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OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

425

COHEN

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NOTE FOR SECRETARY COHEN

Attached is your Day Book for
Tuesday, 3 June. Additionally,
attached is a background paper
for the trip to the NATO Defense
Ministerials in Brussels,
June 12-13 1997.

v/r

J N Mattis
J N. Mattis
Colonel, USMC
Executive ~~Secretary~~

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Attachment

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THIS BOOK CONTAINS

INFORMATION
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3 June 97



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400



28 May
I-97/30872

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

JUN 2 1997 JUN -2 1997

THROUGH:

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM:

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Prepared by Col (b)(6) OASD/ISA (EUR), (b)(6) 28 May 97

Handwritten signatures and dates: 02 JUN 1997

SUBJECT:

Briefing Papers for Your 3 June 1997 Meeting with
British Defense Secretary George Robertson

(U) Attached are briefing papers for your first meeting with The Right Honourable George Robertson, scheduled for 1200-1405 on Tuesday, 3 June 1997 in Room 3E928. The Minister wants to begin his meeting with you by reviewing UK planning for their *Strategic Defence Review* (SDR). The MOD outlined his SDR philosophy in his 28 May letter to you. Plenary agenda items include **NATO-Russia, NATO Enlargement, Bosnia, and Anti-Personnel Landmines**. Between the plenary and lunch, a 1-1 session will allow you both to discuss **NATO JSTARS, Bosnia War Criminals and Iraq/No-Fly Zones**. You and the Minister will have the opportunity to speak with US/UK press following lunch. **Tab A** is a scope paper with political and economic overviews and issues for discussion. You will find talking points for plenary and 1-1 at **Tab B** and Secretary Robertson's biography/itinerary at **Tab C**.

~~(S)~~ Objectives of this meeting are:

- Listen to MOD Robertson's views on conducting a UK *Strategic Defence Review* and provide your personal insights from overseeing the QDR.
- Discuss enlargement issues leading to the NATO Summit, including:
 - Who
 - Summit assurances of an "open door" and timing of second round
 - Post-Summit relationships with those countries invited to join
- Review areas of concern in Bosnia that will allow SFOR to withdraw in June 1998. Ask for MOD Robertson's recommendations from the UK policy review on Bosnia.
- Discuss continued U.S.-British cooperation to enforce No-Fly Zones in Iraq.
- Provide your perspective on British participation in a NATO JSTARS program that demonstrates transatlantic cooperation while providing NATO with an early capability.
- Discuss the new British policy on Anti-Personnel Landmines.



PARTICIPANTS:

US: SECDEF, CJCS, Mr. Slocombe, Mr. Longuemare, Mr. Lodal, Mr. Kramer, Mr. Miller, Mr. Bodner, BG Osterthaler, Ms. Bronson, Col ^{(b)(6)} STATE Rep

UK: MOD Robertson, Amb Kerr, Miss ^{(b)(6)} (Private Sec), Mr. Hatfield (DUS Policy), Mr. ^{(b)(6)} (Special Advisor), MGEN Vyvyan (DATT), Mr. Shapcott, Mr. Sawers

Reviewed by DASD, European and NATO Affairs 110 5130

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SCOPE PAPER

SECDEF COHEN MEETING WITH BRITISH SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE, GEORGE ROBERTSON

~~(S)~~ You will meet for the first time with British Secretary of State for Defence, The Right Honourable George Robertson, on 3 June 1997. Robertson was a surprise choice (over shadow defense secretary David Clark) to head the UK MOD, having previously served as shadow Secretary of State for Scotland since 1993. Robertson, a Scot and member of Labour's right wing since he was first elected to Parliament in 1978, was widely considered a moderating influence on Labour foreign and defense policies during stints as opposition spokesperson on defense (1980-82) and European affairs (1984-93). (b)(1)

(b)(1)

~~(S)~~ **Political Overview:** The United Kingdom remains our closest partner in political, security and intelligence matters. The British continue to cooperate closely with the United States on many key issues on our foreign and defense policy agendas--most importantly, adaptation of NATO, implementation of the Dayton Accords, and the continued isolation of the regime in Iraq. Beyond Europe, there are few apparent differences between the stated foreign policy goals of Labour and its Conservative predecessor. PM Blair, FS Cook and MOD Robertson will be guided largely by the same career officials who advised Messrs Major, Rifkind and Portillo. Policy choices already made are unlikely to be undone and, over the short term, continuity is likely to characterize the course of British policy on areas of importance to the U.S., such as NATO, the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), China and Hong Kong. Nonetheless, the process of policy formation may prove bumpy during Labour's first year. There is some potential for differences with the U.S. as the new Government comes to grips with complex issues such as structuring British relations with Iran, managing Iraq and dealing with Cyprus. There are also several areas in which the new Government will have different priorities than did its predecessor. For example, human rights and environmental issues now will figure more prominently in British foreign policy. In addition, Labour has pledged to provide more development assistance to the poorest countries, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa. In a departure from past British practice, Labour has said it would be prepared to earmark units for UN peacekeeping operations. Although PM Blair has committed to maintain current defense spending levels for two years, Labour's *Strategic Defense Review* could presage future cuts in both spending and capability.

~~CLASSIFIED BY: DASD OSTERHALER
REASON: 1.5 (b)
DECLASSIFY ON: 28 May 2007~~

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(b)(6)

28 May 97
UK/VISITORS/MOD/SCOPE.DOC

~~(S)~~ **Economic Overview:** The United Kingdom is one of the world's great trading powers and financial centers, and its economy ranks among the four largest in Western Europe. Over the past thirteen years, HMG has greatly reduced public ownership and contained the growth of social welfare programs. The economy grew 2.4 % in real terms last year, with real GDP growth for 1997 estimated at 3 %. Inflation is at the lowest level in 27 years, and unemployment has dropped from 10.3 % in 1993 to slightly over 8 % in 1996. The major economic policy question for Britain in the 1990s is the terms on which it participates in the financial and economic integration of Europe.

~~(S)~~ Defense spending has fallen almost 25 % since 1990. The rate of decline has slowed as the armed forces complete their post-Cold War restructuring. UK defense budget was \$32.2 billion in 1996, representing 3.1 % of GDP and 7.3 % of the government budget. With declining defense budgets (est. at 2.7 % of GDP in 98-99), the British have implemented a "front-line first" policy, that retains balanced and capable military forces but seeks economies in support and administrative functions. The UK has reduced the armed forces over the past decade -- from 330,800 in 1986 to 225,000 in 1996. London plans to level out expenditures and anticipates slight real increases by the turn of the century. Emphasis will be placed on selective modernization and quality-of-life increases for the armed forces.

