

U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense



May 3, 2012
Moscow, Russia



Agenda

- Ballistic Missile Threat**
- U.S. Policy on Missile Defense**
- Homeland Missile Defense**
- Regional Missile Defense**
- Addressing Russian Concerns**
- Missile Defense Cooperation with Russia**



Ballistic Missile Threat Continues to Advance

- ❑ **Proliferation of ballistic missiles is a growing concern and constitutes an increasing threat**
 - Proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction contribute to an unpredictable security environment
 - This security environment is marked by a persistence of regional conflicts and growing regional instability, as well as a broader and evolving set of opportunities and challenges

- ❑ **Threats continue to grow quantitatively and qualitatively**
 - Ballistic missiles allow rapid attack & WMD delivery
 - Shorter-range threats within key regions are growing rapidly: Iran, Syria, and North Korea possess 1000s of short- and medium-range missiles, potentially threatening to U.S. forces, allies, and partners
 - Long-range threat from North Korea and Iran still developing. North Korea tested ICBM/SLV in 2006, 2009, and 2012; Iran developing and testing Safir and Simorgh ICBM and/or SLV



*North Korean
Taepo Dong-2
ICBM/SLV*



**Iranian Ashura
MRBM**

**Iranian Simorgh SLV shows
progress in booster design that
could lead to an ICBM**





POLICY

U.S. Policy on Missile Defense

- ❑ **U.S. Homeland Defense: U.S. will defend against limited intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) attack**
 - System designed to support that policy: not scaled, intended or capable of defending the U.S. against the larger and more sophisticated arsenals of Russia and China


- ❑ **Regional Missile Defense: U.S. will defend deployed forces, allies, and partners in key regions**
 - Europe, Middle East, and Asia/Pacific
 - Tailored response to emerging ballistic missile threats

- ❑ **Expand international efforts: U.S. will work with allies and partners to provide pragmatic and cost-effective missile defense capacity**
 - U.S. seeks to create an environment where the development, acquisition, deployment and use of ballistic missiles by regional adversaries can be deterred



Homeland Missile Defense

- ❑ **Purpose: Protect the United States from limited ICBM attack by states like North Korea and Iran**
- ❑ **United States can defend the shaded areas using:**
 - Ground-Based Interceptors in Alaska and California
 - Land-based radars in Alaska, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Greenland
- ❑ **U.S. remains committed to maintaining and improving the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system**
 - Prepared to adjust plans to stay ahead of emerging threats



Defense Against North Korean ICBMs



Defense Against Iranian ICBMs



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BMD Supports Regional Security and Stability

❑ Missile defense supports U.S. security objectives

- Helps to deter and defeat regional aggression by denying an aggressor the prospect of achieving its objectives with the use of ballistic missiles
- Provides a stabilizing presence with deployments and training exercises, supports partner interoperability, and builds partner capacity

❑ Missile defense enhances regional stability and security and contributes to deterrence by:

- Assuring allies and partners of U.S. commitment
- Countering ballistic missile coercion and WMD proliferation
- Providing protection if deterrence fails
- Reducing pressure for rapid escalation if deterrence fails



Regional Missile Defense

- ❑ **Purpose: Defend U.S. deployed forces; protect allies and partners; enable allies and partners to defend themselves**

- ❑ **Missile defense is a key element of U.S. security commitments in Europe, Middle East, and Asia/Pacific**
 - Tailored to the unique geopolitical features of each region
 - Phased to the evolution and availability of U.S./Allied BMD capabilities
 - Adaptive to the scope and scale of current and emerging threats

- ❑ **Through cooperation, missile defense is more effective**
 - International cooperation, both bilateral and multi-lateral, is central to U.S. regional missile defense efforts



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EPAA Not Directed Against Russia

EPAA Elements:

Phase 1 (Present):

Initial defense vs SRBM/MRBM

- TPY-2 Radar in Turkey
- MD ship presence
- SM-3 IA interceptor

Phase 2 (2015 timeframe):

