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USAF MANPOWER IN LIMITED WAR

1964-1967

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by

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FOREWORD

USAF Manpower in Limited War, 1964-1967 discusses the Air Force effort to augment its manpower resources to meet the rapidly expanding requirements of the Vietnam war. Prior to the summer of 1965, when Southeast Asia operations sharply increased, the USAF manpower pool had been contracting as a result of previous decisions and actions. Thereafter, the trend was reversed and the Air Force undertook to enlarge its base as quickly as possible, although facing serious shortages of qualified officers and airmen. Its situation was made more difficult by competition from civilian industry. Many experienced USAF personnel --pilots, technicians, and other professionals--were drawn from the service by attractive salaries offered by the expanding private sector of the economy.

Since new recruits were usually unskilled, the Air Training Command and many combat units had to shoulder the heaviest training burden since the Korean War. An unusual amount of strain, confusion, and overwork followed and, at times, deteriorated the combat readiness of many units not directly involved in the war. Consequently, the Air Force sought to improve its management procedures to insure the most effective utilization and retention of its trained personnel.

This study is the third in a series written by Dr. George F. Lemmer of the USAF Historical Division Liaison Office (AFCHO). Its predecessors were: The Changing Character of Air Force Manpower, 1958-1959, issued in April 1961, and USAF Manpower Trends, 1960-1963, published in March 1965.

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I. THE BUILDUP FOR WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

(U) During the four years between July 1963 and June 1967 the number of military personnel in the Department of Defense (DOD) grew from 2,699,677 to 3,376,880. Within the Air Force this total rose from 869,431 to 897,494. The number of direct-hire civilian employees grew more slowly, from 1,049,765 to 1,302,605; in the Air Force, the figure increased from 296,982 to 328,700.*[1]

(U) Not unexpectedly, costs also rose, but a little more steeply because of the frequent pay raises during these years. Total DOD manpower costs grew from $18.6 billion in fiscal year 1963 to $26.7 billion in fiscal year 1967--the military from $12 to $18 billion, the civilian from $6.6 to $8.7 billion. Since DOD military expenditures had also grown--from $48.3 billion in fiscal year 1963 to $67.7 billion four years later, overall manpower costs varied only slightly, between just under 39 and 40 percent of expenditures.[2]

(U) In the Air Force, military personnel costs grew from $4.3 to $5.4 billion, while civilian manpower costs held fairly steady at about $2.2 billion. (A dip to $2.0 billion took place in fiscal year 1965 when the grade structure was lowered in response to demands by the Bureau of the Budget and the

* In the Army, the largest service, the increase in the military was from 975,916 to 1,442,498; in the Navy from 664,647 to 751,619. The Marine Corps, with the largest percentage growth rose from 189,683 to 285,269. The number of civilians in the Army grew from 375,690 to about 484,800; in the Navy (including the Marine Corps) from 343,970 to 404,940; and in agencies of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from 33,123 to 79,134. In total Department of Defense manpower, the increase was slightly over 930,000; from 3,749,442 to 4,679,485.

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to limit manpower costs.) The totals of roughly $6.4 to $7.7 billion were 33 to 37 percent of expenditures, which had increased from about $20.6 to almost $23.0 billion annually. The percentage fell between 1965 and 1967, however, as procurement of expensive missiles, aircraft, and munitions absorbed a larger proportion of the Air Force dollar. Military manpower accounted for from 22 to 26 percent of USAF expenditures, civilian personnel from 10 to 11 percent.[3]

(U) It would appear that these figures depicted a military establishment that was expanding steadily from 1963 on in order to fight a growing limited war in Southeast Asia and be ready to meet possible aggression elsewhere while manning and maintaining a strategic deterrent of growing complexity. But actually, through June 1965, the size of the U.S. military force declined and total expenditures of $46.2 billion in fiscal year 1965 marked the low point of this four-year period. Between July 1963 and June 1965, total military manpower fell by about 44,300, total civilian employees by about 16,000. The Air Force loss of nearly 44,800 was more than the total loss, since the Navy and Marine Corps gained personnel during these two years. Some of the serious USAF manpower problems after June 1965, when the Air Force had to cope with a limited war, grew out of the shift from a declining force to a rapidly growing one.[4]

(U) The impact of the war in Southeast Asia could readily be seen by comparing statistics for June 1965 and June 1967. Total DOD military personnel had increased from 2,655,389 to 3,376,880; in the Air Force from 824,622 to 897,494. With civilian employees, the total had risen from 1,033,755 to 1,302,605; in the Air Force, from 291,500 to 328,711. Obviously DOD

manpower costs had also increased, from $20.5 billion in 1965 to $26.7 billion in 1967, while military expenditures had jumped from $46.2 billion to $67.7 billion.

