

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD

BY

THE HONORABLE MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

ON

BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY FOR 21ST CENTURY
CHALLENGES

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INTRODUCTION

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the committee: thank you for the opportunity to talk with you about the Department of Defense's efforts to build partner capacity. I am pleased to provide you with information about this critical element of our national security.

Upon release of the new defense strategy in January, President Obama emphasized that "we are joining with allies and partners around the world to build their capacity to promote security, prosperity, and human dignity." Secretary Panetta expanded on this point in a speech at the U.S. Institute of Peace on June 29, when he noted that working with key allies and regional partners to build their military and security forces became a major component of U.S. national security strategy after World War II. This approach has endured long beyond the Cold War, and for the United States military it has gained new – and appropriate – importance as a mission in the decade since 9/11.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

For the Department of Defense, Building Partner Capacity (BPC) is a fundamental aspect of our strategy, tied to the realization of U.S. defense objectives and the success of current and future military missions. Specifically, BPC is a key part of our transition strategy in Afghanistan and the commitment we have made with other International Security and Assistance Force partners to provide training and financial support to Afghanistan's National Security Forces (ANSF) beyond 2014. BPC encompasses a variety of activities, from security force assistance and developing professional, capable, and sustainable foreign security forces, to international security assistance with our partners at the State Department, to developing our own U.S. capability to collaborate with partners on complex challenges and building mutually beneficial security relationships. By enabling partners to achieve our shared national interests, we ultimately create a more cost-effective model for stability that is less reliant on direct U.S. military engagement. BPC mitigates the burden on U.S. forces responding to security threats outside the United States, serves to build a base of credible and capable partner countries that can effectively participate in multinational, coalition-based operations, and sets conditions for future cooperation and improved U.S. access. It also makes any necessary U.S. engagements more effective as we are able to leverage capable partners' unique local knowledge and understanding.

Security Force Assistance in particular is often but not always conducted by our special operations forces (SOF), whose history and proficiency at working "by, with, and through" partner forces makes them our provider of choice for this mission. SOF operate through persistent engagement in key countries, which generates operational context. Operational context is the thorough understanding and, in fact, expertise that is uniquely gained through multiple visits to the same areas. This includes understanding local culture, society, language, economy, history and politics. In short, SOF operators have valuable insights on the physical and human terrain of their areas, which allow them to be more precise and therefore successful in the enabling activities.

BPC permeates the Department of Defense's activities, and is a critical enabler to every primary military mission. Several examples follow below.

- *CounterTerrorism and Irregular Warfare.* Tools like the Section 1206 Global Train and Equip Program and the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program have been

indispensable for maintaining constant pressure on al-Qaida and its affiliates worldwide. In order to counter regional and transnational terrorist organizations, we must develop and sustain a global network of allies and partners who can work together, communicate effectively and share the responsibilities of global leadership. In many cases, partners possess cultural and linguistic abilities that afford them better access and effectiveness than U.S. forces executing the same mission. Building on decades of BPC experience, our SOF are already at the forefront of this approach. They have played a key role in places like the Philippines where their engagement has yielded more capable partner forces and significant progress against terrorists. The ongoing relationship between SOF and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) strengthened when SOF deployed in 2002 to act in a non-combat role to advise and assist the AFP in operations against Abu Sayyaf, a terrorist group taking advantage of safe havens in the southern Philippines. The units first engaged with local residents to learn their basic needs. This allowed US SOF to then work with the AFP to address grievances in the community, severing their ties with the terrorist groups. As SOF trained and advised the AFP personnel, they helped coordinate security efforts and interagency, sometimes international, programs to address key issues such as water, medical care, transportation, and education. Their actions speak louder than my words in demonstrating the effectiveness of BPC.

- *Counternarcotics.* DoD's counternarcotics authorities (i.e. Sections 1004, 1021, 1022, 1033) allow us to provide support to domestic and foreign law enforcement organizations, working with the State Department, as they work to counter the destabilizing effect of narcotics trafficking, terrorists, insurgents, and related threat financing. The impact of this support is most visible in countries such as Colombia, where a sustained, multi-agency BPC effort, together with State Department civilian police engagements and USAID development projects, has enhanced Colombia's ability to counter narcotics production and other security challenges within its own borders. Through this effort, which has drawn on SOF training, Colombia has become an important exporter of security, sharing its expertise with others in the region and beyond.
- *Deter and Defeat Aggression.* BPC efforts are critical to enhancing the aggregate capabilities and capacities of a network of defense partnerships designed to deter aggression and, should deterrence fail, operate together with greater effect. Work needs to be done to ensure allies and partners are capable of operating in contested environments, including in the face of anti-access/area-denial threats. The Department's major exercise programs help us prepare for such challenges by promoting greater interoperability and allowing us to experiment with combined operating concepts.
- *Provide a Stabilizing Presence.* Exercises, deployments for training, and other military-to-military familiarization activities deter aggression from destabilizing regional actors while promoting interoperability, information sharing, and collaboration on mutual security objectives with our partners. We can never be certain where in the world U.S. forces may be required to operate, and being able to count on enduring relationships with partner nations is at the core of a multinational coalition's strength, helping to secure shared access to facilities and territory, information, and diplomatic support. SOF continues to effectively do this through a strategy of persistent engagement in key countries around the world. Intentionally small in scale, these types of engagements can support our partners in building the capacity to counter threats and foster stability.

