holsa
		Talitu			Lahomea
		Tohumeta	Bobonaro (cont.)		Odomau
		Acubilitoho		Maliana	Raifun
		Berelau			Ritabou
		Betulau			Saburai
	Liquidoe	Fahisoi			Tapo/Memo
Aileu		Faturilau			Belulic Leten
Alleu		Manucasa		Fatumean	Fatumean
		Namoleso			Nanu
		Acumao			Dato Tolu*
		Fadabloco	Covalima	Echonom	Dato Rua
		Fatisi		Fohorem	Fohorem
	Remexio	Faturasa			Lactos
	Kelliexio	Hautuho		Fatululik	Fatululik
		Maumeta		Fatululik	Taroman
		Suco-Liurai			Aituha
		Tulataque			Dotic
		Aidabaleten		Alas	Mahaquidan
	Atabae	Atabae			Taitudac
	Atabae	Hataz			Uma Berloic*
		Rairobo			Aitemua
		Balibo Vila			Beremana
		Batugade	Manufahi		Caimauc
	Daliha	Cowa	— Manufahi		Fatucalo
	Balibo	Leohito			Foholau
		Leolima		Turiscai	Lesuata
		Sanirin			Liurai
		Ai-Assa			Manumera
		Atu-Aben			Matorec
		Bobonaro			Mindelo
Dehenere		Carabau			Orana
Bobonaro		Colimau	Total	13	82
		Cotabot			
		Ilat-Laun			
		Leber			
	Dehenene	Lour			
	Bobonaro	Lourba			
		Male-Ubu			
		Malilait			
		Molop			
		Oe-Leu			
		Sibuni			
		Soileu	7		
		Таро			
		Tebabui	-1		

# III. Location of First Round Suco Trainings

# ATTACHMENT A

# TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE EVALUATION OF THE ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PROCESSES PROGRAM IN TIMOR-LESTE November – December 2007

# I. <u>SUMMARY</u>

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Timor-Leste seeks to conduct an evaluation that will: (1) evaluate the impact of elections and political processes programming to determine what contribution activities made to a more representative and consensual multi-party system; (2) evaluate the impact of elections and political processes programming to women's participation in the political process and the capacity of women in politics, and (3) make recommendations as to where USAID programs may have comparative advantage for future assistance in these or other related areas.

# II. <u>PURPOSE OF THE EVALUTION</u>

The purpose of this evaluation is to learn from the experiences of previous years efforts by USAID and to gain insights as to the impact of USAID Timor-Leste's democracy and governance programming. The evaluation will consider the impact programming has had on achieving results under USAID's Strategic Objective for Democracy and Governance: *Strengthen Key Foundations of Good Governance*, including the Mission cross-cutting objective on addressing gender issues and marginalized areas (access of information and inclusion of rural populations in the political process).

The product of this evaluation will be a final report which evaluates the successes or shortcomings and lessons learned of recent programming. The report should include recommendations for future assistance if USAID programs have particular comparative advantage of areas not addressed by other initiatives.

The evaluation will be led by a consultant with experience in conducting electoral program evaluations for USAID. The evaluation team will be selected by the USAID Mission in consultation with USAID/DCHA/DG. The team will include some or all of the following: USAID/DCHA/DG representative, USAID/Timor-Leste representative, regional USAID Mission program staff, and local consultants or researchers.

Specifically, the team will evaluate the contributions made by the following programs in meeting the Mission's DG Strategic Objective: *Strengthen Key Foundations of Good Governance*, and relevant intermediate results:

# 1. Electoral Support and Local Governance (CEPPS)

(1) Develop an impartial electoral framework that achieves broad consensus;

(2) improve political parties' capacity to engage in developing the national electoral laws, compete in the 2007 elections and support *suco* level elected leaders;

(3) develop the oversight role of independent electoral commission;

(4) improve electoral administration through the government department responsible for managing the elections;

(5) strengthen elected local governance bodies and the role and capacity of women and young adults in local governance;

(6) and, increase citizens' informed participation in the national elections as voters, monitors and/or candidates.

Evaluate the effectiveness of USAID interventions in the political processes sector, through Cooperative Agreement No. **DGC-A-00-01-00004-00**, **Electoral Support and Local Governance**, implemented by Consortium for Elections and Political Processes Strengthening (CEPPS). The CEPPS agreement started in February 2005 and was extended to March 31, 2008 for a total of \$3,950,000. (NDI, IRI and IFES) The separate program components for each consortium partner is as follows:

(1) IFES- "Develop the oversight role of independent electoral commission" activities: **Project dates:** February 2006 – September 30, 2007, Budget: \$1,192,000;

(2) International Republican Institute's (IRI)- "Develop an impartial electoral framework that achieves broad consensus" activities:

# Project dates: February 2006 – September 30, 2007, , Budget: \$,1,616,000;

(3) National Democratic Institute's (NDI)- "Improve electoral administration through the government department responsible for managing the elections" activities:

Project dates: September 2005 – September 30, 2007, Budget: \$992,000.

# 2. Previous Grants or Agreements

All three organizations under the CEPPS agreement have been working in Timor-Leste on USAID funding from early 2001 to the present on programs related to election and civic participation for a total USAID investment of \$9.5 million. As the current CEPPS partners are building from relationships and lessons learned from these earlier grants and agreements for elections and political participation, these earlier programs should be included in the evaluation process and are as follows:

- NDI Civic Forum Civic Advocacy and Monitoring Program; 3/21/01 12/31/05 at \$2,736,431
- IRI Political Party Development; 2/02 2/05 at \$1,557,137 (following an earlier grant 3/01-9/02 at \$725,000)
- IFES Election assistance; 6/23/01 12/04 at \$499,997

Other election related programs that were not continued through the 2007 elections will not fall within the scope of this evaluation. These include closed grants to The Carter Center for International Election Observation; The Asia Foundation for Domestic Election Monitoring; and Internews for independent media and the elections. Also the USAID Small Grants for elections will not be included.

# BACKGROUND

The development of Timor-Leste's democratic institutions and increasing citizen participation have been key areas of USAID/Timor-Leste investments since USAID/OTI and longer-term USAID Mission programming since 2000, after the post referendum destruction.

Timor-Leste is in the process of establishing itself as a parliamentary democratic republic with a semipresidential system. The country has undergone tremendous political upheaval and change in recent years. Following hundreds of years of Portuguese colonial rule and then 25 years of violent Indonesian occupation, Timor-Leste underwent a UN-administered referendum process in 1999 that resulted in a successful vote for independence. Immediately following announcement of the referendum results, the country suffered a horrendous period of violence and destruction that was orchestrated by prointegrationist militia and the Indonesian armed forces. The violence was ended through the intervention of an international military force on 20 September 1999, and the exodus of the Indonesians. Following this, Timor-Leste underwent a two-year transitional period under the auspices of the UN to prepare itself for independence. In May 2002, the country became the newest nation and the newest democracy in the world. The establishment and consolidation of the key elements of democratic governance remain a challenge facing the young nation. Following the instability of the security and political crisis in Timor-Leste in 2006, USAID conducted a Conflict and Vulnerability Assessment. The report encouraged USAID to invest in youth employment, land tenure issues, improving access to justice and other conflict mitigation measures. Recommendations were included in the democracy and governance, and noted that USAID's current programming "is inadequate to respond to the current crisis or to substantially address the major drivers of conflict as identified by the assessment team." The assessment included the somewhat contradictory recommendations of investing more in certain areas however cautioning to seek a greater "critical mass" in the DG programming. The election program was cited as a DG program that demonstrated a critical mass in the lead up to the national elections.

The anticipated budget for FY08 limits the scope of what the Mission can achieve in the democracy and governance sector and the Mission is seeking to consolidate its DG program with greater emphasis on the rule of law and evaluate performance across its program sectors. In May-June 2007 DCHA through the RIGHTS Consortium conducted a Rule of Law Assessment. In 2008 USAID intends to evaluate its Rule of Law programs.

# III. EVALUATION QUESTIONS

- A. Determine the accomplishments and the effectiveness of the above programs in making progress towards in achieving the Mission's DG Strategic Objective: *Strengthen Key Foundations of Good Governance*, and relevant intermediate results.
- *B.* What are the generalized lessons learned regarding the approach, design content, management structure, and duration of USAID/Timor-Leste's support to these programs?
- *C.* How effective were the various working relationships established with, between and within the stakeholders?
- *D.* Did the program adequately strengthen Key Foundations of Good Governance (value of positive impact for USG resources invested)?
- *E.* Were stated Mission Goals appropriate to the Timor-Leste context and was USAID management appropriate and able to effectively respond to changes on the ground?

Additional questions which the Team might seek to address are the following:

- If the above mentioned objectives were not met, why not?
- Are there alternative explanations that could account for the observed result? Can it be established that other factors besides USAID activities are responsible for the activity results?
- What aspects of the Election and Political Participation programs in Timor-Leste have been most or least effective in contributing to achieving the strategic objective results? Which activities are likely to lead to lasting impact or be sustainable?
- Were there any unintended consequences and/or effects of USAID-funded assistances activities, either positive or negative?
- Are there any lessons learned regarding activity sequencing, tailoring inputs to specific target groups, or activities that are more likely to lead to more sustainable outcomes?
- How well did the programs keep abreast of developments and challenges and make timely adjustments to prevent or minimize adverse effects on the activity?

# IV. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

It is expected that the evaluation will be conducted using mostly key informant interviews and review of the existing literature. If possible, the Mission and evaluation team may decide to conduct a survey such as that previously undertaken in Uganda as part of a recent similar evaluation.

