

NINEWA PROVINCIAL POLICE  
HEADQUARTERS  
MOSUL, IRAQ

**SIGIR PA 06-072**  
**OCTOBER 10, 2006**



## SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

October 10, 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT  
OFFICE  
COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCES-  
IRAQ  
COMMANDING GENERAL, JOINT CONTRACTING  
COMMAND-IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN  
COMMANDING GENERAL, GULF REGION DIVISION-  
PROJECT AND CONTRACTING OFFICE, U.S. ARMY  
CORPS OF ENGINEERS

SUBJECT: Report on Project Assessment of the Ninewa Provincial Police Headquarters,  
Mosul, Iraq (Report Number SIGIR-PA-06-072)

We are providing this project assessment report for your information and use. We assessed the construction work performed on the Ninewa Provincial Police Headquarters, Mosul, Iraq, an IRRF funded Multi-National Security Transition Command project located in the Ninewa Governorate to determine its status and whether intended objectives will be achieved. This assessment was made to provide you and other interested parties with real-time information on a relief and reconstruction project in order to enable appropriate action to be taken, if warranted. The assessment team included an engineer and an auditor.

This report contains negative findings; however, the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division began termination of the contract to minimize the loss to the U.S. Government. In our judgment, contract termination was the best and most practical solution. Accordingly, this report does not include any recommendations to correct the negative conditions reported and management comments were not required. The U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division did review the draft and offered no additional information and had no comments.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to our staff. This letter does not require a formal response. If you have any questions please contact Mr. Brian Flynn at (703) 604-0969 or [brian.flynn@sigir.mil](mailto:brian.flynn@sigir.mil) or Mr. Jon Novak, at (703) 343-9149 or [jon.novak@iraq.centcom.mil](mailto:jon.novak@iraq.centcom.mil).

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.  
Inspector General

# Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

SIGIR PA 06-072

October 10, 2006

## Ninewa Provincial Police Headquarters, Mosul, Iraq

### Synopsis

**Introduction.** This project assessment was initiated as part of our continuing assessments of selected reconstruction activities. The overall objectives were to determine whether reconstruction contractors were complying with the terms of their contracts or task orders and to evaluate the effectiveness of the monitoring and controls exercised by administrative quality assurance and contract officers. We conducted this project assessment in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspections issued by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency. The assessment team was comprised of an engineer and an auditor.

**Project Assessment Objectives.** The objective of this project assessment was to provide real-time relief and reconstruction project information to interested parties in order to enable appropriate action, when warranted. Specifically, we determined whether:

1. Project components were adequately designed prior to construction or installation;
2. Construction or rehabilitation met the standards of the design;
3. The Contractor's Quality Control and the U.S. Government's Quality Assurance programs were adequate;
4. Project sustainability was addressed ; and
5. Project results were consistent with original objectives.

**Conclusions.** The assessment determined that:

1. The design and specification of components prior to installation or construction were minimally adequate. This condition occurred because the contractor's Bill of Quantities incorporated into the contract coupled with the Statement of Work (SOW) was sufficient to facilitate proper repair and conforming construction. As a result, any project shortcoming was not caused by design or specification inadequacies.
2. Construction or rehabilitation did not meet design standards or specifications because the contractor did not demonstrate professional quality craftsmanship on construction and completed repair work. The contractor did not follow design or specification criteria as required by the SOW and Bill of Quantities. As a result, numerous defects and poor workmanship were noted throughout the project site and substantial work will be necessary to correct defective workmanship and uncompleted SOW tasks.
3. The Contractor's Quality Control and the Government's Quality Assurance Programs were not effective because the government's Quality Assurance Representative did not effectively engage the contractor's Quality Control personnel or effectively monitor project status during the entire timeframe of the project. As a result, the contractor provided numerous non-conforming repairs and substandard construction between early September 2005 and mid March 2006.

