

The NCO Journal

Spring 1993

A Quarterly Forum for Professional Development



Protecting the Force

The NCO Journal

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Our mission is to provide a forum for the open exchange of ideas and information, to support training, education and development of the NCO Corps and to foster a closer bond among its members.

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
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Cover

The wraparound front cover was designed by Rebecca Nolin, Media Management and Production Office, U.S. Army Safety Center, Fort Rucker, Alabama.

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NCO Journal Themes Change

The Summer 1993 issue of *The NCO Journal* has been changed from "Training" to "Total Fitness 2000." Articles should address mental, physical or spiritual (i.e., morale, esprit de corps) or all three. NCOs interested in submitting articles and artwork, photos or graphics should meet the May 1, 1993 deadline.

"Training for the 21st Century," (Fall 1993) will focus on the way the NCO Corps trains today for future and changing missions. Articles should include such areas as Mission Essential Task List training/objectives; what's new and what needs to be trained to fight under new doctrine; Total Force Integration (BOLD SHIFT); etc. Remember the primary reader of *The NCO Journal* is at the sergeant and staff sergeant level. We need to focus our articles on areas that will help these young leaders develop professionally. Deadline for Fall 1993 is August 1, 1993.

Future topics for your magazine include, "Our Controversial Army," (gays in the military, sexual harassment, women in combat, etc.) the NCO authority/law; etc. Call or write us if you have a topic you'd like to see covered.

NCO Journal Distribution

Having trouble getting a copy of your *NCO Journal*? Here's a few tips on what to do to subscribe, cancel, increase, decrease or change address:

① To begin a subscription have your publications office submit DA Form 12-99 for inclusion in the 12-series requirements (12-05 Block 0041)

② If you already receive the magazine but need more (or fewer) copies—your unit is entitled to one copy per five NCOs—just tell your publications office your needs. They should submit the change.

③ If your unit changes address, have your publications office submit DA Form 12-R.

④ If your unit is deactivated, your publications office needs to CANCEL your account.

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⑥ Individual subscribers who have a change of address should submit the change in writing or use Postal Service Form 3576. Send to:

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Should all else fail, call us at DSN 978-9068/9069 or COM (915) 568-9068/9069. We'll get you going in the right direction.

New Program—TRANSFAE— Set To Kick-Start This Year

The Army has developed a new safety program to improve ground vehicle operations. TRANSFAE isn't just another new acronym for the 21st Century but a long-range training strategy for soldiers and leaders who drive military equipment.

The TRANSFAE plan relates to soldiers whose MOS requires driving an Army motor or combat vehicle and to soldiers, although driving isn't an MOS requirement, who drive incidental to other aspects of their MOS. Civilian employees may also participate in this program.

TRANSFAE includes short-, mid- and long-range actions focused on five areas up and down the chain of command. Some expected results are: individuals knowing standards, exercising personal discipline and sharpening skills; leaders knowing and enforcing standards, rewarding achievements and knowing and using risk management; *training*—establishing driver basic training and developing standardized skills training related to accident experience; *standards*—establishing Army Commercial Drivers License, developing medical standards modeled after flight personnel requirements; and *support*—improving equipment design and upgrading maintenance facilities.

Implementing TRANSFAE will benefit soldiers through enhanced readiness (less vehicle damage and personal injury to soldiers), keep a

quality force through disciplined, professional and knowledgeable drivers and improve quality of life as discipline transfers to privately owned vehicle operations.

TRANSFAE is expected to be implemented in late summer or fall.

U.S. Army Safety Center
Fort Rucker, Alabama

NCOES Conference Set For July 19-23 in El Paso

The 1993 NCOES conference is scheduled for July 19-23 at the Airport Hilton Hotel in El Paso, Texas.

The U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy is soliciting agenda topics that will be of general interest to all active and reserve component participants. Topic ideas may be called in or faxed to USASMA POCs CPT Correa or SGM Meldrum at DSN 978-8854 or 8659 respectively. The FAX number is DSN 978-8540 or COM (915) 568-8540. USASMA will consolidate and publish agenda topics NLT 90 days prior to conference start date.


Post billeting and government mess aren't available. Off post billeting is on first come basis. USASMA has blocked rooms in two hotels for this conference. Room availability isn't guaranteed after June 18. Attendees must make reservations prior to June 18 by calling the Airport Hilton at (915)778-4241 or Radisson Hotel (915)772-3333.

Conference registration fee is \$10 and should be stated on the individual's orders.

USASMA
Fort Bliss, Texas

Oops!

We goofed when we failed to identify two soldiers pictured on page 12 of the last issue. In the first photo, they were CPT Travis Bernitter and ISG Zulma Santiago, Company B, William Beaumont Army Medical Center, El Paso, Texas.



Two Key Decisions Affect NCO Leader Development

Senior NCOs will be affected by two key leader development decisions made by Chief of Staff GEN Gordon R. Sullivan. One decision means first-time first sergeants must complete the First Sergeants Course prior to assuming their duties. The second decision expands the Sergeants Major Course from six months to nine months.

Currently, only 40 percent of the active Army's first sergeants attend the five-week course at the Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, Texas. A smaller percentage of Reserve Component first sergeants attend the RC version of the course taught at several of their schools. RC soldiers must now complete the course within a one-year window beginning six months prior to assuming their first sergeant duties. Overseas commanders were granted waiver authority to deal with cases where the constraints of overseas assignments create special circumstances. The policy is effective 1 May 1993.

GEN Sullivan's second decision, to expand the sergeants major course from six to nine months, represents a significant change in the way the Army intends to train and educate future staff and command sergeants major.

The decision means the resident course will be held once instead of twice a year. The non-resident course will remain a two-year program but will have a three-week resident phase instead of two. The additional week will be spent in a command post exercise.

In the revised course, students will master leadership and warfighting skills needed by staff and command sergeants major using a division activation model which will take them through the full nine-month program. Students will activate, train, deploy,

fight, sustain, redeploy, and reconstitute a round-up division. The purpose of the training model is to uncover the training needed by senior NCOs.

Electives will be offered to sharpen leadership competencies and prepare for next assignments. Opportunities to complete associate and bachelors degree programs will also be offered. Qualified students will be encouraged to complete the Master Fitness Trainer Course while assigned to the Sergeants Major Academy. A spouse leadership development program will be offered to student spouses who elect to participate.

The first nine-month resident course is expected to begin in August 1996. Accompanied students will be able to enroll their children in school for a full academic year. On post housing will be available within walking distance of the academy.

The Sergeant Major of the Army, Army Staff, Guard Bureau, Chief of Army Reserve and all Army major command commanders and command sergeants major participated in the decisions.

The two decisions are aimed at keeping leader development strong and meeting the Army and the Nation's future needs.

“
...these decisions clearly demonstrate that we are accommodating change while maintaining our commitment to excellence.
”

GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, CSA

Noncommissioned Officers: Key to Protecting the Force

Noncommissioned officers are the key to force protection in both war and peace. NCOs accomplish this by training to and enforcing standards. The "profession of arms" is a risky business and leaders at every level must develop a higher degree of awareness regarding accidents and their impact on the modern battlefield. This begins by knowing what factors generate accidents and how to reduce the possibilities of their occurrence. Risk management is the tool used to accomplish this task. Good leaders know how to lead soldiers and manage risks.

Accident Generators

Last year 90 percent of our ground-related fatalities were in the ranks of private to staff sergeant. That means 205 soldiers died before their time. In every case, it was the first-line supervisor who was closest to these soldiers. That's the main reason I say NCOs are the key to fixing this force protection issue.

Individual soldiers continuing to ignore standards is the greatest generator of human-error accidents and contributed to 48 percent of all accidents. Sergeants, being the first line leaders, can significantly reduce this percentage by training soldiers to standard and enforcing the standard, on and off duty.



BG R. Dennis Kerr, director of the U.S. Army Safety Center, Fort Rucker, Ala.

This responsibility to reduce accidents overlaps the commander's responsibilities in force protection, thus creating a shared responsibility in preventing accidents. If anyone can make the buddy system work 24 hours a day, it's our NCOs. And the buddy system saves lives and equipment and enhances the warfighting capabilities of the unit.

Commanders set the stage for the leadership climate in their units. If done right, all of the officers, NCOs and safety personnel are actively involved. These are the people, influenced by their commander, who can identify the hazards, minimize or eliminate the risks associated with the modern battlefield and conserve combat power for the fight.

Soldiers follow leaders not just because of rank and position but also because of the motivation leaders inspire by the image they create. This image involves three qualities. First, courage, both moral and physical; second, tactical and technical competence; and third, ability to act. Soldiers expect their NCOs to set the climate for performance to standard in individual training as they maneuver through each of the battlefield operating systems. This climate takes some time to develop, but soldiers perceive the true values of their leaders. They also take note of how NCOs handle difficult situations. Do they have the courage to act when soldiers violate known standards? Do they do so consistently?

The NCO must do what is right even if it's not popular, expedient or career enhancing. Sometimes it seems easier to look the other way and pretend a violation didn't occur, especially if the mission was accomplished without incident or if the violator was a senior officer or NCO. There should be one rule for everyone—that's what soldiers expect.

With the NCOs help, we can continue reducing these terrible losses, and the application of risk management will become the standard in eliminating hazards and reducing or controlling the risks we face in our profession.

In 1992, 237 Soldiers Died Before Their Time



At the end of his four-day pass, the soldier was pushed for time to get back to post. As he was speeding down the highway during a sleet storm, he lost control of his car and drove it under a tractor trailer parked on the highway's shoulder. He died instantly.

A soldier decided to sightsee and take pictures of battlefields. He picked up what appeared to be unexploded ordnance. After looking at the explosive, he dropped it; when it hit the ground, it exploded at his feet. He died on the way to the hospital.



Enforce Standards To Save Limbs and Lives

Enforcing standards is training.

Enforcing standards is leadership.

Enforcing standards is safety.

All three work toward a common goal—accomplishing the mission and saving limbs and lives.

