

The NCO Journal

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A Quarterly Forum for Professional Development



The NCO/Officer Relationship

The NCO Journal

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Our mission is to provide a forum for the open exchange of ideas and information, to support training, education and development of the NCO Corps and to foster a closer bond among its members.

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Covers

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Art supplied by CSM (Ret) Gary Boggs, page 9; Jose J. Diaz de Leon, pages 10-11; SP4 Carl Toti, page 15; and Frank Hughes, page 17.

News and Issues

Clothing Reg Update

The Army's revised clothing regulation (AR 670-1) is available to all units through their publications office. The revised AR, dated 1 September 1992, begins with two pages of bullets listing additions, deletions and clarifications to uniform wear and appearance.

Some of the changes include lifting the ban on starching of the battle dress uniform (BDUs); clarifies policy for blousing trousers; authorizes the wear of awards on AG 415 shirt; clarifies possession policy on combat boots; adds new all weather coat; adds grooming and hygiene statement; deletes AG 344 pantsuit and AG 344 skirt; changes the physical fitness uniform to clothing bag item and revises wear and policy for PT uniform.

NCOs need to become familiar with the changes in the new clothing regulation. Questions or concerns regarding the wear and appearance of Army uniforms and insignia should be addressed to major command uniform board officials or to DA Headquarters, SGM Taylor, DSN 225-6361.

FM 100-5 Nears Publication

A preliminary draft of the revised Army FM 100-5, now titled *Operations*, was distributed throughout the Army for review and comments before October.

"We consulted as much of the Army as we could in the revision of our basic doctrine," said GEN Frederick M. Franks, Jr., TRADOC commander. The other services participated as well.

"Through these discussions, the Army informs itself about the need for revision of the doctrine and what the basic outlines of the revision will be."

Having the Army leadership review and comment on the draft continues those discussions, according to CPT Mike Whetston, a TRADOC staff officer working on the revision.

"Comments were due back to us by October 23, 1992," Whetston said. "As part of the review and critique process,

there may be one more draft for Army leadership to comment on. The final version is scheduled to be published this spring."

Franks said Army doctrine isn't based on possible scenarios in any part of the world, but rather is a statement of principles of how to think about the employment of Army forces as part of the joint team.

The revised doctrine reflects the principles of Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1 recently approved by GEN Colin Powell, JCS chairman, Franks said. That doctrine espouses joint warfare conducted by American armed forces.

The Army manual also deals with operations other than war.

"Our Army needs to have the versatility to be able to think about other operations—counternarcotics operations going on now in Central and South America; humanitarian operations, Provide Comfort in eastern Turkey. Our doctrine lays out the principles of how to think about these things," Franks said.

TRADOC News Service

'User Friendly' Physical Fitness Manual Published

Soldiers and supervisors will find it easier to answer specific physical fitness questions with the revised *Physical Fitness Training Manual—FM 21-20*. The FM doesn't change standards or exercises of the Army physical fitness test, but does include features designed to help make it easier to develop proper physical training programs.

Chapters on circuit training, grass and guerilla drills, aquatics, environmental considerations, injury prevention and APFT procedures make the revised version more 'user friendly,' according to Frank Palkoska, chief of doctrine for the Army Physical Fitness School. In addition, line drawings replace photos because they illustrate exercises better.

"People have the mistaken assumption that soldiers train to pass the

APFT," Palkoska said. "The APFT is a commanders' tool to check the level of physical conditioning of their soldiers."

TRADOC News Service

SDT Update

More than 125,000 NCOs who have taken the new Self Development Test during the first year of validation have averaged answering 70 percent of the questions correctly.

Officials expect scores to go up when SDT results become part of the Enlisted Personnel Management System (EPMS) in FY 94, and when soldiers become more familiar with the new FM 25-101, *Battle Focused Training*.

The SDT is aimed at NCOs from sergeant through sergeant first class. It replaces Skill Qualification Test, which was taken by all enlisted ranks in skill levels 10 through 40.

Individual tests are being ironed out to remove any bugs before SDTs are linked to EPMS in 1994.

The key element to the test is in the title—self development. "Soldiers study and prepare on their own time," said Jim Tripp, deputy director of individual training evaluation for the Army Training Support Center. "The unit's role, basically, is to provide support by making sure that NCOs have access to reference material they need to study."

The SDT is a three-part, 100-question, multiple choice answer examination. The leadership and training management sections each have 20 questions. The MOS portion has 60.

A two-year validation period began Oct. 1, 1991. During the first year only active Army and active Guard reserve NCOs were tested. Reserve component soldiers began taking the SDT Oct. 1.

TRADOC fielded 583 SDTs in the first year of validation, for 88 percent of existing NCO skill levels and 98 percent of the soldiers. By FY 95, all MOSes will have tests.

TRADOC News Service

(continued page 2)

News and Issues

Iron Curtain Museum

The founder of an Iron Curtain Museum is requesting photos, stories, uniforms, insignia and other memorabilia from U.S. Army border patrol soldiers and other involved DoD personnel.

The recently established museum will accurately preserve the physical set-up of the Communist-era fortifications near the town of Bad Sooden-Allendorf in the Werra River valley. Photos, accounts of local incidents, East German artifacts, etc., are also featured.

Interested contributors may contact the founder, Herr Heuckeroth-Hartmann, at Im Kann 20, 3437 Bad Sooden-Allendorf, Germany.

*LTC David J. Barnes
Cdr., 423d MI, USAR, Southfield, Mich.*

Upgrading EO and Sexual Harassment Prevention Training

Upgraded training in TRADOC leader courses in areas of equal opportunity and sexual harassment prevention begins this month when revised leadership manuals and regulations incorporate them into leadership doctrine.

The actions aren't a result of recent highly-publicized cases of sexual abuse in the military, according to Jim Ligon, a TRADOC leader development analyst. Those cases just underline the need for such training, he said.

"In 1989, we did a review of our leader development programs and found that equal opportunity and sexual harassment prevention training needed upgrading. Development of new training support material was directed in 1989 and reemphasized last summer."

TRADOC commandants and installation commanders will also establish training for all personnel assigned to their schools and posts. Equal opportunity advisors will conduct unit and school training. Upgraded training will be included in courses ranging from initial entry to the Command and General Staff Officers course.

TRADOC News Service

2+2 Housing Now 2+1

The Army is planning a 15-year program to upgrade and improve the quality of barracks for junior enlisted and NCOs (see the *Journal*, Fall 92, pages 16-17, for photos of some upgraded facilities at various installations).

Plans initially called for two soldiers sharing a bath and toilet with two other soldiers—thus 2+2. Now, each pair of roommates will have their own bath and toilet. Specialists and below will have a minimum of 110 square feet of space (not 90 as reported) with built-in clos-

ets. NCOs will have 135 square feet. Floor plans will vary, depending on layout of original barracks, the geographical location and environmental factors. Upgrading continues at Forts Hood, Bragg, Lewis, Stewart, Benning, Campbell and other installations, according to CSM James E. Skellion, Corps of Engineers. "The aim is to increase quality of life, with accessibility to commissary, post exchange and other facilities within easy walking distance."

CSM James E. Skellion

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The NCO Journal

"The Sargents... must read and write, be well trained in martial matters, yea and of soe great importance that more tolerable it were that all the other officers of the company and the captaine himself to be rawe men and of little experience, but the sargents not soe."

—A Discourse of Militaire Discipline, 1634

I don't think there's a better statement to introduce the importance of our role as NCOs in building our relationship with the officers of our Army. As a matter of fact, our experience and education is so vital to this process that this edition's theme is dedicated to "NCO/Officer Relationships."

It's our experience, coupled with respect and loyalty, that we must bring to any relationship with our officers, be it in command or staff assignments. "Of course the officer has to be a receptive fellow in the process," said LTC Paul Eaton, G-3, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, N.Y. during our videoconference on the subject. (See pgs. 12-14)

However, we NCOs must remember it is *OUR* duty and responsibility to teach, train and mentor the officer on our NCO education system, roles and responsibilities, leadership skills, and command team attitudes. The officer who fails, often does so because an NCO dropped the ball on one or all of the above. As a matter of fact I just read an article in May/June 1992 edition of *Armor Magazine*, pg. 21, "Remembering: Two Officers, Two Outcomes - The Difference was People," which touched on this subject. It also illustrated what happens when an officer has "stars in his eyes." Our spring edition will carry an "Encore" article on that aspect of command relationships.

All levels of command team building are covered in this issue. Make it a must read for your NCOs and officers. Why not consider this topic for an NCO and officer professional development class?

As you move on through the pages of this issue, also remember my staff and I are already working on the spring edition (April 93), which carries the theme "Protecting the Force." Manuscript deadline is February 1. Photos and artwork are needed by February 19. We don't care if you don't write like Hemingway. Just get your ideas to us by phone or by pen and paper. We also need artwork and photos to illustrate our stories. This is **YOUR Journal**. Help us by getting the things in each edition that our NCO Corps needs to develop professionally.

The Summer (July 93) issue will cover "Training for A Changing Army." Manuscript deadline is May 1. Art and photos are needed by May 14.

Again, I'll stress: **"THIS IS YOUR JOURNAL."** We need to know what you think about the *Journal* (good or bad) and what you want to see on its pages. We want to put you in print.

Brenda L. Harte

Editor-in-Chief

EAH

Instilling Pride

By CSM Ron R. Semon
and LTC Cole Kingsced

NCOs who understand the importance of morale and esprit know that instilling unit pride contributes significantly to combat readiness.

Unit pride consists of four fundamental components: the establishment of a positive command climate, confidence in the members of a command, trust in the organization and a strong sense of affiliation to a specific unit.

Command Climate

Command climate is the conduit for developing unit pride and morale. Soldiers need to feel that their leaders are receptive to their needs. The fulfillment of those soldier needs establishes a certain command climate. That climate evolves into a strong sense of identity for the command and its leaders. Only the leader, regardless of the level, can set the stage for the development of a positive climate in a unit.