Before undertaking fieldwork in Timor-Leste, team members shall familiarize themselves with previous and current documentation about the projects. USAID/Timor-Leste will provide relevant documentation to the team. The literature includes:

- Program description and subsequent modifications for the Cooperative Agreement No. DGC-A-00-01-00004-00, "Timor-Leste: Electoral Support and Local Governance"
- Partners' work plans and PMPs
- Partners' quarterly or semi annual reports
- Key manuals or tools developed by partners
- Written briefing materials on the programs, activity reports, success stores and any other relevant documentation deemed necessary
- Democracy and Governance Assessment Report; Gender Assessment Report; CVA
- Other referential or historic documents which might be identified by USAID

USAID/Timor-Leste will provide the team with input and guidance on setting up a schedule of interviews and site visits and through purchase order hire support staff.

Prior to his/her departure to the field, the USAID/DCHA/DG Technical Advisor will spend three days in Washington D.C. conducting interviews with partner Home Office staff, USAID staff and reviewing background program documents with relevant USAID officials in the Democracy and Governance and ANE Bureau offices to gain a better understanding of the situation in Timor-Leste.

The field work will be conducted over a three-week period. The team will brief the USAID Mission prior to the departure of the expatriate team members. A draft report will be provided to the Mission and DCHA for review and comment within three weeks after the close of field work. The Mission/DCHA shall have no longer than two weeks for review and comment and the evaluation team leader will then submit the final report within two weeks after receiving Mission/DCHA comments.

# ATTACHMENT B METHODOLOGY

USAID/Timor-Leste commissioned this Evaluation to evaluate the impact of its elections and political processes programming in Timor-Leste since 2002. Specifically, the evaluation looked at assistance provided through the following agreements:

Implementer	Title	Number	Dates	\$
CEPPS (IFES, IRI, NDI)	Electoral Support & Local Governance	497-A-00-05-00025	02/25/05 - 03/31/08	3,950,000
IRI	East Timor Political Parties	497-A-00-02-00053	09/30/02 - 01/31/05	1,557,134
IFES	Elections Support in East Timor	497-G-00-01-00039	07/23/01 - 03/31/05	499,997
NDI	Citizen Participation & Political Party Development, Civic Forum	497-G-00-01-00015	03/31/01 - 06/30/06	2,736,490
IRI	Elections Support for East Timor Political Party Training & Supporting Women's Leadership	497-G-00-01-00013	03/22/01 - 10/15/02	820,000
TOTAL			03/22/01 - 03/31/08	9,563,621

The purpose of the evaluation was to: learn from the experiences of USAID programming in these areas; determine the impact programming has had on achieving results under USAID's Strategic Objective for Democracy and Governance: *Strengthen Key Foundations of Good Governance*, including USAID's cross-cutting objective of addressing gender issues and marginalized areas (access of information and inclusion of rural populations in the political process); and make recommendations for future assistance. As some of the programs pre-dated Timor-Leste's independence, the evaluation team focused on activities following its independence in 2002 when Timor-Leste took over responsibility for implementing its own electoral and political electoral processes.

The Evaluation was held in Timor-Leste from November 26 to December 15, 2007 by a team of experts in electoral assistance and processes. It was led by an independent expert in electoral and political processes, Sue Nelson who also responsible for writing the report, and included Barbara Smith from DCHA/DG; Gerardo Porta, OEDG Office, USAID/Philippines, and Filipe Da Costa, Program Officer USAID/Timor-Leste. The team was assisted in its site visits and interviews by Ilido Ximenes Da Costa and Leopoldo Belo with logistical support by Maria Maya Boavida.

Interviews were held in Timor-Leste in both the capital Dili and in site visits to the districts of Aileu, Ainaro, Baucau, Bobonaro Liquica, Lospalos, Manatuto and Viqueque. Additional interviews were held with CEPPS partners in Washington and with others by e-mail (Attachment 3). Available project documentation was reviewed along with other reports on EPP in Timor-Leste (Attachment 4).

The programs were evaluated against both USAID/Timor-Leste's strategic framework and intermediate results and against the stated objectives in each agreement (Annex 1). As can be noted, indicators and objectives changed during the course of most of the agreements, making cumulative tracking of outputs and results difficult. In addition, the evaluation team found short institutional memories and changes in personnel that made the collection of basic data needed for the evaluation difficult. The information detailed in Annex 1 and throughout the evaluation report represent a best-effort to compile available

information. More complete information for each agreement can be found in their respective final reports or from the implementer.

# ATTACHMENT C PERSONS MET

# DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF TIMOR LESTE

#### CNE

Faustino Cardoso, President Maria Angelina Lopes Sarmento, Member and Spokesperson José Luís Oliveira José Luís Oliveira, Former Commissioner Carmelita Caetano Moniz, Former Commissioner Lúcia Belo de Assis, Focal Person, Bobonaro

# STAE

Tomás Do Rosário Cabral, Director Amado Mais, Logistics Officer District Coordinator, Ainaro Head of Voter Registration team, Baucau Crescência Faria and Registration team, Lospalos Head of Voter Registration team, Manututu Registration Staff, Viqueque

#### **Ombudsman for Human Rights and Justice**

Dr. Sebastião Dias Ximenes, Provedor

#### Parliament

Arsénio Paixão Bano, MP FRETILIN Fernanda Borges, MP, Chairman Committee A from PUN Carmelita Caetano Moniz, Secretary Commission A from CNRT Mário Carrascalão, MP PSD Cornélio Gama (L7), MP, from UNDERTIM Manuel Tilman, MP, Chairman Committee C, (Economic, Finance, and Anti-Corruption) from KOTA/PPT

# Executive

José de Jesus, Presidential Advisor District Administrator, Aileu Manuel Pereira, Vice District Administrator, Ainaro Manuel Ramos, District Development Officer, Ainaro António Guterres, Deputy District Administrator, Baucau CDOs, Bobonaro Sub-District Administrator, Bobonaro Elvino Bonaparte do Rego, District Officer Administration, Manututu

#### INAP

Agustinho Letâncio de Deus, Director

#### **Suco Councils**

Ernesto De Sousa, Fatulia Village Chief, Baucau

Júlio Baptista, Suco Chief Bahu, Baucau City Suco Chiefs, Bobonaro Cornélio Eusébio Ribeiro, Suco Chief, Mahena Satu, Lospalos District Américo Fernandes, Former Village Chief, Mahena Satu, Lospalos District Fernando Horácio, Suco Chief Daudere, Lospalos District Suco Council, Raifun Maria da Costa, Suco Council Member, Remexio Subdistrict, Aileu

# CIVIL SOCIETY AND MEDIA

#### BELUN

António da Conceição, Director

# BBH (Baucau Buka Hatene) Baucau

Teresa Pereira, Acting Director Jaquelina Belo, Acting Director

# CAILALO, Baucau

Augusto Pires, Director Duarte, Trainer Manuel, Trainer Constantina, Treasurer

#### Citizens

Lidia Da Costa, Shop Keeper and Voter, Lospalos Olinda Dos Santos, Voter at Mahena Satu Village, Lospalos District.

#### **CNIC (National Research Center)**

Faustino Cardoso, Director Yohanes Osboku, Member

# FONGTIL

Maria Angelina Sarmento, Director

# GFFTL

Odete de Jesus Amaral, Office Manager

# **HAK Association**

José Luís Oliveira, Director

# **KOMEG**

Father Augustinho, Coordinator Dili Faviana, Radio Fini Loro Sae, District Coordinator, Baucau João Pedro Godinho Soares, District Coordinator, Manututo Tomás Aquino, District Coordinator, Viqueque Filomena Dos Santos, District Coordinator, Liquica Bartolomeu Dos Santos, Observer, Liquica

# Moris Foun, Manututu

Eugénia Neves Da Costa, Director

#### **Peace and Justice Commission**

Father José, Lospalos Maria Natália, Liquica

Rede Feto Timor Leste Ubalda Alves, Director

#### RTTL

Rozário Martins, Radio Director

# Women's Caucus

Terezinha Cardoso Laura Pina

# **POLITICAL PARTIES**

# ASDT

José de Jesus, Deputy Secretary

# CNRT Congresso Nacional para a Reconstrucao de Timor

Carmelita Caetano Moniz, MP, Commission A Francisco Ribeiro, Chief of Administration Pedro Horácio,, Logistics Jorge Cristovão, Trainer Francisco Belo, District Secretary, Baucau

# FRETILIN Frente Revolucionária do Timor Leste Independente

Arsénio Paixão Bano, Vice President and MP Alfredo Menezes Dos Santos, Member of District Political Commission, Viqueque District

# KOTA Klibur Oan Timor Asuain

Manuel Tilman, President

# **PD** Partido Democratico

Adriano Suares District President, Bobonara Nazário da Costa, Secretary, Lospalos Cosme Pinto, Secretary, Viqueque

# PDC Partido Democratica Cristao

Rev Arlindo Marçal, Secretary General

# PDRT

Osorio Mauleki, Secretary General.

