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Guidance for CFLCC's Priorities for Securing Key Baghdad Institutions

In addition to obtaining basic access to all ministries, coalition forces should secure the facilities and prevent the destruction or removal of equipment and sensitive records (including paper and electronic media) in key Iraqi institutions in Baghdad. All the following institutions are critical and merit securing by coalition forces as soon as possible to prevent further damage, destruction, and/or pilferage of records and assets:

- 1) Central Bank, key commercial banks & vaults
- 2) The Iraqi Museum and the Abbasid Palace
- 3) Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- 4) Ministry of Defense
- 5) Ministry of Interior
- 6) Ministry of Military Industrialization
- 7) Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research
- 8) Ministry of Justice
- 9) Ministry of Trade (for Oil-for-Food database)
- 10) National Control Center (electrical grid)
- 11) Ministry of Planning
- 12) Ministry of Finance
- 13) Ministry of Information & key media outlets
- 14) Ministry of Industry & Minerals
- 15) Ministry of Transportation & Communications
- 16) Ministry of Oil

TO: Jay Garner

FROM: Mike Mobbs

DATE: 25 March 2003

SUBJECT: Civilian Administration Team Ministry Guidance for CFLCC

Attached is the guidance prepared by the Civilian Administration Team to assist the CFLCC planners:

- Generic Guidance for CFLCC Use Regarding the Ministries (applicable to all ministries)
- Ministry Specific Guidance:
 - Culture
 - Finance & Central Bank
 - Foreign Affairs
 - Higher Education & Scientific Research
 - Industry and Military Industrialization
 - Information
 - Interior
 - Justice
 - Oil
 - Planning
 - Religious Affairs
 - Trade
- Guidance re. border integrity issues

We have also provided the Reconstruction Team with copies of this material to assist them in the preparation of their guidance to CFLCC.

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Generic Guidance for CFLCC's Use Regarding the Ministries

MINISTRY

Initial Contact

- Secure ministries and related facilities (see "Guidance for CFLCC's Priorities for Securing Key Iraqi Institutions").
- Determine damage, if any, to ministry facilities. If main ministry building is significantly damaged or destroyed, establish temporary ministry facility to ensure continuity of essential operations and communicate new location to public and employees.
- Identify and make contact with top officials in ministry. Present Proclamation No. 1 in Arabic and English, formally setting out the powers of the Military Government, and take control of ministry.
- Remove immediately all designated ministry officials. Call ministry's senior employees together (roughly equivalent to office director and above; ~50-100) and announce the provisions of Proclamation No. 1 and removal of top few employees associated with previous regime.
- Explain that the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance will soon place a senior civilian advisor to the ministry.
- Reassure that ORHA will provide for emergency payments to civil servants pending restoration of salary benefits systems.

Immediate Actions

- Secure ministry's records in priority order. List of employees and payroll is a top priority for all ministries.
- Direct that offices of removed officials remain empty.
- Distribute Proclamation No. 1 throughout ministry's internal and national structure. Ensure that no instructions should be issued from ministry to subordinate organizations without written ORHA clearance.
- Refer all who arrive and purport to be or wish to become "advisors to the ministry and the transitional military or civilian authority" to military command headquarters for appropriate action.
- Establish *no* Military Government offices in ministry, except as needed to secure records.
- Assess attitudes of Iraqi employees.

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- Determine the nature of ministry's ongoing functions. Report functions inconsistent with Proclamation No. 1 to military command headquarters for appropriate action.
- Determine ministry's organizational structure, including formal and informal reporting arrangements.
- Identify reliable, experienced civil servants, as well as any that may require replacement.
- Assess quality of ministry infrastructure.
- Identify pay structure.
- Determine nature of ministry's termination of employment process, if any.

OPERATIONS LEVEL

- Identify ministry's key subordinate operating organizations that require military command civil affairs advisory units.
- Employ all available ministry-specific guidance.

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Specific Guidance for CFLCC Use With Respect to the Ministry of Culture

FUNCTIONS: The Ministry of Culture is responsible for running a large network of cultural institutions in Iraq. Among other assets, it controls Iraq's museums and archeological sites, which contain many priceless art treasures and antiquities of world importance, which should be protected from all forms of looting in the post-war period.

OPERATIONS LEVEL: Iraq contains an enormous number of cultural sites and treasures. Since it will be impossible to protect everything, here is a list of the most valuable sites, which should be safeguarded by the stationing of US forces.

Baghdad:

Baghdad contains one of the largest archeological museums in the world, the **Iraqi Museum**, located in Central Baghdad. It contains literally thousands of priceless historical objects, many of them of gold, silver, and precious stones, as well as priceless works of art. Its collections cover over 5000 years of recorded history and represent the fruits of 200 years of scientific investigation by both Western and Iraqi archeologists. It will be a prime target for looters. Central Baghdad in the vicinity of the Defense Ministry also contains the **Abbasid Palace**, another museum containing very valuable collections. In the outskirts of Baghdad stands an ancient ziggurat temple at **Aba Ghrayb**. Finally, the Ministry of Culture is located in Baghdad as well.

The North:

- **Nineveh:** the northern city of Mosul contains a similarly valuable archeological museum, which will also be a magnet for looters. The ruins of the ancient city of **Nineveh** are located in eastern Mosul.
- the important ruins of **Nimrud** and **Ashur** are also located in the vicinity of Mosul.

The South:

- **Babylon:** ruined city located south of Baghdad near the city of al-Hilla.
- **Ur:** major archeological site east of Nasiriyya.
- **Akkad:** important archeological site east of Nasiriyya.
- **Ctesiphon:** large ruined city east of Baghdad.

All of these archeological sites of world importance and could be subject to looting.

LIMITS OF OPERATIONS: Coalition forces must secure these facilities in order to prevent looting and the resulting irreparable loss of cultural treasures of enormous importance to all of humanity. The necessary guidance and procedures established by CFLCC for field commanders should include provisions for arresting and detaining looters and turning them over to the custody of the Ministry of Justice for detention and trial. Museums and archeological sites should be closed to the public initially.

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RECORDS: Locate and secure the following records as soon as possible after arrival at the Ministry of Culture, to avoid their destruction or alteration:

1. Personnel files, including address, payroll, training and proficiency records;
2. Financial records;
3. Records relating to archeological sites and local museums and their contents.
4. If possible, preserve or document any evidence of sabotage by Saddam regime designed to blame damage of cultural sites on coalition operations.

For each category of records, identify the location and principal custodian.

IDENTIFYING PERSONNEL: Obtain the title, full name (personal name, father's name, place of origin name, and tribal name), address, and telephone number of senior members of the Ministry, including the field directors of major archeological sites.