4. Project sustainability was adequately addressed by inclusion of sufficient repair and construction requirements in the contract's Statement of Work and Bill of Quantities. If all repair and construction work would have conformed to contract requirements, facility functionality and sustainability would have been much improved. In addition, the contractor was required to provide a one-year warranty on all construction work.
5. Project results were not consistent with the original objective to repair and reconstruct the facility. This occurred because all the work specified in the contract's Statement of Work and Bill of Quantities was not completed as claimed by the contractor. Numerous required work items were not carried out by the contractor and finished work was often substandard. Accordingly, the project did not materially improve the utility and effectiveness of the facility.

**Recommendations and Management Comments.** During fieldwork, the assessment team verified that United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) officials, newly assigned to the project after the contractor submitted an invoice demanding final payment, initiated action to terminate the contract in order to minimize harm to the government. That action was based on USACE's technical evaluation of work performed by the contractor. In our judgment, contract termination was the best and most practical solution. Accordingly, this report does not include any recommendations to correct the negative conditions reported and management comments were not required. The U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division did review the draft of this report and offered no additional information and had no comments.

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# **Introduction**

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## **Objective of the Project Assessment**

The objective of this project assessment was to provide real-time relief and reconstruction project information to interested parties in order to enable appropriate action, when warranted. Specifically, we determined whether:

1. Project components were adequately designed prior to construction or installation;
2. Construction or rehabilitation met the standards of the design;
3. The Contractor's Quality Control (QC) and the U.S. Government's Quality Assurance (QA) programs were adequate;
4. Project sustainability was addressed; and
5. Project results were consistent with original objectives.

## **Pre-Site Assessment Background**

### **Contract, Task Order and Costs**

The Ninewa Provincial Police Headquarters (1West) project was funded through the U.S. Government's appropriated Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) in the amount of \$988,178 via a firm fixed price contract awarded 18 August 2005 to a local Iraqi company by the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Gulf Region North (GRN). The contract has been administered since award by USACE GRN. While all other terms and conditions were unchanged, a single contract modification dated 16 February 2006 extended the contract's period of performance from 29 November 2005 to 31 May 2006. GRN officials approved a payment of 50 percent (\$494,098) of the contract on 11 November 2005. However, USACE officials newly assigned to the project after the contractor submitted a final invoice dated 12 March 2006 demanding payment in the amount of \$494,098, initiated termination procedures and issued a Cure Notice dated 28 May 2006.

### **Project Objective**

The project objective was to repair and reconstruct facilities associated with the Provincial Ninewa Provincial Police Headquarters (1West). The facilities consisted of a large three-story masonry block structure, a two-story masonry block structure, an auditorium, and a pedestrian entry building (Aerial Photo 1). The project encompassed design and build for new construction, repair and refurbish work for existing facilities, and debris removal and general cleanup for the facility.

### **Description of the Facility (pre-construction)**

The Ninewa Provincial Police Headquarters (1West) complex of buildings included sections or dedicated areas for a prison, a conference hall/lecture hall, a directorate and command section, headquarters administration, a guard company section, a reception center, miscellaneous bedrooms, and a generator control building (Figure 1). In general, the facility required substantial repair or refurbish work. Most notable were the sewer/septic system, air conditioning and

heating system, water supply and distribution system, electrical and power distribution system, sanitary improvements, debris removal, and general cleanup. The Iraqi Police were on site during the construction.




Figure 1. Pre-construction schematic layout of police headquarters buildings

### **Scope of Work of the Contract**

The scope of the project required the contractor to furnish all labor, equipment, materials, and supplies necessary to repair and reconstruct the facilities associated with the Provincial Police Headquarters as outlined in the Statement of Work (SOW), the contractor's proposed Bill of Quantities (BOQ) dated 20 April 2005, and the contractor's email message dated 15 June 2005. Based on the interpretation and recommendation of the Security and Justice Program Manager during the solicitation and contract award timeframes, the contractor's BOQ and email message took precedence over the SOW in the event of conflict between the government's SOW and the contractor's BOQ and email message. We could not verify whether the contractor's BOQ and email message were ever compared with the requirements of the SOW to determine their responsiveness or adequacy. However, a Technical Evaluation performed by the USACE in May 2006 confirmed that the contractor's BOQ and email message did not properly address the Scope of Work.