The importance of safety practices in the conservation of our most precious resource—soldiers—cannot be over-emphasized, especially when one considers the 270 (Total Army) soldiers' lives lost to accidents in 1992. I'm particularly pleased *The NCO Journal* is devoting an entire issue to Safety and Force Protection.

Historically in wartime, accidents have accounted for the largest number of casualties. For example, in every war except the Korean War, accidents claimed more lives than did enemy action, according to Army Safety Center statistics. In World War II, 56 percent of the casualties were caused by accidents; in Vietnam it was 54 percent. And in Operation Desert Shield/Storm, 75 percent of the casualties were the result of accidents.



SMA Richard A. Kidd

What is even more disturbing is that the peacetime figures are not much better. We must realize that these "figures" are soldiers.

Recently, while at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, I visited with two soldiers who were recovering from accidental injuries. During our chat, one of the soldiers admitted his injuries could have been prevented if he had made the necessary safety checks he'd been taught, while the other said he had not taken the required safety precautions (risk assessment).

These soldiers were fortunate, they lived. Many don't get a second chance.


In these times of reduced personnel strengths, it becomes increasingly important for all leaders to make a critical assessment of how we go about our daily activities.

Soldiers in hospitals recovering from injuries have a direct effect on a unit's readiness posture. Our Army is judged by its combat readiness posture and its effectiveness on the battlefield. Key to achieving these two elements is healthy and well-trained soldiers.

We are making progress in integrating "force protection" training initiatives throughout our Noncommissioned Officer Education System. These safety initiatives will help NCOs better manage risks and eliminate potential hazards.


Remember, accidents occur because standards are not enforced. We must do better! *Enforcing standards is training, is leadership and is safety!*

Although we have made some progress in reducing accidents, I encourage all NCOs to heed the advice offered in this issue. The soldier, our "ultimate weapon," is too precious a resource to do otherwise.



A soldier was killed when he fell from the vehicle he was riding and was run over by the same vehicle. The unit was making a night tactical move at about 10 mph when the M548A1 ammunition carrier in which he was riding crossed a ditch. The soldier, who wasn't wearing his safety belt, was jolted out of the vehicle. He was pronounced DOA at the hospital.

During a training exercise, the scout observer in the Bradley cavalry fighting vehicle (CFV) spotted the enemy approaching from the rear. The observer didn't have proper communications equipment and went through the turret access door to inform the driver. However, the gunner was responding to another radio communication and put the turret in motion. The observer's head was crushed by the turret. He died instantly.



A soldier was shot and killed during live-fire training in a tire house. A four-man team was conducting live-fire close-quarters battle training in a poorly maintained facility when their NCO decided to accelerate the training. The soldiers weren't wearing any kind of protective vests. A team member placed a target where it blocked an incoming soldier's view. When he fired, the bullet went through the target and hit the soldier on the opposite wall. He died on the way to the hospital.

The Safety Sixth Sense

By SFC Lydia R. Mead

Banks have sophisticated alarm systems; some are silent, others sound a deafening siren warning of the danger; all for the purpose of protecting the banks' resources. NCOs also have an alarm to protect their most valuable assets — soldiers and equipment. However, many NCOs don't know how to activate that alarm system, which is often referred to as the "sixth sense of safety."

As NCOs, we're charged with the health and welfare of those we lead. Although this may seem like an enormous responsibility, NCOES has provided us with the tools to hone our skills to protect our soldiers. Through Primary Leadership Development, Basic NCO, Advanced NCO, First Sergeant and Sergeants Major courses, we've learned to accept our obligations to lead, train, maintain and care for soldiers and equipment. We'll require those very same skills in protecting the force.

Leading by example and enforcing standards results in a team we can depend on and trust. Our safety sense grows as we make ourselves more aware of setting the example for others. If we take short cuts, avoid protective equipment and perform in an unsafe manner, so will our soldiers.


Doing our job effectively means never walking past a mistake. What greater error is there than an unsafe act? It's directed in AR 385-10 that any unsafe act will be stopped immediately and reported to the supervisor or first line leader. Witnessing an unsafe act should trigger our silent alarm and activate the warning system.

Knowing the standards, not accepting any less and teaching those standards is how we must train. How can we enforce discipline on the battlefield if we don't enforce compliance in training? Prepared for battle means responses must be appropriate and automatic. This takes realistic and precise training. Only perfect practice makes perfect; if we practice incorrectly, we simply have "perfect errors."

According to FM 22-102, "...safety awareness should become a 'sixth sense' as soldiers execute realistic training." In the past, safety has been an add-on measure that seemed intent on putting a halt to this realistic and effective training. In fact, it's an integral part of training because we perform as we train. As stated in FM 25-101, "Ensuring realistic training is safe instills the awareness that will save lives in combat".

To ensure peak performance, we must enforce the standards in Preventive Maintenance Checks and Schedules (PMCS) through refresher training—for the body through physical training, as well as for equipment. The focus of this maintenance must be on the entire system.

What does it really take to activate our sixth sense? If we are to properly guide, lead, and train our soldiers, I believe the key is knowing them.



In addition to knowing their administrative and technical knowledge we must know them personally, which gives greater insight into their reactions to different situations.

Forseeing a possible response to an event allows us to design the necessary strategy to guarantee no accidents or injuries.


Do you remember the soldier who was a heat casualty during the last field exercise? Is he/she likely to have another? When scheduling the first series of convoy drivers, do you think about the soldier with the newborn that "hasn't had a night's rest in weeks"? What about the soldier returned to duty after a visit from the dentist or doctor who might be on medication that doesn't allow operation of heavy or mechanical equipment? What about the soldier who just returned from a relative's funeral?

If you believe you can't possibly think of all these things, don't worry. It gets easier as you follow the steps to activating your sixth sense of safety. One of those steps is to implement *risk assessment*—part of the risk management program. As you make this a regular part of your operations, you sharpen your awareness to any warning signals.

Risk assessment is nothing more than caring for the soldiers we trust to perform at our side. It's common to throw a safety net over the family we care about. However, caring goes along with our performance as NCOs. It's one of the qualities that makes us valuable to our soldiers.

Mastering the skill of sniffing out dangers, hearing and heeding warnings and envisioning countermeasures to successfully complete our mission helps us fine tune that "sixth sense of safety." When we can lead our soldiers toward safe peak performance, we can then feel confident we've done our jobs as NCOs.

Mead is safety NCO, 319th Transportation Bde, (USAR), Oakland Army Base, Calif.



ty 6th Sense Supervisors

Supervisors and Safety

SFC Todd E. Duncan

“I t can't happen to me!” How often do we hear this simple statement just before an accident occurs? Noncommissioned officers are tasked with mission accomplishment and the welfare of their soldiers. Therefore, supervisor and safety are two words that should be synonymous. However, safety is often a “buzz” word that gets little practical use.

Rapid technological advances within the Army make it imperative that reducing losses and damage control to soldiers and equipment continues at all levels.

According to Army Safety Center reports, in 1985 one in four soldiers was accidentally injured; in 1992 seven in every 1000 soldiers were injured. That costs millions of dollars per year in manpower and equipment and impedes combat readiness.

To control this kind of loss, the application of sound management principles will assist in the prevention of loss or damage to our soldiers and equipment.

The first step in a sound safety program is in stating policy. Each level of command formulates their own guidelines. The Army alone has fewer than 27 safety regulations. This doesn't include policy letters, directives, OSHA regulations and the countless other publications offering guidance and instruction. All this places the burden of interpretation and implementation on the first line supervisor (sergeants). Generally, soldiers respond to the attitudes of their sergeants, not what the commander believes.

A good safety indoctrination program for new soldiers can do wonders for the unit's safety record. Generally, there are two major causes of accidents involving new soldiers—lack of training and over-anxiety (the desire to make a good impression). Initial safety briefings along with continuous fol-

low through and training, can help eliminate both problems. Emphasizing the “why” aspect of rules results in a more cooperative attitude. Soldiers are more inclined to follow the rules when the need is more clearly understood.

An initial safety briefing should include, but isn't limited to, the following:

- Emphasize preventing accidents in command policy and guidance.
- Task instructions including applicable safety considerations.
- Forbid operation of any equipment without specific authorization and qualifications.
- Notify chain-of-command immediately of any recognized hazards.
- Inspect equipment and tools prior to use. Deadlining defective equipment.
- Wear personal protective equipment as required.
- Report injuries, no matter how slight, immediately to the supervisor.

Question anything you have uncertainties about.

Brief soldiers prior to their first job assignment. Follow up with a counseling several days later. This allows NCOs to answer questions and discover their soldiers' safety attitudes.

Reinforce the initial safety brief through continued education and training. Good supervisors train their soldiers to run a section/shop effectively and safely whether they are present or not.

On-the-spot safety inspections and risk assessments by supervisors is an effective way to monitor, locate, report and correct potential hazards before an accident happens. A planned inspection is periodic and organized and follows procedures which involves unit safety NCOs and supervisors at all levels. This appraisal helps determine needed improvements. Leaders use a continuous informal assessment in their day-to-day operations to ensure all safety aspects of the unit are covered.

NCOs must be able to identify the accident-prone soldier—the one who's tired, stressed out, sick, untrained, etc. This soldier is like a truck with bad brakes.

NCOs and their soldiers will benefit from a solid safety program that is always informative, continuous and committed to soldier welfare and combat readiness. Those benefits will come in the wake of increased soldier morale and their belief that safety is important—to them and the unit.

Duncan is with the Senior Army Advisor Group, 1st Bn, 245th Aviation, Oklahoma National Guard, Tulsa.



MSDS

By SFC Robert E. Price and SFC Alcides Santana

MSDS—neither a disease nor a meat tenderizer—is another one of those pesky acronyms that every service member or DoD civilian needs to know about. MSDS is the acronym for Material Safety Data Sheet. You'll find this handy little sheet of paper on everything from common spray paint to the most dangerous chemicals.

They weren't put on for decorations, either. In fact they're required by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), as well as various Army Regulations (ARs). Regulations aside, these pieces of paper can literally save your life and the lives of your soldiers.

