

## **The Army of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century**

Less than a decade into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, its perils and challenges are increasingly evident. September 11, 2001 shattered the United States' sense of domestic invulnerability to external threats. Since then, we have been at war - a long-term ideological struggle with a global extremist network. Over one million have served in the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, and over 5,100 of our Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, Airmen and Civilians have sacrificed their lives.

These opening engagements of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century are harbingers of the emerging security environment. In the years ahead, the United States will confront complex, dynamic and unanticipated challenges to our national security and the collective security of our friends and allies. These challenges will occur in many forms and will be waged across the spectrum of conflict – ranging from peaceful competition to general war and at all points in between; and in all domains: land, sea, air, space and cyberspace.

To succeed in this new environment, our Secretary of Defense has reinforced the principle of balance in our defense strategy: balance in our response to the current conflict vice preparing for future conflicts; balance in preparing for irregular warfare vice conventional warfare; and balance between the cultural advantages that have given us security vice the cultural changes needed to preserve it.

Given the emerging security environment, the evolving character of conflict, and the Secretary of Defense's vision of balance in our defense strategy, we see four roles for land forces in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century:

- Prevail in protracted counterinsurgency campaigns
- Engage to help other nations build capacity and to assure friends and allies
- Support civil authorities at home and abroad
- Deter and defeat hybrid threats and hostile state actors

To fulfill these four roles, we need an Army that is a versatile mix of tailorable and networked organizations, operating on a rotational cycle, to provide a sustained flow of trained and ready forces for Full Spectrum Operations and to hedge against unexpected contingencies- at a tempo that is predictable and sustainable for our all-volunteer force. To achieve this, we must continuously adapt our force and the institutions that support and generate it.

### **An Era of Persistent Conflict**

After more than eight years at war, we are facing a future in which several global trends will shape the emerging security environment and exacerbate the ideological struggle we are engaged in. Although such trends pose both dilemmas and opportunities, their comprehensive impact will increase security challenges and frame the conflicts confronting our Nation.

**Globalization** can spread prosperity by accelerating the transfer of trade, technology and ideas, but it can also propagate destabilizing influences. While globalization has brought prosperity to people around the world, its benefits are unequally distributed, creating “have” and “have not” conditions that can spawn conflict. Additionally, the interdependence of the global economy amplifies the local impact of distant crises, as demonstrated by the food, energy, and financial disruptions of the last year.

**Technology** is another double-edged sword. Inexpensive access to information enables entrepreneurs and innovators to collaborate in developing new technologies and improve existing ones. Yet our adversaries can exploit these same technologies to export terror around the globe.

**Population growth** in the developing world expands markets, but the accompanying “youth bulge” can also increase the potential for instability and extremism. Studies predict that the populations in some developing countries will double in the next few decades, and some estimates hold that by 2030, 60% of the world’s population will live in cities. This speaks volumes about the densely populated, urban areas in which our land forces will operate in the future. Conversely in some portions of the developed world, population ‘growth’ is negative; *depopulation* undermines established economies and cultures, inviting potentially destabilizing immigration.

Increased **resource demand** is a consequence of growing global prosperity and populations. While this demand may encourage more efficient use of natural resources and the development of alternatives, burgeoning middle classes in countries like China and India will exacerbate demands on already scarce resources. These rising demands for energy, water and food may enhance the potential for conflict.

**Climate change and natural disasters** have energized states and international institutions to work closer together to alleviate suffering. They can also compound already difficult conditions in developing countries, causing humanitarian crises, driving destabilizing population migrations and raising the potential for epidemic diseases.

The two trends of greatest concern are proliferation and failing states. **Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction** increases the potential for catastrophic attacks that may be globally destabilizing. Al-Qaida and affiliated terrorist groups already seek WMD and will use them against Western interests given the opportunity. Meanwhile, **failed or failing states** that lack the capacity or will to maintain territorial control can provide safe havens for terrorist groups to plan and export operations. The merging of these two trends is particularly worrisome: failing states that offer safe haven to terrorists seeking weapons of mass destruction.

The combined impact of these trends makes it likely that the next decades will be ones of *persistent conflict – protracted confrontation among state, non-state, and individual actors that are increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends*. In the years ahead, protracted competition and friction will manifest themselves in many forms as interests collide across the globe. As a result, our commitments in the future will be more frequent and continuous; conflicts will arise unpredictably, vary in intensity and scope, and will be less susceptible to the traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution.

