Special Envoy for Strategic Stability and Missile Defense Ellen Tauscher and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs Madelyn Creedon On the Russian Ministry of Defense Conference on Missile Defense in Moscow

May 2, 2012

Mr.Ventrell: Thank you all for joining the call this afternoon. Thisis Patrick from the Press Office. Today, we have with us EllenTauscher, Special Envoy for Strategic Stability and Missile Defense, andMadelyn Creedon, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global StrategicAffairs, who are leading a U.S. delegation to participate at the Russian Ministry of Defense Conference on Missile Defense. As a reminder, thiscall is on-the-record, and before we go to your questions, we're goingto allow each of our speakers to make some brief opening remarks. Sowithout further ado, Ellen, over to you. 

Ms. Tauscher: Thank you, Patrick. Good evening, everyone. The UnitedStates welcomes the opportunity to participate in this Missile DefenseConference organized by the Russian Ministry of Defense. We appreciatethe chance to make our case in a broader forum. As you all areundoubtedly aware, and as we have stated many times, our view andanalysis is that the United States' missile defenses don't undermine Russians' strategic deterrent. And we have explained our position innumerous official and public channels, and we will once again presentthe technical facts at this conference. 

It is in our mutual interest to engage in cooperation and avoid confrontation. While the United States and Russia are cooperating on awide range of issues, from Afghanistan to counterterrorism to trade,cooperation on missile defense could be a game changer in theU.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia relations. Cooperation has the potential toenhance the national security of both the United States and Russia, aswell as build a genuine strategic partnership. It presents anopportunity to put aside the vestiges of the Cold War thinking, and moveaway from mutually assured destruction, toward mutually assuredstability. 

At the same time, the United States is committed to all four phases ofthe European Phased Adaptive Approach. We have been transparent with Russia about the timing, deployment, and scope of U.S. missile defense deployments. 

While we can work cooperatively together, we cannot agree topre-conditions outlined by the Russian Government. We cannot agree toany limitations on our missile defense deployments. And - we are ableto agree, however, to a political statement that our missile defenses are not directed at Russia. I have been saying this for many, manymonths now. Such a political statement would publicly proclaim ourintent to cooperate and chart the direction for cooperation, notlimitations. I hope my Russian colleagues recognize that we have no capability or intent to undermine strategic stability, that ourobjective is not about winning public relations points, and that ourcooperation is a much better approach than sticking to the previouspattern of competition. 

Madelyn.

Assistant Secretary Creedon: Thank you. I very much agree, and I alsowant to express our appreciation for Defense Minister Antonov'sinvitation for all of us to participate in this conference. We viewthis as an opportunity to exchange various viewpoints on missile defense, and also view it as an opportunity to hear the various views ofour colleagues from the approximately 50 countries that we understand have sent representatives to this meeting. 

We believe that this exchange will allow the United States, inparticular, to provide in a very public way the reasons that the missiledefenses that the United States is developing both for the protection ofthe homeland and also within the EPAA are simply not aimed at Russia. And we've listened to Russia's concerns. We continue to seek solutions that will address them, but we believe that the best way - we continueto believe that the best way is through cooperation and not confrontation. 

So we hope very much that this meeting tomorrow and on Friday willrevitalize the spirit of cooperation and that we hope that in the nearfuture, we will actually be able to enter into constructive, mutually beneficial cooperation on missile defense. 

Mr.Ventrell: Thank you. With that, Operator, we're ready to go aheadfor our first question. 

Operator: Thank you. At this time, we'll begin the question-and-answersession. To ask a question, you may press *1. To withdraw yourquestion you may press *2. And once again, to ask a question pleasepress *1. One moment for our first question. 

Our first question comes from Viola Gienger from Bloomberg News. Yourline is open. 

Question: Yes. Hello. Thank you very much for doing this call. Iwanted to ask about how many people in addition to the two of youleading the delegation would be in the U.S. delegation. And youmentioned that this is an opportunity to put the U.S. case forward in avery public way. Can you tell us a little bit about your thinking inattending a conference like this, where - when the U.S. and Russiaclearly are still staking out their own positions? And do you see anychange coming forward in the next few days? 

Ms Tauscher: This is Ellen Tauscher. There are approximately eightpeople on the delegation, and of course we're supplemented by the greatpeople here in our Embassy here in Moscow. I think the best way toanswer your question is that we are pursuing this cooperation because itwould be in the security interests of both the United States, NATO, andRussia to strengthen our capabilities. And we have made it very clearthat we believe that genuine cooperation would provide Russia withincreased transparency into our ballistic missile defense plans andcapabilities and would reassure Russia that our systems are not directedat them. 

