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Iran-Egypt: Prospects of a New Alliance?

Interview with Joshua Stacher

By Garrett Nada
 
What is the state of relations between the Muslim Brotherhood and Iran, especially in light of Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi’s third visit to Egypt since President Mohamed Morsi took office in June 2012?
           
            After 32 years without diplomatic relations, Egypt and Iran have initiated a dialogue since the Muslim Brotherhood has risen to power. But the Islamic Republic and the Brotherhood are not natural allies. The Brotherhood is a mainstream Sunni Islamist group that is more aligned to other Arab states in the Gulf than to Iran. The Sunni-Shiite divide in the Middle East is not a real tangible thing. It is largely imagined or manufactured, but powerful actors such as Saudia Arabia have spent money and capital to make people aware of this. Hence, the regional players usually operate along sectarian lines.

            The Palestinian issue is the one exception. The Muslim Brotherhood and Iran both have strong ties to Hamas, a Sunni group with political and military wings. The Brotherhood has even expressed solidarity with Hezbollah, a Lebanese Shiite group backed by Iran. But the Brotherhood’s view of Hezbollah has little to do with shared ideology. It is solely based on politics and a commitment to stop perceived injustice or oppression. The Brotherhood generally supports groups that it perceives as oppressed.
 
What was the agenda of the visit for Iran? For Egypt?
 
            Egypt and Iran had a common agenda, but perhaps with different goals. The main item on Egypt’s agenda was the Syrian conflict. Morsi has repeatedly denounced President Bashar Assad’s crackdown on his own people. In August, he launched a four-nation initiative—Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey—to halt the escalating violence.
And in September 2012, Morsi publicly acknowledged that Tehran was “vital” in resolving the crisis. Iran, as a key Syrian backer, could influence a transition.
 
            Iran focused on the Syrian issue, but partly for its own political reasons. Tehran feel increasingly isolated. It wants to explore better relations with Egypt, the most populous and important Arab country politically. Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi, on an African tour, has been reaching out to other countries to have conversations.
 
            The visit, a regional meet-and-greet, was a way for both countries to broadly open up a dialogue. For now, Egypt is willing to see where the dialogue with Iran leads, but it is long short of cementing an alliance that could change the region’s political balance. The stakes were low since both sides had no concrete expectations.
 
What are the prospects for Morsi changing Egypt’s relationship with Iran?
 
            The visit could lead to more talks between the two countries, perhaps on economic issues. But there is a disconnect between how U.S. and Egyptian policy circles view Salehi’s meeting with Morsi. The two countries are unlikely to become close allies or change the balance of power in the region. The Muslim Brotherhood has acted pragmatically both before and after the 2011 revolution, and Egypt has little incentive to break away from American patronage.
 
            Iran has little to offer Egypt. It cannot buy off Egypt with foreign aid or arms. Tehran also lacks influence with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The United States and its Persian Gulf allies have more capital for Egypt and better connections with international financial institutions than Iran.
 
            The Egyptian government would have a hard time selling its public on an alliance with Iran. Egypt does not have a significant Shiite minority, and its population is heavily nationalist. Egyptians are also staunch supporters of the Syrian revolution, so prospects for opening up to Iran are slim.
 
            Iran also views Israel as an adversary, while Morsi played a pivotal role in brokering a cease-fire between Israel and Hamas to end the November conflict in Gaza.
 
How do you assess reports that a new Tehran-Cairo relationship could transform the Egyptian military and interior ministry and Islamize society?
         
            Morsi may be considering restructuring internal security services but it has nothing to do with Iran or any attempt to “Islamize” society.
 
            The issue of security forces is sensitive because Morsi wants to introduce reforms that extend the executive's control over the institution. It does not seek to reform it or abolish it. The Ministry of Interior is still staffed by Mubarak-era bureaucrats and appointees who want legal guarantees of the ministry’s independence and immunity from oversight, much like a deal negotiated with the army generals.
 