Leaders create a positive command climate by "focusing" the unit. They explain expectations of proficiency, leadership and soldiers for the next six, 12 and 18 months of training. Then, they encourage senior leaders to delegate to subordinates. They teach, coach and mentor the officer/NCO relationship in leadership and training.

Leaders establish a positive climate by consistently and promptly recognizing good performance. Soldiers link good performance to such simple signs as hand shakes, "pats" on the back, certificates of achievement, small unit leadership badges, immediate presentations of marksmanship awards at unit formations and speciality awards such as public recognition of professional excellence. For example, leaders miss an

excellent opportunity if they fail to pin an expert infantryman's badge to the chest of a soldier who completes the grueling competition. Public ceremonies with dignitaries and families can follow, but the soldier will never be prouder than the moment he earns the expert infantryman's badge or any badge of distinction.

Another important factor in building cohesion centers on the frequency leaders talk to soldiers. Most leaders will readily claim they have an excellent rapport with the troops but that perception is often one-sided. In addition to normal operations, noncommissioned officers should brief their platoons and squads daily. Remember, informed soldiers perform better than soldiers who must consistently grasp for information about training schedules, leader expectations, and unit policies.

Confidence

Confidence is the faith or belief that one will act in a right, proper, or effective way. In a military unit, soldiers must have confidence in themselves, their fellow soldiers and in their leaders. Patton once called self confidence the twin brother of leadership. In Patton's estimation, a confident soldier was a trained soldier. Above all, units with enormous pride share the common feature of well trained troops at every skill level. Professional competence is directly related to confidence. Competence is also a function of grade. Specialists are expected to know more about their weapons because they teach privates how to use them.

Team leaders and squad leaders have the primary responsibility to train soldiers. Fulfilling this responsibility begets self confidence in the soldiers and leads to soldier confidence in the leader. Self confidence contributes to and frequently creates success. Successful comple-

tion of individual tasks manifests itself in successful completion of the unit's collective tasks and ultimately the training mission.

Soldiers must also have confidence in their fellow soldiers. They must feel comfortable that the soldier on their left and right can be depended upon to perform their specific tasks to standard. Gunners must know their assistant gunners are as familiar with a crew served weapon as they are. Team members must know that they may take over the team and assume the mission if casualties occur.

Additionally, soldiers must have confidence in their leaders. Soldiers will follow a squad leader who exudes the physical and mental stamina to lead from the front. They will follow a platoon sergeant whom they know has mastered the tactical skills necessary for mission accomplishment.

Confidence in leadership breeds loyalty. Loyalty from the top down is just as important as loyalty from the bottom up... but, less prevalent.

Confidence in the leadership also breeds loyalty to a unit's leaders. Often, we make a great deal about loyalty from the bottom up. However, loyalty from the top down is just as important and unfortunately less prevalent. Leaders have the responsibility to ensure that subordinate leaders and soldiers en-

trusted to their care have opportunities to be competitive for advancement. Demand high standards and insist they attend military and civilian schooling. Soldiers may initially not appreciate your insistence; however, they will know you care and this breeds loyalty.

Trust

Trust in one's organization is another indispensable characteristic of units known for their pride and comradeship. As proficiency increases in units that concentrate on small unit training, so does trust. The more times small units meet or exceed the standard, the more cohesion evolves. Training becomes a team effort and leadership is participative.

Leaders build trust by actions, not by words. Trust is not easily obtained, but it is easily lost the first time the command fails to lead properly or train its soldiers. Soldiers constantly assess the dependability and effectiveness of the unit's leadership. They're the leaders' most staunch advocates and most severe critics in an on-going process. As this trust evolves between the leader and the soldiers, a sense of belonging to the unit and the desire to excel will prevail.

The same trust is true in senior-subordinate relationships. Commanders must empower subordinates with the authority and responsibility to execute missions. Junior noncommissioned officers perform better if they believe that the commander and senior NCO support channel have trust in their abilities to execute assigned tasks. Hold leaders personally accountable for their subordinates. There may be growing pains with this approach, but once everyone comes on board, leaders will have a winning team.

A Sense of Belonging

The final ingredient in establishing pride in a unit is the development of a sense of affiliation to a winning organization that's rich in tradition and that cares for the soldiers in the command. Moreover, it's not enough to feel just a part of the team. Soldiers must feel that they're making an important contribution to that team.

Leaders must welcome each young soldier and family to the command as they would want to be welcomed them-

selves. The leader must assign a sponsor who is receptive to the needs to a newly arrived replacement. Commanders and first sergeants should interview all newly arrived personnel. They must inculcate that soldier in the proud heritage and traditions of the unit. It's "OK" for platoon sergeants to proudly state their platoon has the most EIB recipients in the battalion or the best SAW gunner in the company.

Special activities that distinguish one unit from another are tools that create unit pride. Some units sponsor "home-away-from-home" events, such as unit Christmas parties, family nights at the dining facility, boxing "smokers" or unit

Don't disregard soldiers in planning activities to generate unit pride. Some of the best ideas come from individual soldiers in command information classes.

support of a local school or charity. Consistent, purposeful unit activities such as monthly battalion runs, company teams in all post athletic leagues, maintenance competitions to determine the best driver in each category, are also useful. Formal dining-ins and dining-outs also contribute to the unity of the command. These activities promote cohesion and allow for family members to be part of and enjoy the traditions of the Army.

Family functions such as unit religious retreats and organization days may also create a sense of affiliation to the command. Strong family support groups also send a clear signal to the families that they're as important to the command as the soldiers themselves. Make families proud of what their soldiers do for the Army.

Finally, don't disregard the soldiers

in planning activities to generate pride. Some of the best ideas we observed in units came from individual soldiers in command information classes. One soldier asked if it were possible to obtain a distinctive battalion certificate to commemorate participation in a major international exercise. Battalion or company coins of excellence are also popular with the troops. Some companies post company honor rolls to list the names of noncommissioned officers and their squad members who won squad tactical competitions.

Make the soldiers feel special to be members of a winning team. Solicit soldiers' comments, let them help plan events, suggest ideas and make them part of the team. The first sergeant, platoon sergeant and squad leader must play the role of cheerleaders and encourage the soldiers to excel. Challenge the soldiers to continue the proud legacy of the soldiers who preceded them. Push the identity of the company and the battalion. You will know you're successful when soldiers begin identifying and boasting about their squad and platoon, as well as their company and battalion.

Conclusion

Noncommissioned officers make major contributions to establishing pride in their respective units by being mindful of the qualities and characteristics soldiers like to see in the organizations of which they are a part. It's the spirit of the soldiers who follow and the leaders who lead that produces combat ready units. Well trained and well led soldiers are confident of victory. They ensure success because they have the confidence, trust and strong association to units with a rich heritage.

Does your command have such squads, platoons or companies? You don't even have to ask the leaders, because you can see it on the faces of the soldiers. When they salute smartly and thunder the name of their regiment or company, you have soldiers who are proud of their heritage, soldiers who will fight and win this nation's wars.

Semon was CSM, U.S. Corps of Cadets, West Point, N.Y., when he co-authored the article with Kingsseed, an associate professor of history at the Academy.

Building Teams That Work

NOW

By SFC Douglas C. Sleeth

As a leader who learns best from hands-on situations, few "Great Captains" have seriously affected my development. I've read about Patton, MacArthur and others, but they can't teach me like a live role model can.

One such living example was CPT (now major) Ronald H. Davidson. When I was a young sergeant he taught me three valuable lessons, which helped form the basis of my outlook on leadership.

□ Whenever a soldier initially fails to perform to standard, an NCO is generally responsible (or to blame). How many times do we go around finger pointing at young troops who couldn't meet some standard? Some soldiers are simply apathetic, but there are those who never knew what the standard was.

CPT Davidson came across to me as the guardian angel of young soldiers. Don't get me wrong. When a soldier failed through design or neglect, the ton of bricks would appropriately fall right on his head. Molly-coddling was not tolerated, but training soldiers was expected.

□ The rank of (buck) sergeant is the toughest enlisted rank in the Army. This was an extension of the first lesson. CPT Davidson knew that specialists, all too often, got promoted without real appreciation of their duties, responsibilities and authority as NCOs. Therefore, he was empathetic whenever he saw a sergeant in need of a "hip-pocket" class.

Without going into details, I remember vividly a lesson in vehicle maintenance he gave me. Had I been wearing a "rocker" or two on my collar, I would have gotten a real butt-chewing. But since it was clear I had no idea what I was doing and even clearer that no one had ever shown me, he took a fatherly approach.

□ Accounting for government property is important. This seems like the understatement of the year, but consider my unit. Until CPT Davidson took command, I never heard of a 100 percent change of command inventory. The property book had changed several hands based upon trust instead of physical accountability.

As you might guess, we had a (AR) 15-6 investigation. I was constantly awestruck by CPT Davidson's attention to every detail. Out of all the lug wrenches, pliers, tire chains and jacks, he knew my screwdriver was too small. That was all he would say.

and THEN

Fresh out of West Point, replete in Sam Brown and saber, shavetail 2LT Ralph E. Haines, Jr., reported to his first post and assignment—Fort Bliss and the 8th Cavalry.

It was 1935—a time when NCOs spoke to officers in the third person.

"First Sergeant White, a man of great wisdom and perception, said he felt the lieutenant would want to know the names of the men in the second platoon and get to know the horses and mules as soon as possible," Haines said.

"He guided me to his office where there was a photograph of all 80 men in the company. My platoon had 25 men. First Sergeant White told me I could play back and forth between the photos and the records until I knew the men."

"First Sergeant White said, 'I've instructed the stable sergeant to show the lieutenant the horses,' and I repeated the association exercise in the stables. Of course the horses had vari-

ous markings but they also had brands on the left side of their necks with a letter and three numbers. I started learning about the horses at just about dusk and finished with a flashlight.

"The next morning at roll call there was no 'Hey you, trooper.' I could walk up to Private Jones, for instance, call him by name, and tell him I thought 'Old Baldy' seemed to be a little gimpy and that his horseshoes needed checking out. I could ask about this man's wife and children, or ask another how he felt about his home town.