KEY ISSUES

We do not expect any major change in British security policy on important NATO issues such as Enlargement, the future of the WEU, and U.S. command of AFSOUTH. PM Blair has made clear that NATO will remain the ultimate guarantor of Britain's defense and that emphasis on Europe will not be at the expense of the trans-Atlantic link.

~~(S)~~ **UK Strategic Defence Review (SDR):** In a 28 May meeting with MOD Robertson, Ambassador Crowe provided a brief overview of the results of the Quadrennial Defense Review. Robertson said he wanted to begin his meeting with you by reviewing UK planning for their Strategic Defence Review (SDR). He said the UK review will be foreign policy led rather than driven by resource considerations and that it will build on British strengths and the best features of existing policies and capabilities. The SDR is not intended to be a cost-cutting exercise--on the contrary, HMG is looking to use it as a way to develop a cross-party consensus for maintaining a strong defense effort. Robertson told the Ambassador that the Labour Party had been seriously hurt in the past by its weakness on defense. Ironically, now it is up to Labour to be defenders of the British defense effort. The review should provide MODUK with an accurate picture of where it stands and where it needs to focus its efforts. Any implications for the way in which the British meet their commitment to the Alliance would be the subject of consultation. Robertson intends to complete the SDR around the turn of the new year.

~~(S)~~ **NATO-Russia/NATO Adaptation:** HMG shares the view that the development of a stable and productive relationship with Russia is the key to peace and security in Europe. The British supported the NATO-Russia Founding Act and relieved

to have it out of the way. They support the development of CJTFs and agree that CINCSOUTH must remain an American position.

~~(S)~~ **NATO Enlargement/Enhanced PfP:** HMG supports enlargement, emphasizes that it must be accompanied by measures that make clear it is not threatening Russia, and believes a first wave should be limited to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The British are not necessarily opposed to Slovenia, are leaning against Romania, and are reticent about even entertaining the possibility of Baltic membership. Secretary Albright recently wrote to FS Cook to clarify U.S. thinking on our Open Door strategy. She stressed the importance of establishing post-Madrid dialogues with Partners interested in membership and that these dialogues should be kept at NATO, not placed within the EAPC. Embassy London further stressed to FCO officials the importance the USG places on the intensified dialogues with aspirants following Madrid. FCO principals predicted that we would reach agreement on establishing such dialogues and that the UK wants to work this issue further to ensure we do not establish a process toward membership we would be unable to control. HMG appreciated receiving a more definitive explanation of USG views, and agreed that our positions are in harmony on the need to launch the EAPC at Sintra and on the way ahead for the Enhanced PfP. Although HMG believes that NATO needs to state the door to further membership shall remain open, we still need to reach agreement on the exact wording. The UK remains reluctant to name any aspirants for possible future membership in the Madrid Communiqué--they have been leery of commitments to particular countries or timetables for enlargement beyond what is done at Madrid. These, they think, should be held in abeyance until we have a chance to gauge the repercussions of the first installment. The British want to ensure after the first wave, we have a "healthy Alliance" and that further enlargement would "fit in."

~~(S)~~ **Bosnia/SFOR:** The British have already begun their push to have the U.S. revisit its policy of withdrawing U.S. forces in June 1998. On 22 May, PM Blair chaired HMG's first policy meeting on Bosnia. Although no new policy decisions were taken, PM Blair and his Cabinet members all accepted the view that a more muscular approach was required on Dayton implementation. FS Cook stressed several points in this regard: greater effort to bring indicted war criminals to trial; more pressure on the Parties to permit freedom of the media and unimpeded access by the HiRep; more pressure on Sarajevo to appoint Ambassadors; enhanced economic reconstruction; and, more pressure on the Bosnians to engage in genuine power sharing. MOD Robertson endorsed the U.S. view that Britain should increase its contribution to the IPTF. While an additional thirty policemen were discussed, the issue remained unresolved. The Cabinet agreed that Dayton implementation was unlikely to be completed by June 1998. Though no conclusions were reached, the discussion speculated that a military force would have to remain in Bosnia for some longer period (5-10 years was mentioned) in order to ensure stability. The unanimous view of the Cabinet was that Britain should not remain in Bosnia without U.S. forces (in together, out together). PM Blair had reviewed the FCO's Bosnia Policy Paper and asked FS Cook to prepare a new, longer-term paper on how long it would actually take to fully implement Dayton and at what financial costs and manpower levels.

The UK is completely on board with the U.S. view that we must concentrate in the next few months on intensifying Dayton implementation--FS Cook emphasized that point in

recent meetings with SecDef and SecState. MOD Robertson visited Bosnia on 20 May and clearly articulated that message to Bosnian politicians. HMG believes very strongly that we need to strengthen the IPTF by providing more U.S./European personnel.

~~(C)~~ **Anti-Personnel Landmines (APL):** The new UK APL policy calls for an immediate ban on the manufacture, import, export and transfer of APL through new legislation, and an immediate moratorium on APL use. UK APL stockpiles will be phased out starting this year and will not be replaced. The new policy provides for the destruction of all UK APL stockpiles by the year 2005, commits to a moratorium on APL use which will become a permanent ban by 2005 (or when an effective international agreement enters into force), and commits to negotiate constructively for a ban in the Ottawa process while working in the CD for a wider ban. The previous UK Government supported negotiations in the CD; it is now likely that the UK would join the Ottawa process and attend the related Brussels conference 24-27 June as a full participant. The 7 May trilateral statement by the UK, France and Germany indicates that the three believe it is worthwhile to maintain efforts both in the CD and Ottawa process.

~~(C)~~ **NATO AGS/JSTARS:** The UK fully recognizes the need for a high-level, stand-off AGS capability. The difference in views is how the UK believes we should achieve that capability and why the British prefer their national system, ASTOR. The British will tell you that, considering the theaters of operations the UK is likely to be involved in, their modus operandi does not require an airborne C2 capability, only an airborne surveillance capability. Paul Kennedy, the former ASTOR Project Director, has flown in JSTARS and has said that, "while it is clearly a capable aircraft and very impressive kit, we do not think we need the 24 seats in JSTARS nor the high altitude requirement." Kennedy cited the British desire to own the capability due to no guarantee that NATO would make JSTARS available in a UK-only crisis. Concerned about the procurement and operation/maintenance costs, the UK cannot afford to contribute to both ASTOR and JSTARS. PDUSD (A&T) will brief alternative options to address British concerns during your 1-1 meeting with MOD Robertson.

~~(C)~~ **Iraq No-Fly Zones:** U.S. civilian and military staffs have closely coordinated our plans with HMG, who are appreciative of our continued close cooperation. You will have the opportunity to discuss specific options in more detail during your private meeting with MOD Robertson. As the MOD told you in your 27 May call, he has no doubts about the concept, but emphasizes that timing and appropriateness of any response are key factors.