ASSESSMENT: Perform preliminary assessments of the Ministry assets listed above in Baghdad and the North and South. In doing so, report on:

1. Records availability, with particular emphasis upon those listed above under the "Records" section.
2. Ranks and titles of senior of Ministry personnel.
3. Location of museums and archeological sites and inventories of their contents, including an estimate of loss due to looting, if looting has already occurred.
4. Initial assessment of damage done to these facilities as a result of coalition military activity, in order to facilitate possible reconstruction.

For ease of evaluation and presentation, these elements may be rated as either 1-Good; 2-Fair/acceptable; 3-Fair/unacceptable; or 4-Poor.

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Specific Guidance for CFLCC with Respect to the Ministry of Finance

Function: The Ministry of Finance is the senior economic institution of the Iraqi government. The Ministry manages the budget process, administers the tax system, and manages the state debt, both domestic and foreign.

Secure Assets: CFLCC must secure all vaults, safes, and other storage within the Ministry.

Records: CFLCC must secure the following records as soon as possible after arrival at the Ministry of Finance to avoid the destruction or alteration of these materials:

- 1) Databases and all records related to government finances including budget allocations, disbursements and payments, tax collection and other revenue statistics, and all records related to foreign and domestic debt.
- 2) All information pertaining to any branch offices of the Ministry including location, key personnel, number of staff, and general functions.
- 3) It is understood that all accounting transactions of the Government are maintained at a separate location from the primary Ministry of Finance building. Seek to determine the location of this building and secure all records.

Identifying Personnel: Obtain the full name (personal name, father's name, place of origin name, and tribal name), address and telephone number of senior members of the Ministry of Finance.

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Specific Guidance for CFLCC with Respect to the Central Bank

Function: The Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) has the legal authority to issue currency, set interest rates, control the money supply, and supervise the banking system. Presumably, the Central Bank maintains custodianship of all gold, foreign currency, and unissued "Saddam" Dinars.

Secure Assets: CFLCC must secure all vaults, safes, and other storage within the Central Bank and seek to determine if there are other offsite vaults under the administrative control of the Central Bank. As there are potentially extremely valuable state assets within the Central Bank, this security must be above average and it has to be expected that Central Bank assets are a prime target of criminal elements.

Other Actions: Assure the suspension of all transactions of Iraqi financial transactions, especially all foreign currency transactions.

Records: CFLCC must secure the following records as soon as possible after arrival at the Central Bank to avoid the destruction or alteration of these materials:

- 1) Databases and all records related to foreign currency transactions, monetary supply, foreign and domestic debt, and Central Bank branch locations.
- 2) All information pertaining to the major state-owned banks including location of branches, asset base, key personnel, and current currency holdings:
 - Rafidain Bank
 - Rashid Bank
 - Bank of Baghdad
 - Commercial Bank of Iraq

Identifying Personnel: Obtain the full name (personal name, father's name, place of origin name, and tribal name), address and telephone number of senior members of the Central Bank.

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Specific Guidance for CFLCC Use With Respect to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

FUNCTIONS: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for traditional diplomatic duties in Baghdad and the direction of Iraqi posts abroad. It is also deeply implicated in the planning and conduct of espionage and terrorist activities and, therefore, presents an immediate security threat.

The USG has demarched host governments to withdraw recognition Iraq's current diplomatic missions as well as halt their communications through diplomatic channels.

OPERATIONS LEVELS: The main Ministry of Foreign Affairs facilities are located in Baghdad, with over a hundred foreign missions.

LIMITS ON OPERATIONS: Apply and enforce the limits on the operations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs contained in Coalition Provisional Authority Law No. 1. Secure all remaining international communications equipment in ministry facilities and suspend all communication between the Ministry and Iraqi diplomatic missions abroad. If possible, prepare to instruct highest ranking remaining Iraqi ministry official transmit in his/her name cable to all missions instructing them to lower flag at all facilities, stop issuing visas and passports, make no representations to host governments and other organizations, and suspend all but humanitarian services until instructed otherwise. If communications with foreign missions is not possible, please pass this information immediately to ORHA POC: [REDACTED]. (The initial draft of this cable is now being drafted by ORHA staff and, when complete, will be sent to through ORHA front office, through DOD, to the Department of State for final development.)

RECORDS: Locate and secure the following records as soon as practicable after arrival at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to avoid their destruction or alteration:

- 1) Personnel files including address, payroll, training, and proficiency and disciplinary records;
- 2) Classified and unclassified correspondence and cable traffic to/from posts abroad, as well as all equipment related to communication with posts abroad;
- 3) Records related to diplomatic pouch and passports;
- 4) Internal ministry records and those related to intra-ministry communications (especially those potentially related to security or espionage); and
- 5) Training materials.

For each category, identify the location and principal custodian.

IDENTIFYING PERSONNEL: Obtain the full name (personal name, father's name, place of origin name, and tribal name), address, and contact information of senior members of Ministry and of those who are found to be reliable or who may need replacing.

ASSESSMENT: Perform preliminary assessments of the components of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In so doing, report on:

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1. Records availability with particular emphasis upon those listed above under the "Records" section;
2. Current tables of organization;
3. Rank/Status structure;
4. Operational performance and capability deficiencies with particular emphasis on systemic human rights abuses or other inappropriate activities;
5. Nature and quality of all personnel development/training programs;
6. Adequacy of management structure and controls, i.e. policies, procedures, etc.;
7. Number, location, and quality of all facilities;
8. Immediate equipment requirements; and
9. Other relevant conditions, deficiencies and/or problems and competencies.

For ease of evaluation and presentation, where appropriate, these elements may be rated as either, 1- Good; 2- Fair/acceptable; 3- Fair/unacceptable; or 4- Poor.

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Specific Guidance for Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research

FUNCTIONS: The Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific research oversees the legitimate administration of the Iraqi University system. It has also served as a cover organization for the Iraqi Biological Warfare program. The program was initiated in 1974 at the Al Hazan Ibn Al Hathem Institute, a subordinate of the MOHE & SR.

ORHA's involvement in re-orientation of the Ministry is vital from both international security and economic perspectives. Central to this endeavor is clarifying the relationship between the Ministry and the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction WMD program. Achieving clarity on this relationship is critical to successful implementation and execution of CFLCC's Iraqi Reconstruction Plan for stabilization, recovery and transition to a fully functional Iraqi government. As of this writing, 25 March 2003, the MOHE & SR had not been damaged by coalition bombing and can be expected to be intact. It is co-located with the Ministry of Education on Al Nidal Street, Baghdad. Both have a unique cubed shaped architecture.