On 31 August 2005, the contractor signed the minutes of the Pre-Construction Conference conducted 29 August 2005. In accordance with the contract, the Pre-Construction Conference constituted a Notice to Proceed. Included in the Description of Work section of the Pre-Construction Conference minutes were requirements from the SOW that were never completed by the contractor. Specific requirements not met or completed are addressed in the Site Assessment section of this report.

## **Current Project Design and Specifications**

All required work was specified in the aforementioned SOW, BOQ and email message. However, drawings and submittals, other than the BOQ and email message, relevant to design and specifications were not provided by the contractor based on a review of all project documentation available from the USACE.

## **Site Assessment**

### **Work Completed**

Inspectors, from the office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), with the assistance of GRN officials, conducted an on-site assessment of the Ninewa Provincial Police Headquarters on 3 August 2006. At the time of our on-site visit, GRN officials were in the midst of terminating the contract because of the deficiencies identified. USACE's action to terminate the contract was based on a thorough technical evaluation conducted in May 2006 by the construction representative/Project Engineer. We found the Technical Evaluation to be very helpful and a source of reliable information. During the on-site visit, the construction representative/Project Engineer pointed out numerous deficiencies cited in this report. Overall, the site's reported status included a myriad of uncompleted requirements and the work completed was generally substandard. Major deficiencies were found in all of the following:

- New guard house construction
- Roof repairs
- Air conditioner systems
- Water supply and distribution system
- Wall construction
- Bathrooms
- Generator installation and hookup
- Septic and sewer system construction and upgrades
- Debris removal and general cleanup
- Electrical wiring, fixtures, switches, outlets, and etc.

The guardhouses on the commander building did not include a fan as required and were constructed with an extra window. As a result, exposure of the guards was increased. There was no evidence that roof repairs were completed in accordance with contract terms. The contractor did not install 81 of the 134 air conditioner units specified in the BOQ. The contractor neither renovated the existing water supply system nor provided new water supply and distribution systems components when required. Old and corroded galvanized water tanks and pipes were not replaced. Throughout the facility, wall and bathroom construction and refurbishment were very substandard. Walls and enclosures were crudely constructed. Wall repainting was not complete. Multiple bathroom defects were the result of the contractor's failure to comply with numerous design and specification requirements. For example, showers were not tiled from floor to ceiling, existing wall tiles and surfaces were improperly painted, defective toilet fixtures were not replaced, and defective plumbing hardware was sometimes by-passed or painted to avoid replacement with new hardware. While a new bathroom addition was completed, it was not constructed to specifications. The generator supplied by the contractor was placed at the wrong location without a hookup. Although required, the main septic tank was not replaced with the required tank with three times the capacity of the original. Debris, rubble, and waste materials



were not removed from the site. Lastly, electrical work was often substandard and not compliant with applicable code.

On-site photos taken 3 August 2006 by SIGIR Inspectors are included in this report. Although the photos are descriptive, each photo includes a short narrative to explain the deficiency.



**Site Photo 1. Contrary to contract requirements, four guardhouses were built without a fan, but with an extra window which increases the exposure of the guards.**



**Site Photo 2. This window air conditioner unit should not have been installed in a building interior location because contained units release large amounts of heat into the ambient interior air. The contractor should have installed a more costly split-unit system designed for use in an interior location such as this.**



**Site Photo 3. Existing water tanks left in place versus installing new units as required.**



**Site Photo 4. Lid from existing galvanized tank showed substantial corrosion.**

Throughout the facility, construction of windows and doorways was poorly completed. Window and door frames should have been removed and roughed in with blocks or other suitable framing material to facilitate flush finish work with plaster or other appropriate wall board material.



