14. Thinking again of ALL of the CERP projects for which you were responsible, please describe below the THREE MOST COMMON metrics you used as a BATTALION COMMANDER to measure the effectiveness of the reconstruction and stabilization efforts in your operational environment.

FREQUENCIES

	Frequency	Percent
Response Provided	160	76.6
No Response Provided	49	23.4
Total	209	100.0

COMMENTS

GOI Endorsement and Agreement to Sustain Number of personnel benefitting from the project GOI Prioritization and Inability to Directly Fund.
1. # of local (the same district and muhalla) employed (80-90% was our objective) to effectively maintain support of the locals of the project efforts and security since they had a direct interest in the efforts. Decreased harrassment or threats against employees/laborers/workers. 2. Project on the District Project Priority List (PPL) to ensure efforts met the need(s) of the constituents based on the basic necessities of water distribution, water/waste reduction/treatment, power, education, solid waste management, and security. Efforts had to depict fairness in execution (Sunni/Shia/Christian) and the local/district leadership were the "face" of the efforts rather than US Forces. 3. Cost : Longevity of product/project - the cost of the project had to be an effort the local population and district would be able to sustain/maintain without US Forces continued funding. If projects could not be turned over to the local or district leadership/engineer without a sustainment agreement, it was not considered a valued project effort. This ensured continuity once we transferred efforts to the local nationals rather than US Forces always providing handouts for sustainment/maintenance.
Decrease in violence.
1. Sewage and trash removal. 2. Schools open and operational. 3. Lack of violence in urban areas.
Enemy SIGACTs [significant activities] Per Day/Week Citizen CMOC Visits Iraqi Gov't/Army Feed-back
Number of employed, changes in violence, amount of dollars spent
1. Security of local people 2. Employment 3. New construction - sure sign that things were getting better (but hard to tie back to CERP)
1. Levels of violence. 2. Access to the community. 3. Access to government officials.
Increase in availabe telecommunications services/ employment rate/ reduced insurgent activity
1. Level of violence 2. Return of displaced families 3. Economic improvements (increases in local commerce)
1. Capacity of that particular effort over time (success) 2. Ability of local authorities to leverage improvement 3. Ability of local authorities to sustain improvement
Decrease in violence New shops opening due to increased local cash flow Iraqi children's access to schools
Improved infrastructure reduction in violence local Iraqi cooperation
thh ability to publicize the effort, but nopt attribute to any single individuals thus preventing killings
Level of violence, trust of the Iraqi people for their government and security forces, costs of goods and services
decrease attacks/hotile activity; increase employment; imporve cleanliness of environment
smuggling activity violence population atmospherics
First, was the level of violence directed at US forces. Second, the amount of intelligence generated by projects. And third, support from local population for the projects.
effective operation of Police forces(numbers on duty, patorling, incidents reponded to, reports adn crime

tracking, etc)
Each project had its own set of metrics. Broadly, most common used to measure "success" were: trends in local economic growth/development, employment rates, and level of local violence. Another intangible, though very important metric was level of Iraqi ownership/pride in the project/program, and ability to sustain.
1. Increase in students attending School. 2. increase in employment 3. decrease in trash on the roadways. MSRs
Soldier observation, interaction with officials
Reduction of attacks on US forces, Reduction of attacks on Iraqi's, volume of activity in the markets
Local/district council feedback Individual/influential Iraqi feedback General conditions/metrics in sector
Feedback in council meetings Feedback from population General metrics applicalbe to the collective efforts impacting the setor
1. Has the level of violence decreased 2. Did the project achieve its intended effect (vastly different depending on project) 3. Did we get what we paid for, and was it a resonable price (somewhat subjective, but Google is a big help to bound the expected costs)
1. CUB [combat update brief] with my CO CDRs 2. SIGACTS tracker in CPOF [combat outpost of the future]. SWEAT assessment 3 4. Projects status and impact on district
Sunni Resettlement Economic development as evidenced by new business reduction in violence
-improved quality of life for locals -improved relationship with US/Coaltion forces -local citizen involvement or utilization of the completed project
Did it meet a valid need? Did the project advance US and partner goals/interests? Was the project sustainable by the Iraqis once complete?
Local and District Government process improvement, degree of additional associated costs (less is better), sustainability of program
Decrease in violence Feedback from locals Personal Observation
1) Tribal leader engagement on security issues 2) Support of the election process 3) security in business/market places
Number of local businesses Number of homes with running water Number of clean streets
level of violence, ability to get HUMINT, and population attitude
1. Were the provincial and district government supportive of the projects. 2. Was it independently sustainable by Iraqi Government. 3. Did it provide a basic need or service to the OE population.
Personal Observation, Subordinate Recommendation, IGO Request (USAID, etc.)
1. Feedback from local populace 2. Feedback from government officials 3. Feedback from ePRT
1. # of violent acts (kinetic and intimidation). 2. Signs of improved life (shops open longer, # of shoppers, # of businesses open, more cars, longer gas lines--increased demand for gas is good, rent price) 3. # of families enjoying public facilities (restaurants, schools, parks, soccer games, etc.) The idea was that more people on the street meant better security.
Diminish support for insurgency Rule of Law (reduction of civil violence) Civic prosperity
Did project have a lasting benefit, self-sustaining or skills acquired, amount of people it employed, good will achieved in relationship inroads made which would result in winning over tribes, which normally led to decreases in violence.
GOI feedback through council meetings, citizen feedback through patrol interaction; capabilities increasing enemy attacks on our forces interaction with local population
Involvement by local population in nominating more - helping Feedback from local government Derease in people protesting
- Applications for grants and the survivability of the business and its success - Number of employees hired, trained and certified for the Iraqi Business and Industrial Center - Decrease in rocket attacks on the base and intelligence information received on insurgents in the area
1. # of operating stores in a village/types of goods sold 2. Acts of Violence 3. Perception data of security
1. Violence Reduction (measured by markets opening) 2. Employment 3. Infrastructure improvement
Decrease in Violence Increased Citizen Response/Participation Increased Governance
Sustainability, Scope/size of population benefitted, Cost
Support by local powerbrokers Population attitude to Coalition Forces Increase in Outputs (e.g. amount of water, students trained, etc.)

1) How did the project meet a specific need? Was it meeting the requirement and to what standard? 2) Could it be sustained? Was it worth the price/value? 3) Did it in some way affect another line of effort positively?
Enhances seucirty for the local population Enhances capabilites, professionalim, trust in HN secuirty forces and govt Provides hope for the civilian population
Visual economic revitalization; reduced violence; citizens on the street.
levels of violence, feedback from Iraqi citizens. feedback from mayors
Stability of the Area- reduction in violence, willingness to negotiate, reduction of inflammatory political rhetoric
Effective of desired results for populace their needs Effective results for forces in achieving our goals (save lives, show our resolve and partnering/development goal) Cost
Attacks against our Soldiers Force Protection Attitude of local populace
New items to buy at markets New businesses established Ability of the activity to continue without CERP payments
Could the project stand the test of time. Meaning, was it somthing the Iraqi could fully run on their own, easily maintained, and not easily distrupted by the enemy. Then I would say somthing that developed the future Iraqis citizens. Finally I would say the project would have to help the US / BDE [brigade] look good.
Water, infrastructure improvements for QOL
Reconciliation between neighborhoods Positively effect the most amount of people Allow for the GOI to take over the project and stimulate local administration
Empowerment of the District and Neighborhood Advisory Councils
Did the project allow the local government to address a real need of the people.
1. Does it improve security? 2. Will it create jobs? 3. Does it support GoI?
Did it help reinforce the ISF, did it provide a benefit to the local economy and/or did it protect the local populace.
1. Ease of Iraqis being able to assume control of the project(s) 2. Ability of CF to transition project(s) to Iraqi control 3. Diminished level of violence
decreasing violence community survey's feedback from local leaders
redcution of violence (SOI) Return of population / work Electricty (ran the water pumps)
Feedback from local leaders and citizens. Feedback from subordinate commanders and Soldiers. Feedback from higher headquarters.
Just one - the right effects achieved. It was never about how many or how much they were worth. The right % of the population influenced in the right way. Sons of Iraq program for example influenced the fighting age Sunni males and gave them hope in their future. Culturally, in influenced their tribal leaders by giving them power. The buying power was immediately measurable in the local markets.
Number of workers employed. Ammount of roads repaired. Trends in violence/attitudes towards coalition forces.
number of Iraqis employed, feedback from populous
Decrease in violence, emergence of small businesses in the marketplace and cooperation in local governance.
Increased Qada government capacity and ownership Economic development in rural areas Decrease in attacks against U.S. forces
did it allow for self reliance; could they self sustain the benefit; would it cause more harm than good
1. Number of Attacks against Iraqi Police. 2. Number of Attacks against Iraqi Army. 2. Number of Attacks against U.S. Forces.
Levels of Violence, businesses opening, children in school
Reduction in violence, increase in jobs, increased commerce
Did affected population use the facility? Did they continue to maintain it? Affected population response (comments, concerns, self-policing)
Increase in HN [host nation] partnership; decrease in violence; trust
1 -Delivery of essential services to the local population - "Last Mile." 2 -Grievance from local population 3 -Employment of peopl
The metrics we used to gage our effects were: 1) increased access throughout the area and to key leaders, 2) perception that US forces created value within the community, be it cultural, economic, and medical. 3)

Accomplishment of objectives with less and less US forces.
Enemy activity - particularly when measuring the effectiveness of barrier & check point emplacement as well as Sons of Iraq employment. Employment - Employ and supervise as many local nationals as possible. While the Sons of Iraq program constituted the majority of this effort, local clean up campaigns, as well as, employing local contractors also improved employment. Economic activity - Micro grants and building repair efforts targeted at local markets. Although not every new business received a micro grant or facility repair, many new vendors began arriving once security improved and our initial efforts succeeded in getting resources to assist businesses.
# of people employed/ served Sustainability GOI/ Local governement ownership
reduction in violence
# of police working at a police station. # of patrols conducted by the police. Were supplies and equipment provided to the station accounted for.
1. Increase in freedom of movement for the population. Was the population getting back to a normal way of life. 2. Was the Iraqi Gov putting more money and effort into our area as a result of the local population's conerns. 3. Was there a increase in the local popluations willingness to cooperate with local and U.S. Security forces to maintain an improve in their daily lives
1. Level of violence again US and IA forces 2. Confidence in the Iraqi Govt and Govt officials 3. Increases in local key leader engagements....players coming to the table.
Decreased violence, Iraqi development, counter-COIN activities
Local business and local support in building infrastruture nested withing the local leaders priority for reconstruction
1) Level of violence in a specific area, 2) Access to irrigation water for farming/% of farming areas covered by adequate irrigation water (rural areas) 3) IDP [internally displaced persons] resettlement
1)if the local government wanted it 2)did it employ people 3) did it seem to reduce the level of violence
Number of people employed Number of people serviced Number of wells dug
increase in support to local governance (thru surveys), decrease in violence, increase in delivery of basic services
levels of violence in the area or conducted by the tribe benefitting from the project, amount of intel flowing from benefiting tribes, number of men from the tribe signing up for ISF
Increase in economic development. Increase in water supply and flow. Increase in electrical supply and distribution.
1) reduction in violence 2) receipt of information/intelligence 3) sermons from the local mosques (positive/negative/neutral USF-I)
Reduced effective use of IED Measureable reduction in enemy activity improve patient throughput at local clinic
1. Reduction in violence/reduction in the number of SIGACTS 2. Increased Goodwill (increased intel reports; decreased SIGACTS)
1. Level of violence/insurgent activity 2. SWEAT-MTA Assessment tool (25th ID) 3. Unemployment numbers
Number of extrajudicial killings and kidnappings within specific neighborhoods. Number of Iraqi Police and Military patrols per day and perceived effectiveness. Presence and variance of markets throughout the neighborhoods.
Increased use of local parks, recreation areas; decrease in violence; increase in local jobs
Number of attacks on coalition forces in local area Positive polling of coalition efforts by locals Number of arrests in local area
1. How many acres of farmland was used with drought resistant seed. 2. How many people were employed. 3. How many citizens had access to drinking water.
Number of microgrant businesses still in business after 6 months Flow of water in irrigation ditches Clean water to small villages
satisfaction of local leaders, facilities open for public (schools, health clinics), increase in local government oversight
#km of sewer lines restored to operational status reduction in first responder arrival times number of schools reopened
feedback from iraqi's as to merit of projects; reduction in violence; involvement of iraqi's.