"The point is, my NCOs protected my integrity. They gave me a prime lesson in leadership. First Sergeant White knew that knowing about my men and the horses was a key ingredient in integrating me into the platoon and establishing a good working relationship."

SFC Douglas C. Sleeth is NCOIC, 701st MI Bde NCODC, Augsburg, Germany.

As related by GEN (Ret) Ralph E. Haines.

Five Steps to Success

By ISG Grover L. Watters

I've read many articles about the commander and first sergeant relationship which helped me form my own ideas of how that team should be established. However, it wasn't until I became a first sergeant that I realized how vital the union of these two leaders is in forming a strong company command team and setting the command's climate.

Teamwork is the element that makes or breaks the relationship. The 'how' of working together has kept many a good commander and first sergeant baffled. In some cases, attempts at working together failed because there wasn't mutual cooperation. There has to be a bond between these two leaders before they can form their team. That bond building can be done by working on five elements: relationship, responsibilities, loyalty, duty and goals.

RELATIONSHIP - The commander and first sergeant relationship has to be one of mutual understanding and respect. They must share experiences and ideas both good and bad. They must take each other into consideration and give honest responses. Openness leads to proper sharing between the team. Friendship is also important. Not 'buddy buddy,' but one of personal concern for each other and their family.

My commander and I understand each other's hobbies and what's important in our lives outside the Army. This helps us to better understand where the other is coming from.

RESPONSIBILITIES - These are well defined in AR 600-20. The commander is responsible for everything and the first sergeant implements. Share tasks. Do it in any manner that is comfortable for both leaders.

As first sergeant, I have taken the task of monitoring weight control, the PT program, awards and NCOERs and building and lawn maintenance. The

commander's main focus is on training. These may seem like the traditional roles but the most important point is that we divide the responsibility and share the load.

LOYALTY - This is the element that bonds the team. Loyalty to and from each other must run deep. There is unquestionable loyalty between my commander and me. We understand and support each other. We openly discuss any problems we have and don't back stab or back door each other.

DUTY - This is professionalism at its best. I refer to GEN MacArthur's speech "Duty, Honor, Country." Both the commander and first sergeant must be truly professional and set high standards.

It's not uncommon for our command team to come to work early and stay late. One element that eases tensions early on is to know you can call on each other at any time and receive full support until the mission is complete.

GOALS - Short term goals must be established early along with the long term goals. These goals could last into the next change of command. But setting these goals does pay off.

My commander set a long term goal of a successful first gunnery for the company. The short term goals were to lock in crews early to ensure each has high UCOFT scores, have a good home station gunnery and walk away from SIMNET with each crew confident they could hit targets and maneuver as a platoon on the ground.


Well, we started out great, but ended up on Table VIII flat on our faces. Picking up the pieces and knowing the company

was trained, we rebuilt confidence that Table XII would be ours. In the end it was. Two platoons qualified distinguished and one qualified superior. We reached our long term goal as a result of short term goal accomplishment.

A command team forms if a commander and first sergeant work out the five elements discussed. That team has a sense of direction and duty built on mutual trust and will assist each other in accomplishing their mission.

In addition, it will be a soldier to soldier relationship that lasts throughout your military career as well as your personal lives. The team attitude will allow you both to lead your company and successfully take care of your soldiers and lead them where you want them to go.

Watters is ISG, Co C, 4th Bn, 12th Inf, 1st Armor Div, Baumholder, Germany.



Building the NCO/Officer Team

When Does the

By SFC Ron Rosier

The relationship between the officer and noncommissioned-officer sets the atmosphere of the unit, be it a squad, platoon or company. When does the process start? It starts when you look them in the eye, shake their hand and welcome them aboard. Listen to what they have to say (initial in-brief) and then have your heart-to-heart talk.

Sometimes the relationship may be perceived as an adversarial one with toleration on both sides being a dominating factor. Over-eager or inexperienced officers often try to muddle through tasks, sometimes messing things up, while their dedicated sergeants try to offer advice and guidance to keep them from falling on their sabers.

The same holds true for NCOs. There are officers in the field who are just super and there are some out there displaying a contemptuous attitude towards NCOs.

It's obvious that somewhere, sometime, an NCO let that officer down. That's right, a bad NCO dropped the ball. It only takes one bad NCO to turn an officer against the Corps.

The main intent of this article is to kindle some soul-searching and self-assessment on both sides (officer and non-commissioned) of the house.

The Vietnam War produced some negative effects on the Army's NCO Corps. Sergeant Major of the Army William A. Connelly, in an address before a TRADOC Command Sergeants Major Conference at Savannah, Georgia in November of 1977 expressed it this way:

"The years of Vietnam saw a decline in the role of the NCO. Officers took on many jobs formerly given to NCOs, perhaps because of a lack of faith in subordinates, or perhaps because many from the 'officer factories' of the 60s would have preferred to be NCOs in a more normal time and felt more comfortable doing the 'running' of the outfit. Vietnam was also the time for the 'instant NCO' graduate of 'combat leader courses' which turned out a staff sergeant with less than six months' service." He went on to say that there is not now—nor was there ever—any such thing as an "instant NCO," for the main ingredient, experience, was missing.

Looking back to that time, of which I caught the tail end, the train of thought was that officers had "usurped" NCO

responsibilities. It stemmed from the NCO choosing to relinquish some of that responsibility to that officer. In an essay titled, "The Corps of Noncommissioned Officers," Bainbridge wrote what should be a guide for all NCO/Officer relationships.

"No officer ever took anything away from the NCO—it was simply given away. The good NCO has never been short in confidence, either to perform the mission or to inform the superior that he or she was interfering with traditional NCO business.

When an NCO chose to relinquish some responsibility to a commissioned officer, he or she taught an officer that a sergeant couldn't or wouldn't perform a certain task."

During the last 18 years, I have progressed through the ranks from being a gunner to Howitzer section chief, gunnery sergeant, platoon sergeant/chief of firing battery. I've had my opportunity to work with good officers and convert the other ones. It took some blood, sweat and tears. I know they remember me and our accomplishments.

If you're in a situation where your relationship with your officer isn't as good as it should be, then it's time to check Appendix E of FM 25-100, which pertains to assessment.

You have to ask some hard questions. What is my current relationship status with my officer? Is it good? Can it be improved? Or can it be construed as a Low Intensity Conflict?

The questions to ask yourself are: What are my weak-points? How do I improve this area? Do I need outside help? Then talk to your officer. He will not think poorly of you. My platoon leaders didn't feel that way about me. Their insight coupled with guidance from my first sergeant helped to improve and develop my leadership ability.

In any relationship there are problem areas to identify and avoid. Here are just a few: Becoming too familiar, like using "first names," especially during the workday; off duty, out of uniform, then you have to set your own rules of engagement. Pride can be a good thing to have, but too much can cloud your judgment or slant your thinking. Mistakes happen every day. Forgive and forget, but don't make the same mistake twice. Constructive criticism helps to build and solidify the team concept. Being thin-skinned won't help the process. Criticism sprinkled with compassion, common sense and tact will go a long way to improve the bond between the officer and the NCO. Failing to think before you say something is one of the quickest ways to pooh pooh in your mess kit. So engage your brain before you take your mouth out of travel lock.

Process Begin?



A good officer and NCO relationship improves your unit morale, planning ability and mission accomplishment. The troops benefit from having a strong command element. Good relationships take some time to develop. There are no quick fixes. I hope I've kindled some soul searching and caused readers to assess or reassess their working relationship with their NCO or officer. Different methods can be used. The objective is to create a better working relationship between NCOs and officers, which increases unit readiness and allows the command team to evolve into a combat multiplier.


Rosier is a field artillery advisor to the New York Army National Guard.

What Officers Expect From NCOs

- *Loyalty, honesty and trust*
- *Technical and tactical proficiency*
- *Take charge attitude*
- *Sound and timely decision-making*
- *Concern and care for soldiers*

What NCOs Expect From Officers

- *Loyalty, honesty and trust*
- *Flexibility*
- *Sound and timely decision-making*
- *Communication skills*
- *Integrity and candor (forget politics)*



My LT

By CSM John D. Woodyard

If you've been around the Army for any length of time, you've heard a platoon sergeant speaking of "My LT". These words can be given any number of inflections to convey any number of emotions: pride, respect exasperation, etc. It's important for that platoon sergeant to remember that the "LT's" performance reflects not only the platoon leader's abilities but the platoon sergeant's abilities as well.

The earliest level of direct NCO/Officer relationship is at the platoon level, and it's here that foundations are laid and relationships formed which may last throughout a career. We can sum up the essence of this relationship in four "C's".

It's essential that the platoon leader and platoon sergeant begin with a **common goal**. If there is any question, the goal is simply good training, mission accomplishment and care of the troops. Orientation toward this goal begins with genuine, mutual respect—a recognition of the training, abilities and aspirations of each leader. It doesn't include an unhealthy preoccupation with personal rewards, evaluations or what "the boss" is going to think. If either of you is more worried about these things than about the mission and the soldiers, resolve it immediately or get out of the leadership business. Your soldiers will recognize and "tune out" a phony in a very short time.

In order to build **cohesion**, you should be seen together often (but not always). Some important places to spend your time are: the motor pool, training, sports, unit social activities and the dining facility. (If you want to get a true idea of how your soldiers eat, check the evening and weekend meals, not weekday lunch.) Prove to members of your platoon that you care about them as individuals and that you care for them as a team. You're not supposed to become buddies, but you must work together. Finally, ensure that the troops can't get around one of you by going to the other.

Platoon leaders and platoon sergeants must **communicate**. Good communications doesn't happen all by itself; it requires constant, conscious effort. Both sides must work at it; one person can't communicate. One of your earliest sessions will include your NCOER counseling. At this time, discuss who's responsible for what and ensure that neither can abdicate responsibilities. Set guidelines for how you will deal with routine business and how you will react to anything out of the ordinary.

Talk, talk, talk and listen, listen, listen. Then add some more "listen." Both of you should listen to guidance and directions from above, listen to your soldiers and to each other. Set aside time each day to discuss training, activities and problems. Be sure to include time for brainstorming—sounding out new ideas and improvements.

