NCO Roles & Responsibilities
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ROLL CALL
We honor the men and women who have sacrificed their lives in current operations around the world.

PUBLISHER - Sgt. Maj. of the Army Kenneth O. Preston **BOARD OF DIRECTORS** - Col. Donald E. Gentry, Commandant; Command Sgt. Maj. Raymond Chandler, CSM; Stephen L. Chase, Chief of Staff; Jesse W. McKinney, MA, Director, Personnel and Administration; **EDITOR-IN-CHIEF** - David B. Crozier DSN 978-9875 **GRAPHICS** - Sgt. Russel C. Schnaare ***The NCO Journal*** is a professional publication for Noncommissioned Officers of the U.S. Army. Views expressed herein are those of the authors. Views and contents do not necessarily reflect official Army or Department of Defense positions and do not change or supersede information in other official publications. Our mission is to provide a forum for the open exchange of ideas and information, to support training, education and development of the NCO Corps and to foster a closer bond among its members. The Secretary of the Army approved funds for printing this publication in accordance with provisions of AR 25-30. **Distribution:** *The Journal* is distributed through the U.S. Army Publishing Agency, Distribution Operations Facility, 1655 Woodson Road, Overland, MO 63114-6128 (Phone: (314) 263-7305 or DSN 693-7305). Units or offices with valid publications accounts can receive the *Journal* by having their publications office submit DA Form 12-99 for inclusion in the 12-series requirements (12-05 Block 0041). Submissions: Print and visual submissions of general interest to the NCO Corps are invited. Unsolicited submissions will not be returned. Photographs are U.S. government-furnished, unless otherwise credited. Prospective contributors are encouraged to contact the *Journal* to discuss requirements. Contacts: Our FAX number is DSN 621-8484 or (915) 744-8484. Or call, (915) 568-8975 or DSN 978-8975. Our e-mail is: ATSS-SJ-NCOJOURNAL@conus.army.mil Letters: Letters to the editor must be signed and include the writer's full name and rank, city and state (or city and country) and mailing address. Letters should be brief and are subject to editing. *The NCO Journal* (ISSN 1058-9058) is published quarterly by the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy, 11291 SGT E Churchill St., Fort Bliss, TX 79918-8002. Periodicals postage is paid at El Paso, Texas and at additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to *The NCO Journal* Commandant, USASMA ATTN: ATSS-SJ, Editor 11291 SGT E Churchill St. Fort Bliss, TX 79918-8002

From the SMA

Suicide: a preventable tragedy

Private First Class Morgan was a 19-year old, single male Soldier with two combat deployments to Iraq. There were times when he had difficulty learning new Soldier skills. Because of his slowness, he was often ridiculed by peers and leaders. Everyone believed Pfc. Morgan accepted this treatment as good-natured ribbing and constructive criticism.
In the days prior to his death, he gave away some personal belongings. His buddies saw this as a gesture of friendship. The day prior to his death he told a friend he had "had enough." This was interpreted as a simple frustration. Pfc. Morgan was found dead in his car by carbon monoxide poisoning. Can you list the warning signs?

Suicide prevention training is a commander's program. But the application of this program and the training is the responsibility of every leader and Soldier in the organization. The vignette above stresses the importance of our young NCO leadership and our first line supervisors to remain vigilant and look for the "warning signs" of suicidal ideation. We pass down from generation to generation the importance of NCOs taking responsibility for the care or welfare of their Soldiers both on and off duty, in a combat zone and back at home station. Competence is my watchword. My two basic responsibilities will be uppermost in my mind – accomplishment of my mission and the welfare of my Soldiers.[1] Our mentors taught us the most important aspect of welfare an NCO can give to his or her Soldiers, is training. Teaching from experience and motivating Soldiers to seek out and want to learn more about their profession is the bread and butter task of the Sergeant. It is through the teachings of a Sergeant that we as an institution can continue to grow Sergeants for the future. Taking care of Soldiers is part of our Army values.

We often use the expression, take care of your Soldiers, or care for your unit. What is the context of "care" as it applies to our Soldiers for a first line supervisor? You could put a group of 20 senior NCOs in a room and write 20 different definitions for the word care as it would apply to an individual Soldier. There are probably a thousand things you could do to "take care" of your Soldier, but to know what care the Soldier needs, is the key to success. As I have learned over my time as a Sergeant, you cannot fix what you do not know is broken. Caring for a Soldier begins with knowing your Soldier. "Knowing" generally begins with a solid understanding of the Soldier's background, his/her family situation, and career goals. I was very fortunate to have great NCO mentors as a young Sergeant. My mentors led by their own example in every facet of their life, both on and off duty. We were expected to emulate them in how they wore their uniform, how they participated in the tough work details as a working supervisor, how they tactfully carried themselves when addressing seniors or subordinates, and how they balanced their lives between work, family time, and recreation. We also emulated them in the knowledge they had of us, their piece of the Army, their team, squad, section or platoon. We bonded together as a team and when one squad or crew had to work late, the platoon sergeant was always there with us participating in those late night repairs to get a dead-lined vehicle restored to fully operational standard, or to ensure the squad returned safely from a late night border patrol and completed their debrief to the Squadron S2.

I recently spoke with Maj. Gen. Douglas Carver, our Army's Chief of Chaplains about our concern over the increased numbers of suicides across the Army. He said; "When an individual becomes weary and tired from life's normal struggles, they have a tendency to become less compassionate and less hopeful." I've used this quote in many NCO and Soldier forums to convey my concerns for our first line leaders as they shoulder the responsibility for their Soldiers, their Family and the missions of a busy Army. All of us have a squad leader, someone to look out for us to ensure we are "doing okay" from minute to minute, hour to hour and day to day in the dangerous and tough missions at hand, or in the fast paced and stressful world where we live our lives. An engaged and caring squad leader can tell how well we are doing by one look in our eyes, or by how we phrase our sentences that we simply need someone to listen to our problems. A good squad leader knows when to be compassionate or when to remind us that we are Soldiers and that it's time to take a deep breath and tighten the belt a notch, and get the mission done. An effective squad leader knows when the stresses of life have become too great for their Soldier's resilience and providing the necessary help is beyond their personal and professional experience. A compassionate squad leader understands and knows their Soldiers so well; they can literally feel the pain of their Soldier during times of acute stress and trauma within themselves. Although our

Soldiers have counselors, chaplains, friends, relatives and leaders to turn to for help, a squad leader is the "primary" individual the Soldier can trust and count-on to get help and advice, 24/7. A squad leader is always a leader and a role model first, but is also willing to serve as a big brother or sister to their Soldiers, and always places the interest and welfare of their Soldiers above their own. Squad leaders are the fundamental trainers in our profession. They are "life" educators to our Soldiers, always seeking to share their own experiences to make their piece of the Army better than it was before. Squad leaders counsel their Soldiers formally every month at a minimum, and informally all the time through casual conversations, personal example and individual conduct. A Soldier may not want to tell his commander he has a problem, but he might tell his squad leader.

Leaders at all levels must believe suicide is a preventable tragedy. The U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (USACHPPM) produced and distributed a suicide prevention training tip card (TA-074-0507) for all Soldiers. The card serves as a training aid for Soldier's and Leader's suicide prevention awareness briefings. I encourage everyone, especially first line supervisors at all levels of leadership to maintain a copy in their leader's notebook. The card begins by addressing the feelings associated with most suicides and suicide attempts. The card does a great job defining and helping a young leader understand the impact of depression and goes on to identify the warning signs and risk factors of suicide. The risk factors on the card are potential factors of stress in a person's life. Many of our Sergeants Major will remember these factors from completing a health assessment survey in years past, or most recently the Periodic Health Assessment administered by MEDCOM when they reported to USASMA at Fort Bliss to measure stress in their lives. TA-074-0507 defines these risk factors as; *Risk factors are those things that increase the probability that difficulties could result in serious adverse behavioral or physical health. The risk factors only raise the risk of an individual being suicidal; it does not mean they are suicidal.*[2] The risk factors are:

- ► Relationship problems (loss of girlfriend/boyfriend, divorce, etc.)
- ► Substance abuse (alcohol, prescription drugs, illegal drugs)
- ► Work related problems (negative counseling, harassment, etc.)
- ► Significant loss (death of loved one, financial or property loss due to natural disaster, etc.)
- ► Severe, prolonged, and/or perceived unmanageable stress (deployment to a combat zone, challenging assignment, etc.)
- ► Setbacks (academic, career, or personal)
- ► Transitions (retirement, PCS, discharge, etc.)
- ► Current/pending disciplinary or legal action.
- ► A serious medical problem.
- ► History of depression or other mental illness.
- ► Family history of suicide or violence.
- ► A sense of powerlessness, helplessness, and/or hopelessness.
- ► History of previous suicide attempts.

I rearranged the 13 categories from the card into the sequence above to reflect the most common everyday forms of stress in our lives at the top and the more uncommon stressors lower in the list. We can all identify a number of these stressors from this list in our own lives right now. As the card clearly outlines, this does not mean we are suicidal. With age and maturity we generally gain resilience to multiple stressors in life. All Soldiers respond differently to these stressors, especially when they "get stacked" on top of their fast-paced and somewhat stressful life. The alert and vigilant squad leader will know when the weight of these stressors reaches the point where a Soldier can no longer deal with the magnitude of their problems on their own, or their combined stressors begin to overwhelm mind and soul. That is when they need a strong and caring leader's shoulder to lean on. This is about taking care of our people, our Soldiers.

As part of the Army's directed suicide stand down day conducted between 15 February and 15 March 2009, Soldiers and leaders were given the opportunity to participate in two interactive scenarios. The Army directed a chain teaching program on suicide prevention during the period of 15 March to 15 June 2009. Both of these initiatives are opportunities to ensure what we were doing right in years past, we are still doing right today to take care of our Soldiers. As part of the stand down training and chain teaching programs, Soldiers and leaders will receive an "ACE" card. The ACE card is a training aid item, identified as GTA 12-01-003 May 2008. The three letters spelling ACE stand for "Ask," "Care," and "Escort."

- ► *Ask Your Buddy. Have the courage to ask the question, but stay calm. Ask the question directly, e.g., Are you thinking of killing yourself?*
- ► *Care for Your Buddy. Remove any means that could be used for self-injury. Calmly control the situation; do not use force. Actively listen to produce relief.*
- ► *Escort Your Buddy. Never leave your buddy alone. Escort to the chain of command, a Chaplain, a behavioral health professional, or a primary care provider.*[3]

We all hope the ACE Card is a reference we would never have to pull from our wallets and apply to a friend considering suicide as their only alternative action. Leaders who make the effort to learn and know everything about their Soldiers professionally and personally without being intrusive; leaders who know their Soldiers' strengths and weaknesses; leaders who recognize and understand the multiple stressors ongoing in their Soldiers' lives, can create and maintain a command climate within their organizations where everyone is part of a band of brothers and sisters.

Hooah!!

Kenneth O. Preston

1. NCO Creed, opening sentence of the second paragraph.

2. TA-074-0507, Suicide Prevention Training Tip Card, USACHPPM; http://chppm-www.apgea.army.mil/dhpw/readiness/suicide.aspx

3. GTA 12-01-003 May 2008, ACE Suicide Intervention Card, USACHPPM; http://chppm-www.apgea.army.mil/

Induction ceremony a rite of passage that symbolizes dedication to duty

By Sgt. Micah E. Clare
U.S. Army Europe

While not every day is easy for noncommissioned officers, the U.S. Army Europe NCOs honored at an induction ceremony here Feb. 27 seemed to agree that it was a great day to be a sergeant.

"I wasn't sure if I wanted to stay in the military, but after seeing this today, I'm know I can continue making an impact," said Sgt. Jessica Carter, a human resources information system management specialist with the USAREUR personnel division.

Carter was one of 18 USAREUR NCOs honored at the ceremony, which was designed to provide official recognition for the hard work required to earn the rank of sergeant, and induct the newly promoted in the Army's NCO Corps, said 7th Army Special Troops Battalion Command Sgt. Maj. Sal Katz.

Photo credit Sgt. Micah E. Clare

A group of U.S. Army Europe noncommissioned officers pledge their commitment to their duties as NCOs during a NCO induction ceremony at the Patrick Henry Village Pavilion in Heidelberg, Germany.

After the arrival of the official party and color guard at the Patrick Henry Village Pavilion here, unit leaders moved to the front of the audience and took turns lighting three candles, symbolic of valor and hardiness, purity and innocence, perseverance and justice.

Following the candle-lighting, NCOs from corporal to command sergeant major performed a skit, each stating their rank and job duties, and finishing with each participant echoing the words, "I am that NCO."

USAREUR Command Sgt. Maj. Ralph Beam then spoke to the inductees, challenging them to continue their hard work and dedication, maintain physical fitness, train their Soldiers to established standards, and believe in a higher purpose in all they do.

"The sergeant's stripes you're wearing now will probably be the hardest stripes you'll wear in your career," Beam said. "The NCO business has now become your business."

Each company first sergeant then read the names of their sponsored NCOs from a scroll. As the names were read, each NCO pledged to uphold the NCO charge, a vow of dedication to the duties of their new grade.

After sharing a few words of wisdom with the inductees, the first sergeants assembled to create a symbolic arch of sabers through which the inductees passed.

"It's a rite of passage into the [NCO] Corps when we cross through," said Carter. "We're no longer just Soldiers; now we're noncommissioned officers."

The new NCOs also spent some time in the days prior to the induction in practice sessions with senior NCOs, getting advice and direction for their new roles, said Sgt. Juan Carreon, a USAREUR human resources specialist.

"We were taught during our practice sessions that we need to mentor those who are coming after us," he said. "Becoming an NCO is very important for the lower enlisted, and events like this show them what they have to look forward to. It's important to recognize Soldiers for their hard work and dedication."

