SOURCE: CLIENT STATION: ----

PROGRAM: WEEKLY PRESS BRIEFING TIME: ----

REFERENCE: 100714A-01.DOC LENGTH: 24:16

DATE: 14 JULY 2010
JAMES APPATHURAI AND MARK SEDWILL
JAMES APPATHURAI (NATO Spokesman): Friends, mes amis, so sorry we're late. It was force majeure. It means, it's not my fault. (LAUGHTER)

So let me get straight to the start of the show. You all know Ambassador Sedwill. He is our Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan. He directs the Alliance's political activities in Afghanistan and influences very heavily the Alliance's political activities on Afghanistan and had a long discussion today with the North Atlantic Council and the Secretary General on precisely that.

 I don't want to take up anymore time. Mark has taken his very precious time to come down here, give a briefing, a short introduction and then if he's happy and if I can help I'm happy to take questions, but it's all him today.  Ambassador.

MARK SEDWILL (NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan): Great, hi, thank you. Thanks, James.I want to talk about the Kabul conference because inevitably a lot of our coverage focuses particularly at the moment on the military track and we're in the midst of a very tough summer, as we expected. Casualties are, regrettably, but I'm afraid inevitably high.

 But it is important as well that we understand that the approach in Afghanistan that we're all taking is comprehensive and there is a very important political track as well, because in the end, as General Petraeus himself has said, and indeed his colleagues before him, there isn't a military solution to Afghanistan. It's going to be, in effect, a political solution, enabled by the military effort, so let me talk about that.

 The Secretary General will, by the way, be attending the Kabul conference, as he did the London conference, and will be speaking at it and I'll be there with him.

 A few headlines on the Kabul conference. The first thing is, this is the first conference on Afghanistan in Afghanistan. And that is a critical point. Actually, in a sense, that's the whole story of this really. Because everything we're seeking to do, whether it's military or on the civilian development side, or politically, is to transition responsibility to the Afghans, so they can take responsibility for their own challenges and problems. That's going to be, in the end, how we deal with the insurgency. It's also going to be how we deal with all of the issues around stabilization, political inclusion and all the rest of it, that have made Afghanistan unstable in the past.

 And the Kabul conference is a really important milestone, because it is the first time, as I say, a conference on Afghanistan has taken place in Afghanistan and is therefore a real milestone in them developing their leadership and ownership of the effort to stabilize their country. And they're very clear about that. If you had an Afghan Minister here talking about this he'd be talking about Afghan leadership, Afghan ownership.

 The key outcomes that we're aiming for from it. Well, again, let me sort of give you the Afghan perspective on this at first. You'll remember in the London conference we talked about increasing the amount of aid that was going through the Afghan systems themselves, because that helps develop those systems and enable them to take more responsibility.

 We're going to go a step further in Kabul and that is to align all of our aid, or as much as we can, at least 80 percent, with Afghan priorities. So even those aid programmes that are not going through Afghan systems will actually be aligned with Afghan priorities and meet priorities set out in their national development strategy.

 So, again, Afghan leadership and ownership of what is happening enabled by the international community. And that's, again, one of the big points of this. You'll see the international community seeking to rally behind an Afghan-led process.

 But, of course, that means commitment, too, on the Afghan side, and critically those commitments are not just to the international community. We've had compacts and contracts and all sorts of things in the past, but critically the purpose of this conference is for them to make commitments to their own people. So essentially a compact between the government and their own people, your’ll hear different languages for it, but manifesto, pledges, whatever, between the government and their own people, with the support of the international community, not, as has been the case in the past, between the Afghan government and the donors.

 So if I can get back to the headline, not only is it the first conference on Afghanistan, in Afghanistan, but it's the first one that's really in Afghanistan that's sort of on Afghanistan itself, on the Afghan people themselves. And that's the public outcome we're looking for, so we're looking to really develop that link and that sense of commitment between the government and their people.

 And they'll be picking up a lot of the comments made and commitments made in Karzai's inauguration speech and flushing those outs, there'll be a series of programmes on all of that.

 In terms of... let me give you a few examples of the kind of things that we will be hoping to see, we should see a series of actually quite well developed programmes on economic and social development, and of course, that's where most of international aid in quantitative terms goes, led by the Ministers who have been leading a series of new clusters for human resources, human resource development for infrastructure and for agriculture and rural development.

 We'll see some important (inaudible), I think, on the security side. National security policy. There'll be a transition process agreed between NATO and the Afghan government. I hope we'll see some good news on the growth of Afghan National Security Forces. I'm not going to pre-judge the announcement, but look out for one. And we should also see the standing up of the reintegration programme which was endorsed by the Consultative Peace Jirga. The decree instituting it has now been signed and we should see the programme stood up in the reintegration fund to bring fighters back into the mainstream, back into Afghan political and economic life, launched from this conference.