~~(C)~~ **Nuclear Issues:** While Labour has now publicly committed to maintaining the UK's Trident force, they have also pledged to work for a freeze on nuclear warhead numbers and an international treaty whereby the nuclear weapon states would provide legally binding security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states. Labour has also pledged to include British nuclear weapons in multilateral reduction negotiations when satisfied that "verified progress towards the goal of the global elimination of nuclear weapons" has been achieved.

SECDEF COHEN MEETING WITH BRITISH MOD ROBERTSON
TALKING POINTS FOR PLENARY
3 JUNE 1997

UK Strategic Defence Review

- Thank you for your recent letter announcing the onset of your *Defence Review*.
- I was pleased to note your determination to maintain strong conventional forces and to retain the Trident submarine force as a credible and effective nuclear deterrent.
- I have a few personal insights from my QDR experience that you might find relevant.

NATO-Russia

- We hope the Founding Act represents the start of a strong, cooperative NATO-Russia relationship to face the challenges of a new era in European Security. Now we need to ensure that our publics (and, in the U.S., especially, the Congress) understand that the Act provides the opportunity to work with Russia but does not upset our ability to have a militarily effective and politically coherent Alliance.
- The NATO-Russia Joint Council will be an especially important forum to consult and exchange information. (b)(1)
(b)(1)
- We will continue to work with Russia on START, cooperative threat reduction and similar programs. Former MOD Rodionov and I agreed that bilateral and multilateral cooperation must continue despite Russian opposition to enlargement. I will make those same points with Sergeyev when I meet him.
- NATO should press forward with military liaison missions--such as assigning a NATO officer in Moscow and making General Shetsov's position at SHAPE permanent. We might then begin to enjoy the transparency that has characterized the NATO-Russian relationship in Bosnia.

NATO Enlargement/Enhanced PfP

- What are your views on the "Who?" We support the Czechs, Poles and Hungarians. Romania is a possibility, although probably not ready at this time. Slovenia is still under consideration.
- (b)(1)
(b)(1)
- That reassurance, in my view, needs to be a clear and unambiguous statement that enlargement is a continuing process, that no one will be excluded, and that there will be further invitations considered within a few years.
- The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council will play an important role by giving Partners a greater voice in PfP along with increased interaction with Allies. We were pleased with the inaugural EAPC at Sintra.

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DECLASSIFY ON: 29 May 2007~~

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29 May 97
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- An enhanced PfP will also play a vital role in Partner cooperation with the Alliance. With the Sintra NAC endorsing the SLG report, the Allies should implement PfP enhancements as quickly as possible.

NATO Adaptation

- We recognize that you plan to give up AF Northwest and that others, as of yet, have not made equal gestures.
- We are sympathetic to your efforts to rationalize the entire command structure.
- (b)(1)
- [REDACTED]
- The bottom line is that we do not think we should try to get this resolved by Madrid if it is not totally solved.

Bosnia/SFOR

- We share the view that NATO needs to carefully consider how to maintain the peace in Bosnia after SFOR's mandate ends in June 1998. However, we remain committed to ending our commitment of combat troops at that time – cannot possibly expect any Congressional support for extending the currently constituted mission beyond that date.
- In my view, our focus needs to be on utilizing the 12 months remaining in SFOR's mandate as effectively and efficiently as possible. We should get through the summer and then assess how civilian implementation is proceeding. After that, it would seem appropriate to talk seriously about what kind of security system we will need after June 1998.
- I understand you have been undertaking a review of Bosnia policy. I would be interested in any conclusions you can share.
- We need to accelerate progress on civilian implementation, especially those areas where progress can have the most direct effect on reducing the risk of fighting after SFOR leaves.
- Two such priority areas are public security/police and economic reconstruction. We urge HMG to consider increasing its contribution of both personnel and resources in those two key areas.
- We should discuss the war criminals issue privately.

Anti-Personnel Landmines

- The United States is committed to seek to negotiate a worldwide agreement for a comprehensive global APL ban in the CD. However, we believe that the CD and the Ottawa process are complementary, i.e., mutually reinforcing.
- I would appreciate hearing your views about the new policy.

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SECDEF COHEN MEETING WITH BRITISH MOD ROBERTSON

TALKING POINTS FOR 1-1 SESSION

3 JUNE 1997

NATO AGS/JSTARS

- I realize that both of our predecessors discussed NATO AGS and the JSTARS/ASTOR situation on numerous occasions.
- I believe there is a good option that provides high quality jobs in the UK, allows for significant technology transfer and enhances the AGS operational capability.
- Noel Longuemare will briefly present that option which I hope you will take back to London and seriously consider.

Bosnia War Criminals

Special Access Talking Points will be provided by the Bosnia Task Force.

Iraq/No-Fly Zones (See Next Page)

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SECDEF COHEN MEETING WITH BRITISH MOD ROBERTSON

IRAQ TALKING POINTS FOR 1-1 SESSION

3 JUNE 1997

Hajj Flights

- We believe Saddam will challenge us again to reassert his authority over his own airspace. We will oppose him when he does this.
- We've reached broad agreement to institute a system for the Iraqis to notify the coalition before attempting humanitarian flights in the no-fly zones. The system will be implemented after the next violation.
- If a violation occurs after that, we will respond in a manner that reinforces our commitment to maintain the integrity of the no-fly zones. We should be under no illusion: the coalition will hit Saddam if he violates terms of the notification system.
- We are concerned about what the idea of "proportionality" means in selecting targets for the attack. In our view, the objective of the attack is to avoid erosion of the no-fly zones. We need the flexibility to attack a variety of targets that will ensure this objective is met.
- The no-fly zones remain important to protect Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, to help monitor effectively Iraqi compliance with UNSCRs and for efforts to stabilize the situation in northern Iraq. We are determined to continue them until the Iraqis demonstrate their peaceful intentions by fully complying with all UNSCRs.
- We will continue our close consultations with you prior to taking any actions -- politically or militarily.

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400



28 May 97
I-97/30875



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
Prepared by Col (b)(6) OASD/ISA (EUR), (b)(6) 28 May 97

SUBJECT: Background Book for Your 3 June 1997 Meeting with
British Defense Secretary George Robertson

[Handwritten signatures and dates]
MAY 30 1997
MAY 29 1997

Enclosed for your review is background material for your meeting with The Right Honourable George Robertson, scheduled for **1200-1405 on Tuesday, 3 June 1997**. You will meet MOD Robertson at the River Entrance with an Honor Cordon at 1200 and proceed to your office for a photo opportunity and personal gift exchange.

A Plenary in 3E928 from 1210-1240 will include discussion on the **UK Strategic Defence Review (SDR), NATO-Russia, NATO Enlargement, NATO Adaptation, Bosnia, and Anti-Personnel Landmines**. From 1240-1300, you and MOD Robertson will move to your office for a restricted one-on-one session to discuss **NATO JSTARS, Bosnia War Criminals and Iraq No-Fly Zones**. At 1300, you and MOD Robertson will continue your discussions with plenary attendees at a working lunch in 3E912. You both have the opportunity to speak with US/British press 1345-1405 in the DoD Press Room. Minister Robertson will depart from the River Entrance at 1405.