Russia's cooperation the European missile defense system would result ina more capable system. We could combine our missile defense systems inareas where we have overlapping capabilities, like sensors, andcooperation would also signal that the United States and Russia agree ondangers posed by the proliferation of ballistic missile and nucleartechnology.

Question: But do you see any shift, any signs of any shift in therespective positions? Because they - as you've mentioned, you've beenmaking your case for many months, perhaps even years. And do you seeany signs that there may be a potential meeting of minds on at leastsome of the points? 

Ms. Tauscher: Well, as you know, President Obama and PresidentMedvedev, when they met in Seoul, agreed to have the technical expertsand officials continue talking about the opportunity for cooperation onmissile defense. And so this an opportunity for us to continue thoseconversations. 

As you know, the Russian Federation is inaugurating their new presidentnext week. We are in a political season ourselves. So it's importantthat as we make these transitions that we continue talking. There aremany different issues on the table, both technical and political, and wesee this conference as an opportunity to bring these issues more to thepublic forefront and to discuss it in a much more multilateral way thenwe have previously. We think that's very good news, and we'reinterested in continuing the dialogue. 

I wouldn't say that we're at a stalemate in any case. We know what theareas of concern and questions are. But because many of them aretechnical and some of them are political, it's important that wecontinue these technical and expert conversations moving toward theopportunity of cooperation in the future. 

Question: Did you say you would or would not say it's a stalemate? Anddo you think Putin's inauguration will - 

Ms. Tauscher: I would not say that we're in a stalemate. 

Question: And does Putin's inauguration make any difference? 

Ms. Tauscher: Does it make what? 

Question: Any difference in how this issue plays out between the U.S.and Russia? 

Ms. Tauscher: I mean, I think although a lot of these issues aretechnical, we cannot forget that we are in two political seasons. TheRussians are coming out of their political season, and we're in ours.And so it's important that we maintain the technical talks and thepolitical talks and work to answer some of these concerns and some ofthese questions. We've been clear about what our redlines are and theRussians have made clear what their concerns are. We are working, Ithink, in a very strong interagency way on both sides to begin to answerthose questions, but it's not - keep in mind, this has been a 30-yearirritant in the relationship. It's not going to be solved overnight,and it's important for us to take a methodical and a serious and soberchance to get these questions answered, and that's what we're doing.

Operator: Our next question comes from Jim Wolf with Reuters. Yourline is open. 

Question: Yes. Thank you very much for doing this. A couple of quickthings. First, I hear you saying that the U.S. will continue to seeksolutions that will address the Russian concerns. One solution thatI've heard mentioned I'd like to bounce off you for your reaction, andthat is the possibility that the U.S. might give up the idea of puttinginterceptor missiles in Poland in respect of some of Russia's mosturgent concerns about what they say they consider the threat tostrategic stability. Can you comment on that? And also, what about thefinancial - your participation of Europeans in the Phased AdaptiveApproach?

Assistant Secretary Creedon: This is Madelyn Creedon. The United States is and remains committed to implementing the missile defensesystem in all of its four phases, and I think we've made that very, veryclear. We've also made very clear that we will not accept anylimitations on either the number or the capabilities of these systems.So I hope that - I mean, we've said that, we've made it very clear, andwe hope it continues to be very clear. So no. There's no indicationthat we might give up the interceptors in Poland. We're not agreeing to any limitations on our systems. 

Operator: Our next question comes from Mike Mount with CNN. Your lineis open.

Question: Hi. Thanks for taking my call. I had a question on thetreaty, I guess, that Russia has offered - I guess, NATO and the U.S.designed - in terms of - that the missile defense system will not beused against any of the Russian systems. I know in the past you allhave said you won't sign a treaty like that. My question is why youwon't sign that. If the system won't be used against the Russians, whatis the problem with signing it? It kind of lacks transparency there bysending that message out.

Ms. Tauscher: First of all, there is no operating document or a treatybetween - that anyone has put down on the table. There certainly isn'tanything from the Russian side in the form of a treaty about the Phased Adaptive Approach. We have made very clear for a long time that we canmake political statements that, of course, this system is not targeted against Russia or a raid against Russia. It is - we've made very clearand the President made clear in his September 2009 announcement about the Phased Adaptive Approach that this is about a threat coming from the Middle East and that our concern is not only real and legitimate, but itis a concern that our NATO allies share, because in November 2010 in Lisbon, they changed the mission of NATO to include territorial missile defense and to accommodate the Phased Adaptive Approach. 