The overarching goal for ORHA is two-fold: to normalize the Ministry so that legitimate educational administration may resume, and to identify and terminate illegitimate practices in support of WMD development and acquisition. The preservation of all evidence within this Ministry will be essential in conducting the post-mortem investigation of the Iraqi WMD program. A suspension of Ministry activities may temporarily cause administrative problems with Iraq's Universities, but will not endanger the life or welfare of the Iraqi people.

Several assumptions are key to this objective:

- The Ministry has played a key role in developing Iraq's military program including by not necessarily limited to Biological research and weapons development and the training of WMD scientists.
- Compartmentalization of information and activity has occurred so that very few people have an understanding of the complete program.
- The Ministry used a series of state-owned entities SOEs to buy and build the military power Saddam desired for Iraq.
- The complexities of the MOHE & SR are such that it will require a specialized investigative team to unmask the breath of involvement of this ministry in WMD.

OPERATIONAL LEVELS: Upon the re-entry of the UN Inspection regime, scientists affiliated with the Iraqi WMD program were parceled out to various universities. Here, in the guise of regular staff professors, they were hidden from Inspectors and their identities protected.

LIMITS ON OPERATIONS: Given the gravity of the WMD program and the necessity to fully uncover the details of the research, development, and possible human testing of Biological agents, it is recommended that the MOHE & SR be completely secured from entry by anyone other than coalition personnel.

RECORDS: CFLCC must identify and secure records (immediately to avoid the destruction or alteration of those materials) for all factories producing both chemicals and other industrial products for military and WMD uses. Rank these firms into four categories:

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- a) those that can be easily converted to civilian use;
- b) those that will require minimal capital investment;
- c) those that will require major capital investment and retooling;
- d) and those that need to be destroyed.

CFLCC should also locate and secure the following records:

- a) Suppliers for dual use products and parts.
- b) Facility and property records.
- c) Financial statements.

IDENTIFYING PERSONNEL: Obtain the full name (personal name, father's name, place of origin name, and tribal name), address and telephone number of senior members of the Ministry.

ASSESSMENT: CFLCC shall perform preliminary assessments of the Ministry in all locations, including SOEs. In doing so, CFLC will focus upon:

1. Records availability with particular emphasis upon those listed above under the "Records" section;
2. Nature, extent and types of corrupt practices.
3. Current organization structure.
4. Functions assigned to the ministry.
5. Rank structure.
6. Identification of competent management, engineers and technicians.
7. Operational performance and capability deficiencies with particular emphasis on systemic human rights abuses or other inappropriate activities;
8. Nature and quality of all personnel development/training programs;
9. Adequacy of management controls, i.e. policies, procedures, etc.
10. Number, location, and quality of all facilities;
11. Immediate equipment requirements;
12. Competitive ability of SOEs.
13. Other relevant conditions, deficiencies and/or problems and competencies.

For ease of evaluation and presentation, these elements may be rated as either, 1-Good; 2-Fair/acceptable; 3-Fair/unacceptable; or 4-Poor.

OTHER ADVISORS: CFLCC shall consult with ORHA regarding questions of concern relating to the MOHE & SR. Other persons or organizations offering assistance to CFLCC with respect to the MOHE & SR or SOEs shall be referred to ORHA.

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Specific Guidance for Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialisation

Functions: The Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialisation (MIMI) oversees State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) producing chemicals (including rubber, pulp and paper, fertilizers, petrochemicals, plastics) metals and mining (steel, iron, aluminum, sulfur, phosphate), and manufacturing (autos, tractors). In addition, the Ministry runs defense and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) industries. Since much of the economy is geared towards military development a civilian conversion effort for industry will be a major priority.

ORHA's involvement in re-orientation of the Ministry is vital from both international security and economic perspectives. Central to this endeavor is obtaining a specific understanding of the relationship between the Ministry and the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction WMD program. Achieving clarity on this relationship is critical to successful implementation and execution of CFLCC's Iraqi Reconstruction Plan for stabilization, recovery and transition to a fully functional Iraqi government.

The overarching goal for ORHA is two-fold: to normalize the Ministry so that legitimate chemical, pharmaceutical and other industrial manufacturing are allowed to thrive and contribute to the well-being of the people and the economy; and to identify and terminate illegitimate practices in support of WMD development and acquisition.

Several assumptions are key to this objective:

- The Ministry has played a key role in developing Iraq's military program including WMD.
- Compartmentalization of information and activity has occurred so that very few people have an understanding of the complete program.
- The Ministry used a series of state-owned entities SOEs to buy and build the military power Saddam desired for Iraq.

Operations Levels:

Under MIMI, Iraq established a complex defense industrial plan that encompassed not only military related production facilities, but also government enterprises primarily devoted to civilian production. Agencies within MIMI include the Military Industrialization Corporation (MIC), Technical Corps for Special Projects, Petrochemical Project 2 (PC-2), Petrochemical Project 3, (PC-3), and Nassr State Establishment. MIMI appears to be a dual structure holding companies divided between civilian and defense components. MIMI controls about 40 civilian agencies that were assigned responsibility for building commercial ventures such as the Badush Dam, PC-2, fertilizer factories and truck assembly factories. MIMI often used civilian activity as a front for procuring equipment used to produce WMD. Many Iraqi entities passed the materials from foreign suppliers directly to military projects.

Reportedly MIMI's SOEs include the following (address available):

State Co. for Cotton & Textile Industries (b)(6)

The State Company for Electric Industries (b)(6)

State Co. for Constructing Industries (b)(6)

State Co. for Vegetable Oil Industry

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State Co. for Electronic Industries (b)(6)
State Co. for Iraqi Cement (b)(6)
State Co. for Leather Industries (b)(6)
State Co. for Rubber Industries
State Co. for Tobacco & Cigarettes
Nasir Co. for Mechanical Industries Taji

The military side of MIMI, which is comprised of roughly 25 organizations had responsibility for producing products ranging from military supplies to complete weapons systems. Large Iraqi industrial complexes often contained both civilian and military production facilities. MIMI used the civilian and military nature of these mixed used factories to mask the ultimate end-user of technology shipped to these complexes.

Records: CFLCC must identify and secure records (immediately to avoid the destruction or alteration of those materials) for all factories producing both chemicals and other industrial products for military and WMD uses. Rank these firms into four categories:

- a) those that can be easily converted to civilian use;
- b) those that will require minimal capital investment;
- c) those that will require major capital investment and retooling;
- d) and those that need to be destroyed.

CFLCC should also locate and secure the following records:

- a) Suppliers for dual use products and parts.
- b) Facility and property records.
- c) Financial statements.

