Enclosure 4: Exelon Presentation Meeting Summary of July 28, 2010 Public Meeting with NEI **Dated August 4, 2010**



Braidwood Nuclear Safety Culture Pilot

Ron Gaston
Regulatory Assurance Manager
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NEI 09-07 Implementation at Braidwood

- ✓ Site specific procedure developed based on existing Exelon practices and NEI guidance
- ✓ Braidwood implemented all three phases
 - 4 Monitoring Panel Meetings
 - 1 Semi-Annual Senior Leadership Team (SLT) Review
 - 1 Independent Nuclear Safely Culture Assessment (NSCA)
- ✓ All three phases assessed data against the INPO Nuclear Safety Culture Principles and Attributes
- ✓ NRC observed implementation of all three phases



Monitoring Panel

- ✓ Consists of Plant Manager, Oversight Manager, HR Manager, Regulatory Manager, and Performance Improvement Manager
- ✓ Meetings held on a two month frequency
- ✓ Process inputs provided in advance for review and preliminary binning
 - Condition reports tagged with Safety Culture trend code
 - CAP investigations (Root Cause, Apparent Cause) and feedback
 - NRC findings and violations, referred allegations
 - Nuclear Oversight elevations, assessments and audits, concerns
 - HR investigations / disciplines and ECP cases
 - Offsite Review Committee minutes and findings
 - Selected site performance indicators



Monitoring Panel

- ✓ Meeting involves process input reviews to identify issues at low level and provide oversight of corrective actions
 - Discussion of previous actions items / trend reviews
 - Collegial review of each individual input
 - Bin inputs that represent a weakness in a safety culture principle
 - Identify issues for short term actions
- ✓ Monitoring Panel provides a forum for regular reflection and assessment of safety culture health
 - Aggregate review of broad scope of inputs provided oversight and engagement on safety culture
 - Identified specific departments or plant issues influencing safety culture



SLT Semi-Annual Review

- ✓ Utilized Monitoring Panel data and SLT judgment to reach consensus on site's implementation of each safety culture principle
- ✓ Identified safety culture improvement opportunities
 - Principle 3 Organizational Trust
 - Long-term issues not being resolved
 - Communication challenges
 - Principle 5 Nuclear is Recognized as Special
 - Cross-functional human performance issues
 - Principle 7 Organizational Learning
 - Investigation and issue resolution weaknesses



Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment

- ✓ Independent assessment against the eight INPO principles
- ✓ Two phases: Survey (65% response) and Onsite Assessment
- ✓ Onsite Assessment
 - 74 interviews of site personnel and 4 meeting observations
 - Interview questions based on INPO safety culture principles and attributes
- √ 3 Positive Observations, 5 Negative Observations, and 4 General Observations



Braidwood Results

- ✓ Monitoring Panel identified safety culture weaknesses in specific departments and with specific site issues
- ✓ Monitoring Panel binning and focus areas were consistent with independent NSCA observations
- ✓ SLT review challenged sites actions / progress related to resolving NSCA negative observations
- ✓ SLT review identified Improvement Opportunity in Principle 7 – Organizational Learning
 - Consistent with Oversight / Offsite Review Board feedback of recent decline in CAP performance
- ✓ NSCA and SLT review noted effective site action and improvements in decision making – consistent with recent NRC feedback related to existing SCCI



Braidwood Improvements | Lessons Learned

- ✓ Monitoring Panel bin process now inputs to the safety culture attribute level
- ✓ Insights from line organization department heads presented to Monitoring Panel
- ✓ Bin positive behaviors against safety culture principles to identify areas to leverage / benchmark
- ✓ Periodic challenge of site disposition of SLT improvement opportunities / NSCA observations
- ✓ Improved communication of results to requisite levels of the organization



Braidwood Insights

- ✓ The NEI 09-07 guidance provides a structured and tiered process that drives the site to own and actively monitor / improve safety culture
- ✓ Use of a broad range of process inputs allows for identification of potential safety culture issues:
 - As a leading indicator of performance
 - At the precursor / low level
 - Related to a specific department or targeted population
- ✓ Provides transparency
 - NRC observations of all three phases
 - NRC review of inputs, binning results, meeting minutes, and assessment reports
 - NRC tracking of site actions through CAP