There are an estimated 575,000 existing chemical products. They pose a serious problem for the vast majority of our soldiers since many will come into contact with quite a variety of these potentially hazardous materials. These chemicals can cause or contribute to heart ailments, kidney and lung damage, sterility, cancer, burns and rashes. It's our responsibility to make sure all our soldiers are protected from these hazards. In fact, we would be derelict in our duties if we as NCOs failed to properly protect our soldiers from these chemicals.

MSDS sheets are like having the Poison Prevention Hot Line at your fingertips. These sheets tell you virtually everything about the particular chemicals that you work with. Facts such as: flash point, if the use of a respirator is required; first aid information, if contact with skin or eyes is dangerous; and unlimited information on the makeup, storage and use of the product is listed right on the MSDS. MSDS information sheets are relatively new and in the few years they've been around they've saved lives, prevented injuries and saved countless dollars. NCOs should make it a top priority to learn about these lifesaving sheets of paper.

When you receive items from the supply system that have MSDS sheets attached there's an obligation to user and supervisor to read and thoroughly understand all that is involved with the use of the product. The sheet will be posted on or near the product where all can see and heed the information. It's not, repeat *not* to be thrown in the trash along with the other packing materials. Remember, this sheet of paper can save a life or prevent serious injury to you and your soldiers.

Industry and the military have spent millions of dollars and time to test and develop ways to protect personnel from death and injury caused by the improper handling of hazardous materials. As responsible NCOs, we can take the extra time and effort to become familiar with and properly post these little sheets of paper known as MSDS.

Price and Santana are Aviation safety specialists, Army Safety Center, Fort Rucker, Alabama.

Force

By Jim Collins

A lot of NCOs play with less than a full deck when planning operations. And if you're one of the NCOs who's not playing with the wild card in that deck—the risk assessment card—then you're not playing the odds correctly when it comes to protecting the force. This card plays with any hand you deal, or with any hand you're dealt.

Listen to what SGM Jim Wertman (now commander, Company A, USASMA at Fort Bliss) has to say about the card (when he was CSM of the 4th Bn-7th Inf Div in 1990):

"In a battalion-sized unit when we

Basic Operational Process

MISSION PHASE	OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY	SAFETY ACTIVITY
Mission received. Develop commander's intent.	Initial estimate. Evaluate mission. Develop alternatives. Apply insight from previous mission and experiences. Formulate concept. Decision making.	Mission analysis. Risk assessment. Hazard assessment. Risk reduction action.
Prepare plans and orders.	Mission briefing. Develop detailed concept of operations. Develop plans and orders. Issue orders. Coordinate.	Safety input to briefings, orders and SOPs. Special briefings.
Prepare for execution.	Prepare terrain, equipment and troops. Make necessary changes. Coordinate.	Safety checks. Explain safety measures. Special training. Outside support required.
Execute operations	Lead tactical and logistical operations. Adapt plans as required. Coordinate.	Enforce standards and safety guidance. Review changes for risk implications.
Execute operations	Assess performance, weaknesses and strengths. Identify future action required.	Assess risk management, effectiveness. Implement changes required.

The risk assessment process is part and parcel of the overall operation—*totally integrated*. Although operations and safety are shown separately, integration begins the moment the mission is conceived and continues until the last insight from the after action review is acted upon.

Protection — it's in the cards

went on gunnery or maneuver and fire operations we had zero accidents. I know in my unit the accident rate dropped at least 50 percent when we began using the risk assessment card.

"When the 3D Inf Div went with the 1st Armd Div to Saudi, we took 1010 soldiers and came back with 1010 soldiers. The impact really becomes significant when the process gets passed down to the squad level," Wertman said, and he gives much of the credit to leaders' use of the card.

SGM John Chavez, chief of the CSM course at USASMA, remembers seeing the card used first at Fort Hood, Texas, in 1987, when he was the senior Army enlisted advisor for the Texas National Guard, 1st Bde-24th Cavalry.

"I've seen it used in peace and in battle. It's in combat where the big payoff comes, but it works anytime, anywhere," he said.

When he was CSM, 4th Bn/66th Armd, 3rd Bde, 3D Inf Div in Germany, "we used the card extensively for almost any operation we got into, from railhead to actual deployment to Saudi."


The form can be adapted to "play" in any unit by changing ratings or factors to conform or to fit the specific operations requirements of that unit.

For example, the 3D Inf Div designed a risk assessment card (see below) that uses a combination of number values (from 1 for safest to 5 for most hazardous) and color codes (green for safe, yellow for caution and red for extreme


caution). Leaders could look at the card and the values and tell at a glance what the risks were and make better-informed decisions about what could or couldn't be done.

Using the risk assessment card stacks the deck in your favor when it comes to force protection. You play with a full deck and 'know when to hold 'em and when to fold 'em,' when it comes to mission accomplishment. You also receive powerful payoffs in the form of lives saved, increased efficiency, effectiveness and readiness.

It all adds up to a winning hand.



3D INFANTRY DIVISION
RISK ASSESSMENT



NATURE OF OPERATION			
OPERATION LENGTH	OPERATIONAL AREA		
	LOCAL AREA	AUTOBAHN OR TACTICAL	SUSPECTED HAZARD OR UNK COND
72 HOURS	3	4	5
48 HOURS	2	3	4
24 HOURS	1	2	3

FIRST LINE SUPERVISION			
COMMAND CONTROL	NATURE OF MISSION		
	SUPPORT NONTACTICAL	DAY TACTICAL	NIGHT TACTICAL
AD HOC (HEY YOU)	3	4	5
ATTACHED	2	3	4
ORGANIC	1	2	3

LEADER REST & TIME FOR PREPARATION			
LEADER REST	TIME FOR MISSION PREPARATION		
	INDEPTH	ADEQUATE	MINIMAL
<4 HOURS	3	4	5
6 HOURS	2	3	4
8 HOURS	1	2	3

SOLDIER SELECTION			
TASK	SOLDIER EXPERIENCE		
	QUALIFIED & EXPERIENCED	SOMEWHAT FAMILIAR - BUT NOT EXPERIENCED	OJT
COMPLEX	3	4	5
ROUTINE	2	3	4
SIMPLE	1	2	3

SOLDIER ALERTNESS				
OPERATING ENVIRONMENT	LENGTH OF REST			
	OPTIMUM 8 HOURS	ADEQUATE 6 HOURS	MINIMAL <4 HOURS	
TACTICAL	3	4	5	
GARRISON	1	2	3	


EQUIPMENT STATUS				
EQUIPMENT AGE	MAINTENANCE STATUS			
	HIGHLY MAINTAINED	C-2	C-3	NOT COMBAT READY C-4
OLD	3	4	5	5
AVERAGE	2	3	4	5
NEW	1	2	3	5

WEATHER & ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS			
TEMPERATURE	VISIBILITY / MOISTURE		
	DAY CLEAR DRY	LTD VIS HAZY DRIZZLE	NIGHT DUST-FOG-SNOW MUD-RAIN-ICE
VERY COLD	3	4	5
COLD	2	3	4
MODERATE	1	2	3

RISK ASSESSMENT					
1	LOW	11 12	CAUTION	23	24 HIGH 30

HAZARDOUS OR SENSITIVE CARGO RISK ASSESSMENT					
1	LOW	9 10	CAUTION	19 20	HIGH 30

WHAT ARE YOUR RISK REDUCTION ACTIONS?



Are we
**Training
Soldiers
to Kill?**
each other

By MSG Miles C. Pitman

"Gunner, sabot, three tanks."
"One identified, scanning."
"Second and third targets identified."
"Middle tank, fire, right tank."

A "clunk!" is heard over the intercom as the gunner changes to ten-power on his thermal sights.

"On the way!"

Through the blast from the cannon, the gunner sees a white hot flash.

"Target!"

"Up!"

"On the way!"

Again, the gunner sees what could be flash, but isn't certain, so he announces:

"Lost!"

"Re-engage!"

"On the way!"

This time the flash is obvious, followed almost immediately by apparent secondary explosions.

"Cease fire, cease fire, freeze! All firing vehicles confirm! I say again, this is Range Safety, cease fire, freeze! Place all gun switches to safe and remove your hands from all power controls. Display a green light when complete. Shut down main engine and all members exit to the back deck. Confirm instructions!"

This dramatized action took place several years ago at Grafenwoehr, Germany when an M1 Abrams main battle tank engaged two M3 Bradley scout

fighting vehicles in an adjoining lane during a night gunnery CALFEX (Cavalry Firing Exercise).

With the current emphasis on fratricide occurring as a result of Desert Storm, we need to closely examine what led to this action. I'd like to try to step inside the minds of the tank crew members and analyze the events that led to that tragic night.

First, understand that the methods of engagement are highly refined and each crew member has responsibilities which must be met prior to pulling the trigger. Second, if those responsibilities are met, chance of an accidental fratricide is virtually removed, at least to a range of about 1,500 meters. So, how did a highly trained and professional crew make this mistake?

I say the fault lies with the crew's training. Some may say we've been training tankers the same way for 40 years, so how can anyone make a statement like that?

I say we haven't been training crews the same way we do now, nor on systems with the lethality of today's systems. Now that I've stuck my neck out, let me try to justify my statements.

Let's look at our training devices for clues. The UCOFT (unit conduct of fire trainer) is a computerized marvel that

must bear both blame and honor in this accident. The UCOFT is the first training aid to be widely used which presents friendly vehicles in a live fire, war-fighting scenario. That means for a crew to be successful, they must not only shoot the bad guys, *but* not shoot the good guys. So where's the problem?

The problem lies in the hardware of the trainer. When you change the thermal sight of the M1 series tank from three-power (scanning) to ten-power (engagement), you *have* to adjust the focus for a clear picture. In the UCOFT, the focus doesn't need adjustment. That means target engagement in the UCOFT leaves out a necessary step in the engagement process. **The gunner is taught to flip and fire without adjusting his focus!** The desperate need to save time during the engagement overrides proper technique.

Another problem lies directly with training exercises on the range itself. It goes by the name of "Opening Time." This means the time it takes from full target presentation until the first round is fired. This is a step used during scoring procedure under some circumstances. I've known units that trained to fire that first round even when they were



uncertain of what they were shooting at, and even when they knew they wouldn't hit the target or had the wrong ammunition loaded. Incredibly, the cost and error was acceptable because of the higher score possible.