## The Evolving Character of Conflict

Nations and other actors will seek their own interests, so conflict is a “normal” aspect of our environment. Although the fundamental *nature* of conflict is timeless, its *character* reflects the unique conditions of each era. The global trends that shape this era of persistent conflict will also significantly shape the character of conflict in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

Conflicts will be waged between and among **diverse actors**, both state and non-state, with the former frequently acting covertly, and the latter sometimes acting through state sponsorship or as a proxy for a state. The Second Lebanon War in 2006 pitted the state of Israel against a non-state actor, Hezbollah, supported by Iran and Syria, inside the territory of Lebanon. Such situations pose special challenges to an international system that has been focused on conflict between and among nation states. Conflict motives, objectives, and even the identities of protagonists will be difficult to discern and will shift over time. The presence and power of non-state actors, in particular their ability to challenge nation states, is a significant shift in the character of conflict. States no longer hold a monopoly on the instruments of war.

Ideological competition for sovereignty and influence over populations also characterize current conflict. Gaining the support of indigenous populations, always instrumental to the outcome of conflict, is now so important that conflict cannot be waged “around the people,” it is unavoidably waged “**among the people.**” Many of the safe havens we encounter today are “safe” not because of their geographic location, but because of the popular support our adversaries find in those locations. Adversaries will seek to mitigate our advantages, operating anonymously among indigenous populations to avoid detection and counteraction. Hezbollah, for example, made extensive use of civilian areas to deter Israeli counterstrikes.

Future conflicts will be **unpredictable** and may arise suddenly, expand rapidly into unanticipated locations, and last for unexpected durations. Adversaries will pursue dynamic combinations of means, shifting their employment in rapid succession and exploiting the element of surprise. Conflicts may also expand to areas historically immune to conflict, such as space and cyberspace. Previous trends may be suddenly reversed: Hezbollah inflicted more Israeli casualties per Arab fighter in 2006 than did any opponent in 1956, 1967, 1973 or 1982.

Local conflicts and their social, economic, and political consequences offer increasing **potential for spillover**, creating regional and globally destabilizing effects. Moreover, the interconnectedness of a globalized world can cause crises to spread quickly while the conditions necessary to resolve crises, such as governance or effective rule of law, usually evolve slowly, posing increased challenges for governments.

Conflicts will continue to take place under the **unblinking scrutiny** of the 24-hour media cycle and the World Wide Web. A global media presence and increasingly universal access to information will ensure that details of a conflict are rapidly available through social, communications, and cyber networks. Adversaries will have many fora to disseminate their messages worldwide.

Future conflicts will also present a new array of threats that defy simple categorization. Formerly, we could differentiate and categorize threats as conventional or unconventional;

regular or irregular; high intensity or low intensity; traditional, terrorist, or criminal. Such categorization was useful because each categorized threat had an associated counter. It is no longer enough to discern the 'correct' conflict category and then pursue a singular solution. We are more likely to face **hybrid threats** – dynamic combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal capabilities employed asymmetrically to counter our advantages.

The Israeli-Hezbollah conflict in 2006 also illustrates the potential impact of hybrid threats. Hezbollah employed modern civil technology (secure cell phones, computers, and video tele-communications systems) combined with military means (anti-tank, surface-to-air, and anti-ship missiles, rockets, mortars, and unmanned aerial vehicles) and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in an innovative array of unanticipated patterns. Additionally, Hezbollah placed an emphasis on holding ground, concentrated its forces and engaged in sustained fights associated more with conventional forces. Hezbollah's methods and tactics were a mix of the conventional and unconventional.

Hezbollah demonstrates that today's non-state actors are not limited to irregular, guerrilla methods. The future is not simply irregular warfare by non-state actors: adversaries can be expected to use a full spectrum of options, including every political, economic, informational, and military measure at their disposal. When combined with cultural and demographic factors, they will present leaders with complex challenges that will require increasingly complex solutions. Hybrid threats necessitate hybrid solutions, and such solutions increasingly require military forces that are adaptive and versatile enough to function in a variety of situations against myriad threats with a diverse set of national, allied and indigenous partners.