So first and foremost, there's nothing from the Russians that we haverejected. The Russians have consistently said that they wantedsomething that was legally binding. And what we have said is that webelieve that there are a number of political statements that have to bemade first and foremost. Secondly, that we can't do anything legally binding that would include limitations on the system and our ability toprotect ourselves, forward-deployed American troops, and NATO allies.

So there's nothing on the table. We haven't rejected anything. We areactually early in these talks. We've had extensive conversations abouta number of different things, but this is still a very early phase, andI think that what's important is that nothing has been rejected otherthan for our position, which we've made very clear from the beginning, that we cannot and will not make any legally binding agreement thatincludes limitations on our ability to protect ourselves.

Operator: Our next question comes from Michael Evans with The London Times. Your line is open.

Question: Hi. Thanks for doing this. Can you hear me? Yes. You canhear me hopefully. Can I ask - you mentioned that you would be preparedto make a political statement. What did you mean by that? Obviouslynot a treaty, but how would the political statement deal with theRussians' concerns?

Ms. Tauscher: Just as we've said, this system is not a system that canundercut their strategic deterrent. It has robust capabilities to holdat risk short, medium, and intermediate range missiles from the MiddleEast that could target either the United States homeland or our European allies in NATO. But it is not a system that could actually hold at riskthe Russian strategic deterrent. So it is a little apples and oranges,I guess you could say. 

But we've made that very clear. We have gone as far as having Russianscome and see what is publicly available, and we think that the case isvery significant, and the science is there. So that's what we continueto say. That's what we continue to assert, and the Russian concerns areconcerns that we're very willing to listen to, but at the same time,they cannot be concerns that we will mitigate by offering any kinds oflimitations on the system.

Operator: Our next question comes from Will England with The WashingtonPost. Your line is open.

Question: Hi. Thanks very much. Just to get back to the question ofpolitics and transitions, I just want to ask: Do you anticipate anyevolution of the Russian position under the new presidency of Mr. Putin?

Ms. Tauscher: Well, I don't have any hopes for anything other than thatwe continue these conversations and that the system and our offer forcooperation is met on its merits and that it is an opportunity to moveaway from a world of mutually assured destruction to a world of mutuallyassured stability in the sense that we both share common threats and that we both share an opportunity to work and leverage existing systemsthat we have in a way that improves them. 

At the same time, NATO would protect NATO and Russia would protectRussia, but at the same time there is an opportunity for us to work cooperatively, which we think tremendously changes the old-fashioned default position of the arms race, and moves it from competition tocooperation.

So we believe that that is an evolving part of the relationship. Wehope that the Russians see it the same way we do.

Operator: Our next question comes from Ivan Lebedev with TASS NewsAgency of Russia. Your line is open.

Question: Thank you. Do you hear me? I hope -- 

Ms. Tauscher: Yes.

Question: Thank you. Well, my question is about the upcoming NATOsummit in Chicago. It looks like the Russian delegation - Russia hasdecided not to take part in NATO-Russian Council meeting during the NATO summit in Chicago because of the disagreements on the ABM issues. So itlooks like you receive rather mixed signals from Russia. On one hand,the negotiations or technical talks are going on. On the other hand, Russia decided not to go to Chicago. So are you disappointed with this decision? What do you think about it? Thank you.

Assistant Secretary Creedon: Well, one of the issues, though, that weneed to understand here is that the United States - not only is theUnited States committed to implementing our system, but since 2012 is infact an election year in both countries - well, though yours is over,but your transition hasn't occurred - it's also an election year in theUnited States. So I think it's pretty clear that this is a year inwhich we're probably not going to achieve any sort of a breakthrough. But both President Obama and President Medvedev agreed, not withstanding this situation, that it was in the best interests for both our countriesfor our technical experts to continue to do the work of betterunderstanding our respective positions, to provide some space forcontinued discussions on missile defense cooperation in the future, andso that's what we're going to do. We'll spend the next nine to tenmonths trying to work through some of the technical aspects of what's avery complex proposal.

Operator: Our next question comes from Ellen Barry with The New YorkTimes. Your line is open.

Question: Hi. Ellen, you mentioned that this is not a stalemate, and Iguess I wonder: How will we know when it is a stalemate? Are theresort of guideposts that would tell us that? And how would a stalematechange the behavior of both parties to this? Would it have any effecton American plans going forward? And would you expect any specificsteps from the Russian side?

Ms. Tauscher: Well, a stalemate would not have resulted in the commentsout of Seoul by President Medvedev and President Obama to continue tohave their experts - technical experts and officials continue to talkabout this. So because we had that that tells me we do not have astalemate. And because we're here in great force, it tells me that thisis not a stalemate. And because we continue to have conversations - Icontinue to have conversations with my counterpart - the deputy foreignminister in the interagency, all the counterparts continue to haveconversations. 

