

14. Thinking again of ALL of the projects for which you were responsible, please describe below the THREE MOST COMMON metrics you used to measure the effectiveness of the reconstruction and stabilization efforts in your operational environment.

FREQUENCIES

	Frequency	Percent
Response Provided	21	65.6
No Response Provided	11	34.4
Total	32	100.0

COMMENTS

Violence decrease. Employment of military age males. Relationship state with local leaders.
- Feedback from public through different information channels - Public Support - Follow up visits after turnover to see if project was used as intended
Timeliness of award of contract, approval of funds, project start date
- Having Iraqis involved in construction decisions - Having competent construction contractors - Having a well developed O&M plan for use of projects once completed
Nahia / Quata requests for support OR thanks and requests to visit a project once complete. Feedback from the provincial staff department engineers during weekly and/or monthly project reviews. Feedback from "local press" and Muhlas.
Acceptance of completed project by Ninewa Province Officials; facilities used for its intended purpose (school doesn't turn into police station); and facility is maintained after turn-over to Government Officials.
Measurement of effectiveness was difficult to define and for the most part the metrics were not developed as too the effect we were trying to achieve. Having said that, in pure numbers: we did increase the electrical output; we did increase the number of schools and clinics, etc....
Maintenance of previously constructed/reconstructed infrastructure and how well they were stocked with supplies and personnel
Percent construction was actually completed; Number of incidents of violence; Number of incidents of sabotage to infrastructure
How many Iraqis were being employed Was the project needed to support US missions Short and long term impacts of the completed project
Reception of the locals upon completion, Iraqi plan for sustainment, amount of violence in the region
Number of attacks Number of Iraqis Employed Number of long term jobs created
1. project on time 2. project on budget 3. feedback from provincial governors on overall utility of project
1) The percentage/number of local populace supported. 2) Utilization by the Iraqi and local

government during and after the project. 3) Number of local Iraqis employed during the project.
Not qualified to answer.
% complete, # of Iraqis working, # of dollars spent
PRT metrics were focused on GoI/Provincial government capacity building, so we didn't measure reconstruction metrics specifically in a sense that would be meaningful to your survey. Reconstruction was a means to our end, not the end itself.
Increase/change in capacity; value added to community; change in violence or local attitudes
1. Amount of power to the citizens of Iraq 2. Keeping the US military in the good graces of the citizens. 3. Employing local nationals.
Obligation, Execution, Turn-over
Amount of construction completed; usefulness of the project; number of Iraqis who would benefit

15. What do you believe were the THREE MOST COMMON metrics the District used to measure the effectiveness of the reconstruction and stabilization efforts in your operational environment?

FREQUENCIES

	Frequency	Percent
Response Provided	20	62.5
No Response Provided	12	37.5
Total	32	100.0

COMMENTS

NA, this project was not managed by the COE.
I don't think we had established metrics for measuring effectiveness
Timeliness of award of contract, approval of funds, project start date
- Having Iraqis involved in construction decisions - Having competent construction contractors - Having a well developed O&M plan for use of projects once completed
On time. On budget. Quality of construction.
Funding stayed within authorized limits; construction completion; contract close-out
We were measured on execution: contract award and completion of project and cost growth. Again measures of effectiveness was lacking.
unknown/can't remember
Percent construction complete; schedule variance; cost variance
Cost Efficiency Force Protection
Reception of the locals upon completion, Iraqi plan for sustainment, amount of violence in the region
Number of jobs created Iraqis employed on the projects Customer satisfaction with the end product
1. project on time 2. project on budget 3. feedback from provincial governors on overall utility of project
1) Percentage of the project completed. 2) Type of projects completed (security, education, healthcare, etc). 3) Amount of funds paid to the contractor.
Not qualified to answer.
While assigned to GRN [Gulf Region North], i did not work in the district so was not positioned to see/assess their measures of effectiveness.
similar to above
1. Amount of power to the citizens of Iraq 2. Keeping the US military in the good graces of the citizens. 3. Employing local nationals.

Obligation, Execution, Turn-over
Number of Iraqis employed; Amount of Money Spent; Timeliness of Project delivery

16. What do you believe were the THREE MOST COMMON metrics the Corps Division used to measure the effectiveness of the reconstruction and stabilization efforts in your operational environment?