Reviewed by DASD, European and NATO Affairs 105129

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BRITISH SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE GEORGE ROBERTSON

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SCOPE PAPER

SECDEF COHEN MEETING WITH BRITISH
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE, GEORGE ROBERTSON

~~(S)~~ You will meet for the first time with British Secretary of State for Defence, The Right Honourable George Robertson, on 3 June 1997. Robertson was a surprise choice (over shadow defense secretary David Clark) to head the UK MOD, having previously served as shadow Secretary of State for Scotland since 1993. Robertson, a Scot and member of Labour's right wing since he was first elected to Parliament in 1978, was widely considered a moderating influence on Labour foreign and defense policies during stints as opposition spokesperson on defense (1980-82) and European affairs (1984-93). (b)(1)

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to have it out of the way. They support the development of CJTFs and agree that CINCSOUTH must remain an American position.

~~(S)~~ **NATO Enlargement/Enhanced PfP:** HMG supports enlargement, emphasizes that it must be accompanied by measures that make clear it is not threatening Russia, and believes a first wave should be limited to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The British are not necessarily opposed to Slovenia, are leaning against Romania, and are reticent about even entertaining the possibility of Baltic membership. Secretary Albright recently wrote to FS Cook to clarify U.S. thinking on our Open Door strategy. She stressed the importance of establishing post-Madrid dialogues with Partners interested in membership and that these dialogues should be kept at NATO, not placed within the EAPC. Embassy London further stressed to FCO officials the importance the USG places on the intensified dialogues with aspirants following Madrid. FCO principals predicted that we would reach agreement on establishing such dialogues and that the UK wants to work this issue further to ensure we do not establish a process toward membership we would be unable to control. HMG appreciated receiving a more definitive explanation of USG views, and agreed that our positions are in harmony on the need to launch the EAPC at Sintra and on the way ahead for the Enhanced PfP. Although HMG believes that NATO needs to state the door to further membership shall remain open, we still need to reach agreement on the exact wording. The UK remains reluctant to name any aspirants for possible future membership in the Madrid Communiqué--they have been leery of commitments to particular countries or timetables for enlargement beyond what is done at Madrid. These, they think, should be held in abeyance until we have a chance to gauge the repercussions of the first installment. The British want to ensure after the first wave, we have a "healthy Alliance" and that further enlargement would "fit in."

~~(S)~~ **Bosnia/SFOR:** The British have already begun their push to have the U.S. revisit its policy of withdrawing U.S. forces in June 1998. On 22 May, PM Blair chaired HMG's first policy meeting on Bosnia. Although no new policy decisions were taken, PM Blair and his Cabinet members all accepted the view that a more muscular approach was required on Dayton implementation. FS Cook stressed several points in this regard: greater effort to bring indicted war criminals to trial; more pressure on the Parties to permit freedom of the media and unimpeded access by the HiRep; more pressure on Sarajevo to appoint Ambassadors; enhanced economic reconstruction; and, more pressure on the Bosnians to engage in genuine power sharing. MOD Robertson endorsed the U.S. view that Britain should increase its contribution to the IPTF. While an additional thirty policemen were discussed, the issue remained unresolved. The Cabinet agreed that Dayton implementation was unlikely to be completed by June 1998. Though no conclusions were reached, the discussion speculated that a military force would have to remain in Bosnia for some longer period (5-10 years was mentioned) in order to ensure stability. The unanimous view of the Cabinet was that Britain should not remain in Bosnia without U.S. forces (in together, out together). PM Blair had reviewed the FCO's Bosnia Policy Paper and asked FS Cook to prepare a new, longer-term paper on how long it would actually take to fully implement Dayton and at what financial costs and manpower levels.

The UK is completely on board with the U.S. view that we must concentrate in the next few months on intensifying Dayton implementation--FS Cook emphasized that point in

recent meetings with SecDef and SecState. MOD Robertson visited Bosnia on 20 May and clearly articulated that message to Bosnian politicians. HMG believes very strongly that we need to strengthen the IPTF by providing more U.S./European personnel.

~~(C)~~ **Anti-Personnel Landmines (APL):** The new UK APL policy calls for an immediate ban on the manufacture, import, export and transfer of APL through new legislation, and an immediate moratorium on APL use. UK APL stockpiles will be phased out starting this year and will not be replaced. The new policy provides for the destruction of all UK APL stockpiles by the year 2005, commits to a moratorium on APL use which will become a permanent ban by 2005 (or when an effective international agreement enters into force), and commits to negotiate constructively for a ban in the Ottawa process while working in the CD for a wider ban. The previous UK Government supported negotiations in the CD; it is now likely that the UK would join the Ottawa process and attend the related Brussels conference 24-27 June as a full participant. The 7 May trilateral statement by the UK, France and Germany indicates that the three believe it is worthwhile to maintain efforts both in the CD and Ottawa process.

~~(C)~~ **NATO AGS/JSTARS:** The UK fully recognizes the need for a high-level, stand-off AGS capability. The difference in views is how the UK believes we should achieve that capability and why the British prefer their national system, ASTOR. The British will tell you that, considering the theaters of operations the UK is likely to be involved in, their modus operandi does not require an airborne C2 capability, only an airborne surveillance capability. Paul Kennedy, the former ASTOR Project Director, has flown in JSTARS and has said that, "while it is clearly a capable aircraft and very impressive kit, we do not think we need the 24 seats in JSTARS nor the high altitude requirement." Kennedy cited the British desire to own the capability due to no guarantee that NATO would make JSTARS available in a UK-only crisis. Concerned about the procurement and operation/maintenance costs, the UK cannot afford to contribute to both ASTOR and JSTARS. PDUSD (A&T) will brief alternative options to address British concerns during your 1-1 meeting with MOD Robertson.

~~(C)~~ **Iraq No-Fly Zones:** U.S. civilian and military staffs have closely coordinated our plans with HMG, who are appreciative of our continued close cooperation. You will have the opportunity to discuss specific options in more detail during your private meeting with MOD Robertson. As the MOD told you in your 27 May call, he has no doubts about the concept, but emphasizes that timing and appropriateness of any response are key factors.

~~(C)~~ **Nuclear Issues:** While Labour has now publicly committed to maintaining the UK's Trident force, they have also pledged to work for a freeze on nuclear warhead numbers and an international treaty whereby the nuclear weapon states would provide legally binding security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states. Labour has also pledged to include British nuclear weapons in multilateral reduction negotiations when satisfied that "verified progress towards the goal of the global elimination of nuclear weapons" has been achieved.