So it's not a stalemate, and I think you will know that it's a stalematewhen people stop talking about it and when we have nothing to say andcertainly not when we're all here in Moscow at a conference talkingabout missile defense. So I think that - I think it's important to saythat these talks are fraught with history and with a lot of baggage onboth sides. But we have made our commitment to our NATO allies and wehave announced - the President has announced what the Phase Adapted Approach is, and I will tell you that there's nothing I can imagine thatwill stop us from making those deployments on time. We've already made the first, as you know. We have all of the agreements in place with Poland, Romania, and Turkey. So this is just about moving out on atimely basis and meeting the deadlines for the deployments because allthe other hard work has been done.

So I don't think that there's really anything that's going to changeanybody's mind about going forward with the Phase Adapted Approach as wehave outlined it.

Operator: Our next question comes from Mike Shuster with NationalPublic Radio. Your line is open.

Question: Hello. One of the concerns that Russian officials haveexpressed is not that the initial deployments of missile defenses inEurope by the Obama Administration would threaten their strategicdeterrent, but that in the long run the Russians fear that differentfuture administrations could easily expand that system to the pointwhere it could technically threaten the Russian deterrent. How - what arguments have you used to address that concern of the Russians.

Assistant Secretary Creedon: Well, right now, we've been very open andvery transparent that the EPAA is a four-phase system. We've been veryclear laying out what is part and parcel of each phase, and we've beenvery clear, I believe, in terms of when each phase will occur and as we- and when we will transition to the next phase. So I think we've beenpretty clear. So the opportunity for change is obviously always there,but this President has been very clear about what his plans are. Andthat's what the Department of Defense is working on, is implementing those four phases as well as the work in Alaska and in California todefend the homeland.

Operator: Our next question comes from Doug Guarino with the National Journal Group. Your line is open.

Question: Hi. Thank you. Just a clarification from Ellen's openingremarks. You said something to the effect of how this could - thisissue could create a game changer in terms of the relationship betweenthe U.S. and Russia and NATO-Russia. Was that meant to imply that ifRussia doesn't sort of come around and relax some of its demands, thatthe relationship would go south?

Ms. Tauscher: No. It's a game changer in a positive sense. Weobviously are also talking to the Russians about the contours of ourrelationship in general, the reset that has been successful, and movingforward past what had been a relationship characterized by many things,including an arms race. And we don't want to be in thatcharacterization any longer. We want to move from the world of mutuallyassured destruction to a world of mutually assured stability. 

And since the system that we are deploying in Europe to defend both ourEuropean allies and the United States against a Middle East threat isnot one that is oriented toward Russia, we feel very confident that itwould be a game changer. And cooperation on missile defense in Europebetween NATO, the United States, and Russia is a game changer. It's agame changer for European security, it's a game changer for therelationship writ large as far as how we cooperate, and it follows thereset, we think, in a very nice fashion. So this is not about - we'renot threatening anybody; we're not suggesting how things might not workout. We actually have a very positive point of view on this, and it'sabout the opportunity to change things in a positive way.

Operator: Our next question comes from John Liang with Inside Missile Defense. Your line is open. 

Question: Hi. My question is for Ms. Creedon. And you'll preface this with asking if you'd forgive me, because I came in a little bit late.So forgive me if this question has already been asked, but I have aquestion concerning the House Armed Services Committee last week, during its markup, noted that duties - Cost Assessment and Program Evaluationoffice was working on a comprehensive and detailed cost estimate for theEPAA and was supposed to have provided a briefing to lawmakers on itsinitial findings in March, and the committee noted that that briefinghad not yet been provided. What is the status of that CAPE study? Whatare your - if - do you know any of what the preliminary conclusions were? And when do you plan on briefing Congress on those conclusions? 

Assistant Secretary Creedon: The CAPE study is underway. It is looking at the cost of EPAA. But one of the things that it's - I think it'simportant to understand here is that the EPAA is an effort to bring toEurope and to the defense of Europe, in partnership with NATO, a varietyof different assets. So a very - and I'm sorry for - but I'll get a little bit into the weeds here. So very often, when CAPE does a cost estimate, it's a cost estimate of a program, like a specific program. And because the EPAA is not, in DOD parlance, a program, what CAPE isdoing is looking at the costs of each of the individual programs thatwill be utilized to build the EPAA.

