Testimony of Under
Secretary of Commerce for International Trade
Grant D. Aldonas
Trade and
the Competitiveness of the U.S. Aircraft Manufacturing Industry
U.S. House of Representatives
�Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure
Subcommittee on Aviation
July 26, 2001
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Thank you,
Mr. Chairman, Congressman Oberstar, Congressman Matheson, and Members
of the Committee, for inviting me to testify before the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure.� I look forward to establishing a close working
relationship with you and your staff.�
Secretary of Commerce Evans asked me personally to convey his
interest in your advice and counsel as we represent U.S. businesses
abroad.� Since the Wright brothers took to the skies,
the United States has developed an aircraft-manufacturing base that
is the envy of the world.� As
Secretary Evans emphasized at the Paris Air Show last month, U.S. manufacturers
of aircraft and aircraft components can more than hold their own in
the global marketplace, given an opportunity for free and fair competition.
����������� Mr. Chairman, your subcommittee has jurisdiction over a
key high-tech sector of our economy one that has long been linked
to our national growth, prosperity, and international trade.� I appreciate your holding this hearing to enable us to discuss the
competitiveness of the U.S. aircraft manufacturing industry, which is
closely tied to our ability to open markets and liberalize international
trade.� Given that major markets
for aircraft lie beyond our borders, trade is critical to this industrys
competitiveness.� And, granting
the President Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) is a key step in ensuring
that our industry competes on a level playing field internationally.�
����������� Mr. Chairman, I would first like to underscore the importance
of aircraft trade to the U.S. economy.� I will then discuss some current competitiveness issues.� Finally, I will emphasize how the grant of
Trade Promotion Authority is essential to this innovative, high-tech
manufacturing industry.
Aircraft
trade is vital to the U.S. economy
����������� Our aerospace industry has the highest net trade surplus
of all of our manufactured goods and has consistently recorded trade
surpluses even as the overall U.S. trade balance in manufactured products
has widened.� Last year, when
the United States experienced a record trade deficit, the U.S. aerospace
industry recorded a trade surplus of some $27 billion.
����������� These exports sustain hundreds of thousands of high wage,
high-tech U.S. jobs.� Export
sales help support not only the airframe manufacturers themselves, but
many other companies, including small- and medium-sized enterprises
who serve as indirect exporters.�
Manufacturers of complete aircraft rely on over 10,000 U.S. suppliers
to provide the millions of individual components that comprise a complete
aircraft.� In addition, U.S.
parts suppliers support a vigorous market in after-sales service support.�
Last year, U.S. exports of aircraft parts (at about $28.5 billion)
exceeded the value of U.S. exports of complete aircraft (at about $24.7
billion).
����������� Access to foreign markets is crucial for the U.S. aerospace
industry, and especially for manufacturers of civil aircraft and parts
of civil aircraft.� This is the
largest segment of the U.S. aerospace manufacturing industry, accounting
for about one-third of total U.S. aerospace shipments measured by value.� About two-thirds of all the large civil aircraft
produced in the United States are shipped to customers overseas.�
��������� � Mr. Chairman, I applaud you for holding a hearing to focus on the
civil sector of the aircraft industry.� Over the last decade, the value of U.S. exports of civil aircraft
in any given year has exceeded that of military aircraft by as much
as 10 times.� While there are
important issues concerning the role of military aircraft in U.S. international
trade, the civil side of the business is key, and the parts manufacturers
play an important role in this industry.
U.S.
Competitiveness��������������������������
����������� A number of variables impact the competitiveness of U.S.
aircraft manufacturers.� The
policies and practices of the United States as well as those of our
competitors governments influence our competitiveness.�
����������� The single largest U.S. civil aircraft competitor is Europes
Airbus, and the nature and scope of this competition is different from
any other kind of competition that we encounter.� In the United States, aircraft manufacturers have never been owned
by the government.� With the
exception of military aircraft procured in the interests of national
defense, the U.S. Government has not sought to direct what type of aircraft
are produced, or when they are produced, or the price at which they
are sold.� Our industry is dynamic and shaped by market
forces.�
����������� European governments have a different orientation.� Many governments in Europe view aircraft manufacturing
in terms of its contribution to their national economic and engineering
capability.� These governments
point to the aerospace industry as an engine of high technology growth
and jobs.�
����������� Airbus and other major aircraft manufacturers in Europe
have a history of government ownership and control.� Given this direct financial interest, European governments have
undertaken steps to boost their industrys competitiveness.�� Airbuss corporate structure is telling.�
Airbus is owned by two companies: 20 percent is owned by British
Aerospace Systems, and 80 percent by the European Aeronautics Defense
and Space Company (EADS), which is the result a merger (of Frances
Aerospatiale, Germanys DASA, and Spains CASA) that was created
at the behest of European governments.