So, given the strategic environment and the projected character of 21<sup>st</sup> Century Conflict described above, we believe that, for the next several decades, we should prepare our land forces, as part of a joint and interagency team, to:

-- **Prevail in protracted counterinsurgency campaigns:** It is imperative that we prevail in our current missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Successful counterinsurgency (COIN) operations are inherently protracted and we must be prepared to sustain the required level of commitment to prevail in these and future COIN operations.

-- **Engage to help other nations build capacity and to assure friends and allies:** The Army can help in preventing future conflicts by increasing the capacity of other nations' security forces, both military and police, to uphold the rule of law, ensure domestic order, and deny their territory to terrorists.

-- **Support civil authorities at home and abroad:** We work primarily through the National Guard to provide support to civil authorities in the United States, augmenting them with active forces as necessary. Abroad, we will provide support to other agencies of the government, as we are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan today, helping them plan, integrate and execute the political, economic, and information elements of national strategy. The planning, organizing and integrating skills of the military should be seen as a national asset to assist other agencies of the government in their efforts.

-- **Deter and defeat hybrid threats and hostile state actors:** While we do not anticipate a “near-peer competitor” challenging us in the foreseeable future we can never lose sight of the requirement to train and prepare for this state-on-state conflict. There are nations in the world today training their forces with our Army as their primary threat.

### A Balanced Army for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century

Fulfilling the four roles for land forces outlined above will require a fundamentally different Army than the one we had before September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001. While the Army has been progressively adapting since the end of the Cold War, we must take advantage of what we continue to learn in our current operations, leverage emerging technology and continuously adapt to build a balanced Army to meet the demands of 21<sup>st</sup> Century conflict. We need to continuously adapt to a *versatile mix of tailorable and networked organizations, operating on a rotational cycle, to provide a sustained flow of trained and ready forces for Full Spectrum Operations and to hedge against unexpected contingencies - at a tempo that is predictable and sustainable for our all-volunteer force.*

One truism about predicting the future is that we will never get it exactly right; indeed we can only aspire not to be too wrong. We therefore need to build versatility into our force. We will develop a **versatile mix** of forces that allows us to address the broadest range of future requirements and provides us a base from which to adapt to reality as it unfolds. The advent of modular brigades is a great first step in building this versatile mix of organizations, but it is not the only step. A versatile army must provide operational commanders a balanced mix of force types – heavy, Stryker, light, Special Operating Forces (SOF), and enablers – so that they can devise effective combinations for any tactical situation. It is our strategic estimate, supported by our experience over the last decade, that we need a multi-weight force; infantry BCTs augmented with protected vehicles, Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (BCT), and armored BCTs, all integrated with SOF and enablers, to provide the Nation with versatile land force options for the wide variety of security challenges we will face. All of these formations have some utility at any point on the spectrum of conflict, while each BCT type possesses relative advantages that compensate for the disadvantages of the other types.

The Army’s modular design efforts of the past five years have immeasurably enhanced the inherent versatility of Army units. Modular units were designed to be **tailorable**. We have distributed key enablers previously held at division level and higher to brigade combat teams (BCTs), improving their ability to be tailored for a broad range of missions. These key enablers include intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), civil affairs, psychological operations, public affairs capabilities, and expanded logistics support, providing them the versatility to effectively perform a variety of missions and to operate independently. The Army can also task organize these modular units with force packages of additional enablers to enhance their ability to meet expanded mission requirements, increasing the land options available to combatant commanders.

We can extend this versatility by rethinking the composition of our Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS), ensuring that they contain full spectrum capabilities, to include those that increase

the survivability of Infantry BCTs within an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) environment. In this way, we can ensure our forces are fully prepared for the broadest range of challenges.

Moreover, these units will be **networked**, providing robust digital connectivity down to the Soldier. The network will enable our Soldiers to access information at the right place and time to achieve a decisive advantage over any enemy they face. The network will enhance their situational awareness enabling our forces to know where they are, where friendly forces are, where the enemy is, and afford them the ability to engage the enemy with precision fires. It will give commanders the ability to fuse data more efficiently to enable a more accurate understanding of the battlefield and better collaboration to enhance decision-making. Our Army organizations will operate from their operational base to the deployed area of operations on a single network that provides Joint, combined, and interagency connectivity, that is redundant, and that provides the capacity required to satisfy ever-increasing communications, intelligence, and situational awareness needs. In future operational environments, where the tactical environment and strategic environment will often be seamless, it is the network that will provide the ability to gain and maintain the operational advantage over our adversaries.