As platoon sergeant, you must be constantly aware of your role as teacher to your platoon leader. In most cases, you will be older, more experienced and more established as a leader. Your task is to convey your knowledge and experience to your lieutenant without being condescending or disrespectful. And remember—you're never so knowledgeable that you can't learn something new for yourself.

The next aspect of communication is so important I almost give it a "C" of its own. Meanwhile, timely **counseling** is absolutely necessary to maintain a motivated,

and Me

disciplined, smooth-running platoon. Counseling—to include rewards and punishments—is integral to caring for soldiers. In fact, it's as important as good training and good equipment. You and your platoon leader will work together to establish realistic, recognizable standards. Then, you must correct soldiers who fall short, recognize those who meet the standards and reward those who exceed them. It's not necessary for you to sit together during the counseling session, but you must counsel and you must communicate the results to each other.

As an NCO your professionalism should present a constant **challenge** to your platoon leader and to the soldiers assigned to you. Every day, you set the example in appearance, physical fitness, dependability and attitudes. If you slip, you give someone else an excuse to slip with you. When it comes to common task, MOS competence, weapons or general military knowledge, you must be the most proficient soldier in the platoon. If you're doing all of this, you will earn the same respect I heard in the voice of a young lieutenant a few days ago. He told me, "When I screw up, I don't worry about what the commander will say; I worry about what SFC Jones is going to think of me. I hate to let him down." Such respect does not come with the job; you earn it.

The final "C" I call **cover**. Be careful not to give this one the wrong connotation. Cover does *not* include covering up breaches of integrity or deliberate wrongdoing. It does mean that you create an environment where your lieutenant can make mistakes, learn and grow. You begin creating this environment by demanding proper military courtesy from the platoon members towards their platoon leader.

You must understand and weigh the relative inexperience of young officers in contrast to the amount of responsibility they carry. In addition to the platoon, most lieutenants will have a number of additional responsibilities. Most young officers need help managing their time. Teach them how to prioritize, plan and delegate. You will know that your leadership team is working well when their time is not eaten up with the routine running of the platoon.


Everyone makes mistakes. Lieutenants make their share. Your job here is twofold. First, make sure they learn from those mistakes. If a mistake is repeated, provide firm, pointed instruction to keep it from becoming a habitual problem.

The Army has done a superb job in recent years of teaching NCOs to train soldiers. We have placed less emphasis on the vital task of teaching young officers. However, if you're new at this business, help is available. Your best source is probably your first sergeant or an experienced, trusted platoon sergeant. Also, keep your eyes open for a commander or staff officer who works well with NCOs. This indicates a good first experience and chance for you to learn about the relationship from another angle. The 22-series of leadership publications provide another valuable source of information.

As you begin working with "your" LT, your first concern will be to provide the very best leadership possible for the platoon. But at the same time, you're training a future commander or staff officer and making an impression that will influence his/her relationship with NCOs for years to come. You have a big job, platoon sergeant; get to it.

Woodyard is CSM, 84th Ordnance Bn, Muenchweiler, Germany





The NCO Journal staff interviewed four command teams on this issue's theme, "The NCO and Officer Relationship." The participants give our NCO readership responses which represent a cross level of experience in several career fields from platoon to division staff. (See photos and captions for command team identification.)



LTC Paul D. Eaton, G-3, and MSG Donald L. Brumfield, acting G-3 SGM, serve as a division staff team, 10th Mountain Div, Ft. Drum, N.Y.

Walking

Q *What does it take to develop an effective working relationship between the NCO and officer?*

ISG Hand: Establish trust between you and your officer. Then sit down and explain what your experiences are and go over the unit's mission. Share each other's weak and strong points and be willing to train each other going into the job.

ISG Molinar: Open and honest communication between the commander and first sergeant. Trust each other and there won't be any problems.

CPT McKay: Be open for communication and be flexible, particularly if you are new going into the situation. It's very important for that new person to be openminded and not to make judgments. Rather than (just) observe, listen.

MSG Brumfield: Through mutual trust and experience—which will grow over time with you and your officer—and trial and error, you'll see how the other reacts to different situations. Keep communication open and honest.

LTC Eaton: Trust and communication are important. Only now am I getting to the point where I'm the same age as the NCOs I've been working with. So, I

would say officers need to exercise considerable humility and understand that the NCOs they're paired with have a wealth of experience. They should be willing to draw from that. The officer has to be a receptive fellow in the process.

Q *What is the most common "stopper" for NCOs and officers in establishing an effective relationship?*

CPT McKay: Working independently is a very critical stopper in building a command team. Officers and NCOs who feel comfortable with a micro-management style and believe their way is the only way (to do things) put a big stop in forming an effective command team.

MSG Brumfield: Lack of communication as well as talking rank-to-rank versus soldier-to-soldier. There's experience with the NCO... and it needs to be capitalized on. Rank-to-rank turns people off, it's a definite stopper.

Q *The NCO and officer share a common goal – accomplishment of unit mission – therefore some responsibilities overlap and some are shared. What are some ways to determine what is NCO business versus officer business?*

CSM Robinson: We all need to know our individual responsibilities and I don't think we know that across the board. Often NCOs and officers don't know their primary responsibilities. Duties overlap, and you have to sit down and talk about the commander's guidance and about boundaries. As senior NCOs, if that relationship is intact, then we also have input into his policy and guidance. Again, that comes about with a good command relationship built on honest communication....and being able to disagree without disrespect.

SFC Gerena: My lieutenant and I understand the shared responsibility. I must have a general understanding of what his duties are. He understands my responsibilities because he's tasking me. At times we must check each other out to make sure we're not crossing over into one another's business.

Q *Do you think NCOs and officers are "walking the talk" on building their relationships?*

CSM Robinson: I would say no. Sometimes we're not even talking the talk—for a number of reasons. Again, you



2LT Mark G. Jansen, platoon leader, paired with platoon sergeant SFC Ramon A. Gerena, form the command team for the 4th Platoon, Co A, 1/33rd Armor (INF), 2nd ACR, Ft. Lewis, Washington.



Photo by Brooke Medical Center PAO

CPT Donna McKay, commander, 1SG Douglas C. Hand, Co C, and 1SG Alberto Molinar, Co B, form company command teams for Troop Command, Brooke Medical Center, Ft. Sam Houston, Texas. McKay commands both companies.

and Talking the Talk

must know your individual responsibilities. And, we need to start the education process on both the officer and NCO sides at an earlier stage in their respective careers. There used to be a great disparity between the education levels of officers and NCOs. That's no longer true. Now we're talking about bridging the gap in education credentials as well as experience. Also, we need to think with a "team attitude." I enjoy my relationship with my commander because we can sit down and brainstorm, throw ideas around. We make it a team effort based on mutual respect.

LTC Southerland: It (walking the talk) is working much better at the senior grades. We're still having problems down at the captain, lieutenant, staff sergeant and sergeant first class ranks in being able to cross that bridge and do the things at the level we need to. Education and training is having a big impact on our Army, but I don't see that concept visibly displayed until you start getting into the senior grades.

CPT McKay: The Army's such a transitioning society that it's important to continue training. But as far as folks being educated in this (NCO/Officer relation-

ships), they aren't. Particularly at the junior NCO and officer level. Consider a second lieutenant who comes right out of college, into a basic course and then into a unit. What is lacking across the board is that they (new officers) aren't taught to look at an individual and the experience they have. Many new officers receive some training in what NCOs are. But these classes are taught by officers. These new officers are younger than the NCOs they lead. NCOs should teach their roles to these officers. Also, leadership skills don't develop in a vacuum. Individuals must possess some innate skills. New officers have an educational base but lack the experience. In order to bridge the gap, each group needs to better understand the other's role. This enhances the professional relationship and allow the team to better 'walk the talk.'

Q Many of our NCOs are exiting the ranks, at all levels, and doing so for different reasons (i.e., RCPs, separation incentives, etc.). Are any of you concerned about how the NCO Corps can maintain the continuity that NCOs bring to our Army and that officers are accustomed to?

LTC Southerland: I'm concerned about that, and it's not so much a concern about the NCOs we have today in the senior ranks, but those who are going to come along later—say another four to five years. What we're seeing here (Ft. Huachuca) is the majority of those exiting the ranks are folks at the sergeant and staff sergeant level. Those are the soldiers that are filling the gap between the soldiers that are on the streets today and the soldiers that are in the senior grades now. So, I'm concerned that down the road, as we start moving these soldiers and trying to fill up the senior ranks, we won't know where they (NCOs) will come from.

LTC Eaton: A while back I had contact with some Russian officers and their main comment was the singular difference between our Army and theirs—that being our professional NCO Corps and the continuity it brings our Army. (LTC Southerland's) point is well taken. We're losing many of the young NCOs, and officers as well. But, the NCO has that thread of continuity link to the sergeant first class positions. Losing it (the link) will make it difficult in the future



CSM Sandra Robinson and LTC Norman Southerland serve as the command team, 86th Signal Bn, 11th Signal Bde, Fort Huachuca, Ariz.

and we'll lose one of the singular strengths of our Army—the continuity the NCO Corps brings.

McKay: The Army made a good attempt to try to downsize, in a sense. I believe, however, it could've been dealt with in more depth. For example, looking at what is going on with the Army, we haven't looked at the long term effects. We've actually taken some MOSES and strangled them to a point where services are strained, delayed or non-existent. When you look at numbers, medical MOSES weren't hit as hard as others, but looking at our density what we did lose hurt. I really don't think they (DA) considered the long term effect as much as the numbers (needed to reduce the force).

CSM Robinson: It appears the long term effects weren't considered. There are good and bad sides about RCPs (retention control points). There comes a time when officers and enlisted lose their effectiveness. These soldiers often don't have the moral courage to say, "it's time for me to move on." So, sometimes the system has to assist them. Not only that, as senior NCOs, we must look to the future and do some things right now that will address those problems. Such as training and mentoring junior soldiers that will fill those gaps and adequately prepare them to assume greater responsibility at that junior level.