Identifying Personnel: Obtain the full name (personal name, father's name, place of origin name, and tribal name), address and telephone number of senior members of the Ministry.

Assessment: CFLCC shall perform preliminary assessments of the Ministry in all locations, including SOEs. In doing so, CFLC will focus upon:

1. Records availability with particular emphasis upon those listed above under the "Records" section;
2. Nature, extent and types of corrupt practices.
3. Current organization structure.
4. Functions assigned to the ministry.
5. Rank structure.
6. Identification of competent management, engineers and technicians.
7. Operational performance and capability deficiencies with particular emphasis on systemic human rights abuses or other inappropriate activities;
8. Nature and quality of all personnel development/training programs;
9. Adequacy of management controls, i.e. policies, procedures, etc.
10. Number, location, and quality of all facilities;
11. Immediate equipment requirements;
12. Competitive ability of SOEs.
13. Other relevant conditions, deficiencies and/or problems and competencies.

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For ease of evaluation and presentation, these elements may be rated as either, 1-Good; 2-Fair/acceptable; 3-Fair/unacceptable; or 4-Poor.

Other Advisors: CFLCC shall consult with ORHA regarding questions of concern relating to the MIMI. Other persons or organizations offering assistance to CFLCC with respect to the MIMI or SOEs shall be referred to ORHA POC: [REDACTED]

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Specific Guidance for CFLCC Use With Respect to the Ministry of Information

FUNCTIONS: The purpose of the Ministry of Information is to control, Soviet style, the flow of news, information, and propaganda through its monopolization of TV, radio, press, Internet and other media venues.

OPERATIONS LEVELS: The Ministry is organized into six primary directorates with the following functions:

- TV and radio are run together out of the same building. Uday Hussein's Youth channel uses the same facilities.
- Press-Ba'ath Party publications and propaganda
- Iraqi News Agency is the exclusive news wire service used by national, regional, and local publications. It is also the primary news source for radio and TV, where editors simply rewrite the material for their format.
- External Information Directorate assigns and controls most of the press attaches in the Iraqi embassies and vets any foreign press presence allowed inside Iraq. The "minders" standing by foreign correspondents as they file their stories from Baghdad or elsewhere in Iraq come from this directorate.
- Internal Information Directorate oversees offices in major cities and each of the 18 provinces which organize "festivities" and public demonstrations on behalf of the regime, e.g. Saddam's nationwide birthday celebration.
- Public Supervision Directorate provides the censorship function for all media.
- Publication directorate publishes all newspapers and magazines
- Records: Secure security/access files to the Ministry; secure all records, and equipment and video/radio archives.

LIMITS ON OPERATIONS:

1. Stop all Ministry broadcasting and publishing, and all other press activities.
2. Secure the Information Ministry buildings, especially the main Ministry building that houses TV and radio; collect keys and master keys.
3. Secure all broadcasting and publishing equipment, supplies, archives, and records.
4. Collect contact numbers from upper management and technical management and release workers to go home until re-called to the Ministry by Director, ORHA Indigenous Media team.

IDENTIFYING PERSONNEL:

1. Identify senior leadership/upper management personnel.
2. Instruct them to establish contact roster of all personnel.
3. Ensure that everyone leaves the premises only with personal items.

ASSESSMENT: No CFLCC requirement. ORHA has contracted Western subject matter experts to conduct the initial assessment of the operational and technical status of the Ministry of Information.

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Guidance for CFLCC With Respect to the Ministry of Interior

FUNCTIONS: In Iraq, responsibility for the overall civilian police function is vested within the Ministry of Interior. Estimates of the number of true civilian police in Iraq (as opposed to other of Saddam's former security forces) ranges from a low of 35,000 to more than 100,000. Best intelligence suggests that the Iraqi police organization is divided into four primary divisions including:

- General Police - further subdivided into 14 sections covering specific functions including theft, prisons, property, protection, youth crime, emergency services, etc.
- National Registry Police - responsible for issuing Iraq nationality certificates and processing foreign workers and visitors
- Civil Defense Police - manage natural disasters such as floods and major fires and provide security at government buildings
- Traffic Police - responsible for motor vehicle traffic control

A significant number of other persons are assigned to special state security services, all of which must be demobilized and disbanded. Included in the latter category are:

- The Directorate of General Security (DGS), an organization of 25,000-30,000 personnel which is divided among non-uniformed investigators and paramilitary "emergency battalions";
- The Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) investigates dissident political activity inside Iraq by employing half of its 10,000-15,000 personnel to internal security activities and penetrating opposition groups within the country. The IIS typically does not involve local security services or police in its operations

The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) will initiate a process for systematically developing the Iraqi civilian police in order to enable them to function in a manner consistent with principles of policing in a free society. ORHA anticipates that CFLCC will play a substantial role in providing law enforcement services to the general populous pending the time when either an international police mission is deployed or the indigenous police are developed to the point they can effectively assume and discharge responsibility for civilian policing throughout Iraq.

LIMITS ON OPERATIONS: To the extent that ongoing military operations are not adversely affected, or Iraqis or others deprived of human rights, the Iraqi police (other than the DGS and IIS) should be allowed to function in order to preserve reasonable public order pending the development of the Organization and retraining of all personnel. CFLCC shall enforce this temporary arrangement and provide support to the civilian police as required to maintain public order. Odious practices identified by CFLCC during the assessment will either be modified in accordance with international standards (UN Standards for Law Enforcement Personnel) or discontinued.

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RECORDS: Locate and secure the following records as soon as practicable after arrival at the Ministry of Interior to avoid the destruction or alteration of those materials:

1. Personnel files including address, payroll, training and proficiency and disciplinary history records;
2. Criminal history records;
3. Investigative case files; and
4. Facility and property records

For each category of records, please identify the location and principal custodian.

IDENTIFYING PERSONNEL: Obtain the full names (personal name, father's name, place of origin name, and tribal name), addresses and telephone numbers of senior members of the security services Ministry including any remaining deputy and assistant ministers and the heads and deputies of major functional units within the national police who must be replaced as well as those who seem to be reliable and competent.

ASSESSMENT: Perform preliminary assessments of the Iraq National Police in all locations where they are present. In so doing, focus upon:

1. Records availability with particular emphasis upon those listed above under the "Records" section;
2. Nature, extent and types of corrupt practices
3. Current table of organization;
4. Rank structure;
5. Functions assigned to the police;
6. Identification of competent senior managers;
7. Operational performance and capability deficiencies with particular emphasis on systemic human rights abuses or other inappropriate activities;
8. Nature and quality of all personnel development/training programs;
9. Command and control facilities and capabilities;
10. Adequacy of management controls, i.e. policies, procedures, etc.;
11. Number, location and quality of all facilities;
12. Adequacy of forensics evidence analysis capability;
13. Immediate equipment requirements; and
14. Other relevant conditions, deficiencies and/or problems and competencies.

