Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise today to urge my colleagues to support bringing forward Chairman Dodd's regulatory reform bill. The chairman has just spoken with great passion about how we got here. I want to take perhaps somewhat of a similar tack and describe, as a new Member, why I think this legislation is so terribly important.

I have had the opportunity today and on other Mondays, as is often noted, to sit in the chair and listen to my colleagues come in and talk about this issue. I heard today my colleagues talk about health care, talk about stimulus, talk about unemployment, as somehow reasons why we should not start a debate about financial regulatory reform. I am not sure I understand the connection.

Candidly, the American people could do with a little less political theater and a little more action. Regardless of what happens this afternoon at the vote at 5 o'clock, I hope--and I honestly believe most of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle hope--that we will get to that agreement in a bipartisan new set of rules of the road for the financial sector that will stand the test of time for not a year or two but for decades to come.

Before I get into a substantive discussion about how we got here and how I believe the Dodd bill takes dramatic steps forward, there is one other issue I need to address. I have sat in the chair as the Presiding Officer and have heard--and I know as Presiding Officer we have to bite our tongues sometimes--colleagues come forward and somehow portray this piece of legislation as a partisan product.

I have only been here for 15 months but in the 15 months I have had the honor of serving this body, I have not seen any piece of legislation that anywhere approaches the type of bipartisan input, discussion, and ongoing dialog that Chairman Dodd's bill has. Literally, in the 15 months I have had the honor of serving on the Banking Committee, we held dozens if not hundreds of hearings on the objectives of this legislation, objectives, again, that I think colleagues on both sides of the aisle agree upon: making sure there is never again taxpayer bailouts for mistakes made by too large financial institutions, making sure we have more transparency and, as the chairman said, a return of a sense of fairness to our whole financial product system and, third, that ultimately the American people, the consumers of this Nation, will make sure there is somebody watching out for the financial products that sometimes they have been purchasing without appropriate knowledge or appropriate recourse, when these products explode in their faces.

Again, unlike the Presiding Officer who served around this body for many years, I am a new Member. But I saw where the chairman did something I thought was somewhat unusual with a major piece of legislation. Rather than saying he had all the knowledge and all the input, he actually invited in the members of the committee, junior members, senior members of both parties to set up working groups to take on some of the challenging aspects of this bill--consumer protection, systemic risk, corporate governance, the whole question of derivatives. Let me state absolutely, because I can state from the systemic risk/too big to fail portions, the products we developed that are critical parts of this legislation are bipartisan in nature, bipartisan in ideas, and find that common ground that has been so absent from so many of the previous debates we have had over the last 15 months--I think particularly about the fact of the systemic risk, too big to fail, and resolution authorities Senator Corker and I worked on. There has been no better partner I could have had than Senator Bob Corker, grinding through hundreds of hours, recognizing there was no Democratic or Republican response to systemic risk and too big to fail, but we had to get it right. While there may be parts of this bill that can still be tightened and need to be tweaked here and there, and the Senator and I may add a few improvements, on the overarching goal of making sure the taxpayers never again would be on the hook, I believe we have taken giant steps forward.

As you heard from the chairman already, those conversations are ongoing even today. Please, while we kind of get sometimes subject in this body to hyperbole, anyone who makes the claim that this legislation is partisan only doesn't recognize the facts or has not seen the experience of the members of the Banking Committee over the last 15 months.

Let me also acknowledge--and I recognize I have a number of things I want to say and maybe other Members want to come, but let me acknowledge something else about this discussion. Sixteen months ago, when I came to this body, I actually thought I knew something about the financial services sector. I spent 20 years prior to being Governor around financial services, taking companies public. I had some ideas about how we would sort through these issues. I have to tell you what I quickly found was that oftentimes my original idea, or oftentimes the simplistic sound bite solution that I thought might be the solution, more often

than not proved not to be the case and that trying to sort our way through this labyrinth of financial rules and regulations in a way that brings appropriate regulation but maintains America's preeminent role as the capital markets' capital of the world has been challenging.