2LT Jansen: For the past 15 months I served as the platoon's leader and sergeant. I had a young and fairly inexperienced sergeant filling in. A lot of things were his job and maybe he didn't realize that, even though I counseled him on numerous occasions. It was a difficult relationship most of the time, which strained my relationships with other commanders and platoon leaders.

SFC Gerena: The biggest thing I find in platoons lately is younger soldiers don't have that first line supervisor, sergeant and staff sergeant, as mentor. The platoon sergeant isn't always there. In our changing Army many squads are being led by young specialists and PFCs because the sergeant and staff sergeants are gone. That leaves a large gap between the soldier and the platoon sergeant. The platoon sergeant can help develop those younger soldiers, but we still need that middle NCO who keeps the continuity.

Q *What do you look for or expect from your NCOs?*

LTC Eaton: The greatest thing I need from an NCO is the leadership traits that soldier can bring (to the position). I need that NCO to deal with soldiers with as much respect to them as possible. I tell NCOs to apply the Golden Rule: 'Treat those young (soldiers) the way you expected to be treated when you were in their place.' Establish that bond with your subordinates. I view that as a leadership challenge to that NCO.

LTC Southerland: You can take a lot out of textbooks that you would like to see in an NCO. But, if you look at tactical and technical proficiency and can find someone who exercises good common sense in decision-making and job accomplishment; takes charge when in charge; counsels soldiers, good and bad; understands and assumes responsibility for caring for soldier families—then you have someone you want.

CPT McKay: I like my NCOs to talk to me with honesty and openness. Tell me if I'm wrong. The key to a (strong) NCO, particularly in the technical field, is knowing their NCO responsibilities as well as their technical skills. Often we find where a soldier is very good technically but they forget they wear those stripes, too. They forget the leadership traits and skills and the total Army concept. I look for an NCO who does both.

Q *What do you look for and expect from your officers?*

SFC Gerena: The biggest thing I've always seen is loyalty and confidence. My lieutenant is honest and true to his word. He keeps me well informed. I find that officers who don't, sometimes are lost.

CSM Robinson: You can't say enough about honesty and dialogue. I look for an officer who...isn't afraid to make decisions, is there to provide the leadership and guidance, cares about soldiers enough to say 'good job,' is innovative, meaning looking at where we're going in the future; knows that just because we've done it that way doesn't mean we must continue; realizes that two or more heads are better than one; is respectful, for opinions and input, and is willing to listen to and accept alternatives and suggestions for resolving problems.

1SG Hand: I expect them to share the same genuine care and concern for soldiers.

1SG Molinar: My commander knows my strengths and weaknesses and provides me the guidance I look for and need.

MSG Brumfield: I look for mutual trust and openness. You have to have a working relationship where initiative is expected as well as demanded. Mistakes must be treated as a learning process. The 'zero defect' Army doesn't cut it. I need someone I can count on for guidance, not micro-management; who expects and demands high standards of me, but is going to be fair at the same time.

Q *If you could share one piece of advice to another NCO and officer entering a command team what would that advice be?*

SFC Gerena: Keep an open mind and establish an effective line of communication.

1SG Hand: Listen to your NCO support chain and your soldiers.

CPT McKay: Come into your new position with all the positive energy you can. Share advice, mutually.

MSG Brumfield: Sit down, close the door, work out problems, define duties, etc. Then work on a trial and error basis.

LTC Eaton: Get in the NCO's head. Find out what he can do. Develop that soldier to soldier relationship with your NCO.

LTC Southerland: Sit down and talk right away, and not in a one-way conversation. Discuss mission, goals, responsibilities, expectations, pet peeves, all that stuff. Sometimes you can't do that in the comfort of an office. But you must do it and do it immediately.

The NCO Corps

More Than the Backbone

By GEN (Ret) Frederick E. Kroesen

As a consequence of the end of the Cold War, Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei F. Akhromeyev visited the U. S. as a guest of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. On a visit to Ft. Hood, Tex., he observed III Corps tactics and techniques of armor warfare that served so well in the Persian Gulf War.

Upon his return to Washington, Marshal Akhromeyev's comments to the Army Chief of Staff about our Abrams tank, Bradley fighting vehicle and our battle tactics were relatively perfunctory when compared with one more surprising observation. *He was, he said, astounded by the role played by the noncommissioned officers of the command.* They gave briefings, directed activities and answered questions. They were in charge much of the day. Most important, they were obeyed with alacrity and treated with great respect by the enlisted soldiers and commissioned officers, alike. In his career, the marshal hadn't seen their like in any army, certainly not in the Red Army where authority and responsibility rested only with commissioned officers and political commissars.

The classical representation of the role of NCOs has for years identified him as "the backbone of the Army," an accolade that brings to mind a vision of stalwarts who guarantee the honor, integrity, fortitude and *esprit de corps* of the force. I would not want to alter that vision, for it is an apt portrayal of a vital role an NCO must play; nevertheless, it

has long been my contention that the analogy fails to portray the far greater scope and responsibility associated with the corps of men and women.

In my view, the NCO corps provides not only a skeleton on which to hang the body but, more important, the nerve sys-

tem that allows the body to function.

When a finger touches hot metal, nodes of the nerve system make sure not only that the finger reacts but also that the whole hand recoils. The arm withdraws automatically, and the brain is informed so that follow-on action can be initiated.

Nerves dictate the first response, quick reaction, while allowing the brain to decide whether to "send for the doctor" or "turn off the stove," or both. It is just that kind of role that the NCO corps must fulfill in any successful army.

The fundamental mission of the NCO corps is automatic execution of the doctrine, the customs and the orders of a command. It is the assurance of execution that guarantees that an army can function in accord with its plans and the intentions of its commanders. It is the NCO complement of any command that watches over the conduct of soldiers as they do their duty in response to the dictates and desires of the chain of command.

The NCO must also be prepared to substitute for the officer corps. Every NCO is familiar with the exigencies of the service that results in him having to serve as the alter ego of the lieutenant or captain who is "not yet assigned," who departed before his replacement arrived, or who went on six weeks of schooling or temporary duty. During those periods, motivation and leadership, normally the responsibilities of the commissioned officer, devolve also on the NCO. The



Infantry School teaches lieutenants that "Follow me!" is their creed; when lieutenants are absent, sergeants step forward.

A final NCO responsibility, one that is unwritten, unproclaimed but real, nevertheless, is the responsibility for training, molding and caring for second lieutenants—and for a lot of first lieutenants and captains, too.

Most company grade officers arrive in a unit to do a job for the first time. Most NCOs go through cycle after cycle of new leaders. The imbalance in experience is significant (although, obviously, first sergeants are first-timers at some time also), and it is the NCO who must restore it. With full awareness of the need for tact and diplomacy, he must offer advice, prevent disasters and incorporate the officer into the team. The LT's role is demanding, for which no formal training is provided. It should also be a very satisfying role because in the officer corps, the good ones never forget the NCOs who guided them to success.

The NCO Corps has grown and matured in its role in the past 50 years. World War II saw good NCOs spread very thinly through the force. It

was only the lucky lieutenant or captain who found a platoon sergeant or squad leader or first sergeant who was professionally competent and more experienced than himself. The NCO Corps got by on dedication, patriotism and on-the-job training.

In Vietnam, things got worse. Given the failure to mobilize the Reserves and the one-year tour, the Army began to recycle NCOs, particularly in the combat arms. Many who returned from Vietnam found themselves ordered to return in only six to nine months. Reenlistments dried up and the "instant NCO" courses began. "Honor graduates" from basic training were selected for six more weeks of training designed to make them sergeants and staff sergeants. They were good soldiers who performed yeoman service, but they weren't truly competent, knowledgeable NCOs.

Once again, the officer corps, itself suffering from the same personnel management policies, found itself lacking the skeleton and the nerve system it needed to make the body function.

Commanders recognized that NCOs needed schooling and training, which spawned NCO academies and other ad-

hoc activities. This attempt at schooling wasn't made until the 1970s when the resources were finally committed for the NCOES of today. In my last assignment, as commander in chief, U.S. Army, Europe, I commented to a division commander that the Army was truly better than we had been just five years before, and the principal reason for that was the greater professionalism of the NCOs.

In these days of shrinking budgets and cutbacks in structure, it's mandatory that the NCO Corps' vital role be recognized and assured of continuing viability. The Army's only guarantee of remaining a collective, responsive body, able to function professionally in the next international crisis, will be the performance of its total nerve system, operating out of that cord in its backbone.

[Condensed from Army Magazine, September 1992, pg. 10, © 1992, and reprinted with Association of the U.S. Army permission. GEN Frederick J. Kroesen (Ret) is former commander-in-chief, U.S. Army, Europe.]

"If we value the NCO Corps we will:..."

By LTC R. B. Anderson

I'd like to congratulate GEN Frederick J. Kroesen, (Ret) on his fine article. It's heartening to know there are "four-stars" who understand the burdens of being a good NCO.

GEN Kroesen adeptly described the numerous and complex duties charged to the Army's frontline supervisors, and he correctly explained their importance; they are indeed the key element in the military's system of getting things done.

While I wholeheartedly agree with GEN Kroesen's ideal of the NCO Corps, I disagree that we are there. As a former NCO, I know we haven't yet fully returned to the concept of "officers command, but sergeants run units."

We have higher caliber and better schooled NCOs than we did before 1970, but today's sergeants don't display the

same initiative and responsibility. The fault is ours. We officers haven't given the NCOs the independence and authority to develop...

Officer inflation is...exacerbated when we fill our staffs with majors and lieutenant colonels because we feel they're needed to deal with the other majors and lieutenant colonels. In some instances, NCOs have skills that make them better suited than officers. My boss recently bemoaned the prospect of having another lieutenant colonel assigned and said, "I don't need another colonel. I need a couple of NCOs!"

If we value the NCO Corps we will:

Give NCOs responsibilities equal to their abilities and the authority to do the job. We will allow freedom to learn and won't over-supervise. Every task does not require an officer in charge.

Decrease officer/enlisted ratios.