For ease of evaluation and presentation, these elements may be rated as either, 1- Good; 2- Fair/acceptable; 3- Fair/unacceptable; or 4- Poor.

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Specific Guidance for CFLCC Use With Respect to the Ministry of Justice

FUNCTIONS: Iraq has three court systems: regular courts, which try common criminal offenses and civil matters, revolutionary or special courts, which try national security cases and any others deemed appropriate, and tribal courts, which are active primarily in rural areas.

The Ministry of Justice is responsible for the regular court system, the revolutionary and tribal courts being outside its purview. The Justice Ministry directly supervises the Court of Cassation, the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office, the Supreme Law College (which trains judges), all but petty municipal criminal and civil courts and notarial offices, which issue powers of attorney and settle arguments dealing with debts and inheritances.

The regular court system is based partly on French civil law. Sharia law is applied for matters of personal status—marriage, divorce and inheritance—for Shia and Sunni Muslims. In some cases, special religious judges (qadis) apply Sharia; in others, regular judges enforce it. Much of the investigative work is accomplished by judicial magistrates and all cases are decided by judges, who must be Ba'ath party members and graduates of a recognized Iraqi law school. There are about 500 such judges.

Petty crimes and misdemeanors are handled by a variety of local ad hoc courts, composed not of trained magistrates or judges, but of local municipal council members or other local administrative officials, who must be members of the Ba'ath party.

OPERATIONS LEVELS: For judicial administration, Iraq is divided into five appellate districts centered in Baghdad, Basra, Al Hillah (Babylon), Kirkuk and Mosul. There are several levels of appeals courts, the highest of which is the Court of Cassation in Baghdad, with approximately 30 judges. There are 18 major civil and administrative courts of first instance with unlimited jurisdiction, one located in the capital city of each of the 18 governorates. There are also 150 single judge first instance courts with more limited powers located in the major municipalities of the districts and subdistricts into which each governorate is divided.

Major criminal and Sharia courts are generally co-located with the civil courts. The Public Prosecutor's Office is also represented at the five appellate district centers and in the 18 governorates.

LIMITS ON OPERATIONS: Apply and enforce the limits on operations of the Ministry of Justice and courts contained in Coalition Provisional Authority Law No. 1, Instructions to the Citizens of Iraq, dated _____, and the Coalition Force Commander's Instructions to Prison Officials, Prosecutors, and Judiciary of Iraq, dated _____.

RECORDS: Locate and secure the following records as soon as practicable after arrival at the Ministry of Justice and major courts to avoid their destruction or alteration:

1. Personnel files including address, payroll, training and proficiency and disciplinary history records;

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2. Financial records;
3. Docketing and adjudication records; and
4. Facility and property records

For each category of records, identify the location and principal custodian.

IDENTIFYING PERSONNEL: Obtain the full name (personal name, father's name, place of origin name, and tribal name), address and telephone number of senior members of the Ministry and of the Courts and of those who are found to be reliable or who need replacing.

ASSESSMENT: Perform preliminary assessments of the components of the Ministry of Justice in all locations where they are significantly present. In so doing, report on:

1. Records availability with particular emphasis upon those listed above under the "Records" section;
2. Nature, extent and types of corrupt practices. (The judiciary is not independent and interference is common in any of the courts at any stage of judicial proceedings. The salaries of government attorneys are insufficient to cover basic needs. As a consequence, bribery and corruption are reportedly rife within their ranks.)
3. Current tables of organization;
4. Rank/Status structure;
5. Operational performance and capability deficiencies with particular emphasis on systemic human rights abuses or other inappropriate activities;
6. Nature and quality of all personnel development/training programs;
7. Adequacy of management structure and controls, i.e. policies, procedures, etc.;
8. Number, location and quality of all facilities;
9. Immediate equipment requirements; and
10. Other relevant conditions, deficiencies and/or problems and competencies.

For ease of evaluation and presentation, these elements may be rated as either, 1- Good; 2- Fair/acceptable; 3- Fair/unacceptable; or 4- Poor.

Working Draft

Specific Guidance for CFLCC Use With Respect to Oil Ministry

FUNCTIONS: Iraq's oil ministry consists of four major divisions. Three of the divisions contain operating companies that handle all domestic upstream and downstream operations. The fourth division is the State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO) that handles all the crude oil export operations and shipping. A recent organization chart is attached.

The Oil Ministry is responsible for all oil production, refining, distribution and marketing. All oil resources within Iraq belong to state. There is no private ownership of oil assets.

OPERATIONS: Iraq presently produces about 2.4 million barrels a day (MMBD) of crude oil. Of this production, about .3 MMBD get processed through three small fuels refiners. The remaining 2+ MMBD are exported under the United Nations Security Council Sanction Regime. This regime requires that all Iraqi crude oil exports are monitored and the revenue from oil sales goes to a United Nations escrow account used to pay for materials and services obtained under the UN Oil For Food (OFF) program. Much of the oil infrastructure has been highly neglected since the Gulf War of 1991 due to the lack of spare parts. This has contributed to an oil ministry that is unsafe, inefficient and very unreliable.

LIMITS ON OPERATIONS: Operations will be in a safe non-operational mode until such time as assessments are completed.


RECORDS: The records within the Oil Ministry may offer the greatest opportunity to identify some of the corruption and theft orchestrated by Saddam and his cronies. Foreign companies and countries that have participated in this illegal activity would want the evidence destroyed. We suspect that the illegal smuggling of oil out of the country will be recorded in ministry accounting records. As such, locate and secure the following records as soon as possible after arrival at the Ministry of Oil.

1. Marketing/sales records located in the SOMO area.
2. Contracts located in the offices of the senior leaders of the ministry.
3. Financial information primarily located in the SOMO group.
4. Personnel files including addresses, payroll, training, etc.

IDENTIFYING PERSONNEL: Obtain full name, address and phone numbers of all senior members of the ministry, especially those assigned to the SOMO group.

ASSESSMENT: Brown & Root Services will provide the resources to perform oil infrastructure assessments on oilfield equipment, refineries and gas plants.

Organization of the Iraqi Oil & Gas Industries



*Ministry of Oil, telephone: (964-1) 886-8136/9621/2203

WORKING DRAFT

Specific Guidance for CFLCC Use With Respect to the Ministry of Planning

FUNCTIONS: The Ministry of Planning is responsible for a number of functions including presenting the annual economic report, social development, major civil projects and demographic data collection and analysis. Other significant functions revolve around the International Computer Center which is a vital communications hub.