            The Ministry of Interior is still the nerve center for domestic surveillance and riot police. In 2009 and 2010, approximately 1.5 million Egyptians worked for the ministry, many as informants. One in 50 citizens worked for various security services—roughly equal to the ratio of East Germany’s security services before 1989. During Mubarak’s rule, the ministry was responsible for egregious acts of torture, corruption and thuggery.
 
            This controversy has coincided with—and entangled in—the Iranian foreign minister’s visit. The Gulf-based Arab press claimed that former Minister of Interior Ahmed Gamal al Din was ousted in early January because he objected to a meeting between President Morsi and a Revolutionary Guards commander. A Muslim Brotherhood spokesman called the reports “pure fiction.” Similarly, the Egyptian domestic press does not seem to give the reports as much credence as the Gulf-based press. For the time being, it is best to treat this as a rumor rather than fact.
 
 
Joshua Stacher is a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars currently on leave from Kent State University.
 
 
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Tags: Egypt, Iran, Syria

Iran’s Post-U.S. Influence in Iraq

Interview with Ambassador Jim Jeffrey

By Garrett Nada
 
            Jim Jeffrey was U.S. Ambassador to Iraq from 2010-2012. He was also ambassador to Turkey, and deputy national security advisor under the George W. Bush administration. He is now a visiting fellow at The Washington Institute.
 
What has Iran done to increase its influence in Iraq since the U.S. drawdown began in September 2010?
            People should not be shocked, surprised, disappointed or discouraged by Tehran’s close relationship with Baghdad. Iran has actually played a significant role in Iraq since 2003. Iran has had considerable influence among the various Shiites political parties in Iraq. Most of them have their headquarters or leadership based in Iran. That’s true of the Supreme Council, Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s Dawa party and Muqtada al Sadr.
            Iran has significant economic and religious ties to Iraq. It is one of Iraq’s top trade partners after Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. It also has a very strong and understandable national security concern in ensuring that Iraq never invades it again. The United States understand that.
            The problem is that Iran uses its influence with both the Shiites and the Kurds, to some degree, to try to win Iraq over to its side on various issues like Syria. Syria has changed the nature of Iran’s relationship with Iraq more than the U.S. drawdown.
            The United States also did not set out to recreate Iraq as an American colony. Iraq lives in the neighborhood and has to deal with issues like Syria. Iran is an important neighbor with extraordinary ties to Iraq, particularly to the Shiites and Kurds who combined make up 80 percent of the population. Iraq is under pressure from both Iran and the United States. That is normal.
            U.S. combat troops were not necessarily keeping Iranian influence under control. U.S. troops [who fought alongside Iraqi forces] were effective in helping the Iraqis defeat Iranian-backed militias in 2008.
             
How has the Syrian crisis affected Iran’s relationship with Iraq?
            Syria has complicated the relationship to an extraordinary degree. Iraq, with its majority-Shiite population and significant Kurdish and Sunni Arab minorities, is caught in the middle of the wider Shiite-Sunni clash.
            There is a huge concern throughout the region that the conflict will turn into an ethnic-religious one. Elements in the Sunni-Arab camp and the Syrian Alawis associated with Bashar Assad, and to some degree the Iranians, want to divert attention from the oppression of the Syrian people. They want to start a sectarian conflict similar to Lebanon’s civil war from 1975 to 1990. Many Iraqi Shiites feel that a Sunni victory in Syria will lead to an upsurge of al Qaeda and Salafi influence in Iraq. This could pull the country back into civil war.
            Iran is also particularly concerned with losing its ability to project influence into the Mediterranean region. It would be more difficult to support Hezbollah if Assad falls.
            There is also tension between Baghdad and Tehran on Iranian flights over Iraq. The planes are believed to be carrying weapons to the Syrian government. This would be a violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions. The United States has been pressuring Iraq, sometimes successfully, to ground those flights and inspect them. The effectiveness of inspections is disputed.
 