����������� The Airbus consortiums parent governments
have intervened in sales competitions in an effort to win orders for
Airbus.�� Due to the fact that many foreign airlines
are government-owned or substantially government-controlled, political
rather than market forces can become decisive factors in purchasing
decisions.� In the past, some European governments have
sought to influence these decisions by potentially offering increased
airline landing rights for the purchasing airline, granting preferential
trading rights in unrelated sectors to benefit the country purchasing
aircraft, and demonstrating willingness to advance the status of countries
interested in joining the European Union.�
The United States makes no such linkages.�
����������� To counter such pressure, we have raised our concerns in
U.S.-EU aircraft trade consultations, and we coordinate advocacy
campaigns on behalf of U.S. exporters.�
The thrust of these campaigns is to neutralize political factors
in the aircraft selection process.�
Through representations by senior officials, including Secretary
Evans and other cabinet members, we focus attention on the technical
and commercial considerations of aircraft purchases, ensuring that the
foreign buyer is aware of U.S. Government interest in a fair competition.�
In FY 2000, the Commerce Department participated in dozens of
advocacy cases in the aerospace industry, assisting U.S. companies in
completing billions of dollars in export sales.
����������� Another major challenge to U.S. competitiveness is foreign
government funding.� All models
of Airbus aircraft appear to have been supported through financial support
from European governments.� A
substantial part of this is from so-called royalty-based loans
to defray the costs of developing a new aircraft model.�
The terms of the loans were such that European government
funding may not have had to have been repaid if the actual level of
sales for a particular aircraft failed to meet projected levels.
����������� Some defenders of this direct support to Airbus
claim that it is necessary to counter indirect support that
Boeing receives in the form of NASA-funded aeronautical research and
development and the technological spin-offs from designing and producing
military aircraft under Department of Defense contract.�
This line of reasoning should be questioned closely.�
Both Airbus and Boeing receive indirect support.� In fact, I understand that Airbus parent
companies have more military and government sales than does Boeing.� But Boeing has not received direct subsidies;
only Airbus has received billions of dollars of direct, low-cost government
financing for specific aircraft programs.
����������� In January 2001, the European Commission released a report
on the importance of research and development to the future competitiveness
of Europes aircraft industry.�
The report calls for a major re-orientation of research and development,
in which member states and other public institutions would increase
funding and better coordinate programs to meet the perceived challenge
of the United States.�
����������� Airbus plans to develop a 550 seat-plus super jumbo
civil aircraft, the A380.� The
European Union has notified us that seven member state governments plan
to contribute funding for development of the A380.��
As a first step, we have requested detailed information on the
funding, and the EU is reviewing our questions.
����������� Another major concern affecting U.S. competitiveness relates
to regulatory measures. Increasingly, foreign governments are turning
to issues such as aircraft airworthiness certification and environmental
issues in what appears to be a strategy aimed at limiting U.S. aircraft
exports.
����������� A celebrated example of a regulatory issue, addressed by
this committee, concerns the European Union hushkit regulation.� Ostensibly implemented to address concerns
with excessive levels of aircraft noise, the regulation results in a
trade barrier through environmental protection legislation.� It embodies a carefully constructed design standard that negatively
impacts U.S. aircraft and aircraft engines while allowing the continued
operation of aircraft that are as noisy, and even noisier, than the
aircraft being restricted.� Consultations
are continuing today aimed at reaching a resolution with the European
Union on this issue.