1. Support from the populatio 2. Decrease in violence 3. Economic improvement
1.Decreased violence (less IEDs) 2.Improved corporation from LNs 3. Return of normal day to day activities in the area.
Decrease in enemy initiated contacts, dollar velocity in micro economy and increase in stocks mechants had to sell
fewer attacks on US Forces, fewer repeate detainees, better quality of life
Most good for the local populace and the nation Most return on our investment of american tax $ Most visible impact - Iraqis had to see and witness change by their Government
Iraqi govt compliance/pliability, local power broker compliance/pliability, local impact on QOL
Normally we worked in close coordination with our BDE PRT and if the metrics of clean water, re-establishing or establishing electricty in areas needed, or improving educational facilities were not agreed upon as the priority of effort we did not approve it.
Number of employed, decreased violence, economic growth
Violence reduction Children interaction (visibility and talking to patrols) Feedback from locals during random stops/visits
Number of tips leading to capture of Anti-Iraqi Forces Number of attacks against Iraqi Officials Number of attacks against coalition officials
Reduction of violence; economic activity; population support to the Government of Iraq.
1. Decrease in violence. 2. Increase in support for local governance from local population. 3. Increase in support for/understanding of U.S. activities amongst local population.
1. Feedback from local Iraqis 2. Feedback from Iraqi officials. 3. Local Iraqi press coverage.
Employment level of locals, enduring impact of project, and ability to improve governance in eyes of local population
There was really a process for assessments, which ultimately came from assessments from my ground commanders, Psyop teams, and Civil Affairs teams. However, based on the problem set, project being assessed, there are different levels of objective and subjective ways of doing assessments. The question doesn't fit into a clean answer. I would have to simplify what is a complex answer.
1) The impact to reduce violence in assigned battlespace. 2) The ability to put potential antagonists to work productively. 3) The partnership with Iraqi citizens to demonstrate that together we could win.
Demonstrated individual dedication of local people to improvement.
1) Did it increase security?; 2) Did it increase the legitimacy of the GOI?; 3) Did it improve Iraqi quality of life?
1. improved security 2. citizen feedback 3. Soldier and CA assessments
1. Increased security. 2. Potential to increase GOI effectiveness thru local quada and provincial government coordination for the projects. 3. Potential to demonstrate to Iraqi citizens their government was involved.
- Level of violence in a troop AO or specific village. - Increase in troop and squadron command authority and influence in an area. - How the project contributed to a larger positive trend in security, local social contract between the people and their leadership, and improved local economics
1. Number of Iraq citizens positvly effected 2. ability to creat a lasting effect 3. Will it be sustain by the Iraqis
Meeting Project Time Schedule Amount of Local Interest Number of Locals working on the project
Did the project improve Iraqi government process. Did it improve the working of the civil service system it was a part of (sanitation, water, etc.). Did it improve the perception of security in the population. Did it substantively improve quality of life.
Access to targeting information. Willingness of local population to interact with our partner forces.
Ability to turn local/tribal leaders into allies Ability to restore/improve basic sanitation and water delivery/availability Ability to improve commerce and infrastructure
measurable, tied to buidling civic capacity and perception, tangible and high benenfit to cost ratio
Decrease in violence Feedback from local Shieks and Councils Use/no Use of the facilities built
1. Relationship with ISF. 2. Relationship with Provincial officials 3. Level of violence in neighborhods.
Iraqi Citizen usage and/or participation
1 - level of violence against US forces 2 - number of "good" tips received 3 - level of violence against ISF
1. decrease in violence 2. change in metrics specific to the project (for example, a water project should lead to increased water production in the AO[area of operations]) 3. subordinate commander analysis

Gov'ts ability to meet needs of population; number of job created; violence
long term impact short term return wide audience but through the sheik
1. How long did the project remain before being destroyed. 2. Acceptance within the community before tribal nepotism took over. 3. Did it actually decrease violent attacks.
Metrics: 1) cost of telephone centers/facilities repair, 2) security of site, 3)operational availability/capability of center/facility
Information reports Lowered violence Increased trust/confidence in ISF (tough to measure...but that was the real MOE [measure of effectiveness] that mattered)
Did we see a decrease in violence? How many people were employed? Were local Iraqis (leaders and men on the street) thankful?
Commander's personal observation of the local results.
Impact to the economy (Green houses and drip irrigation) Visibility in the community Improved security
The number of jobs created for Iraqis
Battle damage repair, Employment, improvement of health and education facilities, wells. I couldn't measure the effect, but knew it was where needed to place our resources to demonstrate our willingness to answer the peoples needs.
Economic growth Gov't legitimacy reduction in violence
Iraqi prioritization of the project at the Nahia and Q'ada council levels and feedback when complete. Subordinate CDR - population feedback. Employment opportunity created.
Reduction in kinetic activity Increase in intel reports from Locals positive feedback from the populace
decrease in violence, citizen feedback, GOI feedback
1. School attendance and atmospherics 2. Economic growth of small businesses 3. Violence tied to unemployment
Willingness of Iraqi Gov't to be more effective, favorable exposure to the Iraqi people, project is fair and pleases all parties.
- did it have positive impact on local economy - did it have postivie impact on local population - did it have postive impact on safety of my Soldiers
Decrease in level of violence
Educating the local population to do minor construction repair and electrical work. Ability for local companies to compete for contracts after training.
Participation in Neighborhood and District Advisory Committee (NAC/DAC) meetings Attitude of local population Feedback from patrols

15. What do you believe were the THREE MOST COMMON metrics that your BRIGADE HQ used to measure the effectiveness of the reconstruction and stabilization efforts in your operational environment?

FREQUENCIES

		Frequency	Percent
	Response Provided	152	72.7
	No Response Provided	57	27.3
Total		209	100.0

COMMENTS

Same or similar
1. Dollars spent. 2. Reduced sectarian violence. 3. Dollars spent.
1. Volunteers to join Iraqi Army and Police. 2. Level of violence. 3. Participation in activities in Govt Center
Don't Remember
I don't recall, but suspect they were similar
Really hard to say...
1. Stability. 2. Governance. 3. OPTEMPO.
Stabiliaztion- reduced violence/ employment/
1. Level of violence 2. Effective governance 3. Infrastructure improvements
1. How much did you spend this month 2. How much did you spend this month 3. How much did you spend this month.
Decreas in violence Government capacity Iraqi Security capacity
same
percentages spent and accomplished, this was very poorly executed at the BDE level
violence, government capacity and capacity of ISF, trust of the people
decrease attacks/hotile activity; increase employment, increased MOI/MOD capacity
civil confidence in police (number of calls/request for police repsonse, cooperation with police, attacks on police/stations, CA survey input, etc)
levels of violence; trends in economic growth and development; partnership
same.
Less violence, interaction with officials, soldier observations
Reduction of attacks on US forces, Reduction of attacks on Iraqi's, volume of activity in the markets
District council feedback
feedback in council meetings level of violence
1. How much $$ are we spending 2. Was the project completed to standard 3. Is the project still operational
1. CDR CUB [commanders' combat update brief] 2. BI -Weekly projects update 3. Weekly projects meeting
Reduction in violence infrastructure improvement resettlement statistics
-improved infrastructure -increased cooperation from local leaders -increased actioanble intel
Do not remember
overall same
How nice it looked Personal Observation Not sure
I do not have an answer for this question, and below--clearly dollars spent has been a metric--but I served at a time when CERP was coming under suspicion as actually a financing mechanism for insurgents. Hence my BCT and MND were somewhat ambivilant about CERP--I think they wanted clarity that the money

was going towards a trusted agent, with minimum potential for diversion to terrorists.
Same
don't know
Same
Atmospherics, Government Request, Subordinate Recommendation
1. Feedback from Governemnt Officials 2. Feedback from State Dept Rep 3. Feedback from subordinates
1. Amount of money spent. 2. # of projects completed. 3. Sustainment of large projects (hospital, electricity, school)
Diminish support for insurgency Secure local environment Availability of Civic services
Decrease in violence, number of people employed, amount $ spent
for the most part, along the same lines
same as in question 14
Money Spent Structures built Decrease in violence
Not applicable - we were a separate BN.
1. CERP Money spent 2. # of projects 3. Acts of Violence
1. Violence Reduction (measured by markets opening) 2. Employment 3. Infrastructure improvement
Decrease in Violence Increased Citizen Response/Participation Increased Governance
Sustainability, Scope/size of population benefitted, Cost
Amount of $ spent Number of projects completed Amount of press generated
N/A
Enhances Security
amount of money spent, completion of the major projects, feedback from embedded PRT (who was largely ineffective and isolated from reality)
Reduction of CERP corruption- using the money for other purposes Impact on community- perception of the people Improvements in Relationships with GOI Authorities
Same as above
Attack trends against Soldiers Attacks against partenred Iraq Army Soldiers Force Protection
Increases in economic activity Number employed Decrease in Violence
What looked the easiest and briefed the best. Higher seemed to buy into fairy tales. No engineer or technical analysis nor an understanding of the past. Why put a well in for the 3d time - because it briefs well.
PJCC ICW the mayor
reconciliation decrease in violence support security infrastructure
Reduction in violence, improvements to Sewer, Water, Education, and Trash services.
Community buy in Local government support Levels of violence
Same
Same as above
unk - weak BDE HQ
decreasing violence Community Survey's employment stats
decrease in SIGACTS Increase in population returning home
Feedback from local leaders and citizens. Feedback from subordinate commanders and Soldiers. Feedback from higher headquarters.
How many projects.
Level of violence. Engagement with civic leaders and attitude towards coalition. Amount of money spent.
number of schools completed, amount of money spent
SJA review and BDE CDR assessments.
Provincial Government capacity and self-sustainment Rule of Law development and improvement Decrease in unemployment
did it provide leverage; did it violate US law; could they self sustain the benefit
Number of Attacks against Iraqi Police. 2. Number of Attacks against Iraqi Army. 2. Number of Attacks against U.S. Forces.
same
reduction in violence, number of enemy captured/destroyed