# PNT Partido Nacionalista Timorense

Carlos De Carvalho, Secretary General Aliança Conceição de Araújo

#### PPT/AD Partido do Povo de Timor

Agapito de Fátima, President Ainaro District

#### PR Partidu Republikanu

João Mariano Saldanha, President

# PSD Partido Social Democratia Timor Lorosae

Mário Carrascalão, President and MP Fernando, Staff

#### PUN

Fernanda Borges, President and MP

# UDT Uniao Democratica Timorense

Cipriano Gonçalves, Vice President

**UNDERTIM Unidade Nacional Democratica da Resistencia Timorense** Cornélio Gama (L7), President and MP

# INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES AND ORGANIZATIONS

#### AUSAID

Augusto Ximenes Pereira, Program Officer and ETCAS Manager

# **Catholic Relief Services**

Richard Markowski, Head of Programming Catharina Maria, Program Manager, Peace Building and Civic Participation Ray, Project Coordinator

# Friends of Baucau, Australia

Loraine McBride, District Coordinator

# IFES

May Lou Schramm, Country Director Bernardo Cardoso, Senior Program Officer Kyle LeMargie, IFES Washington

# **International Republican Institute**

Christopher Wyrod, Resident Program Officer Kimber Shearer, IRI Washington

# **National Democratic Institute**

Telibert Laoc, Country Director Terry Hoerveter, NDI Washington

# New Zealand Embassy

Chris Day, Deputy Head of Mission

#### **Portuguese Embassy**

Maria de Fátima Mendes, Ministra Conselheira Pedro Teles, Portuguese Cooperation

# **United Nations Development Programme**

Dan Radulescu, Training and Capacity Building Coordinator, Support to the Timorese Electoral Cycle

Karen Kelleher, Graphic Designer, Support to the Timorese Electoral Cycle Jacinto Guterres, District Coordinator, UNDP Party Resource Center, Baucau Horácio Boneo, by e-mail

# UNIFEM

Dianna Arboleda, Officer-in-Charge Chris Parkinson, Communications

# UNMIT

Vera Monteiro, Officer-in-Charge, Legal Officer, DGSU Carla Duarte, Training Officer, DGSU Elsebacy Islam, UNPOL Commander, Viqueque

# **U.S. Embassy**

Lurdes Bessa, Political Office

# **USAID/Timor-Leste**

Nicole Seibel, Democracy Officer, Office of Democracy and Governance Isabel Ximenes, Democracy and Governance Office, CTO CEPPS Ana Lourenço Guterres, Democracy and Governance Office Brian Frantz, Program Officer, Program Office and Acting Mission Director Dorvin Stockdale, Economic Growth Office

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# AMFREL

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# Belun

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# ANNEX 1 ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PROCESSES PROGRAM IN TIMOR-LESTE AGREEMENT-LEVEL RESULTS

# Status as of December 31, 2007

# I. CEPPS Agreement No 497-A-00-05-00025 February 22, 2005 – March 30, 2008

# INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTION SYSTEMS 2/22/05 – 3/31/08

**STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE:** Develop the national electoral framework in a participatory and transparent manner to ensure broad consensus and support for the electoral process.

*Result:* Electoral framework was adopted that ensured broad consensus and support for the electoral process with the exception of the last minute amendment that switched the location for ballot counting for the parliamentary elections. This was adopted by Parliament despite widespread opposition party and CSO disapproval.

# **OBJECTIVE 1**

Amended Objective:<sup>116</sup> Develop an impartial electoral framework that achieves broad consensus

Indicator	Current Status	Result
1. Number of IFES/CNE/STAE recommendations that are incorporated into draft electoral legislation <i>Amended</i>	<ul> <li>2006; Provided commentary on EMB law, presidential election law, parliamentary election law</li> <li>Parliament Law: Dropped threshold from 5% to 3%.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>2006: Reduction in threshold to 3% resulted in 2 more parties and one coalition winning seat in election; quotas adopted for women; permanent CNE adopted; CNE received independent funding from the state budget; enhanced authority for CNE.</li> <li>2008: CNE oversees party funding</li> </ul>
2. Number of CNE Commissioners, MPs, political party representatives and CSO representatives informed on limitations of the existing election law and options for change. <i>Amended</i>	<ul> <li>2006: All MPs, political parties and key CSOs received IFES comments &amp;</li> <li>2 reports commissioned from:</li> <li>(1) 2 CNE commissioners with recommendations for permanent CNE,</li> <li>(2) NGO view from district level</li> <li>(ETPA contract for workshop) on features electoral framework.</li> <li>(3) IFES Discussion Briefs on election law issues</li> </ul>	Per IFES: 2006: after all MPs, political parties, and relevant CSOs received IFES reports on drafts with recommendations the opposition produced alternate draft. 2007: All CNE members

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>116</sup> The objectives and indicators changed in most agreements through the life of the project. "Original" refers to those used in the original agreement or in original reporting. "Amended" refers to objectives that were added later either through amendments or through changes in reporting.

	IFES sponsored TV/radio show on some topics 2007: Suggested amendments to parliamentary law before election. Helped CNE review and revise draft regulations 2008: Draft assistance/comments to Committee A in Parliament on new legislation. Commented on draft political finance law, provided alternative text which was adapted by 4 parties.	informed and advised on recommended Parliamentary law amendments with CNE submitting recommendation to Parliament for election law amendments. Most recommendations adopted 2008: MPs use IFES' recommendations and draft language to amend FRETLIN draft bill on political party funding. Law passed with all major recommendations from IFES.
3. Parliament identifies electoral reform as one of its early legislative objectives. <i>Amended</i>	Done. Adopted by Committee A.	More neutral environment to review laws when done so far in advance of elections. Also gives adequate time to develop a rational electoral calendar and for parties to prepare.

# **OBJECTIVE 2**

ORIGINAL:

• Develop the role of the newly established independent electoral commission in its oversight of the voter registration process and elections. (*Objective 2*)

- CNE's independent oversight role is maintained or strengthened (*IR 1*)
- CNE exercises its oversight role effectively. (IR 2)

AMENDED:

• Strengthen the oversight role of the Independent Electoral Commission.

• CNE establishes a plan to consolidate its institutional structure and oversight systems and begins planning for future elections. (*IR2*)

Results: Met in part for voter registration. Will be met fully if IFES undertakes its suggested audit of the registration lists that was planned during the evaluation for February 2008 (subsequently UNMIT indicated it wanted to do this). For the CNE: permanent CNE established 1/07 which IFES helped develop and strengthen including systems for complaints, campaign finance reporting, inquires to and oversight of STAE, result reporting and media outreach. The CNE developed its own internal regulations. IFES gave models, helped them develop their systems, training initial orientation. Mentoring on special topics including ongoing legal advice and election operations. Oversight improved STAE administration and operation during 2007 electoral cycle.

Indicator	Current Status	Result
1.1. Procedures for oversight in line with international standards.	Met. IFES provided TA & help drafting official correspondence.	CNE practiced oversight and exercised authority within the bounds and limits of the election laws.
1.2. CNE included in GOTL budgetary process.	Met. In 2007: IFES gave budgetary framework to CNE which they adapted with Ministry of Finance & advice on line items. Also helped with justifications in 2008.	CNE has an independent budget and line item in the State budget since July 2007. CNE submitted reasonable budget request for 2008 and was satisfied with allocation.
1. Number of new qualified CNE staff identified <i>Amended</i>	Provided 7 lawyers during complaint process CNE has no staff to train	CNE had expert staff during elections to process complaints. Funding for 2008 will allow CNE

		to hire 5 key staff: legal, media, IT, executive director, and staff assistant.
2. Number of trainings provided to new CNE secretariat personnel <i>Amended</i>	Orientation & initial training provided to all commissioners & 52 focal points in 2006. Ongoing training and advice to commissioners in 2007 Training on counting & tabulation presidential/parliamentary elections Training on campaign finance reporting, candidate registration, election complaints & observation Training of 7 election complaint lawyers	Commissioners and focal points seemed adequately trained with increased understanding of comprehensive election topics. Able to competently carry out electoral mandate through 3 election rounds in 2007 national elections Main issue is in the part-time nature of their positions.
3. Number of CNE secretariat personnel participating in trainings <i>Amended</i>	2007: 52 focal points (district-level staff) and 7 lawyers.	Main secretariat of CNE not yet hired.
5. Number of CNE staff trained ( <i>indicator from Result 4</i> )	52 out of 52 focal points	Increased knowledge of electoral process. Enhanced ability to oversee STAE operations in districts. Provided accurate info to voters in district voter education sessions.
4. CNE departments or portfolios established <i>Amended</i>	Pre election: Gave definitions for department, direct assistance for legal complaint, finance, candidate registration, elections operations and media outreach. Post-election: Gave organizational models & advice. CNE established department and named commissioners for each on paper but are waiting to see if changes in EMB law first (that would bring STAE under CNE control).	Agreement reached by CNE members in Sept. 2007 on portfolios & departments. Not yet in operation.
5. Workplan for 2009 suco-elections created <i>Amended</i>	Not yet done. Waiting for new suco law with new requirements and schedule. Waiting for new EMB law to see if new CNE is appointed which would do this task.	n/a
1. Monitoring reports from CNE are drafted and released	Some done during process. When political parties violated election law or code of conduct CNE did public reprimand. Did letters to STAE with oral response from STAE director, a couple cases with STAE made public in CNE press interviews. CNE released reports on 2007 campaign finance, media work, and election complaints in January 2008	Public reprimand to parties and candidates for violations of code of conduct and election laws showed public CNE was overseeing the process, but lack of sanction power limits its effectiveness.

**RESULT 3** 

• Improve electoral administration through the government department responsible for managing the election. (original)

• Develop the government's capacity to manage the national voter registration process and data base in a transparent and sustainable way.

• STAE's ability to manage the voter registration process is enhanced. (*Amended*)

*Result: System & equipment needed was mapped in 2005 and purchased subsequently by UNDP. Data base established. Will do audit in 2/08. Elections Administration improved indirectly through CNE oversight and recommendations to STAE based on IFES advice during 2007 cycle.* 

Indicator	<b>Current Status</b>	Result
3.1. Reliance on external IT support is lessened and suitable partnerships formed.	UN has full time IT person assigned to STAE. IFES believes national staff is capable to run IT on own but may need temporary help on issues.	Voter registration functioning smoothly without controversy and is currently being updated.
1. Voter registry developed with high level of advocacy and quality	Completed. Primary complaints initially were typographical errors in entry	Audit in 2008 will determine level of accuracy. No complaints lodged against voter registry during elections.
2. Capacity of VR to serve both national and local electoral events	Completed	Voters registered to neighborhood/hamlet level.
3. Number of political parties trained and sensitized.	2005: n/a 2006: 16 parties on election law development 2007: 16 parties, especially CNRT, PUN and PD on counting, seat allocation, formation of government, to 4 by request for specific topics. Provided training materials to 4 UNDP party resource centers.	IFES info to PUN enabled it to challenge MOJ decision that it was not eligible to register as a political party. PUN now has 3 seats in Parliament
4. Number of CSOs/observer groups trained and sensitized	Providing training to: KOMEG, TAF lawyers' network, major media organizations; more than 45 journalists; Women's Caucus, Rede Feto, FOKUPERS; GOTIL and to international groups through UNDP observation center. Served as resource for EU observation mission, especially legal advisor Directly trained over 1,100 people	Increased knowledge of CSOs and observers on election laws and electoral process – for more effective observation and reporting.
6. Interest of political parties and observer groups in voter registration.	<i>Little interest evident at time of evaluation.</i>	Voter registration was not an issue with parties or observers.