What influence does Iran have on Prime Minister Maliki?
            Maliki is in the middle of a tug-of-war between the United States and Iran. The Iraqi prime minister can tell the Iranians that he cannot make concessions because of U.S. interests. Then he can say to the Americans that his hands are tied by Tehran.
            But this is how the United States is going to have to make foreign policy in the new Middle East. The situation with the Egyptians is similar and I dealt with this in Turkey too. The leaders of these countries are representative of their populations, which have diverse world views and are generally not enthused about the United States. The governments act professionally and recognize that they have to deal the world as it is. But even when the United States objectively is helpful to these governments, leaders use a great deal of rhetoric and avoid dealing with their population’s problems. There is a lot of dancing and bobbing and weaving.
 
Iran signed a defense agreement with Iraq in October 2012. What does this mean?
            The two countries have had close contacts at the security level before, although that visit by Iran’s defense minister was troubling. It is too early to tell if anything significant will come out of the agreement. They almost certainly discussed Syria, which is Iran’s main concern.
 
What are the key issues on which Iraq and Iran agree and disagree?
            There is actually very little common ground between Iraq and Iran on major issues, despite having significant trade with each other. Tehran would prefer Baghdad to export less oil. Iraq surpassed Iran in oil production in July 2012. Iraqi exports are allowing the international oil market to absorb the dramatic cut in Iranian exports due to U.S. and E.U. sanctions. So Iraq is a major factor in squeezing Iran right now on the nuclear issue. But the Iranians know that selling oil is an important Iraqi national interest.
            On Syria, Iran and Iraq have differing interests. But Iran may be able to garner more sympathy from Iraqis [than on other issues].
            The two major Shiite religious centers, Najaf in Iraq and Qum in Iran, are also competitors. Qum’s institutions promote the principle of velayat-e faqih, or guardianship of the jurist, which is unique to Iranian theology.
 
Has Iran increased its activities in Iraq since 2010--or sought to take over roles previously played by the United States? In Afghanistan, for example, Iran supports large infrastructure projects, which are very popular among Afghans.
            Iran has not taken over any previous U.S. roles. U.S. technical expertise in counterterrorism, intelligence and capacity building are vastly different than Iran’s. But Tehran has funded a fair amount of projects in southern Iraq. Iran has a lot of economic, commercial and trade influence there. It is providing some 15 percent of Iraq’s electricity and funding some infrastructure construction projects.
            Despite these projects, Iran’s image in Iraq has never been particularly good. Iraqis, including the Shiites, are somewhat skeptical of Iran’s intentions. But they generally want to maintain a good relationship with Tehran.
            Just a few years ago, there were militias that were armed, supported, equipped, trained and, to some degree, guided by Iran. Nobody wants to see that again. So there is a certain threat that Iran exercises through the potential to use these groups. Iraqis do not want Tehran to unleash these groups again.
 
What interests do Iran and the United States share in Iraq? On what issues do they differ?
            Both want to see a unified and stable Iraq, and they want to ensure that it cannot threaten its neighbors.
            But Iran does not have an interest in Iraq pumping additional oil. It does not want Iraq to have a close relationship with the United States, the Arab states or with Turkey. Iran also does not want Iraq to develop a significant defensive military capability. Ideally, Iran would like to have Iraq under its thumb, yet retain its independence and sovereignty.
 
 
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Part II: U.S. Pushes Back Israelis

Garrett Nada

        The United States and Israel are at odds over the need for imminent military action against Iran because of widespread concern about its controversial nuclear program. In mid-August 2012, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said talks between the world’s six major powers and Iran had failed to produce a diplomatic solution. He also began suggesting that Israel would be justified in taking unilateral action. But top U.S. officials have pushed back against the increasingly tough Israeli language.
 
        Since new U.S. sanctions were imposed during the summer, the Obama administration has argued that economic penalties are having a growing impact on Iran and that diplomacy is still alive. Senior officials – including Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and National Security Adviser Tom Donilon – have traveled to Israel to urge the Netanyahu government not to act now. Officials have pledged a commitment to Israel’s security, but recent public statements reflect serious differences with Israel over Tehran’s capabilities and prospects for successful negotiations.
 