 So those are the important things on the security side, which obviously NATO has a lot of interest in.

 And then thirdly, we'll see some commitments on governance, on improvements in public administration in particular, tackling corruption, but also inefficiency and capability gaps within public administration, and more generally on corruption including contracting private security companies and so on, on which we are also engaged.

 And that's the aim. So what I hope we'll see is at the end of the conference the Secretary General, Hillary Clinton, all of the other big players, being able to walk out and walk towards the nearest television camera and pretty much say what I've just said, which is as said, first conference on Afghanistan in Afghanistan, important commitments made by the Afghan government to their own people and the international community has aligned our effort either directly or indirectly behind that series of Afghan programmes. And that will be an important milestone if we can achieve it. I think we're in pretty good shape to do so, but obviously there are still a few days to go.

 Probably enough by way of introduction.

 JAMES APPATHURAI: I add my deep thought to this, just to say the Secretary General will be participating in the conference as well.

 MARK SEDWILL: I said that at the beginning.

 JAMES APPATHURAI: Oh did you?

 MARK SEDWILL: Yes.

 JAMES APPATHURAI: I wasn't listening to you, so... (Laughs).

 MARK SEDWILL: That was obviously... great!

 JAMES APPATHURAI: Please go ahead. And if you could identify yourselves, please.

 Did you?

 MARK SEDWILL: I did. Did you say anything?

 (LAUGHTER)

 Q: Okay, hi. Sorry to interrupt you. Hi, Klaus (inaudible) from Financial Times.

 (LAUGHTER)

 Q: Klaus (inaudible) from Financial Times in Deutschland, and one question and one of the... well, everybody used to say crucial project, infrastructure project in Afghanistan is the Ring Road. Could you just update us a little bit on the state of that project? Thanks.

 MARK SEDWILL: I'm not an expert on it, but it is... it still isn't complete. The area that is still needed to be completed is in the northwest and runs between Bagdhis and I think Faryab provinces. There are significant security issues in one of the valleys in Bagdhis which—and I'm trying to remember the name of the valley, we'll come back to it in a minute—which are preventing the completion of the Ring Road in that patch until we have managed to secure it. And actually there are security operations led by the Spanish forces in cooperation with the Afghans right now in that area.

 Elsewhere the work on the Ring Road is going ahead. In some areas it's fully tarmaced and actually you see vehicles driving along it at alarming speeds, for example, between Kabul and Kandahar. And there are still security issues elsewhere in the Ring Road, but elsewhere it is actually beginning to really perform its function as a trading route.

 Q: Can you just tell us... or what's your opinion on that project. How crucial is it? How important is it? Especially for Afghan national unity?

 MARK SEDWILL: I think it is critical. I wouldn't say it's necessarily crucial for Afghan national unity. Afghans themselves are still able to travel across the country and there are many other routes. It's essential... I think it's really largely... it's got two purposes.

 Firstly, economic. It does bring the country together and enable Afghanistan to shift away from being essentially an island among a series of Central Asian states becoming a trading hub again, which of course is what it was historically, until the British and Russian empires decided to make use of it as a buffer state. A quick little history there. Very pop history, I'm afraid, for you.

 But that is the objective, is to turn it more into a trading hub. So the Ring road helps connect Afghanistan into Central Asia, Iran, Pakistan, et cetera.

 And actually as crucial as the Ring Road itself are those linking roads, and indeed rail routes to the main border crossing points in the north, west, south and east.

 So it's really... it's economic, but it is a different paradigm of the economic model of Afghanistan, if you like, that the Ring Road is part of trying to develop.

 Q: Ben Nimmo, DPA. Mark, a couple of things. On the reintegration fund, if I remember right it's always been a bit of a struggle to get money for other funds, such as the trust fund, building up the army, so how are pledges looking? How's the atmosphere looking around that reintegration fund? Is there going to be enough money in there?

 And on a separate question, again, on the political track, after the Kabul conference we're probably what, two months away now from the parliamentary elections? And given the difficulties with the presidential elections, how are things now looking for the parliamentaries?

 MARK SEDWILL: On the reintegration fund we've got plenty of pledges. You'll see announcements made at the Kabul conference but the United States, Japan, the U.K. have each pledged substantial funds. I won't, obviously, pre-empt them by announcing the numbers, but I think you'll see announcements... It's not a pledging conference, but you'll see some announcements on that. And indeed, I think one or two other countries as well.