Enhanced coverage vs SRBM/MRBM

- Aegis Ashore site in Romania
- SM-3 IB interceptor
- Continued MD ship presence

Phase 3 (2018 timeframe):


Adds coverage vs IRBM

- Aegis Ashore site in Poland
- SM-3 IIA interceptor
- Continued MD ship presence

Phase 4 (2020+ timeframe):

Adds first layer capability vs potential Iranian ICBM

- SM-3 IIB interceptor
- Continued MD ship presence



Potential Threat Evolution



Addressing Russian Concerns About U.S./NATO Ballistic Missile Defense

- ❑ **Russia has expressed concerns that U.S. missile defense systems, particularly Phases 3 and 4 of the EPAA, could undermine strategic stability**
- ❑ **U.S. continues to consult with Russia to directly address these concerns**
 - We have shared our assessment that the ballistic missile threat is real and growing
 - Thousands of short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles; several states pursuing long-range missiles
 - We have explained the technical reasons why the EPAA cannot negate or undermine Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal
 - We have proposed extensive U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia missile defense cooperation



EPAA Cannot Negate Russia's Strategic Deterrent

❑ **EPAA is not positioned or designed to intercept Russian ICBMs**

- Ships, land-based sites, and radars are positioned to defend NATO Europe and United States against missiles from Middle East, not ICBMs from Russia
- This is true of all phases, including Phase 4, which will defend Europe and the United States against potential longer range missiles launched from Iran, not ICBMs from Russia
- EPAA is limited in capacity – only a few dozen interceptors, not enough to affect Russia's strategic capabilities even if intercepts were possible
- EPAA is capable against emerging Middle East missile threats, but is not capable against sophisticated countermeasures and multiple reentry vehicles such as Russia deploys

❑ **Interceptors in Europe cannot intercept Russian ICBMs**

- U.S. missile defense system requires tens of seconds after threat ballistic missile burn out in order to generate a firing solution
- U.S. interceptors are not fast enough to catch Russian ICBMs - would result in "tail chase"


❑ **Russia has large and sophisticated nuclear arsenal**

- Well over a thousand deployed strategic warheads - land, sea and air delivered
- Sophisticated countermeasures and multiple reentry vehicles
- Many possible launch points for land and sea-launched ballistic missiles



POLICY

EPAA Cannot Negate Russia's Strategic Deterrent



EPAA Not Designed or Positioned to Intercept Russian ICBMs



POLICY

Missile Defense Cooperation with Russia is a Key U.S. Priority

Operational benefits of U.S.-Russia cooperation

- Cooperation enables more effective and efficient defense
 - Data sharing and fusion allows improved early warning and interceptor performance
- Improves defense of all partners

Political benefits of U.S.-Russia cooperation

- Gain insights into BMD plans and capabilities
- Enhance strategic stability
- Sends clear message that proliferation will not go unchallenged
- Build habits of cooperation that could flow to other areas

U.S. and Russia have exchanged serious proposals

- Joint Analysis - to design a cooperative BMD approach and provide a greater understanding of our respective capabilities
- NATO-Russia BMD Centers - where we would combine sensor information and develop a common operational approach

MD cooperation is the best way for Russia to gain confidence that the U.S.-NATO system will not negate or undermine its strategic deterrent



Conclusions

- The ballistic missile threat is real and growing, and it challenges NATO, Russia, and many other nations**
- To reinforce regional stability, the United States and NATO are deploying missile defenses adaptive to the threat**
- U.S. and NATO missile defenses are not oriented towards Russia, and they can neither negate nor undermine Russia's strategic deterrent**
- Cooperation is the best way forward and is in the interests of Russia, NATO, and the United States**
- Promising proposals are on the table and the pathway to increasingly robust cooperation is clear**
- U.S. and NATO look forward to a Russian political decision to cooperate**