PLENARY AND 1-1 DISCUSSION TOPICS AND ATTENDEES

SECDEF AND UK MOD ROBERTSON

3 JUNE 1997

PLENARY DISCUSSION TOPICS

- 1. UK *Strategic Defence Review***
- 2. NATO-Russia**
- 3. NATO Enlargement**
- 4. NATO Adaptation (CINCSOUTH)**
- 5. Bosnia**
- 6. Anti-Personnel Landmines (New British Policy)**

1-1 CLOSED SESSION TOPICS

- 1. NATO AGS/JSTARS**
- 2. Bosnia War Criminals**
- 3. Iraq No-Fly Zones**

PLENARY ATTENDEES

SECDEF

CJCS

Mr. Bodner

Mr. Slocombe

Mr. Longuemare

Mr. Lodal

Mr. Kramer

Mr. Miller

BGen Osterthaler

Ms. (b)(6)

Colonel (b)(6)

Mr. Martinez (STATE)

MOD ROBERTSON

HM Ambassador Kerr

Miss (b)(6) (Private Secretary)

Mr. Hatfield (DUS Policy)

Mr. (b)(6) (Special Advisor)

MGEN Vyvyan (British DATT)

Mr. Sawers

Mr. Shapcott

BACKGROUND PAPER
on
NATO-RUSSIA FOUNDING ACT

The Founding Act expresses the desire of Russia and NATO for a new, cooperative relationship in the post-Cold War European security landscape.

PROVISIONS OF THE ACT

-- Section I articulates governing principles, e.g., UN Charter and Helsinki Final Act norms of international conduct and commitments to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states and settle disputes peacefully.

-- Section II creates a new forum called the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council for NATO-Russia meetings and describes how this council will function.

-- Section III describes issues that NATO and Russia will discuss, including conflict prevention, peacekeeping, prevention of nuclear biological and chemical weapons proliferation and exchange of security policy and defense information.

-- Section IV describes the military dimensions of the relationship, including:

-- NATO's December 1996 statement that it has "no intention, no plan, and no reason" to deploy nuclear weapons or storage sites on new members' territory.

-- NATO's 14 March 1997 statement that in the current and foreseeable security environment, NATO will carry out its collective defense and other missions through interoperability, integration and capability for reinforcement, rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces on the territory of new members.

--Recognition that NATO will require adequate infrastructure on new members' territory to carry out the Alliance's core functions.

--Commitment by NATO and Russia to work for prompt adaptation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty to reflect the changed security environment since CFE was completed in 1990.

PREPARED BY B. NEADERLAND/CASD-ISA(NATO)/28 MAY 97

~~Classified By: L. Bronson, Dir NATO Policy
Reason: 1.5 (b) and (d)
Declassify On: 10 Apr 07~~

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BACKGROUND PAPER
on
NATO INTERNAL ADAPTATION

At its January 1994 Summit in Brussels, NATO agreed to examine how its structures and procedures could be adapted to respond to the changed security situation in Europe. Allies also pledged to work to develop structures and procedures that would improve cooperation with the Western European Union (WEU) and reflect the emerging European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI).

Specifically, Allied Heads of State and Government agreed to develop Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). A CJTF is a multinational (combined) and multi-service (joint) task force, task-organized and formed for contingency operations which require multinational and multi-service command and control. A CJTF headquarters nucleus is a permanent minimum framework staff that serves as the core for a CJTF headquarters. It is formed from personnel assigned to a larger parent headquarters who are "dual hatted" (i.e., assigned duties involving CJTF as well as operational functions within the parent headquarters). CJTFs will serve three functions: 1) To provide a means for flexibly responding to new security challenges; 2) To embody the use of "separable but not separate" Alliance assets for European-led operations; and, 3) To provide an opportunity for nations outside the Alliance to participate in NATO-led contingency operations.

In June 1996, NATO Foreign and Defense ministers agreed to adapt the Alliance internally through completion of the CJTF concept, renovation of the military command structure and development of ESDI within the Alliance.

- CJTF: NATO Allies agreed on an implementation plan for CJTF on 4 December 1996. CJTF headquarters nuclei will be initially located in three regional NATO headquarters: Striking Fleet Atlantic (STRIKFLTANT) (in Norfolk, VA), AFCENT (Brunssum, Netherlands) and in AFSOUTH (Naples, Italy). Exercises will be conducted in 1997 and 1998 with full implementation envisaged in the 1998-1999 time frame. Denmark has been trying to gain agreement that CJTF nuclei should be located in sub-regional commands as well as regional commands. The Danes rationalize that this is needed to support PFP outreach activities and to ensure that the operational importance of the NATO headquarters on their soil is not diminished. The U.S. view is that regional headquarters are better resourced and organized to support CJTF nuclei and that decisions on the eventual placement of nuclei should await completion of trials.

- Command Structure Review: Adapting NATO's military command structure is the focus of the Military Committee's Long Term Study (LTS). Allies have agreed to

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retain two strategic commands (ACE and ACLANT), each commanded by an American. The number of regional commands in the Atlantic will be reduced from five to three. An informal consensus among CHODS has formed around reducing the number of regional commands in Europe from three to two. The French demand that Europeans must be placed in command of European regional commands, including AFSOUTH. The U.S. insists on retaining the AFSOUTH command because of the need for an American operational commander in the region where the bulk of U.S. forces are deployed. Work on the command structure is currently focused on the sub-regional level; in particular, the number and composition of Joint Sub-Regional Commands (JSRC) and Component Commands (CC). At their 22-23 April meeting, CHODS were unable to achieve consensus on a sub-regional command structure model. Turkey blocked consensus with its call for a maximum of four sub-regional commands (SRC) in the Southern Region (one each in Turkey, Greece, Italy and Spain). This would result in elimination of two commands in Italy and does not consider the possibility for an SRC in France if that nation re-integrates. The Spanish also blocked consensus by insisting that strategic command boundaries be re-drawn to depict the Canary Islands as part of the ACE area of responsibility. The French withheld support for any command structure formulation until their government decides on re-integration. CHODS are planning to meet again on 6 June 1997 in attempt to reach agreement prior to the Brussels defense ministerial on 12 June.

- ESDI: Significant progress has been made in a number of areas. Allies have agreed on changes to the NATO defense planning process that will ensure that NATO is prepared to support WEU-led operations. Allies have also agreed on various ways that NATO and the WEU can cooperate in developing ESDI; on elaboration of multinational command arrangements within the integrated structure to support and conduct WEU-led operations; and for the identification of Alliance assets for support of WEU-led operations. The NATO military authorities have developed ways to support WEU "illustrative scenarios" and are incorporating these scenarios in NATO planning. The NAC has approved revised terms of reference for the Deputy SACEUR which task him with planning and in some cases leading WEU operations making use of NATO assets.