 So I think we're in pretty good shape there. And actually quite a lot of that money won't go directly to reintegrees. In fact, most of it will go via other programmes into essentially community development projects to encourage communities to reintegrate their own young men. It's important to remember how communal a society Afghanistan is, particularly in the rural areas.

 On your second question, the parliamentary elections, they're on the 18th of September and they're on track for that. The security measures are well-developed, we're away ahead of where we were last year, and I went through this process last year in my previous role. We're way ahead of where we were then in terms of security planning.

 The number of polling stations will be greater than last year. One of the things we're currently doing, with the Afghans, I mean,
led by the Afghans, is looking at the areas where polling stations are likely to be vulnerable and may have to be... some of which may have to be closed either because they're in the middle of nowhere, and that has been the case sometimes, or because of security threats.

 And just trying to ensure that if we map across that, the tribal and ethnic map of Afghanistan that there isn't a sort of, if you like, an unintended consequence from the security situation that particular groups will be disenfranchised.

 And it's different to the presidential election, of course. With the presidential election it was a single constituency, so therefore the fact that there were security problems in the south and east meant that the south was relatively disenfranchised compared to the north and west, in voting for a single person.

 Because within provinces, this is where it matters with a parliamentary election, because the province is the constituency for multi-member constituencies, and therefore if, for example, a southern province has fewer polling stations than a northern province that doesn't matter so much this time, as long as within that province there is a balanced representation because it's across the constituency boundary, if you get the point I'm making.

 In terms of measures to combat fraud and so on, I think the UN will be able to answer that better, but I think, again, the new IEC chairman is a strong and credible figure, Manawi. He is leading the effort on that, and I think we will see improvements from last year.

 We need to remember the constraints, of course. And the test really is twofold. It's a credible process and inclusive outcome. Because it is important that these parliamentary elections are inclusive, that those groups who felt excluded in the past feel they've got some representation at the end of this. And they have either, through intimidation or fraud or warlordism or all the other things that can happen, been excluded from the process.

 And my personal view, partially because, I guess, I'm focused on the insurgency, is that the outcome is more important than the process in that sense. It is more important that we have, within each province, a sense that every one, every tribal group, every ethnic group has got somebody within Parliament, within the political process who they feel represents them. Particularly those groups that were underrepresented in the past.

 I think we're in reasonable shape, but it'll still be very challenging, and of course we know that the insurgents will seem to make a day of it. The parliamentary election last year was the single most violent day in 2009. Presidential election, sorry.

 JAMES APPATHURAI: Two questions, Brooks and then...

 Q: Yes, Brooks Tigner, Jane's Defense. You told us to keep our eye out on the ANP, but I didn't quite catch what you said was going to happen. It's going to be reinforced, or be larger or stronger. Could you please elaborate on that?

 And related to that, what kind of budgetary resources are needed by the government, medium-term, to pay these soldiers, and were you expecting any substantial pledges there?

 MARK SEDWILL: Yes. On the first point, what I said was look out for... we have set some targets, or agreed some targets with the Afghan government for the growth of the Afghan National Security Forces, army and police, with milestones for October this year and October next year.

 Look out for some announcements on progress towards those targets at the Kabul conference, because I think we'll be in pretty good shape.

 In terms of paying for those forces, absolutely right. Again, it's not a pledging conference and we're not at the stage yet that we're looking beyond the point at which essentially ISAF is contributing as much as we are now of the overall military effort on the ground. We have... you know, we'll have a 140,000-plus once the surge is complete. The Afghans are now up to about 220,000 between the army and the police, altogether, roughly. Or they were about a month ago.

 But if you look at, for example, NTMA, NTMA has a budget of $11 billion a year, give or take.

 The, I think—I'm not an expert on this—I think the estimate for the cost of the Afghan Forces, the salary cost of the Afghan Forces was around half that number long term. The IMF, I think, though that they would be sustainable by around 2023, so there will need to be an international commitment to cover that gap meanwhile.

 Let's not forget, however, that however big that commitment is it will be a fraction of what it would cost to keep our own forces in the field in the long term.

 JAMES APPATHURAI: David.

 Q: Yes, David Brunnstrom from Reuters. Given that one of the aims of this conference is to make sure more aid money is channelled through the Afghan government, how much of a concern is it now that we have the U.S. lower house blocking billions of dollars of requested assistance because of corruption allegations?

 MARK SEDWILL: That supplemental actually went through the House of Representatives a few days later, so it was a temporary hold, but the broader point, which is the concern, quite legitimate, among Congress... actually this was Congresswoman Nita Lowey, but Congress generally and other funding sources about corruption is well made.