To provide a **sustained flow of trained and ready forces** at a **tempo** sustainable for our all-volunteer force, we have instituted a **rotational readiness model** called Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN). ARFORGEN is a transformation in how the Army builds readiness. This rotational model includes both Active and Reserve Component forces.

As depicted below the ARFORGEN model consists of three force pools—Reset; Train-Ready; and Available. Each of the three force pools contains a versatile force package to provide a sustained flow of forces for current commitments and to hedge against unexpected contingencies. The force pools are available at varying time intervals based on their readiness levels to provide operational and strategic depth. The ARFORGEN model, as depicted, provides a versatile mix of ready forces capable of full spectrum operations at a BOG: Dwell ratio of 1:2 for Active Component forces and 1:4 for Reserve Component forces.<sup>1</sup> BOG, or “Boots on the Ground” refers to time spent deployed while, Dwell refers to time spent not deployed, so that an example of a 1:2 BOG: Dwell could mean 1 year deployed and 2 years at home. In emergencies, the model permits “surging” forces from the “train-ready” pool to meet unexpected demands.

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<sup>1</sup> The optimal ARFORGEN allows for a Boots On the Ground:Dwell ratio of 1:3 and 1:5 for active and reserve components respectively. Boots On the Ground (BOG) refers to time spent deployed while, Dwell refers to time spent not deployed, so that an example of a 1:2 BOG:Dwell could mean 1 year deployed and 2 years at home.

**Army Capabilities (FY11 Goal)  
1:2(AC) and 1:4 (RC)**

	<u>2 x RC Force Pools</u>	<u>RESET</u>	<u>TRAIN - READY</u>	<u>AVAILABLE</u>
<u>ACTIVITY</u>		Recovery From Deployment	Full Spectrum Training / Prepare for Deployment	Deployed or Available for Deployment / Engagement
<u>READINESS LEVEL</u>		Not Ready	Manned and Equipped at C2 Levels to C1 Levels	Manned and Equipped at C1 level
<u>AVAILABILITY</u>		> 180 Days	90-180 Days	Available
<u>FORCE PACKAGE</u>	1 Corps HQ Remainder of RC Forces*	1 Corps HQ 4 Div HQs 20 BCTs ~92K Enablers	1 Corps HQ 5 Div HQs 20 BCTs ~92K Enablers	1 Corps HQ 5 Div HQs 20 BCTs ~92K Enablers

\* The remainder of our 18 Divisions, 73 BCTs and enablers would rotate through the Force Pools at a 1:4 ratio.

We are organizing our force structure on the ARFORGEN model to continuously supply an operational headquarters, 5 tactical headquarters, 20 Infantry, Stryker, and Armored BCTs and enabling forces organized, trained and equipped for full spectrum operations at a sustainable rate of 1:2 (AC) and 1:4 (RC) (see box above). This versatile mix of land forces could sustain operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and, at lower demand levels, provide ready global reaction forces and regionally-oriented forces for engagement in support of combatant commander Theater Security Cooperation Programs. Further, this model allows us to surge portions of another five-division corps and enabling forces from the train-ready pool to respond to **unexpected contingencies** across the spectrum of conflict, and to have two more corps available at longer commitment times to provide strategic depth.

The enablers generated as part of each force package are an essential component of the ability of the Army to sustain land campaigns and to provide support to the joint force. These enablers provide a versatile mix of operational capabilities. They consist of tailorable packages of aviation, artillery, engineers, intelligence, sustainment, and other capabilities that enable commanders to organize their operational areas to achieve their campaign objectives. Enablers also provide the versatility to conduct full spectrum operations by permitting tailoring of force packages with the type and amount of capabilities required for a specific environment or mission. Our modular enablers are designed to “plug-in” to allow for rapid adjustment in a force when the environment or enemy changes.

We are building an integrated Total Force in which our RC forces are also on a rotational cycle, but at a deployment rate about half that of their AC counterparts. This cyclical readiness model will increase **predictability** for Soldiers, Families, employers, and communities, and enable our RC to remain an integral element of the operational force while also providing the Nation with a strategic reserve (i.e., those non-deployed RC units which are two to three years from commitment).