FREQUENCIES

	Frequency	Percent
Response Provided	21	65.6
No Response Provided	11	34.4
Total	32	100.0

COMMENTS

NA.
I don't think we had established metrics for measuring effectiveness
Timeliness of award of contract, approval of funds, project start date
- Having Iraqis involved in construction decisions - Having competent construction contractors - Having a well developed O&M plan for use of projects once completed
On budget. On time. Threat to project site/efforts.
Contract close-out; projecting and assessing program funding levels; USACE mission execution
Same as above.....
unknown/can't remember
Percent construction complete; schedule variance; cost variance
Supports US interests Amount spent Impacts to security/governance
Reception of the locals upon completion, Iraqi plan for sustainment, amount of violence in the region
Project completed to standard on time, budget and quality Iraqis employed or trained Number of attacks/SIGACTs in the area
1. project on time 2. project on budget 3. feedback from provincial governors on overall utility of project
1) Number of projects by type in province or major city (security, education, etc) 2) Project completion by supporting agency (USAID, MNF-I, MND, etc) 3) Capacity of projects by type (number of population serviced/supported)
Not qualified to answer.
of projects started, # of dollars spent
See above, attached to DoS.
Cost, schedule and performance = it is USACE?!
1. Amount of power to the citizens of Iraq 2. Keeping the US military in the good graces of the citizens. 3. Employing local nationals.

Obligation, Execution, Turn-over
Number of Iraqis employed; Amount of Money Spent; Timeliness of Project delivery

19. What indicators led you to believe that some CERP funding was lost to fraud or corruption? Please write in your answer.

FREQUENCIES

	Frequency	Percent
Response Provided	22	68.8
No Response Provided	10	31.2
Total	32	100.0

COMMENTS

<p>This project was contracted with specific objectives and metrics that unless met, payments were not given.</p>
<p>KTRs [contractors] selling the contracts. Our poorly qualified/trained USACE civilian personnel were constantly challenged and did not know what to do at times. This was the biggest contributor. I had a several temprary hirers who had no experience in construction. With little or no training we had these USACE employees making monetary decisions that cost us lots of money.</p>
<p>After construction facility was not used or not used for its intended purpose.</p>
<p>The award of almost all contracts the same individual was always at the table to receive the intital payment despite the company who was awarded the contract. We all knew that he was the leader outside the base and that any \$\$ that was spent in his area he was going to benefit from it. This was 2004 so many things changed.</p>
<p>Contractors would provide anecdotal accounts of local threats requiring payoffs.</p>
<p>When on site reviewing work of the contractors it was clear that they were NOT a "one sub" to the main. In several (many) cases, as opposed to the Iraqi laws, there were two or three subs in front of the actual contractor doing the work. The prime and other subs took "their cut / fraud in my opinion" and passed the work down. The result was the actual contractor doing the work did not have sufficent funding to provide "quality" products. I tried to overcome this by ensuring that SOW included "level of quality" for various components, fixtures, furniture, etc... However, it was a constant struggle. That said, I felt (toward the end of my tour) that my insistence on "better quality work" and acceptable fixtures and furinture had some effect, but reality was only way I could effect change was withholding funds until "minimal standards meet." My concern was that the "good fixtures/furniture" would be taken out once I accepted the project. To overcome this I insisted that the "owners of the project / leaders who would occupy" accompany me on inspections, punchlist walk throughs and acceptance walk throughs. I would reinforce to them and Providincial leadership (Deputy Governor, Chief Engineer, PC Members, and press when present) that this was minimum standrad and that they needed to continue GoI sustainment funding and service contracts that the PRT insited they put in place as part of the US funding for the project. Reality is we were trying to train them on how to run projects with their own funding which was becoming more prevelant than US funding in 2007.</p>
<p>Quality assurance inspections sometimes would uncover poor quality construction material or</p>