**Site Photo 5. Blocks with only horizontal mortar joints merely stacked outside a window.**

Site Photo 5 shows that the wall's top course (row) falls short of covering the window from bottom to top. The SOW requirement to enclose exterior exposures in a weather tight manner was not met.



**Site Photo 6. Plywood used to enclose metal frame was crudely held in position by tacking to only one piece of 2 by 4 lumber. The fit was not weather tight.**

The SOW called for tiled and grouted walls from floor to ceiling and new piping, fixtures and faucets in latrines and showers. However, contractor performance was generally substandard in the bathrooms observed during our on-site visit.



**Site Photo 7. The shower wall was painted with plaster versus being grouted with tile from floor to ceiling as required.**



**Site Photo 8. Existing wall tile was painted and existing leaking faucets were not replaced. Left faucet was capped/disabled instead of being replaced.**



**Site Photo 9. Original water closet toilet fixture should have been replaced. The wall should have been tiled and grouted from floor to ceiling and not painted.**

The SOW called for a new latrine attached to the guard company building to be comprised of:

- 10 individual showers
- 12 toilets
- 10 urinals
- 10 sinks
- 1 changing room

However, the contractor built a new latrine with only 1 shower, 1 toilet, 1 sink and no changing room. Had the contractor built a latrine compliant with contract requirements, two trees in the way would have required removal. However, neither tree was removed. The first tree is shown to the far left of the photo while the second tree is shown in the photo's center (Site Photo 10). Rather than removing the second tree, the latrine's concrete roof was cast around the tree. The new latrine was missing numerous requirements (sinks, showers, urinals, toilets, and a changing room) and the finished construction was substandard.



**Site Photo 10. “Shady Construction” trees were not removed when the new latrine was built.**

The contractor did not replace the main septic tank with a new tank three times the volume as required in the contract. Rather, the contractor added additional tanks of an unspecified and unverified size to the system. Such a course of action was outside of the design requirements. Concrete work to cover connecting pipe trenches was poor and manhole covers were generally nothing more than make-shift pieces of metal or wood. In addition, there was no evidence to support whether the underground sewer lines and system were inspected, repaired, and pressure tested as required by the contract.



**Site Photo 11. Main septic tank was not replaced with one three times the capacity.**



**Site Photo 12. Manhole cover made of tin/wood and concrete work over the trench which was substandard.**

The contract required the contractor to clear and remove all existing debris and rubble at the site location defined as each building's interior, exterior, roof, and perimeter. In addition to soil and waste material, the contract specified that unused hangers, wires, cable trays, conduit, plumbing, damaged ductwork, and all inserts from ceilings and walls were to be removed. Lastly, the contractor was required to provide a final cleanup of all buildings. At the time of our site visit, there was a substantial amount of debris lying about the facility and it appeared that a final cleanup was never conducted (Site Photos 13 & 14).





**Site Photo 13. Substantial amount of debris on the Police HQ grounds was not removed.**



**Site Photo 14. All debris was not removed from rooftop.**

### **Work in Progress and Pending**

No work was in progress at the time of our site visit since actual work needed to complete the project was not determined as of 3 August 2006. However, USACE officials plan to evaluate requirements and contracting options once the cure notice and contract termination process is concluded. Based on our observations and the general condition of the facility, USACE's plan to evaluate requirements and options in order to effectively and efficiently finish the project with a different contractor is practical.