Since no friendly targets were in the target area, no risk was present. That meant a crew could fire at a "hot spot" in the thermal sight picture with absolute certainty that it was an enemy target.

A major flaw in training lies with vehicle identification. In order to be truly proficient in identifying armored vehicles, you must use **actual** photographs of the vehicles, both in normal light and in thermal imagery, and out to the limits of engagement range.

Crews have to qualify at vehicle identification prior to live fire exercises. However, time crunches sometimes result in taking short cuts, usually with GTA cards with line drawings on them. They are plentiful, convenient to carry and use, and deadly! The poor training and complacency they cause borders on criminal negligence. At least they should have actual size photos rather than line drawings. And why not have hazy thermal images?

I've administered many TCGSTs (tank crew gunnery skills test), and vehicle identification is by far the most commonly failed task, when real images are used. That means we either train tougher, or accept the training weakness. Unfortunately, the senior leadership has the least time to prepare individually and are put in the position of being personally embarrassed, or allowing easier standards.

This is a tough call, and one that will have to be looked at throughout the Armor community. Major changes in priority would have to be made to correct this flaw.

Many training areas fail to insert friendly silhouettes into the target scenarios. I saw this done in the late 70s. The usual result was that the friendly got shot. Rather than correct the problem,

the friendly targets were removed. The answer to this problem is obvious, but with far-reaching consequences. A commander would have to have tremendous tolerance and confidence in his subordinates to face the embarrassment of having his superior view a "fratricide" during training. I know of no other way to train to correct the problem.

Is there any good news? Yes, the very structure of the Combat Training Centers is geared toward preventing fratricides. With the MILES (multiple-integrated laser engagement system) equipment, units learn first-hand how not to kill their partners.

Absolute realism demands absolute honesty in training. By keeping the CTC rotations a training exercise rather than an evaluation, a commander can train without fear of retribution. To get full value from the training, he must treat each death on the battlefield as if it were real.

The best commanders I've seen do exactly that. In some instances, junior leaders had to write letters to the parents of "killed" subordinates explaining the circumstances of "friendly fire." Once, a CG ordered a 15-6 investigation performed when an OH-58D was "shot" down during training by a "friendly" M1 tank.

The individual didn't have to pay for the aircraft or account for the lives of the two flight crew members, but the impact was immediate and obvious. Within hours, every soldier heard of the action, and suddenly it was no longer "cool" to shoot down anything that flew.

Currently, many extraordinary measures are being taken to prevent fratricides, and I agree with every one, including hardware systems that provide positive identification, similar to that

used in SIMNET (simulation network). This training device allows an armored vehicle crew to lay on another vehicle, press a button and the vehicle is identified by bumper number in the sight picture.

A real-world application of this type would have limitations, and eventually be defeated by ECW (electronic counter-warfare) methods. But, it's far better than what we have now. Visual signals, such as the infrared lamps the former USSR vehicles had on the back of their turrets since the World War II are also viable deterrents to fratricide. Improvements to vehicle location finding through satellite location will also help by accurately locating units on the battlefield.

The bottom line for today, however, is that the most effective fratricide prevention measure is exacting training techniques with no margin for error. Allowance for mistakes during training must happen, but only when training failure is corrected.

Even at the CTCs, this means extra time must be planned to retrain failures. Lack of training resources will always be a problem, but failure to train to standard can only lead to tragedies like those at Grafenwoehr and Desert Storm. The fact that so few fratricides have taken place in recent years is testimony to the fine commanders and great soldiers that are already training to standard.

As my old CSM, Ned Devereaux, used to say to soldiers he caught doing something unsafe, "You can't make *me* send *you* home in a coffin! Now do it right!"

Pitman is a faculty advisor for the U.S. Army Sergeants Major course, Fort Bliss, Texas.



The UCFT system helps gunners acquire and identify (friend or foe) targets prior to firing.

Photo by SFC Bill Horner

FORCE

Protection

By SGM Samuel Reynolds

As NCOs prepare to step into the 21st century, they will step on solid ground if they've honed their leadership skills to perfection and integrated force protection into the three pillars of their leader development.

NCO leadership is developed through a dynamic process consisting of three equally important pillars: institutional training, operational assignments and self-development. This process provides the education, training and experience NCOs need to develop the skills, knowledge and attitudes to be successful leaders. Integrating force protection into this mix enhances this process.

Why Force Protection? For leaders to be successful in war fighting, they must master the four elements of combat power; leadership, firepower, maneuver and force protection. Most NCOs perform the first three elements flawlessly but often short change themselves and their soldiers when doing the one called force protection. To achieve maximum success in combat and garrison, NCOs must understand and execute each element of combat power to near perfection.

What is Force Protection? It's anything that causes a loss of force potential within the scope of safety. In simple terms, force protection is protecting assets, both soldiers and equipment, from the hazards that cause accidents, injuries, fatalities and equipment damage.

Why integrate Force Protection into the three pillars of leader development? The Army uses leader development to build competent and confident leaders. The process encompasses assessment,

feedback, additional training and reinforcement, education, training experience and selection for advancement.

The Army is committed to developing NCOs by providing the education necessary for acquiring the skills, knowledge and attitudes needed to lead. This is done through the three pillars of leader development described below.

Institutional Training. The Non-commissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) of progressive and sequential learning provides a foundation of leadership, doctrine, technical and tactical skills each NCO needs to lead today's soldiers.

In each phase of NCOES, NCOs must learn the initiatives of force protection and provide ways to implement these procedures commensurate with their grade level. The most important of these initiatives is the risk management process. Risk management is a decision

making process that allows leaders to achieve safer and more realistic training. NCOs who use the risk management process become more sensitive to potential hazards associated with the full spectrum of Army activities from garrison operations to war.

Operational Assignments. Operational experience gained through assignments provides NCOs the opportunity to use and build upon information learned through formal education. It's in the unit where NCOs learn to lead soldiers and develop and influence other potential NCO leaders. It's in the operational unit where NCOs fine tune those force protection initiatives learned in NCOES. NCOs who implement the risk management process in every activity will lead, train and take care of the soldier, their most precious asset, whether in war or in peace.

Self Development. Individual ini-

Rules for managing risk...

Once you understand the "why" of risk management, you need to be able to apply some general principles.

- Integrate safety into planning. Start as early as possible in the training management cycle. Incorporate the commander's safety guidance into the training for METL tasks. In conducting combat operations, consider safety hazards during the METT-T analysis and include controls in the operation order.
- Accept no unnecessary risk. Soldiering is a risky profession, but no one wants to see soldiers killed or injured. If you can, eliminate or reduce hazards that don't interfere with your unit's ability to accomplish the mission. By protecting soldiers and equipment, you are improving your chances of accomplishing the mission.
- Make risk decisions at the proper level. Leaders at all levels need to apply the risk management process in planning and conducting operations. As you assess hazards and identify controls, determine your authority and resources. Can you reduce the risk to a degree that you may accept; is it based on the commander's guidance?
- Accept risk if benefits outweigh the cost. After instituting controls and assessing the residual risk, ask yourself one more time: What's this worth to me and my unit? Be sure that what you are gaining is worth the potential price.



tiative and self-improvement are keys to training and developing every NCO. The NCO leaders must continue to expand their knowledge base whether through Army correspondence courses, civilian education, reading programs, or self-study programs. The way the Army does business changes daily. As NCOs expand their knowledge of force protection and integrate it into their daily routines, they must always keep abreast of other initiatives to remain competitive, to remain fit to fight.

There's nothing new about force protection. It's been in the Army's arsenal of war fighting capabilities for some time. It's part of the Army's doctrine and one of its four elements of combat power. Simply put, force protection equates to protecting and preserving assets to win in combat.

For the Army to continue successfully, NCOs and their soldiers must always ask and think of the best ways to implement force protection in all missions. Implementation of the four components of force protection is the key. These components are:

Concealment and deception. Make your soldiers difficult for the enemy to locate, strike and destroy. Deceive the enemy through good use of camouflage discipline, etc., to prevent unnecessary combat losses.

"Fit to Fight." Keep your soldiers healthy by safeguarding equipment and supplies from loss or damage and meet soldiers' basic health needs. Supervise preventive maintenance and the quick repair of equipment.

Safety. Integrate safety as a principle element in everything you and your soldiers do. Soldiering is tough, demanding and risky so the potential for danger is inherent. NCOs trained to accomplish missions with safety integrated can manage those associated risks. Safety must be part of the planning, training and operations of all combat operations to preserve combat power.

Prevent Fratricide (the unintentional killing of our own soldiers). New technology has made the modern battlefield very lethal. We can engage and destroy targets before we see them. NCOs must use strong command, disciplined operations and detailed situational awareness. Trained and experienced NCOs exercise positive control over fires, timing of troop movements and disciplined operational procedures.

NCOs must train in force protection and continue to enforce it with their soldiers. This helps in managing and assessing the risks and hazards that go along with soldiering.

NCOs sometimes confuse the terms "risk management" and "risk assessment." They are two different terms. Risk management is a tool that helps leaders at all levels to do exactly what the term implies: manage risk. NCOs face a variety of training, safety and fiscal risks.

Safety risk management, however, is a specific type of risk management. Risk management is a five-step cyclic process that integrates easily into the decision-making process outlined in FM 101-5, **Staff Organization and Operations**. The decision-making process is in-

grained in military leaders and readily lends itself to safety risk management.

Risk Management PROCESS

- 1 Identify hazards.
 - 2 Assess hazards.
 - 3 Make risk decisions.
 - 4 Implement controls.
 - 5 Supervise.
-

A "risk assessment" is part of risk management. It can range from simple to complex. A risk assessment causes leaders to identify hazards and threats and place them in perspective to the mission or task at hand. Logically, one can't identify the risk without first determining what the hazards are. The best tool commanders and NCOs can have is risk assessment. Assessing risks in any operation can be as small an issue as simply asking, "How can my soldiers get hurt, and what can I do about it?" Asking that one question and getting an answer, and applying the risk assessment principles—risk analysis and hazard control—may save a soldier's life.