Cost/benefit analysis Linkage to Lines of Operations Alternate funding sources
N/A
1. ePRT Feedback 2. DIV HQ Feedback 3. GOI Feedback
Execution and follow through of projects that enabled a reduction of US combat power.
I don't recall. It has been four years since I departed theater.
# of people employed/ served Sustainability GOI/ Local governement ownership
reduction in violence
same as above
Very similar to ours.
1. Level of Violence 2. Key leader engagement 3. Economic Development
Dollars spent and #s of project
They didn't have any
1) Amount of money spent, 2) Level of violence, 3) Hours of electrical power/day.
1) if government wanted it 2) did we get what we paid for 3) did it affect the level of violence
Number of people served Number of people employed Nuber of attacks on U.S. Forces in project area
increase in support to local governance (thru surveys), decrease in violence, increase in delivery of basic services
Dollars spent, levels of violence, GOI comments
Water flow. Operating businesses. Money spent.
1) How much $$ spent by subordinate units 2) # of CERP projects that were funded 3) # of local iraqi's hired
Brigade did not have messures of effectivness
In [unit] the only metric the brigade commander cared about was the amount of money spent. In [unit] the brigade used my metrics above.
1. SWEAT-MTA Assessment tool 2. Level of Violence/insurgent activity 3. Unemployment numbers
Impact/support to on local government officials. Number of Iraqi Police and Military patrols per day. Economic indicators (fuel, food, electricity, medical, etc…)
increase in economic development; decrease in violence; long-term, large-scale projects
Number of attacks on coalition forces in local area Positive polling of coalition efforts by locals Number of arrests in local area
1. How many people were employed. 2. Was there a drop in violence. 3. Access to drinking water.
Sunni / Shia Reconciliation Major market centers reopening Kurd / Arab cooperation
$$ spent, # SOIs employed, violence
none
N/A I had no Bde HQs
Pretty much the same as those I used.
Same as above but a slight variance on the last 2 metrics in that they defined them based on the area and tried to measure economic growth.
I cannot recall
Reduction of IED strikes Number of phone calls asking for US forces to assist Iraqis in getting rid of the enemy Populace back out on the road and commernce moving again
Dollars spent, dollars spent, met Brigade directed nonlethal target determinations
Clean water, electricity and educational facility improvement or re-construction.
dollars spent, programs managed, decreased acts of violence
same
Number of tips leading to capture of Anti-Iraqi Forces Number of attacks against Iraqi Officials Number of attacks against coalition officials
Reduction of violence; economic activity; population support to the Government of Iraq.
1. Decrease in violence.
Same as above (question 14).
1. Feedback from Bn Cdrs, 2, Feedback from ePRT. 3. BCT [brigade combat team] Cdr's personal observations
Same as above.

Reduced Violence, amount spent, positive feedback
Same as above
citizen feedback economic growth CA team asessments
1. Security # attacks, # security forces and Sons of Iraq involved in positive security measures. 2. GOI--increase capacity of governance. 3. Increase capacity/effectiveness of security forces.
- Security - Essential Services - Economic growth
Same as above
Brigade did not get involved; projects usually came from higher HQs and no interest in metrics
Amount of money spent and amount of trash on the street.
Same as above.
Improvements to GoI ISF facilities near our bases Water delivery Cultural/artifact preservation and restoration
cost, geography, number of people served
Decrease in violence Amount of money obligated Amount of money paid out
1. Economic development 2. Security of Iraqis during elections 3. Provincial government effectiveness
Unknown, worked for 6xdifferent Brigades
Brigade and Div HQs did not bother with metrics (or understand the need) until the metrics were imposed by MNF-I and MNSTC-I
1. BN CDR analysis 2. violence 3. govt official feedback
Violence, govt viability,
rapid turn visible workers employed
1. Decrease violent attacks 2. Sharing the wealth throughout the sector. Tikrit received a major of dollars 3. Did local governance improve?
N/A - was a separate battalion commander
same
How much money were we spending? How many CERP projects did we have underway? How many people were employed?
Money Spent
The capacity that was established to provide essential services to the Iraqis
They didn't really measure against CERP. They trusted commanders to make the right judgements.
Gov't Legitimacy Security ? can't remember
Does this project get after reduction of the drivers of instability. Is it nested with the priorities of the Provincial and sub-provincial council. Did the project enable an Iraqi capability or capacity that improved their self reliance.
Reduction in kinetic activity Increase in intel reports from Locals positive feedback from the populace
PRT feedback, decrease in violence, GOI feedback
1. Openings (schools, businesses, gas stations, etc.) 2. unemployment 3. Perceived American Goodwill
Same as above - Willingness of Iraqi Gov't to be more effective, favorable exposure to the Iraqi people, project is fair and pleases all parties.
Increase in number of children attending school
Getting contracts to the local companies after training.
N/A

16. What do you believe were the THREE MOST COMMON metrics that your DIVISION HQ used to measure the effectiveness of the reconstruction and stabilization efforts in your operational environment?

FREQUENCIES

		Frequency	Percent
	Response Provided	147	70.3
	No Response Provided	62	29.7
Total		209	100.0

COMMENTS

Same or similar
1. Number of local nationals employed. 2. Reduced sectarian violence. 3. Dollars spent.
Division Headquarters? Didn't know they ever left the FOBs!
1. Volunteers to join Iraqi Army and Police. 2. Level of violence. 3. Participation in activities in Govt Center
Don't Remember
Don't recall
1. Money expended 2. Money expended 3. Money expended
Did not report to a Div HQ.
Unknown
1. Level of violence 2. Effective governance 3. Effective security forces
Same - success was calculated by aggregate amount spent; and not determined by measures of performance, improvement or sustainment.
Decreas in violence Government capacity Iraqi Security capacity
same
Quite frankly, My division centralized much of this and we offerred ideas, but got very little feedback
MOI/MOD capacity; employment; economic/civic growht
facilities adn equipment on hand(operational, effective employment, accountablity, etc)
levels of violence, trend in economic growth/development; ability/willingness of central/Provincial governments to sustain program
NA
Money spent, projects open, projects completed
unknown
unknown
1. Is the level of violence declining 2. Are the number and $$ value of CERP projects increasing 3. Status of project completion
1. DIV CDRs CUB 2. Cerp project tracker and $ spent 3. SIGACTs trends, etc.
Same as Bde
-decreased instability -increased political capacity -increased national will
Do not remember
overall same
Did it nest with the Div reconstruction and stabilization efforts Decrease in violence Feedback from locals and surveys
See above.
Same
don't know

Same
Atmospherics, Government Request, Subordinate Recommendation
1. Personal Observation 2. Amount spent 3. Feedback from subordinates
Honestly...not sure. I didn't operate with any specific MND-B guidance on effectiveness metrics. If they exsisted, I wasn't aware of them...maybe they just aligned with what I wanted to track anyway so it was transparent to me.
Secure local environment Promotion of Governance Availability of Civic services
number of people employed, $ invested, impact on violence levels
same as above
economic growth communications improvements electricity improvements
Money Spent Feedback forom City Councils Decrease in violence
- Level of violence - School openings - Businesses and markets open w/ local citizens moving freely w/in the city.
1. CERP Money spent 2. # of projects 3. Acts of Violence
1. Violence Reduction (measured by markets opening) 2. Employment 3. Infrastructure improvement
Do not recall
Unknown
1) What was the commander's stated priority? 2) Was the project an effective means to achieve the intended effect? 3) Could it be sustained effectively?
Enhances Secuirty
completion of major projects, feedback from prov governor & Baghdad mayor, feedback from PRTs
Reduction in Violence Reduction in Corruption Improvements in Relationships with GOI Authorities
Same as above
Imporved local governance Improved Rule of Law activities Improved local economic activities
Number employed Decrease in Violence Did the results of the project improve well-being or did the activity continue without US dollars
Assessment from AID, USACE and did the project tie into their non - lethal fires matrix.
same as BDE
Reduction in violence, improvements to Sewer, Water, Education, and Trash services.
Levels of violence Local government support Cost
1. Does it support GoI? 2. Does it create jobs? 3. Is it sustainable?
Not sure
1. $ spent 2. Ability to transition to Iraqi control
decreasing violence employment stats community surveys
decrease in SIGACTS
Feedback from local leaders and citizens. Feedback from subordinate commanders and Soldiers. Feedback from higher headquarters.
How much money and how many projects. If money was a weapon system, it was all about volume of fire vice volume of fire and accuracy of fire.
Level of violence. Depended upon CERP program. Amount of money.
amount of money spent, number of projects submitted, number of projects completed
No idea
Government of Iraq capacity and self-sustainment Decrease in attacks by violent extremist networks Decrease in unemployment
did it violate US law; did it support mission and objectives; were other agencies not able to assit
Number of Attacks against Iraqi Police. 2. Number of Attacks against Iraqi Army. 2. Number of Attacks against U.S. Forces.
unknown
number of dollars spent, reduction in violence.
Cost/benefit analysis Availability of funds Altenate fund sources
Same as above
1. GOI feedback 2. IO feedback 3. PRT feedback
Increased governance and administrative and services capacity.