OPERATIONS LEVELS: The main Ministry of is located in Baghdad but there are likely to be regional and/or local offices.

LIMITS ON OPERATIONS: Apply and enforce the limits on the operations of the Ministry of Planning contained in Coalition Provisional Authority Law No. 1. If possible make contact with the highest ranking officer remaining official.

RECORDS: Locate and secure the following records as soon as practicable after arrival at the Ministry of Planning to avoid their destruction or alteration:

- 1) All computer equipment
- 2) Economic Data
- 3) Personnel files including address, payroll, training, and proficiency and disciplinary records;
- 4) Census records

For each category, identify the location and principal custodian.

IDENTIFYING PERSONNEL: Obtain the full name (personal name, father's name, place of origin name, and tribal name), address, and contact information of senior members of Ministry and of those who are found to be reliable or who may need replacing.

ASSESSMENT: Perform preliminary assessments of the components of the Ministry of Planning. In so doing, report on:

1. Records availability with particular emphasis upon those listed above under the "Records" section;
2. Current tables of organization;
3. Rank/Status structure;
4. Operational performance and capability deficiencies with particular emphasis on systemic human rights abuses or other inappropriate activities;
5. Nature and quality of all personnel development/training programs;
6. Adequacy of management structure and controls, i.e. policies, procedures, etc.;
7. Number, location, and quality of all facilities;
8. Immediate equipment requirements; and
9. Other relevant conditions, deficiencies and/or problems and competencies.

For ease of evaluation and presentation, where appropriate, these elements may be rated as either, 1- Good; 2- Fair/acceptable; 3- Fair/unacceptable; or 4- Poor.

Working Draft

Specific Guidance for CFLCC Use With Respect to the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Awqaf (Religious Foundations)

FUNCTIONS: The Ministry of Religious Affairs and Awqaf is responsible for running the majority of the mosques and religious charities in Iraq. Its employees include the imams (prayer leaders) at local mosques nation-wide as well as the central ministry staff in Baghdad, in addition to senior religious lawyers and scholars. It has limited control over the major Shi'ite shrines in the Shi'ite holy cities of Najaf and Karbala'. The Ministry also exercises influences over the religious or Sharia courts, which issue rulings on personal status issues that apply only to Muslims. There are both Sunni and Shi'ite Sharia courts.

OPERATIONS LEVELS: Iraq is divided along religious and ethnic lines: over 60 percent are Shi'ite Muslim Arabs, while 20 percent are Sunni Muslim Arabs and most of the remaining 20 percent are Sunni Kurds. There are limited numbers of Christians, Yazidis, Jews, Saba'ites, and Sufis as well. The southern region of Iraq, from Umm Qasr to the outskirts of Baghdad, is overwhelmingly Shi'ite in population. Baghdad itself is 70 percent Shi'ite, but contains large numbers of Sunni Muslims and Christians as well, in addition to smaller numbers of other minority faiths. The area between Baghdad and Tikrit in the north and toward the Jordanian border in the west is predominantly Sunni Muslim. The Kurdish region north of Tikrit, which includes Kirkuk, Sulaymaniyya, and Irbil, is overwhelming Sunni, with scatterings of Christians, Yazidis, and others.

The Iraqi countryside and its villages, towns, and cities contain thousands of shrines, mosques, holy sites, and other places of worship. It is important that US military personnel refrain from entering Muslim and other places of worship, in order to avoid creating unnecessary tension with the local population, since Muslim tradition forbids entry into mosques by military personnel and non-Muslims. In addition, all Yazidi shrines are strictly forbidden to non-Yazidis.

LIMITS OF OPERATIONS: Under no circumstances should US forces interfere in any way with the legitimate use of religious facilities. CFLCC guidance to field commanders should reflect this principle. All members of the clergy should be treated with maximum respect. Unless they turn violent, religious processions must not be interfered with. Any peace-keeping actions involving religious sites should be limited to the minimum necessary to restore order and, in the case of inter-confessional violence, to separate the combatants.

RECORDS: Locate and secure the following records as soon as possible after arrival at the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Awqaf to avoid their destruction or alteration:

1. Personnel files, including address, payroll, training, and proficiency records;
2. Financial records;
3. Records relating to "awqaf" (religious foundations), including mosques, schools, and charitable facilities.

For each category of records, please identify the location and principal custodian.

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Specific Guidance for CFLCC with Respect to the Ministry of Trade

Function: A critical role added to the Ministry of Trade (MoT) is the implementation of a ration ticket system, referred to as oil for food, and the provisions and distribution of food among the population. This is implemented primarily in the provinces (governorates) via ~50,000 food agents. The ministry also covers everything that is related to the movement of population and insuring monthly rations.

The overall role of the MoT is foreign trade and regulating foreign economic relations, guiding internal trade, contributing to the definition of the state's economic policy.

ORHA's preliminary vision for the MoT is to 1) continue to facilitate public distribution of food via the World Food Program (WFP) which assumes the role of the oil for food program; 2) work with MoT to help develop an open, competitive and prosperous economy.

Operational Levels: The Ministry's headquarters consist of the following administrative offices: Minister's Office, Office of Planning and Following Up, Office of the Foreign Economic Relations, Office of the Economic Relations with the Arab States, Office of Companies' Registration, Administrative Office, Office of Commercial and Financial Monitoring, Office of Legal Affairs, Computer Center, and Commercial Training Centers. The Ministry also has subordinate offices throughout the country.

Records: CFLCC must secure the follow records as soon as possible after arrival at MoT to avoid the destruction or alteration of these materials:

- 1) Database and all records (food agents, suppliers) for the oil for food program
- 2) All information pertaining to the eight SOEs (set forth below), including production, financial statements, government financial support and benefits, management and technical capabilities;
 - i. The State Company for Food Stuff Trading.
 - ii. The Grain Board of Iraq.
 - iii. The State Company for Grain Processing.
 - iv. The State Company for Shopping Centers.
 - v. The State Company for Automobiles, Machine and Tools Company.
 - vi. The State Company for Iraqi Fairs.
 - vii. The State Company for Import and Export.
 - viii. State Trading Company for Construction Materials
- 3) Personnel records including capabilities, pay, grade and performance.
- 4) All international trade related materials such as trade restrictions, licensing, and customs.

For each category, identify the location and principal custodian.

Identifying Personnel: Obtain the full name (personal name, father's name, place of origin name, and tribal name), address and telephone number of senior members of the Ministry.