Quit looting quality from the NCO Corps to fill the ranks of warrant officers. This is particularly troublesome in my field, Special Forces. We often wonder why we don't have as many take-charge team sergeants. Simple; they're serving as take-charge team warrants.

Pay NCOs what they're worth. A command sergeant major with 34 years of service receives the same income as a captain with ten years. A sergeant first class with 14 years makes the same as a first lieutenant. A newly promoted sergeant only receives about \$100 more a month than he did as a specialist four.

[Letter from LTC R. B. Anderson, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii, reprinted from Army Magazine, November 1992, pg. 3, © 1992, with Association of the U.S. Army permission.]

It's time to get off the fence and get...

Back to Basics

By CW2 Phillip Hambrick

We officers often find ourselves "sitting on the fence" when it comes to closing the relationship gap with noncommissioned officers. Seeking their advice might be viewed as incompetence. On the other hand, not seeking advice might mean making an avoidable mistake.

Young officers often face this dilemma. I was fortunate. My enlisted as well as senior NCO time better prepared me for my transition to the aviation warrant officer field. That experience has allowed me to better relate to the soldier and appreciate the jobs they perform.

Am I saying that officers that haven't had this prior enlisted or NCO experience are no good? No, I'm not. I also wouldn't suggest that they should first serve as enlisted soldiers. It sounds like a good idea, but it's not a feasible one.

What I am suggesting though, is that the Officer and NCO Corps get back to the basics. We know that NCOs are responsible for knowing what it takes to get the job done and how to treat soldiers. Getting the right equipment and training sites are known officer responsibilities. These are but a few. There are many more responsibilities and all vary according to the level at which they're performed. Not knowing and understanding these roles and responsibilities, which *are* the basics, causes the gap in the relationship between the two corps. I think we need to get back to these basics.

These basics often aren't known to junior officers and NCOs because it isn't taught early in their careers. Warrant officers, for the most part, are more fortunate than their commissioned counterparts in that they are selected to the warrant grade based on their enlisted experience in a particular field. (One exception is the aviation warrant candidate who, if qualified, can go to flight school after graduation from high school.) These candidates, along with

those attending the officer basic course after college, do not have the prior enlisted service experience to benefit from.

After these two courses, these young officers are blessed or cursed—depending on how you look at it—with the 'power of authority' before they ever really learn its value. Enter the senior NCO, or the warrant or commissioned officer with enlisted experience.

My enlisted and NCO time not only benefited my progress but allowed me to help those younger officers in disciplining themselves with their new 'rank power.'

It's often said that rank has its privileges. But don't forget that respect given also deserves respect. My success with soldiers has been in remembering the Golden Rule: Treat soldiers with the respect and dignity you would expect to get. Make them feel their job is just as

important at their level as yours is at your level. Get to know what their roles and responsibilities are and make sure they know and understand yours.

While there are advantages to having former enlisted time, I've also found a disadvantage if one is not careful. I've gotten "tunnel vision" because I was so busy learning about my officer business, responsibilities and adjusting to the new 'higher authority' that my vision for soldiers became tunneled.


This happened because I got comfortable with "when I was an NCO, or platoon sergeant ten years ago..." Times change and so do regulations and policies. Some of that NCO experience will always be good, but some will not. Enter the senior NCO, once again. That NCO can bring you up to date and give you "fresh" advice on how to handle soldiers and situations. All you have to do is seek that advice.

Turning to your NCOs for advice shouldn't make you feel incompetent. Our NCO Corps is well educated, both in military and civilian fields. The NCOs' job experience, coupled with their education gives officers better qualified NCOs from which to seek technical, managerial and personal advice.

Again, I feel fortunate that I had experience in the NCO structure going into my warrant officer position. However, if I hadn't had this experience, I wouldn't—and still don't—hesitate to call on my NCOs for advice. Every junior, and some senior officers need to remember that. Also, junior officers and NCOs need to seek each other out and communicate to each other, soldier-to-soldier and not rank-to-rank, about the basics I mentioned earlier. And the Army needs to ensure these junior leaders get taught earlier in their careers about the NCO structure.

I believe that closing the gap between NCO and officer relationships at all levels is based on understanding the person(s) and respecting them for the job they are tasked to accomplish. Remember, the real power comes from knowledge, not rank. It's time to "get off the fence" and join the team—the NCO and officer team.

Hambrick is assigned to Co B, 7/159th AV Bn, Giebelstadt, Germany.



To build effective command teams, officers and NCOs need to speak

A 'Common Language'

By CSM James E. Skellion

The "fog of war" demands that officers and NCOs speak a "common language" if they are to build "Command Teams" that function effectively.

However, the professional development track of officers and NCOs don't always run parallel. Lack of parallelism in some areas can result in miscommunication, which can produce misunderstanding between officers and NCOs about their respective responsibilities and tasks.

The swiftness of events in the application of the AirLand Battle Doctrine to achieve objectives and the necessity for speaking a common language horizontally and vertically are critical at all levels of command. Subordinate officers and NCOs at every milestone must know the commander's intent if the war is to be won, for there will be no time for mistakes due to poor communication between key leaders.

Understanding lubricates communication flow, which allows combat, combat support and combat service support units to synchronize their missions in a timely manner.

Baron von Steuben, founding architect of our Army, in 1779 charged every sergeant major to know the internal specifics of his unit. His guidance applies even more pointedly in today's highly technical Army.

With the numerous units in the Army, officers and NCOs must know the "mission-technical" language of their own organization and the organizations they support. The mission-technical vocabulary includes those words, phrases and jargon used daily by specific specialties. Understanding the Army's basic language is also essential.

Internal organizational goals are better attained when officers and NCOs reflect parallel professional development. Individual values are synthesized as whole organization values when experience and military education are similar. A unit with a common set of values speaks a common language, which expedites fulfillment of unit goals.

How does military training compare between officers and NCOs? The officer at OBC learns basic leadership and skill level one, two and three tasks. This training compares to NCO education development at PLDC and BNCOC. The officer education system complements assignment policy while balancing the officer's general managerial development and technical competence in assigned specialties. PLDC and BNCOC prepare NCOs for attendance at ANCOC and assignment as platoon sergeants. Generally, the professional development tracks are parallel, resulting in a common language.

However, the platoon leader's lack of field experience can result in a misunderstanding concerning officer-NCO responsibilities and tasks. This misunderstanding is partly fostered by the fact that the two education systems exclude teaching the other's responsibilities. There have been attempts to correct this problem.

The U.S. Army Military Academy, for example, includes a one-hour block of instruction on the duties and responsibilities of the NCO. It's given by an officer—not an NCO—during a cadet's freshman year. Much of the training received by an officer is the same received by an NCO. However, the two train separately, each in his own system of education.

There's been a definite improvement over the years in educating NCOs above the specialist and sergeant level. A substantial gap still exists between officer and NCO education systems at company level, despite the existence of NCO academies since World War II.

For example, the First Sergeant Course provides a five-week, branch-generic program of instruction, gearing a sergeant first class or master sergeant for first sergeant duty at any company. In other words, it's a "go anywhere" course for first sergeants.

On the other hand, first lieutenants and captains are selected for 20 weeks of branch-specific training at their branch's home base. Their education is specifically geared to prepare them for duties of command within their branch. (Infantry officers at OAC at Fort Benning; Quartermaster officers at OAC at Fort Lee; etc.)

The program of instruction (POI) for the infantry officer calls for over one-half of the total classroom hours (384 of a total of 748) to be devoted to combined arms tactics (small unit operations) and company/battalion operations. Armor is spoken at the Armor School, Infantry at the Infantry School, supply at the Quartermaster School, etc.

This dichotomy in the educational process further widens the communication gap in the officer-NCO relationship. There's no need for a direct parallel and certainly no need to combine the two courses. The responsibilities of each officer and NCO are different. However, it would enhance cohesiveness for the two to speak a common language if they are to be a Command Team.

The first sergeant must understand the reasoning process in order to execute actions formulated by his commander or higher headquarters. The days of operating blindly on the orders of superior authority went out with brown boots. Autonomy, initiative, boldness and the AirLand Battle Doctrine are



now called for in combat as shown by the trend in operation orders. The first sergeant, as the alter ego of the commander, must understand—from minute detail to the overall broad plan—what, when, where, who and how his company is going to be employed/deployed in a combat environment.

While the future first sergeant is being schooled in the cosmetics of the daily operations of the company, the future commander is receiving intensive training in combat operations and small unit tactics. Whether the two may ever expect to speak a common language is open to speculation.

The first sergeant and the commander will breach the language barrier when, after attending the first sergeant course, the future first sergeant is able to receive branch-specific training geared to his or her MOS.

Army schools are very good at presenting the Army doctrine and operation procedures in conducting daily activities in preparation for combat. However, where does the officer or the NCO learn the skills and techniques that make a Command Team. Every school available to NCOs and officers is important. But, nothing takes the place of experience.

Experience teaches the young officer the relationship. No strict, established rule covers every relationship. Generally, officers set the overall policies and standards of the organization, concerning themselves with the entire range of duties. Officers are responsible for commanding, leading, supervising and ensuring the NCOs carry out their responsibilities. Officers shouldn't do NCOs' work for them. However, they must ensure NCOs have the guidance, resources, authority and assistance necessary to do their duties.

The commander of an organization must determine the exact division of responsibility for commissioned and noncommissioned officers. Mission accomplishment demands that the commissioned and noncommissioned officers advise, assist and learn from each other to insure coordinated efforts in their respective, complementary responsibility.

Officers may attend two other schools for their career development and preparation for command—the Pre-Command Course and the U.S. Army War College. PCC does cover some of the duties and responsibilities of the NCO, but senior NCOs should teach such a class, during several blocks of instruction, throughout the officer's formal military education. Especially important is how well informed the young lieutenant is upon completion of OBC.

It is the personal experience of the officers and NCOs that validate personal values or philosophies of leadership and management. These personal values of doing "business" in the Army must be shared between Command Team members. When perceptions and expectations are clarified through effective communication, then the job gets done.