Whatever they were, they were not communicated to me nor did some of their projects synchronize with my "on the ground" efforts". Although I routinely got encouragement from the Corps and MNF-I commanders for my planning and execution, my division commander's silence was deafening.
UNK
reduction in violence
same as above
Very similar to ours.
1. Level of Violence 2. Key Leader Involvement 3. Improved Governance
Dollars spent and #s of project
building local economy through the hiring of local businesses and security of project sites by hiring from local shieks
1) Amount of money spent, 2) Hours of electrical power/day, 3) UNK.
same as BDE
Number of people served Number of attacks on U. S. Forces in area of project Number of projects
Money spent, location spent, decrease in significant activities
Same as BDE HQ
Money spent # of businesses operational # households with electricity
do not know
Don't recall
No idea.
1. SWEAT-MTA Assessment tool 2. Level of Violence/insurgent activity 3. Unemployment numbers
Iraqi Provincial Leadership effectiveness. Levels of violence. Provincial economy.
not clear; not aware of clear Division guidance
Number of attacks on coalition forces in local area Positive polling of coalition efforts by locals Number of arrests in local area
1. How many people were employed. 2. Was there a drop in violence. 3. Are essential needs of the populace met.
Number of IEDs on MSRs Amount of Sunni / Shia violence towards each other Number of Sons of Iraq at guard posts.
$$ spent, # SOIs employed, violence
none
N/A I had no Div. HQs
Unknown
Same as the BDEs
I cannot recall
Iraqi government in control Iraq Soldiers in the lead on projects Number and speed that projects went in...
Don't know
I believe we were pretty nested with Bde and Div, although I was not in a position to comment on the division program but it seemed to me our priorities were one in the same...
dollars spent, programs managed, decreased acts of violence
Similar
Number of attacks against Iraqi Officials Number of attacks against coalition officials Number of jobs created
Reduction of violence; economic activity; population support to the Government of Iraq.
. Decrease in violence.
1. Feedback from Iraqi officials. 2. Local Iraqi press coverage. 3. Speed at which projects were completed.
1. Attack levels, 2. BCT Commander's assessments, 3. Div Staff assessments; those primary come from GOI and Iraqi leader feedback to the same above (except for attack levels)
Same as above. The [unit] was extraordinarily supportive of our efforts and inevitably it saved many lives.
Reduced Violence, amount spent, civil leadership response
Same as above
Governmental exchanges (meetings etc) Increased security LOC mobility
GOI effectiveness. Security.

- can't recall
Unknown
Amount of money spent.
NA
Projects leading to decrease in violence (against Coalition and among rival factions/religions) Improvements in ISF and GoI ability to function and improvement governance Basic care (SWEAT)
cost, ties to a specific line of operation, and politics
Amount of money obligated Amount of money paid out Projects awarded/complete
1. Economic 2. Elections 3. Government
Unknown, 2006-2007 we wrestling with everything.
see above. metrics imposed by higher HQ were too generic to be quantified and could not be generaliazed across the country. In COIN/Stability opns, 'the People' define the metrics; successful commanders follow these.
1. capacity 2. violence 3. govt official feedback
Violence, govt, health and sanitation
rapid turn
Div HQs decentralized to the BCTs due to the size and mix of our Div AO
dollars/cost, operational ability/impact, security of effort (does the project improve security)
same
Unknown
Money Spent decrease in Violence
The ability of the Iraqis to expand on capacities established through CERP and find long term solutions to provide the services
They didn't really measure against CERP.
can't remember
Recommendation from BCT [brigade combat team] Cmd. Cost. Reduction of Instability.
Reduction in kinetic activity Increase in intel reports from Locals positive feedback from the populace
State Department Feedback, BCT [brigade combat team] feedback, GOI feedback
not sure at this point
Increase in the effectiveness of ISF (# of detentions, ect)
Getting contracts to the local companies after training; and, the level of violence in the areas that received the training.
N/A

19. What indicators led you to believe that some CERP funding was lost to fraud or corruption? Please write in your answer.

FREQUENCIES

		Frequency	Percent
	Response Provided	133	34.1
	No Response Provided	76	65.9
Total		209	100.0

COMMENTS

While we delivered an acceptable product on most CERP projects, there were vulnerabilities to contractors selling contracts after award by our HQ. In those cases, the bid price was certainly higher than what the sub-contractor was receiving from the prime resulting in increased cost. We also emphasized the use of local contractors which created some difficulty in terms of an on time, quality product. At times, this required additional work to bring up to standard.
Knowing the cost of the project efforts, we conducted routine surveys of laborers using local nationals to how much laborers were being paid, determine the cost of materiels, distance travelled to deliver materiels, and if security was required to mitigate materiel loss or provide security to the laborers at the job sites. We used these cost figures as part of our Independant Government Cost Estimate (IGCE) and applied that to a compettive bid process. The outliers were normally those who had little to no experience in the project process or efforts, or those who were obviously greedy - either stuck out like a sore thumb! Our selection process weighted local contractor experience over outsourced contractors (out of the district or city), prior project quality/efforts/success, ability to maintain project timelines, responsiveness, and how close their bid came to the IGCE. We anticipated an additional 10-25% cost of all projects to be the "norm" for getting people to work in a risky/hazardous environment and for navigating through several areas with materiels to the project sites - these are things we do not have to consider in the free world.
None observed
Feed-back from trusted Iraqi Gov't personnel, Military personnel, citizens and translators
When asked why tings cost so much it was generally mentioned that it was for security reasons - meaning blackmail
There is no way the money we spent on the major contracts foisted on us by DIV HQ were paid to the contractors at fair market value for the work performed. The biggest problem was that most of my large projects were construction projects, and it never occurred to the Contracting officials to put in place any sort of controls- QA/QC inspectors, percentage of completion payments, etc - all that was on me as a BN CDR, with no requisite expertise. It was just "get it done!" without regard to consequences.
Corruption is an integral feature of Iraqi society and politics. Battling corruption in the Iraqi system is a sisyphian task. Although never directly observed, it was generally understood and accepted as common practice.
The quality of work for infrastructure repairs was extremely hard to manage because vetting and trscking progress was difficult. Electricity and sewage repairs were very poor due to a lack of qualified workers. Sons of Iraq were difficult to track closely despite our efforts to adhere to strict contract guidance and parameters. Some of the guards were not paid the correct amount of money or did not show up on pay day.
We had substantial evidence that the local authorities (Gov't / Security and Military Forces) were stealing right off the top. Additionally, Governors were leveraging position and percentage of CERP payments to pay insurgents to NOT attack certain CERP funded programs. This produced clear benefits for that level of government, security forces, insurgents and contracted party. We lost hundreds of millions of dollars for a false sense of improvement and success.
Up front payments.
We were extremely deliberate in allocating CERP funds, We made contractors detail the spending and

allocated only partial amounts for long term work.
A subordinate was found guilty of fraud
stuff going to relatives of local gov't leaders.
Iraqi companies bid on projects, then sub-contracted work, (plus accountability and tracking funds once local company won bid - not sure there was a mechanism (we had Kurdish companies bidding on contracts in Shia areas?)). Work/quality of CERP projects was consistently below expectations
The human dimension involved with delivering a high number of micro grants to border villages was wrought with risk of fraud; however, the level was, I believe, acceptable given some of the fraud was cultural and the overwhelming benefits outwhelming the costs.
Quality of the work performed when compared to the personal benefits garnered by local "contractors."
lack of quality work, incomplete projects, request for additional funds due ot kickbacks/security payments, lack of fully transparent accounting by iragi officials)
subjective observations such as lack of ownership by Iraqi officials; lack of urgency; intentionally drawing out the process; poor supervision/bookeepping.
iraqi contractors not meeting requirements of contracts with little to no recourse.
co-variance of payments to increase in attacks, special intelligence collection.
Iraqi feedback
The corruption mainly incolved the Sons of Iraq. While we monitored the payments to individuals, the leaders who organized the SOI would often charge them fees in order to join the team. Although we took many steps to counter this, I know that it still went on, and the practice is part of their way of life.
Every business transaction in Iraq is replete with some type of fraud/corruption, so this is more of an assumption than factual based on any specific indicators
Potential inflation of prices/contracts, though safeguards were in place to assess overpricing (receiving multiple bids, assessments by trained persons/SMEs, etc.)
who the money went to and the degree to which they were accoutable for showing where the money went, parallel budget within the government (how much "double dipping" was apparent)
Projects not completed to standard
Clearly nothing could be done without local council and provincial council buy-in. In the Arab areas these were political surrogates for tribal cabals. Contractors, both local and outside the province, all function within a complex structure of kick-backs and graft. It is almost impossible to eliminate this, however it can be kept within reason by establishing a fair-market pricing system. we did this by hiring a former contractor to provide us with an independent cost estimate for the project--and then scrutinize the bids with this as a metric.
projects not completed IAW the agreement. Individuals who provided information that project money was being lost.
Iraqi Contractor Pricing
The use of local contractors and vendors has an embedded cost that are above and beyond the actual cost of goods and services. Vendors and contractors must like US contractors and vendors charge more for goods services because they are dealing with the US goverment.
This is really hard to gauge because I think the corruption piece was to buy protection, pay ghost workers, and shave quality standards. Don't know how to quantify these items so it was difficult to find indicators. It was mainly a hunch rather than hard data.
local contruction projects moved forward only when local political party members were "entertained". The entertaining was seen as hosted dinners and gifts given by the job foreman or company representative to political party leaders within the distric for their support of the project. I never saw money change hands nor could I collect proof but was it seemed very apparent the rumors of pay-offs were true. Workers in Eastern Diyala walked off the job several times until local KDP [Kurdish Democratic Party] leaders approved their return and several times KDP party members said they would ensure job completion if they were allowed to choose or pay workers.
We expect the person to receive the contract to pocket some of the money himself and not pay employees as much as employess want or we directed. The key to success was selecting the smartest and honorable leaders that would lead these contracts. In one Sonds of Iraq contract, we had lots of complaints from employees that the employer was not paying them adequately. We looked into it, found no significant issue, but did not renew his contract and put a new person in charge of the area. We had no more complaints.

The long-term tracking process established as units on a one year tour swapped out with other units. In many cases as areas of responsibility grew in size, but had less troops assigned, it became more challenging.
Same services were secured later for half the cost and double the output when the neighborhoods stsarted to manage their own projects and costs to help them establish systems.
Questioning of other local leaders as to where the money was used and applied as was discussed in the negotiations and discussions.
- wealthy contractors - repetitive use of contractors - reports of corruption
An example is the [Company] (corrupt, fraudulent company). During the project signing, they tried to give me an expensive persian rug. There was no transparency as to how the company was spending money and no way fro us to tell how much profit the company was making. I believe they skimped on construction materials. Fortunately, we could supervise the salaries they were paying the employees (the scope of the project was to train individuals to build canals & roads while providing a salary for 6 mos).
Inability to show clear methods of accounting and expenditure of funds once provided to non-DOD entities.
Assessing the quality and cost effectiveness of competing contractors proved a difficult and challenging process in an environment where government regulation is limited and units lack subject matter expertise. Many opporutnities exist for unscrupulous contractors to inflate material and labor costs.
Accusations by local contractors Centralized contracting process where access was controlled (Bde HQ) and could be exploited by interpreters and others Local culture and custom
Influence that Sheihks held over "sons of Iraq". Beleive they "taxed" some for the payments.
Quality of service
cash transactions ripe for graft, massive inflation from 2004-2006 fueled the graft, we threw money at problems/projects because we could -- in retrospect we should have forces Iraqi systems to fix/improve what we were trying to do with CERP.
GOI Authorities would get a cut of the CERP funding directly from the contractor. CERP Contractors understood the system. This type of corruption needs to be compared with funding that was reinvested in insurgent activity or paid to disgruntled leaders of communities susceptible to insurgent support. The first is commonplace and expected, the second does makes money a weapon system- given to insurgents.
The amount of money we spent on projects may have been to high. Also, though some of the money may have exchange hands with various high ranking officials after the contracts were approved and the money was let.
Local Iraqi vendors were charging outrageous prices Local Iraqi Sons of Iraq were being "shaken down" by local thugs/ Sheiks Local Iraqi Army officers were corrupt
What Americans define as corruption is an ingrained part of business in Iraq. I did not consider the loss as corruption, but as the cost of doing business.
I saw numerous projects where the pay outs exceeded the work done and the project would have to be shut down because the contractor had no financial incentive to pay (cant tie payments to construction schedule). Then projects were guided to the Shieks and Gov official family members, not the guy who could get the project done. then I saw a case where a project paid for a facility to store grain was fully paid by the previous unit and we could never find the facility and nobody heard of it. The only indicator of construction ever happening at that grid was some fresh foundation work. Then we started training the Iraqis on how to bid out a project. You saw the same Sheiks and Family members coming in to "bid" and the Provincial Engineer, governor staff would magically pick the same corrupt guys. Between Iraqi corruption and US Miltary ignorance most of the money was wasted or atleast not well spent. That is not a crack on the Militiary Leadership. A guys spends 19 -24 years to become a lethal combat leader and then gets a bunch of projects, money and concepts dumped into his lap with a tactical JAG guy in the staff and an engineer who probably never spent any time in the Corps or on a real project managing millions of dollars of money. The CA guys put a better twist on it but it was a funcion of luck. I had a CA CERP coordinator who inspected water treatment facilities as a civilian and had a great understanding of how projects work - fundamentally. She could atleast farm a project out to the right guy. I am a registered PE with some experience in the Corps and I was bewelderd to the complex problems set. Most units had folks with much less experience or savvy. DIV wised up a bit and started putting limits or making the thresh-holds tougher to get through but the projects just got smaller and more of them as the Iraqi's got smarter on how the milk the BDE / BN CDRs out of cash.
Sepcific personel involved with projects were found to be strongarming which contractors were used.