#### **RESULT 4**

Public understanding of the role and importance of the independent elections commission and public confidence in CNE are enhanced.

*Result:* The CNE has name recognition with most voters but depth of understanding of its role and the difference between the CNE and STAE is probably minimal.

Indicator	Current Status	Result
4.1. Voter knowledge and	IFES gave STAE location of high	Reporting on results that was

confidence is increased	invalid votes to target vote information after presidential 1 <sup>st</sup> round and the number decreased for the 2 <sup>nd</sup> round; Efficient media outreach & reporting systems developed for parliamentary election (website updated 3-4 times/day, released 2x/day from press center; CNE TV and radio program on election topics and vote count was broadcast to public for parliamentary elections	timely, accurate, transparent & professional builds credibility of the process for the parliamentary elections Voter turnout at 80-81% for all 3 rounds but no survey data available to know extent of voter knowledge or confidence in process.
4.2. Credibility of the register of voters and subsequent voter list is strengthened. <i>Amended</i>	IT TA: built STAE data registry, IT base, designed systems, hired students to enter data 5/06: Evaluation on maintaining system and determine equipment needs done, used by UN to purchase equipment. Audit planned for 2/08 but now awaiting decision if IFES or UNMIT by MoSA	IFES' original training and system design led to voter registry updates in 2007 without technical problems. HW/SW and maintenance system designed by IFES formed the basis of the voter registry system. Large majority of eligible citizens (534,594) registered. No complaints against the voter registry lodged in 2007 elections.

# I.B. INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE 10/01/05 – 3/31/08

# **OBJECTIVE 1**

*ORIGINAL*: Led by the political parties, members of civil society and the Timorese government will engage in inclusive, informed debate on the merits of differing electoral legal models, leading to Parliament's selection of an electoral framework that is broadly understood by Timorese citizens, civil society leaders and political party representatives.

AMENDED: A national electoral framework receives support from political parties, civil society groups, and citizens.

*Result:* National framework adopted with some informed debate that enabled all parties to participate in the elections, but the counting provisions in the amendments to the parliament law were not widely accepted by opposition parties or CSOs. Violence following announcement of results shows lack of understanding by Timorese citizens on rules for formation of government.

Indicator	Current Status	Result
1.1. Political parties and women's organizations formulate proposals or criteria for preferred national legislative electoral systems.	Working group established 5/05 that met through 2007. It included ASDT, PD, PSD, PST, HAK, Dili Institute of Technology & Caucus. Some members testified before Committee A in 2006 hearings on draft legislation.	Participating parties better informed on content draft legislation. Opposition parties stressed need for greater transparency mechanisms within law which was a focus of the WG study tour to New Zealand.
1.2. Political party and civil society stakeholders constructively discuss electoral legislation introduced by the government, outlining key concerns and providing alternatives	Done in working group meetings.	Threshold lowered from 5% to 3% enabling 3 more parties to win seats in parliament.

framework on political participation in the country they visited. 1.4. Members of the working group	Report on study tour done. 6/05 8 interns hired out of 20 anticipated due to need to ensure	Insufficient information available to make a determination.
political party members publicly discuss the impact of the electoral framework on political participation in the country they visited.R1.4. Members of the working group6	5/05 8 interns hired out of 20	to make a determination.
		Soveral members of Working
debate the merits and consequences and	quality of interns (3 women, 5 men)	Several members of Working Group testified at Committee A hearings on draft legislation
indicates support for (and fill understanding of) the national cu	Most parties supported the electoral framework with the exception of the counting provisions and placement of STAE under MOSA.	Parties competed in the electoral process and accepted the results. Want changes for future elections (STAE under CNE, CNE with enforcement powers)
groups indicates support for (and in understanding of) the national	Same as above. Some CSOs were not in agreement with the timing for the elections which they thought was too soon after the violence.	ű
Content analysis of media and	Information not available to know extent of citizen understanding on electoral framework or on content analysis of media.	Not enough information to make a determination.
document citizen support for national elections <i>Amended</i>	OD IECTIVE 2.	

# **OBJECTIVE 2**:

*ORIGINAL*: Foundations for future informed debates are established, transforming how future issues can be debated between political parties, civil society and the Timorese government.

AMENDED: Political parties' internal reforms lead to strengthened organizational and logistical capacity at the national and local levels.

Result: A transformation of party-citizen-government debate process was not visible. Some parties' structural reforms resulted in some strengthened capacity when compared to early years of assistance. IRI reporting credits training with improving internal organization of parties so they were able to distribute IRI party agent manual for 2007 elections down to more remote sub-district. This capacity did not exist in 2001.

Indicator	Current Status	Result
2.1. Working group introduces to parliament alternative legislation representing their consensus on electoral framework	Several members testified before Parliament	Not enough information available to make a determination of Working Group impact.
2.2. Political party members, civil society and government members regularly utilize the materials available at the resource center.	Resource center established by CDA within the existing Xanana Gusmao Reading Room. Consists of a display case of books and materials.	Increased number of reference materials at a study center that was being used by students and others during the evaluation.
2.3. Resource center interns research and produce original works on electoral legal frameworks for	Information not available.	Note enough information to make a determination.

discussion by working group members.		
2.4. Working group members establish a cohesiveness that can be replicated on future issues of mutual concern. Government, political party, working group members and civil society stakeholders increase public awareness of various electoral options and their respective consequences for political participation by publishing opinion commentary on electoral policy in newspapers and Timorese journals and discussing electoral policy options on radio and television pieces.	Working group no longer functioning.	No visible results beyond individual member input into electoral law drafting.
2.1. Political parties conduct issue- oriented campaigns that directly address voter concerns <i>Amended</i>	3 phases of training provided at district level in 2007 on campaign preparations which included local message development using messages developed at national level done in partnership with UNDP party project.	Campaigning done more on personalities than on issues but some issue based campaigning was done. Examples are given in narrative reporting on some parties adapting national-level issues to local level issues during campaign
2.2. Parties implement changes providing for increased involvement of women in their organizations and electoral campaigns. <i>Amended</i>	For 2007 elections: women's platform adopted (result of a UNIFEM project). Women's Caucus trained 118 women of which 47 were nominated as MP candidates and 71 became party pollwatchers.	Changes adopted were primarily due to quotas for women mandated in legislation. Women's involvement in politics beyond the quota systems remains limited.
2.3. Local political party members make policy recommendations to the national party and play and active role in party platform development through suco chiefs and council members. <i>Amended</i>	IRI did not work at the suco level to avoid duplication with NDI suco council training program.	Parties remain predominately top down.
2.4. Parties agree to, sign and hold their members to a Code of Conduct pledging peaceful campaigning. <i>Amended</i>	Completed (result of a UN program).	Parties abided to the code of conduct during the campaign for the most part.
	<b>OBJECTIVE 3</b>	

**OBJECTIVE 3** The participation of political party poll watchers contributes to the legitimacy of the electoral outcome. *Amended* 

Result:	Party monitors participated broadly in the suco and national elections which contributed to the legitimacy
of the pr	rocess.

Indicator	Current Status	Result
3.1. Trained political party agents observe the parliamentary elections at polling stations throughout the country.	3 rounds of training in 13 districts, 3 agents per party per training for a total of 1,290 agents done in coordination with UNDP which provided 1 trainer. 22,000 manuals printed/distributed.	Presence increased reliability of results and legitimacy of the process.

3.2. Party agents are able to identify and substantiate a range of possible electoral violations	Developed 4-ply complaint form in Tetum, distributed 35,000 copies.	Most party agents were able to identify violations, but few were able to accurately document problems so that they could be taken to court.
3.3. Political parties lodge legally sufficient claims for electoral complaints	Partially met. CNE received 175 complaints 84 were found to be valid,	"

# **OBJECTIVE 4**

Newly elected suco council members acquire and use governance skills to fulfil their responsibilities in a professional, accountable and responsive manner. *Amended* 

Youth leadership is cultivated by participating civil society groups and suco council members through increased participation and demonstrated responsibility. Amended

Result: IRI agreed with USAID that it would only do some training of women suco members through the Caucus in order not to duplicate NDI's training program with the sucos. For youth: Results were not tracked at the suco level, but they may participate more at the CSO level due to CSO outreach

Indicator	Current Status	Result
4.1. Suco council members work with council members from other parties and exchange experiences and knowledge on community development initiatives.	n/a	n/a
4.2. Suco council members incorporate constituents (and youth) input into community development programs.	n/a	n/a
4.3 Women and youth trainers from these suco councils receive requests for additional governance training from neighboring sucos and districts.	Information not tracked	Not enough information to be able to make a determination.

# I.C. NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE 10/05 - 03/31/08

# **OBJECTIVE 1**

To strengthen the capacity of *suco* councils to organize and represent their communities through orientation and skills building programs to organize and represent their communities.

**RESULT 1.1**. Increased understanding by participating *suco* council members of their roles and responsibilities.

*Result:* Suco chiefs, women and youth representatives in 82 suco councils in 13 subdistricts in 4 districts reached by two-day trainings in 2006; and 52 sucos in 18 subdistricts in 10 districts reached in 2007.