        The following are key statements by senior U.S. officials that push back on the Israeli government’s stance on Iran.
 
Leon Panetta, Secretary of Defense, August 14
 
“I don’t believe they’ve [the Israelis] made a decision as to whether or not they will go in and attack Iran at this time…With regards to the issue of where we’re at from a diplomatic point of view, the reality is that we still think there is room to continue to negotiate.”
 
Gen. Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 14
 
“I may not know about all of their [Israeli] capabilities but I think that it’s a fair characterization to say that they could delay but not destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities.”
 
Gen. Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 19
 
“You can take two countries [Israel and the United States], give them the same intelligence and reach two different conclusions. I think that's what’s happening here."
 
“At the same time, we admit that our clocks ticking at different paces. We have to understand the Israelis; they live with a constant suspicion with which we do not have to deal.”
 
Jay Carney, White House Press Secretary, August 20
 
“We continue to believe that there is time and space to pursue a diplomatic solution to the problem of Iran’s failure to live up to its nuclear obligations. And we, as part of that relationship, that security relationship that we have with Israel, communicate all the time about Iran and other issues in the region that are of concern to Israel.”
 

Part I: Israelis Squabble Over Iran

Garrett Nada

        In August 2012, Israeli officials appeared increasingly divided over the need for imminent military action against Iran because of its controversial nuclear program. Israeli decision-makers and military elites now fall into three broad camps.
 
        One group surrounding Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has started calling for unilateral action against Iran if the United States hesitates. A second camp, personified by President Shimon Peres, is advising Israel to wait for American support. A third camp, composed of generals who fought in earlier Israeli wars, is urging caution and even questioning the government’s timetable.
 
        In the first camp, Netanyahu charged on Aug. 12 that the Islamic Republic’s nuclear potential “dwarfed” all other threats faced by Israel. And Michael Oren, ambassador to the United States, said on Aug. 16 that talks between Iran and the world’s six major powers had failed to produce a diplomatic deal. “We’ve come to a very critical juncture where important decisions do have to be made,” he said.
 
        But in the second camp, President Shimon Peres is now suggesting that Israel should not go it alone—and seems to even challenge the sense of urgency. The Nobel Peace Prize winner, who also opposed bombing Iraq’s Osirak Nuclear Reactor in 1981, backed waiting for the United States to make a decision. Peres’ remarks have sparked a firestorm of condemnation from the Israeli right.
 
        Several ministers and senior officials immediately blasted President Peres for publicly disagreeing with Netanyahu. One of the nine members of Netanyahu’s inner cabinet, bluntly said Peres “should stick to ceremonial duties.” An Israeli press report cited one official who said Peres has undermined Israeli national security. And a Netanyahu aide charged on Aug. 16 that Peres had "forgotten what the role of Israel's president is. He has forgotten that he made three major mistakes in regard to Israel's security ... His greatest mistake was in 1981, when he thought bombing the reactor in Iraq was wrong and, to the fortune of Israel's citizens, Prime Minister Begin ignored him."
 
        Former Israeli military officials have implicitly backed Peres. Some even went further in calling for restraint and questioned the need to act in the coming months. Uri Sagi, the former head of the Military Intelligence Directorate, told an Israeli press source that Israel’s leaders are creating “an orchestrated and timed hysteria – artificial or not – that is instilling fear in the country.” He characterized Tehran as a “harsh” but not “existential” threat to Israel. Like Peres, Sagi concluded that any strike “would not be possible without coordination with and consent from the Americans.”
 
        The following are key quotes reflecting the wide range of views among senior Israeli political and military officials.
Netanyahu Camp
 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, August 6
 
“This is a regime that has broken every rule in the book. They [Iranians] very likely could use weapons of mass death.”
 