workmanship after payment to contractors. Some contractors had to pay (bribe) the community for the "right" to operate in their area and I believe the cost of doing business was factored into the winning contractor's bid. Some new facilities turned over to GoI would immediately fall in disrepair due to no sustainment effort or would be destroyed by criminals, then the GoI would request we "fix" the facilities again using US reconstruction funds (US tax dollars).
Conducted several contract fraud investigations; Effort and dollars were spent on ensuring supplies flowed to the project site and security---versus "brick and mortar"
multiple sub-contractors under the one selected for the project contractors operating under several different company names
The number of full and open contract awards to companies who did not seem to have any real intention of completing the project.
I did not see any fraud or corruption in our little office with regard to management or disbursing of funds; on the contrary, we worked very hard to preserve the government contracting, finance, and oversight processes given the poor environment. We did see many indicators of fraud and extortion with some of the contractors we hired. For example, we saw a lot of very poor construction quality by local contractors which required extensive oversight to fix... and in some cases extensive litigation. We also saw local contractors being extorted by local thugs to ensure the security of their projects, equipment, and personnel. Occasionally, we saw criminal activity... like one of our prime local contractors was murdered and robbed in broad daylight after he had received a substantial contract payment in cash; this caused several projects to shut down... therefore costing more in the end.
Contractors had to provide funds to Iraqi government officials in order to complete the work. Not all contractors provided the same level of quality.
Money spent did not equal the progress on the project. Contractors were often paid but then did not complete work Work would be completed but then the project would be vandalized, attacked or the work otherwise ruined and it would have to be redone. Some of this sabotage may have come from workers trying to keep a project going.
Due to the vast scale of our program, (\$2.5B across all 6 sectors of development dispersed throughout southern Iraq in one year), not enough capacity (shear numbers of inspectors) or ability (security limitations) to get enough QA/QC (CORs [contract officer's representative], COTRs [contracting officer's technical representative], construction and project managers) eyes on the projects frequently enough.
I believe corruption and fraud are normal business practices for the current Iraqi society. In addition, we had several areas where only one contractor was willing to bid on projects. We felt that these contractors were doing one or all of the following: 1) conspiring with the insurgency, 2) threatening other contractors, or 3) paying the insurgents to allow them to work in the area.
I can't put a figure on it, but I answered the highest possible. I personally fired two contract employees for corruption. Two GS employees walked free, even though they were dirty. CID did not have the resources to investigate them. Multiple State Department personnel made poor decisions on the award of contracts that makes you really wonder what they stood to gain. Every local government office had someone working there who was fixing contracts. There were plenty of others. Someone at [Headquarters] made unauthorized charges on my projects that showed up with fund codes from my engineers; only problem was my engineers' time cards didn't show them making those charges. No explanation. I also personally uncovered \$90,000 of

inflated bogus charges on projects as well as substitution of materials. No one cared as long as the buildings were going up
On the American side: Cost plus contracts had few controls for telling the contractors NO. Each contractor had it's own village in the IZ [International Zone], contract security, and fat salaries. On the Iraqi side: any Iraqi contractor had to pay a stream of bribes to the government and local strong men just to stay in business.
Successful contractors/bidders who shared with me their requirement to pay "inspectors" and others additional "fees" to obtain materials, provide unmolested access to sites, or avoid "targetting" from hostile elements. Our perception, and legal definition, of "fraud" is outside of the social construct of how Iraq operates.
new cars, watches and other overt signs of wealth flaunted by local and provincial leadership as well as contractors and security forces
I do not believe that there was any fraud or corruption but I believe that some money was spent on old equipment that would have been better replaced. These generation systems that i speak of are almost to the end of their life in normal conditions.
High bids with underwhelming quality of construction
apparent over charging for construction materials; occasional payment for work not completed to standard; over payment for termination of contracts

20. Please provide below any additional comments you may have on the use of CERP for reconstruction and stabilization, or the measurement of its impact that you feel would be beneficial to this project. Please DO NOT enter any personal information in this field.

FREQUENCIES

	Frequency	Percent
Response Provided	17	53.1
No Response Provided	15	46.9
Total	32	100.0