The increased demands of our combatant commanders, coupled with the size of our Active Component (AC) force, require that we routinely employ Reserve Component (RC) forces as part of our operational force. Continued and routine access to our RC forces is essential to sustaining current operations, and is improving the overall operational experience and quality of our RC forces. Additionally, adequate Army National Guard (ARNG) forces will be ready and immediately available to their State and Territorial authorities to respond to domestic crises.

We have begun the implementation of ARFORGEN. We are already using the model to meet the requirements for Army forces around the world, but we are doing so mostly with institutions and processes that were originally designed for an Army of a different era. Our Generating Force, the force that recruits, equips, trains and sustains our Army is critically important to building the Army of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Without our generating force, we would not have been able to sustain the last 8 years of continuous mobilization and combat operations across two separate theaters. No other nation in the world has the quality or capacity in its generating force that America has. While the generating force has been constantly adapting to meet the requirements of the operating force over the last 8 years, we must now look for fundamental change in the generating force to support an Army operating on a rotational cycle. The generating force must be as versatile as the operating force it supports. This will require making fundamental changes to the processes and policies we use to manage the Army. Once the mission is defined, our institutions must seamlessly and continuously adapt – tailoring force packages and quickly readjusting training, manning and equipping – to ensure units have all of the physical and mental tools necessary to succeed. Adapting our institutions and generating force processes to support an Army operating on a rotational cycle is an essential element of our transformation.

### Land Force Qualities

A balanced Army adapted to the requirements of 21<sup>st</sup> Century conflict will be fundamentally different in every dimension of doctrine, organization, training, manning, equipping, stationing, and support from the Army we had on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001. A balanced Army must be organized to be *versatile*; deployable enough to be *expeditionary*; responsive enough to be *agile*; precise enough to be *lethal*; robust and protected enough to be *sustainable*; and flexible enough to be *interoperable* with a wide range of partners. These qualities -- **versatile, expeditionary, agile, lethal, sustainable, and interoperable** – are the defining qualities of a balanced Army. They describe not only the Operating Force, but also the Generating Force, and will form the basis of our overall Modernization Strategy and for the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV).

### **Versatile**

*Versatility* is the central organizing principle of a balanced Army. It is this quality that will enable our forces and institutions to effectively execute operations across the spectrum of conflict. Versatility acknowledges that precision is impossible in predicting force requirements in this volatile and uncertain strategic environment, and that our Army must be able to react to



the future as it actually presents itself. A versatile force must possess a balanced mix of multi-purpose capabilities, and sufficient capacity to execute our doctrine of Full Spectrum Operations across the spectrum of military operations, from peacetime engagement to major combat operations.

Versatility begins with how the Army *thinks* - a solid foundation of coherent, relevant and adaptive concepts and doctrine. The revision of Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, established full spectrum operations as our capstone operational concept - ***Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results.*** The concepts supporting full spectrum operations are further refined in updates to subordinate doctrinal manuals such FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, and FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*.

Most importantly, the Army is only as versatile as its Soldiers, leaders, and civilians. Every Soldier is a Warrior, and each must be trained and ready to effectively operate in any environment. Versatile leaders are competent in their core proficiencies, yet broad enough to operate across the spectrum of conflict. Army civilians must be adaptable, providing broad expertise and stability across myriad tasks and functions. Developing versatile Soldiers, leaders and civilians will enable us to lead the versatile Army we need to overcome 21<sup>st</sup> Century challenges.

## **Expeditionary**

The dynamic and global character of conflict will require the Army, as part of a joint force, to deploy to the site of problems in austere and unfamiliar locations around the world, to sustain operations for extended periods of time, and to engage with the security forces of other nations. To do this, we must be expeditionary. The Army must be organized, trained, and equipped to provide forces capable of operating in austere environments; comfortable in diverse cultural environments; able to conduct joint forcible entry operations and to fight, if necessary, upon arrival.

The ARFORGEN model and the Army's global force posture define the available start points for expeditionary response. We have recently shifted to a more CONUS-based posture, adjusting our forward-stationing. There is a natural tension between the flexibility of a CONUS-based response posture and the immediacy of forward presence. Forward stationed forces are an indicator of our regional commitment and a source of assurance to our friends and allies. They also provide a mechanism to increase our cultural awareness and sensitivity. This shift to a CONUS-based posture puts added significance on maintaining a robust joint forcible entry capability.