Certain political figures would block very viable health care projects unless we paid them and they controlled the project and a lack of reliable accounting.
Using local contractors caused the loss of funds due to corruption and fraud. Each project required more direct supervision than we could afford to provide.
It is part of the local culture
"Supervision" of security contracts. However, I felt that this corruption was the cost of doing business in this environment and within cultural limits. In the end, it was well worth it and critical to our success in the mission.
The amount of money for some of the services were excessive.
Suspected corrupt local leaders. Difficulty of being able to supervise where every dollar for the project went. Inability to screen all contractors.
I'm not sure we were postured that early in OIF to find corruption for our CERP projects.
--Poor quality of work identified during QC assessments --Reports from trusted local Iraqis
cultural bias to bakshis - it was common, trickle down corruption. Think Sopranos
Overall quality of some projects such as buildings just did not meet the expectation of the amount of money spent for materials and labor.
The Sons of Iraq contracts were extremely corrupted when we took over. They were mafia like - and spread to all other CERP projects. Once they were cleaned up, and the muscle that crazy cash was buying taken away, the corruption decreased.
quality of materials and workmenship which was countered by oversight a cell created in BN
Candidly we needed results to stabilize the country, and it is very likely we were routinely over-charged.
cultural aspect of contractors
The practice of Iraqi contractors to sub-contract portions of work projects which caused great furstration in the vetting and tracking of money and payments.
Didn't believe it would cost a Sheik 15K to drill a well. But the well got dug, people got water for the first time in a couple of years, and there was money in the Sheik's pocket to take care of the elderly and infirmed who looked to him for support. Everyone was happy and the sheik regained his status, and attacks dropped precipitously.
resources & $$ were used as leverage on govenenors between one district and the next, competing for contracts. Often the Govenor with the most power got the backing of the biggest mafia....and that mafia expected payback.
Did not trust construction workers/contractors...did not seem to get the quality of effort we were expecting. Experienced far too many delays and "on delivery" standards were not always met.
We spent very little money during my time as a BN CDR, we spent our efforts on small and focused projects. From what I observed as a MAJ/LTC on my first rotaion to Baghdad, conditions indicators of fraud begin with the size of a project or the number of projects a unit undertakes. US Forces/leaders have a tough time in the oversight, quality control, and assurance between productivity vs. dollars spent on large projects over $500,000, projects that take a long time, or projects stemming from unsolicited or un-competitive bids. Finally, battalions and brigades can oversee a limited number of projects and the unit has to have continuous access to the developer/contractor and the work site/project in order to minimize teh risk of fraud.
The majority, if not all, of this fraud and corruption I believe occurred in those higher headquarters directed projects which were executed or planned for my battalion area of operations. USAID routinely reported cleaning campaigns in my neighborhod which I never saw executed (I would learn of these supposed campaigns during District counsel meetings). USA Corps of Engineer projects which never receieve any Corps oversite. Without my unit demanding that they come see the lack of progress and then escorting them to the site, they would have continued to believe the contractor (whose subcontractor subsequently subcontracted so that the Corps had no idea what company was executing the work) who claimed they could not safely work at the work site, although I physically established a company sized combat outpost with multiple watch towers which commanded the area. Finally, the bluntness of my local contractors who often told me of the local, regional and national "officials" that need a :"cut" in order for work to proceed.
Cultural reasons. The way they do business in the region, for example awarding to family and friends, doing favors for others, and taking a little under the table for themselves.
Inflated pricing security/ political skimming/kickbacks

unable to identify or prove corruption once funds are disbursed
Kickbacks were deeply rooted in their culture. I feel that the police and possibly provincial leadership received them from projects we funded.
Schedule of delivery, timeliness of completion, expertise of contractors performing work. Contractors using subpar subcontractors.
1.Projects allowed to continue without interference.....JAM influence suspected of extorting money from contractors in exchange for security 2. Grossly overpriced projects
US contractors overcharging
I prosecuted an officer in my battalion for fraud with CERP money. Additionally, there was a certain amount of "graft" that was part of the Iraqi/tribal culture.
Subordinate leader convicted of fraud
they seemed to know my funding limitations and allocations better then I did....think costs were higher due to this, even when receiving multiple bids
Quality of construction below expected level for cost, Rumors and drastically increased standard of living for contractors
Money used to make pay offs for security
The local contractors we would contract work out to would tell me that the Iraqi Army who we were parterned with would threaten them if they did not recieve funds.
Micro grants - limited amout of progress (construction & product output) considering the short time we were in theater to observe. Difficult to assess how productive a Micro Grant is when you only observe/monitor for 4 - 8 months.
Inherent in the Iraqi culture; somewhat niave to say "none" was lost to fraud; having said that, losing small amounts to fraud to serve important long-term goals is probably acceptable; goal should be none, but reality is to emplace measures to properly monitor money and minimize fraud
Construction projects not completed and of poor quality
Payment to contractors was done in GOI offices so that the Government official could see how much was paid to the contractor so that he could get his cut of kick back at a later time.
Amount of money sheikhs had on hand.
We vetted our projects very thoroughly and in much detail only providing funds when we could verify all input
Lack of progress in the program. There was some level on fraud but as those executing the program became more familure with the program, they were able to weed out most of the fraud.
In one case we lined up all workers to pay them directly and it took awhile for them to understand this is what they should have been getting every week. A part of this can be attributed to the cultural paradigm -- amonst the Iraqis that I worked with a certain level of corruption was acceptable. We had to find creative ways to minimize this.
I think there could have been some corruption with Iraqi contractors but the fact is we could get nobody else to build the projects-that is the price you will pay in a non-secured environment.
- Questionable motives of local Iraqi leaders - poor coordination between CA teams during RIP creating seams exploited by locals
When we use the term corruption we see it through our eyes, the Iraqi's see it as normal procedure so when tribes charge a contractor a fee to access an area, for security, etc... Many times we don't find out about these things until after the fact. Sometimes we would find out why the money was charged and in some cases it helped us figure out who were the tribes with Al Queda ties or those involved in illegal activity were in our areas and would go out of our way to make sure this type of activity was not tolerated. In a couple of cases it lead to a decrease in support in some areas simply due to the corruption factor.
sigint, humint, poor output
This is WAY too broad. I believe that money was accurately accounted for at our battalion and brigade levele. I do believe that money was "built into contracts" for local security and protection that equaled about 10%. Contractors were aware of this and it was customary in Iraq. If they were squeezed for more money ... we heard about it. However, I do not believe this was corruption any more than certain practices in the US. Perspectives matter.
over charging for materials; use of inferior goods; overcharging for labor; charging for "security costs"
1. Any type of construction efforts costing much more than reasonable. 2. HUMINT 3. Interception of

fraudulent transactions by U.S. forces.
1. Feedback from local Iraqis regarding corruption of Iraqi contractors. 2. Quality of work / projects, even after they were inspected for contract compliance. 3. Personal gut feeling by my subordinates and I.
We spent less in CERP than those units around me. I personally wrote a paper on corruption, having studied third-world corruption in graduate schools year before. My unit did things where we bucked the cultural system somewhat to keep corruption to a mininum. For example, we did not pay middlemen and kept tight controls on contracts.
Leaders who benefited financially through no other apparent means
I learned early in my deployment that the Director General was responsible and funded for trash collection, road repair, water pipe repair, etc. Once I learned that he had a very good budget to fund such activities, I worked with him and no longer funded contractors who worked against what the DG was attempting to accomplish.
Coordination with USACE, USAID, NGOs and units was poor, but the few times that we did establish contact we identified several projects where local Iraqis were double (or triple) dipping the same project to multiple agencies - they were paid by multiple agencies to do the same project. Better coordination can identify this without appearances of the Military taking over all projects.
For example, CERP money was used via a local contractor to rennovate a fire station. If the work was shoddy/substandard, was an indicator the CERP money was not used properly, and we wouldn't use that contractor again.
Poor contracter support and performance Influence of official in the process to gain money/favor
Substandard construction that was only discernable later Wages to workers
Corrupt Senior Leaders in all parts of the Iraqi Govt
I contracted (with CERP) a firm of Iraqi Engineers to QC and help oversight project scopes of work and construction. Once I had them on the job my contracting bids dropped at least 25% based on their knowledge of Iraqi construction requirements and actual costs. The firm had 3 Engineers and cost me $6000 a month but saved huge amounts of funds overall.
contractors not delvier on promises, GOI officials over budget, National Police involvement in contracting
Money was paid to insurgents for protection - some of this money (usually new US $100 dollar bills was found during raids on insurgents Admission from contractors that they paid money "for protection" Local Council members, Sheiks and others who clearly benefited for projects that they championed through nomination of certain contractors or building on their land
Historic trends reported by previous units Reports from contractors concerning strong arm tactics of local thugs
No visible/measurable improvement or other items showing up that were unprogrammed that you knew Iraqis could not afford and weren't resourced for.
People informing us that the money was not used for the intended project.
If any fraud or corruption occurred, it was on the Iraqi side unfortunately.
The contractors had to pay for protection from local thugs
Caught those that were exploiting the system.
anything that could be pilfered probably was number of times the contract gets subcontracted
The number of times a contract was sub-contracted within a tribe or not allowed to be given to a certain company/tribal affliation. How often the project was delayed due to damage, attacks or or destroyed.
We tracked project completion closely, and actually penalized contractors for not meeting reqmts. We also tied every CERP/project to ISF actions...not just putting money in contractor hands.
Exhorbitantly high costs to do the project. One elder in the village being the only one we could deal with.
My personal understanding of the Arabic Heirarchial system and the way of doing business. It wasn't considered corruption to them.
I believe that contractors that were used for certain projects were required to pay off Iraqi officials. Incidents occurred when these contractors did not payoff officials, such as threats and attacks. Additionally, some Iraqi officials, political and military, were attempted to force us to use certain contractors. The assumption was that these contractors were providing kickbacks to the Iraqi officials. We did use proper procedures and identified the contractors according to CERP regulations. When a different contractor was selected, once the Iraqi official found out, he would express his concern.
All greenhouses and drip irrigation were small projects that were easily monitored for completion. Civic