Reynolds is sergeant major at the U.S. Army Safety Center, Fort Rucker, Ala.

Accident Prevention FORMula

By SGM Samuel Reynolds

How many times have you wished for a crystal ball that would identify the soldier that's going to have the next accident?

Such a device would allow you to prevent the accident and guarantee mission accomplishment. A crystal ball isn't the answer when it comes to identifying high accident risk in soldiers, but "The Next Accident Assessment" form is a reliable substitute.

The form assists leaders in identifying the risk-generating factors every individual possesses. Individuals with high risk factors are more susceptible to human

error accidents—and human error causes 80-percent of all ground and aviation accidents.

Risk is a leadership imperative that can be assessed and managed to protect the force, enhance training and increase combat proficiency. NCOs need to ask three key questions to raise awareness. These are: **Who will have the next accident in my unit? What kind of accident will it be? What am I doing about it?**

To assist leaders and soldiers in answering the first question, the U.S. Army Safety Center (USASC) developed a tool (one for commanders/leaders and one for individuals) called "The Next Accident Assessment." The assessment is based on the five reasons for human error accidents in ground and aviation operations over the last 10 years.

The form is not a cure-all for accidents, but leaders will find it a useful tool in reducing risks that cause accidents.

Enter the names of the individuals you rate at the top of the accident risk assessment score sheet. As you answer each question, enter the point value for the risk factor under the name of the soldier for whom it applies. Total the points

for each and assign a risk factor based on the scale at the end of the assessment.

It's important to note that the commander's/leader's assessment can be used in two ways: First, it can be used to "generally" evaluate each rated soldier; and second, it can be used to evaluate each rated soldier based on the mission at hand. **For Example:** As the platoon sergeant of a transportation battalion, you've been tasked to deploy one squad to support transportation soldiers and equipment 250 miles to port for deployment. Using the form, you determine that one of your four squad leaders is at a greater risk of having an accident than the others.

The one that's identified as having the higher risk has been counseled for poor performance (8 points), has had his civilian drivers license revoked for speeding (8 points), is a 25-year old male (8 points), has one of his trucks deadlined for maintenance (2 points) and has three newly assigned soldiers out of AIT (2 points).

As platoon sergeant, you wouldn't send this squad leader on the mission because he has the highest risk factor of all squad leaders. Or, if it became absolutely necessary to use this squad leader you would implement special control measures to reduce the risk, ie; provide detailed guidance for the task, replace the deadlined truck, and exchange three seasoned drivers for the soldiers just graduated from AIT.

Reynolds is a SGM, U.S. Army Safety Center, Fort Rucker, Alabama.

"The Next Accident Assessment" Score Sheet For Commanders/Leaders		Points	person rated	person rated	
1. Self-discipline (dependability)—soldiers know and are trained to standard (std), but don't follow std.	a. Counseled for poor performance (3 times last 12 mos., or more than 4 times last 24 mos.)	8			
	b. Had at-fault accidents/citations (2-4 last 12 mos or 5 or more last 24 mos)	8			
	c. Abused alcohol/drugs (last 12 mos) or referred to community mental health (last 24 mos)	8			
	d. Had judicial/non-judicial punishment (last 24 mo)	8			
	e. GT score 90 or less (enlisted only)	8			
	f. Male under age 25	8			
2. Leadership (enforcement of std) leaders not ready, willing or able to supervise and enforce performance.	a. Insufficient knowledge/experience (each subordinate who fits this example)	6			
	b. Tolerates below-standard performance (each subordinate who fits this example)	12			
3. Training (job skills and knowledge)—soldiers lack training to perform tasks to std.	a. MOS SDT (SQT) score less than 70	9			
	b. Not proficient in assigned tasks outside MOS (has not received OJT, school, unit, task training)	9			
4. Standards—soldiers performing tasks for which task-condition-standard or procedures	a. Do not exist (example: two vehicles operating in opposite directions on test track run into each other because there is no std on track direction)	4			
	b. Are not clear/practical (example: TM shows soldier changing 195-pound tire by himself)	4			
5. Support—soldiers not receiving support needed to perform task to std.	a. Personnel (not full crew, wrong MOS, not trained to std)	2			
	b. Equipment (TA-50, weapons, transportation, safety)	2			
	c. Supplies (ammo, fuel, food, water, parts, clothing, publications)	2			
	d. Services/facilities (maintenance, medical, personal svcs, storage)	2			
Points: 0-20		Risk: Low (L)	Each Person's	Points	
21-30		Medium (M)			Risk
31+		High (H)			



Weapons Safety? (NOT)

By SFC Vance Middleton

Who's your worst enemy when it comes to handling weapons in peacetime? Look at the Army's FY 92 accident and injury statistics and you discover that it's none other than a comrade in arms.

During the past three years, 11 soldiers were killed (5 of them in Desert Shield/Storm) and 120 others were injured (28 Desert Shield/Storm) because of improper weapons handling or improper misfire procedures. More than half of the accidents involved privately owned weapons, and almost all of the

others involved personally assigned military weapons.

Failure to treat weapons as if they were loaded was a major factor in many weapons accidents. For example:

- ☞ A soldier and a group of friends were handling a .22-caliber pistol. They made sure the pistol was unloaded before placing it in the trunk of a car. The soldier left for a few minutes; when he returned, he picked up the pistol, assuming it was still unloaded. When he pulled the trigger, the pistol fired, killing him instantly.

Weapons aren't toys. Horseplay shouldn't be tolerated. NCOs and other leaders should ensure soldiers know to never point a weapon at anyone—even if it's not loaded. A case in point:

- ☞ A soldier was part of a team performing guard duty at an air defense site. During guard change, the soldier pointed out that the guard he was relieving had a magazine in his weapon and it wasn't on safe. The guard told him it was okay; no round was chambered. The guard then pointed the rifle at the relief soldier and pulled the trigger. The weapon fired, and the round struck the soldier in the throat. He died the next day.

Weapons safety covers a wide area. However, it starts when your soldiers enter the arms room and draw their weapons, no matter what the weapon and continues until they turn it in. It's our responsibility as NCOs to make sure our soldiers know what is expected of them concerning weapons and safety. This applies from cleaning to qualifying to guard duty and beyond. They need to know the standards.

The basic rule is once you draw your weapon, clear it and put it on safe. It stays on safe until you're ready to shoot someone or something.

How many times do soldiers and leaders walk around in garrison with a magazine inserted into their weapon? I ask, "for what purpose?" Probably the most common answer is it looks macho or it keeps the magazine well clean. *Not!* Train as you fight. Get your soldiers used to treating their magazines as if they're loaded.

It's amazing how many soldiers—and NCOs—don't seem to understand the damage a blank round can do. For a visual demonstration, shoot blank ammo with and without a blank adapter at balloons, paper bags, sandbags, or even watermelons. Hitting any of these items with blank ammo will drive home the point. Always use a blank adapter when firing with blanks.

During the course of live fire ranges it's common to do a practice run using blanks. Especially on fire and maneuver ranges. Leaders need to be cautious about never mixing blanks and live ammunition. Prior to issuing live rounds remove blank adapters, collect all blanks and clear weapons.

Brass and ammo check after training aren't optional. Leaders must do this, not once, but several times if necessary. Physically check your soldiers. It's your duty. Besides checking ammo pouches you must also check cargo pockets and rucksacks.

Assumptions cause accidents. For example:

- "How could a weapon in the arms room be loaded?"
- "I didn't know it was loaded."
- "I cleared it before I turned it in."
- "I only have blanks in my magazine."

These assumptions, and many more, kill or injure soldiers.

We're responsible for the welfare of our soldiers. To more effectively accomplish our NCO mission, we must enforce high standards in all areas, particularly in weapons safety and handling.

Middleton is a platoon sergeant with the 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, N.C.

Deadly Duds

By SSG Edward L. Woodford

Many soldiers died or suffered injuries needlessly during Desert Storm for lack of training in Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) recognition. An Army-wide UXO training program—aimed at rectifying this deficiency—is currently being fielded. It starts with a safety video, "Danger UXO," (#709919), which is available at all Audiovisual Support Centers. This 13-minute video educates soldiers about the UXO hazard, shows what various types of ordnance can look like and stresses the importance of leaving it alone.

It tells soldiers to report any suspected UXO to their supervisor. The new soldiers manual of common tasks, (STP 21-24-SMCT) has three tasks regarding UXO, (093-403-5010, *Recognize Military Explosive Ordnance*; 093-403-5020, *Take Immediate Action for an Explosive Hazard* and 093-403-5030, *Report an Explosive Hazard*.) Recognizing military ordnance will be tested in FY 93 common task testing. A UXO training aids package is available at a number of TASC's. The package contains everything from aircraft bombs, to land mines, handgrenades, rockets and small submunitions.

There is also a 40-minute video, "The UXO Hazard," which will be fielded to help explain the common tasks. Very few soldiers actually have any

experience with ordnance items, so the film, along with the common task manual, is designed to enhance training and retention of information.

Soldiers can use a graphic training aid (GTA 9-12-1), designed to be used like a leadership card, to recognize, report and protect against UXO hazards. Drawings of ordnance items on the reverse side of the card aid in the recognition of different ordnance types.

An Army-wide UXO reporting system, starting with the UXO Spot Report, has been developed. It's in the supplemental support information of all SOI's and is on the GTA. It's a nine-line report sent by the fastest means by the individual that first encounters the hazard. The report alerts commanders to potential mobility problems on that area of the battlefield and lets commanders know that the requesting unit requires help to continue with their mission.

A task included in the updated Common Collective Task manual for AR-TEPs requires units to react to a UXO hazard by reporting and taking immediate action.

FM 21-16, *Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Procedures*, currently under development at OMMCS, Redstone Arsenal, explains the concept behind UXO recognition, reporting and immediate action. It will also contain numerous pictures of ordnance items that soldiers can expect to encounter on the battlefield.

While UXO was a battlefield deficiency, it can be encountered wherever soldiers train. It can be ordnance items, or simulators, such as the M115 artillery simulator. All items are just as dangerous. Through education and training, an urgent safety issue can be addressed.