An expeditionary Army must also retain an expeditionary mindset – the confidence and competence to quickly adapt and function effectively in any physical or cultural environment. Such a mindset requires that Soldiers, leaders, and civilians are mentally prepared to deploy anywhere in the world on short notice. Soldiers possessing an expeditionary mindset have the

critical-thinking skills necessary to adapt quickly to unexpected situations in unfamiliar physical surroundings and are prepared to succeed in austere and complex conditions.

An expeditionary mindset also has a cultural component. In an era characterized by conflicts among the people, in which personal interaction between Soldiers and indigenous populations could mean the difference between victory and defeat, Soldiers, leaders, and civilians must feel confident interacting with people of different cultural backgrounds and perspectives. Developing this confidence demands that Soldiers, leaders, and civilians become culturally astute and able to use this awareness to operate innovatively.

## **Agile**

While versatility is the ability to do different tasks, agility is the ability to rapidly shift from one task to another. An *agile* Army must have forces able to quickly adapt to exploit opportunities in complex environments. To do this, we require not only agile units but also agile minds and institutions.

To build and maintain our agility, we must remain a learning organization, quickly absorbing lessons learned, sharing them, and applying them to current and future problems. One key to institutionalizing our learning is adaptive doctrine. Doctrine must grow and adapt based on the hard-earned lessons being learned daily in the field. Our institutions must be able to quickly collect, analyze, learn, and disseminate best practices from units in contact and adapt Army doctrine.

Soldiers must possess the mental agility to react quickly and appropriately to changing situations and complex environments. We must prepare Soldiers and leaders to function effectively in these complex operational environments through a variety of institutional, operational, and self-development educational and training opportunities. Army training and education programs must be dynamic and adaptive, instilling full spectrum capabilities in the operating force while keeping pace with constantly evolving doctrine and operational requirements. We will continue to incorporate hard-learned battlefield tactics, techniques and procedures into individual and collective training so that Soldiers and leaders possess the requisite and relevant skills required for full spectrum operations. Diverse, realistic training and education will develop the agile Soldiers and leaders that make up agile units.

To direct agile Soldiers, the Army must continue to develop agile leaders able to handle the challenges of full spectrum operations. Agile leaders are adaptive thinkers that use their individual initiative and understanding of the environment to quickly and boldly seize and exploit opportunities as they present themselves. While our junior officers and non-commissioned officers have had ample opportunities to develop their mental agility on the battlefield, we must develop and empower agile, adaptive leaders at all levels, from the tactical to the strategic.

Agile Soldiers deserve agile institutions. While focused on building versatile, agile units capable of adapting to changing environments, the institutional Army has continued to utilize

processes and procedures designed to support a static Army. To support an agile operating force, the Army must have an agile generating force. This requires fundamentally transforming generating force and supporting processes to more effectively and efficiently prepare trained and ready forces for Combatant Commanders. Institutional agility allows us to adapt to the realities of the future as they present themselves.

## **Lethal**

Only the armed forces possess the core competency of applying lethal force. This competency requires the capability to overmatch any enemy across the spectrum of conflict while mitigating collateral damage. The Army achieves such competency by operating as part of a joint team with air, naval and special operations forces.

Conflicts among populations require the employment of proportional lethal force with precision. To do so effectively, Soldiers and leaders must be able to quickly and accurately identify targets, discriminate between hostile, friendly and neutral actors and apply precise lethal effects on identified targets.

Lethal precision requires superior intelligence capabilities, precise delivery systems, and broad situational awareness. As the Army provides “capability packages” to BCTs currently fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, these systems will provide precision fires and advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, exponentially increasing Soldiers’ ability to positively identify and apply precision lethality to legitimate threats. Concurrently, these systems enable commanders at the operational level to gain broader situational awareness and shift resources appropriately to gain an advantage over the threat, while mitigating collateral damage to the surrounding populace.

Finally, the requirement for precision also extends to how we apply non-lethal effects. In a population-centric operating environment, we must be as precise in the execution of information operations, to ensure that we are sending the most effective message to the right audience in a timely manner. Mastery of the information environment is a critical component of full spectrum operations.