- *Conduct Humanitarian Assistance & Disaster Relief.* In regions like the Pacific and Caribbean that are prone to hurricanes, tsunamis, and other large-scale natural disasters, Combatant Commanders conduct a variety of exercises and engagements that help Geographic Combatant Commands prepare for providing humanitarian relief in support of our civilian partners. This can also include medical, dental, or other civic assistance programs whereby U.S. forces have the opportunity to hone their skills while helping local populations. As we cultivate new security relationships with uncertain partners, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief training is an important mechanism for increased cooperation and relationship building with partner militaries. The Navy's Southern Partnership Station (SPS) is a good example of how we use port visits with partners around Central & South America and the Caribbean Basin to share best practices and improve our collective ability to support humanitarian relief operations in response to disasters.
- *Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction.* The proliferation of WMD is a global challenge, one the U.S. cannot address alone. International partners have resources and relationships that can be brought to bear against this problem; building their capacity to do so is an integral component of our strategy to counter the spread of WMD. Efforts like the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) are prominent examples of DoD's engagement along these lines, and many of the Combatant Commands are also active in Countering WMD BPC activities within their respective areas of responsibility.
- *Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations.* Though U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations, we have learned hard lessons and applied new operational approaches in the counterinsurgency and security force assistance arenas. We will seek to codify these lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan, and emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address instability and reduce the demand for significant U.S. force commitments to stability operations. SOF will be a key enabler here as well. As my own experience in El Salvador in the eighties demonstrates, SOF can lead the way to successfully reducing our footprint while maintaining stability and protecting US national interests. Through programs like the Village Stability Operations to build Afghan Local Police, and training and equipping Afghan Special Operations Forces, U.S. SOF efforts are helping to build sustainable capacity to facilitate stability in Afghanistan post-2014.

Looking across regions in the context of these various missions, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff, in coordination with the Military Departments, Combatant Commands, and the State Department, strive to carefully prioritize which partners we engage with, how often, and to what end. In advancing a common security vision for the future, we work closely with our civilian agency colleagues to identify shared priorities. As Secretary Panetta reinforced, the Department of State must “have a leading role in crafting and conducting U.S. foreign policy, so that we can reaffirm and strengthen our strategic approach to defense partnerships.”

EMERGING SECURITY CHALLENGES

As we look to the future security environment, we recognize that BPC will need to address a broad range of security challenges. In the wake of the Benghazi attack and increasing syndication of terrorist threats, we must make capacity building for internal security forces and counterterrorism operations a clear priority. We must be able to work with partners in the Persian Gulf to strengthen their ability to counter Iran's destabilizing activities, and advance collaborative efforts with Israel to deploy systems like Iron Dome, which protects Israeli citizens against the threat of rockets. We must invest in new capabilities with allies in Northeast Asia, such as missile defense, to counter North Korea. We will also work to strengthen the maritime security and humanitarian assistance capabilities of key partners in the Indian Ocean and in Southeast Asia. Currently, throughout the year, SOF conducts engagements in more than 100 countries worldwide. In close coordination with the State Department and in alignment with our broader foreign policy goals, our special operations forces draw from their experiences in places like Colombia, Yemen, and East Africa to build the capacity of partner forces through training, equipping, advising and assisting, and integrating civil affairs teams, military information support teams, and even cultural support teams to ensure effective support capabilities. And we will strengthen NATO's capabilities in missile defense, meet our Article 5 commitments, and ensure that we can conduct expeditionary operations with our European allies. And we must ensure that they can assume a greater burden of the responsibility when we do engage.