COMMENTS

<p>Continue to fund and approve projects that keep MAM [military aged males] off the streets. Continue to build the local leadership capacity to manage future similar projects.</p>
<p>Totally ineffective at times. We did not marry the projects with the capacity level of the Iraqis nor did we do a detailed assessment of condition of the infrastructure to support projects. We need to invest in education/training before we gave "Emerald City" projects which they could not handle. Case in point - \$28M Water Treatment Plant. Within a year, the plant was ineffective and not operating. The director general for the water sector did not have trained personnel to run the plant. Additionally the water distribution infrastructure was in horrendous condition so even with the water treatment plant working, it did not reach the population effectively.</p>
<p>A significant amount of money is spent on security and construction supervision. Some contracts are let and no one is there to administer the contract and we have no real way to ensure that we receive the product (facility) we have paid for. Greatest disconnect I observed is that there was no COP [common operating picture] between what land owning BCT was doing and what the Corps was doing. Two different sets of priorities.</p>
<p>I was deployed twice (2005, 2008). The reconstruction effort was much more effective in 2008 than my experience in 2005. Thought needs to be put toward what are the basic needs and what can the country sustain after we turn projects over to them. Western construction standards (porcelain sinks) quickly deteriorated compared to basic forms (steel trough sink). Determine what the basic functions are and design accordingly (industrial greade). Many projects were not functioning 6 months after completion due to a lack of O&M budget from the Iraqi Ministry (fuel for generators, chemicals for water purification).</p>
<p>My time as a Provential Reconstruction Engineer was the BEST assignment of my 23+ year career and the one that I am most proud of. The differences we were able to make by funding courts and other Rule of Law and my work with contractors, engineers and leaders that I mentioned in the last question are the things that I know made a difference while I was there AND in the years after I left Salah ah Din Province. Yes, there were enormous challenges each and every day dealing with the Provincial, Nahia and Qhada governments as well as the central GoI. In addition, there were many challenges with the US State Dept, USAID, and Military chains as well. However, I truly felt like I made a difference for the GoI, the Iraqi people and the</p>

US interests. I know this because I still hear regularly from many of the people I worked with at all levels of the Iraqi Government / society. Was there corruption that occurred - yes. Was it so overwhelming that nothing was completed - NO. HOWEVER, one of the great insights was the degree to which all levels of the Iraqi government/engineers that I dealt with would highlight US Government corruption examples when we were preaching and insisting on transparency, reduction in corruption, etc... Very hard to keep pushing these ideals when US Congressional Representatives were being found with \$90K in their refrigerator freezer, US local and state government leaders were being convicted of various corruption charges, etc... The one thing we would outline when these were raised to us was that our "people and press" were holding our government leaders accountable for their actions. If the Iraqi leaders wanted to remain in "office" they needed to focus on their own accountability since there were now elections. Hopefully we were able to impact the culture, democratic ideals, and goals of a transparent and "free" society that will continue now that we are not working so closely with them. My fear is there will never be the true reconciliation between the central government (majority) and the Sunni provinces.

Some thoughts: Required for success:

- Safe and secure environment: provides the condition for economic progress and political reform.
- Host nation ownership: of the affected country drives its own development needs and stabilization and reconstruction process.
- Legitimacy: the degree to which the population accepts the mission; the degree to which the government is accountable to its people; and the degree to which regional neighbors accept the mission
- Common funding:
- Unity of effort: common set of goal objectives and procedures over the short and long term—even when the participants come from many different organizations with diverse operating cultures.
- Common Operating Picture. The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) model is designed to tie in military, government, and non-governmental organization (NGO) efforts, but there is no overarching automated tool with which to coordinate operations.
- Regional Engagement: entails encouraging the host nation, its neighboring countries, and other key states in the region to partner in promoting both the host

Weaknesses: Interagency Rehearsals: Conduct rehearsals of this pol-mil plan prior to D-DAY. Inadequate civilian strategic planning and interagency operational planning Structural weaknesses in the U.S. government system for conducting missions: Department-centric organizations resulting in the tendency for “stove-piping,” with each agency reporting up and down through its own chain of command Insufficient civilian resources, including personnel, and funding Inadequate mechanisms to foster information sharing within and among agencies Leadership authority at the operational level (CORD--Vietnam example), Personnel who are not trained for interagency missions Build what they need; what they can sustain and what they can build Use local materials Use local design standards--keep it simple

For small to medium projects: The most successful projects were those that employed local companies using local labor to build local infrastructure. For large regional projects (water and electricity): The most successful projects employed International primes with proven experience working in insecure environments, using local subcontractors.

CERP projects provided the local population / economy hope of a better future for the people of Iraq.

One of the biggest problems was monitoring projects with "USACE eyes on". The security environment and the great geographic dispersion of these projects plus the sheer number of projects often made it impossible to do more than cursory, irregular visits to any given project.