## **Project Quality Management**

### **Contractor's Quality Control**

Contractor Quality Control (CQC) - is the construction contractor's system to manage, control and document compliance with contract requirements. In accordance with USACE Engineer Regulation 1180-1-6, a formal Contractor Quality Control Plan was not required because the contract for the work on the Police Headquarters did not exceed \$1million. However, the contractor was not exempted from Quality Control (QC) activities. Specifically, the contractor signed the minutes of the Pre-Construction Conference conducted on 29 August 2005 and confirmed reading a requirement to perform QC duties throughout the duration of design, construction, installation, testing, commissioning, and acceptance for the project. The contractor was required to inform USACE representatives at least 7 days in advance of the following operations:

- Backfill operations
- New water line pressure tests
- New gas line pressure tests
- Generator load tests
- Electrical tests
- Any construction inspections by local authorities
- Project final inspection

The contractor certified by signature on 31 August 2005 that all work would be performed by tradecraft personnel working within their trained craft. By itself, such a practice could have been a key element of effective Quality Control early-on and continued throughout the reconstruction and refurbishment of the Police Headquarters.

### **Government Quality Assurance**

Quality Assurance (QA) is the system by which the government fulfills its responsibility to ensure the Contractor Quality Control system is functional and effective. Project and Contracting Office Standard Operating Procedure CN-100, Construction Contractor QC/QA Inspection and Reporting, specifies requirements for an adequate and effective Government QA program while CN-102, Contractor Quality Control/Quality Assurance Construction Deficiency Tracking, provides more specific guidance pertaining to the mechanics of a QC/QA deficiency tracking system and relevant Quality Assurance Representative (QAR) responsibilities. On-site QA personnel should monitor a contractor's processes in order to track construction deficiencies to ensure acceptable corrective action while maintaining an audit trail and ensure that new work is not combined with unacceptable work.

## **Quality Management**

Quality Management (QM) is a combination of all QC and QA activities instituted to achieve the quality established by the contract requirements. Accordingly, obtaining quality construction is a combined responsibility of the construction contractor and the government. Their mutual goal must be a quality product conforming to the contract requirements. A cooperative and professional working relationship should be established in order to realize the common goal.

The assessment team determined that Quality Management (QM) practices were inadequate and ineffective. The government's Quality Assurance Representative did not effectively engage the contractor's Quality Control personnel or effectively monitor project status during the entire timeframe that the project was in progress. In addition, Quality Control (QC) reports submitted by the contractor were not adequately detailed. All QC reports submitted between 2 September 2005 and 12 March 2006 included very little detail related to specific tasks and locations and none included adequate disclosure about the percentage of work completed. It was not prudent for the government's Quality Assurance Representative (QAR) to rely on inadequate QC reports as a basis for Resident Management System (RMS) input. In short, the government's QAR neither implemented an effective deficiency tracking system to detect deficiencies as they occurred nor did the QAR initiate corrective action in a timely manner. The RMS Summary dated 13 March 2006 disclosed that zero QA tests were conducted and that zero Punch List Items were issues or were verified during the entire timeframe the project was in progress.

Not only were QC reports insufficiently detailed, the contractor also claimed that the project was completed and submitted a final invoice dated 12 March 2006 demanding payment of approximately \$494,000. The contractor's claim that all required work was completed was inaccurate. For example, 10 individual showers, 12 toilets, 10 urinals, 10 sinks, and a changing room should have been installed/included in a new latrine; however, only one shower, one sink, and one toilet were installed and the changing room was not built (Site Photo 15). In another instance, the contractor should have installed 6 split-unit air conditioner systems in the new reception center building; however, we verified that only two units were installed (Site Photo 16). Overall, the contractor only installed 53 of the 134 air conditioners required by the contract (Table 1). In yet another instance, the QC report dated 20 February 2006 stated: "Today we operate generator with new wiring and connections". However, the generator was merely delivered to the site by the contractor (Site Photo 17) and never started. United States Army personnel familiar with the history of the generator attested that Iraqi Police (IP) personnel placed the generator on a concrete pad (Site Photo 18) and installed an old fuel truck tank to supply the generator (Site Photo 19). At the time of our 3 August 2006 site visit, the generator remained non-operational. In summary, the contractor repeatedly provided non-conforming repairs and construction.