## **Sustainable**

The anticipated expeditionary nature of Army operations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century; abroad for extended periods of time in austere and unfamiliar locations; requires a fundamentally different view of sustainability. A sustainable Army must integrate national and global resources to ensure forces are physically available, properly equipped, at the right place and at the right time with the right tools to support the combatant commanders. Flexibility and agility must be the hallmarks of expeditionary sustainability. In addition our sustainment footprint must take into account the social and political realities of the countries to which we may deploy.

The modularity of the Army sustainment force structure has kept pace with the remainder of the Army. Today our sustainability is achieved through a mix of Soldiers, civilians, and contractors. We must continually assess that mix to ensure that it will be adequate across the entire spectrum of potential operations to provide the most expeditionary sustainment capability for the operational force.

The Army has developed an affordable equipping strategy that supports ARFORGEN and an Army on a rotational readiness cycle. Army acquisition must leverage technologies that make us lighter and more mobile while maintaining or improving our survivability and lethality. We must continue to push research and development to produce smaller and lighter energy sources, fuel efficient engines, and lighter and stronger protection materials.

Our view of the future security environment includes the proliferation of improvised explosive devices (IED) across the battlefield. This puts added emphasis on developing technologies and tactics, techniques, and procedures that enhance the protection of the force. This creates an increased urgency in developing the next break-through in lighter protection technologies. Additionally, a smaller logistics footprint will be enabled by advances in energy efficiency and reduction in logistics demand by developing more reliable equipment. When coupled with a network-enabled common logistics operating picture, our forces will be more sustainable in austere environments and able to decrease the frequency of driving down IED-strewn lines of communication.

## **Interoperable**

Well beyond the capability to operate on the same radio frequencies and utilize the same caliber ammunition, an interoperable Army must be able to build unity of effort with other government agencies, indigenous forces and international partners. The Army can lead the development of interoperability with the interagency, allies and indigenous forces by sharing our planning and organizational skills. The Army can also facilitate unity of effort through the development of both an interoperable mindset and interoperable technologies.

To enhance the Army's interoperability and ensure a common view of how the Army, the joint force, and civil government agencies should work collaboratively, we must actively contribute to the development of interagency doctrine. Such doctrine would provide the intellectual and institutional basis for success in full spectrum operations, and would ensure that we are integrating all Joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational efforts to achieve our common strategic objectives.

Furthermore, we must expand educational and experiential opportunities for leaders and Soldiers beyond the Department of Defense, including graduate school, training with industry, other government agencies, and with allies and partners. The Army's asymmetric advantage is its people; therefore, we must commit the resources necessary to maximize their intellectual abilities to effectively employ all elements of national power.

## **Leading Change**

The 21<sup>st</sup> Century security environment and the continuous adaptation of the Army to remain ahead of rapidly evolving threats will put a premium on leaders of character and competence; leaders grounded in Army Values and the Warrior Ethos. We must train, educate, and provide experiences to progressively develop leaders to conduct full spectrum operations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century security environment and to lead the Army enterprise. We must instill agility, initiative, and the ability to innovate in our leaders. This will require a commitment by the institution, leaders, and individuals to lifelong learning and development as well as a balanced approach to training, education, and experience as the foundation of any leader development plan. Further, our leader development policies and programs must support ARFORGEN and the rotational readiness model in order to provide balance and predictability for our All-Volunteer Army.

Army leaders must be competent in their core proficiencies and broad enough to operate across the spectrum of conflict. They must be able to operate in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environments and leverage other capabilities in achieving their objectives. They must be adaptive and innovative. They must be culturally astute and able to use this awareness and understanding to conduct operations innovatively as well as courageous enough to see and exploit opportunities in the challenges and complexities of the operational environment. They must be willing and able to lead change and above all else, Army leaders must adhere to our professional military ethic.

The Army of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century described in this paper will require continuous change. Our strategic environment has evolved dramatically, and so has the Army. The challenges of institutional change in large organizations like the Army are substantial, especially as we are adapting an organization that is already the best in the world at what it does. Our test must not be "*Have we changed?*" It must be "*Have we changed enough?*" Everything is on the table except our core values. We are building an agile, disciplined Warrior Team that is dominant across the spectrum of 21<sup>st</sup> Century Conflict. It will be, inherently, a balanced Army for a balanced strategy.