cleanup was managed and overseen by troop commanders and their reps and easily monitored. All large complex problems; water treatment facility, etc, was left to the experts in the PRT.
I come from a construction family so I know what right and wrong looks like on a job sight. Iraqis would try to pass of poor quality work, and nonstandard material. They would inflate prices sometimes for selfish reason and many times just because it was their way of life. As part of their life the construction owner/works had to pay local and provincial officials, they had to pay Sheiks, they had to pay other tribal leaders. The construction owner/works would have to quadruple their price just to make minimal profit.
When you pay $40K to a contract to have a well dug and 10% goes to the contractor, and 10% more goes to the local tribal leader, we call that corruption. But that was the cost of getting things done. I never saw US personnel commit fraud, but in Iraqi culture, there were many hidden costs.
Contracts were 4 times the cost.
-shoddy workmanship/materials -contractor bait/switch elements -contractor relationships with GOI/Iraqi Army/INP senior leaders
I have no first hand knowledge of, but numerous US personnel discuss the "Iraqi-Way" of doing business - kickbacks to local government and tribal leadership. I never witnessed any of this but heard of it infrequently.
We only paid contractors for completed construction work of facilities or for completed labor based on established labor rates.
-- Over pricing of services and products delivered.
Word of mouth from the locals/GOI officials
Contractor bribes forced by bad guys and Gov't officials was a way of life...this type of crime was expected, was that way for many decades before we arrived
Overpricing of projects by Iraqi Contractors
The Iraqi contractors would set up false bidders but they all went to the same place. Bribes were endemic

20. Please provide below any additional comments you may have on the use of CERP for reconstruction and stabilization, or the measurement of its impact that you feel would be beneficial to this project. Please DO NOT enter any personal information in this field.

FREQUENCIES

		Frequency	Percent
	Response Provided	103	49.3
	No Response Provided	106	50.7
Total		209	100.0

COMMENTS

"Money as a weapon" is as effective as the local national leaders effectiveness to influence and/or support their "constituents" or affected populace. We must comprehensively understand their needs from 1-N and work closely with them to "rack and stack" into a priority list they "own" and they "market" to the affected populace. This requires them to lead project efforts, get the message out to their people, creates inherent security because the local people's needs will be met when the project is completed, and ensures transferrence of responsibility from outside resourcing to internal (local national) funding, training, and sustainment. Every project should begin with an agreement of transfer and ownership to the local nationals and expectations made clear they have the responsibility to meet the needs of the affected population. When the project request for proposal (RFP) and contracting processes begin, leaders must take the realistic cost of project efforts once the local or national government begins to completely take over the process by asking two questions - Are we paying too much or more than the local nationals will be able to sustain once we leave? Will the local nationals be able to sustain/maintain the completed project once transferred to their responsibility?
CERP is a great tool, just in and of itself, not a panecea in combat zone.
CERP was as necessary as lethal means to curb the activities of insurgents in Ar Ramadi.
Had it uses, but not the end all/be all as originally thought. Lack of coordination and willingness of DOS and USAID to get involved stiffled true progress.
None
Perhaps the biggest travesty of the hundreds of millions spent on CERP in Iraq is the fact that very little of the money ever really benefitted the Iraqi people - of that I am convinced. Any program designed around the assumption that human beings will always do the right thing and follow their better angels is doomed to failure, because like Communism, such a system completely discounts human nature. The second biggest disappoinment - and there is not a doubt in my mind this is true - is that senior raters used total CERP money spent as a metric to rank order their commanders. In fact, this is the ONLY metric that I ever saw applied to anything to do with the CERP program! It was all about looking good, not actually making positive change.
Oversight of CERP spending is critical to prevent fraud, waste and abuse. Battalions are and should remain the primary oversight organization. However, most Battalion Commanders and Staffs are not educated thoroughly enough on how to use it. Access to Subject Matter Experts and Mobile Training Teams during Pre-mission Training and throughout deployments would make a substantial contribution to the units understanding and execution of CERP.
Good porgram if used wisely and carefully monitored.
Our unit did a good job of leveraging CERP funds to reduce violence and increase cooperation in our area of operation. There was a visible and enduring difference in progress, Families felt safe returning home; local citizens were assisiting security forces in locating insurgents and caches; the local economy returned to near normalcy; local citizens were more confident in seeking help from Iraqi security forces and local council members to remedy complaints and resolving problems. The most telling indicator of the

effectiveness was that the levels of violence continued to decrease and the local citizens felt that their lives were indeed getting better even as our unit conducted a RIP/TOA [relief in place/transfer of authority] at the end of our tour. Attacks against our units significantly decreased as conditions improved. We believe this was based on the incresaed levels of trust between the local populace, Iraqi security forces, and our units. CERP dollars was a key enabler to our achieving the high levels of success in our AO.

CERP is a good program, however, because it is a metric we undersand so much better than cultural dynamics, we choose to use a financial number as the measure of success instead of the outcome of its is use.

Focus and use of CERP must be delicately balanced between the local desires and thier government's desires at higher levels. Building consensus from the poulace either through a formal town or community council or an existing formal governing body ensures that the people see development as a product of thier leaders. Even if they know the money comes from the US, seeing a government entity prioritize and fight for thier intrests instills confidence.

CERP is an effective tool but needs to be utilized as judiciously as any direct fire weapon

Must have mechanisms in place to guarantee quality of work; probably hard to do adequately until a security apparattus is in place. Most importantly, if we're operating in a country that has no business ethics, no moral ethics, no community consciousness, no national commitment and no techical skills -how can you hope to develop a successful CERP program?

Critical to spend CERP on project the Iraqis actually wanted or had buy-in with. Too much money was thrown away on American good ideas, as opposed to Iraqi real needs.

Excellent program when used properly. CDR must have absolute ownership and involvement in every facet--projection slection, means of measuring success, porject supervision and qulity control, strong partnerhsip with Iraqis, etc..If not, tax payer money is wasted and effects are not achieved. Too often, I think this was the case. CERP cannot be delegated to a junior officer for management or as an "extra duty" It is arguably a commander's most potent weapon system.

my experiences were very early in OIF.

Saw the effects of CERP in my first deployment more than in my second one

CERP was absolutely essential and the amount of oversight a cetnralized HQ's only decreased its usage, not the level of misapplication. Need to move approval authority down to Brigade level to provide better oversight and timely usage.

While often difficult to objectively measure the effectiveness of cerp, subjective feedback/assessment leads me to believe that it was a truly invaluable tool to prevailing in the environment in which we were operating.

Funds of this type are critical to commanders on the ground. Aside from the obvious economic development lever it provides, it is an important tool to increase the commander's influence over the behaviour of the people - both good and bad - in his area of operations.

Over three deployments, we learned a great deal about tactical level CERP. First, the money should be spent through local government officials who are already accoutable to a constintuency. Second, don't invest in something that is already receiving adequate funding within host nation channels (i.e. paying for trash cleanup when the local governement is already funded and has the capacity to do the job). Third, done in concert with other agencies (DoS, DoA, etc...) so there isn't mom against dad programs for money competetion.

CERP funds for reconstruction and stabilization are very effective tools.

The ePRT in central and western Al Anbar province was absolutely instrumental in the nomination, development, and execution of CERP projects. The provincial PRT was an absolute hindrance.

I believe that that CERP funds played and intergral role in our success. While there is some waste the overall impact of CERP funding was very important in accomplishing the counter insurgency mission my battalion was faced with.

1. Commander's need maximum flexibility in spending CERP based on the situation in their area. Trust them to use the money correctly and unshackle them from the piles of regulations about how and on what the money can be spent. 2. Change the name of CERP to Commander's Economic Development Fund (or something similar)...it can't be just about Emergencies...there needs to be a long term view. 3. Every project should have "sustainment" as part of the planning and budgeting process for development. School buildings are no good without teachers, furniture, operating budget, and supplies. What does it take to keep the system working?

Several times PRTs and some NGOs picked projects without consulting the local "land owners" or checking to see what the local leaders really wanted. Projects were not done in a logical order. Road projects were started and well underway, then sewer projects began that tore up newly constructed roads. The locals saw this as a complete waste and bad planning but the companies didn't care because it was seen as US projects (money) and not their own.
What gets lost in the employment of CERP dollars is the good will it can create with some low cost projects. These small projects may not nest well with higher CERP priorities but may create a key inroad to building strong relationships with the tribes and local governance. In later years these small projects became harder to get approved and took a valuable tool away from BN and CO level lommanders. The key to success was developing strong guenuine relationships with the local tribes and goverment institutions. CERP was a great vehicle that opened many doors and took the opportunist/economically driven insurgent off the street and gave him an honorable option for how to provide for his family. We would not have been as successful in Iraq without the CERP capability. It allowed subordinate CDRs to have more tools tools in their kit bag than just a rifle. The CERP tool was a far more effective a tool in the Iraq COIN environment than adding more troops or searching entire villages for caches.
This program needs careful monitoring and specialized training for those responsible for managing and implementing it. This was not readily available in Iraq in 2004 and 2005.
The overall program needs to be better coordinated through the interaction of and the inceasing role of the State Department.
Was largely not effecive and coul dhave been beeter coordinated with the NGOs and DOS to have a holistic plan for reconstruction that actually had metrics and purpose for each service.
CERP is an important tool that can aid BN CDRs in the COIN fight. Too often the only metric focused on was the amount of money being spent, rather than on what we were trying to accomplish/effect. CERP must be allocated as an Emergency measure rather than a substitue for long term development - ie, using CERP money to develop electrical distribution systems where none previously existed is ineffective, using it to rebuild or repair water distribuition networks in small towns is effective.
I think it would improve transparency/reduce corruption if we could get a spend plan. Understand the companies need to make a profit, but we should get some type of spend plan that allows us to make sure we can supervise the company allocating appropriate resources to support the project. Companies like Green Dream skimped on raw materials for sure.
In my opinion, many CERP funded projects were initiated without proper consideration of long term sustainability and maintenance. Examples included water purification stations without consideration of employee training or availabilitiy of required supplies/chemicals, funding of businesses without analysis of their business model and long term potential, construction of medical clinics without consideration of staffing, supplies, or utilities. We sought to avoid such pitfills by applying a deliberate and thorough screening process of proposed projects, and conducted follow up inspections of completed projects to ensure proper care and upkeep.
It was/is a good system but as the name implies, it should be only be used for EMERGENCY (cErp) requirements where we tried to prosecute wholesale reconstruction efforts with it. All in all it was a very important tool, but it wound up getting used/applied to efforts that should have been solved via Iraqi systems.
I find it personally shamefull how much US money was spent on a country that cared less about our sacrifice in terms of blood, treasure, and prestige. A generation of American citizens lost out on funding that could have been better spent on our own citizenry. The lack of State Department oversight and ownership will stand out for me personally as the b iggest failure in this war. Soldiers are not trained to manage reconstruction projects and large sums of money. The fact that our interagency "partners" lacked courage to do their job will remain with me for the rest of my life. Fellow Soldiers lost their lives pursuing ill-conceived, and poorly managed schemes to improve the lives of Iraqis. Repeating this model in future wars will stand out as our nation's biggest failure!
I believe there were measures in place to ensure the effective use of CERP in a combat zone.
It was fundamentally a waste. I suspect we funded a large percentage of the IEDs I cleared. It was a running joke that we would pay for the IED through CERP by day and clear them by night (I had a route clearance mission too). BN CDR has a year or so to make positive effects and knows his report card is on the line so he just "gets after it". All tried to do the right thing but the "Persian Bizzarre" savvy Iraq salesman was usually better. I remember well when I started killing"stupid projects" there was a collective