 Essentially there is a process by which either the World Bank or the U.S. government or others, certify ministries as essentially passing a threshold of credibility so that they can receive direct aid funds and their programmes can receive direct aid funds. Those audits, if you like, are kept under review, and they are genuinely credible processes. It's something the World Bank does all around the world. And there are several ministries that have now passed that test. USAID have their own process which is slightly separate, but very similar. Several ministries have passed that test, and therefore are eligible for direct funding. But that means that they have to have sound financial management measures in place that are proof against significant corruption.

 One of the papers that will come forward to the Kabul conference is going to be on financial management across government, led by the Ministry of Finance, and I think, again, we'll see some significant commitments made there.

 I mean, and not just commitments in the sense of promises, but commitments in the sense of a programme of improvement to tackle financial management across government and thus enable them to receive aid and for us to be confident that it will head in the right direction.

 Evidence from around the world, by the way, suggests that aid sent through government, a higher proportion of it, even with corruption and thus some of it sticking to the sides, a high proportion of it in really challenged developing countries like Afghanistan reaches the intended recipient then aid put through contractors and subcontractors and consultants and so on, where it isn't corruption, but there are a whole load of profit margins that take the numbers away.

 If you look there's a DFID study on this which suggests that it is actually... It is still, despite the rest, the most efficient way of getting aid to the sharp end.

 JAMES APPATHURAI: Do you have a question?

 Q: (Inaudible) from ANSA Italian News Agency. You said that it was expected a very hot summer. Between yesterday and today
12 soldiers of ISAF were killed and hundred of Taliban attack this district, Barg-e Matal...

 MARK SEDWILL: Barg-e Matal?

 Q: Yes. Trying to keep already the, once again, the control. So do you think it is the hottest part of the summer, we reach the maximum, or we have to expect...?

 MARK SEDWILL: Well, Sam Goldwyn said never make predictions, especially about the future, so I'm not going to be able to... I'm not going to predict whether it's going to get tougher and to what extent.

 Our sense is that it probably will. We would expect the level of violence to continue to rise, relatively speaking, until it turns and that's because we are really seeking to regain the initiative against the insurgents this year. We are tackling them in areas they have regarded as safe havens from which they could operate with impunity before. And inevitably they are fighting back and seeking to disrupt that campaign.

 We need to remember that we have surge forces into Afghanistan for precisely this purpose and tragic though any casualty is, whether an individual one or large numbers, it is, as I've said before, as General McCrystal said, as General Petraeus has said, and have been saying for months, it is inevitable that we would fight a high level of violence and thus a high level of casualties this year.

 One thing I should point out, which is a real tribute to the way ISAF has changed, and change particularly under... in the last year, since we focused on this, is that in the three months through till the end of June, roughly that kind of period, the number of civilian casualties was half the number it was in 2009, despite the fact we have roughly twice, nearly now three times as many forces in the field, and a much higher level of activity and operational tempo, so our efforts to drive down civilian casualties caused by us, always inadvertently, is showing real success. And I think that's one of the parts of the story of the overall levels of violence it's worth just recalling.

 JAMES APPATHURAI: We have time for one more, I think.

 Q: Stefanie Bolzen, Die Welt. I think last week there was this report by Integrity Watch on corruption saying that corruption actually had doubled. Can you comment on that looking at what were the commitments by the Afghan government back in London, on the London conference?

 MARK SEDWILL: I haven't seen the report itself. I don't know... I'm not sure corruption double since when? But the underlying point about corruption being endemic in Afghanistan and certainly among the top two or three challenges the country faces, is well taken.

 They did make commitments at the London conference to tackle corruption. We've seen some of those delivered already, a reinforced high office of oversight, which is their main anti-corruption body. We've seen some really significant procedural changes in some of the ministries to combat the kind of corruption that really affects people at the sharp end, which means that you have to pay $300 to register a car instead of the $50 it should cost you, that kind of thing, has been tackled. So I think we've seen some progress on corruption and the Afghan government will no doubt talk about some of that at the Kabul conference.

 But everybody is clear there's a long way to go on this, and it's probably one of the most important tests for the Afghan government, is the degree to which they can really press forward on this issue.

 We also have some work to do ourselves. Some of our own contracting practices haven't helped and have fuelled, at least the perception of corruption, but in some cases actual corruption as well. That's inevitably with the huge amounts of money going into Afghanistan. Within ISAF we have a task force looking at that, precisely that question, right now. In fact, two task forces. One more generally contracting; one looking at private security companies. But in the end the Afghan government really has to get to grips with this issue, and not just corruption in terms of financial corruption, but abuse of power, warlordism and all of those other things that essentially form the same nexus of issues they need to tackle.

 JAMES APPATHURAI: That's all you have time for (inaudible...).

 MARK SEDWILL: Okay, great. Thank you, everyone.