More broadly, the Secretary made clear in his 29 June speech at the United States Institute of Peace that the Department needs to take a strategic approach to security cooperation and make sure that we have comprehensive and integrated capabilities in key regions in order to confront critical security challenges. Over the past decade, much of the strategic emphasis in security cooperation has rightly focused on supporting current operations and helping states deal with internal instability. As we draw down from a decade of conflict, we will place additional strategic emphasis on preparing our network of allies and partners to confront emerging challenges. We will also ensure that our security cooperation tools are calibrated so that the U.S. is optimally prepared to exploit emerging opportunities and counter potential threats— meaning lowering the barriers to defense cooperation and being prepared to rapidly take advantage of opportunities with like-minded partners.

The accomplishments of U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan are an important example of the value of building partner capacity, and the NATO Strategic Plan for Afghanistan typifies the criticality of international security partnerships. As we approach 2014, we will continue to work alongside our coalition partners as we transition full security responsibility to the Afghan National Security Forces. We are taking significant steps towards this vision through the fielding of Coalition Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams. These teams enable the transition of lead security responsibility to the Afghan Government and Security Forces and demonstrate our ongoing commitment to the Coalition and Afghanistan as codified at the Chicago NATO Summit last spring. As the Strategic Partnership Agreement signed by Presidents Obama and Karzai in May reflects, the United States and Afghanistan share “a common desire for peace and to strengthen collective efforts to achieve a region that is no longer a safe haven for al-Qaida and its affiliates.”

For instance, after a multi-year effort to build the capabilities of specialized Afghan counternarcotics units, these units have begun to undertake independent, sustained operations to deprive the Taliban of an important source of its revenue. This investment has helped make

these units among the most capable in Afghanistan and reliable partners for interagency and international counterdrug operations.

Even as we continue the transition process, we have been clear that we have an enduring commitment to Afghanistan and our assistance will not cease after 2014. We must be prepared to maintain a financial and political investment for years to come or we risk watching our security gains in Afghanistan devolve. Regional and transnational threats, like international terrorism and drug trafficking, will persist and may expand given changes in the security environment, and we will need to maintain a strong partnership with Afghanistan and its neighbors to counter such threats. We will not forget what brought us to Afghanistan in the first place and will continue to work with our partners to pursue al-Qaida, its affiliates, and other terrorist organizations that threaten the United States and its interests, wherever they make safe-haven; from the sands of the Maghreb and streets of Mogadishu, to the jungles of Mindanao.

We expect that combined operations with capable partners will continue to be the most effective way to respond to emerging security challenges worldwide. This will require U.S. forces to exercise and engage regularly with our foreign military counterparts to maintain the high levels of proficiency, interoperability, and readiness that we have attained in Afghanistan. In the fight against al-Qaida, our success in enabling partners to defend and govern their own countries is just as important as the fighting that we do ourselves. In support of this effort, we appreciate the committee making Section 1206 assistance more effective by enabling us to provide small-scale military construction in conjunction with other forms of capacity-building assistance. This kind of modification is critical, as we have seen that equipping a partner with boats is not sustainable if they don't have a dock on which to land them, or a boathouse in which to store and maintain them.

We are also concerned about drug trafficking and the rise of some transnational organized crime (TOC) to the level of a national security threat. While we play a lead role in the detection and monitoring of narcotics approaching the United States by air and sea, DoD works to support U.S. law enforcement personnel and State Department officers to support counter the organizations that traffic illicit drugs and foment instability in various regions around the world. As the President's Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime states "TOC presents sophisticated and multi-faceted threats that cannot be addressed through law enforcement action alone." We have also seen a dramatic rise in the number of terrorist organizations that rely on the proceeds from drug trafficking, and this crime-terror nexus represents an especially dangerous convergence. As we face increasing budgetary pressures, BPC will remain a central component of our efforts in this regard.

Promoting Shared Responsibility While Addressing Military Needs

We appreciate the committee's support in working with the Senate last year to pass the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) legislation. The GSCF is a unique innovation that recognizes the shared responsibility between the Departments of State and Defense for conducting security sector assistance, and we are excited to be moving forward with several initial projects to test out this new business model. During its pilot phase, we intend for GSCF projects to address national level priorities shared by the Secretaries of State and Defense. Our ability to effectively plan and successfully operate to build partner capacity can be best supported by authorities that are not subject to year-to-year variation. In this respect, GSCF's multi-year authority is of great benefit in addressing national level priorities and could be similarly beneficial for other more targeted capacity-building programs.