Assessment: CFLCC shall perform preliminary assessments of the Ministry of Trade in all locations, including SOEs. In doing so, CFLCC will focus upon:

1. Records availability with particular emphasis upon those listed above under the "Records" section;

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2. Nature, extent and types of corrupt practices.
3. Current organization structure.
4. Functions assigned to the ministry.
5. Rank structure.
6. Identification of competent management, engineers and technicians.
7. Operational performance and capability deficiencies with particular emphasis on systemic human rights abuses or other inappropriate activities;
8. Nature and quality of all personnel development/training programs;
9. Adequacy of management controls, i.e. policies, procedures, etc.
10. Number, location and quality of all facilities;
11. Immediate equipment requirements;
12. Competitive ability of SOEs.
13. Other relevant conditions, deficiencies and/or problems and competencies.

For ease of evaluation and presentation, these elements may be rated as either, 1-Good; 2-Fair/acceptable; 3-Fair/unacceptable; or 4-Poor.

Other Advisors: CFLCC shall consult with ORHA regarding questions of concern relating to the Ministry of Trade. Other persons or organizations offering assistance to CFLCC with respect to the Ministry of Trade or SOEs shall be referred to ORHA POC: [REDACTED]

Working Draft

**BORDER INTEGRITY: CUSTOMS, BORDERS, IMMIGRATION: GUIDANCE FOR
CFLCC AT POINTS OF ENTRY TO IRAQ**

Introduction

This is a one-off paper to provide guidance (until further notice) to CFLCC (the Coalition Forces Land Component Commander) at points of entry into Iraq.

I. Central Ministries

There is no single Central Ministry responsible for "border integrity". We believe that the subject matter falls within the remits of the following Ministries:

- Interior (nationality / passports),
- Defense (presumably import / export of components for WMD and other weaponry),
- Health (human health),
- Finance (collection of customs duties, taxation),
- Trade (determining customs duties), and
- Agriculture (plant and animal health).

Guidance for securing records etc within each Central Ministry is provided within the papers for those Ministries.

II. Border control in the First Few Days

Assumption: Coalition forces have taken / will take control of all key border crossings.

Coalition forces will therefore need to know:

- who to let in and out of the country
- what to let in and out of the country (how to identify goods authorised by the UN Sanctions Committee)
- what to look for in consignments entering the country
- what, if any, tariff to apply on import / export
- what to do with oil exports.

Coalition forces will be unable to achieve full security of Iraq's borders. I understand that they currently intend to tell the border guards at the main border crossings to "carry on as usual", though will watch out for bribe-taking. This will be insufficient. The border guards are presumably not currently enforcing sanctions (which continue), nor are they preventing smuggling. They will be enforcing nationality (and presumably residence) rules we consider unacceptable.

General

Coalition forces should seek to prevent bribe taking, and ensure accounting for all payments.

People

Draft, 22 March 2003, 1145Z

Point of Contact: [REDACTED]



Working Draft

Categories / passports

Large numbers of refugees may seek to return shortly. Many have had their nationality revoked, or would for other reasons not be permitted to enter under the Nationalities Law.

In the absence of other guidance, border guards should:

- seek identification;
- allow entry to those able to provide some credible indication in writing of previous Iraqi residence or nationality, and their accompanying children (even if over the age of 18); CFLCC have discretion to permit entry in exceptional circumstances on oral evidence of previous Iraqi residence or nationality
- allow entry to foreign nationals with a current visa issued under Saddam Hussein's regime; allow also entry of those who they assess to be bona fides humanitarian assistance workers (CFLCC discretion: they should seek identification of some sort);
- allow exit of Iraqi and foreign nationals not on the black / grey lists (careful search for records / computers / discs needed).

If refugees return in such numbers that massive queues form, the priority must be to avoid humanitarian suffering. If there is suitable provision of humanitarian assistance near the crossing, the entry requirements should be enforced. If necessary, however, refugees should be permitted to enter to obtain humanitarian relief.

CFLCC need:

- a list of people who should not be allowed to enter the country
- a list of people who should not be allowed to leave the country
- a list of people who should be detained

I know that lists have been worked on. I understand that they are with CFLCC. Is this correct?

Counter-terrorism: is any Agency able to provide additional identification equipment?

Money

In the absence of further guidance:

- subject to the rule on re-export below, no-one should be allowed to leave Iraq with more than \$200 cash (or the equivalent in dinars or foreign currency);
- re-export should be permitted with a valid currency declaration issued by border controls under Coalition control (but not with currency declarations issued under Saddam Hussein);
- there should be no limit on bringing money into Iraq (eg by returning refugees); a currency declaration should be made for amounts over \$200 if re-export is intended.

Draft, 22 March 2003, 1145Z

Point of Contact: [REDACTED]



Working Draft

Goods, including food

Background: under continuing UN sanctions, a certificate is a requirement for all imports.

Border posts should ask to see UN certificates for all imports other than personal effects. Personal effects should be interpreted liberally for used goods (eg returning refugees should be able to return with their household goods).

Border posts should exercise discretion over the import of humanitarian assistance: if food, medicines, or other humanitarian assistance are being imported by an apparently bona fides importer, they should be permitted entry.

Tariffs should continue to be levied in accordance with the current schedule. (*This is not currently available to us. Border posts will presumably have a current list of accounts.*)

Oil

Oil smuggling is big business, on which many livelihoods (and the recipients – eg Jordan) depend. In theory, all oil distribution points in Iraq should be in state control. We shall therefore address oil smuggling at point of distribution, not at borders.

Border posts should ensure that tankers carrying oil are indeed carrying oil (and nothing else), but should otherwise permit exports.

Goods to search for

No import of weapons permitted. Suggested maximum knife blade length: 8 inches (CFLCC discretion).

No computers, floppy disks or CD roms to be exported. (Danger of export of records.)

Question: Anything else, the import or export of which should be prohibited?

III. The Future of the Sanctions Regime

The above reflects our current understanding of the sanctions regime. However, the sanctions regime and its strict import controls will seem absurd once the coalition has secured all points of entry to Iraq.


It would be helpful to know when UN sanctions will be lifted or suspended.


IV. Longer term

The first stage will be to conduct an assessment of Iraq's current border integrity. Plans for this will follow.

Any offer of assistance (urgently required) would be greatly appreciated.

Draft, 22 March 2003, 1145Z

Point of Contact: 



Druff

(b)(6)

- your thoughts?