"It's really exciting that the more we do, the more we're appreciated," said Carter. "This brings new meaning to being an NCO. I want to excel in this path I'm on."

Army publishes first Reserve Retirement Guide

Army News Service – The Army has created a Retirement Guide just for Army Reserve Soldiers and their families.

The 26-page Army Reserve Non-regular Retirement Information Guide was written specifically to cover the unique circumstances of Reserve retirement.

The Guide is the result of a collaboration between the Army G-1 Retirement Services Division, part of the G-1's Human Resources Policy Directorate, and the Army Reserve Command.

"Publishing this Guide represents a big step forward in helping to ensure that Reserve Soldiers and their families receive the Army's full support before and after retirement," said John Radke, chief of Army G-1 Retirement Services. "My team now includes an Army Reserve liaison officer, Lt. Col. Robert Hagan, who is spearheading our initiative to support this vital population."

The Guide is in the process of being distributed through the Reserve. In the meantime, it's available online on both the Army G-1 Retirement Services homepage at *http://www.armyg1.army.mil/retire*, under the "What's New" tab and on the special Army Knowledge Online site for Army Retirees at *https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/559734*.

Army announces plan to reduce stop-loss

By Army Public Affairs

U.S. Army photo

The Army announced March 18 that Soldiers affected by "Stop-Loss" will begin receiving $500 per month soon, and the Total Army will gradually reduce the number of those affected by the program that involuntarily extends Soldiers beyond the end of their enlistment or retirement dates in units deploying to combat areas.

Under a comprehensive plan to reduce Stop-Loss, the Army Reserve will begin mobilizing units without Stop-Loss in August 2009, followed by the Army National Guard in September 2009. The Active Army will begin deploying units without Stop-Loss beginning in January 2010, according to Lt. Gen. Michael Rochelle, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.

"The Army has used Stop-Loss since 2001 to ensure that units that have trained together remain together in combat, and that they have the qualified and experienced troops necessary for the full spectrum of military operations," Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. George W. Casey, Jr. said.

"With conditions changing in Iraq, a gradual restoration of balance between deployments, and an increase in the size of the Army, we'll now be able to begin weaning ourselves off of Stop-Loss," Gen. Casey said.

There are approximately 13,000 stop-lossed Soldiers across all three Army components. In the Active Army, there are 7,307; 4,458 in the Army National Guard; and 1,452 in the Army Reserve.

"Stop-Loss is a legal tool that has allowed the Army to sustain a force that has trained together as a cohesive element. Losses caused by separation, retirement, and reassignments can adversely affect training, cohesion, readiness, and stability in deploying units. Limiting the use of Stop-Loss balances the need for unit effectiveness against the impact on individual Soldiers and their Families," Gen. Casey said.

Before 2001, the Army used Stop-Loss in 1990-91 during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm. At that time, Executive Order 12728, dated August 22, 1990, gave Stop Loss authority to the Secretary of Defense to suspend any provision of law relating to retirement or separation applicable to any member of the armed forces determined to be essential to the national security of the United States. This authority remains in effect.

Drill Sergeant Handbook now available



The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) announces Handbook 09-12, Drill Sergeant Handbook. CALL partnered with the Basic Combat Training Center of Excellence and Fort Jackson to develop the handbook, which helps drill sergeants prepare, train, fight and win the Global War on Terrorism. Through "street smart" advice from more experienced current and former drill sergeants who also want you to succeed, the Drill Sergeant Handbook shows you how to become a better leader, handle the many pressures of your position, and overcome numerous training obstacles. The book is available for download in PDF format at *https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/14653729.*



Available for download in PDF at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/07-30/07-30.pdf

New logo identifies equipment, clothing as ‘Army certified’

By Kathi Ghannam

Photo by Staff Sgt. Michael J. Carden

The Army Team Soldier Certification logo will help Soldiers identify off-the-shelf items that have been Army-tested and approved by Program Executive Office Soldier. The logo will either be incorporated into a tag or branded directly on equipment

Program Executive Office Soldier has developed a “certification process” to help Soldiers identify off-the-shelf clothing and equipment that meet the Army’s highest standards for safety, performance and durability.

PEO-Soldier, the agency responsible for developing, acquiring and fielding Army equipment, recognizes there is no one-solution fit that is universal to all Soldiers, so many look to the commercial market to augment Army-issued gear.

However, not all off-the-shelf equipment and clothing labeled “mil-spec” has been actually certified for military use. Under the PEO-Soldier Certification Program, Approved Product Lists, or APLs, have been developed and are being adapted to incorporate various types of equipment as requirements are identified.

Items presently on the APLs include eyewear, combat gloves and the family of flashlights.

“The Army will always prioritize the internal design, creation, testing and fielding of the best Army issue equipment available,” said Lt. Col. Michael Sloane, PEO-Soldier product manager for clothing and individual equipment. However, Sloane acknowledged there are suitable and reasonable alternatives outside the Army.

Through responses to solicitations, manufacturers who are interested in receiving PEO-Soldier certification are asked to submit their products to the Army for testing to determine suitability and possible inclusion in the APLs.

APL authorizations and enhancements are driven by rigid standardized testing and user input, officials said. Once certification is obtained, approved products are branded with the Army Team Soldier Certification logo. The logo also appears on issue items to help ensure Soldiers aren’t misled into purchasing knock-off items. The logo will either be incorporated into a tag or branded directly on equipment.

“I think this is an excellent tool for Soldiers and leaders,” said Sgt. 1st Class William Corp, equipment modernization NCO for the product manager office. “It helps Soldiers make the best decisions possible when purchasing personal equipment.”

Although the PEO-Soldier Certification Program is primarily aimed at providing assurance to Soldiers who buy gear from authorized vendors, some vendors may also be licensed to sell some of the same gear in general commercial markets. In these cases, the licenses will be royalty-bearing, with net royalty proceeds benefiting the Army’s morale, welfare and recreation programs.

Editor’s note: Kathi Ghannam serves as public affairs advisor for PEO-Soldier Project Manager Soldier Equipment.

Year of the NCO Suggested Reading

Stephen E. Ambrose, **Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from Normandy to Hitler’s Eagle’s Nest.** New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992. (335 pages)

Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway, **We Were Soldiers Once and Young.** New York: Random House. 1992. (412 pages)

Ernest F. Fisher, Jr., **Guardians of the Republic: A History of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps of the US Army.** Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001 (475 pages)

S.L.A. Marshall, **Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War.** Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000. (224 pages)

Roy Benavidez, **The Three Wars of Roy Benavidez.** San Antonio, TX: Corona Publishing Company, 1986. (293 pages)

Army receives first six NEVs

By C. Todd Lopez
Army News Service

The Army accepted it's first six "neighborhood electric vehicles" during a ceremony Jan. 12 at Fort Myer, Va.

Delivery of the six tiny battery-powered NEVs, each about the size of a golf cart, represents the beginning of a leasing action by the Army to obtain more than 4,000 of the vehicles.

Secretary of the Army Pete Geren said the service will receive a total of 800 NEVs in 2009, and an additional 1,600 of the vehicles in both 2010 and 2011. The vehicles will help the Army save money in both vehicle purchase and in fuel savings, he said. Though there will be a small cost associated with installing infrastructure to charge the vehicles – about $800,000 total – that cost will be eclipsed by the savings, he said.

"It will be offset multiple times by the reduction and consumption of 11.5 million gallons of gasoline over the six-year life of these vehicles," Geren said. "And this acquisition of 4,000 NEVs will allow the Army to meet 42 percent of the 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act requirement for a two percent annual petroleum consumption reduction through 2015."

The Army's acquisition of the NEVs constitutes not just the largest acquisition of electric vehicles for the military, but also the largest acquisition of electric vehicles in the United States, Geren said.

"The Army is committed to substantially reducing the greenhouse gas emissions through our acquisition of Neighborhood Electric Vehicles," Geren said. "This historic acquisition will constitute the largest acquisition of electric vehicles not just in the military, but in the entire country."

The acquisition of the NEVs also helps the Army "go green" by preventing the release of some 218.5 million pounds of carbon dioxide into the environment, the secretary said.

The initial contract for 4,000 leased NEVs will cost less than the gasoline-powered vehicles they replace – $3,300 less than a gasoline powered sedan, for instance, and $13,000 less than a hybrid vehicle, Geren said.

For now, the Army plans to lease as many as 4,000 of the NEVs through the General Service Administration. The GSA has placed an announcement on its Web site, FedBizOps.Gov, to solicit additional manufacturers for the vehicles.

Photo credit C. Todd Lopez

The first six "neighborhood electric vehicles" were delivered to the Army Jan. 12 during a ceremony at Fort Myer, Va. The use of NEVs by the Army is part of its comprehensive and far-reaching energy security initiative to ease its dependence on fossil fuels.

The NEVs will be used to replace non-tactical vehicles only, Geren said.

"The Army operates almost 68,000 non-tactical vehicles," he said. "Approximately 28,000 of those are sedans or light trucks -- these vehicles are good candidates for replacement by additional or other varieties of electric vehicles."

The first of the NEVs have been manufactured by the Global Electric Motorcars division of the Chrysler Corporation. The vehicles come in several variants, including passenger vehicles and cargo-carrying vehicles – the largest of which carries a payload up to 1,450 pounds.

The NEVs are street-legal in nearly all 50 states on roads with speed limits of 35 mph or less. The cars can travel approximately 30 miles on one eight-hour charge, and according to a GEM press release, the comparative per mile fuel cost is about two cents.

"We're going to save a lot of energy with these," said Lt. Col. Cameron A. Leiker, garrison headquarters command, battalion commander at Fort Myer. "I can imagine seeing these with boxes on the back for guys that do repair work on post. You know there's a lot of places you can go with 30 miles on a post like this."

Year of the NCO Stories

Got a great NCO Story, we want to see it and help you spread the word. Need a topic, or an idea to get you started? Visit the Year of the NCO Web site at *http://www4.army.mil/yearofthenco/home.php* and click on the **"initiatives"** tab. There you will find a host of information about your year. Send your story to: NCO Journal Magazine, USASMA, 11291 SGT E Churchill St., Fort Bliss, TX 79918-8002. If submitting photographs, please identify all individuals in the picture. We reserve the right to edit your story based on length, content and grammar.

2009 - The Ye

Illustration by Larry Selman

June 6, 1944, Normandy, France, 7:20 a.m. . . . Soaked, bloodied, and exhausted, Army Rangers breach the German defenses at Pointe-du-Hoc in search of five 155mm cannons that threaten the invasion beaches. As elements of Companies D, E, F, and HQ storm the heights, 1st Sgt. Leonard Lomell returns fire while Pfc. Leonard Rubin snags Pfc. Robert Fruhling at the cliff face. Lomell would later find and disable the cannons, earning the DSC. After two days of vicious combat, only 50 of the 225 Rangers who landed at Pointe-du-Hoc remained able to fight.

ear of the NCO

- The Role of the NCO
- The Chevron - A Short History
- Ethical challenges in Stability Operations
- NCO Stories

The Year of the NCO

By David Crozier

NCO Roles, Responsibili

When Inspector General Friedrich von Steuben sat down and wrote up his *Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States* in 1778, he envisioned an NCO Corps capable of leading soldiers in the field. Looking at the highest levels of leadership in the corps, the sergeant major, von Steuben wrote, "The sergeant major, being head of the non-commissioned officers, must pay the greatest attention to their conduct and behavior, never conniving at the least irregularity committed by them or the soldiers, from both whom he must exact the most implicit obedience. He should be well acquainted with all the interior management and discipline of the regiment, and the manner of keeping rosters and forming details."

In looking at the lowest level in the Corps, the sergeant, von Steuben wrote, "It being on the non-commissioned officers that the discipline and order of the company in a great measure depend, they cannot be too circumspect in their behavior towards the men, by treating them with mildness, and at the same time obliging everyone to do his duty."

Published the following year, von Steuben's regulation, commonly referred to as the "Blue Book," set the standard for the next 30 years and established the duties and responsibilities for an NCO corps that was destined to become the "Backbone of the Army."

While Army regulations have gone through many changes since then, the basic tenants of von Steuben's regulation have remained and established the centerpiece of the roles and responsibilities for today's NCO Corps. Two individuals have witnessed and helped transform the roles and responsibilities of the Corps – the first Sgt. Maj. Of the Army, William O. Wooldridge, and the 13th Sgt. Maj. of the Army, Kenneth O. Preston.

From the day he entered service in 1940 until he left office as the Sergeant Major of the Army in 1968, Wooldridge understood the importance of a good NCO and made it his mission to see to it that NCOs were given the proper authority to not only carry out their basic mission, but to also make decisions based on the commander's intent.

The following is an excerpt of a letter written by Wooldridge in November 2002 that outlines his role in shaping the proper utilization of NCOs and is currently, along with several other documents on this subject, on file at the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy Learning Resource Center, Ft. Bliss, Texas:

From the time that I entered the United States Army, on 11 November 1940, I was keenly aware of the important role and great responsibility of the noncommissioned officers. My first unit was Company F, 23d Regiment of Infantry (Dec. 1940 – Nov. 1941). In those days basic training was done by the unit to which you were assigned. Our basic training was two weeks at Dodd Field, Texas with a corporal from the 23rd Regiment. He taught us the very basics of how to salute, how to do the manual of arms, how to march, and very basic squad and platoon infantry tactics. We were then sent on to the company for an additional two weeks training, conducted out in back of the company headquarters, by the same corporal. There we got into more advanced things such as the function and tactics of a rifle company, instructions on the 60mm mortar; 37mm anti-tank gun, 30 caliber machine gun, etc. After that



ties: Yesterday & Today

we were put into a regular platoon in the company …

The NCOs in Company F were true professionals; the company first sergeant, my platoon sergeant, and my platoon guide. As I recall, there were no written guidelines for NCOs other than the War Department FM 21-100 Basic Field Manual, Soldier's Handbook. These guidelines were limited to the soldier's relationship with noncommissioned officers but they were unequivocal. Training was conducted entirely by the noncommissioned officers of the unit, many times at the sand tables in the company attic, squads on line, two up, one back, and on tactical walks with my platoon sergeant. My platoon sergeant, a three-striper named Hull, was a World War I veteran and Distinguished Service Cross winner who served as a private with the same 23rd Regiment and had come up from the line ... I did not again, in the U.S. Army, serve under NCOs so qualified and disciplined, both physically and mentally. They were just beautifully trained and dedicated men.