Over the last 7 years, working closely with the State Department, BPC programs like Section 1206 have proven that such efforts large impact and can be operated responsibly in close synchronization with our colleagues in the State Department. We firmly believe that State and DoD collaboration on Section 1206 proposals makes the overall selection process more rigorous and results in better programs. We look forward to continued close work with the State Department and other agencies to ensure that DoD's BPC efforts are agile in responding to partners' needs and consistent with U.S. foreign policy.

Enhancing Skill Sets & Improving Internal Processes

As Secretary Panetta recently made clear “the task of training, advising, and partnering with foreign military and security forces has moved from the periphery to become a critical skill set across our armed forces.” Accordingly, we are working to enhance DoD skills sets, capabilities, and tools for encouraging and enabling partnerships, as well as streamlining DoD's internal BPC and security force assistance processes.

In developing innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to BPC, SOF will continue to play a critical role. This will be especially true in physically austere and politically sensitive environments. U.S. SOF will also be integral in building a cohesive global network with their counterparts in the international special operations community.

Over the last decade, our general purpose forces (GPF) have developed considerable skills in training, advising, and assisting the security forces of friendly foreign countries. Historically, SOF have conducted the majority of DoD's activities to train, equip, advise, and assist international security forces. However, the large demand for building partner nation capability over the past decade coupled with the limited availability of SOF for this mission has required the GPF to adapt and develop their skills in conducting an increasingly larger portion of security force assistance activities. As this experience will be important to leverage in future conflicts and in the avoidance of future conflicts, OSD is in the process of developing the means to track individuals with related experience and identifying opportunities for these individuals to maintain their skills.

Similarly, our experience in Afghanistan with the Ministry of Defense Advisors Program (MoDA) has demonstrated the positive impact that DoD civilian personnel can have in the field by helping to build capable defense institutions and providing professional advice and assistance at the ministerial level. MoDA and our other defense institution building initiatives like the Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI) are important capacity building tools that will sustain other security assistance efforts over time by building the core competencies needed in effective and accountable defense ministries. We are grateful for this committee's support in expanding MoDA's program authority outside Afghanistan, and are preparing to expand the MoDA program globally in the coming months.

Streamlining Processes to Speed Up and Improve Security Cooperation Programs

Secretary Panetta has also charged that we streamline the Department's internal processes to speed up and improve security cooperation programs – and work with the Department of State and Congress to do the same. Making the security cooperation system more responsive will enable the U.S. to take advantage of opportunities for cooperation with allies and partners and be the security partner of choice globally. Even where authorities exist, the patchwork character

and temporary nature of authorities presents management, planning, and sustainment challenges that can hinder internal processes no matter how efficient they could become.

We are working to become more anticipatory and expedient in the delivery of defense articles and services. This means better anticipating partners' needs ahead of time, fast-tracking priority sales, and incorporating U.S. exportability requirements up front in the development process. We are also working to make U.S. government decision-making simpler, faster and more predictable for our partners. We have built Expeditionary Requirements Generation Teams (ERGTs) that work with combatant command staffs, embassy country teams, and partner nations to better define partner military requirements and develop appropriate acquisition or assistance programs. ERGTs help partners clearly articulate what capability they want to build and identify the equipment, training courses, and other assistance it will take to achieve that desired capability, as recently occurred with Armenia's expanded peacekeeping capability. We are also preparing to leverage the newly-recapitalized Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF) to identify and purchase high-demand items and items with lengthy production lead times with the goal of accelerating the delivery to the partner. A recently authorized pilot program, the Special Defense Repair Fund, will afford even greater responsiveness by allowing us to repair, overhaul, and refurbish in-stock defense articles in anticipation of partner sales and transfers. We are also working with the Department of Commerce and others as part of the President's Export Control Reform Initiative to update the U.S. Munitions List and streamline the technology security and foreign disclosure processes to increase the speed with which we can provide material assistance to partners.

Defense trade is a promising avenue for deepening security cooperation with our most capable partner nations. Our ongoing work in reforming our export control system is a critical part of fostering that cooperation. Each transaction creates new opportunities for training, for exercises, for relationship building. It also supports our industrial base, with roughly one third of defense industry output supported by defense exports. This is important for American jobs and for our ability to invest in new defense capabilities for the future.

Returns on Investment

Documenting the impact of BPC activities or showing the "bang for the buck" is more art than science and by necessity must involve more qualitative than quantitative results. Traditional assessments primarily show success in terms of measurable outputs that indicate whether project implementation proceeded as designed, such as number of people trained or quantity of vehicles delivered. We continue to work with our partners and independent research, for example there is a pending study GAO, to document the impacts of these programs. In addition we would like to share several examples that best demonstrate how our BPC investment has benefitted the American taxpayer.