Indicator	Current Status	Result
1.1.1: Number of events in which the <i>suco</i> council engages the community in a discussion of village development programs <i>Used 9/06 on</i>	Not tracked systematically. Only asked before a training so actual numbers or change over time is unknown.	Not enough information to be able to make a determination.
1.1.2: Cross-sectional representation of the community at these events, based on the <i>suco</i>	Not tracked. NDI reporting says yes based on content of annual reports it helped some	u

profile. Used from 9/06 on	sucos prepare.	
1.1.3: Quality of participation at these events. <i>Used from 9/06 on.</i>	Not tracked. NDI reporting says community wants to participate on discussions of development projects.	u
1.1.4: Extent to which <i>suco</i> council members are able to exercise other duties and responsibilities prescribed in Decree-Law No. 5/2004 on Community Authorities, such as prevention and resolution of domestic, security, and inter-suco disputes <i>Used from</i> <i>9/06 on.</i>	Not tracked. Per NDI reporting: 75% of the sucos they trained held meetings on formation of government.	u
1.a.1. Clarity with which suco council members are able to explain their roles and responsibilities to their constituents, government officials and other audiences. <i>Used until 9/06.</i>	Not tracked.	"

**Result 1.2:** Participating *suco* councils discuss, plan, and coordinate village development programs with subdistrict authorities. *Used* 9/06 on

**Result 1.b.** Participating suco councils engage community members and citizen groups to help identify, prioritize and solve community issues. *Used until 9/06* 

Result: Not enough information available to be able to make a determination

Indicator	Current Status	Result
<ul> <li>1.2.1: Number of <i>suco</i> councils meeting with the subdistrict administrator to discuss programs <i>Used 9/06 on</i>.</li> <li>1.b. Number of open meetings held by participating suco councils with community members and citizen groups to help identify, prioritize and solve community issues, <i>Original</i></li> </ul>	Not tracked consistently. NDI reporting gives anecdotal information.	Not enough information available to make a determination
1.2.2: Number of <i>suco</i> councils which regularly communicate results from the meetings with the subdistrict administrator and other related matters to the community. <i>Used 9/06 on.</i>	"	"
1.2.3: Number of <i>suco</i> councils which use the <i>suco</i> profile, and information or ideas derived from the community meetings, in the discussion of development programs with the subdistrict administrator. Used 9/06 on.	"	"
1.b. Breadth and quality of community participation in these meetings (number of participants, % women, % youth, quality of participation by these groups). <i>Original</i>	"	"
Number and quality of community development plans produced by these meetings.	"	"

Indicator	Current Status	Result
Number of projects identified in community	Not tracked consistently. NDI reporting	Not enough information available to

development plans that are carried out with internal village resources <i>Amended</i>	only gives anecdotal information	make a determination.
Number & quality of proposals developed by suco councils for assistance from government bodies, NGOs, international donors, etc to carry out community development plans <i>Amended</i>	"	cc.
% of such proposals that are successful in obtaining resources and carrying out projects <i>Amended</i>	"	"
Result 1d. Participating suco councils commun	nicate with each other in order to perform their	jobs more effectively. Amended
Extent to which participating suco councils share experiences with one another	Not tracked consistently. NDI reporting gives anecdotal information	Not enough information to make a determination
Number of incidents in which one suco councils adopts a best practice form another.	"	"
Extent to which suco councils communicate their collective needs and concerns for the government	"	ű

### **OBJECTIVE 2**

To assist the National Institute for Public Administration (INAP) to accelerate and implement its national training program for elected *suco* councils. *Used 9/06 on*.

To support suco councils an village-based community groups to develop and conduct civic and voter education initiatives *Used from* 2/06 on

*Result: INAP trained 442 suco councils, NDI trained 53 villages.* [Note: Number of Sucos reached by NDI training varies in reporting]

Result 2.1: Increased responsibility taken by INAP for the suco council training program as of July 2007. Used 9/06 on.

*Result:* INAP took over the suco council training program but has not done any further training since the initial orientation. It should be noted that INAP is an institution developed to train public administrators and not elected officials.

Indicator	Current Status	Result
2.1.1: NDI-trained individuals incorporated by INAP into its pool of available trainers. <i>Used 9/06 on.</i>	INAP decided to engage local NGOs to assist in the training of suco councils and no longer saw need for this intervention.	n/a
2.1.2: Remaining <i>suco</i> council training scheduled and implemented by INAP on its own beginning in July 2007. <i>Used 9/06 on</i>	INAP completed the suco orientation training. No future training anticipated at the moment.	All sucos reached by orientation training.
2.1.3: Advanced training modules developed with NDI adopted by INAP for any supplemental training requested by <i>suco</i> councils. <i>Used 9/06 on</i> .	NDI helped develop simpler training manuals in early 2007	No supplemental trainings anticipated at time of evaluation

# **OBJECTIVE 3**

To assist an emerging coalition of civil society organizations to monitor the 2007 elections, in order to help ensure the participation and confidence of voters in the electoral process. *Used 9/06 on*.

Result: Assisted KOMEG to organize a credible nationwide observation of 19 CSOs for the 2007 elections.

**Result 3.1**: Coalition of non-partisan East Timorese civil society organizations formed for the purposes of monitoring the 2007 parliamentary and presidential elections. *Used 9/06 on.* 

Result: KOMEG established 12/06 ended 7/07

Indicator	Current Status	Result
3.1.1: Groups agree to cooperate and divide up responsibilities appropriately. <i>Used 9/06 on.</i>	Completed	All CSOs continued through to the end of the elections except for 4 CSOs that split off before the parliamentary elections to form GOITL.
3.1.2: A coalition secretariat is established and staffed appropriately. <i>Used 9/06 on</i> .	<i>Completed.</i> 7 <i>member Secretariat hired by</i> 12/06.	Secretariat facilitated and funded much of KOMEG's work
3.1.3: Trainers, 13 district coordinators and at least 300 monitors are recruited. <i>Used 9/06 on.</i>	Completed. 13 hired. Additional 13 hired under UNIFEM funding for gender balance for a total of 14 women, 12 men. Over 1,000 observers recruited.	Trainers interested in process and seemed to have recruited appropriate persons as observers.
3.1.4: Manuals and monitoring checklists are produced and used in the training of trainers, coordinators and monitors. <i>Used 9/06 on</i> .	Completed. One for trainers, One for observers, updated between rounds. Funded by UNDP for parliamentary elections 1,100 manuals printed. NDI designed & produced checklist.	Ensured coordinated and systematic observation and reporting of findings.

Result 3.2: The integrity of the election process is promoted by the coalition through its monitoring efforts. Used 9/06 on.

Results: The credible observation done by KOMEG added to the credibility and integrity of the elections process.

Indicator	Current Status	Result
3.2.1: Regular reports are produced and distributed by the coalition throughout the electoral process. <i>Used 9/06 on</i> .	Press statements were done at the end of campaign period & after each election. Preliminary report after each election.	Joint statements ensured cohesiveness among the different participating CSOs in their public statements.
3.2.2: At least 300 trained monitors are deployed on election day and during vote counting and tabulation. <i>Used 9/06 on</i> .	1 <sup>st</sup> Round presidential: 1,036 observers (416 female- 40%) 2 <sup>nd</sup> Round presidential: 1,054 observers (425 female- 40%} Parliamentary: 1,224 (524 female, 43%)	Trained observer teams present nationwide during elections.
3.2.3: Increased public confidence in the electoral process, as measured through available valid public opinion research. <i>Used</i> 9/06 on.	Not measured.	Not enough information to make a determination.

# **OBJECTIVE 4**

To support this coalition to work with *suco* councils and village-based community groups to develop and conduct voter education initiatives. *Used 9/06 on*.

Result: Nothing found during field visits.

Result 4.1: Increased information regarding the electoral process received by voters. Used 9/06 on.

Status: Official voter information training done by UNMIT with STAE inviting NGOs to deliver voter information for the state. NDI saw UNMIT program as "more encompassing & perhaps better at engaging local NGOs" than what NDI had planned and did not do this activity with USAID concurrence.

Indicator	Current Status	Result
4.1.1: Audience-appropriate voter education materials are obtained and/or designed, as well as distributed, by the coalition. <i>Used</i> 9/06 on.	Observers distributed NDI-developed leaflet: Vota Los/Vota La Los voter	Formed part of voter information materials circulating in country
4.1.2: These materials are made use of by <i>suco</i> councils and village-based community groups to inform voters. <i>Used 9/06 on</i> .	n/a	-

4.1.3: Increased public knowledge about the electoral process, as measured through available valid public opinion research. <i>Used</i> 9/06 on.	No polling done	Polling data would have been useful for this project and others.
Successful civic and voter education campaigns community groups	s are designed and implemented by participating	g suco councils and village based
Indicator	Current Status	Result
Extent to which citizens in participating locations are able to explain their civil and political rights under the E Timorese constitution and laws	Not tracked, no polling done	Unable to make a determination
% of eligible voters who are registered to vote in participating locations	Not tracked	Registration of voters is compulsory.
Extent to which citizens in participating locations understand the electoral system and purpose of the election	Not tracked, and no polling data available	Unable to make a determination
% of registered voters in participating locations who turn out to vote	Not tracked	Nationwide turnout above 80%
Participating organizing committees communicate with one another about issues that they may be facing, including lessons learned		
Indicator	Current Status	Result
Extent to which participating OCs share experience with one another	Tracked in earlier agreement	Not enough information to make a determination
Number of instances in which one OC adopts a best practice from another.	"	"

# I1. IRI Agreement No. 497-A-00-02-00053 East Timor Political Parties

INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE 9/30/02 – 1/31/05		
Governance Capacity Benchmarks		
Indicator	End of Project Status	Result
A. Political parties will develop internal institutions to support the policy-making and representative functions of their elected officials. These will include the creation of sound policy development process, promotion of two-way communication between elected officials and their constituents, and transparency in legislative and government operations.	Some incremental progress made within parties	Release of parliamentary funds in late 2004 for deputado groups to visit districts (even though funds budgeted for two previous years). Increasing references/interaction by Deputados to constituent concerns in parliament and with government.
Legislators and political party members will develop capacity to effectively draft and analyze legislation and budgets derived from other government bodies. Legislation and budgets will meet the needs of political	Activities related to first indicator were not evident in project reporting. Some progress made on second indicator but no opposition amendments or legislation was approved by the Parliament.	Parliament was dominated by majority parliament and winner-take-all systems left opposition parties resorting to boycott tactics.