The positive impact of speaking a common language results in mission objectives and standards being met, clear and meaningful policy formulation, effective use of resources (people as well as materiel) and a stronger link in the chain of command.

Common language promotes common understanding, which produces uncommon results.

Skellion is CSM, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Washington, D.C.

Some of our readers feel...

Journal Sensationalism Misleads Soldiers

ABOUT ASSIGNMENTS...

The article "Securing an Assignment" from your fall issue raised many questions and eyebrows at the Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate (EPMD), Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) and I assume, throughout the Army.

Most of the questions raised came from the first few paragraphs of the article. To ensure the article "grabbed" the reader, the author used sensational journalism techniques, masquerading opinion as fact. That's unfortunate because it gave soldiers the wrong impression of how assignments are made, and discredited what otherwise would have been an informative article.

Since PERSCOM's activation in 1973, known then as MILPERCEN, thousands of civilians, NCOs and officers within EPMD have committed considerable expenditures in time and resources perfecting internal management systems. These improvements have enabled Army managers to effectively manage soldiers' careers rather than just moving them through a rigid impersonal system.

By implying assignments are made by "who-you-know," the author challenged the integrity and professionalism of all members of the EMPD, PERSCOM team. I assure you that only the best soldiers from all respective career fields are assigned to our organization, and we're proud of their ability and dedication to ensure that soldiers' needs are met while ensuring Army readiness is maintained.

That may sound easy, but many issues and programs impact on assign-

ments. It is a monumental task for branch and CMF managers to ensure those issues and programs are considered. Not only must they consider soldiers' preferences and needs of the Army, the assignment managers and professional development NCOs must stay current on unit moves, base realignment and closure, early-out programs, force modernization, Army reshaping policies, retention control points, and much, much more!!

The assignment process is too complex for this publication, but is covered

**'sensational
journalism
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sion of how
assignments
are made'**

in depth in AR 614-200. That regulation should be within every noncommissioned officer's grasp. I urge all soldiers to become familiar with that regulation and to contact their personnel services company or career branch with any questions.

Our goal at the Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate, PERSCOM, is to provide quality soldier service while maximizing Army readiness. We feel soldiers deserve nothing less than the best quality service the Army can provide.

SGM Dennis Scott is with the EPMD in Alexandria, Va.

EDITOR'S NOTE: Perhaps a better job of editing the first paragraph may have clarified the author's opinion as just that—opinion. The second sentence reads, "In fact, in an informal survey conducted at the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy, a group of senior NCOs ..." The sentence should have been edited to say, "An informal survey of a group of senior NCOs..." This would have been more accurate since the Sergeants Major Academy itself doesn't conduct informal surveys and then state fact or policy. MSG Plate was a student in class 39 when he wrote the article and he surveyed a group of his peers. The comments he wrote about were just that, "perceptions from NCOs," which may or may not be factual.

ABOUT HARASSMENT...

A picture is indeed worth a thousand words. In the case of the unfortunate choice of cartoon illustration accompanying MSG Brenda Hoster's, "Sexual Harassment... It's No Joke" (*The NCO Journal*, Fall 1992, pp. 4-5), the negative messages communicated by the picture,

in effect, cancel out the positive thousand words in the article. This cartoon defuses the seriousness of the topic, focuses on the least prevalent form of sexual harassment, limits the problem to a small segment of the Army, and reinforces several negative stereotypes.

It's somewhat ironic that the cartoon immediately sets a humorous tone for the article, while the title proclaims, "...It's No Joke". Clearly, there is an ambiguous message here—a battle between the printed word and a picture.

In my experience as a combat medic and a former Equal Opportunity Advisor who has served in both TOE and TDA units in both capacities, the preponderance of sexual harassment complaints are from women. Repeated surveys on this issue over the past 10 years by Department of the Army indicate that a consistent 35-40% of Army women report that they have been victims of sexual harassment. Yet this cartoon depicts the male as victim. This role reversal exaggerates the humorous impact, thus detracting from the serious message of the article. Worse yet, the primary offenders (males) are unlikely to identify with the message and recognize their own behavior.

By clearly depicting the two soldiers in this situation as a female officer nurse and a male enlisted medic, the cartoon unnecessarily limits the scope of the problem and allows many to mentally divorce themselves from it with the rationalization that, "it doesn't apply to me, since there aren't any women in my unit." In fact, although units composed of both genders have experienced their share of problems with sexual harassment, some of the most serious sexual harassment is inflicted by soldiers from all-male units. In my opinion, this cartoon helps reinforce the perception that only units with mixed gender have to concern themselves with this issue. There is no need to identify the two soldiers involved with any particular career field. The duty uniform for the vast majority of soldiers (medics included) is the BDU.

As a senior NCO in the Army Medical Department (AMEDD), I would also like to point out that this cartoon reinforces a number of inaccurate negative stereotypes associated with army

medical personnel. For a number of years, we in the AMEDD have been working hard to dispel the myth that we are unprofessional and not "real" soldiers. This cartoon depicts a member of the Army Nurse Corps behaving unprofessionally toward a subordinate and violating the Army's standards of appearance with hair below her collar. In the words of chief nurse at one of our MEDDACs, we believe that, "...the cartoon used to illustrate this article is in poor taste and presents a negative image of the AMEDD, the Army Nurse Corps, and the nursing profession in general."

In short, we have a serious problem with sexual harassment throughout the Army that is predominantly directed toward women. To more effectively reinforce the content of the article, an illustration which depicted two soldiers in BDUs with the woman as victim would have more clearly communicated the nature of the problem and focused all soldiers on the solutions in the article.

SGM David W. McIntosh is with the Office of the Surgeon General, Falls Church, Va.

“this cartoon detracts from the serious side of sexual harassment... and reinforces a number of inaccurate negative stereotypes”



EDITOR'S NOTE: The illustration used with that particular article was done so with a purpose—not to make light of sexual harassment, but to contrast the seriousness of it; a form of satire. The "twist" we gave it was to "grab" reader attention to the article/problem. Regardless of what art or photo runs with such a story, some readers will pass it over anyway. Obviously we got your attention enough for you to write and share some interesting facts about sexual harassment which will benefit the NCO readership even more. In addition, your letter points out some interesting myths about the AMEDD and Army Nurse Corps that we weren't aware of.

Because the Army and its soldiers are

aware of the "common" sexual harassment problems, an illustration depicting such "common" behavior would've been expected. What we ran makes you think. The point here is that sexual harassment of all types exists in our Army and in the NCO Corps. It matters not that one form is more prevalent than the other, but that we focus on the problem, period. And, our training in this area should discuss all forms of harassment, not only the most common.

Yes, the uniforms could have been BDUs. However, the artist keyed in on one of the examples preceding the story. It wasn't intended as a professional or personal attack on any one specialty. Thanks for sharing your views with us.

Letters to the Editor

Hard Jobs—Repeat

I commend 1SG Bennily on his letter about the "hard job" of recruiting. (letter to editor, Fall 92 *NCO Journal*).

Instructions to the centralized promotion boards define "hard jobs" as squad leader, platoon sergeant and first sergeant duties. Time spent as a recruiter and drill sergeant are important. These jobs should be done well and then the NCO should get back to his primary job skill.

Projecting the opinion that one job is harder than another doesn't support the "one Army" concept. There must be NCOs in aviation units as there must be first sergeants in the recruiting field. For the Army to function fully, all NCOs must do their jobs and do them to the best of their ability.

As for 1SG Bennily's statement that SFC Ferris (letter to editor, Summer 92 *NCO Journal*) obviously isn't one of the Army's top 10 percent because he'd never been a recruiter, I'm here to tell you that being a recruiter isn't the measure of where an NCO stands within the Army. It's a measure of an NCO that wished to take a different challenge. It doesn't consider those who choose to stay with their primary skill. There's no single yardstick with which to measure the quality of an NCO.

My suggestion to 1SG Bennily might be similar to the one he gave to SFC Ferris. Let me know when you come back to doing the job that you joined the Army for and left the recruiting field.

CSM Halford M. Dudley
Fort Bliss, Texas

"No More" Hard Jobs

I find it hard to believe that "professional" NCOs have nothing better to focus their energies on than who has the hardest job.

I believe everyone would be better off and make a more valuable contribution to the overall Army mission if *those* NCOs would worry about their perfor-

mance and not whether their job is one of the hard ones. As far as hard jobs, there are both physically and mentally hard jobs. Each job is hard because a good professional NCO works hard and strives for perfection regardless of duties. I tend to question an NCO's professionalism when he/she openly belittles and downgrades a fellow NCO. This whole thing is nothing more than a difference of opinion and as everyone knows, opinions are like...well, we all have one.

The simple solution is for all NCOs to take pride in what they do, do the best they can and let the others do the same. After all, professionalism is contagious. For those *children* NCOs—do the rest of the solid NCO Corps a favor; retire or get out and tell your war stories to someone who doesn't know better.

SFC Gary Ogden

122d US ARCOM, Little Rock, Ark.

Reasons to Serve

I read several inspirational articles in *The NCO Journal*, summer 1992 edition written by individuals concerned with the impact that Force Reductions will have on military families and soldiers. We must consider how the force reductions and the initiative to do more with less will change the lives of service members and their families over the next five years.

As with any form of restructuring there are stress factors that find their way into the process of change. Therefore, an educated soldier will function much more effectively in a smaller armed forces.

Soldiers have a responsibility to stay informed and also make proper career decisions to be successful. The article: "A Duty to Prepare," expresses the writer's willingness to be part of getting the word out.

The article: "What Do We Do, Now That We've Won," reflects the writer's intent to address the issue of military force reductions by emphasizing the new world order.

These articles help one to identify his or her purpose for continued service as a member of the armed forces. I commend these two writers for taking the time to say it like it is. Finally, cohorts... your skills must be vertical and horizontal to be competitive in the corporate world. It's never too late to start an educational program which would increase job opportunities as we leave the career we've been dedicated to.

SFC Kenneth Harvey
Fort Belvoir, Va.

Promotion Snafu?