Woodford is UXO project officer at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.





"Sometimes you really do not know what to say right away. You have that person in tears, another relative must take the telephone. Some people are old and I'm sensitive to older people. I don't know their health condition and I visualize something happening to them if they can't take the news, like a heart attack. Sometimes we have to send an ambulance out."

a Notification
NCO



When Tragedy Calls

By Morten G. Ender and Carla D. Porter

As a senior NCO you may be called to assist bereaved families following Army deaths, serious injuries or illnesses. Many of you can expect to serve at least once in your career as a Casualty Notification Officer or Casualty Assistance Officer (CAO) as names rotate on your unit's additional duty roster.

Casualty Notification Officers are active duty and retired Army personnel living or working nearest the deceased soldier's next of kin. Although the name implies officers, sergeants (E5 and above) may be called. DA policy requires personal notification of the death within 24 hours, if possible, to the next of kin.

Like the Notification Officer, the CAO can be a senior NCO or officer. After being briefed by the Casualty Notification Officer on any special circumstances regarding the next of kin, the CAO makes arrangements to visit the home of the next of kin.

A CAO must handle a host of time-limited, but intense, duties. First, the CAO must meet the family. Next, needs are assessed. The initial death gratuity must be obtained. CAOs are also responsible for escorting the remains from airports or train stations to private or Army burial sites. Burial rights and benefits must also be coordinated with the family. Arranging for a burial plot, headstone and full military honors, such as positioning the firing party and bugler

at the gravesite, are all key tasks associated with being a CAO. Likewise, administrative responsibilities are required after the funeral. Any additional death gratuities and autopsy reports are furnished to the next of kin. New identification cards are issued to qualifying family members. Personal effects of the deceased are itemized, assessed for appropriateness and handed over to the next of kin. Insurance payments must be applied for. Dependent educational benefits for surviving children may need assessing and legal counsel and assistance sought when necessary.

Hundreds of questions from bereaved family members and friends may face the CAO. Sometimes, the bereaved family may not be receptive. You may come to represent the organization responsible for taking their loved one's life, or not providing for survivors appropriately.

"Coping with the family's anger and frustration was hard. They wanted results now. But due to the time involved with the identification of remains, I could give no quick answers. Later, when it was determined that the deceased's illegitimate son was to be the primary beneficiary, more anger and frustration were directed towards me from brothers, sisters and other family members."

a CAO

You'll find CAO duty stressful. Performing these duties may produce negative psychological effects. Some CAOs complained of headaches, nervousness and insomnia.

However, CAOs emphasize the importance of receiving support from their commander, unit, family and friends in helping them cope with the duty. Helping a family through "tough times" also carries its own rewards.

Notification NCOs work primarily via telephone and are typically career-oriented NCOs with five to 15 years active duty and some college. The primary MOS is 71 Lima. Notification NCOs are assigned to the Casualty and Memorial Affairs Operation Center, and serve at least three years.

The most stressful part of the Notification NCOs job? A 1989 survey reported that informing families over the phone was the hardest and most stressful part of the job, both for themselves and the next of kin.

CAOs, Notification Officers and Notification NCOs share the responsibility of acting as the official representatives of the Army. Members of all three groups said the "unofficial Army ambassador" role is mostly positive.

As one NCO said: "We're only treating the families like we would want our family to be treated."

The research projects summarized in this article were supervised by Paul T. Bartone, Ph.D., principal investigator, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Washington, D.C.

An Officer's Perspective on The NCO's Role in...

Training

By MAJ Mike Galloucis

As I look back on my almost 13 years of active duty, I remember fondly (and sometimes not so fondly) how NCOs have helped me learn what it means to be a soldier—and, more importantly, what it means to be a leader.

My first exposure to Army NCOs came during ROTC summer camps. After my sophomore year in college, I went to Fort Knox, KY for ROTC Basic Camp, where I learned much about the Army in only six weeks. Back then, we still had “open bay” barracks—45 cadets living in one big room—with plenty of bunk beds and metal, one-door wall lockers. Teamwork and discipline were essential!

Each platoon had two sergeants first class drill sergeants and a sergeant major platoon evaluator. The only officer in the company was the commander, and the only time I saw him was at morning reveille, PT and graduation. He wasn't involved in cadet training. The drill sergeants taught me basic soldier skills and the platoon evaluator was responsible for my initial leadership training. The majority of these NCOs served with combat units in Vietnam, and they were top-notch professionals.

After my junior year, I went to Fort Bragg, N.C., for ROTC Advance Camp. At Bragg, I gained a better appreciation for what I'd learned the summer before. The little “tricks of the trade” the NCOs at Knox taught me really paid off—such as how to pack a rucksack, how to navigate “smartly,” how to clear a jammed M-16, conduct drill and ceremonies, manage time effectively, etc. At Bragg, I also got my first exposure to Army paratroopers. Those “can do” airborne NCOs were highly motivated and provided a superior leadership model to emulate.

I still remember doing four-count push-ups in a platoon formation after a long run around Bragg in the middle of July. As my arms began to feel like Jello, I thought to myself, “this platoon sergeant is a real turkey—can't he see we're dying?” About this time, I looked up and realized the crusty old Green Beret NCO not only barked, “get down and give me fifty”; he was doing them with us!

As was the case with the NCOs at Knox, the NCOs I encountered at Bragg were top-notch professionals, eager to help a cadet reach his potential and learn what it means to be an Army leader.

As a new second lieutenant fresh out of the officer basic course, I reported for my first assignment as a platoon leader in Germany. I was motivated and possessed basic tactical and technical competence. But, aside from basic leadership skills I'd learned growing up (i.e. parents, athletics, civilian jobs), in ROTC and OBC, I had little practical experience leading—particularly leading soldiers.

I learned a valuable lesson about people at my first duty assignment: you can't judge someone by appearance alone. It took almost a year to drive this point home. My first platoon sergeant was a pudgy staff sergeant who at first glance appeared out of touch with reality, not to mention out of shape. I felt this platoon was falling quite short of its capabilities, and I initially attributed this poor performance to the platoon sergeant.

My relationship with him in those early months was less than ideal, and eventually he talked the commander into moving him from the platoon to be the training NCO. Shortly after, a new sergeant first class reported for duty as my platoon sergeant.

I'd hoped for a disciplinarian and was a little disappointed to discover the new man generally was a laid-back person who didn't seem to fit the mold of what I thought the platoon needed from its platoon sergeant.

I was wrong on both counts. The hefty staff sergeant turned out to be one of the finest soldiers I've ever known. Later, I fought (and succeeded) to get him back and he was instrumental in helping the platoon excel in all its missions. Several years later, I saw the same NCO at Fort Hood where he'd lost much of the weight, been promoted to sergeant first class and was once again a platoon sergeant helping turn second lieutenants into leaders. As for the quiet, unassuming sergeant first class, he immediately “took charge” of the platoon—albeit not in the customary way—helped restore esprit and generally turned out to be an ideal platoon sergeant.

Several other NCOs, including the battalion command sergeant major, first sergeant and other platoon sergeants at my first unit, took me “under their wings” and attempted to teach me how to be a good officer. I learned a great deal about people, leadership, the Army and myself from those NCOs.

The next “lesson” I'd learn from an NCO came in my first staff position as a battalion assistant S-3. Having served as a platoon leader in two units for more than three years, I thought I knew something about troop leadership. But, I knew nothing of “staff work.”

More than anyone else, the person who helped me be-

Officers

come an effective staff officer was a master sergeant who was within one year of retirement. Although this old soldier had a bad back, knees and ingested aspirin at an alarming rate, he possessed the institutional knowledge of four people, plus the savvy on how to get things done on a staff. What surprised me most was his eagerness to pass his vast knowledge on to me. Fortunately, I succeeded in learning as much as I could from this soldier before we went separate ways.

In Germany, while attending a course in Bad Tolz, I also met a first sergeant (now a CSM) who positively exuded leadership. He's still an inspiration, even though I haven't seen him in nine years; that's what you call a lasting impression!


Upon returning stateside, I was assigned to Fort McClellan, Ala., as an operations officer for a complex project known as a Force Development Test and Experimentation. After several months working by myself, I got an unexpected—but welcome—surprise: a master sergeant who just completed several years as a drill sergeant and first sergeant in the training brigade. His leadership, work ethic and professionalism contributed immeasurably to the success of the project.

On two occasions, I've had the privilege of commanding company-sized units. In both cases, NCOs played key roles in the unit. As an MP company commander in Korea, I was blessed with several superb NCOs who truly were the "backbone" of the unit.

As an HHC commander in a mechanized infantry brigade at Fort Hood, I benefitted immensely from two combat arms first sergeants who balanced taking care of soldiers, looking out for the officers, and accomplishing the mission as well as I've seen it done. There were also many other NCOs in the unit who successfully balanced their brigade staff and company leadership responsibilities.

From a late-summer rotation at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, Calif., to a winter deployment to Germany for REFORGER, I saw my NCOs doing miraculous things at all hours of the day and night; in the desert's early September heat to Bavaria's cold in January. It's a great feeling for a commander to see the unit performing effectively during extended field deployments or other less than ideal conditions; smart commanders know that won't happen without quality NCOs.

Between commands, I served in a brigade S-3 shop. Once again, I benefitted from the counsel, support and professionalism of Army NCOs. For most of my tour on a brigade staff, I worked with two master sergeants who epit-



omized the quality of today's NCO. Both were technically and tactically proficient, had the energy of an 18-year-old, were airborne qualified, physically fit, had college degrees, wrote and spoke well and had served in troop leadership positions for the majority of their careers.

I continue to learn from NCOs. Today, I routinely seek the counsel of several senior NCOs who work in my organization. Their advice on a myriad of issues has always been right on the mark and has helped me become proficient in a secondary specialty.

It's been a genuine pleasure for me to see many of the NCOs I've served with going on to positions of greater responsibility. It proves to me the Army's promotion system—while not infallible—does recognize and reward proven performers.