deep breath taken thinking the DIV CDR was going to crush me. During a CPOF [command post of the future] brief the DIV CDR noted the drop in projects, I described why and he was full of laudatory comments. The lash up between the PRT and the manever CDR is / can be a challenge. The unit we replace completely isolated the PRT that we fell on. I remember vividly the time the outgoing BDE CDR stated "the PRT is lucky I feed them". My BDE CDR had a hell of a time patching up that relationship. That PRT was pretty good and did good work well on larger projects. But the 1000's of small projects at the BN level were tough to get positive effects when there was any complexity to the projects. The best projects for quick turn around effects where "hire 100 Iraqis to clear brush" or get a 3 month contract to get the trash picked up. It made the routes safer but as soon as we left the AO the same Iraqis went back out, threw trash all over and started laying IED. Immediate effect - good, long term wasted. Governance projects and training seemed effective. Our PRT just happend to have a reserve officer that was a mayor in his home town - FANTASTIC at training the the Iraqis. Much better than the poor JAG dude that got tagged. It was mostly luck we had a Mayor. This issue is so complicated I would not know how to offer a remedy. I hate to sit here and rant but it is one hell of a challenge. The CA guys I had were better prepared but some of that was luck (had a water treatment inspector who was savy). Problem was some of these folks were: A) arrogant - it a CA thing, you would not understand AD guy. B) undisciplined - can't put a convoy together, keep thier vehicles maintained, shoot or just were sloppy. C) tied to emotion rather than logic - this project will make them feel good instead of actually provide a sustained positive effect.

All of our CERP projects were tied to requests made by the District and Neighborhood advisory councils. I believe the completion of these projects accomplished my goal of empowering these councils demonstrating to the Iraqi's that their goverment was concerned about their needs and their welfare.

The US Govt made using CERP too hard. At the battalion-level, we could have made much better use of CERP to address local needs and therefore generate local support for goverance and security if we had fewer rules and less bureaucracy. Applying US standards for anti-corruption and accountability of funds to Iraqi culture does not work and hindered our ability to make progress.

CERP is an indispensable tool for the commander in the field. It can change the operational environment and save lives if used correctly. Any analysis of CERP must consider the environment of combat which is far different from any business considerations.

Overall a good program in a very tough fight.

USAID started huge projects and did not supervise the work through to completion. They started projects in areas they were unwilling to go out into and thus did not understand the evironment enough to realize they were being taken to the cleaners and in some case actually increasing the civil violence. Same can be said for USACE. ePRTs were never on the same sheet as the brigades and battalions because they too refused to see with their own eyes the ramifications of the projects they started or supported. ePRT agendas were not in tune with the reality of the local population. Example, drip irrigation. For thousands of years, the people in the Tigris river valley used flood irrigation. Don't throw money at drip irrigation because it will never culturally take hold. Use less money better by reinforcing how the local culture works.

use of funds did help support the local population and assisted the unit in accomplishing its mission. additional training is need to ensure agencies are not duplicating efforts. This can also be linked to ensuring all goals and objectives are agreed to performed as a team among military and other agencies.

Overall, I beleive CERP was very effective in placing large portions of the Iraqi Male population to work who would otherwise work for the insurgency. Believe many US Armed Forces and ISF lives were saved as a result of CERP use IAW MAAWS [money as a weapon system] SOPs. Believe many needed project were completed which will benefit Iraqi's for many years to come.

Great flexible system for Commanders on the ground. We saved lives, both American and Iraqi by this system. Combat multiplier for BN CDRs.

only used CERP funds for 5 months, then PRT got all CERP projects.

I also commanded in [year] with my HQs in [province]. Same thoughts apply. If your unit had good controls in place, you only approved the right projects. You had to track project through completion and assess their usefulness after built/implemented. Some projects even had indirect force protection benefits. Most projects were successful, but a few, because of their location and the strength of insurgency there, were tainted as US projects and less effective in the short-term. Cannot say about long-term as I was not there to continually assess over the years.

Filled in survey to the best of my memory given time lapse since deployed. We may not have had much CERP $ left throughout our deployment but know we spent $ in categories selected. Only real issue I saw

as a battalion commander was how many times the MAWS would change or staff officers at higher levels would quote or pass on guidance that would sometimes contradict the MAWS and chalk it up to new guidance... As commanders on the ground, we need the flexibility and latitude to use our judgment to operate within the conditions that exist and no two provinces are necessarily alike. The MAWS was a good tool but need to keep things simple. Overall our Bde and support from Div couldn't have been much better. Our relationship with the PRT was superb and we spoke w/a common voice ISO common objectives IAW the Unified Common Plan betw/Coalition and PRT leadership. Regardless of $ spent, projects are only as good as the QA/QC program you have established to monitor and enforce standards in SOW and expected outcomes.

CERP is a critical tool for commanders on the battlefield. It is a must to allow success and operate during reconstruction operations. Imperative for security of US forces.

lack of coordination between mil and state/USAID was a grave concern. with in the military, mil and Corp of Engineers lacked coordination also. Corps of Engineer projects appeared to be developed and handed over with minimal coordination. for example, contacts were written and bid upon, howver, when building standards/code changed, Corps of Eng washed their hands and the problem bacame the land owner's issues. (on base construction).

CERP is a very poweful and effective tool. The linkage between CERP and projects in development with other organizations and the local government make it as not effective as it can be long-term. Outside organizations must get better at coordinating with local commanders to understand how all can work more effective to achieve the desired results. Some projects will not be as effective as they were suppose to be because you are dealing with people and you are in a hostile environment were the enemy has a vote. Everyone must expect this and not let that prevent them from employing this effective weapon.

SOI program was the most effective use of CERP while most other projects resulted in very little benefit given the large investment

I was a battalion commander in Iraq in OIF-1 and OIF-3. We were much more effective and accounted for in OIF-1 when CERP was decentralized and controlled by a Field Grade Officer who signed for cash and accounted for every $100 bill.

CERP measures of effectiveness (MOE) and performance grew over time as well as the capability of the GOI. As the GOI became able to govern and provide basic services, their input became more important. My local GOI partners got very good at prioritizing what they needed help on to get the biggest bang for CERP or ICERP. Including or making the HN government take the lead (if capable) is the best way to get ownership from the local government to include plans for sustainment of the project. Too many unwanted projects were done with no GOI buy-in or O&M funding to sustain the project after completion. MOEs need to be more standard across the theater so reporting and metrics mean something versus every unit doing its own thing with no real benchmark for progress being available.

CERP is critical in reshaping the operational environment. It increases the populace support to a governement and local security forces.

During this rotation we were concerned with completing existing CERP projects in preparation for turning the area over to complete Iraqi control.

It must be tied in with what the local leaders/gov't want...then they are accountable for effectiveness...things improved as they had more and more accountability

CERP is an invaluable tool for commanders to use if bolstering host nation ability to govern. Counterinsurgency is a battle over the population---whomever provides the best services, governance etc will become the support government---in countries that can't deliver basic services, the body which does will have the advantage over the other. CERP is a tool which commanders can use to bolster our supported host nations.

We used CERP to buy down violence against us. We used CERP as a driver to teach Local GOI and ISF officials how to budget, plan to provide services to the population, and how to be accountable to their constituents. We lacked an overarching plan for Iraq to allow us to nest our individual projects within a grand scheme to build a national capability in any of these areas. We were frustrated by building schools or health clinics then learning MOE or MOH [Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health] hadn't funded staff. We learned that CERP was a crutch which both allowed Local officials to gain resources from us quickly and separated them from their own Government. This program set us back years by making Local government dependent on us instead of their own Iraqi Governmental systems. CERP and PRTs are part of the problem in COIN, not the solution. We should be connecting the people to their governments, not our