Michael Oren, Ambassador to the United States, August 6
 
“A combination of truly crippling sanctions and a credible military threat—a threat that the ayatollahs still do not believe today—may yet convince Iran to relinquish its nuclear dreams. But time is dwindling and, with each passing day, the lives of eight million Israelis grow increasingly imperiled. The window that opened 20 years ago is now almost shut.”
 
Avi Dichter, new Home Front Defense Minister, August 19
 
“There are those that represent a strategic threat from Lebanon, from Gaza and from Syria, and an existential threat from Iran for the first time since the establishment of the State of Israel.”
 
Peres Camp
 
President Shimon Peres, August 16
 
"I am convinced this is an American interest. I am convinced [Obama] recognizes the American interest and he isn't saying this just to keep us happy. I have no doubt about it, after having had talks with him.”
 
"Now, it's clear to us that we can't do it alone. We can delay [Iran's nuclear program]. It's clear to us we have to proceed together with America. There are questions about coordination and timing, but as serious as the danger is, this time at least we are not alone."
 
Shaul Mofaz, Kadima Party leader and former defense minister, August 16
 
“You [Prime Minister Netanyahu] are headed for a rash confrontation at an unnecessary cost while abandoning the home front. Over the past few months, Israel has waged an extensive and relentless PR campaign with the sole objective of preparing the ground for a premature military adventure."
 
Military Camp
 
Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, former Israeli Defense Forces Chief of Staff, August 14
 
“We will still have the option (of striking Iran) even after the elections in America and therefore we shouldn't rush. We shouldn't present it as though it must happen in the autumn, as I read in the papers.”
 
Uzi Dayan, former Deputy Israeli Defense Forces Chief of Staff, August 15
 

“There is a window of opportunity. This window is closing, but if the United States would be much clearer and stronger about the sanctions on one hand and about what can happen if Iran won’t make a U-turn — there is not a lot of time, but there is still time to make a difference.”

 

Garrett Nada is a Program Assistant at USIP in the Center for Conflict Management.

 

Iran’s Evolving Policy on Syria

Garrett Nada

Iran has consistently supported President Bashar Assad since the uprising erupted in March 2011. Yet Iran’s tone on the Syrian crisis has noticeably evolved. Tehran initially subscribed to the official Syrian narrative; it described the protests as insignificant and orchestrated by foreign powers, including the United States. The first shift was visible in August 2011, as escalating dissent spread nationwide. High-ranking Iranian officials began referring to the “legitimate” demands of the Syrian people and the need for political reform.

In a second shift, Iranian officials started calling for a negotiated solution in early 2012. Tehran then formally backed the six-point U.N. plan on March 28, 2012.

But the top political, religious and military leaders have taken widely diverse positions. Some have stressed the need for the regime, Tehran’s longtime ally, to engage in dialogue with the opposition. Others have encouraged solidarity with Assad against “the dirt” of Syria’s enemies.

Still others have called for a combination of the two positions. On July 27, U.N. Ambassador Mohammad Khazaee warned against supporting opposition groups in Syria with arms or funds but also pledged support for the six-point U.N. plan. Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi hosted his Syrian counterpart, Foreign Minister Walid Mouallem, on July 29 in Tehran. Salehi acknowledged the Syrian people’s desire for change, but he also accused Israel and other countries of hatching a “plot” against Damascus.

The following quotes track the evolution in Iranian comments, dating from the crisis onset in spring 2011 through the joint press conference by the Iranian and Syrian foreign ministers.

Ramin Mehmanparast, Foreign Ministry spokesman, April 12, 2011

“What is happening in Syria is a mischievous act of Westerners, particularly Americans and Zionists…No one should be fooled by this trick that the Americans are playing.”
 
Mehmanparast, May 10, 2011

“We in no way accept violent confrontation and crackdowns against those who express their demands peacefully…[But] through their media, [Western countries] are trying to exaggerate the limited [opposition] movements and portray them as if they reflect the demands of the majority of the people.”
 