PREPARED BY
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/27 May 97

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INFORMATION PAPER/TALKING POINTS

SUBJECT: Recent Change in the British Position on Anti-Personnel Landmines (APL)

PURPOSE: To provide the SECDEF information for use during British Defense Secretary Robertson's Visit to Washington.

DISCUSSION:

- Announcement of an APL Ban. On May 21, the United Kingdom Prime Minister announced a ban on the import, export, transfer, and manufacture of APL and the UK's intent to participate in the Ottawa Process and push for a wider ban in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). This ban goes beyond the previous government's moratorium on export alone and is a major shift in policy, as the former Conservative Government refused to sign up to the Ottawa Process because of reluctance to press for a total ban. (The Ottawa Process is a Canadian initiative for a series of free-standing meetings resulting in interested States signing an APL ban agreement in December 1997.) According to British news sources, the previous policy was supported by military commanders, who argued strongly that mines remained an important military tool and would not cause humanitarian problems if used responsibly.

- Phase Out Stocks and End APL Use by 2005. The Foreign Secretary added that APL stocks will be phased out by 2005 or when an effective international agreement to ban their use enters into force, whichever is first. "In the meantime, we have introduced a complete moratorium on their operational use. . . That moratorium will only be suspended if we judge that, for a specific operation, the security of our Armed Forces would be jeopardized without the possibility of the use of APL. In such an exceptional case, we would report to Parliament the decision and the circumstances which led to it." (The U.S. APL policy affords the use of APL in military hostilities in Korea until APL alternatives become available or the risk of aggression has been removed—and elsewhere, if necessary—to safeguard American lives and hasten an end to fighting.)

- UK Participation in the Ottawa Process. The UK defines "an effective international agreement" as "an international treaty which has a reasonable prospect of leading to world-wide support for a ban on APL." The UK expects the Ottawa Process to produce such a treaty and establish a clear framework, but the UK acknowledges that other steps, notably the CD in Geneva, are likely to continue to be necessary to ensure the widest possible participation in the ban. (Current U.S. policy is that the U.S. will seek to initiate negotiations on a world-wide agreement for a comprehensive global APL ban in the CD. Two major concerns are [1] that the major APL-producing countries, e.g., Russia, China, and India, will not participate in the Ottawa process and [2] that the Ottawa Agreement, as currently drafted, would not permit us to protect our Korean exception. While we plan to continue our efforts in the CD, we will consult with the Canadians on June 12 to inquire if the Ottawa Process can accommodate U.S. concerns.)

- Working in the CD for a Wider Ban. In a statement on May 22, the permanent CD representative of the UK and Northern Ireland stated that the UK continues strongly to support the immediate establishment of an ad hoc committee on APL with a negotiating mandate, and, in the interests of achieving such a consensus, supports the immediate appointment of a Special Coordinator to conduct consultations on the most appropriate arrangement to deal with the question of APL. (The UK and U.S. positions do not differ on these two items.)

- Attachment 1 is the London Press Association's transcribed excerpt of the Prime Minister's announcement and a discussion of the military risk the UK has decided to take. Attachment 2 is the statement delivered by the UK representative at the CD in Geneva on May 22.

TALKING POINTS:

- The U.S. is committed to seek to negotiate a world-wide agreement for a comprehensive global APL ban in the CD. However, we believe that the CD and the Ottawa Process are complementary, i.e., mutually reinforcing.

- (If the Defense Secretary raises U.S. consultations with Canada): U.S. and Canadian consultations will be held on June 12. We will inquire as to how U.S. concerns can be accommodated in the Ottawa Process and ask that the Canadians push to actively support our efforts in the CD.

el (Mrs. (b)(6) SO/LIC, PM/DAP, (b)(6)

Background Paper
on
the United Kingdom and NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS)

BACKGROUND:

In December 1995 NATO agreed to acquire a "core" Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system. In Fall 1996, the United States proposed that NATO acquire a fleet of six Joint STARS aircraft and 24 Ground Station Modules to satisfy an urgent requirement for an AGS capability. The US proposal includes provisions for a first aircraft delivery in 2000 by diverting two Joint STARS from the US domestic production line. In addition, the US would bear the burden of early program funding. At the November 1996 Conference of National Armament Directors' (CNAD) meeting, a decision on this "fast track" proposal was postponed until Fall 1997 because of an effort led by the UK to follow a more "deliberate track" to AGS system selection. The UK position results from a parallel effort to satisfy a long standing UK national requirement for an airborne ground surveillance system; a program named Airborne Stand-Off Radar (ASTOR). The UK states that ASTOR will be based on a business jet and, unlike Joint STARS, will have a very limited real-time capability and no on-board command and control. While Joint STARS is first optimized for Moving Target Indication, ASTOR will be optimized for Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) (fixed target imaging). ASTOR is scheduled for system selection in 1998 with first aircraft delivery slated for 2003. The UK nominated ASTOR as a candidate for the NATO "core" AGS requirement. (FYI: When NATO was considering acquiring an Airborne Early Warning Aircraft, the US AWACS was in production and available and the UK was pursuing its own domestic NIMROD-AEW development program. That program was finally canceled because of technical difficulties and cost over runs. As a result, the UK ended up acquiring the US AWACS for its domestic requirements. **END FYI**)

DISCUSSION:

The US and others (Canada, Denmark, Italy, Norway and Spain) have repeatedly stated that the NATO requirement is urgent based upon the US Joint STARS' support for NATO Bosnia operations and the likelihood that NATO will continually be involved in Bosnia-type operations in the future. These nations also see a requirement to provide surveillance beyond the borders of a newly expanded Alliance. Both Major NATO Commanders (MNC), SACEUR (General Joulwan) and SACLANC (General Sheehan) are strong supporters of a NATO acquisition of Joint STARS, but their recommendation that NATO treat the matter as urgent has not been fully supported by the NATO Military Committee. The UK has led a group of nations, including Germany and France, which have stated that they don't see the urgent requirement stated by the "fast track" nations and the MNC. They (UK, France and Germany) called for a more "deliberate track" approach to selecting a NATO "core" AGS system.

UK POSITION:

The UK agrees that NATO has a requirement for AGS, but it is not urgent. They believe rapid fielding is not as critical as the need to follow a deliberate and formal approach to system acquisition. The deliberate process includes a full and complete Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA), followed by a competition of all possible candidates. A system

selection decision would not be made until the 2000 time frame. As an alternative, the UK, at the April 1997 CNAD, aligned with a French-German proposal that would have a "ground station first" approach with airborne platform selection and acquisition delayed until later. (NOTE: As the UK ASTOR project has not yet entered development, both the "deliberate track" and the "ground station first" approaches allow time for the ASTOR to become a real competitor for the NATO AGS program.)