Colombia is a good example of where more than a decade of security force assistance has enabled a partner to combat internal destabilizing elements effectively -- in that case, the FARC and other designated terrorist organizations. In particular, we have provided support to aviation training, intelligence and operational fusion, operational planning, riverine operations, logistics, command and control, security, and medical training. Colombia is also a prime example of how SOF plays a leading role in BPC. U.S. special operations forces used their core skillset -- building relationships, training and mentoring partner forces -- to dramatically improve Colombia's capacities to address internal threats. Now, we are encouraged to see that Colombia

is in turn providing justice sector and security force assistance of their own to other U.S. partner nations across the Americas and in Africa.

As cited previously, the fifty flags that wave at the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Headquarters in Afghanistan symbolize how building the capacity of other nations in turn pays dividends for U.S. security interests. A range of forces from El Salvador to Mongolia have made a significant contribution to coalition operations, facilitated largely by equipment and training that we have provided. Georgia, which is already the largest per-capita ISAF contributor, is a prime example. It has nearly doubled its contribution to ISAF by providing two counterinsurgency-trained light infantry battalions without national caveats. This increase will make Georgia the largest non-NATO ISAF force contributor. These forces occupy their own battle space and play a key role in the counterinsurgency strategy of clear, hold, and build; an important contribution that eases the burden on U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

It is also worth noting that our security force assistance programs with the Armed Forces of the Philippines over the last several years have enabled those forces to conduct effective domestic counterterrorism operations and to contribute to regional maritime security. Specifically, we have worked toward improving their surveillance, tracking, and interception capabilities, and provided tactical equipment that has been used in numerous operations against extremist organizations in the southern Philippines. Importantly, the provision of radars has been a catalyst for Philippine interest in acquiring secure targeting capabilities and communications methods, which will enable information sharing with U.S. Pacific Command on tracking activities in the tri-border area of the southern Philippines. The Government of the Philippines recognizes the importance of these investments and is now sustaining its newly acquired capabilities through national funds/Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs.

Finally, I would like to mention the impact of our assistance to Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, and Kenya in supporting their efforts in the African Mission in Somalia, or AMISOM. AMISOM is backed by the U.N. Security Council and the African Union and tasked to reduce the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups in order to establish conditions for effective governance country-wide. The specialized counterterrorism training and equipment support provided to AMISOM troop contributors through Sections 1206 and 1207(n) is part of a whole-of-government approach to supporting AMISOM, and complements the long-standing State Department train-and-equip efforts for AMISOM, including the work of the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. The training and equipment provided by the U.S. Government has enabled AMISOM, in concert with the security forces of the Somali Transitional Federal Government, to reclaim the capital city of Mogadishu and a number of towns previously held by the al-Qaida linked terrorist group al-Shabaab. AMISOM's success in pushing back al-Shabaab is an important trend. As Director of National Intelligence James Clapper and former CIA Director David Petraeus have testified before numerous committees this year, Somalia continues to pose a threat to the United States as a training ground and launching pad for individuals seeking to conduct violent attacks against innocent people around the world.

CONCLUSION

With constrained resources, thoughtful choices will need to be made regarding the location and frequency of our BPC activities. DoD's BPC activities do expose us to some risk. We face

risks from the time, money and effort which may not, in the end, yield security returns. We also face the risk that the partners we train and equip engage in egregious behavior which violates the laws, norms, and human rights of their fellow citizens. Further risks come from the danger in upsetting regional balances. It is important that we acknowledge and take seriously these risks in assessing if BPC is worth the investment. DoD works actively with our civilian agency colleagues to reduce these risks by designing program elements that emphasize the importance of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the need for legitimate civilian authority in countries where we conduct BPC activities. Before conducting any training program with a foreign security force, we coordinate with the Department of State to ensure that the prospective unit that will receive training has not committed a gross violation of human rights.

We must also recognize, though, that BPC can reduce our risk around the world by strengthening collective security, augmenting stability, and, when necessary, enabling military action. Our persistent engagement serves a key role in helping our foreign partners provide for their own security. These relationships can also foster respect for the rule of law, preventing future violations of rights and norms. This overall contribution to multilateral security is an investment that pays immediate and long-term dividends by reducing the need for costlier U.S. interventions in response to turmoil in regions critical to U.S. interests. These activities are a cost-effective way to strengthen our national security posture by building lasting relationships and alliances with partner nations. The Department's BPC activities are major elements of Geographic Combatant Commanders' plans to work with foreign militaries, and will be imperative for DoD into the foreseeable future.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and testify on the Department's efforts to build partner capacity. This concludes my statement.