So for instance, they're looking at the cost of the SM-3 IA. They'relooking at the cost of the SM-3 IB. They're looking at all of the costsof all the various increments that will be utilized not only in EPAA,but also in other Phased Adaptive approaches as we move towards otherareas of the world. So as a result, it sounds like it's a simple tasking, but it's not. It's actually far more complicated. So all ofthat aside, we're hoping that we will have all of this wrapped up fairlysoon. Sometime this summer is our - is the hope. 

Mr. Ventrell: To our speakers in Moscow, do you still have time for acouple of more questions?

Ms. Taushcer: Sure.

Mr. Ventrell: Okay. Operator, go ahead.

Operator: Our next question comes from Bill Gertz with National Security Journalists. Your line is open.

Question: Yes, hi. My question is about the draft agreement that wasprepared for the Deauville Summit. Apparently, it was never signed overconcerns that it contained legally binding restrictions. Could youaddress what happened with that draft agreement? And Republicans on theHill are calling for that document to be released. 

Ms. Tauscher: I think I know what you're talking about. 

Question: Also, if you could address what the President meant in hisopen mike conversation when he said he would have more flexibility onmissile defense after the reelection, would that mean providing suchlegally binding guarantees that the Russians want? 

Ms. Tauscher: On the last part of the question, as we said, the UnitedStates is committed to implementing our missile defense system, andwe've repeatedly said it's not aimed at Russia. And given thelongstanding difference between U.S. and Russia on this issue, it willtake time and technical work before we can reach an agreement. Andbecause 2012 is an election year in both countries, it is clearly not ayear in which we are going to achieve a breakthrough. Therefore,President Obama and President Medvedev agreed that it was best toinstruct our technical experts to do the work of better understandingour respective positions, providing space for continued discussions onmissile defense cooperation going forward. 

Operator: Our next question comes from Amy Butler with Aviation Week.Your line is open. 

Question: Hi. Thank you very much. Ms. Creedon, this question mightbe geared more toward you, but I'd love to hear both of your inputs onthis. I'm curious. Ms. Tauscher mentioned that there's nothing thatshe can imagine that would prevent the United States from implementingPAA. I am curious because the technical side is something that youcannot control, and the SM-3 IB has had a testing failure. There's alsoa financial crunch going on that could basically stem efforts to get aIIB out for the final phase. Can you talk to me a little bit about yourconfidence or concerns with regard to the technology maturation ingetting these increments out into the field?

Assistant Secretary Creedon: Well, with all these, it is a technicallycomplex system, and maturing the technologies is important. And a keyaspect of that, particularly with the various modifications anditerations of the SM-3, is that we do, in fact, test them, and that wetest them under operationally realistic circumstances because thisAdministration is committed to a fly before we buy approach, which isvery different from how we placed the initial GBIs up in Alaska. Sopart of the problem right now we have is also dealing with the residualissues of the GBIs in Alaska. So we're working on that. We're gettingthose fixed. And at the same time, we're developing the newcapabilities for the SM-3, and we will continue to test and test untilwe get it right. 

I mean, I should also add, I think, to your - although it was a littlebit garbled, but to your other comment that this is also obviously apartnership with our Congress. So our Congress also has to besupportive of this effort and make sure that the Department of Defenseactually has the money to continue this rational program oftest-develop, test-develop as we go forward. 

Operator: Our next question comes from Alexander Grigoryev of Voice ofAmerica Russia Service. Your line is open. 

Question: Hi. Thank you. Russia will - is - Deputy Defense MinisterAnatoly Antonov today said that he will present special committee frommotherland which show that threats, which missile defense to Russia. Doyou have counterarguments about that? Do you have any - did you haveany special research as how serious the threat toward Russia? Do you -can you argue about that? Thank you.

Assistant Secretary Creedon: Well, I'll start and the special envoy cancarry on here. But I think the first thing is, obviously, we haven'tseen the presentation and are looking forward very much to actuallyseeing the presentation. But in general, the United States has beenvery clear that the systems are not designed nor intended to negate inany way Russia's strategic defense. It's, in fact, very important to usthat we maintain strategic stability between the U.S. and Russia. 

Ms. Tauscher: I think it's important to remember that we have listenedto Russia's concerns and we have taken them seriously. We have beentransparent with Russia and have held close consultations with them overthe last several years. We have discussed how the European missilesystem is designed and configured to counter ballistic missile threatsfrom the Middle East. We have demonstrated through technicaldiscussions that the system is not directed at Russia and cannotintercept Russian ICBMs. And we believe the best way for Russia to beconvinced is to join us in missile defense cooperation. Russia can useits own eyes and ears to see for itself that our missile defenses cannotnegate or undermine its strategic deterrence. 

Mr. Ventrell: Thank you all. At this time, we have to end our call,but thank you all for joining and have a good afternoon.