Again I thank my colleague Senator Corker. I think we both realize there is no Democratic or Republican way to get this right but we had to get it right. Over the last year we have set up literally dozens of seminars where we invited members of the Banking Committee to come in and kind of get up to speed as well. Fifteen months later, with this legislation now before the floor, I think we have taken giant steps forward in getting it right.

I also want to revisit for a moment, before we get to the substance of the bill, how we got here. I have actually been stunned sometimes, sitting in the Presiding Officer's chair, hearing colleagues come in and try to cite as the causation of the crisis that arose in 2007 and 2008 a single legislative action back in the 1970s or a single individual's activities over the last two decades. The claims are so patently absurd, sometimes they do not even bear recognition or bear rebuttal. But it is important to take a moment to look back on the fact that none of us comes with clean hands to this process of how we got to such a mess in 2008 that we were on the verge of financial meltdown.

Think about the fact back in the early 1990s, back in 1993, Congress actually passed legislation to give the Federal Reserve the responsibility to regulate mortgages--responsibility that we have seen time and again they didn't take up the challenge to meet.

The Presiding Officer spoke very eloquently earlier this afternoon about the actions of Congress in 1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley bill, that basically broke down the walls between traditional depository bank and investment banking that had been set up by the Glass-Steagall Act in the early 1930s. Where the Presiding Officer and I may differ now is I am not sure we can unscramble those eggs, but clearly we needed a little more thought back in 1999, as we internationalized our financial markets and turned these large institutions into financial supermarkets, which was one of the precipitating factors in this crisis as well.

Candidly, bank regulators were not given the tools to regulate, and oftentimes regulators of both depository institutions, their bank holding companies, and their securities firms, had no collaboration or coordination.

During our hearings in the Banking Committee when we looked into one of the most egregious excesses in the last few years, the Bernie Madoff scandals, we heard regulators had started down the path to try to find out the source of some of the criminality that took place in the Madoff case, only to find because of our mismatch of regulatory structure they got to a door they couldn't open because that was the purview of another regulator.

Regulators, under our existing rules, were actually prohibited from looking at derivatives. Derivatives, as the Chairman mentioned, in the last decade have gone from what seems like a large number--$90-plus billion--to literally hundreds of trillions of dollars in value.

Responsibility continues, again, in some of our monetary policy. In the early part of the 2000s--and again, not many people sounded the alarm at that point. We over-relied on low interest rates and monetary policy to pull us out of the 2001 recession. But as we came out of that 2001 recession, we left those monetary policies in place, which led to a housing bubble for which we are still paying the price.

I know some of my colleagues on the other side said this bill does not take on the GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. And, yes, to a degree, they are right. And then, in a subsequent action, we will have to make sure we have a new model in place for these institutions. But that should not be used as an excuse to not put in place major financial regulatory reform.

Candidly, if we are going to be really truthful with each other and the American people, we have to acknowledge that everyone--not just the banks but everyone--got overleveraged. Quite honestly, we all, the American people, probably need to take a look in the mirror as well. I think, as we bought those adjustable rate mortgages; took out that second and third loan on our home; ended up getting that deal that seemed too good to be true; moved away from the conventional idea that you ought to go ahead and, before you get a mortgage, be able to put 20 percent down and be able to show you can pay it back, we all got swept up in this ``who cares about tomorrow; let's just borrow for today.''

We also saw innovations, and American capitalism has worked pretty well, particularly in the last 100 years. But we particularly saw innovations in the last 5 or 6 years alone, innovations that originated on Wall Street that were supposed to be about better pricing risks: derivatives and all of their cousins, nephews, and bastard offspring. But these tools that were supposed to be a better price risk we have now found were more about fee generation for the banks that created them and, instead of lowering overall risk, created this inter-tangled web that, once you started to put the string on, potentially brought about the whole collapse of our markets.

Time and again, we saw, rather than transparency in the market, opaqueness and regulators who never looked beyond their silos.