(b)(6)

Name of Ministry: Ministry of Youth

ORHA Vision Statement: To ensure that democratic principles and leadership take root among future generations of a free Iraq by promoting the participation of youth and young adults in the social, educational, athletic and cultural life of Iraq; to replace all remaining youth and education programs that have been used in the past to advance the interests of the totalitarian state with initiatives to encourage youth to participate in voluntary organizations, sporting activity and community service projects; create a new mechanism to develop a competitive non-politicized athletics program at all levels and promote the development of Iraqi athletes.

Essential background: The future of Iraq rests with those under the age of 24 which constitute the largest demographic group in Iraq. Presently, 41.7 percent of the Iraq population is 14 years of age or younger, and another 20 percent is between the age of 15 and 24. Sixty percent of the Iraqi people are under the age of 24. If democracy is to be a part of Iraq's future, it must take root with this age group.

Under Saddam Hussein and his sons just about every activity of life involving youth was co-opted to serve the state, including athletic, cultural and literary activity. All programming was designed to encourage obedience to Saddam Hussein and Ba'ath party ideology.

ORHA Program Objectives:

Revise all existing youth programs and activities – athletic, cultural, civic – to ensure that youth are being trained for a future in democratic citizenship.

Immediate Actions:

Identify qualified Iraqi figures to represent the Ministry of Youth on an interim basis before the Iraqi public; enlist Iraqi civil society organizations (NGOs, local voluntary groups, religious organizations) in developing a youth policy.

Sponsor cultural, dramatic, musical and sports events.

Conduct an assessment of all athletic programs; create a sports program steering committee consisting of Iraq athletes to depoliticize all sporting activity; develop a program for the training and development of future athletes.

Provide youth leadership training programs in partnership with grass roots civil society organizations.

Assess the social and economic needs of Iraq youth; identify priority problems facing youth and preventing their participation in society.

New Initiatives:

Working in concert with existing USG programs at DOS, USAID as well as NGOs, institute a new **Iraqi Youth Democracy Corps (IYDC)**, a national program to educate all youth in the elementary principles of democracy, including critical thinking, tolerance, civil debate, and public service. The IYDC will organize community youth to participate in local community improvement projects, such as conservation and restoring historic sites. Working in collaboration with the Department of State, the IYDC will immediately implement scholarship and exchange programs with American counterparts.

Youth Parliament Project. The Youth Parliament will serve to assist young people to: understand the basic principles and practices of participatory democracy; learn to shape public policy; become familiar with the democratic process; and become advocates among the young for democratic values. Youth representatives will participate in mock legislative debates, serve on legislative committees, write legislation, and conduct oversight of government ministries.

This will be a special two-day event held the year immediately following the conduct of national elections, with youth parliamentarians selected by their local representatives from each of the Governates.

Theme - getting electricity
working together. Baseline

Ministry of Transportation and Communication:

POCs:

- ◆ Iraqi Telecoms and Post Co. (ITPC).

▶ (b)(6)
▶
▶
▶
▶

- ◆ Transportation.

Contacts Made:

Sound Bites:

- ▶ Re-establish safe and viable highway, railway and seaport networks that meets the needs of coalition military, humanitarian relief, and Iraqi economic development.
- ▶ Telecommunications are fundamental for civil governance, the growth of the economy and achievement of social inclusion. The goal is to ensure access for the Iraqi government, industry and wider population, to a large number of telecommunications services at competitive prices, enabling delivery of voice and data services (to include broadcast and internet services), to permit Iraq to take part in the global communications architecture and industry.
- ▶ The long-term objective is to encourage an appropriate mix of state and private company participation within the Iraqi telecommunications infrastructure, thereby driving down costs, providing opportunities for new services and enhancing the economic prosperity of the country. ORHA will facilitate the re-establishment of the national system making maximum use of appropriate Iraqi expertise.
- ▶ ORHA's goal is to re-establish internationally recognized safe and reliable air traffic management and a civil aviation system to meets the needs of coalition military, humanitarian aid, and Iraq economic development by effectively transitioning from coalition military airspace control to the Iraq civil authority.

Ministry of Irrigation and Water:

POCs:

- > (b)(6)
- > [REDACTED]

Contacts Made:

Sound Bites:

- > ORHA goal is to enable provision and distribution of water resources to the people of Iraq on sound economic, social, and environmentally sustainable manner.
- > Short term
 - The reconstruction of primary water supply and sanitation services.
 - The establishment of a central agency to coordinate water rights, the usage
- > Medium term
 - Assist in the transfer of responsibility for water and irrigation services to Iraq's civil authorities and support them through assessment and institution building activities.
- > Long term
 - Trans-boundary water allocation agreements
 - Implementation of priority water management projects
 - Address priority ecological restoration

Ministry of Housing and Construction.

POCs:

Minister of Housing and Construction: Maan Abdallah Sarsam (grey list)

Contacts Made:

Sound Bite:

The Ministry of Housing and Construction has great expertise in the construction and repair of vital infrastructure on behalf of the Iraqi people. ORHA's goal is to enable the Ministry to resume functioning as quickly as possible in order to make a major contribution to the reconstruction effort. We envision that the Ministry will play a key role in planning reconstruction, re-establishing essential services, and re-starting the critical construction programs that provide over 200,000 jobs nationwide.

One of the most critical requirements is adequate housing. The UN estimates that Iraq requires over 60,000 new housing units per year to keep up with new demand. The Ministry successfully coordinated a major housing construction program under the UN Oil for Food program starting in the year 2000. Significant progress was made towards meeting these requirements in 2001 and 2002. As of January 2003 the Ministry announced that they had awarded 22 housing construction contracts with Saudi, Egyptian, and Syrian firms. The key now is to rapidly screen and, where appropriate, reinstate the construction projects that were interrupted by the war to maintain this positive momentum.

Electricity Commission:

POCs:

Contacts Made:

Sound Bite:

ORHA goal is to re-establish electric power to the people of Iraq and provide them with dependable, cost effective power. Longer term objective is to establish a system of sound management and safe, reliable operation of power generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure that meet industry standards and practices.

Baghdad Water and Sewage Administration:

POCs:

(b)(6) (Chief Scientist and Administrator; Speaks English; Good Guy)

Contacts Made:

Sound Bite:

Baghdad Prime Power Plant:

POCs:

(b)(6) (Dawrah Power Plant)

(b)(6) (Taji Power Plant)
(b)(6) (Baghdad South Power Plant)
(b)(6) (New Baghdad Sub-Station)

Contacts Made: All of the above.

Condition of Power Infrastructure: See attached.

Sound Bite:

ORHA goal is to re-establish electric power to the people of Baghdad and provide them with dependable, cost effective power. Longer term objective is to establish a system of sound management and safe, reliable operation of power generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure that meet industry standards and practices.