Being unable to get to the projects and observe on a daily basis, we were forced to rely on progress reports and sometimes make payments for work that was difficult to verify had been completed let alone be able to verify the standard of quality. This was a huge frustration during my first tour. Often we would find we'd spent 50% of the money allocated to a project but the thing would only be 15% complete. However, by the time we figured this out the contractor building the project may have left, gone out of business, skipped town or been killed by insurgents with no way to recover the funds. At that point we would then have to go out and find another contractor to finish the job and expend funds to go through that process. Another critical factor was how the poor security situation in many areas caused costs to skyrocket, especially in 2004-07. Early on, we had no idea how expensive in terms of dollars it would be to provide security for projects or what our contractors would have to spend on security which sometimes amounted to bribing the local leaders.

We built several schools, health clinics, police stations, and fire stations that went unoccupied or under utilized because they were not part of a larger, national plan. The thought of "build it and they will come" did not work with professional and specialized workers in Iraq. I felt that in many areas, the various reconstruction agencies looked at a map and saw there were not enough civil service buildings in certain portions of the country. Projects were then developed and funded to help build the local government capacity. We built all kinds of facilities without coordinating their future use by the Iraqi Govt. The issue truly hit me on my following tour in Iraq as a transition team member. During a village engagement, I visited one of the health clinics that we worked so hard to fund and build two years prior. The clinic was a nice facility with a waiting room, store room, small operating room, two patient rooms, and office space. However, the building had no power (never had it) and contained only first aid supplies. Also, the building was used two days a week by a traveling doctor and nurse.

SIGIR is toothless At least two U.S. civilian employees who worked for me were part of the problem. As far as I know, they still have their old jobs. No one even had their security clearance flagged. Contracting Command Iraq was so incompetent, they would sign off on anything. But when you showed them where they made a mistake, they would never back down--since if they did they could get in trouble for signing off on a bad contract

PCO [project and contracting office] & IRRF [Iraqi Reconstruction and Relief Fund] were wonderful ideas but did not take into account the full situation. Iraq had a functioning government with relatively competent ministries. Iraq was also coming out of its Saddam era shell. PCO was created from scratch and manned with contractors. The American & Ex-pat contractors in PCO and their sector prime contracts meant well and were technically competent, but they did not think like government officials and once the insurgency began they were not willing to take physical risks. I visited PCO often and they were generally very out-of-touch with the reality of trying to do construction in the difficult environment in Iraq. The metric became "# of project starts" - this was a foolish metric. It's quite easy to start a project, it's incredibly hard to finish one, particularly in Iraq. The American recovery effort was not synched in with what the government wanted and therefore much of it went to waste. .

Measuring effectiveness of reconstruction funds with a focus on metrics of effectiveness - when applied to the mission of PRTs and Capacity Building - is extremely challenging at best. Reconstruction funding - having access to \$ and control/influence in the project "approval" process - gave the PRT itself credibility and "access" to provincial government officials. That access and legitimate "business" interaction with Provincial Council members provided a

working medium with which to develop governance capacity - completely separate and distinct from the impact/effectiveness of the reconstruction projects themselves. Put another way, without reconstruction funding, the provincial government would have paid little heed to what the PRT wanted to do. We had to bring something to the table - aside from intangibles like "additional skill/competence" in their ability to perform - in order that they would genuinely engage with us. Reconstruction funds provided that "something" - it got us a seat at the provincial table, and it allowed the provincial officials to "demonstrate" that they were, indeed, doing something for their population.

I have very mixed emotions about the return on investment that the US taxpayer got or is getting for his investment in Iraqi reconstruction. For example, we committed several million dollars to SCADA [supervisory control and data acquisition] management tools to watch an immature electrical grid --- did/does that make any tangible difference for a country whose demand far outstrips production and distribution numbers and potential for the coming decade?

I do not believe that there was any fraud or corruption but I believe that some money was spent on old equipment that would have been better replaced. These generation systems that I speak of are almost to the end of their life in normal conditions.

Impressed with USACE effort and dedication to duty and mission accomplishment. The SIGIR was unimpressive and lacked basic knowledge of construction or the construction environment.

I think that the payment/income structure used by the Corps of Engineers (i.e. they take a percentage of payment for work completed) lends itself to the emplacement of projects as quickly as possible with little thought to usefulness of the project and the quality of construction placement. Additionally, the lack of detailed contract and the use of Iraqi "design build" firms is not conducive to delivering quality projects (particularly on large or complex projects). Dedicating more contract specialists and more design engineers (using standard designs and Iraqi construction methods) would lead to better projects. Finally, the inclusion of liquidated damages (or other penalties for lateness) in contracts would help deliver projects in a more timely manner.