Then in December 1941 I was placed on detached service with the British Army then guarding Iceland. I saw then my complete ideal of a professional noncommissioned officer in the presence of the Regimental Sergeant Major. He was impressive. Unlike his U. S. Army counterparts, the British RSM literally ran the regiment, he and his company sergeants major were involved in everything the unit did, they participated in training, and could do anything the troops could do, and usually better. In addition there was the prestige which accompanied the position with the ceremony and tradition, including a RSM mess for the exclusive use of he and his senior NCOs.

It was from these two experiences that I envisioned what a Noncommissioned Officer

Sergeants Major of the Army Kenneth O. Preston and William O. Wooldridge in 2005 at Fort Bliss, Texas.
Original photo by David Crozier

Base of the Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) ranks, a CPL serves as team leader of the smallest Army units. Like SGTs, they are responsible for individual training, personal appearance and cleanliness of Soldiers.

Typically commands a squad of nine to 10 Soldiers. Because SGTs oversee their Soldiers in their daily tasks, they are considered to have the greatest impact on the Soldier - SGTs set the example and the standard for Privates.

Also commands a squad of nine to 10 Soldiers. Often have one or more SGTs under their leadership. Responsible for developing, maintaining and utilizing the full range of his Soldiers' potential.

Key assistant and adviser to the platoon leader. Generally has 15 years to 18 years of Army experience and puts it to use by making quick, accurate decisions in the best interests of the Soldiers and the country.

should be and I held that as a standard for myself and all Noncommissioned Officers. When I became a platoon sergeant and then a first sergeant I emulated the behavior which I had earlier experienced and began to articulate my expectations of noncommissioned officers to those about me, both officers and enlisted.

I got my first opportunity to be the ultimate sergeant major when I became Sergeant Major of the 2nd Battle Group, 28th Infantry. With the full support of my commander and working with my NCOs, we built one of the top infantry units in Army Europe … During a visit to my unit, I had the opportunity to host General Bruce E. Clarke … At that lunch I talked to General Clarke about my views regarding the proper recognition and utilization of noncommissioned officers. After that meeting General Clarke wrote to his field commanders and outlined some of the things that we had talked about. My commander forwarded the letter to me. I followed that up by suggesting that our unit establish a "poop" sheet formalizing the guidelines … In my opinion, this was the beginning of today's more formal guideline for the proper recognition and utilization of the NCO.

As noted in Wooldridge's letter, Clarke sent out a memorandum to his commanders that outlined his "List of Suggested Actions to Enhance the Prestige of the Noncommissioned Officer" which noted that officers should: prevent NCOs from being used for menial or degrading tasks; address NCOs by their ranks; adhere to the chain of command through the NCO ranks; reduce the requirement for officer supervision or mandatory presence at troop formations – Let the noncommissioned officers take charge; when appropriate, permit key NCOs to attend staff conferences and commanders' briefings; ensure deserving NCOs are commended for outstanding service with awarding of ribbons, certificates, commendations; refrain from over supervising NCOs after a task has been given; as well as a host of other suggestions.

In June 1963, Wooldridge wrote a memorandum to the Commanding General of the 24th Infantry Division outlining his thoughts on the Duties and Responsibilities of Unit Sergeants Major. In turn, Maj. Gen. William A. Cunningham, then commander of 24th Infantry Division, took Wooldridge's recommendations to the next level by writing a memorandum to all of his major command units outlining his personal views as to how unit sergeants majors should be utilized. In September of that same year, Cunningham wrote another memorandum, this time outlining his views on the proper utilization of NCOs in general.

Wooldridge, when he became the Sergeant Major of the Army in 1966, then turned his attention on trying to establish an education system for NCOs, something all of his successors, including Preston, are the recipient of.

"Now the only thing we were lacking back then, was a schooling system. So we never had the advantage of schooling. One unit would be much better than the other because it had stronger leadership in the NCOs. So that unit would stand out in the regiment because of it. We weren't equal across the board with leadership, it wasn't distributed at all. It was just focused on what you did for yourself in your unit – no schooling," he said. "I am reminded that when I made the recommendation to the chief of staff of the Army in November 1966, that we needed a noncommissioned officer school system; when he ran that through the staff they all said "no," it wasn't needed. The vice chief of staff signed off on it, and he said, and I will never forget it, 'They learn everything they need to know down at the unit. They don't need a school system.'"

Wooldridge said it was a hard fight to get a system going, but as everyone knows the Army gradually got a first class school system.

"So when I hear and listen to what SMA Preston has to say; I am reminded that he benefitted greatly because he has come from a school system. And I think the difference in my NCOs from my time to today's NCOs, is the school system," Wooldridge said. "It was very much different back [in my time] because the education level was so much different. The average education level in my first rifle company was eighth, ninth, tenth grade. Many, many of them had no higher than a third grade education level. It was rare back then to find an enlisted Soldier who had a high school education. Now that has changed greatly. You [can't] come into the military unless you have a high school diploma or equivalent and that has made a great deal of difference on how we have expanded and how we use Soldiers. They can do just about anything today with very little supervision."

Preston agreed.

"Over the years I have gained a deep appreciation for education and hands down it is education that really sets the foundation for the soldiers that serve in an Army," said Preston. "And although we are very critical of our own society and number of kids that are dropping out of school, we have set some high standards for education and test scores; their aptitude; that really sets the foundation for learning and development [in today's Army]."

Much like Wooldridge, Preston said his first NCOs were very instrumental in shaping his actions for the past 33-plus years.

"As I look back over my career there are lots of NCOs who have influenced my career along the way. You go all the way back to day one when I came in the Army and I was very fortunate; 1975 was a very tough time for the Army. The unit and

the organization I was assigned to was an elite unit; it had a lot of NCOs that were hand selected to serve in the unit," Preston said. "So I was very fortunate from day one with first impressions of what an NCO should Be, Know, and Do."

Preston remembers a time when the Army and the Corps were struggling with defining, educating and developing NCOs to Be, Know and Do all the things that the Army has grown to be. Looking back over the past 3 ½ decades he said the Army has come a long way in not only teaching duties and responsibilities, but also growing the breadth of those duties and responsibilities across all organizations.

"That is especially critical today when you look at how our units and organizations, the missions they have right now with the Global War on Terrorism, are organized. The Army that I came in to, whenever there was a mission out there to be executed, you would have a platoon leader and a platoon sergeant with their 30-man platoon and it would be a collective mission. They would be out there with the entire platoon executing that mission together," he said. "Today, when you look at a platoon that is in theater doing combat operations you may have five or six missions going on simultaneously within that one platoon. Now you have got sergeants and staff sergeants out there executing missions independently on their own; making decisions. They have the critical thinking skills and are making decisions that potentially have strategic level impacts not only on the Army and the mission, but on the entire operation that is ongoing. We have come a long way from duties and responsibilities to expanding the capabilities of our noncommissioned officers."

Asked what he believed was the epitome of an NCO role, Wooldridge replied, "small unit leadership."

"I think the NCO is vital at those levels and I think it is the most important thing for noncommissioned officers that we have today," he said. "I am talking about squads and platoons. I think our most valued NCO, the one that does the most for the Army, is that group down there; the E5 and E6s primarily."

For Preston, it is more on the mentoring and growing the corps.

"I tell leaders out there as I travel around the Army the most important thing we can do today as a leader, the most important mission for a sergeant is to take their two or three Soldiers and train them to be like themselves," he said. "To help them grow, mature and be the subject matter expert that they are so as they themselves move on and get promoted or they leave the unit or the service, the next generation of NCOs are ready to step up and take their place."

The things that are the same, Preston explained, are the basic fundamental duties and responsibilities of NCOs – going all the way back to von Stueben – when you look at what was originally outlined in the "Blue Book" as the basic responsibilities, it was fundamental things about the welfare of the Soldier, accomplishment of the mission, ensuring Soldiers were prepared for an operation or mission, it was conducting inspections – it was doing the routine daily kinds of business.

"Over the years we have continued to grow that and develop it, and we have taken on additional duties and responsibilities every day," he said. "And as I look back on my career, each generation of NCO year after year, progressively has become far more competent and far more capable than we have ever had before. And we have had 233 years of learning to get to the point where we are today to build the Army and the Corps that we have today. Many other armies out there today are just starting. There are many out there that look at the U.S. Army as being the epitome of what an Army is and they see the NCO Corps as the backbone of the Army also, they see the roles and responsibilities that our NCOs are taking on along with the trust and confidence that officers have in their NCOs to go out there and act independently on their own and make those right decisions, strategic level decisions, or make decisions that potential have strategic level implications and not have to be there to over watch them."

What is the future role and responsibility of the NCO?

"I don't see drastic changes," Preston said. "What I see for the future and it is really the world environment and how potentially we are going to be used as an Army. If you look at the fight that we are in right now in the global war on terror you have got organizations and units out there that in the morning are doing full up combat operations and then that afternoon you could be doing peacekeeping and humanitarian relief. And in between all that you have Soldiers engaged with the indigenous armies. So what we are asking now of the Army; those types of operations were many times thought to be Special Forces types of operations, but now we have all Soldiers out there doing those kinds of operations. When we get them back to garrison, what do we want our leaders and NCOs to be doing?

"The mission of a sergeant is to train his Soldiers. When a unit gets back from a deployment the priority is to help their Soldiers reintegrate back with their families and into society. That is the first mission when you come back from a major deployment. The second priority is once you get the Soldiers and families reintegrated, or the single soldiers reintegrated back into their families or communities, the next thing to do is to start building the team. And the inherent responsibility in all leaders is to build the team. You start over again preparing that organization for those missions that you have to face in the future."

Principal NCO at the battalion level and often higher. Not charged with all the leadership responsibilities of a 1SG, but expected to dispatch leadership and other duties with the same professionalism.

Principal NCO and life blood of the company. Provider, disciplinarian and wise counselor. Instructs other SGTs, advises the Commander and helps train all enlisted Soldiers. Assists Officers at the company level - 62 to 190 Soldiers.

SGMs' experience and abilities are equal to that of the CSM, but the sphere of influence regarding leadership is generally limited to those directly under his charge. Assists Officers at the battalion level - 300 to 1,000 Soldiers.

Functioning without supervision, a CSM's counsel is expected to be calm, settled and accurate with unflagging enthusiasm. Supplies recommendations to the Commander and staff, and carries out policies and standards on the performance, training, appearance and conduct of enlisted personnel. Assists Officers at the brigade level - 3,000 to 5,000 Soldiers.

The NCO Insignia: A

By L.R. ARMS
NCO Museum Curator

In the center courtyard of the US Army Sergeants Major Academy, two chevrons point proudly upward. They are a fitting symbol for Academy students and staff to view at this institution which epitomizes the ascendancy of the role of the noncommissioned officer in more than 200 years of Army history. The chevron, more than any other symbol, represents the growth of the noncommissioned officer leadership role.

1st Sgt - Circa 1948

From the earliest stages of the American Revolution to present, the Army has seen the need to differentiate noncommissioned officers from other enlisted men. Much of this need arises from the desire to enhance or clarify the role of the NCO. Noncommissioned Officers were responsible for the order and discipline of the troops. Early NCOs of the American Revolution carried only a halberd or sword to signify their rank. Some NCOs began to wear epaulettes on their uniforms to signify corporals and sergeants. Sergeants wore a red epaulette on the right shoulder, and corporals wore a green epaulette.

Photo by Dav

In 1779, Inspector General Von Steuben's *Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States* standardized the NCO ranks. The ranks consisted of sergeant major, quartermaster sergeant, first sergeant, and sergeant—each of whom wore an epaulette on both shoulders. Corporals wore a single epaulette on the right shoulder. These epaulettes were color-coded: white for the infantry and dragoons; yellow for the artillery and engineers. No additional device differentiated the ranks of sergeant major, quartermaster sergeant, or first sergeant from other sergeants.

In 1812, new regulations changed the devices used to show the rank and prestige of senior NCOs. Both the sergeant major and the quartermaster sergeant carried only swords, not muskets or bayonets carried by other soldiers. In addition, sergeants and above wore red sashes around the waist.

In 1821, the Army introduced chevrons as an insignia for soldiers. Copying both the French and British armies, the US Army adopted the wearing of wings or "V"-shaped chevrons point up. Both company grade officers and NCOs wore chevrons. Sergeants major and quartermaster sergeants wore a single chevron of worsted braid above each elbow. Sergeants and senior musicians wore the same insignia below the elbow. Corporals wore a single chevron on the right, above the elbow.

In 1825, an arch was added to the bottom of the sergeant major and quartermaster sergeant chevron. This mirrored changes of company officer insignia. The insignia for a sergeant consisted of a chevron above each elbow. The corporal wore a chevron below each elbow.

A brief history

In 1832, chevrons were suspended; red sashes and epaulettes returned, and an attempt to make clear distinction between each rank existed. There were two exceptions to this: the ranks of sergeant major and quartermaster sergeant, each of which wore a red sash, two epaulettes, and aiguillette, and four buttons on each sleeve. The first sergeant's insignia consisted of a red sash and three buttons on his sleeve. The sergeant's insignia did not include the red sash but did include the three buttons. The corporal had only two buttons on his sleeve. In addition, all sergeants and above wore a 1 ½ inch branch-colored strip on the seam of their trousers, while the corporal had a ½ inch branch-colored strip.