units or PRTs.
It was very effective and helped turned the tide of the insurgency in our AO.
As the commander, I personally managed my CERP account. I personally approved the soending and approved of projects.
CERP started off as a good idea to give company, and maybe battalion commanders, money to spend to have an immediate impact in their local area. Unfortunately, CERP quickly became centralized and spent on large, wasteful projects directed by some higher HQ with inadequate situational awareness or understanding. Getting money for company commanders was extremely difficult other than for commanders to make monthly payments on an existing project. Using CERP to pay the 9000 Sons of Iraq in my battalion's AO was also another misuse of the CERP from its original intent. The SoI were effective, but monthly payroll is not an "emergency." In [province], CERP was used effectively on various projects and initiatives tied to a reduction in violence. Money was spent only on initiatives that had support of the local and provincial government or key tribal leaders. When my battalion moved to [province], we saw the only measure of CERP's effectiveness was dollars spent. Many of my battalion counterparts did not even bother checking to ensure money was spent properly and to its intended effect because they knew the brigade commander was only interested in dollars spent.
The CERP tool was effective for us however it is difficult to see the audit trails and "taxes/tarrifs" imposed. My impression was that the level of corruption within the local/provincial/national governments was so deep and a part of the culture that it is extremely difficult to see true benefit when compared to our western culture.
CERP funds gave me the ability to impact the Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information, and Physical Environment in my area of operations (AO) when the necessary US Government Agencies were not available to do so. Furthermore, they gave me the ability to respond to immediate or emerging needs within my AO before they became a major issue or to reverse a negative trend. I will admit that the significant lack of trained and ready US Government representatives (State Department, USAID, etc?) hindered my ability to effectively integrate my efforts to a more long range and overarching national strategy but I believe that improved over time. These funds were vital to our success and should be an integral part of future campaigns of similar scope or intent.
CERP is a VERY powerful tool for commanders on the ground who have the best overall feel for the local communties although it should not be blanket money just given out without much thought. As part of a comprhensive plan nested with BDE and DIV HQs, CERP can make a tremendous impact in counter-insurgency efforts. At one point, the CERP funds were cut off (without much previous notice)which directly hampered the the ability of leaders at the lowest levels (company commanders and platoon leaders) to accomplish their mission. Very difficult for them to explain why they offered money one day and took it away the next. Overall, having worked on the [district] as part of the surge, CERP was an useful tool in helping our battalion accomplish our mission and goals.
Decentralized approach resulted in haphazard execution and inability to assess effectiveness. Money was spent by each battalion commander who looked through a soda straw in their particular AOR. Better for CERP projects to be centrally planned at Division level or higher and grouping of funding for larger, more tangible projects.
Use of CERP for other than truly essential needs or to provide security should not be used until a secure environment exists or else the chance of fraud/corruption increases exponentially. Once security is established, CERP is best used to enhance the legitimacy of local governance in providing for the needs of the population by determining shortfalls in their budget and augmenting as needed to address critical grievances of the population that effect legitimacy in the near-term planning horizon (1-3 years).
This program should continue as it allows the commander on the ground to make small incremental improvements while waiting on the achievement of the long term goals.
We out spent the insurgents....instead of planting IEDs guys were getting paid to ensure they did not get planted.
We had many external inspections on CERP, it was a good program and was effective. the program must be inspected frequently yo avoid misuse.
This survey asked about my experiences as a BN CDR - very confident that if I took the survey again for the time I served as a BCT DCO [brigade combat team deputy commanding officer] 1 year later answers would be markedly improved. Our relationship with PRT/USAID was vastly better and I personally led a weekly MAAWS audit meeting attended by targeters, brigade legal, S9, BN Reps to insure we were on

track, aware, and disciplined
Absolutely needed at the Bn/Company level in war!! We changed the way Iraqis felt about our projects-we made them part of the system...Sustain.
I was an Aviation Battalion Commander, so my CERP funds were used for "inside the wire" projects that improved the force protection of my facilities and Soldiers.
CERP was an absolutely essential tool commanders. In many cases it was the only real means for buliding goodwill with the citizens in our area of operations
CERP remains an important program and was critical to our success; by the very nature of the program though it is subject to abuse if it is not used in a discipline and rigorous matter; the key component of the effective use of the program is not the myriad of rgulations and reviews, but rather the disciplined execution of the required tasks by educated and informed Army leadership; regardless, some ineffeciencies will be inevitable given the nature of counterinsurgency operations, particularly changing security conditions.
I would like to reiterate that it would be impossible to achieve desired effects in these type of operations without CERP. Hoever, CERP should be part of our lexicon and part of our training from this point forward, not a good idea we start up after we have commanders on the ground in the thick of things.
Strict contracting standards / procedures should not apply for the use of CERP, especially during extremely violent phases of combat & stability operations. Decreasing violence should be the primary purpose of CERP during these periods.
The ability to use US CERP followed in 2008 by Iraqi CERP enabled we as the battlespace owners to reduce violence by over 80%. The unit previous to us sustained over 20 US KIA, we sustained 4 USKIA. As a method of facilitating non-lethal efforts coupled with lethal targeting of the enemy network, I believe CERP changed the outcome of the battle for Iraq.
Projects within a neighborhood, city, and/or province must be managed using a "basic needs" template. The template should consist of an assessment of that specific area to include number of persons living there and infrastructure not meeting a determined standard of living. Working in concert with USACE, USAID, the PRT, and the Army CERP Program, leaders can best determine who is going to pay for what and set the conditions so that each project is completed to standard in a timely manner. My greatest frustration were projects in my AO that were started by USACE and then left to fail. We cannot have "monuments of incompletion," and we cannot just throw money at a country that has no managerial or governmental experience to ensure projects and programs are completed to standard, safely. We need to be smarter in how we do business. As the sayings go... if you want it bad, you'll get it bad vice slow is smooth, smooth is fast. I prefer the latter.
I believe the CERP money was essential from a number of perspectives. -For a local health clinic, if it was inoperable due to a generator that needed to be repaired, for CERP money of about $500 we could show tremendous good will towards the Iraqi people of that community. -In our area, getting water distribution going was key. We were able to use CERP money to clean up some canals, and repair some water pump and power generation capability, and were able to measure the effectiveness by the water flowing to Shia farmer fields and eventual agricultural production. -In our area, the Sons of Iraq program, with about a 50/50% Shia/Sunni composition, was key to establishing security in the area-- these CERP funds, at about 400k a month for about 1300 total "Sons of Iraq, administered thru a council of Sheiks and 2 security force officers in charge, resulted in a marked decrease in attacks and increase in the security environment-- by month 3, a market district of shops, which had no shops open for over a year, had over 20 shops open. CERP funds at the battalion level were essential and very effective. I'm convinced the CERP funds were very effective, helped us accomplish our mission of increasing security and increasing the capacity of local governance, and ultimately saved American lives to to a dramatic increase in security across the area of operations.
I believe the amount and type of controls put on CERP approval process became a major obstacle to success in Iraq. The desire to protect units and commanders from making the wrong decisions on these projects caused endless delays, over loads on staff sizes, and reduced effectiveness. I would rather see improved education of commanders prior to deployment, clear budget guidance while deployed, and individual accountability of those commanders that violate the rules.
I would say that the majority of our projects (unit and Army) were a waste of tax payer money. They were done haphazardly and without any real look at the long term. Why should the HN government take responsibility if we will do it. My best projects were directly tied to the development of local governemnt

by exercising the local system of doing a project. Using the project as a tool to teach the system of providing for the population. If it did not work within the system of government then doing the projects, for the moist part, had a detrimental effect to the development of governance. Spending money for the sake of spending is the worst way to use these funds but that is the metric that we persist in using.

The use of CERP at the lower levels of command for small projects, assisting in gaining the trust of local populations and highlighting the desire of local ISF to help the population was very valuable and successful in most of our employments of CERP funds. A valuable and worthwhile program to have access to in the future.

CERP was an excellent tool, but my opinion was that it was not available on the order of magnitude necessary for the commanders on the ground, and by that I mean BATTALION, to truly make a difference. At brigade and above, the focus was on "big picture" whereas the real changes were made at the local areas. Battalion is about as high as a command can be to truly be able to interact freely with those who CERP would help most.

I think the process of using CERP in military operations should be discontinued. The misuse rate is too high and commanders receive almost no training on how to use the funds in a holistic approach toward development. Projects often competed, overlapped, or failed as millions of dollars were flooded into the war zone for construction. USACE and USAID in particular had no idea of what was going on most of their construction projects and did an extremely poor job integrating any development plans with the military land owner or local government. I often found USACE and USAID projects that were wasted and left unfinished as they had not been properly inspected nor were they tied in to any sustainment plans or the local council. Huge multimillion dollar projects were marked as "completed" by USACE in particular but were often not connected to local power grid, had no sewage or water hook ups and often not used as intended if at all. Military commanders were often looked at favorably for "spending up" all of the CERP money and even asking for more to spend left over CERP money at Division. The pressure to spend CERP was high as this was the primary metric used by Division and above to track progress. No plans were made for long term maintenance or development nor did anyone really care.

glad you are looking at fixing but not eliminating this important program

We did not employ CERP at levels I had seen during previous deployments. That is a good thing because I believe that during the evolutions of OIF the use of CERP expanded way beyond the original intent. Also, although we (BCT [brigade combat team]) had a great relationship and system of project management/oversite with the PRT/USAID we found it nearly impossible to coordinate similar efforts with USACE and their big ticket projects; and not for a lack of trying by the BCT. The net result was an un-sychronized approach to the whole MAWS concept in Ninewa province.

It served it's purpose in so far as it allowed Battalion Task Force CDRs to bridge the security gap until things could be stabilized and bought us some time. While that may not be the exact intended purpose, probably critical to overarching success during 2006-2007 timeframe. Recommendation, do not look at CERP use in just the aggregate. Have to look at it during different major time periods on the ground before you summarize.

CERP is a critical weapon system/tool needed to rebuild a community. The commanders who used it successfully understood/focused on "population-centric operations." The units that experienced only 'fraud/waste/abuse', were focused on enemy-centric operations - the wrong method.

Cerp is a great tool for the commander to effect the coin environment - don't limit it based on a few bad examples I know it helped me win my fight in Bagdhad [district], without it would have been a different fight Amounts could be higher for BN CDR approval - always amazed me that I was entrusted with the sons and daughters of our citizens, but could only approve a couple grand in cerp money.

we always sought out two and three-fers - how could our project support more than one aim to bring the people closer to the GOI and separate them further from the insurgents. don't discount any project unless it is just to spend. local commander has greater depth of knowledge and impact than even the next higher, unless completely out of it. Not all commanders alike in their application. rapid turn = burn. not a good metric

CERP was and has continued to be a valuable tool to the commander on the ground. OIF II CERP was still in its infancy and rules and regulations were just being established. Corruption will always be a concern so local/provincial/district buy-in is a must. 50/50 or 75/25 at a minimum.

Biggest issue with CERP was the lack of a coherent strategy across Iraq for reconstruction and even within provinces.

CERP is a great program which provided an value added flexibility to Commanders to influence their environment. By the time I left Iraq, the guide lines for managing CERP had established enough checks and balances in the system which reduced the fraud generated from US individuals. Over my deployments, I saw that many individuals were being investigated for stealing funds from CERP. Additionally, the guidlines also established the ways in which CERP could be utilized. Although restrictive, there was still enough flexibility to utilize the funds to affect the environment.

Military supported CERPprojects should have near immediate impact and be visible to populace; more small projects better than one large. PRTs should handle large construction and work at higher gov't levels. Agriculture projects; green houses etc, had a huge impact in our area.

CERP is a very powerful tool, in fact more resources need to be allocated to lower levels. There were so many big plans at USAID, USACE and higher levels, but at the end of the day, many did not get executed due to security reasons, or they were simply out of congruence with the immediate needs of the people. I would observe a 2x month survey take place on water distribution, just to find that the conclusions were wrong. The expertise of what was required existed within Sub-Districts, the Iraqis knew exactly what they needed at the local level. The units on the ground that spend every day working with local leaders, engineers and security forces know what the problems are and many of the solutions. We need to empower at the lowest leve during the first 2x years of a reconstruction operation, until strategic infrastructure analysis is complete and bigger projects can be accomplished.

Construction, business and engineering experience is critical.