Once upon a time, there was a staff sergeant with only four years of service who got "selected" (and not volunteered) for drill sergeant duty. He later made the sergeant first class promotion list with only eight years in the service.

As an Airborne-Ranger senior NCO, he always maintained a score of "no less" than 93 on SQT, 270 on APFT, all station go's on CTT, and received "excellent" ratings on all his NCOERs. He graduated on the "Commandant's List" from ANCOG, never bounced a check, wasn't overweight, had no DUIs, Article 15s or bad counseling reports. He was always "picked on" because he got the job done right the first time.

Then one day after serving 20 long years and being passed over no less than "seven times" for master sergeant, he decided it was time to put in his retirement papers. He refused to sign anymore of his NCOERs. When PAC informed him he had to update his DA photo and record for the upcoming MSG promotion board, he told them to "stick it" because he's retiring. He missed, on purpose, his SDT and CTT window by taking leave, and barely passed his unit's APFTs with minimum scores. Basically, the bottom line was... he really didn't care anymore.

Then, eight months after receiving his retirement orders, he's notified of his selection for promotion to master sergeant.

The moral of the story: Either he should've been QMP'd for being passed over so many times, or selected for master sergeant a "long time" ago. Promotion board members and those key leaders in the ranks of command sergeants major, colonel and general who claim to run this new and improved Army had better get their "heads out of their butts" and fix the promotion selection system. Otherwise, they're going to demoralize, destroy and lose many good future soldiers and leaders in the years to come.

That soldier was me. And oh yes, I'm still retiring 1 January with absolutely NO REGRETS! As a matter of fact, and for the record, if I had been selected one or two years earlier, I would have declined it. It's not my loss, my military record can speak for itself.

SFC "Ranger Rick" Tscherne
Vicenza, Italy

Earning the CMB

In response to SSG Jitendra C. Shukla's Summer 92 comment on the Combat Medical Badge, I am, at least embarrassed. For an NCO to make the statement that all medics should get the CMB regardless of unit of assignment or attachment shows that SSG Shukla does not know the purpose of the CMB.

Just because you were in front of a combat unit and suffered casualties does not qualify you for the CMB.

Shukla asks: "What makes us different from medics in Infantry, Armor or Cavalry units?" Simply put: it's the unit's mission. The unit is tasked to close with and destroy the enemy, and those medics that accompany them are an integral part of that mission.

I know of what I speak. I spent three years as a medic in an Infantry battalion and deployed to Saudi Arabia as an individual replacement. In Saudi Arabia I was with a M.A.S.H. that supported the 3rd Armored Div. and we too, were in front of some combat units in Iraq. I don't have the CMB and I don't feel I

deserve it. And, I don't support others getting it that weren't with those units that closed with and destroyed the enemy.

Yes there's still partiality in the awarding of the CMB. It still goes to those soldier-medics that are doing what it takes to earn the badge.

SSG Charles H. Kean
Dugway Proving Ground, Utah

Hurdler's Stretch Stressful

I'm a firm believer in the Master Fitness program. The MF program in today's new Army is designed to reduce personal injury and maximize individual potential.

The key word here is "injury." Is the "hurdler's stretch" authorized? What are the negative results of this stretch?

I've been told by two MFTs that the stretch is not good for the knee. However, I can't seem to get a good read from anyone. Maybe you can help me solve this problem by responding with some concrete medical advice.

SGT Ronald Hart
Panama

Editor's Note: After searching through all the messages put out by the "Master Fitness Trainer" (MFT) school at Fort Benning, Ga., the medical staff (MFT) at the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy couldn't come up with anything specifically stating that the hurdler's stretch is not an authorized exercise.

However, a message from the MFT school DTG 181400Z subject; High Risk Training Exercises, para. 6b, suggests key points to remember for insuring safety. All stretching should be done slowly and without pain or unnatural stress at a joint.

While the hurdler's stretch is an authorized exercise, it is not recommended because of the unnatural stress directly placed on the bent knee joint. Many other stretching exercises in FM 21-20 do the same thing as the hurdler's stretch without risk of injury.

Asking "Why Not?"

When current programs result in marginal achievement or dismal failure, change must occur if we are to survive on the modern battlefield. The noncommissioned officer of today's Army must have the courage and conviction to challenge and change the mediocrity of marginal success practices by asking not "why," but rather "why not." We've all heard the responses, "It won't work," or "it's the way we've always done it." The classic one is, "the command will never go for it."

Change will happen when innovation replaces mediocrity and excellence replaces achieved minimal standards. As leaders of today, we must make history, not repeat it. We must draw from experience the tools to develop junior leaders. We need to impart a sense of urgency down to the newest member of the team. We have to be willing to involve others in the decision making process. We must stay current with world affairs and the possible impact to our mission. Above all, we must demand excellence.

Change is evident when a basic trainee achieves honor graduate status because we took the time to impart the skills in a program that ensures success. It is felt when unit members receive external awards for outstanding achievement, due in part to a refocused battle task and hip pocket training program. Last, but certainly not least, change is recognized when the unit achieves excellence ratings in training, logistics management and mission capability.

It's not enough to ask why. The backbone of today's Army must be willing to ask about trying new approaches. Why not attempt to influence change? Why not demonstrate that innovation can bring success? Why not review old programs as challenges to creative management? History will record our efforts.

SFC Donald C. Patterson II
344th Medical Co., Marion, Ill.

Book Reviews

The Last Medal of Honor

By
Pete Billac

Swan Publishing Co., 1990
224 pages, \$11.95 (PB)

Pete Billac wrote his book to tell us the story of a living legend, MSG (Ret.) Roy P. Benavidez—the last man to receive the Medal of Honor. Billac used personal interviews, letters, telephone calls, photographs, books and newspaper articles to piece together the story. He refers to Benavidez's heroic deed as his "six hours in Hell."

An admirer of Benavidez, the author wants us to know him. He also recounts the history of the Medal of Honor and the stories of several of its recipients. He tells of other heroes and special people of the Vietnam era and of Benavidez's life since receiving the medal.

Billac—at Benavidez's insistence—also devotes chapters to special people who influenced this sergeant's life. Among them are Martha Raye (the actress many Vietnam veterans refer to as 'COL. Maggie'), CPT Daniel Castillo (a quadriplegic) and SFC Jerry 'Mad Dog' Shriver (a Vietnam soldier whose appetite for combat was legendary).

This book contains minor technical flaws (misspelled words, typographical errors). However, I found it to be a compelling, interesting and detailed account of a heroic individual.

MSG Ashley C. Davis

Lieutenant Ramsey's War

By
Edwin P. Ramsey
and Stephen J. Rivele

Knightsbridge Publishing Co., 1990
333 pages, \$19.95 (H/B)

From 1942 to 1945, a secret war raged in the Philippines without the aid of Allied troops. Fought in the teeming hell of the disease-infested jungle, isolated from any outside help by the Japanese-controlled seas of the South Pacific, it was led by one courageous young American.

Lieutenant Ramsey was a young cavalry officer on Luzon prior to World War II. His life was filled with minutia of a colonial force in a tropical paradise. His idyllic existence, interrupted by the Japanese invasion, suddenly changed into

an unending war of retreat and defeat.

Although the entire Army capitulated, Ramsey refused to surrender as a P.O.W.

He never received the surrender order nor did he feel obligated to obey it. So, he melted into the jungle and joined a band of guerrillas that he would soon lead.

Short on battle detail, this book is not a "how-to" on guerrilla warfare. Its worth is in the author's description of the many life and death decisions he was forced to make. For over three years his sense of duty burdened him as much as the fear and physical hardship which ravaged his body.

Despite the danger from the enemy, both human and natural, Ramsey recognized that his was the path of a soldier. When others surrendered to capture or death, he chose to continue to fight. Ramsey lived the Code of Conduct before those words found life on paper. His story is an inspiration and contains 'lessons learned' that should be read and remembered by all NCOs.

MSG James H. Clifford

The Four Dueces

By
C. S. Crawford

Presidio Press, 1989
288 pages, \$18.95 (H/B)

C. S. Crawford tells a Marine grunt's view of trench warfare during the Korean War. Crawford, a 21-year-old sergeant known by the radio code name 'Cautious,' spent the war as a 4.2-inch mortar company forward observer. He writes, "Can you do it, Cautious?" "I'm sure as shit gonna try." "It was the first of 85 confirmed kills I would chalk up over the next ten months' time." The young Marine had an uncanny talent for judging distance, excelling at his job.

Crawford describes his experiences in a storyteller's style that is humorous as well as poignant. As 'Cautious' chronicle unfolds, the reader learns of trench warfare through the eyes and ears of a 21-year-old sergeant.

We follow him through the foul-ups that sent a switchboard repairman to the front lines of the Punchbowl, through the guidance of an experienced first sergeant called 'Funny Gunney,' through a comrade's rescue from a mine field and on to 'Luke-the Gook's' castle. These experiences were unique, yet typical of many who fought.

This book teaches us that inexperienced soldiers look to NCOs for guidance during battle and a good NCO has the responsibility to train soldiers to accomplish the mission.

Crawford writes, "This book is about some of the grunts who died or were wounded from September 1951 through September 1952." His book pays tribute to these soldier for the sacrifices they made.

MSG James M. Dalen

America's Army

It is sometimes difficult to describe change in the Army... We're a great Army and to structure for the future, one of our strategies is to make change as transparent as possible in many respects...

We still guard the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier...




We still build character one soldier at a time...



We still qualify crews and squads in the sweat and grime of our training centers...



We still live in every little town and village...



We were trained and ready yesterday and we will be trained and ready tomorrow...



But we're different... we're moving into the 21st Century



"Desert Victory" is the title of this painting by artist Tom Freeman. The painting symbolizes the 'now' of noncommissioned officers' performance in Operation Desert Storm. "...That performance had nothing to do with generalship or...great commanders. It was done by tank commanders; the NCOs in charge of those tanks. It was their discipline, maintaining good fire distribution and taking care of their soldiers...."

Comment by LTG Ronald H. Griffith, Army Inspector General, who served as 1st AD commander in Desert Storm.