I think most all of our colleagues want reform. Colleagues on both sides of the aisle want to get it right. But I believe there are two real dangers as we go down this reform path. One is to resort to sound-bite solutions that at first blush sound like an easy way to solve the problem but in actuality may not get to the solution we need.

I know we are going to have a fervent debate on this floor--and I look forward to it--about the question of whether the challenge with some of our institutions was their market cap or was it really putting pressure on the regulators to look at their level of interconnectedness and the level of risk-taking that was taking place. I look forward to that. There are valid points on both sides. When we get to that debate, I will point out the fact that in Canada, where there is actually a higher concentration of the banking industry than in the United States, because there was greater regulatory oversight and actual restrictions on leverage, those Canadian banks didn't fall prey to the same kind of excess we found here in the United States.

I know the chairman and Chairman Lincoln are working through the question of derivatives, where they should be housed, because they do provide important tools when used properly. And there will be a spirited debate on whether we should break off derivatives functions from financial institutions. I look forward to that discussion. By simply breaking off these products into a more unregulated sector of the industry, we could, in effect, if we do not do it right, create an even greater harm down the road than we have right now.

So the first challenge is to make sure we don't fall prey to the simple solutions and recognize the complexities of these issues.

The other challenge we have to be aware of is the converse. I know the chairman has heard, I know the Presiding Officer has heard--any of us who have tried to get into this issue have had folks from the financial industry come in and talk to us about the unforeseen consequences of any of our actions. Some of those arguments are valid, but oftentimes those arguments are simply--they always start the same: We favor financial reform, but don't touch our portion of the financial sector because if you do this, the unintended consequences would be enormous.

Because the knowledge level and the complexity of these discussions are so challenging, what we also have to fight against in this body is the more easy process to default to the status quo because timidity in this case will not solve this crisis and will not provide the new 21st-century financial rules of the road we need.

We can't be afraid to shine the light on markets or, for that matter, to raise the cost of certain activities, because the unforeseen consequences of the interconnection of these activities, as we saw in 2007 and 2008, pose grave risk to our financial system--and as we have seen with the 8 million jobs lost and literally trillions of dollars of value lost from the American public.

So what does S. 3217 do to accomplish this? I spent most of my time on the two titles that Senator Corker and I worked on and the chairman and his staff adopted and changed a bit but that still provide the framework and, I believe, the right structure.

First--the chairman has already mentioned this--we create for the first time ever an early warning system on systemic risk. If there is one thing that has become clear from all of the hearings that have been held, not just at the Banking Committee but under Senator Levin's Investigations Committee and Chairman Lincoln's Agriculture Committee, it is that there was very little combination and sharing of information between the regulatory silos.

The chairman's bill creates a nine-member Financial Oversight Council chaired by the Treasury Secretary and made up of the Federal financial regulators. This group will bear the responsibility, both good and bad, if they mess up, of spotting systemic risk and putting speed bumps in place because we can never prevent another future crisis, but to do all we can to slow and minimize the chance of those crises. The most important part of this systemic risk council is it will actually share information, so no longer will we have one regulator who is looking at the holding company, another regulator looking at the depository institution, a third looking at the securities concerns and not sharing that data.

We will place increased cost on the size and complexity of firms. The largest, most interconnected firms will be required--not optional but required--to have higher capital, lower leverage, better liquidity, better risk management. Those have all been traditional tools that have already been in our regulatory system, but this systemic risk council will require those large institutions to meet all of these higher costs--in effect, their cost of being so large and interconnected.

But what we are also bringing to the table are three brand new tools that I think, if executed and implemented correctly, will provide tremendous value in preventing that next financial crisis. Those three tools are contingent debt, our so-called funeral plans, and third, the Office of Financial Research. Since these are new tools, let me spend a moment on each.

One of the things we saw in the 2007, 2008 crisis was that as these firms got to their day of reckoning, it became virtually impossible for them to raise additional capital and shore up their equity. Once they start going down the tubes, the ability to attract new investors, particularly from a management team that sometimes doesn't recognize how far and how close they are coming to the brink, is a great challenge.