US POSITION:

The NATO AGS requirement is urgent as demonstrated by the two deployments of Joint STARS in support of NATO's Bosnia efforts and the likelihood that the Alliance will face an increasing amount of these types of contingencies in the future. Given the limited US Joint STARS buy (19 operational aircraft) and unilateral worldwide US requirements for the system, NATO needs demand fielding of an Alliance capability as soon as possible. The US "fast track" proposal provides for the earliest possible capability by diverting two US domestic Joint STARS to provide a first NATO delivery in 2000. It also provides for the US to bear the largest share of the costs in the first two years of the program. Clearly the "deliberate track" approach will not provide an Alliance capability until several years later. A NATO program, based upon the already developed and in production Joint STARS, offers a truly transatlantic cooperative opportunity. The US will waive financial recoupment of the approximately \$3 billion of research and development already expended on Joint STARS.

The UK and the other participating allies would receive significant Industrial Participation with BAe performing a large share of the Joint STARS airframe re-manufacturing and modification work. (If Germany were not to participate in the NATO program, it is likely that BAe would become the lead airframe subcontractor.) Computing Devices Hastings and other UK companies would perform high quality mission equipment and ground station electronics work. The US offer includes a cooperative radar and communications upgrade effort with the associated highly technical research and development work performed both in Europe and North America. The UK share, based upon a 16 nation NATO program would be approximately 16 percent. Based on that, the Industrial Participation opportunities for the UK would be approximately \$430 million (Constant Year 1997). The cooperative aspects of the program and, therefore the opportunity for increased Alliance cohesion, would be significantly enhanced by UK participation in a NATO Joint STARS program:

Prepared by:

(b)(6)

OUUSD (A&T) I&CP/ACA

9 May 97

(b)(6)

Background Paper
on a
Joint STARS Business Jet Derivative for
the United Kingdom's Airborne Stand Off Radar (ASTOR)

BACKGROUND:

The United Kingdom has a long standing national requirement for an airborne ground surveillance capability. This requirement is separate from the NATO requirement for a NATO owned and operated "core" capability. The UK has stated that they can not afford to participate in both a NATO and a national program, but that they would make their national Airborne Stand Off Radar (ASTOR) asset available "in kind" as the UK contribution to the NATO AGS capability. In addition, they have nominated ASTOR as a candidate for the NATO owned and operated "core" requirement. The UK has indicated a preference for a business jet-based system for ASTOR. The UK has stated that later this year they intend to ask for Best and Final Offers (BAFO) from two consortia (one led by Lockheed Martin and the other by Raytheon E-Systems) to develop and produce ASTOR. The two consortia performed separate ASTOR Program Definition (PD) studies after which the UK performed a Cost, Operational Effectiveness and Investment Analysis (COEIA) on the two PD proposals, the existing U-2R and the current Joint STARS. They expect to perform systems selection in 1998 and achieve an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in 2003.

DISCUSSION:

In the interest of Alliance cohesiveness, interoperability and lower overall costs, the US has repeatedly tried to enlist UK support for a NATO Joint STARS program. When the UK stated that they had a unilateral national requirement for their own airborne ground surveillance capability, the US encouraged them to select the E-8 Joint STARS, or a business jet derivative of Joint STARS, for ASTOR. The US offered a variety of options, including a very high value cooperative research and development effort, as enticements in an effort to maintain a high degree of commonality. To date, the UK has rejected these offers and has deliberately slowed efforts to move forward on a NATO Joint STARS program. Apparently, these delaying tactics are (1) to allow ASTOR to at least reach the program development stage prior to an Alliance decision so that it would be a "real" NATO competitor and (2) fear that a NATO decision for Joint STARS would result in considerable domestic political pressure to choose Joint STARS for ASTOR and join the NATO program. Reportedly, an Equipment Acquisition Committee (EAC) decision was rushed through prior to the UK election to (hopefully) avoid a Labor Government review of the program.

UK POSITION:

Like the US, the UK needs its own capability to fulfill unilateral commitments outside of NATO. The UK specification calls for ASTOR to be interoperable with Joint STARS and other allied systems. The UK ASTOR fleet will be provided "in kind" as the UK's contribution to the NATO capability. Regarding an E-8 Joint STARS for the ASTOR requirement, they state they cannot afford the acquisition or operations and maintenance costs of the 707-based platform and that Joint STARS is based on obsolete technology and does not meet ASTOR's operational requirements. Further, they prefer a business jet aircraft. Responding to a Northrop Grumman (Joint STARS prime contractor)

proposal to place a fully ASTOR specification-complaint Joint STARS radar capability on a business jet, they stated their belief that the proposal was more costly and of higher technical risk than either of their PD proposals. The Northrop Grumman offer was priced at \$758 million (Constant 1996 dollars). (In a statement to Parliament then MOD Portillo stated the cost of the ASTOR program was "...in the region of 750 million pounds." (\$1.2 billion))

US POSITION:

In the interest of operational effectiveness, interoperability and overall Alliance solidarity, a NATO program with full UK participation is by far the most preferred solution. For the UK domestic program, we believe that there is significant benefit to the UK if ASTOR would be either an E-8 Joint STARS, or a business jet-based derivative thereof. If, however, for unilateral reasons, the UK can not participate at any level in a NATO program, then a system that is largely common with the US and NATO, would provide for the greatest degree of interoperability and the greatest life cycle cost savings to all parties. Dr. Kaminski proposed an ASTOR solution based on an E-8 Joint STARS, or a Joint STARS business jet derivative. We believe that such an approach presents the lowest possible program risk for the UK as Joint STARS has completed development, is in production, has performed well during three real world operational deployments and the ASTOR-required modifications (the same as NATO-required upgrades) have already been demonstrated with data collected during actual missions. A Joint STARS-derivative in a business jet type aircraft would have largely common mission equipment components (greater than 90 percent commonality) with the US and a NATO Joint STARS fleet. Upgrades of radar and communications proposed for NATO would also be applicable to ASTOR so that costs to develop these improvements could be cooperatively shared among the UK, the US and NATO. Not, insignificantly, a large amount of this very high quality technical research and development work would be done in the UK. (FYI: Another US proposal (classified) provides an unique opportunity for a US-UK-only cooperative program. END FYI) Life cycle operations and support costs would be lower for all parties because of the large amount of commonality of mission equipment components.