The western frontier increased the leadership role of the NCO. First sergeants were required to hold up to five roll calls per day. Sergeants and corporals often led the soldiers sent out from frontier forts. The NCO became the key leader in training, maintaining, and sustaining the soldier.

In 1833, the Army regulations for the newly formed dragoons or mounted riflemen adopted the regulations of 1832. There was, however, one major change: chevrons were added to the 1832 system, with three stripes for sergeants and above and two stripes for corporals. All chevrons were worn point down.

The sword for the NCO Corps was standardized in 1840. Some branches introduced their own NCO swords at later periods, but the Model 1840 NCO Sword became the standard for the NCO Corps for the next 70 years. The sword was based on a sword used by the French Army. It can be described as somewhat heavy-hilted and ill-balanced. After the early 1900s, its use was primarily for ceremonial occasions.

In 1847, during the Mexican-American War, the Army adopted a new chevron system for the fatigue uniform. With this system came the differentiation of each rank. The sergeant major wore three stripes and three arcs. The quartermaster sergeant, three stripes with three bars. The first sergeant wore three stripes with a lozenge or diamond below his stripes. The sergeant wore three stripes and the corporal two to show their rank. All branches wore their chevrons point-up, except the mounted riflemen and dragoons.

Number of NCOs in 1849

Branch	Regiments	SGM	QSGM	1SG	SGT	CPL
Dragoons	2 Regiments	2	2	20	80	80
Mounted Rifleman	1 Regiment	1	1	10	40	40
Artillery	4 Regiments	4	4	48	192	192
Infantry	8 Regiments	8	8	80	320	320
Engineers	1 Company	0	0	1	10	10
Totals	**15 Regiments/1 Company**	**15**	**15**	**159**	**642**	**642**

The chart (pictured above) depicts the number of NCOs wearing chevrons in 1849.

Ordnance sergeants, chief and principal musicians, and chief trumpeters were considered NCOs, but they had no distinguishing chevrons.

In 1851, several changes were made to NCO chevrons. The first major change consisted of turning the chevron from point up to point down. Infantry chevrons changed from white to light blue. The ordnance sergeant received a light maroon chevron consisting of three stripes with a star. Specialist chevrons were created for the hospital stewards and pioneers.

During the Civil War, many volunteer units adopted a chevron for the company quartermaster sergeant. This chevron, a single bar over the sergeant's chevron, became regulation from 1866 to 1870.

Photo By David Crozier
A War of 1812 Sergeant. Notice the red sash around the waist.

Photo By David Crozier

The uniform of a World War II Master Sergeant.

After the Civil War, the rise of technology caused the development of new branches and new NCOs in the Army. The primary use of the chevron to this point had been to distinguish the leadership role of the NCO in relation to other soldiers. There were a few exceptions: for example, the ordnance sergeant or the hospital steward, where the chevron represented the specific duties of a soldier, however, these were limited. During the period from 1872 to 1907, the development of ranks for specific duties became commonplace. The saddler sergeant, commissary sergeant, post quartermaster sergeant, and chief trumpeter were added prior to the Spanish-American War. After the War the ranks of electrician sergeant, first class sergeant (Signal Corps), color sergeant, battalion quartermaster sergeant (Engineer Corps), company quartermaster sergeant, battery stable sergeant, and acting hospital steward were added. To further complicate matters, a number of sergeant major ranks existed. These ranks consisted of sergeant major (regimental), sergeant major senior grade (Artillery Corps), squadron and battalion sergeant major, and sergeant major junior grade.

In 1902, a major change was made to the chevron. The long-standing wearing of chevrons in the "V" gave way to the inverted "V," largely because the chevron was reduced in size. The reduction in the size of the chevron resulted from the fact that four inches of material cost less than ten inches of material. In addition, a small chevron did not make as easy a target like the larger chevron in an age where weaponry became very accurate.

Overtime, the system began to spiral out of control with added emphasis on the technical role over the leadership role of NCOs. By 1907, there were fifty-seven different titles for enlisted men. Those men lucky enough to be a Master Signal Electrician or a Master Electrician in Coast Artillery received between $75 and $84 per month. On the other hand, a Battalion Sergeant Major of the Infantry, which commonly took twenty years of service to accomplish, received between $25 and $34 per month in pay. While a Sergeant in the Signal Corps, which the common Signal Corpsman could expect to accomplish in five years, received between $34 and $43 per month in pay. Therefore it was not uncommon for a soldier with five years of service to receive more pay than the soldier who had already served twenty years.

The importance of leadership was still stressed by the Army. The 1910 *Noncommis-*

The chevron of the NCO has gone through many changes since its early introduction to the Army. Left, Civil War Chevrons - 1854 to 1872. The red chevrons indicated Artillery, the light blue - Infantry, the yellow - Cavalry and the maroon - Ordinance.

Below: The Chevrons of 1872. These were used until 1902 with few revisions. Branch colors were emphasized to increase morale and esprit de corps in an army suffering from public apathy and congressional expenditure cuts.

Photos by David Crozier

sioned Officers' Manual states: "When a private is made a corporal his status is changed from that of a follower to that of a leader of men, and he should do all he can to become an efficient leader." However, the *Manual* provides few words for corporals and sergeants compared to the pages devoted to the Company Quartermaster Sergeant, Ordnance Sergeant, Post Commissary Sergeant, and the Post Quartermaster Sergeant.

World War I witnessed a renewed emphasis on the leadership role of NCOs. As a result of increased firepower and large numbers of causalities, the need for additional NCO ranks became increasingly apparent. A need existed for an additional rank between sergeant and first sergeant. In addition, a need existed for a fire team leader to direct the large volume of fire power from weapons like the machine-gun. After the War, in 1920, these two factors combined with the tremendous number of NCO ranks, led to the restructuring the NCO Corps. The NCO ranks were consolidated and restructured so that only five NCO ranks existed. The master sergeant (with three stripes and three rockers) became the senior NCO, replacing the sergeant major. The technical sergeant (with three stripes and two rockers) constituted the next rank in the order of precedence. Stressing the Army's return to the importance of NCO leadership, the first sergeant (with three stripes, two rockers, with a lozenge or diamond in the center) was equal to the technical sergeant. The staff sergeant (with three stripes and a single rocker) was placed between the first sergeant and the sergeant for added leadership in the company. The sergeant (with three stripes) and the corporal (with two stripes) completed the NCO Corps. Therefore, the design of the system provided additional NCO leaders to the company, troop, or battery.

Specialist ranks were rated as Private First Class, Specialist 1st Class to 6th Class. In the specialist grades, a soldier could receive an additional two to twenty plus dollars per month. In 1942, specialist chevrons gave way to technician chevrons. Technicians were rated from 5th Grade to 3rd Grade. The Technician 5th Grade had two stripes and a "T," while the Technician 4th Grade, three stripes and a "T," and the Technician 3rd Grade, three stripes and a single rocker with a "T."

The importance of NCO leadership to the company, troop, or battery was stressed to every soldier. In the 1941, FM 21-100, *The Basic Field Manual and Soldier's Handbook* clearly states the role of squad, platoon, and company NCOs. The importance of company, troop, and battery NCO leadership became evident when in 1942 the position of first sergeant rose from equivalent to technical sergeant to equal the master sergeant. This created the first sergeant's chevron as three stripes, three rockers, with the diamond or lozenge in the center and for the first time gave the first sergeant equal pay to the most senior NCO rank, master sergeant.

During World War II, the Army changed from the eight-man to the 12-man Infantry squad. This resulted from the need to direct the additional firepower of the Infantry squad and machine-gun teams, coupled with the need to increase the ability of the squad to sustain casualties and continue to fight. The corporal, the

squad leader for most of the Army's history, was replaced by the sergeant and then the staff sergeant.

In 1948, a major change occurred in the NCO ranks. The five ranks created in 1920 were cut to four ranks: corporal, sergeant, sergeant first class, and master sergeant. The corporal had two stripes, but the sergeant rank had three stripes and a rocker (as if a staff sergeant's chevron of the pre-1948 period or the post 1958 period. The sergeant first class replaced the technician sergeant and retained his chevron of three stripes and two rockers to distinguish his rank. The sergeant first class replaced the staff sergeant as the squad leader; the result was a minimum of promotional possibilities or pay incentives for senior NCOs. The Regimental Sergeant Major (a Master Sergeant) was only one pay grade above the squad leader.

From 1949 to 1951, the small two-inch chevrons signified not only rank, but also a distinction between combat and non-combat NCOs. Combat NCOs wore gold chevrons with a dark blue background, and non-combat NCOs wore dark blue chevrons with a gold background. These chevrons were replaced in 1951, by a 3 ½-inch chevron that later changed to three-inches.

In 1955, the Army again separated specialist from NCOs, creating the Specialist Third Class to Specialist Nine. The chevrons for the Specialist Nine consisted of two inverted "V" stripes, three inverted rockers, and the Great Seal. In 1959, the Specialist Third Class was dropped. This left the soldiers in the specialist ranks as Specialist Four to Specialist Nine. A major problem with this system soon revealed itself: a solider would advance from Specialist Four to Specialist Six without holding a leadership position. Then, after receiving a promotion to Sergeant First Class, the soldier became responsible for leading a large group of soldiers—not a good avenue for success. The Specialist grades were reduced through the 1970s and 1980s, leaving only the Specialist today.

In 1958, a major restructuring of the NCO ranks occurred: the ranks of staff sergeant and sergeant major were reinstated to the NCO Corps. The sergeant's chevron returned to three stripes, and the staff sergeant received the three stripes and a single rocker. The sergeant major chevron consisted of three stripes, three rockers, with a star in the center.

In 1965, a proposal was made to distinguish a unit (battalion or higher) sergeant major from other sergeants major. Those not holding a position of unit sergeant major would be known as staff sergeants major. The chevron of those sergeants major of units would consist of the sergeant major chevron with a wreath. These chevrons were manufactured, but not issued.

In 1966, Sgt. Maj. William Wooldridge was appointed the first Sergeant Major of the Army. He wore the sergeant major chevron with the single star and only a collar device distinguished his uniform from other sergeants major. This mode of identification continued until 1967, when the sergeant major chevron with three stripes, three rockers, a wreath, and a star, became the chevron for unit sergeants major as had been envisioned in 1965.

In 1979, the Sergeant Major of the Army was authorized a new chevron. This chevron consisted of three stripes and three rockers with two stars. The chevron was replaced in 1995 with a chevron of three stripes, three rockers, two stars, and the Great Seal.

The evolution of Noncommissioned Officer Insignia has grown with the evolution of the NCO Corps. The insignia originally depicted the role of the NCO in maintaining order and discipline. As the leadership role of NCOs grew, new forms of differentiating the NCO from other soldiers arose. Today, the chevron serves not only as the most recognizable feature of the NCOs insignia it also signifies the importance of the noncommissioned officers' leadership role.

Editor's note: The NCO Museum, located at Ft. Bliss, Texas, adjacent to the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy, has a Web site with additional information at https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/522612. *You can also take tours of the facility by calling 915-744-8646, DSN 621 to make an appointment.*

Rank and File

Top, In 1958, a major restructuring of the NCO ranks occurred: the ranks of staff sergeant and sergeant major were reinstated. Notice the specialist ranks of Specialist Four through Specialist Eight. The Army they had a problem when a soldier came up through the specialist ranks as was then promoted to Sergeant First Class without ever having any leadership experience.

Far right, The Civil War Sergeant Major. In 1812, new regulations changed the devices used to show the rank and prestige of senior NCOs. Both the sergeant major and the quartermaster sergeant carried only swords, not muskets or bayonets carried by other soldiers. In addition, sergeants and above wore red sashes around the waist.

Right, the uniform of a Corporal serving with the 3rd Infantry, Old Guard. This is the Army's newest Dress Blue Uniform. The Corporal insignia that adorns it is the same insignia that has been in service since 1986.

Below, The Chevrons or 1885. During the period from 1872 to 1907, the development of ranks for specific duties became commonplace. The saddler sergeant, commissary sergeant, post quartermaster sergeant, and chief trumpeter were added prior to the Spanish-American War. After the War the ranks of electrician sergeant, first class sergeant (Signal Corps), color sergeant, battalion quartermaster sergeant (Engineer Corps), company quartermaster sergeant, battery stable sergeant, and acting hospital steward were added.

Photos by David Crozier



CHEVRONS
1958
FIRST SERGEANT
SERGEANT MAJOR
SERGEANT FIRST CLASS
MASTER SERGEANT
SPECIALIST SEVEN
SPECIALIST EIGHT



Ethical challenges in Stability Operations

By Sergeant Jared Tracey, U.S. Army

In May 2003, the United States began the daunting task of nation building in Iraq by rebuilding the Iraqi infrastructure and reformulating its political institutions. The military's role in modern stability operations, though seemingly new, fits into a preexisting American foreign policy formula. However, the military sees stability operations through contemporary ethical lenses. Since each case depends upon current ethical understanding about what the military should or should not do, past examples of stability operations do not necessarily provide fitting frameworks for modern efforts. This article focuses on ethical abstractions as well as the ways national and social views of how "right" and "wrong" translate into political and military application, and it examines examples of stability operations and the ethical challenges and implications such efforts raise.[1]

Morality in Post-war Operations

Even though moral rhetoric often permeates stability operations, international stability and perceived strategic interests have overridden moral obligations as determinants for American military commitments. A study of the ethical implications of conducting stability operations today bridges a historiographic gap in the understanding of morality in warfare. Scholars have often alluded to the prevalence of the just war tradition in (Western) military thought.[2] However, the Just War model is insufficient when discussing stability operations because it only describes jus ad bellum (rationale for going to war in the first place) and jus in bello (appropriate conduct during war).[3] The moral reasons for going to war are not always the same as the reasons the victor uses to justify occupation of the defeated nation. Jus in bello does continue to have relevance during stability operations, particularly when armed hostilities exist between "insurgents" and the government, unarmed civilians, and occupying forces. Legal discourse that constitutes the "Laws of War" cover much of this.[4] However, there is nothing in jus in bello that compels the victorious nation to provide security, rebuild infrastructure, improve public services, and see to the establishment of a democratic form of government.[5] In the final pages of Arguing About War (2004), noted Just War historian Michael Walzer raises the issue of morality in post-war operations, and he suggests further scholarly

1. The present work accepts Merriam-Webster's definition of ethic(s) as "the discipline dealing with what is good and bad and with moral duty and obligation" and as a set or "sets of moral principles." (Definition accessed online at *www.m-w.com/dictionary/ethics* on 12 January 2008). Furthermore, ethics have the function of identifying activities and behavior "as good or bad or somewhere in between these two extremes." On this point, see Cloma Huffman, "Ethical Bases for Military Decisions," Military Review (August 1961).