<ul><li>parties while also addressing the needs of constituents.</li><li>D. Political parties will start to form working relationships with each other and with civil society groups in order to analyze and propose legislation. They will also be able to plan a strategy around publicizing their policy on certain key pieces of legislation. <i>Amended</i></li></ul>	Opposition parties able to get enough signatures to send Presidential veto of Immigration law to Court of Appeals for ruling on its constitutionality. Opposition boycott of budget debate in Parliament "extremely-well organized".	However, according to IRI, the opposition MPs "staged a walk-out that was brilliantly captured by the media who were in place to record statements regarding the process & content of the budget." (Final report p23)
Elected officials and political parties will seek the input of their constituents on legislative and policy matters and will devise strategies for keeping constituents informed about governmental action and policies.	6/03-2/05: Facilitated and promoted deputado visits to constituents in 13 districts and 60 villages. 2003: IRI initiated internship program with Dili Institute of Technology Developed intern manual in Tetum	Internship program "not successful" in helping deputados engage with constituent as MPs/students did not understand broad intentions of program and other logistical issues (p30). Did expose youth to political process and MPs to internship idea.
Elected officials and political parties will establish structures and programs to provide responsive constituent services and effective two-way communications.	2003-2004: 6 radio program discussions Dalan Ba Demokrasia" aired on community radio on issues.	Two way communications and responsive constituent services minimal.
Political parties will display tolerance and respect for differing viewpoints and opinions expressed by other parties in public dialogue and parliamentary debate.	6 public forums held 2003-2004 with University of Dili and ETSG 3/04: Week of National Dialogue included 1 discussion in Parliament ("Parliament the voice of the People") "Responsibilities of a Government to the People and the people to the government in a Democracy" led by PM	Per IRI: "as two main opposition parties became more active, FRETILIN tightened its grip. FRETILIN leadership needs to learn to handle criticism in a professional manner, the opposition parties also need to begin to offer positive solutions to problems rather than merely condemn the government." (p31 Final Report)

# **Political Party Benchmarks**

IRI will focus on party sustainability, internal democracy and expanding the base of party representation through outreach to youth, women and other underserved populations. IRI will work with parties on cultivating grassroots support, basic roles and responsibilities in democratic society, and work to develop internal research and analytical skills with the goal of permanent and professional operations.

Results: Some progress made on party sustainability, minimal progress on women and youth in parties and internal democracy for most parties.

Indicator	End of Project Status	Result
Political parties will develop clearly defined party programs and platforms that are issue- and solution-based.	Worked with PD and PSD to create better balance between anti-govt rhetoric & positive messages of parties. Did platform development training.	Per IRI, PD & PSD did negative campaigning and had unclear platform. (Final report p 22) "Opposition party candidates in the December 2004 and February 2005 suco elections did not campaign on substantive issues. (Final report p23)
Parties will implement post-election strategies for organization, message and platform development, elected representative support, and membership recruitment and retention.	2003: 1 day training on Role of Political Party in 13 districts & Dili Use of IRI polls with parties as a mechanism to help them develop platforms, etc.	<i>IRI:</i> 1 <sup>st</sup> poll led to creation of party messages by PD and PSD who created & distributed party flyers. ASDT developed comprehensive pamphlet on platforms 2 <sup>nd</sup> poll: tended to be discounted by

ground through coalition development. Membership of women, youth and other disadvantaged groups in political parties will increase.	2003: Sent youth sent to International Youth Democratic Union Conference in Bangkok 5/04: PD Youth training	"None of the political parties examined in this final assessment have made serious movements towards the inclusion of women into their mainstream political activities In addition, few attempts have been made to include youth members into the party with any substantial input."
The number and nature of political parties in East Timor will consolidate; small, non- viable parties will seek coalitions or absorption into larger more viable entities; viable minority parties will seek common	Alliance building promoted throughout activities. Worked with PD and PSD to form formal alliance, but parties unable to agree on person to lead alliance	Parentil united with PPT PMD aligned with ASDT Partido Democratiica Chirstao was in negotiations to rejoin UDC/PDC.
Parties will operate in a professional manner, exhibiting tolerance of plural political views, peaceful resolution of disputes, efforts to improve the quality of public and participatory discourse on issues and efforts to aggregate the preferences of the electorate through promotion of policies that reflect the considered input of the electorate.	At some level parties operated professionally, at others they did not. They were still predominately top down in 2005.	District reps able to correctly articulate party's national platform (was nonexistent at baseline).
Parties will increase their internal democratic processes by holding intra-party elections, formalizing and socializing their organizational structure, broadening their membership bases and creating complementary, internal and external communications networks.	Training provided since 2001 PD: Reorganized based on IRI recommendations with democratically elected leadership at subdistrict level. Suco leaders appointed by subdistrict leaders.	Plaijorm as result.According to IRI's final report: partiesstarted Dili centric but by end ofproject were more focused on districts-the use of cell phones was credited fora lot of this change as they were ableto easily communicate with districts.Pre-training, organizational structurebased on shadow govt. Post training:PD, PSD, ASDT created partyleadership positions (membershiprecruitment, fundraising, outreach,communications)
	ASDT & PD made most changes FRETILIN & PSD remained same	parties as they were "disappointed in not having received negative information about the government or other political parties" ASDT used and crafted economic platform as result.

# Women's Political Leadership Benchmarks

*Results:* Women are active in some parties at the political leadership level but attribution for these results belong to the combined efforts of the international community.

Indicator	<b>End of Project Status</b>	Result
Leadership training for women in East Timor	IRI through the Women's Caucus provided	More women were elected but much of
will provide for broader representation of	a number of trainings including:	this is due to the quota systems.
women in political parties, civil society and	3/03:1 day leadership training for14 women	
government structures and will help ensure	MPs from all 5 parties + 2 senior party	Adequate survey data is not available

issues important to Timorese women are included in public debates, national agendas and political party platforms.	officials from party not in parliament. 5/04: 5 meetings in subdistricts Lospalos to id women candidates Initiated and issued 6 editions of "Caucus Bulletin" with information on activities, events and legislation and distributed 1,500 copies	to be able to determine extent of impact.
IRI's partner organization, the Women's Caucus, will establish a long-term program of training to increase the skill base of women who are already serving or wish to serve in elected, appointed, staff and/or civil service positions within the government.	Workshops done during the LOP. 10/02- 3/03: 3 day workshop on Women's Political Development in 8 districts 6/04: 2 day workshop in Dili with STAE & sub-district based NGOs to promote their use to distribute voter info for suco elections. 3/04: Held event with Cambodian Minister for Women's and Veterans Affairs there for IRI's dialogue week. 4/04: Co-hosted forum with PM's Office of Gender Equality for women reps from 13 high schools.	Women's Caucus still working, but long term training program is UNIFEM project.
The Women's Caucus will establish a durable mechanism for working with women serving in the Legislative Assembly and other government posts. The Women's Caucus will develop sustainable channels of communication with national and local political party leaders through which messages about women's participation can be sent and information about participation can be gained.	Hosted 5 "Women in Parliament lunches" from 11/02 - 11/03 for interparty discussion among women MPs	Longer term mechanisms not established other than use of networks.
The Women's Caucus, together with women political leaders, will develop a program to recruit more women as candidates in coming elections at the national and sub-national level.	Did trainings: 7/03: 2 day seminar to encourage women's involvement in local elections. Included US state Senator Pam Roach 2003-2004: Effort to create support networks for women candidates training 2004: Attempted to create "Alliance for promoting women and youth participation in Suco Elections" with FOKUPERS and Men against Violence but ended up Caucus effort with limited work in 4 districts.	<ul> <li>829 women in 8 districts on how to run a campaign trained. 835 on leadership skills</li> <li>1,489 women ran, 815 elected suco council reps, 6 as suco chiefs, 15 aldeia chiefs.</li> </ul>
The Women's Caucus will continue to be a leading provider of women's political training in East Timor and will develop a self- sustaining network for political active women.	Caucus still in existence providing training in 2007	Women's Caucus diversified funders and now works closely with UNIFEM
Women serving in the Legislative Assembly and other positions of authority will begin working strategically to broaden the participation of women in the political process in key sectors, including party membership, party leadership, elected officials, government civil service posts,	<ul> <li>Held lunches to create networks within women in parliament and safe space for multi-party discussions.</li> <li>4 women MPs volunteered time to serve as trainers in Bobonaro Oecussi.</li> </ul>	Not enough information available to make a determination. Women's Bench in parliament active in 2007

appointed leadership posts, and local political and elected leadership positions.		
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# III. IFES Agreement No 497-G-00-001-00039 Elections Support in East Timor

#### INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTION SYSTEMS 7/23/01 - 3/31/05 Indicator **End of Project Status** Result 2001-2003 Used for USAID/UN program Phase I: Constituent Assembly Elections Produced: Report on Technical Aspects of Constituent Elections 8/01 planning for post-independence Technical Assistance Report Done 4/02. Produced: Report on Technical " Phase II: Presidential Election Assessment Aspects of Presidential Elections 5/02 Phase III: UN-IFES Electoral Needs Galvanized call for improved voter Conducted 11/02 with UNEAD. Assessment registry 2004-2005 Per IFES access to senior expert & TA provided through regular visits on info gave confidence to newly created oversight & reporting, future structure, TA to CNE (advice & support) body to execute its oversight role. budget, getting donor funding, framework CNE required reporting completed. for voter education/civic education plan CNE considers operational models IT expert provided Technical infrastructure for voter 2004, 160 persons for data entry trained registry and IT systems created that TA to STAE on voter registration system .Collaboration with DAI to purchase supported voter registration in long (design, printing forms, internet connection) network at STAE and 2 servers term Result: UNTAET and East Timorese election officials receive assistance, as requested, in managing Constituent Assembly elections in East Timor. Indicator **End of Project Status** Result Election administration and training IFES not involved in this activity for procedures are strengthened for Constituent *Not applicable (UN ran elections)* UN-administered elections Assembly elections, as needed and requested Commission links established through Two of first CNE commissioners who Professional relationships are established technical monitoring of CA and presidential worked with IFES were appointed to with East Timorese election officials, elections. 2<sup>nd</sup> CNE in 2007. STAE director who especially those who may be involved in the worked with IFES also in place for administration of future elections. Working relationship established with 1<sup>st</sup> 2007 elections. CNE for suco elections CNE members from suco-election CNE publish report in 11/06 on future role

Election administration and election law<br/>needs are documented for post-election<br/>democracy building activities with the new<br/>East Timorese government.Need for independent CNE and adequate<br/>resources noted, with recommendations for<br/>budget, structure, responsibilities for<br/>staffing and independence.TA given to STAE on voter registration and<br/>IT for suco and future elections.

of CNE. Independent CNE in EMB

law passed in 12/2006. Established

parliamentary election laws passed in

STAE voter registration and IT

capacity updated based on IFES

1/2007. Presidential and

recommendations.