Because the US has already paid for the research and development of the basic Joint STARS system, and will not seek financial recouperment of that approximately \$3 billion investment, and the opportunity for a cooperative upgrade effort, we believe that the UK could field a Joint STARS-derivative (business jet-based) ASTOR (fully compliant with their requirements) sooner and participate, at a reduced level, in a NATO Joint STARS program for the approximately 750 million pounds (\$1.2 billion) proposed for a unilateral ASTOR program. Such an approach, would provide the following benefits to the UK: reduced costs by participating in the shared program; provide UK industry with approximately \$375 million in direct Industrial Participation (on the ASTOR portion, plus their share of the NATO program) during program acquisition; provide an earlier operational capability; and reduce risk because their system would be based on operationally proven technology. Such an effort would, importantly, demonstrate Alliance solidarity, provide all parties (the UK, NATO and the US) with state-of-the-art capabilities, lower acquisition and operations and maintenance costs for all and provide significant high quality Industrial Participation opportunities for UK industry.

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OUSD (A&T) I&CP/ACA

9 May 97

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War Criminals - Although the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was created over two years ago, it has had little success in bringing war criminals to justice. To date, 75 individuals have been indicted for alleged war crimes in the Balkans: 54 Serbs, 18 Croats, and 3 Muslims. Most of the indictees are believed to live in Bosnia or other parts of the former Yugoslavia. In addition to the seven in custody -- one Serb, three Muslims, and three Croats -- a Croat indictee has finally been extradited by Zagreb, and only two cases have been completed--both convictions. According to Art. IX of the General Framework Agreement of the Dayton Accords, primary responsibility for the arrest of indicted war criminals lies with the Parties. Although the Bosnian government has generally cooperated, the Bosnian Croats, Serbia, and Croatia have provided only minimal cooperation and the Bosnian Serbs have even refused to recognize ICTY's authority. Like IFOR, SFOR personnel will have the authority to detain indicted war criminals if they come into contact with them during the normal course of their duties and if the tactical situation permits. Given the lack of progress to date, the USG has embarked on a concerted diplomatic effort to increase pressure on all of the national authorities of the former Yugoslavia to arrest indictees on their territory. A more aggressive effort by the international community to assist the ICTY in apprehending indictees is under consideration in the USG. The USG and its allies at the London Peace Implementation Conference in December strongly pledged to provide additional resources which the ICTY needs to accomplish its work, including personnel, intelligence, and funding. In addition, SFOR provides general security and emergency support to ICTY teams investigating mass grave sites.

Talking Points

The USG believes that bringing war criminals to justice is an important component of the Dayton peace process and that progress in this area has been insufficient. The international community must do more to bolster the Tribunal's efforts.

My government has been consulting with yours on ways to improve the ICTY's track record. I assume you are being kept informed on those discussions, and I would rather leave detailed discussion to that forum--or we can speak privately.

SECRET

Latest Iraqi Violation of the No-Fly Zones (NFZ)

Background. ~~(S)~~ It is clear to us that Saddam has decided to challenge the NFZ's by conducting so-called humanitarian flights. We have no doubt that his goal with these flights is to undermine the legitimacy of the NFZs, erode the Coalition's unity and ultimately dismantle the sanctions regime.

- The Iraqi Health Minister has said that Iraq wants to conduct similar flights through the NFZ's for medical purposes as well.

~~(S)~~ An Iraqi jetliner transported 104 Iraqi pilgrims from Baghdad to Jeddah for the Hajj on April 10th. The Iraqis filed no flight plan and Jordanian civil air traffic controllers spotted the aircraft entering Jordanian airspace as it "cut the corner" to Saudi airspace. The jet landed at Jeddah where Saudi security forces surrounded it. Passengers deplaned and the jet was quickly sent on its way back to Baghdad. US assets monitored the Iraqi flight, alerting both the Jordanians and Saudis to the flight. After conducting their pilgrimage, the Iraqi's returned to their homes in Iraqi helicopters on April 22nd, in defiance of the southern no-fly and northern no-fly zones.

USG Response

~~(S)~~ The Principals met on Friday, 23 May to discuss a range of possible responses to the Hajj flight violations. The PC recommended to the President that we allow Iraq the use of civilian aircraft and helicopters for genuine humanitarian reasons if they notify the Coalition in advance of these flights. This strategy allows us to demonstrate that we have no quarrel with the Iraqi people and allows us to grab the high moral ground by recognizing the need for humanitarian flights. As a practical matter, it also closes up the latest loophole in the NFZ enforcement that Saddam has tried to exploit. The President approved the advance notification scheme and directed that it be implemented upon the next Iraqi humanitarian NFZ violation.

~~(S)~~ The PC also considered a range of military target set options to be used in the event Saddam ignores the advance notification procedure. The PC reviewed the options but did not make a recommendation to the President; the options are still being refined.

~~(S)~~ We have begun consultations with our coalition partners on the advanced notification plan. It appears that the Saudis, Kuwaitis and British are with us. The French have not yet agreed to go along with the advanced notification scheme. State A/S David Welch is being sent to France on Tuesday to persuade the French to join us on this. Additionally, this week "second tier" states (remainder of the GCC plus Russia,

~~Classified by Acting DASD NESA, Alina Romanowski
Reason: 1.5 (a) (1)
Declassify: 27 May 2007~~

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China, Jordan, Israel, Egypt, Canada, Japan, Netherlands) will be engaged on our NFZ strategy.

Talking Points

Iraq Policy

- The U.S. view of Iraq has not changed. Saddam Hussayn remains a dangerous and unrepentant leader who will continue to threaten the security of the Gulf region as long as he remains in power.

¥ Our primary policy objective is to contain Saddam and limit his ability to threaten the region. Containment is achieved through strict sanctions enforcement and a strong regional deterrent posture sustained through prepositioning of equipment and forward deployed forces. President Clinton has said that he will not support the lifting of sanctions until Iraq complies with all of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

- You can expect that we will continue to enforce the Southern no-fly and no-drive zones and the northern no-fly zone. These will remain the linchpins if our containment policy.

- The United States views Iraq's WMD effort as a global problem. We continue to solicit our friends and allies around the world to support UNSCOM in the United Nations Security Council to ensure full Iraqi compliance with its obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions.

No-fly Zone Enforcement

- In our demarche of August 1992, we informed the Government of Iraq that in view of Iraq's failure to comply with UNSCR 688, the coalition concluded that it must monitor Iraqi compliance with UNSCR 688 in the south. That need remains.

- The coalition warned Iraq against flying military or civilian aircraft, whether fixed or rotary wing, south of 33 degrees north. We warned Iraq that we would respond appropriately and decisively to any Iraqi failure to comply with this requirement.

- No threat to Coalition operations will be permitted. The Iraqi Government should know that Coalition aircraft will use appropriate force in response to any indication of hostile intent as defined in previous diplomatic demarches.

- Iraq will bear full responsibility for failure to observe scrupulously the terms of the established no-fly zone.

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Containment Plus

- In view of Saddam's record, there is a serious question as to whether he can ever satisfy the international community that his intentions are peaceful.
- As Secretary Albright stated in her March address, a change in leadership in Baghdad could make a difference in our policy.
- We will be ready to enter into a dialog with a successor regime, should that occur.

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