2. Some of the most important recent works include Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Just War against Terror: The Burden of American Power in a Violent World* (New York: Basic Books, 2003); Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic Books, 1977); and Michael W. Brough, John W. Lango, and Harry van der Linden, eds., *Rethinking the Just War Tradition* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2007).

3. Martin Cook, *The Moral Warrior: Ethics and Service in the U.S. Military* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), 26–27.

4. An excellent work that covers the genesis of the Law of War, to include Just War and other doctrines, can be found in David Cavaleri, *The Law of War: Can 20th-Century Standards Apply to the Global War on Terrorism?* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005). Amidst the numerous debates concerning the practicality of 20th-century laws of war in the current conflict against terrorism, Cavaleri states succinctly that "the law of war in its current form is more than adequate to face the new GWOT challenges, [and] it does not warrant revision."

inquiry into a new jus post bellum theory.

Walzer argues, "It seems clear that you can fight a just war, and fight it justly, and still make a moral mess of the aftermath." Conversely, "a misguided military intervention or a preventive war fought before its time might nonetheless end with the displacement of a brutal regime and the construction of a decent one."[6] Walzer's argument highlights the need for a deeper understanding of the ethical aspects of stability operations.

Stability Operations in American history

The term "stability operations" is an inexact concept. It can be all encompassing or exclusionary, depending upon its usage. The 2008 edition of U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, describes stability operations as — *Encompass[ing] various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Stability operations can be conducted in support of a host-nation or interim government or as part of an occupation when no government exists. Stability operations involve both coercive and constructive military actions. They help to establish a safe and secure environment and facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries. Stability operations can also help establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions and support the transition to legitimate local governance. Stability operations must maintain the initiative by pursing objectives that resolve the causes of instability. Stability operations cannot succeed if they only react to enemy initiatives.*[7] [Emphasis added.]

While the concept "stability operations" does not exclude the possibility (and necessity) of defensive operations, it prizes proactive military operations in conjunction with well-conceived civil actions to neutralize enemy resistance, reduce political opposition, and earn public favor. According to stability operations doctrine, Soldiers and Marines on the ground must accept the dual role of waging war while securing the peace. This paradoxical role stems from the American public's and elected leadership's understanding of what U.S. forces are legally and ethically obliged to do following successful completion of conventional combat operations.

Photo by Sgt. Brad Willeford

Staff Sgt. Kellen Hansen holds an Iraqi girl who ran up to him during a patrol in Taji Qada, northwest of Baghdad. Hansen is an infantryman assigned to HHC, 1-27th Infantry "Wolfhounds," 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team. Stability Operations are now an Army core mission outlined in the new FM 3-0.

The annals of American military history are thin on addressing its long involvement in stability operations. Lawrence Yates, a career U.S. Army historian at Fort Leavenworth's Combat Studies Institute, condensed the vast history of the U.S. military's role in stability operations into one succinct volume, *The U.S. Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789–2005*. In this comprehensive work, Yates concludes, "The U.S. military has not regarded stability operations as a 'core' mission with a priority approaching that accorded to combat operations." According to Yates, the military has traditionally understood its role to be the executor of the nation's will through military means—to win the nation's wars. After examining 28 case studies from the early republic through the War on Terrorism, Yates makes five basic assessments concerning the future:

- "The U.S. government will continue to conduct stability operations."
- Stability operations are joint-service, interagency, and multinational endeavors.
- The U.S. military, and the Army specifically, will play increasingly important roles in post-combat efforts.
- The military will increasingly play a large part in the "pre-execution phase" of stability operations.
- Stability operations must have the same doctrinal and operational emphasis as traditional military operations.[8]

Although Yates's argument is sound, he does not address the question of why military leaders are still apprehensive when it comes to conducting stability operations. If they are such an integral aspect of U.S. military history, why do post-combat operations evoke so much apprehension in military leaders? One way to answer the question might be that commanders do not know how to plan for and execute them to the same extent they do traditional military operations. For example, despite the military's involvement in stability operations throughout its history, it was not until 2006 that Army historian John McGrath proposed that planners use a troop-density model for post-combat security operations.[9] The reason for this, at least in part, is that external entities have directed commanders' roles. In principle, the American public (through

5. The reason why the American media (and public) still refers to the U.S. role in Iraq as the "Iraq War" could be because that term is acceptable shorthand for "American stability operations and nation-building efforts in Iraq," but it might be that certain rules of moral conduct are best understood in the context of a full-scale war.

6. Michael Walzer, *Arguing About War* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2004), 163–169.

7. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 2008), 3–12.

8. Lawrence Yates, *The U.S. Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789–2005* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 21–42.

9. John McGrath, *Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006) and *The Other End of the Spear: The Tooth-to-Tail Ratio (T3R) in Modern Military Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007).

10. Jack Bauer, *The Mexican War, 1846–1848* (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1974) described the U.S. military occupation to an extent. For more on the American stability operations role in Mexico, see Yates, *The U.S. Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 56; Justin Smith, "American Rule in Mexico," American Historical Review* 23 (January,

Photo by Staff Sgt. Mike Pryor

Sgt. 1st Class Jorge Mazuela, a platoon sergeant with Company B, 2-325th, 82nd Airborne Division, keeps a watchful eye out for security risks during a visit to one of the thriving new market areas in Baghdad's Sha'ab neighborhood. While the Army has been conducting stability operations similar to Mazuela's years, it has only recently included those operations among what it defines as its core missions.

its civilian leadership) entrusts its U.S. military commanders with responsibilities outside of their intellectual and professional comfort zones. The former decides what the latter should and will do based heavily on ethical criteria.

Mexico. The first test of American military governance occurred during and after the U.S.-Mexican War (1846–1848). Most of the scholarship on the U.S.-Mexican War focuses on the conventional military aspects of it, not on its subsequent stability operations.[10] The unconventional nature of the War on Terrorism's stability operations has sparked renewed interest in historical examples, including the Mexican War. In "Occupation and Stability Dilemmas of the Mexican War", Latin American historian Irving Levinson concludes that President James Polk and General Winfield Scott's approach toward stability operations revolved around just that—"stability." The U.S. military presence following conventional combat operations did not carry with it the modern condition or requirement to establish and secure a stable democratic government. The defeated Mexican and the U.S. governments both regarded the peasant and Indian rebels bent on disrupting the established order as the opposition. They both sought to quell rebellion to secure Mexico's oligarchic social strata, its international border, and its commerce. The U.S. military functioned as a surrogate security force because it had destroyed the bulk of Mexico's main army. Both governments relied on American forces in Acapulco, Camargo, Mexico City, Monterrey, Tampico, Veracruz, and elsewhere to quash the rebels. The U.S.-Mexican War proved that American stability operations hinged on maintaining the societal status quo, not on ethical reform such as promoting just socio-political equality or implementing minimum human rights standards.[11]

Post-Civil War Reconstruction. The moral criterion for stability operations entered modern consciousness after the Civil War. Texas A&M historian Joseph Dawson argues that post-Civil War Reconstruction provided the "foundation for American military government and 'nation building' in other eras." Dawson agreed with Herman Belz and Lawrence Yates that there were no written plans for occupation prior to the end of hostilities.[12]

Dawson is not the first to acknowledge the Union "occupation" of the South as an exercise in nation building, but he goes a step further to say that it provided the doctrinal framework for future efforts.[13] Dawson notes that Reconstruction differed from previous known stability and security efforts. Post-Civil War stability operations experienced a social, political, and ideological thrust that the American occupation presence in Mexico had lacked two decades earlier. While one could argue that, at least in part, Reconstruction-era occupation was a method of political retribution, one could also make the case that ethical concerns were a powerful motivator for rebuilding Southern society. Because the South belonged to the United States, the federal government naturally pushed for the reconstruction of the physical damage wrought by four years of war. Also, since the Union cause during the war ultimately sought eradication of slave holding, there was an ethical compulsion to reintegrate the South into the greater Union. There was also need to establish and safeguard legal citizenship for millions of former slaves. Dawson's conclusion highlights the merging of stability and moral obligation as pretexts for American stability operations.[14]

Philippine Insurrection. In the last quarter of the 19th century, the United States revisited the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 by reaffirming it as a mandate for American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. In *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*, historian Michael Hunt demonstrates that, beginning in the late-19th century, the United States developed and gradually solidified an ideologically based foreign policy to deal with non-Western peoples and nations. This ideology coincided with and was influenced by the U.S. ability to outwardly project its economic, political, and military might.[15]

Certainly, by the turn of the 20th century, the American military had become something more than a punitive or expeditionary force: the U.S. government could use its power as a mechanism to defend or even create foreign governmental and civil constructs. Morally buttressed with a presumed altruistic (albeit deluded) no-

1918), 287–302; and Edward Wallace, "The United States Army in Mexico City," *Military Affairs* 13 (1949), 158–166.

11. Irving Levinson, "Occupation and Stability Dilemmas of the Mexican War: Origins and Solutions," in *Armed Diplomacy: Two Centuries of American Campaigning* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2003), 1–16.

12. Herman Belz, *Reconstructing the Union: Theory and Policy during the Civil War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969); Lawrence Yates, *The U.S. Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789–2005*.

13. For more on this, see J.G. Randall and David Donald, *The Civil War and Reconstruction* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1969); Eric Foner's *A Short History of Reconstruction* (New York: Harper and Row, 1988); and *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877* (New York: Harper and Row, 1988).

14. Joseph Dawson, "The U.S. Army in the South: Reconstruction as Nation-Building," in *Armed Diplomacy: Two Centuries of American Campaigning* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2003), 39–63.

15. Michael Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1987).

16. Ibid.

17. For a discussion on the political dimensions of the American role in the Philippines, see Vicente Bunuan, "Democracy in the Philippines," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 131 (May 1927). The mutually reinforcing ideas of order and morality were paramount in 20th-century American foreign policy, particularly during the Cold War. John Lewis Gaddis described (among other things) how the United States imbued moral language into the establishment

tion of assuming the White Man's Burden, America saw the idea of using the military for stability operations and nation building eventually become a foreign policy blueprint. Stability operations became the pretext for how to deal with hostile or otherwise "un-Americanized" peoples.[16]

From a historiographic standpoint, the American military's involvement in the Philippines provides an instructive example of how the U.S. military flexed its muscle to secure stability where the moral dimensions of its mission held secondary consideration to the Nation's developmental economic self-interest.[17] An array of sources exist on American counterinsurgency and stability operations in the Philippines, with John Gates, Brian Linn, and Glenn May being among the most notable historians of the topic.[18] More recent work attempts to extract lessons from the American role in the Philippines for potential application in the War on Terrorism.

In *Savage Wars of Peace*, Army historian Robert Ramsey argues that stability operations in the Philippines represented a success story, despite some significant setbacks. Because American efforts to improve the country's infrastructure and educational, political, and economic systems often could not forestall the insurgent attempts to undermine the U.S. occupation, public improvements had to occur in tandem with proactive military operations. Continued nonmilitary support to the country was essential while low-level interaction with local leaders helped isolate the insurgents from the population. Commanders at the tactical level had to make decisions always keeping strategic objectives in mind. Commanders and Soldiers felt the same frustrations as those in Iraq do today over the dual military and civil nature of stability operations.[19]

Ramsey followed *Savage Wars of Peace* with *A Masterpiece of Counterguerilla Warfare*, an inside look into the leadership approach of Brigadier General Franklin Bell, an engineer and intelligence officer in the Philippines between 1898 and 1902. Using primary sources and interpreting them with a prescriptive tone, Ramsey concludes the methods Bell used to remove Philippine insurgents from their popular base of support, or rather to remove the population from the insurgents, provide an excellent model for future stability operations and pacification efforts.[20]

Another recent work on the Philippines describes the American pacification of the Moro province as embodying the Rooseveltian spirit of establishing "order out of chaos." In *"Leonard Wood, John J. Pershing, and Pacifying the Moros in the Philippines"*, historian Charles Byler argues that Generals Wood and Pershing conducted stability operations in the Moro province of the southern Philippines using varied approaches. They worked at improving the daily life within the province by building infrastructure and providing improved medical care, among other public services. Byler argues that the U.S. military made progress in quelling Moro opposition until it implemented "dramatic [cultural] changes," such as outlawing slavery and weapons and changing the legal code. In short, U.S.-imposed cultural and legal changes counteracted progress made by providing and improving public services. Though Byler recognizes that Wood's and Pershing's military operations against militants were successful, rebel opposition remained strong because of attempted changes in Moro culture and way of life.[21] In the end, the need for order superseded attempts at imposing political and cultural goals based on Western ethical considerations. The need for order proved primary over other ethical considerations.