Ayatollah Ali Mohammad Dastgheib, member of the Assembly of Experts, June 23, 2011

Condemned sending “the national wealth of Iran to Syria and wasting it on the repression of the Syrian people, instead of providing this aid to the Iranian people.”
 
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, June 30, 2011

“The essence of the Islamic Awakening in the region is anti-Zionist and anti-U.S. But in the case of Syria, U.S. and Israeli hands are evidently at work.”
 
Ali Akbar Salehi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, August 27, 2011

“The government should answer to the demands of its people, be it Syria, Yemen or other countriesThe people of these nations have legitimate demands, and the governments should answer these demands as soon as possible.”
 
Ahmed Avaei, member of parliament, early September 2011

“The reality of the matter is that our absolute support for Syria was a wrong policy… The people protesting against the government in that country are religious people, and the protest movement there is a grassroots movement.”
 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President, September 8, 2011

“Regional nations can assist the Syrian people and government in the implementation of essential reforms and the resolution of their problems.”
 
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, January 31, 2012

“The Americans and certain Western countries want to take revenge on Syria for their recent defeats in the region, including Egypt and Tunisia…The main purpose of the U.S. plot in Syria is to deal a blow to the resistance front in the region because Syria is supporting the resistance of Palestine and the Islamic resistance of Lebanon.”
 
“The Islamic Republic of Iran's stance toward Syria is to support any kind of reform that would benefit the country's people and oppose the interference of the United States and its allies in Syria's internal affairs.”
 
Khamenei, March 29, 2012

“Iran will defend Syria because it supports its policy of resistance against the Zionist regime [Israel], and is strongly opposed to any interference by foreign forces in Syria's internal affairs.”
 
Alaeddin Boroujerdi, Chairman for Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, April 1, 2012

“Iran hopes that President Bashar al Assad …will maintain Syria’s stability and restore peace to the country through executing reforms and preventing foreign interference.”
 
Ismail Ghaani, deputy head of the IRGC Quds Force, May 28, 2012 (subsequently removed from the Islamic Student News Agency website ISNA)

“Before our presence in Syria, too many people were killed by the opposition but with the physical and non-physical presence of the Islamic republic, big massacres in Syria were prevented.”

Ramin Mehmanparast, Foreign Ministry spokesman, May 28, 2012

“We are certain that foreign interference, terrorists and suspicious measures which have targeted the resilient Syrian people are doomed to fail.”
 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President, May 31, 2012

“It seems unbelievable to me that a government would engage in killing its own people .... [but] I'm not excluding anyone from this responsibility. Any individual who committed these murders is guilty …The people responsible for this massacre must be punished, must be sanctioned.”
 
Ramin Mehmanparast, Foreign Ministry spokesman, July 4, 2012

“Any meeting that excludes the Syrian government and influential regional countries will be futile and any settlement imposed from outside on Syria will not succeed.”
 
Mohammad Ali Sobhani, former Ambassador to Lebanon, early July, 2012

“The entire world is against Syria and we are standing here defending Syria, a country accused of crimes against humanity. We are not playing this game very well.”
 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President, July 5, 2012

“The main enemies... are trying to revive their domination of the region and to save the occupying regime from destruction.”
 
“The Americans are seeking only their interests, and it is the right of the people of the region, including the great Syrian people, to freely decide their own fate and others should not impose their demands on them.”
 
Ali Akbar Salehi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, July 9, 2012

“No ruler is an eternal ruler, so in the case of Mr. Bashar al Assad, by 2014 there are presidential elections in which we will have to let the events take their normal course…We also support this idea whereby the government and the opposition sit down together to find a way out.”
 
Ali Akbar Velayati, International Affairs advisor to the Supreme Leader, July 13, 2012

“Under existing conditions, they [the United States and its allies] intend to challenge the region by creating crisis in Syria, which is at the frontline [of resistance] against the Zionists. Meanwhile, they want to prevent unity of the Islamic Ummah because the Middle East is the heart of the Muslim Ummah.”
 