So working with folks from the Fed and experts across the country, this bill includes a whole new category within the capital structure of those large institutions: contingent debt. There will be funds within the capital structure that will convert into equity at the earliest signs of a crisis. Why is this important? This is important because if this debt converts into equity, the effect it has on the existing shareholders is it dilutes them. It takes money right out of their pockets. So existing shareholders will have a real incentive to hold management accountable, not to take undue risks, because long before bankruptcy or resolution we will be able to have this trigger in place that will convert this debt into equity, diluting existing shareholders and, candidly, diluting management as well. How effectively we use this tool has yet to be seen, but it will provide another early warning check on these large institutions.

The second new addition to the chairman's bill is basically funeral plans for these large institutions. What do I mean? I mean a management team will have to come before their regulators and explain how they can unwind themselves in an orderly way through the bankruptcy process.

We heard stories--I will not mention the institution--we heard stories in the height of the crisis in 2008 about how certain very large international institutions in effect came before the regulators and said: You have to bail us out because we cannot go through bankruptcy; it is just too hard. Never again should any institution be allowed to be in that position. And if we use this tool correctly--this is an area where I know the Presiding Officer has great interest--if the regulator does not sign off on the funeral plan for this institution, on how it can unwind itself, even with many of its international divisions, through an orderly bankruptcy process, then the regulator can, in effect, make this institution sell off or dispose of parts that can't be done through a regular order of bankruptcy. By doing this, we create the expectation in the marketplace that bankruptcy will always be the preferred option.

Never again will there be an excuse that, we are too big and too complicated to go through that orderly process. Creditors and the market will know there is a plan in place that has to have been approved by the regulator and constantly updated so we have a way out.

The third area--again, I was very pleased to hear the chairman mention this because within the press and the commentary, it has gotten no information or no focus at all--is the creation of a new Office of Financial Research within the Treasury.

One of the things we heard time and again from regulators as we kind of went back and looked at how we got in the crisis of 2007 and 2008 was that the regulators didn't realize the state of interconnectedness of some of the institutions they were supposed to be regulating. No one had a current, real-time market snapshot of all of the transactions that were taking place on a daily basis, so nobody knew what would happen if you pulled the string on AIG, even though it was their London-based office, what would happen if those contracts suddenly all became suspect.

By creating this Office of Financial Research, we will give the regulators and the systemic risk council, on a daily basis, the current state of play across all the markets of the world.

This tool, if used correctly, would be another terribly important early warning system. But as the chairman has mentioned, with all this good work, we still can't predict there will never be another financial crisis. Chances are Wall Street and others, creativity being what they are, will find some way, even with all this additional regulatory structure and oversight. We can never predict there might not be another crisis. So what do we do?

First and foremost, what this bill puts in place is a strong presumption for bankruptcy so that creditors and the market alike will know what happens if they get themselves in trouble. Particularly for these largest institutions that are systemically important, they will have to have their preapproved, in effect, bankruptcy funeral plan on the shelf so that we can pull that off in the event of a crisis and allow the institution to go through an orderly bankruptcy process. Again, bankruptcy will be the preferred option of any reasonable management team because through bankruptcy there is at least some chance they may emerge on the other side in some form or another. They may be able to keep their job, if they are part of management. Some shareholders may still have some equity remaining.

What happens if we have a firm that doesn't see the inevitable and isn't willing to move to bankruptcy? What happens if we have a circumstance where the failure of an institution could cause systemic risk and bring down the whole system?

With an appropriate check and balance--and again, I commend Senator Corker for his additions--in effect, simultaneous action of three keys: the Treasury Secretary, the head of the Fed, the FDIC, and additional oversight--all of these actions taking place, there then is an ability to say, how do we resolve an institution, in effect put it out of business--unlike in 2008 where the government invested, in effect, in a conservatorship approach that said: We will prop you up to keep you alive because we don't know what to do with you to keep you alive because you are so large and systemically important.