Throughout this article, I've tried to show the important role NCOs played in my development as an Army officer. Sure, I've served with and seen some mediocre NCOs, but I've also served with some mediocre officers. Images of those sub-par NCOs have been more than overshadowed by numerous NCOs who have gone the extra mile for their soldiers, the Army and me personally. To these professional soldiers, I dedicate this article—with renewed gratitude and pride.

Galloucis serves with the Army's Office of the Chief of Public Affairs at the Pentagon.

I wrote in a speech that 'we had won every war we'd been in.'

Upon asking another individual to look over the speech and critique it, he crossed out that statement and wrote 'not true' above it. His objection was that we'd lost the Vietnam War. He defined the 'we' in my statement as the United States.

He applied the historical measurement of victory in war and determined that we'd withdrawn from Vietnam without achieving the objectives of our national policy; therefore we'd lost the war. He was absolutely right—for the first time in our history, our nation had made war and lost!

The 'we' in my statement, however, wasn't meant to refer to the United States. It was meant to refer to the military. *That* 'we' did not lose in Vietnam—the military didn't lose.

Nations make war; the military merely fights them. We seem reluctant to admit that our nation made war, we achieved a military victory, but our nation decided to accept a political defeat.

When our nation accepted this political defeat it caused something to happen to those of us who fought in Vietnam. Maybe it was confusion over how the hell our country could give up this military victory. Maybe it was frustration at being the instrument that had achieved its part of the national policy—military victory—only to have our civilian leadership change the damn policy. Maybe it was simply a 'to hell with it all' attitude. Maybe it was a combination of all of this. Whatever this *something* was that happened to us, it resulted in the the creation of a strange phenomenon that most of us who fought in that war are part of, that which I call 'The Silent Warriors.'

The silent warriors. You know who they are. They're the ones who went to Vietnam, fought and returned home. The ones who returned to fight again. The ones who went to fight—and died. They're the ones who went to war and carried out their orders professionally—with dignity, pride and to the best of their ability. You remember those guys. The hundreds of thousands that didn't go to Canada.

Surely you must remember these soldiers. The hundreds of thousands that weren't involved in fraggings.

You know who I'm talking about. The silent warriors who performed their duty successfully, causing 900,000 North Vietnamese soldiers to die. The silent warriors who didn't believe in the cause of Vietnam but went and fought because of their oath. The silent warriors who are—*us!*

We stayed silent for a lot of reasons. We lived through an unbelievable experience when public opinion forced a pres-

THE SILENT WARRIORS SPEAK

By CSM John W. Gillis

were maybe a little confused about the psychological importance of a parade for Vietnam veterans. But we didn't go to war for a parade.

It was the same with the Vietnam Memorial. We were certainly in favor of a Memorial, but the media's pursuit of celebrities and those few Vietnam veterans who all cried out for the need as 'absolution for our shameful involvement in Vietnam,' violated the noble death of our fallen comrades.

There are other reasons. The point is, we kept silent—not because we were ashamed, or embarrassed, or believed any less in our country, ourselves or our commitment to duty. It seems we just silently, collectively, withdrew into ourselves.

We were wrong to stay silent as long as we have. We need to tell our side of the story to the NCOs and soldiers we train. We don't need to have our side of the story made into a movie. We just have to make sure those we train know the truth of war, the normal, everyday business of combat. Our side of the Vietnam War won't sell newspapers or cause TV ratings to increase, but will simply create a better understanding of the 'Profession of Arms' in those soldiers we are responsible for training.

Maybe I've been a little over-dramatic in labeling us as the silent warriors. I don't think so. All the NCOs I've known are proud of their service in Vietnam. Yet, none have openly taken the opportunity to call attention to their proud service and thus reinforce the warrior ethic.

I know I've not been over-dramatic in referring to us as warriors. *Webster's* defines warrior as 'one experienced in combat.' It doesn't take a genius to figure out we're among the last. Our legacy shouldn't be one of silence.

Winston Churchill, when talking about his experience in battle as a wartime journalist, said: "There is nothing more exhilarating in life than to be shot at without effect."

Those of us that have been shot at without effect, or at least without fatal effect, have to calmly, purposely and with conviction share our individual Vietnam combat experience with those we train. We owe them more than silence. It could mean the difference for them and for our country in the next battle.

Gillis is CSM, 8th U.S. Army, Korea.

■ Letters to the Editor

Honor Women as Soldiers and Women

In light of recent increases in sexual harassment incidents within the military, I felt compelled to write this letter. I wanted to reach our most senior NCOs (you who wield so much influence and maturity on our young soldiers) on this issue.

Our women soldiers have proudly served our nation through many wars, proving themselves to be as tough, professional and able as any man.

We haven't (yet) learned to fully appreciate and respect them for that ability. Eleven thousand women came home from the Vietnam war to none of the care, compassion and concern which they gave when that was so very needed. Recently, these valiant ladies excelled in arduous service during Operation Desert Storm.

The heartless stupidity of the "Tailhook" scandal was a callous affront to our servicewomen. The military must learn to be more sensitive and genteel towards these women. They need to know we value, appreciate and (still) honor them as persons and soldiers.

We must all work ardently to ensure there are no more "Tailhook" outrages in any branch of the military. Our military women rightly deserve our full respect and support.

SSG Joe Hammel
Waegwan, Korea

"My LT and Me" Article Stirs Memories

A fellow NCO sent me a copy of the Winter 92 *NCO Journal*. It took me back many moons to the "Brown Shoe Army."

The story, "My LT and Me," by CSM Woodyard tells it all. I was one of those young sergeants with those young LTs who now are retired generals. I've been retired 16 years as well.

Thanks for such a great magazine. I sent my copy to a young West Pointer

(Class of 92). His father and I were in 'Nam in 68.

I'd also like to thank MSG Ashley C. Davis for his review of my book [*The Last Medal of Honor*]. Our future leaders (NCOs and Officers) must possess faith, determination and a positive attitude. I believe a positive attitude will carry you farther than ability. Again, thanks for a great magazine.

MSG (Ret) Roy Benavidez
El Campo, Texas

Muscle Not Everything To Being a Soldier

After reading the Fall 92 issue of *The NCO Journal* I was surprised to read SGT William E. Burke's "quick fix" to Women in Combat. Did you run short on "Letters to the Editor?"

I'm sure that SGT Burke isn't a day over 21 and he probably has no more than three or four years of service!

SGT Burke's opinion of a person's usefulness and maximum potential in life past age 30 is absurd. I'm sure he'd like to see people over 30 in nursing facilities or retirement centers!

Is SGT Burke's memory so short? Doesn't he remember how efficient and productive people like General Schwarzkopf were during Desert Storm. I'm sure he was well over 30. I don't think SGT Burke gave much thought to age versus efficiency, motivation and self respect. I think he's been far too busy trying to figure out a way to justify his bad attitude about females.

I have several years of active duty service and I'm well into my 30s and a woman. I'd like SGT Burke to know that it's my experience that older soldiers, whether men or women, have much more stamina, initiative, motivation and self control than the "younger soldiers." Every time I participate in an NCO school the older soldiers are the ones who score the highest, volunteer and participate to the max and by

all means carry more than their weight. I recently completed BNCOC at Ft. Ben Harrison, Indiana, where PT was a must, five days a week. Every time we ran, it was the younger soldier who continually fell out.

If you give me a choice of who I'd prefer in combat, I'm not going to be concerned about gender but I'd definitely feel more secure with a soldier with age and wisdom rather than a "younger soldier." There's a lot more to being a soldier than just muscle.

SGT Paula S. Elliott
Nebraska National Guard

Managing Promotions

Recently I was talking with a friend of mine and the topic of promotions came up. My associate was talking about the SFC board and wondering why he wasn't selected this year. I myself was anxious to see if he had some insights into the board because I'd soon be eligible. This brought our attention to the Officer Corps and how they manage their promotions.

It seems to me the Officer Corps does a much better job of managing their soldiers than the NCO Corps. What's the reason for this?

Mentoring. Not once have I been told how to get promoted to the senior ranks. Do we just do the same things we've done in the past or is there something new we should concentrate on?

As senior NCOs we need to know—not just guess—what will help us to get promoted. Do we need more TO&E assignments, or is a mix of assignments better? As a rule how much college should we have to make sergeant first class and master sergeant?

It's also time our specific branches were better able, or more willing, to give us the facts about upcoming assignment opportunities. In other words, the branch managers need to give us more than, "This is open and this is open." Provide us with pros and cons for each specific assignment and *together* we can

decide which assignment is best for us. Whenever possible the soldier should be involved in the decision-making process.

The drawdown makes it essential for senior NCOs to know how to manage their careers. A mentoring system can help solve this problem.

SSG Paul R. Danner
Fort Sill, Oklahoma

NCOs Look For Officers Who Make Decisions

This letter is in reference to the article "Walking and Talking the Talk." (Winter 92) I'd like to commend CSM Robinson on her comment on what NCOs expect from our officers. CSM Robinson hit it right on the head when she stated "we look for an officer who... is not afraid to make decisions, is there to provide the leadership and guidance and cares about soldiers."

Such officers are a rare breed as we face this mandated Congressional drawdown. It seems to me, and I might be wrong, that most midgrade officers, ie: captains and majors, are a little gun shy in making command decisions. And, this is so because they don't want to make a mistake which might end their careers through what they may see as a less than average OER.

As we walk into the 21st Century, let us not forget where we came from and make decisions to lead and take care of soldiers. I think that to walk the walk and talk the talk as an NCO or officer we must first forget about day to day politics of our ratings and start concentrating on leading and training the young soldiers who will take our places in the near future.

Ask not what this Army can do for your career, but what you can do for your Army. Also, we must remember where we came from and where we're going as leaders.

MSG James E. Russum, Jr.
Fort Riley, Kansas

Reply to "Ranger Rick"

This is in response to "Ranger Rick" Tscherne's letter in your Winter 92 issue. I'm amazed that SFC Tscherne would think the Army is the loser because he chose to retire. I have to wonder if the reason he was passed over for promotion is because the promotion board saw the same qualities in this NCO's records as the rest of the Army now sees in his letter.