The Evolution of a Moral Paradigm

Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson personify the two notions of order and moral obligation in stability operations. President Roosevelt believed that the United States should use its military-industrial strength to bring "order out of chaos" and police the outside world as a colonial power.[22] President Wilson held that a steadfast moral component of American foreign policy was necessary (whereby the Nation would export its own spirit of liberty and sociopolitical structures through selfless acts of helping poor and struggling peoples), but using military force to impose such ostensibly altruistic assistance might also be necessary.[23] Throughout the 20th century, Roosevelt's and Wilson's individual approaches often remained harmonious.

The mutually reinforcing ideas of order and a presumed morality in stability operations and nation building persisted beyond the 20th century into the 21st. In October 2000, the National Intelligence Council (NIC), a premier intelligence think-tank within the U.S. government, completed its assessment of the national "reorientations" that had taken place in Central Asia and

Photo by Staff Sgt. Klaus Baesu

Soldiers provide security while setting up a checkpoint in Tikrit, Iraq. The Soldiers are assigned to the 1st Infantry Division's 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment, operating as part of Task Force Danger during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The task force is focused on defeating anti-Coalition fighters while simultaneously conducting stability operations.

and protection of non-Communist satellites during the Cold War in *The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Group, 2005) and Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). See also Hunt, *Ideology*, 125–170. For a contrary argument that posits that American leaders' world views inhibited military and political intervention abroad, see Eric Love, *Race Over Empire: Racism and U.S. Imperialism, 1865–1900* (University of North Carolina Press, 2004).

18. See John Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898–1902* (westport: Greenwood Press, 1973) and "the Pacification of the Philippines, 1898–1902," in *The American Military and the Far East: Proceedings of the Ninth Military History Symposium, United States Air Force Academy, 1–3 October 1980* (Washington, D.C.: United States Air Force Academy and Office of Air Force History, 1980); Brian Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899–1902* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,1989) and *The Philippine War, 1899–1902* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2000); and Glenn May, *Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims, Execution, and Impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900–1913* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1980).

19. Robert Ramsey, *Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1900–1902* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press. 2007), 117–121.

20. Robert Ramsey, *A Masterpiece of Counterguerrilla Warfare: BG J. Franklin Bell in the Philippines, 1901–1902* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007).

the former Soviet states over the preceding decade. The NIC argues that U.S. policy regarding underdeveloped and developing nation-states in these regions should focus on effecting political and economic reform, encouraging reduced dependence on regional powers, and rewarding "intraregional cooperation—all with an eye to creating an independent, generally Western-oriented, belt of stability." Some members of the NIC warn that "democracy and civil societies must develop within the existing cultural context, not as some kind of unnatural foreign imposition." However, the lack of a Western role in democratizing these nations is unthinkable: "The long-term implications of a generation growing up in poverty, lacking basic education, and increasingly enmeshed in semi-criminalized societies are disturbing and run directly counter to Western goals for the regions." This paternalistic notion resembles a sociopolitical parallel to economic modernization theory. A powerful patron state ultimately benefits from increases in standards of living and economic output, higher education rates, and stable democratic structures. From a strategic and ethical vantage point, the George W. Bush doctrine of the United States evidently views expending economic investment and utilizing military intervention (treasure and blood) as worthwhile to ensure the viability of developing democratic nation-states.[24]

Photo by Spc. Daniel Love

An Army Special Operations Force Soldier scans for insurgents during an engagementin the Sangin District area of Helmand Province in southern Afghanistan. Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force - Afghanistan Soldiers have conducted operations to eliminate insurgents and promote peace and stability.

From Injustice to Justice

From a Just War perspective, Australian scholar Tom Frame concludes that "the 2003 Gulf War was neither manifestly just nor, it can be argued, even necessary."[25] One American skeptic comments that "Iraq is not a nation, and nobody can unite its tribes. The notion that Iraq can be democratized or even civilized must be abandoned."[26] Another notes that "the endeavor of forcing democracy on the faction-torn Iraqi society does not seem likely to succeed."[27] These concerns echo the cultural objections of political modernization mentioned earlier, namely, that external forces cannot impose democratic idealism because governments can never truly be separated from culture.

The newly formed Iraqi government may not share the West's long-standing parliamentary orientation just as their culture persists in tribal values at the expense of individual rights. The rapid transition from autocracy to popular rule requires drastic changes in individual ethical perspective as well as in democratic procedural norms. Timely political and economic results are imperative, for both the citizens of Iraq and those of its patron state.

While not down playing the difficulties and frustrations of stability operations in Iraq, in *What We Owe Iraq*, constitutional law professor Noah Feldman argues that after toppling the Hussein regime, the United States had a legal and moral obligation to rebuild Iraq in its own democratic image. In Feldman's view, Iraqis are not only capable of, but also entitled to freedom and democracy. According to him, the United States must limit its role in Iraq to that of a temporary political trustee and not allow itself to become a permanent military occupation force. The paramount ethical objective of nation building in Iraq and elsewhere is "creating democratically legitimate states that [treat] their citizens with dignity and respect." In short, the United States would be morally negligent if it did not see to stabilization in Iraq.[28] The major obstacles to fulfilling such obligations are the aforementioned hierarchy of ethical norms among the individuals themselves and the need for order as a primary moral concern.

The difficultly is putting moral objectives into practice and sequencing them so they are practicable. Acommon theme in stability operations historiography is the all-too-common disconnect among American objectives. Citing the problems in postwar Iraq, retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner, Director of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance in early 2003, criticizes the American government's relative lack of contingency planning. He does not deny the U.S.'s obligation to rebuild and establish order, but he says that stability operations and nation building were not high enough priorities in planning circles, that there had not been enough civilian-military coordination, and that despite their significant ability to do so, the Army Corps of Engineers and media outlets had made little headway in winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people. In conclusion, Garner does not challenge America's moral obligations as legitimate concerns, but rather blames planning failures and unsuccessful methods for the deteriorated security situation.[29]

If contingency planning is a major element of stability operations and nation building, inter- and intra-agency conflicts can complicate putting a valid plan into action. In After Saddam: Stabilization or Transformation?, U.S. Army Major Shane Story highlights the contrasts among various institutional objectives during planning for and execution of the Iraq war. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's efforts to transform the Cold War-era makeup of the Armed Forces complicated Lieutenant General David McKiernan and Ambassador Paul Bremer's efforts to stabilize Iraq after Hussein's fall.[30]

21. Charles Byler, "Leonard Wood, John J. Pershing, and Pacifying the Moros in the Philippines: Americans in a Muslim land," in *Turning Victory into Success: Military Operations After the Campaign* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 89–104.

22. Theodore Roosevelt, speech, 10 April 1899, in *Theodore Roosevelt, The Strenuous Life* (New York, 1900), 6–7, cited in Hunt, *Ideology*, 128.

23. Arthur Link, Ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 11:440, 12:18, 14:433, 18:104, referenced in Hunt, *Ideology*,129.

24. "Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Reorientations, Internal Transitions, and Strategic Dynamics," National Intelligence Council Conference, declassified Central Intelligence Agency document, accessed online at *www.foia.cia.gov/browse_docs.asp?* on 12 January 2008.

25. Tom Frame, *Living by the Sword? The Ethics of Armed Intervention* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2004), 147–148.

26. *Time*, 21 September 2007.

27. *Time*, 27 September 2007.

28. Noah Feldman, *What We Owe Iraq: War and Ethics of Nation-Building* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); see also Robert Kagan's review of *What We Owe Iraq in New York Times,* 14 November 2005.

These contrasting objectives "reflected a self-defeating disunity of effort." In concert with conflicting civilian and military objectives in the interagency, Iraq's tumultuous cultural history hindered stability operations in Iraq from the outset. Story argues that Rumsfeld held long-standing "aversions to open-ended and to large-scale military operations," both of which are requisite for successful stability operations.[31] Stability operations and nation building require massive interagency planning and cooperation. Decisions to forcefully ensure security and political viability also depend heavily on ethical criteria more familiar to non-military agencies, while commanders at tactical and operational echelons often express frustration with having to assume the complexity entailed in the dual roles of leading civil and military operations. Soldiers are being asked to view stability operations through complicated ethical prisms other agencies are more attuned to, and the "problem" rests in the fact that they cannot help applying preconceived cultural and ethical notions to everyday situations in subconscious efforts to order reality. Their preconceptions have little or no currency in the moral hierarchies of the interagency and geographical cultures in which they are asked to operate. As U.S. Army Captain Porcher Taylor argues, there are invariably "circumstances in which personal and institutional value systems conflict."[32] Commanders and Soldiers on the ground will not necessarily share the same ethical convictions as others who have entrusted them with carrying out stability operations.

A Moral Military in War's Aftermath

Since Vietnam, the U.S. military has attempted to address the need to instill ethical thinking at all levels. For example, during the early '70s, U.S. service academies started mandatory core courses on morality and war. In 1979, U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Jack Lane proposed the establishment of a single code of ethics for the United States Army.[33] In 1985, U.S. Army Major William Diehl went a step further by suggesting one ethical code for all branches of the military. Diehl argues that a well-conceived ethical code would stand the test of time by virtue of its inherent adaptability. After all, he says, "Ethics applies common principles of value to widely differing tasks or vocations." He argues that matters of ethics necessarily involve moral judgment.[34] Similarly, U.S. Army Reserve Lieutenant Colonel James Swartz argues, "The moral leader will not merely keep his own house in order. The moral leader will not tolerate those who abridge the standard, and the moral leader will punish those who break the rules—even when such decisions are unpopular, and even when it conflicts with the wishes of others in positions of influence."[35] Ethical behavior "must be inculcated" and enforced by proper authorities.[36] Only ethical instruction at the lowest levels can help alleviate the conflicting pressures of fighting a war and doing all that stability operations entails for success.

U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Cecilio M. Ricardo Jr.

U.S. Army Sgt. 1st Class Ed Franco plays with local refugee children in Dar Ul Aman, Kabul, Afghanistan, in support of a volunteer community reach program.

Heavy moral language laces the discourse on stability operations and nation-building efforts; however, from a strategic standpoint, security, stability, and order have always been the first priorities—they too rest on a substratum of ethical assumptions. As Michael Walzer suggests, historians should pay due attention to jus post bellum, or the moral issues involved after the cessation of conventional hostilities. Laws of war and military training and regulations guide Soldiers' actions in combat, but there is something missing if these same Soldiers wonder "Why are we still here?" after they have defeated another country's forces in wartime. The ethical commitment to conduct stability operations is often forced upon America's military in the absence of understanding, leaving the individuals therein with the psychological burden of reconciling their roles as both trained killers and purveyors of goodwill, attempting to earn an indigenous population's hearts and minds. The Soldiers so burdened have not yet been educated to that effect—the military has treated the ethics of war, peace, and occupation more as a process of osmosis than a focused effort.

Problems arise when the majority of the population, civilian leaders, and Soldiers on the ground do not share the ethical commitment to stabilize or rebuild another country. When this conviction is absent or not evenly distributed, resentment swells, tension rises, and unfortunately, often deadly, tragic, and potentially catastrophic consequences ensue.

Editor's Note: This article was first published in Military Review's January-February 2009 issue and is used with its permission. Sergeant Jared Tracy is a medical laboratory technician at Munson Army Health Clinic, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. He holds a B.A. and an M.A. from Virginia Commonwealth University and is completing a Ph.D. in history at Kansas State University. His studies specialize in media and communications, domestic public relations and international propaganda, and military psychological operations.

29. Jay Garner, "Iraq Revisited," in *Actions After the Campaign* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat institute Press, 2004), 253–280; see also Walter Boyne, *Operation Iraqi Freedom: What Went Right, What Went Wrong, and Why* (New York: Forge Books, 2003) and Roger MacGinty, "the Pre-War Reconstruction of Post-War Iraq," *Third World Quarterly* 24 (August 2003).

30. Shane Story, "After Saddam: Stabilization or Transformation," in *Security Assistance: U.S. and International Historical Perspectives* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies institute Press, 2006), 79–92.

31. ibid.

32. Porcher Taylor, "Viewpoints on Values," *Military Review* (November1986):32.

33. Jack Lane, "Military Code of Ethics: A Proposal," *Military Review* (October 1979): 71–72.

34. William Diehl, "Ethics and Leadership: the Pursuit Continues," Military Review (April 1985): 36.

35. James Swartz, "Morality: A Leadership Imperative," Military Review (September 1992): 79.

36.See also Lewis Sorley, "Doing What's Right: Shaping the Army's Professional Environment," Lloyd Matthews and Dale Brown, eds., *The Challenge of Military Leadership* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1989).

NCO Stories

A selection of Valor

Citation to award the Medal of Honor

The President of the United States of America, authorized by Act of Congress,, March 3, 1863, has awarded in the name of Congress the Medal of Honor to

Corporal Freddie Stowers
United States Army

Corporal Stowers, distinguished himself by exceptional heroism on 28 September 1918 while serving as a squad leader in Company C, 371st Infantry Regiment, 93d Division. His company was the lead company during the attack on Hill 188, Champagne Marne Sector, France, during World War I. A few minutes after the attack began, the enemy ceased firing and began climbing up onto the parapets of the trenches, holding up their arms as if wishing to surrender. The enemy's actions caused the American forces to cease fire and to come out into the open. As the company started forward and when within about 100 meters of the trench line, the enemy jumped back into their trenches and greeted Corporal Stowers' company with interlocking bands of machine gun fire and mortar fire causing well over fifty percent casualties. Faced with incredible enemy resistance, Corporal Stowers took charge, setting such a courageous example of personal bravery and leadership that he inspired his men to follow him in the attack. With extraordinary heroism and complete disregard of personal danger under devastating fire, he crawled forward leading his squad toward an enemy machine gun nest, which was causing heavy casualties to his company. After fierce fighting, the machine gun position was destroyed and the enemy soldiers were killed. Displaying great courage and intrepidity Corporal Stowers continued to press the attack against a determined enemy. While crawling forward and urging his men to continue the attack on a second trench line, he was gravely wounded by machine gun fire. Although Corporal Stowers was mortally wounded, he pressed forward, urging on the members of his squad, until he died. Inspired by the heroism and display of bravery of Corporal Stowers, his company continued the attack against incredible odds, contributing to the capture of Hill 188 and causing heavy enemy casualties. Corporal Stowers' conspicuous gallantry, extraordinary heroism, and supreme devotion to his men were well above and beyond the call of duty, follow the finest traditions of military service, and reflect the utmost credit on him and the United States Army

Medal of Honor recognition long overdue

By Ashley Henry
Fort Jackson Leader

Only 33 South Carolina Soldiers have been awarded the Medal of Honor. Only two of them are African American.