12/2006

# **OBJECTIVE 1**

The new election commission will exhibit basic capacity to conduct its election related activities and to administer future elections in East Timor.

**IR:** East Timorese management bodies are able to competently administer future elections.

Indicator	End of Project Status	Result
Policies and procedures, management and administrative mechanisms, and training and education programs are created for the election management bodies where none existed before	Completed in terms of voter registry and oversight functions for CNE. IFES set up policies and procedures for STAE IT/VR staff and trained them in IT and registration operations. IFES advised new CNE in 2004-2005 on procedures and management, provided on- demand training and advice on oversight of suco elections and support in reporting.	<ul> <li>Elections perceived as more professional and credible. STAE had functioning IT and voter registration staff and completed voter registry for suco elections.</li> <li>Small number of CNE members conducted limited oversight (had no resources), completed election reports and referred election cases to justice system.</li> <li>2 CNE members carry skills with them to the 2007 CNE becoming president and head of finance. They are able to expand competence and authority of CNE in 2007.</li> </ul>
Election officials integrate recommendation concerning relevant aspects of election management, voter registration, balloting and counting procedures, results reporting, voter information requirements, candidate/party requirements, and other proposed areas of assistance for future elections in East Timor.	EMB assistance limited primarily to voter registry. TA to CNE for remainder. CNE reports on suco elections with 2 members commissioned by IFES to provide recommendations for future CNE.	Recommendations given to STAE for improvement of 2007 STAE cycle. Some of these became reflected in 2006 election laws and regulations that gave CNE increase authority and resources, although this is still limited. STAE IT and voter registration departments completed voter registration campaigns for suco and 2007 national elections. No major problems with database in these elections.
Election officials are able to increasingly assume responsibility for election administration and respond to citizens' concerns.	CNE received and considered suco election complaints.	STAE and CNE ran their own elections in 2005 and 2007 but with large scale international assistance in 2007. CNE in suco elections had limited resources and experience but was still able to analyze complaints, recommend solutions to problems and refer cases with criminal allegations to court.
Voting, counting and reporting procedures are conducted in a standard uniform way throughout the country for the presidential elections slated for early 2002.	n/a to IFES assistance for 2002	n/a
Post-election interviews with the election commission show that the newly appointed commission members understand how to effectively carry out their roles.	Done	Accomplished and passed on to permanent commission in lessons learned study commissioned by IFES in subsequent agreement.
Accurate and official voter information is	n/a to IFES primary focus	Assessment recommended measure

developed by electoral authorities and distributed throughout the country through radio, print media, town hall meetings, and other traditional means.

IFES conducted civic ed assessment of STAE methods in suco elections with recommendations for broadening methodology used by STAE in 2007 elections that expanded outreach to voters.

# **OBJECTIVE 2**

A legal framework and other constitutional considerations related to elections, political parties and relevant government institutions will be initiated for development by the Constituent Assembly.

**IR:** The new government of East Timor (i.e. the Constituent Assembly) begins the process to develop general election and political party laws, devise a representational system, and establish an appropriate election management body.

Indicator	End of Project Status	Result
The Constituent Assembly, East Timorese government, and key NGO members solicit legal assistance and advice on developing election laws.	IFES assisted legal drafting process with TA to CNE. Most work done in subsequent agreement.	Legal framework developed but under assistance provided in subsequent agreement
Workshops or other public fora are conducted by East Timorese civic groups and/or government officials to bring key issues on the electoral framework into the public debate	Done but not focus of IFES assistance	Most done in subsequent agreement
Information and advice from IFES is integrated into the election laws.	Done but most work done in subsequent agreement	Legal framework developed but primarily under subsequent agreement activities.
Electoral legislation is introduced for consideration by the Constituent Assembly.	Done for suco level. Draft done by UN during UN administration of East Timor.	Suco elections held
Electoral system measures related to election law and election administration are enacted by the government.	Done but most work done in subsequent agreement.	Done but under next agreement
The structure for an independent election commission is established to replace the interim UNTAET/ETTA election management body.	Done Temporary CNE established 2004. Draft done by UN during UN administration of East Timor.	Temporary CNE ran credible Suco elections
Formal and informal networks are established with district administrators, NGOs, religious groups and business organizations to disseminate information on electoral issues (e.g. status of election law development, the representation system, the presidential election etc).	Not part of IFES focus for this agreement but IFES provided information on these topics	Done but not result of this agreement

# IV. NDI Agreement No. 497-G-00-01-00015 Civic Participation and Political Party Development

# NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE 3/21/01 – 6/30/06

**Main Objectives**: To expand citizen knowledge and understanding of basic democratic concepts and encourage the development of an aware and active citizenship through participatory grassroots civic education and to facilitate the active and information participation of East Timorese political parties in multi-party dialogue in support of competitive peaceful elections, political tolerance and a democratic electoral process.

Result: NDI reached 40,000 persons over the life of the project and its programs helped increase the overall knowledge of Timorese citizens on the meaning of basic democratic concepts in conjunction with other programs done by the international community. Its work helped empower participating citizen groups and the women within them. Although it did not continue with its political party work after 2005, its early work with candidate debate and focus on nonviolent participation were appropriate and constructive.

#### **OBJECTIVE 1**

Sustained citizen participation in civic life. To develop a critical and active democratic citizenry through the organization of interconnected community discussions, as a means to support democratic renewal and local community participation in the democratic development process in East Timor

To expand citizen knowledge and understanding of basic democratic concepts and encourage the development of an aware and active citizenship through participatory grassroots education. *Amended*.

Result: Citizens continued to participate and had high turnout in elections.

**Result 1**: Civic Forum groups identify specific community issues and advocate for change to decision makers at district or municipal levels *Amended* 

Indicator	End of Project Status	Result
Groups working with NDI conduct community based research to identify issues of concern and develop an advocacy plan around issues	NDI conducted: Midterm program evaluation 2-3/02 (internal); participatory baseline assessment 9/02 (internal; political participatory assessment 12/02 (external); national consultations assessment 5/03; national consultations follow up assessment 9/03 and 1/04; baseline assessment for civic program 8/04 and community survey 2005 (end of project).	NDI collected information that shows increased actions by members of organizing committees in some areas such as meetings and distributing information in 2003-3004 but it is difficult to determine from the reporting available to the evaluation team if "advocacy plans" were established or implemented.
Groups working with NDI implement advocacy plans that include meetings with decision makers and outreach to citizens on issues of community concern.	<ul> <li>Per NDI reporting:</li> <li>1) increasing number of civic forum groups approached MPs and organizing committees met with local government.</li> <li>2) advocacy skills building through community social analysis discussions &amp; participatory community planning meetings with participating OCs, some communities did door-to-door campaigns and raised money.</li> </ul>	Ibid for local level. Anecdotal information for the national level appears to be that advocacy was limited to occasional visits by NDI facilitators to parliament.

Result 1.1. Widespread information dissemination, awareness and discussion of basic democratic concepts

Indicator	End-of-Project Status	Result
Civic education materials developed & distributed; popular participation in discussion groups; level of involvement of existing local associations in discussion groups.	14 discussion modules designed and used by facilitators 6/01: Worked with Commission for Justice and Peace in Baucau, Yayasan Hak, OPJATII, Working Group on Voter Education, NGO Forum and Tilmo to recruit 29 facilitators for civic forum	CSOs are still active in civic education as are most former civic forum facilitators.

	Hosted 2,500 discussion groups, totalling 38,181 participants with approximately 46% women. Assisted STAE by distributing voter info materials through its networks in 10 districts and 23 sucos.	
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**Result 1.2** Increased knowledge, skills and understanding among targeted citizens regarding civic education and the democratic process.

Indicator	End-of-Project Status	Result
Increasing active participation in discussion groups, discussions become increasingly self-facilitated; participants apply information and concepts from pervious discussion topics; participants use skills from Civic Forum in approaching real life situations; participants complete group assignments.	29 facilitators recruited, trained and used were from participating CSO groups. They worked with 77 organizing committees 2001-2003. 9 of these were retained to become field organizers for 30 organizing committees in 2004-2005 when program moved to an advocacy focus. National congress of organizing committees in 7/05 Use of skills not tracked	Not enough information available to make a determination on impact

**Result 1.3.** Active political participation in community decision-making

Indicator	End-of-Project Status	Result
Citizens participate in local community meetings and forums; informed citizen participation in elections and election activities, including candidate forums and election monitoring; Civic Forum groups organize local candidate forums and monitoring efforts	For the 2001 elections, helped conduct & moderate 4 candidate debate forums through the civic forum system. 15 debates were anticipated but 2 were cancelled (Aileu and Ermera) after the Civic Forum facilitators were found to be party activists, and others were cut back due to costs (anticipated cost was \$105 per forum, actual cost was \$700 per forum). GFFTL trained 638 women participants from organizing committees in 35 training sessions to encourage more active participation in OC meetings (2003). Leadership training in 4 districts, included men and women in 2005.	Citizens able to articulate their issues through community committee discussions and participating women encouraged and empowered to speak up during meetings.