<b>Air Conditioner (AC) Description</b>	<b>BOQ Requirements</b>	<b>Units Installed</b>	<b>Shortage</b>
36,000 BTU AC	1	0	1
48,000 BTU AC	10	10	0
24,000 BTU Window AC	32	4	28
24,000 BTU Split-Type AC	79	35	44
30,000 BTU Split-Type AC	12	4	8
<b>Totals</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>81</b>

**Table 1. Air conditioner units to be installed.**



**Site Photo 15. Frontal view of bathroom, which should have included 10 individual showers, 12 toilets, 10 urinals, 10 sinks, and a changing room.**



**Site Photo 16. Only two (left edge of rooftop) of six split-unit air conditioners required by the SOW and BOQ were installed in the new reception center.**



**Site Photo 17. Generator was delivered (bottom left), but never connected and load tested by the contractor.**



**Site Photo 18. Final site, where the generator was placed by Iraqi Police (IP).**



**Site Photo 19. Old fuel truck tank used to supply the generator placed by the IP.**

## **Project Sustainability**

Project sustainability was adequately addressed in the contract awarded 18 August 2005. Repair and reconstruction requirements written into the Statement of Work and Bill of Quantities for the Ninewa Provincial Police Headquarters were sufficient to provide for a much improved and sustainable facility. Although USACE officials initiated action in May 2006 to terminate the original contract, sustainability should be adequately addressed when the USACE awards a contract to complete the required work.

## **Conclusions**

Based upon the results of our site visit, we reached the following conclusions. Appendix A provides details pertaining to Scope and Methodology.

1. Determine whether project components were adequately designed prior to construction or installation.

The design and specification of components prior to installation or construction were minimally adequate. This occurred because the contractor's BOQ was incorporated into the contract and was coupled with the SOW, which sufficiently facilitated proper repair and construction conformation. While SOW requirements were somewhat vague and the contractor's BOQ did not adequately address the SOW, the contractor signed the Pre-Construction Conference minutes on 31 August 2005 and confirmed reading the conference minutes that specified some SOW requirements not addressed in the BOQ. As a result, any project shortcomings were not caused by design or specification inadequacies.

2. Determine whether construction met the standards of the design.

Construction or rehabilitation did not meet design standards or specifications because the contractor did not demonstrate professional quality craftsmanship on construction and completed repair work. The contractor did not follow design criteria as required by the SOW and BOQ. As a result, numerous defects and poor workmanship were noted throughout the site and substantial work will be necessary to correct defective workmanship and uncompleted SOW tasks.

3. Determine whether the Contractor's Quality Control and the Government Quality Assurance Programs were adequate.

The Contractor's Quality Control and the Government's Quality Assurance Programs were not effective. This condition occurred because the government's Quality Assurance Representative did not effectively engage the contractor's Quality Control personnel or effectively monitor project status during the entire timeframe that the project was in progress. For example, Resident Management System (RMS) QA Summary dated 13 March 2006 disclosed that zero QA tests were completed and zero Punch List Items were issued and verified over the duration of the project. Although Quality Control (QC) reports submitted by the contractor were not adequately detailed or sufficiently accurate, RMS input was based almost entirely on QC reports. As a result, the contractor provided numerous non-conforming repairs and substandard construction between early September 2005 and mid March 2006.

4. Determine if project sustainability was addressed.

Project sustainability was adequately addressed by inclusion of sufficient repair and construction requirements in the contract's Statement of Work and Bill of Quantities. If all repair and construction work would have conformed to contract requirements, facility functionality and sustainability would have been much improved. In addition, the contract required a one year warranty on all construction. However, issues related to non-conforming performance by the contractor were addressed elsewhere (Assessment Objectives 2 and 3) in this report.

5. Determine whether project results were consistent with original objectives.

The project results were not consistent with the original objective to repair and reconstruct the facility. This occurred because the contractor did not follow or complete all the work specified in the contract's Statement of Work and Bill of Quantities. Numerous required work items were not carried out by the contractor and finished work was often substandard. Accordingly, the project did not materially improve the utility and effectiveness of the facility.