Seventy-three years after his death, Cpl. Freddie Stowers was awarded the Medal of Honor for his valor during World War I. He is the only African American to receive this honor for service during this war.

"It's been said that the ultimate measure of a man is not where he stands in moments of comfort and convenience but where he stands at times of challenge," said President George H.W. Bush at the posthumous presentation of the Medal of Honor. "On Sept. 28, 1918, Cpl. Freddie Stowers stood poised on the edge of such a challenge and summoned his mettle and his courage."

Stowers' military career began here, at Fort Jackson, where he joined the First Provisional Infantry Regiment (Colored) on Oct. 4, 1917. He was born and raised in Sandy Springs, S.C., and was part of the first military draft of World War I.

According to his Medal of Honor citation, on Sept. 28, 1918, while serving as squad leader of Company C, 371st Infantry Regiment, 93rd Division, Stowers went above and beyond the call of duty when his company led the attack at Hill 188, Champagne Marne Sector, France.

Photo Courtesy of South Carolina Military Museum

This image of Cpl. Freddie Stowers was generated by Army forensics from photos of his mother and sisters.

Shortly after the attack began, the enemy came out of the trenches leading Stowers and his company to believe they were surrendering. However, soon after the American forces came out of their trenches, the enemy resumed fire.

Stowers led his company to the enemy trench line to take out a machine gun post which was causing a majority of the casualties.

As Stowers and his men moved forward he was mortally wounded. He continued to go on with his company and encouraged his men to go forward without him.

The members of Stowers' squad pressed on, motivated by his heroism, they continued the attack; leading to the capture of Hill 188.

Stowers' commanding officer recommended him for the Medal of Honor after his death, but the paperwork was misplaced. It was April 24, 1991, when Bush presented Stowers' Medal of Honor to his two sisters, Georgiana Palmer and Mary Bowens.

"Today, as we pay tribute to this great Soldier, our thoughts continue to be with the men and women of all our wars who valiantly carried the banner of freedom into battle," Bush said. "They, too, know America would not be the land of the free, if it were not also the home of the brave."

The Medal of Honor

The Medal of Honor is the nation's highest medal for valor in combat that can be awarded to members of the armed forces. It sometimes is referred to as the "Congressional Medal of Honor" because the president awards it on behalf of the Congress.

The medal was first authorized in 1861 for Sailors and Marines, and the following year for Soldiers as well. Since then, more than 3,400 Medals of Honor have been awarded to members of all DOD services and the Coast Guard, as well as to a few civilians who distinguished themselves with valor.

Medals of Honor are awarded sparingly and are bestowed only to the bravest of the brave; and that courage must be well documented. So few Medals of Honor are awarded, in fact, that there have only been five bestowed posthumously for service in Iraq and Afghanistan. The most recent recipients are Army Sgt. 1st Class Paul R. Smith, Marine Cpl. Jason L. Dunham, Navy SEAL Master-at-Arms Michael A. Monsoor, Army Spc. Ross A. McGinnis for valor in Iraq, and Navy Lt. Michael P. Murphy for valor in Afghanistan.

However, since 1998, 15 other Medals of Honor have been awarded to correct past administrative errors, oversights and follow-up on lost recommendations or as a result of new evidence.

Silver Star recipient leaves legacy

By Sgt. Les Newport
Indiana National Guard Public Affairs

Some family names stretch across National Guard unit rosters back to the militia's beginnings. Prominent among those family names in Indiana is one that's synonymous with honor; the name Proctor.

Family members, friends and fellow Soldiers gathered in the atrium of the Indiana State House here Dec. 20 to pay tribute to one of Indiana's fallen, Sgt. Joseph Proctor of Whiteland, Ind. The Indiana National Guardsman was lost May 3, 2006, at Camp Ramadi, Iraq.

Gov. Mitch Daniels and Indiana National Guard Adjutant General R. Martin Umbarger presented Proctor's family with the Silver Star Medal, the third highest award for gallantry.

Courtesy photo

Sgt. Joseph Proctor

Among the ranks of Soldiers were three of Proctor's immediate family members: his son Joseph Jr., his brother Eddie and his nephew Bradlee. Another nephew, Eddie Jr., is still in training and was unable to attend. All enlisted in the months following the loss of Proctor.

Many years have passed since Proctor's older brother Eddie served, but soon after his brother's death, Eddie reenlisted in Joseph's unit as a Motor Transport Operator. It's a skill he brings after many years as a civilian long-haul driver.

"I heard they needed truck drivers in Iraq, and that's something I know about," said Eddie. "If I can continue what Joey started, I want to do that."

Joseph was an aviation fueler but volunteered for Military Transition Team duty in Iraq. He was embedded with a fellow Soldier into an Iraqi unit to train and mentor.

A group of Soldiers who served with Joseph traveled from New England to be with Proctor's family during the ceremony.

"We've never met, but have talked on the phone," said Sgt. Ben Hannur of Watertown, Conn. "Now, to actually meet them brings it into perspective. It's a big family, and they're close, close like we were in Iraq."

Hannur said the loss of Proctor was felt heavily, particularly among the Iraqi soldiers Proctor trained.

"Everybody knew him and he knew everybody. He made a huge impression on the Iraqis and they mourned him along with us," said Hannur. "He was the one you went to when you needed something, needed anything"

The most telling evidence of Sgt. Proctor's mettle and character can be found in the narrative of the incident that accompanied the presentation of the Silver Star:

"Sgt. Joseph E. Proctor, United States Army, distinguished himself by exhibiting exceptionally valorous conduct in the face of an enemy attack as Military Transition Team Trainer for 1st Battalion, 172nd Armor, Camp Ramadi, Iraq on 3 May 2006 during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

"Sgt. Proctor served with 1st Battalion, 1st Brigade, 7th Iraqi Division as a Military Transition Team Trainer in the Anbar Province of Iraq. This is one of the most dangerous and challenging jobs a soldier can perform.

"Previously, Sgt. Proctor was a petroleum supply specialist who volunteered from the task force support platoon. He was in almost constant danger patrolling the most violent areas of the 5 Kilo District of Tammim, often with only one other coalition force member present.

"He would spend several consecutive days at Observation Post 293, one of the most isolated areas in Ramadi. This observation post had been a target for insurgents in the Tammim area and routinely came under attack. Sgt. Proctor was on duty the afternoon of May 3rd when Observation Post 293 came under one of the fiercest attacks since its establishment. At approximately 1415 hours on May 3rd, Observation Post 293 began receiving indirect fire.

"At least four rounds landed, some within extremely close proximity and some directly on the observation post. Sgt. Proctor was in a relatively safe location at the time, inside the barracks, which was a cement structure. Cognizant of the hazards outside the barracks and without any official order to leave the safety of the building, Sgt. Proctor quickly donned his protective equipment and secured his weapon. He developed an expedient plan, left the safety of the building to assess the situation and render aid to those on security who were under attack.

"Shortly after he entered the compound, the observation post was attacked with small-arms fire. It appeared they were under a complex attack. The severity of the attack ultimately was a diversion by the enemy in its attempt to destroy the observation post with a large, powerful and deadly vehicular suicide bomb.

"A large dump truck penetrated the west gate during the complex attack and continued moving toward the center of the observation post. Sgt. Proctor immediately and aggressively

Continued on Page 31

Special Forces Soldier awarded second highest medal for combat

By Sgt. Daniel Love
Army News Service

A Soldier was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross during a ceremony April 30, 2008 for valorous actions during Operation Enduring Freedom.

A 20-year veteran, Master Sgt. Brendan O'Connor, formerly a senior medic on a 2nd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (A) Operational Detachment Alpha, was presented the award while he stood before family, friends, and fellow Soldiers.

"For the men who were with him that day, Master Sergeant O'Connor is a savior," said Adm. Eric T. Olson, commander of United States Special Operations Command, who presented the award to O'Connor.

U.S. Army photo

Master Sgt. Brendan O'Connor, 7th Special Forces Group (A) Operational Detachment Alpha, was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross during a ceremony at Bank Hall, Fort Bragg, N.C., April 30 for heroic actions during Operation Enduring Freedom.

"For all Americans, he is a hero, and for all members of special operations across the services, he is a source of enormous pride," he said.

O'Connor was instrumental in keeping his team alive during an intense battle with more than 250 Taliban fighters in southern Afghanistan on June 22, 2006. While making a temporary stop during a patrol, his team and their attached Afghan National Army soldiers were attacked from all sides with small-arms fire, heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, recoilless rifles and mortars.

During the 17 1/2 hours of sustained combat that followed, O'Connor and his team fought off wave after wave of Taliban attackers from a group of small compounds, fighting for their lives against insurgents who were intent on killing or capturing the beleaguered defenders. Much of the combat was so close that the defenders of the compounds could hear cursing and taunting from the enemies who swarmed the perimeter.

After hearing two Soldiers were wounded at another location, O'Connor removed his body armor and low-crawled under heavy machine gun fire to treat and extract his wounded comrades. O'Connor then carried a wounded Soldier back to a safer area, again passing through intense fire.

One teammate commented that as he was crawling, machine gun fire "mowed the grass" around him.

"I don't think that what I did was particularly brave," said O'Connor. "My friend needed help and I had the opportunity to help him, so I did. I think I'm lucky to get this sort of recognition; there are so many other Soldiers who do similarly brave things overseas and are happy with just a pat on the back when they get home."

O'Connor is the second Soldier to be awarded the DSC for actions taken in Operation Enduring Freedom. The first was a 5th Special Forces Group Soldier, Maj. Mark Mitchell in 2003. Before Mitchell there had been none since the Vietnam War. The DSC is the second highest award for valor, surpassed only by the Medal of Honor.

"I've never been more honored, but this medal belongs to my whole team," said O'Connor.

"Every member was watching out for the other, inspiring each other, and for some, sacrificing for each other. We all fought hard, and it could just as easily be any one of them standing up here getting it pinned on; every one of them is a hero," he said.

The Distinguished Service Cross is awarded to a person who, while serving in any capacity with the Army, distinguishes himself or herself by extraordinary heroism not justifying the award of a Medal of Honor; while engaged in an action against an enemy of the United States; while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing/foreign force; or while serving with friendly foreign forces engaged in an armed conflict against an opposing Armed Force in which the United States is not a belligerent party. The act or acts of heroism must have been so notable and have involved risk of life so extraordinary as to set the individual apart from his or her comrades.

First Reserve Soldier receives Silver Star for Valor in Afghanistan

By Donna Miles
American Forces Press Service

When Staff Sgt. Jason Fetty put himself between a suicide bomber and the bomber's intended targets at the grand opening of a new medical facility in Khost, Afghanistan, he wasn't thinking of the strategic, or even tactical, importance of his actions.

All he wanted was to protect his fellow soldiers, the Afghan people they were helping and the new emergency room his provincial reconstruction team had spent months working to make a reality.

On Oct, 30, 2007, the 32-year-old pharmacist from Parkersburg, W. Va., became the first Army Reserve Soldier to receive the Silver Star for valor in Afghanistan. Staff Sgt. Fetty's commander said his actions went far beyond saving "countless, countless lives."

"His actions, along with the actions of others on the team, really prevented a strategic catastrophe," said Navy Cmdr. John F.G. Wade, who commanded Joint Provisional Reconstruction Team Khost during the late-February incident.

Provisional reconstruction teams serve a vital role in Afghanistan, Cdr. Wade explained. They complement maneuver forces in separating the enemy from the people, connecting people to the Afghan government and helping the government meet the needs of the people.

"We truly are deployed to contribute to the betterment of others," Cdr. Wade said. "But that is a threat to the enemy, because what we are doing is giving hope, providing opportunity, creating a better future for the people of Afghanistan."

That makes the 25 PRTs' achievements in Afghanistan -- including the opening of a new emergency room for almost 1 million Khost province citizens -- prime targets for terrorists, he said.

That's exactly what happened when members of the Khost PRT joined officials from throughout the province to celebrate the facility's opening Feb. 20. "We were all there to celebrate the fact that we had come together, worked together as a team to achieve a common desire, and that was to help the people," Cdr. Wade said.

But among the medical professionals who had come from all corners of Khost was a man in a doctor's lab coat nobody else recognized.

Staff Sgt. Fetty, a PRT member who was pulling guard duty outside the building alongside the newly arrived 82nd Airborne Division, watched as a sea of white lab coats came rushing out of the building and past him. After more than 10 months in Khost, Fetty had worked closely with the local medical community and recognized each doctor's face.

He turned to ensure the 82nd Division troops didn't fire and cleared them from the area, noting that "those guys had no way of knowing these were actual doctors. I was the only one who knew they weren't bad guys."

When Staff Sgt. Fetty turned back toward the building, the "bad guy" was standing directly in front of him, disguised as a doctor. Fetty had never laid eyes on him before and immediately knew something was wrong. "He was crazy in the eyes. He looked like he was on drugs, and he was acting very erratic. He definitely didn't look right," Staff Sgt. Fetty said.

"Every Soldier who has been in combat or been downrange knows when something is not right," he continued. "You can feel it. You can see it. It's a general sinking feeling that things are not going to go right. You feel it in your gut."