����������� The granting of aircraft airworthiness certification also
can be used to injure U.S. competitiveness, such as with the Boeing
737 NG (New Generation) aircraft.�
Despite being approved by the Federal Aviation Administration,
and despite the Joint Aviation Authorities approving a basis for its
certification throughout Europe, the French government has not certified
the Boeing 737NG at its full limit of passenger capacity.�
Draft legislation proposed by the European Commission to create
a European Aviation Safety Authority contains provisions
that would permit the European Commission to overturn a member states
certification of U.S.-produced aircraft if the Commission were to consider
that the approval would give an unfair advantage to the
United States or would be contrary to Community policy vis-a-vis
the United States.� We have pressed
the EU to avoid linking aircraft safety and technical issues to trade
considerations.
����������� Finally, Mr. Chairman, unfortunately, this is an industry
where foreign corruption has a real impact.�
Bribery by foreign companies can have important consequences
for U.S. competitiveness.� Because
of the critical role governments play in selecting aircraft suppliers,
and because of the huge sums of money involved in aircraft purchases,
this sector has been especially vulnerable to trade distortions involving
bribery of foreign public officials.�
Whereas U.S. law has long prohibited U.S. companies from offering
bribes, the governments of many foreign aircraft companies allowed bribery,
and in some cases, even permitted tax deductions for bribe‑giving.
����������� A major step towards remedying this imbalance was the establishment
of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in International Business Transactions.� Its 34 signatory countries (all 30 OECD members and Argentina, Brazil,
Bulgaria and Chile) have pledged to criminalize the offering and payment
of bribes to foreign public officials.�
Unfortunately, there continue to be credible reports implicating
competitors in the bribery of foreign public officials as a tool to
get the contract.� In his July
report to Congress on implementation of the Convention, Secretary Evans
stated that he is committed to deriving the intended benefits from this
landmark agreement.� I have directed staff in the International
Trade Administration to redouble efforts aimed at obtaining our trading
partners full compliance with this important anticorruption agreement.
Trade
Promotion Authority
����������� To enhance our competitiveness, the President intends to
press forward bilaterally, regionally and multilaterally to expand trade
and the economic opportunities they create for�
U.S. aircraft manufacturers and for the American people more
broadly.
����������� Mr. Chairman, as the President has observed, Free
trade agreements are being negotiated all over the world, and were
not party to them.� There
are more than 130 preferential trade agreements in the world today,
and the United States belongs to only two.�
The European Union is not restricting its negotiators.�
They are busy inking agreements that give their manufacturers
preferential treatment across the globe including in markets
where weve previously enjoyed a competitive advantage.�
We have to get off the sidelines and back into the game.�
Our inaction hurts American aircraft manufacturers and the workers
they employ as they find their goods and services shut out of markets
by the many preferential trade and investment agreements negotiated
by our trading partners.�
����������� This Administration welcomes the fundamental role that Congress
was intended to play in setting our trade policies under the Constitution.�
In fact, what Trade Promotion Authority really provides is a
vehicle to ensure that Congress and the President have agreed on negotiating
objectives.� Our intent is to work closely with Congress, not only for the passage
of Trade Promotion Authority, but to rebuild the political consensus
necessary for our negotiators to engage with their counterparts at the
bargaining table.� Congress is
an indispensable partner in this enterprise.
����������� We must make the needs of aircraft manufacturers and their
suppliers a priority as we draft our negotiating objectives.� Trade Promotion Authority can help this high-tech
sector by enabling us to fully participate in a new round of global
trade negotiations, which we seek to launch at the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Ministerial in Doha.� This
could set the stage for resolving legal uncertainties over the status
of the WTO Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, the core WTO agreement
liberalizing trade in civil aircraft.�
These uncertainties have led some WTO members to be reluctant
to accede to the aircraft agreement.�
����������� Through continued trade liberalization, we can continue
to open markets for our civil aircraft and reduce pressures to provide
offsets to source components for aircraft and major aircraft
assemblies from foreign suppliers to gain market access.�
Decreased pressure for foreign sourcing can help improve sales
prospects for U.S. parts suppliers.�
Trade liberalization is a boon especially for smaller companies
such as aircraft parts manufacturers that often cannot
afford to invest behind the high tariff walls that certain
countries erect.
Conclusion
����������� Let me close by saying that, together, we have some tough
work ahead of us.� That is true
of the work we have to do abroad in liberalizing trade for the aircraft
manufacturing industry to enhance its competitiveness and of the work
we have to do here at home in setting the stage for further trade liberalization
by the renewal of Trade Promotion Authority.
����������� Thank you again for inviting me to testify.� I welcome your questions.