## **Recommendations and Management Comments**

During fieldwork, the assessment team verified that United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) officials, newly assigned to the project after the contractor submitted an invoice demanding final payment, initiated action to terminate the contract in order to minimize harm to the government. That action was based on USACE's technical evaluation of work performed by the contractor. In our judgment, contract termination was the best and most practical solution. Accordingly, this report does not include any recommendations to correct the negative conditions reported and management comments were not required. However, U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division reviewed the draft and offered no additional information and had no comments.



## **Appendix A. Scope and Methodology**

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We performed this project assessment from July through September 2006 in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspections issued by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency. The assessment team included a professional engineer and an auditor.

In performing this Project Assessment, we:

- Reviewed contract documentation to include the following: Contract W917BE-05-P-0058, Contract Modification P00001, Pre-Construction Conference Minutes, Statement of Work, and the contractors' Bill of Quantities;
- Reviewed the requirement contained within the SOW and contractor's BOQ, Contractor's Quality Control Reports, USACE Quality Assurance Reports, RMS Summary Report dated 12 March 2006, USACE Technical Evaluation dated 26 May 2006, and other relevant information;
- Interviewed or discussed the project with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Resident Engineer, Construction Representative, and the Multinational Security Transition Command J-7 (Engineering Directorate) staff; and
- Conducted an on-site assessment and documented results with photos taken 3 August 2006.

## **Appendix B. Acronyms**

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AC	Air Conditioning
BOQ	Bill of Quantities
CQC	Contractor Quality Control
GRN	Gulf Region North
IP	Iraqi Police
NTP	Notice To Proceed
QA	Quality Assurance
QAR	Quality Assurance Representative
QC	Quality Control
QM	Quality Management
RMS	Resident Management System
SIGIR	Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
SOW	Statement of Work
TO	Task Order
USACE	United States Army Corps of Engineers

## **Appendix C. Report Distribution**

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### **Department of State**

Secretary of State

Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq

Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office

Inspector General, Department of State

### **Department of Defense**

Secretary of Defense

Deputy Secretary of Defense

Director, Defense Reconstruction Support Office

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer

Deputy Chief Financial Officer

Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)

Inspector General, Department of Defense

### **Department of the Army**

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology

Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,

Logistics, and Technology

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement)

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller

Chief of Engineers and Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Commanding General, Gulf Region Division

Auditor General of the Army

### **U.S. Central Command**

Commanding General, Multi-National Force - Iraq

Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command – Iraq/Afghanistan

Commanding General, Multi-National Corps – Iraq

Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq

Commander, Joint Area Support Group – Central

### **Other Defense Organizations**

Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency

## **Other Federal Government Organizations**

Director, Office of Management and Budget  
Comptroller General of the United States  
Inspector General, Department of the Treasury  
Inspector General, Department of Commerce  
Inspector General, Health and Human Services  
Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development  
Mission Director – Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development

## **Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and Ranking Minority Member**

### **U.S. Senate**

Senate Committee on Appropriations  
    Subcommittee on Defense  
    Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs  
Senate Committee on Armed Services  
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations  
    Subcommittee on International Operations and Terrorism  
    Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs  
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs  
    Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information and International Security  
    Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia

### **U.S. House of Representatives**

House Committee on Appropriations  
    Subcommittee on Defense  
    Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs  
    Subcommittee on Science, State, Justice and Commerce and Related Agencies  
House Committee on Armed Services  
House Committee on Government Reform  
    Subcommittee on Management, Finance and Accountability  
    Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations  
House Committee on International Relations  
    Subcommittee on Middle East and Central Asia

## **Appendix D. Project Assessment Team Members**

The Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Inspections, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, prepared this report. The principal staff members who contributed to the report were:

Bill Tweedy

Lloyd Wilson