We have created in this bill a resolution process that says: If you as a management team are crazy enough not to go into bankruptcy, but actually allow resolution to take place, you are going out of business. Senator Corker said: You are toast. Your management team is toast. Your equity is toast. Your unsecured creditors are toast. You are going away.

Again, we are going to put this institution out of business in a way that does not harm the overall financial system. We have to have an orderly process.

We saw during the crisis of 2008 what happens when one of these institutions fails without any game plan. We saw the value of these institutions disappear overnight as confidence in the market, confidence within the market in the institution was lost. So working with my colleagues and experts from the FDIC and others, we said: What you have to do is, you have to have some dollars available to keep the lights on so that you can sell off the portions of the institution that are systemically important and unwind this in an orderly way that doesn't have an effect, the equivalent of a run on the bank or a run on the financial system.

Again, we have heard critiques of the approach Senator Corker and I came up with in this resolution fund, this ``how do you put yourself out of business in an orderly way'' fund. We actually thought it ought to be paid for by the financial industry, with the ability then to have that fund, in effect, replenished after the crisis is over.

I saw polling today that shows the overwhelming majority of Americans actually think the financial sector ought to bear the cost of unwinding one of these large, systemically important firms. Let me say, if there are other ways to do it--as a matter of fact, some in the administration have suggested other ways--I am sure we can find common ground as long as we do have at least two principles: First and foremost, the taxpayer must be protected, and industry, not the taxpayer, has to take the financial exposure. Second, funding has to be available quickly to allow resolution to work in a way to orderly unwind the process. But it ought to be done in a [Page: S2618] GPO's PDF way--again, this is where some of the judgment comes in--where there is not so much capital available that we create a moral hazard, but a bailout fund is created.

Personally, I believe the House legislation goes too far in creating a fund of that size. I think the chairman's mark strikes a much more appropriate balance. But if there are ways to do this that protect the taxpayer, allow speedy resolution with funds that will be available so we don't have a run on the market, a run on the institution that creates more systemic risk, as long as the industry at the end of day is going to pay for it, I am sure there are other ways and we can find that common ground.

What we did in this process of resolution is we said: Let's take what is working. Let's see what is best from the FDIC process which currently resolves banks on a regular basis. One of the things I have heard from some of my colleagues on the other side--I don't know about their community banks, but my community banks in Virginia; I would bet the community banks in Delaware and the community banks in Connecticut--we don't want to get stuck paying the bills for the large Wall Street firms that bring the system to the brink of financial catastrophe. So, again, one of the aspects of the chairman's bill is to make sure any resolution process does not burden, charge, or in any way otherwise interfere with community banks.

What we think we have struck is a process that puts costs on those institutions that make the business decision to get large and systemically important. We think we have put in place abilities for the regulators, with the funeral plans, to make sure if this interconnectedness is so large that they can't go through bankruptcy, then we can stop them from taking on these new activities. But because we can't always predict eventuality, we have then said: If you need to use a resolution process, let's make sure it is orderly, paid for by industry, and that you have stood it up in a way that no rational management team would ever expect or want to choose resolution.

I know my colleague from New Hampshire has been a great partner in this legislation and is on the Senate floor. I will end with just a couple more moments. There are other parts of this bill that have not received a lot of attention. In this bill, the chairman has included an office of national insurance.

One of the things we saw in the crisis in the fall of 2008 was that nobody knew how entangled AIG's activities were with the whole financial system. This doesn't get to the question of who should regulate insurance companies, but it does create at the Federal level at least the knowledge within the insurance sector of its interconnectedness. The chairman has mentioned that he and Chairman Lincoln are working to grapple through one of the toughest parts of the bill--again, an area I know my colleague, Senator Gregg, has been working on: How we get it right around derivatives.