SFC Tscherne obviously believes he is justified in giving up and developing a negative attitude because he didn't receive what he believed to be proper recognition. However, he not only quit on himself but also quit on his soldiers.

If he and his soldiers deployed to war, would he still believe he was justified if his soldiers were killed or injured because of his actions or inactions—because "he really didn't care anymore?"

An NCO doesn't stop doing his duty because he's upset over not being promoted. There are many good NCOs in the Army who can't get promoted for various reasons, but they continue to do their job in a professional manner. It's my opinion that the Army's loss of SFC Tscherne is in fact the Army's gain. We don't need NCOs with self serving attitudes. There are too many truly good NCOs that are willing to do the job for no other reason than it's what they want to do. SFC Tscherne, what took you so long to get out?

MSG Samuel McGregor
Fort Bliss, Texas

AGR Oblivion

This letter is to further reiterate the "ills" of the Army promotion system and it's "stepchild" the Army Reserve. SFC Tscherne's letter barely draws blood on the subjects surrounding "promotion snafu's", specifically reverse discrimination and preferential treatment!

I was drafted and served as a combat medic with the First Infantry Division,

earning a combat medical badge and a Bronze Star. I reentered the service in the Army Reserve and volunteered for recruiting duty. I presented the image that both the Recruiting Command and the Army Reserve were eager to "use."

Later, I transferred to the Active Guard Reserve program. Three assignments in Pennsylvania and New York now total 17 years of active duty in a reserve position.

As a former recruiter, I brought counseling expertise to the technician program and saved many disillusioned "TPU" reservists from throughout six or more years of service. After 13 years (time in grade), I've become aware of the ethnic and gender partialities which demonstrate annual evidence of inside favoritism.

It's obvious that ARPERCEN management techniques are permeated with incompetence. One AGR assigned in "the field" received notice that NCO-ERs dating back three and four years are "mysteriously missing" for an upcoming board. Additionally, that won't effect the qualitative portion of the board.

SSG Michael A. Collins
West Chester, Pennsylvania

Living the Promotion Lie

I read with interest and can identify with SFC Tscherne's letter on promotions in the Winter Journal. I call my experience "Living the Big Promotion Lie."

The "Lie" starts as soon as you're promoted to sergeant and they tell you promotion to senior NCO ranks requires certain things. These things are: college, successfully complete a 'hard assignment,' have varied assignments, leadership time, high SQT score and be physically fit.

The promotion selections during the past few years reinforced my feelings. Why? I was selected for promotion to sergeant first class in the secondary zone with 10 years of service and while on

recruiting duty. I immediately began working the magic "must do" list. I was very successful in my 'hard assignment' as a recruiter.

After returning to my primary skill I attended night school two to four nights a week and earned my Associates Degree. I consistently scored in the upper 80 percent on my SQT and attended all required NCO courses. I served in leadership positions which are documented on my NCOERs. I knew I was ready for promotion to master sergeant.

I didn't get promoted in the secondary zone in 1991 or in the primary zone in 1992. I was disappointed but not overly so until I read the results of the promotion board. That's when the "lic" became evident.

The selectee list in my MOS showed NCOs with no college. It also included NCOs with SQT scores in the 60 percentile range. After having worked a promotion selection board and knowing how selections are made I couldn't believe what I was seeing. I was more qualified than over half of the list! Why? Maybe the "good old boy network" is alive and well at Fort Benjamin Harrison.

I have one more chance before retirement eligibility. With nine years in grade you can be assured what I'll do if not selected. SFC Tscherne, good luck with your retirement, I may be joining you very soon.

SFC Paul Johnson
Kaiserslautern, Germany

Kudos From Missouri

I just wanted to let you know that a quick survey here at DOES (Directorate of Evaluation and Standards) revealed that you are doing an outstanding job. Most of the articles in *The NCO Journal* are useful. Keep up the quality of (our) pub!

SSG Thomas J. Chavez
Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri

MILES Training... Training As We Will Die?

Last summer the National Guard developed a training plan that lowered the unit-level of training to squad and platoon, where it should have been all along. Large-scale exercises that train the few at the expense of the many are gone.

MILES lanes this past summer concentrated everyone's attention on an idea that's been around for awhile, but has received scant application in the past. Someone deserves enormous credit for this initiative to redirect our training resources in the right direction and at a level that makes complete sense.

But there's a snag. If some units are conducting the MILES lanes like some units in Nebraska, and I fear many are due to the Active Component influence and imposition, then we're seriously threatened with changing a very profound principle from "training as we will fight," to "training as we will die."

Our methodology for the MILES lanes needs rethinking, reevaluation and reconstruction. Our future combat soldiers must be trained to expect the unexpected. The present method is too predictable.

Not adhering to the rules of engagement on occasion pales in comparison to the sterile environment of the lanes that offer little in the way of "initiative" training for the good guys as well as the bad.

Not only do the good guys know specifically the one or two tasks required of them before they reach the objective, they also have the luxury of conducting a dry run over the terrain. This method allows for the absorption of a great deal of intelligence that real combat soldiers are often deprived of.

The OPFOR, on the other hand, is too restricted. They can't practice every standard for their ARTEP counter-tasks. They must remain in the same positions for both the dry and wet runs.

What is the tragic consequence of such training? Soldiers become condi-

tioned to expect real situations to offer the same step-by-step methodology. The good guys will meet their end when the bad guys weren't where they were suppose to be, or weren't playing by the rules.

The great thing about MILES lanes, is the tremendous amount of initiative demonstrated by the soldiers. Having a primary objective is fine, but don't be so restrictive that both sides can't choose to develop their own plans and then react to a variety of situations as they develop.

SSG Marshall K. Maddox
ARNG, Falls City Nebraska

Reader-Friendly ARs?

I am a faithful reader of your (our) magazine and would like to see an article on the promotion system, to include the establishment of the promotion zones. Also, what causes a soldier to have a retroactive promotion?

I know that it's the personnel service company's job to know, but it seems they say read the ARs. Some of the ARs are confusing to us non-personnel types. I think such an article would help soldiers to prepare their career maps and set goals.

SGT Ivory M. Davis
Tripler AMC, Hawaii

■ *Editor's Note: If the majority of our readers think there is a need for an article discussing the promotion system (centralized and semi-centralized) cut off score determination, retroactive promotions, etc., we will be happy to oblige. Let us know what you want or need to read in your NCO Journal.*

Book Reviews

The Threat at Home

Confronting
The Toxic Legacy
of the U.S. Military

By
Seth Shulman

Beacon Press, 1992
254 pages, \$23 (HB)

Any soldier who doesn't fully understand the importance of environmental stewardship must read this book. The author provides a very critical review of the Department of Defense and its treatment of the environment.

Mr. Shulman describes numerous examples of environmental abuse currently existing at military operated facilities throughout the United States.

He criticizes the military both for allowing widespread pollution of the land entrusted to it and for failure to comply with environmental laws.

One chapter, "Eastern Europe at

Home," draws a comparison between the polluted military installations left behind in Eastern Bloc forces and our own installations in the U.S. and overseas. The author states "...the military's pollution taints pieces of every state in the nation."

Appendix A describes methods for civilian communities to find out about the environmental practices of DoD facilities near them. The author explains the Freedom of Information Act and provides a list of addresses and phone numbers for public and private agencies that could assist groups on environmental concerns. Appendix B provides a detailed list of suspected sites of contamination. That list is divided into categories that reflect the installation's name, state and number of sites identified.

Overall this book provides excellent background reading for anyone who still doesn't grasp the importance of balancing our warfighting missions with environmental impacts. America's Army must become better stewards of the land entrusted to us.

SGM Dan Hubbard

The Twenty Four Hour Society

By
Martin Moore-Ede

Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1992
230 pages, \$22.95 (HB)

Every sergeant of the guard, tactical operations center NCOIC, squad leader, platoon sergeant and first sergeant who has worried about keeping soldiers safe, awake, alert and alive during critical times will want to read this interesting and informative book.

Chapter titles such as "The Costs of

Human Breakdown," "Aviation Safety and Pilot Error," "Keep on Trucking," "Decision Maker Fatigue," are enough to excite interest and draw you into the book to find parallels between related civilian and military sleep and fatigue management problems.

Readers will discover that the most notorious environmental and industrial accidents in recent times happened in early morning hours and were caused by fatigued and inattentive workers and first line managers. These accidents include Exxon Valdez, Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, Bhopal, Challenger and the Iranian airline shutdown.

Chapter 4, "Alertness: The Achilles Heel of a Nonstop World," breaks down management of human performance so readers can think clearly about managing alertness, attentiveness and performance. The author presents a model

Low Intensity Conflict

A Guide for Tactics,
Techniques
and Procedures

By
CSM James J. Gallagher
USA (Ret)

Stackpole Books, 1992
202 pages, \$14.95 (PB)

CSM Gallagher has written an excellent "How To" book on LIC. Since there hasn't been any official doctrine published to cover all military services working together, it has left many wondering about the principles and fundamentals of LIC. This book gives the reader a place to start—a "guide post."

The author takes you through a step-by-step process of identifying training, equipment, services and combat support responsibilities of the military and its leaders. He justifies a projected military action and puts a favorable light on political leaders. The book is laid out like a cook book for the military minded.

I recommend this as reading for anyone who wants to understand the actions of our military and political leaders in relation to world events in this new and challenging era of the 1990s.

SFC Bill Horner

for managing fatigue and keeping alertness high. The model is built around "the nine switches of human alertness."

Fatigue management strategies built around this model can produce productive, high-quality and safe performance.

Leaders who worry about the safety of their soldiers during continuous operations will find practical how-to advice in this book.

COL Fredrick Van Horn

“
Human error is a behavioral oddity that is like stumbling over our own feet. We do not intend to do it, and we wonder why we did. Often, we do it again.

Dr. Paul J. School, Fort Belvoir, Virginia



“The Army’s no. 1 killer is speeding, alcohol, and lack of safety belt use.”

SMA Richard A. Kidd

Adjust speed to road and weather conditions.



Alcohol and water don’t mix.



“Unloaded” weapons kill soldiers