Result 1.4. Citizens engage local officials to express their interests and concerns and those of their communities.

Result 2: Citizens hold elected official accountable to the public. Amended

Indicator	End-of-Project Status	Result
Citizens arrange and participate in meetings with local officials to discuss local issues. Citizen groups working with NDI	NDI issued two Bulletins on success stories from organizing committees in 8/03 & 1/04 Focus group research on major political concerns by ordinary	Not enough information to make a determination.
organize meetings with public	citizens 11/02, published 1/03 as	

officials on specific policy issues identified in advance. Turnout strategies with other groups, and media coverage are evident. <i>Amended</i>	"Government within Reach." 77 of 88 MPs visited communities through complementary UNDP funding to community groups 7-10/03 & some 2005.	
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**Result 1.5.** Strengthened capacities of NGOs, CBOs and other CSOs that support sustained and enhanced civic education and

participation through community discussions.

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Indicator	End-of-Project Status	Result
Number of women joining Organizing Committees and community activities	Project worked with over 600 women members to improve interest, confidence & increase participation	46% of committee members were women by end of project.
Number of women joining political actions and or political parties	364 program participants openly joined political parities, including 210 women. NDI reports 16.5% increase of women's public participation or showing willingness to participate in political life.	Increased numbers of women on suco councils but major factor was the quota system.

#### **OBJECTVE 2**

Promoting political party participation in the Transition Process. To facilitate the active and informed participation of East Timorese political parties in multi-party dialogue in support of competitive, peaceful elections, political tolerance and a democratic electoral processes.

To facilitate the active and informed participation of East Timorese political parties in multi-party dialogue in support of competitive peaceful elections, political tolerance and a democratic electoral process. *Amended* 

*Result:* Conducted during the transition, work stopped towards end of agreement with AID concurrence so as not to overlap with IRI which was doing similar work.

Result 2.1 Increased public confidence	in the multi-party political system	
Indicator	End-of-Project Status	Result

Citizen attitudes reflect greater confidence; increased citizen participation in political activities; increased political tolerance among citizens. Citizen attitudes reflect greater confidence <i>Amended</i>	Contributions to multi-level discussions on code of conduct through translation and distribution of model codes of conduct and dissemination of Unity Pact.	No polling data available to be able to determine impact.
Increased political tolerance among citizens <i>Amended</i>	No polling data available	Not enough information to make a determination.

Result 2.2 Development of party mechanisms to resolve conflict peacefully and promote political tolerance.

Indicator	End-of-Project Status	Result
Decreased political tension among parties; political leaders participate in multiparty dialogue, reduced violent conflict, increased use of alternative conflict resolution	No results reported for IR2.2 in NDI's final report. But in the 2001 elections, NDI provided models of codes of conducts from other countries and gave information to UNTAET department of political and	More information available on agreement of parties to abide by elections results and their
Decreased political tensions among parties <i>Amended</i> Political leaders participate in multiparty dialogues <i>Amended</i> Less violent conduct <i>Amended</i>	civil affairs which developed a Pact of National Unity with parties. NDI helped propagate the pact by distributing 2,000 copies in Tetum through its civic forum network.	expected conduct during the elections.

**Result 2.3**. Increased capacity of the political parties to participate in the constitutional and electoral system design processes *Became Result 3 in amendments* 

Indicator	End-of-Project Status	Result
Parties understand electoral and constitutional framework issues, parties offer input into design of electoral and constitutional frameworks, parties assess strengths and weaknesses of legal framework issues, ability of parties to education memberships on legal framework issues.	4 candidate forums held before constituent assembly elections for district/independent candidates by civic forum facilitators: 1 Dili, 1 Liquica, 1 with ProDemocracy Students Movement, Senate Students of the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, 1 with East Timorese Journalists Association, Internews and local media in Bobonaro. Presidential debate organized with University of East Timor4/02	Precedent set for locally sponsored issues-based debates well covered by media.

### **OBJECTIVE 3**

To enhance the capacity of CF organizing committees and community groups to determine their community's needs, monitor local initiatives and advocate for greater transparency and accountability at the local level. *Amended* 

*Results:* Done during life of project. Not enough information to determine sustainability of community monitoring activities.

Result 1. Organizing committees can effectively analyze, identify and prioritize community issues		
Indicator	End-of-Project Status	Result
Community leaders and figures agree on issues identified by organizing committees	Meetings held with MPs and national/local government officials to discus concerns.	Not enough information to make a determination

Broader community agreement on issues identified by organizing committees	Does not appear to have been tracked.	"
Results II: Organizing committees effectively identified possible community solutions to take public officials for action Amended	"	"
Indicator	End-of-Project Status	Result
Organizing committees develop plan of action for implementing identified community solution.	Does not appear to have been tracked	Not enough information to make a determination.
figures and officials. Public figures and	blish and maintain two-way communicat officials refers to civil servants, religious nfluence and in some cases are in control	leaders, NGO leaders and elected
Indicator	<b>End-of-Project Status</b>	Result
Number and frequency of meetings with decision makers	Not tracked	Not enough information to make a determination.
Frequency of correspondence with decision makers	Not tracked	"
Result IV: OCs apply advocacy techniquissues.	ues to effect the decision making process	concerning identified community
Indicator	End-of-Project Status	Result
Responses from public figures and/or officials following advocacy by citizens	A few examples are provided in narrative reporting. Actual degree of response unknown	Not enough information to make a determination
Changes in decisions or policy made by public figures and/or officials following advocacy by citizens.	A few example provided in narrative reporting, actual extent of changes made unknown.	Not enough information to make a determination
Result V. Organizing committees build	networks and/or coalitions of support for	their priority issues
Indicator	End-of-Project Status	Result
Number of new organizing committee members from the community participating in organizing committee activities	Some data available from consultations on 9/03 and 1/04 which attempted to track this kind of information using a standard questionnaire. But this level of detail is hard to capture.	Not enough information to make a determination.
Number of new relationships with other organizing committees, NGOs, community leaders such as clergy, etc who supported their advocacy efforts	"	"
Results VI: Increased women's role in le	eadership and decision making positions	
Indicator	End-of-Project Status	Result
Number of women participating in organizing committees	46%	Increased number of women in suco councils.
Number of women running for public office	Not tracked	Unknown as indicators do not take variable of quota system into consideration. 2005 & 2007 will provide baseline for future elections.

Number of women elected to leadership and decision-making positions within organizing committees, village councils and any other community development initiatives, such as parent - teacher councils	Not tracked	Not enough information to make a determination.
Result VII: Sustainability of community	advocacy practice	
Indicator	<b>End-of-Project Status</b>	Result
Level of community support for organizing committee activities	15% increase in number of collective actions due primarily to donor responses	Not enough information to make a determination.
Organizing committees and communities are able to raise funds for their own action plans	Yes, but extent not tracked.	Some community projects funded by other donors during life of project.
Organizing committees become part of national network which links them to the national level	Did a national conference of committees in 2005. No other information available on networking	Network appeared to be through the project facilitators. Personal contacts would have remained after the project.

Gray shading is for indicators that were included in the Agreement's Final Report but which had nothing reported on them.

# IRI Agreement No. 497-G-00-01-00013 Political Party Training and Supporting Women's Leadership Program

# INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE 4/01 – 10/02

**SO:** Create and implement a program to support the development of stable, grassroots oriented, well organized and idea based political parties committed to democracy and pluralism.

*Result:* Project implemented that supported these ideals, short term nature of program makes it difficult to obtain any real achievements but assistance contributed to keeping multi-party system alive.

**OBJECTIVE** 

Technical training and assistance to political parties: organizational structure, internal democracy, message development, communications (internal/external), coalition building, democratic leadership skills, fundraising, basic campaign techniques to assist East Timor parties to prepare for its first presidential/national elections.

Indicator	End of Project Status	Result
No indicator stated	3/01: needs evaluation done 4/01: series of local party organization training seminars. In Dili: 8 parties in 5 districts. Seminars including 7/01 communications seminar with 7 parties	Developed campaign flyer for reproduction at UNDP resource center with messages outlined & a clear idea of what wanted to produce.

# **OBJECTIVE 2**

Assist political parties in various technical aspects of preparing to compete in legitimate democratic elections, such as understanding the legal requirements of participation and the importance of developing political party witness programs, political party monitoring training TOT at national, district and subdistrict levels.

Indicator	End of Project Status	Result
No indicator stated	Developed pollwatching manual, produced 8,200 ( 6,000 in Tetum, 2,000 in Bahasa, 200 in English) Elections 8/01: 450 agents trained Elections 4/02: 350 agents (district coordinators), trained from 11 political parties and 1 candidate. 3,000 manuals produced	Parties monitored elections. 8/01: 4,000 agents registered 4/02: 2,897 registered
	OBJECTIVE 3	•
Assessment of party witness training pr	ogram during elections program and provide parties w	ith feed back and recommendations
Indicator	End of Project Status	Result
No indicator stated	6 teams observed & assessed party agents on e-day 2001.	Observation showed weaknesses to address next time (party agents engaged but wide disparities of knowledge & varying degrees of confidence to bring issues to attention pollworkers)
	<b>OBJECTIVE 4</b>	
	through subgrant to an East Timorese women's organi encourage women's participation in the political proce	
Indicator	End of Project Status	Result
No indicator stated	Chose Women's Caucus to implement women's training	Used Caucus for training, through an MOU as IRI felt it had no capacity to manage a subgrant.
Training exercises at the national and description of the supporting and quantifying women's possible to the support of the su	<b>OBJECTIVE 5</b> istrict levels, produce relevant publications and material plitical participation in East Timor.	als an serve as a clearing house for
	istrict levels, produce relevant publications and materia	als an serve as a clearing house for Result