Ali Akbar Salehi, Minister of Foreign Affairs July 15, 2012
“The Islamic Republic of Iran is ready to sit down with the Syrian opposition and invite them to Iran…We are ready to facilitate and provide the conditions for talks between the opposition and the government.”
 
Ghadanfar Rokn Abadi, Ambassador to Lebanon, July 20, 2012
“Iran will not deviate one iota from its support to the Syrian regime…The latest bombings resemble a powerful paper in Syria's hands…such attacks would open the way for the regime to act firmly with the terrorists, and would give it full powers to tighten its iron grip.”
 
Ali Larijani, Speaker of parliament, July 22, 2012

“The behavior of the western countries towards Syria needs a board to write on it 'we have reached the era of modern barbarism era'…You [Western states] assassinate, we will harvest its political advantages in the UN Security Council.”
 
Ali Akbar Salehi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, July 23, 2012

“Enemies imagined that they can create a vacuum in the management of the country by explosions in Damascus but the enemies of the Syrian nation have been defeated…and the army is gradually finding supremacy over the armed opposition.” 
 
“We believe that the opposition groups should reach a compromise with the Syrian government to get out of this situation even though Syria is heading toward calm.”
 
Brig. Gen. Masoud Jazayeri of the Revolutionary Guards, July 24, 2012

“Soon the soil of Syria will be cleaned of the dirt of the enemy…Yet none of the friends of the Syrian government and the great front of resistance has entered the scene. If this happens, they will strike back hard at the enemy, particularly the hated Arabs.”
 
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, July 25, 2012

 “What is going on in Syria is a real war between the front of the hegemonic and the front of the resistance…The resistance front will surely triumph.”
 
Ali Saeedlou, Vice President for International Affairs, July 25, 2012

Tehran is ready to give its experience and capabilities to its friend and brother nation of Syria.”

Mohammad Reza Rahimi, First Vice President, July 25, 2012

"Given that powers have united to damage the Syrian nation, Iran's stance toward Syria is not changeable -- it will always stand by its Syrian brothers.”
 
Mohammad-Reza Raouf Sheibani, Ambassador to Syria, July 25, 2012

“The military trend will further complicate and prolong the crisis in Syria and will bear negative and grave consequences for the region, in particular, for the instigators of the crisis.”
 
Mohammad-Reza Tabesh, member of parliament, late July, 2012

“We must support the government of Syria, which is at the frontline of the struggle against Israel…But we should support it as long as the government of Syria does not treat the people of Syria badly and the rights of the people are not violated.”
 
Mousa-al-Reza Servati, member of parliament, late July, 2012

“We oppose the West because of the belief that any reform must take place based on the choice of the people and implemented by the people of Syria. People can achieve whatever their wishes through elections.”
 
Majid Namjou, Minister of Energy, July 26, 2012

“Iran will not abandon support for Damascus under the circumstances that Western countries have united to hatch plots against the Arab country and undermine the security of Muslims in cooperation with terrorists.”
 
Mohammad Khazaee, U.N. Ambassador, July 27, 2012

“From the beginning, we have supported Mr. Kofi Annan’s plan, and we believe that’s the best way to resolve the issues in Syria…Reform should take place in Syria, some good steps have been so far taken. So therefore the solution is not to support financially or militarily different groups inside Syria and escalate the level in violence in Syria.”
 
Ali Akbar Salehi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, July 29, 2012

It is not appropriate that we compound these problems under the false assumption that if a [political] vacuum is created in Syria and the Syrian government changes, it will easily be replaced by another government. This is wishful thinking and an illusion.”

“We do not deny this fact that the Syrian people, like other nations, have the right to enjoy all civil rights in a free country, but it should be noted that a plot has been hatched against Syria, which is clearly manifested in the stance and views of the Zionist regime against Syria.”

 

Garrett Nada is a Program Assistant at USIP in the Center for Conflict Management.
 

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