Again, there is no policy difference. Both sides agree derivatives are an important tool when used appropriately. Particularly industrial companies need to use the derivative to hedge against future risk within their business. The challenge is, how do we not draw that end user exemption so large that every institution on Wall Street suddenly transforms itself into an industrial end user. Secondly, while these contracts are unique, they have to have more light shown on them in terms of clearing and exchanges.

I know Chairman Dodd and Chairman Lincoln and Senator Reid and Senator Gregg will be working through this. One suggestion I would have--because as someone who has seen Wall Street act time and again, I wish them all the luck--part of my concern is that whatever rule we come up with, there is so much financial incentive on the other side that a year or two from now, we may be back because they found a way around it that we again need to give the regulators certain trip wires. I, for one, believe we ought to take the industry at its word. The industry says end users are only going to be 10 percent of total derivative contracts. Then let's put that in as a regulatory goal. If they end up exceeding that, then we can bring draconian consequences to bear. Or if they say, yes, we can make most of these transactions and most of these contracts transparent through clearing or exchange, great; let's accept them at their word.

But if they don't get to those totals, then perhaps some of the actions that particularly Members on my side of the aisle would like to take can be put in place. But, again, folks of goodwill can find common agreement.

Finally, the area around consumer protection, where the chairman and the ranking member have worked at great length to kind of sort this through, everybody agrees on the common goal. There needs to be enhanced consumer protection, particularly for the whole nonregulated portion of the financial industry that now exceeds the regulatory half. Too often it was the community bank that was chasing the mortgage broker on some of the bad financial products because there was no regulation on the mortgage broker to start with. So, again, there will be differences, but I think the approach of the chairman, which is to keep this with the appropriate rulemaking ability but to make sure, particularly for those smaller banks, that we don't end with conflicting information of a consumer regulator showing up on Monday and a safety and soundness regulator showing up on Wednesday, to do that in a combined fashion so there is commonality of message, particularly to smaller banks, that strikes that right balance.

Again, I can only say for the banks in my State of Virginia, those smaller banks who oftentimes have said they didn't cause the crisis--and they didn't--they are the first to say: We need enhanced consumer protection to make sure that our financial products are regulated by the type of product, not by the charter of the institution that issues the product. There may be ways to improve on this section. But, again, I think Senator Dodd and Senator Shelby are working to get it right.

We have seen, as well, major action on the rating agencies, questions around underwriting. There are tremendous parts of this bill that haven't been the subject of great criticism because they are that common ground that, I think Senator Shelby has said in earlier quotes, 80 or 90 percent of both sides agree on. Where we don't agree, we ought to debate and offer amendments.

I look forward to candidly working with a number of colleagues on the other side of the aisle on technical amendments to this bill where we think we can make it slightly better. But if we are going to get there, we have to get to the debate.

I hope we move past procedural back-and-forth that, as a new guy, I still don't fully understand. I think it is time to fully debate this bill out in the open. The chairman made mention of what has been taking place in the last few weeks in Greece. I know the Presiding Officer has helped educate me on a whole new activity that is taking place in the financial markets right now around high-speed trading and co-location that could be the forbear of the next financial crisis.

How irresponsible would we be, 18 months after, again, the analogy of the chairman, after our house was broken into, when we haven't even put new locks on the door, if we ended up with another robbery, whether it was caused by international action or whether it was caused by high-speed trading, because we don't have new rules of the road in place?

In the 15 months I have had the honor of serving in the Senate, I can't think of a piece of legislation that better represents what is good about the Senate, folks on both sides of the aisle coming forth with their ideas, trying to fashion a good piece of legislation. I can't think of an area where there is less traditional partisan, left versus right, Democrat versus Republican divides. I can't think of an applause line better, whether I am talking to a group of liberal bloggers or folks from the tea party, than the notion that we have to end taxpayer bailouts.

I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, let's get through the procedural wrangling. Let's find that common ground that I think we are 90 percent of the way there. Let's pass a bill that gets 60, 70, 80 Members of the Senate and set financial rules of the road that will last not just for the next congressional session but for decades to come.

I yield the floor.