Staff Sgt. Fetty's military training kicked in. He began going through his "escalation of force" commands: "Stop. Get down." The "doctor" ignored him, and tried to grab him.

Staff Sgt. Fetty wanted to fire a warning shot, but feared it would ricochet and hit the hospital or someone gathered in the crowd around it. The suspect continued to close in on him and grabbed the barrel of his rifle. At this point, Fetty started to fear the worst. "I was pretty sure he had a (suicide) vest on under his lab coat, but I still didn't know for sure," he said.

Rather than shirking him off, Staff Sgt. Fetty used the distance his weapon created between him and his attacker to his advantage. "I knew that if he grabbed hold of my armor or my person in any way, I was toast," he said. "There was no getting out of it at that point. I wouldn't be able to stop him from detonating himself."

He slowly maneuvered toward a clearing between the hospital and the nearby administrative huts, away from the crowd. "I figured that if I stalled him long enough, everyone else would do their job and get the area cleared," he said.

Staff Sgt. Fetty kept his eyes locked with his attackers'. "The last thing I wanted him to do was lose focus on me, because he didn't want me," he said. "The governor of the province was there, and he was the primary target. Suicide bombers rarely attack Americans; they want government officials. So I had to keep his focus on me."

As the struggle continued, Staff Sgt. Fetty recognized he probably wouldn't survive. "You resign yourself pretty quick. You just stop thinking at that point about yourself," he said. "It was either going to be me or 20 other people back there. ... Suicide bombers are next to impossible to stop. All you can do is limit the damage that they can do."

The chain of events "becomes sketchy" when Staff Sgt. Fetty recalls what happened after he maneuvered the attacker around

the corner from the crowd. "Things happened very, very quickly," he said. Friends told Staff Sgt. Fetty he tackled the attacker, but he doesn't remember that. He recalls hitting him with the butt of his weapon, then firing warning shots at the ground near his feet.

The attacker came at him, so Staff Sgt. Fetty fired into his lower legs, then his kneecap. "He stood back up, even though I gave him a crippling wound," he said. "He got back up and tried to come at me again."

Staff Sgt. Fetty said he remembers hearing the blast of weapons from other members of the security team firing at the attacker. He shot again, at the man's stomach. He'd heard that it's safe to fire into a suicide vest, but didn't want to test his luck by firing into the attacker's chest. "That's a bad way for me to end up in a bunch of pieces," he said.

Then the attacker looked at Staff Sgt. Fetty with "the scariest face I've ever seen." The standoff had turned personal. "Earlier, he just looked crazy, but now he wanted to kill me," Staff Sgt. Fetty said. "I knew what his intent was, and I abandoned all hopes of killing the guy before he would explode."

Staff Sgt. Fetty took three steps before making a "Hollywood dive." The blast came as he hit the ground, peppering him with shrapnel in the face, leg and ankle. All that remained where he had struggled with the attacker was a big hole in the ground.

Photo by Photo by Donna Miles

Staff Sgt. Jason Fetty (center) is the first Army Reserve Soldier to earn the Silver Star for actions in Afghanistan. With him are Army Command Sgt. Maj. Leon Caffie (left), senior enlisted advisor for the Army Reserve, and Navy Cmdr. John F.G. Wade, commander of Joint Provincial Reconstruction Team, Khost, Afghanistan.

For several months after the incident, Staff Sgt. Fetty second-guessed his actions. He fretted that several other soldiers and an Afghan security guard had received shrapnel wounds. Should he have shot sooner or done something differently? "Maybe I could have done it so nobody got hurt, or at least just I got hurt," he said.

In the end, he accepted that he'd made the best of a bad situation by limiting collateral damage as he applied the training that had been grilled into him. "We train hard," and for every imaginable scenario, including dealings with a suicide bomber, he said. "You go through your rules of engagement and pray that it all works out the way it's supposed to. This time it happened to work out."

Although he's proud to receive the Silver Star, Staff Sgt. Fetty said anyone in his shoes would have acted the same way. "I don't really believe in valor that much," he said. "It's more like the set of circumstances you're put in. I think there are plenty of people over there who are just as brave as I am, who fortunately never found themselves in that situation."

He said he's convinced that everyone possesses traits of heroism. "It's in every human nature to protect someone else," he said, particularly those they've bonded with through hundreds of combat missions and countless hours of ping-pong. "It's a combination of training, loyalty to your friends and basic human nature," he said.

Looking back, he said he's glad he felt compelled to volunteer for duty in Afghanistan, even changing his military specialty so he could deploy as part of the civil affairs team.

He's convinced the PRTs are making "a huge difference" in Afghanistan. "It's absolutely vital," he said. "We build roads, build bridges, improve health care. The Afghan government doesn't really have the means to fix itself by itself."

Working among the Afghan people was "amazing," he said. "Every time we'd go and stop someplace, people were happy to see us. Kids knew 'PRT' meant that we were going to fix something. We were going to improve their life in some way."

Cdr. Wade said Staff Sgt. Fetty's actions during a celebration of a PRT milestone "exemplified what we are trying to achieve." By standing firmly in the face of danger, Staff Sgt. Fetty demonstrated "that we really are there to help the people of Afghanistan," he said.

Staff Sgt. Fetty's actions had a ripple effect in Khost province, he said. Furious that terrorists would try to undo the progress being made, local leaders and mullahs staged a peace rally following the would-be attack. They decreed acts of violence "unIslamic," Cdr. Wade said, and helped get word out to the people "that the United States and coalition are truly here to help."

Cdr. Wade said he's glad Staff Sgt. Fetty is being recognized for his actions, "and for the tactical and strategic impact he had."

"It was an incredible honor to have served with him," he said.

Proctor continued from Page 26

stood his ground in the compound, firing over 25 rounds from his M16 into the cab of the vehicular suicide bomb. He did not waver-he did not flinch, engaging the vehicle head-on as it was moving toward him and the remaining Soldiers in the building. He killed the driver of the dump truck before the truck could enter further into the interior of the compound. The vehicular suicide bomb detonated causing significant destruction from the point of the explosion. Sgt. Proctor was mortally wounded where he made his stand against the attack.

"Sgt. Joseph Proctor saved countless lives that fateful day by stopping the driver before he could reach his objective. His actions were nothing less than heroic and embody the warrior ethos by his selfless courage. His actions are in keeping with the finest traditions of military service and reflect distinct credit upon himself, the Indiana National Guard and the United States Army."

Roll call
of the fallen

Operation Iraqi Freedom

Spc. Michael B. Alleman, 31, Logan, Utah, Feb. 23, 2009 ◆ Staff Sgt. Roberto Andrade Jr., 26, Chicago, Ill., Jan. 18, 2009 ◆ Staff Sgt. Justin L. Bauer, 24, Loveland, Colo., Jan. 10, 2009 ◆ Staff Sgt. Mark C. Baum, 32, Telford, Pa., Feb. 21, 2009 ◆ Spc. Brian M. Connelly, 26, Union Beach, N.J., Feb. 26, 2009 ◆ Pvt. Grant A. Cotting, 19, Corona, Calif., Jan. 24, 2009 ◆ Staff Sgt. Anthony D. Davis, 29, Daytona Beach, Fla., Jan. 6, 2009 ◆ Staff Sgt. Jonathan W. Dean, 25, Henagar, Ala., Dec. 20, 2008 ◆ Lt. Col. Garnet R. Derby, 44, Missoula, Mont., Feb. 9, 2009 ◆ Staff Sgt. Sean D. Diamond, 41, Dublin, Calif., Feb. 15, 2009 ◆ Spc. James M. Dorsey, 23, Beardstown, Ill., Feb. 8, 2009 ◆ 1st Lt. William E. Emmert, 36, Lincoln, Tenn., Feb. 24, 2009 ◆ Sgt. Jose R. Escobedo Jr., 32, Albuquerque, N.M., March 20, 2009 ◆ Spc. Darrell L. Fernandez, 25, Truth or Consequences, N.M., Jan. 31, 2009 ◆ Spc. Tony J. Gonzales, 20, Newman, Calif., Dec. 28, 2008 ◆ Sgt. Kyle J. Harrington, 24, Swansea, Mass., Jan. 24, 2009 ◆ Pfc. Coleman W. Hinkefent, 19, Coweta, Okla., Dec. 20, 2008 ◆ 1st Lt. Daniel B. Hyde, 24, Modesto, Calif., Mar. 7, 2009 ◆ Pfc. Albert R. Jex, 23, Phoenix, Ariz., Feb. 9, 2009 ◆ Chief Warrant Officer Matthew G. Kelley, 30, Cameron, Mo., Jan. 26, 2009 ◆ Pfc. Christopher W. Lotter, 20, Chester Heights, Pa., Dec. 31, 2008 ◆ Pvt. Sean P. McCune, 20, Euless, Texas, Jan. 11, 2009 ◆ Cpl. Michael L. Mayne, 21, Burlington Flat, N.Y., Feb. 23, 2009 ◆ Cpl. Gary L. Moore, 25, Del City, Okla., March 16, 2009 ◆ Pfc. Zachary R. Nordmeyer, 21, Indianapolis, Ind., Feb. 23, 2009 ◆ Spc. Stephen M. Okray, 21, St. Claire Shores, Mich., Dec. 24, 2008 ◆ Maj. John P. Pryor, 42, Moorestown, N.J., Dec. 25, 2008 ◆ Sgt. Jeffrey A. Reed, 23, Chesterfield, Va., Mar. 2, 2009 ◆ Pfc. Jonathan R. Roberge, 22, Leominster, Mass., Feb. 9, 2009 ◆ Pfc. Jessica Y. Sarandrea, 22, Miami, Fla., Mar. 3, 2009 ◆ Staff Sgt. Christopher G. Smith, 28, Grand Rapids, Mich., Dec. 24, 2008 ◆ Chief Warrant Officer Milton E. Suggs, 51, Lockport, La., Jan. 30, 2009 ◆ Cpl. Stephen S. Thompson, 23, Tulsa, Okla., Feb. 14, 2009 ◆ Spc. Christopher P. Sweet, 28, Kahului, Hawaii, Feb. 6, 2009 ◆ Chief Warrant Officer Joshua M. Tillery, 31, Beaverton, Ore., Jan. 26, 2009 ◆ Chief Warrant Officer Benjamin H. Todd, 29, Colville, Wash., Jan. 26, 2009 ◆ Pfc. Benjamin B. Tollefson, 22, Concord, Calif., Dec. 31, 2008 ◆ Pfc. Ricky L. Turner, 20, Athens, Ala., Jan. 16, 2009 ◆ Pfc. Cwislyn K. Walter, 19, Honolulu, Hawaii, Feb. 19, 2009 ◆ Sgt. Joshua A. Ward, 30, Scottsville, Ky., Feb. 9, 2009 ◆ Chief Warrant Officer Philip E. Windorski Jr., 35, Bovey, Minn., Jan 26, 2009 ◆ Spc. Stephen G. Zapasnik, 19, Broken Arrow, Okla., Dec. 24, 2008

Operation Enduring Freedom

Sgt. Christopher P. Abeyta, 23, of Midlothian, Ill., Mar. 15, 2009 ◆ Staff Sgt. Jeremy F. Bessa, 26, Woodridge, Ill., Feb. 20, 2009 ◆ Capt. Brian M. Bunting, 29, Potomac, Md., Feb. 24, 2009 ◆ Staff Sgt. Jason Burkholder, 27, Elida, Ohio, Feb. 8, 2009 ◆ Spc. Norman L. Cain III, 22, of Oregon, Ill., Mar 15, 2009 ◆ Spc. Ezra Dawson, 31, Las Vegas, Nev., Jan. 17, 2009 ◆ Pfc. Patrick A. Devoe, II, 27, Auburn, N.Y., Mar. 8, 2009 ◆ Spc. Keith E. Essary, 20, Dyersburg, Tenn., Jan. 8, 2009 ◆ Cpl. Charles P. Gaffney Jr., 42, Phoenix, Ariz., Dec. 24, 2008 ◆ Pfc. Adam J. Hardt, 19, Avondale, Ariz., March 22, 2009 ◆ Spc. Joseph M. Hernandez, 24, Hammond, Ind., Jan. 9, 2009 ◆ Master Sgt. David Hurt, 36, Tucson, Ariz., Feb. 20, 2009 ◆ Maj. Brian M. Mescall, 33, Hopkinton, Mass., Jan. 9, 2009 ◆ Sgt. 1st Class Raymond J. Munden, 35, Mesquite, Texas, Feb. 16, 2009 ◆ Spc. Jason R. Parsons, 24, Lenoir, N.C., Jan. 9, 2009 ◆ Sgt. Schuyler B. Patch, 25, Owasso Okla., Feb. 24, 2009 ◆ Sgt. Joshua L. Rath, 22, Decatur, Ala., Jan. 8, 2009 ◆ Spc. Simone A. Robinson, 21, Dixmoor, Ill., Mar. 1, 2009 ◆ Staff Sgt. Marc J. Small, 29, Collegville, Pa., Feb. 12, 2009 ◆ 1st Lt. Jared W. Southworth, 26, Oakland, Ill., Feb. 8, 2009 ◆ Sgt. Scott B. Stream, 39, Mattoon, Ill., Feb. 24, 2009 ◆ Sgt. Daniel J. Thompson, 24, Madison, Wis., Feb. 24, 2009 ◆ Staff Sgt. Joshua R. Townsend, 30, Solvang, Calif., Jan. 16, 2009 ◆ Spc. Robert M. Weinger, 24, of Round Lake Beach, Ill., Mar. 15, 2009

Editor's note: This is a continuation of the list that was started with the October 2003 issue of the NCO Journal and contains those names released by the Department of Defense between December 18, 2008 and March 26, 2009.

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