(U) The fluctuation in the number of officers and airmen stationed overseas afforded another illustration of the war's impact. Beginning in mid-1962, the administrations of Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson either closed or reduced the manning of many oversea bases and returned large numbers of men to the United States. By June 1965 the number of USAF military personnel overseas had dropped by 30,000 to 189,230. But two years later it had jumped to 286,400, an increase of almost 97,000. More than 84,000 were in Vietnam and Thailand, where only about 7,600 had been stationed in January 1965.* Within the Air Force, these war years were marked by rapid acceleration of operations and training and by frustrating shortages of pilots and technicians. The statistics illustrated the vast difference between preparing for a limited war and actually engaging in a bitter and rapidly expanding conflict in a far-off part of the world.[5]

(U) Significantly, the U.S. military establishment, despite additional missions and greater worldwide responsibilities, had almost 175,000 fewer men under arms in 1967 than it had in the Korean War. The Air Force had 80,000 less--897,494 as compared to 977,593 in June 1953--yet its responsibilities had become more numerous and complex during the intervening years.[6]

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* Total U.S. military manpower in Southeast Asia rose from 201,428 in January 1966 to 513,569 in June 1967; USAF strength from 25,329 to 84,026.

[redacted]

Reorienting the Peacetime Force

[redacted] The steady USAF buildup in Southeast Asia beginning in the spring of 1965 to prevent the collapse of South Vietnam produced a manpower crisis which continued in varying degrees for the next two years. During the first half of 1965, six months before the large-scale deployments began, Air Staff personnel planners worked closely with Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) officials to find, assign, and coordinate the movement of people to combat and training units.[7]

[redacted] In February and March 1965 the JCS recommended to Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara that nine tactical fighter squadrons, along with other strong military forces, be dispatched to the western Pacific, and from that time on events moved rapidly. Before the end of April Secretary McNamara had directed deployment of 16 fighter, reconnaissance, and airlift squadrons to Southeast Asia and the western Pacific by the end of August. Obviously, military manpower would have to be greatly increased if these steadily mounting deployments continued.[8]

[redacted] By July it had become evident that they would not only continue but increase greatly. In September Secretary McNamara approved a plan calling for 210,000 men, of which 34,500 would be from the Air Force. On 14 October this was raised by 12,000, including 934 airmen. The Secretary ordered two more large force increments before the end of the year, to be deployed by 30 June 1967. In addition to fighter, airlift, and reconnaissance forces, there were also numerous special units that required highly trained technicians. Among the latter were heavy repair "Red Horse" squadrons, "Phyllis Ann" and "Wild Weasel" electronic

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warfare units, and the 606th Air Commando Squadron. The Air Force was deeply troubled by these new demands since it was already having difficulty meeting the earlier requirements. The accelerating calls for more combat forces and the blossoming training needs were beginning to exceed manpower resources. The shortage of skilled manpower became more acute and required a large expansion of the training establishment. Competent instructors could be obtained only by raiding operational units not immediately needed in the combat theater.[9]

[redacted] During 1966, as more tactical squadrons and many special units moved to Southeast Asia, USAF manpower requirements in that area jumped by nearly 36,000. Before the end of the year the need for skilled people in the combat theater was coupled with the need to replace men who had completed a tour there. As a result, the number of skilled people in both the United States and Europe was reduced and certain specialists were no longer available for deployment. Until near the end of 1966, most of the men returning from Vietnam helped train new technicians or filled positions in the depleted stateside units in an attempt to keep them operational.[10]

[redacted] The withdrawal of skilled people to support forces in Southeast Asia reduced the USAF replacement and rotational base and lowered the efficiency of units not directly involved in the conflict. While striving feverishly to meet expanding needs, through 1965 the Air Force also had to stay under a strict military manpower ceiling. Both JCS and the Air Force urged Secretary McNamara to raise this manpower ceiling in order to permit the recruitment and training of enough people to meet worldwide as well as Southeast Asia requirements. In August 1965 the Secretary raised the USAF

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ceiling by 40,000 for fiscal year 1966. On 15 October Under Secretary of the Air Force Norman S. Paul informed Mr. McNamara that the Air Force still could not meet approved Southeast Asia requirements for 55,000 men--15,000 more than the ceiling increase. Mr. Paul believed that the deficit might actually be close to 27,000. The Air Force continued to meet commitments, however, on the assumption that OSD would approve new manpower increases. And, by the end of June 1966, OSD did permit another increase of 38,000. Actually, by June 1967 the ceiling had been raised to about 5,000 above the total military strength the Air Force had reached by that date.[11]

(S-[redacted]) To end the problem of large-scale temporary-duty deployments to Southeast Asia, Eugene M. Zuckert, Secretary of the Air Force until 1 October 1965, directed in early September that most of the tactical units already there and those to be transferred should be placed in the permanent change of station (PCS) category. The shift proceeded rapidly, and by December 25,765 of the 29,737 in Southeast Asia were in a permanent status; by the end of June 1966, more than 49,150 of 53,300; and by December 1966, about 74,600 of 79,020. Of the 4,430 on TDY on the last date, 2,484 were in South Vietnam and 1,943 in Thailand. Secretary Zuckert also eased a morale problem by relaxing a security policy concerning deployment dates and giving men more time to relocate their families and settle personal affairs.[12]

(S-[redacted]) The buildup of units and manpower in Southeast Asia continued into 1967. By June, total strength in the area had reached 84,026 and by the end of 1967, 89,303. At mid-1966, there were 35

[redacted]

different squadrons in Southeast Asia. A year later there were 67, and at the end of the year 73. The Air Force satisfied the basic requirements in one fashion or another, although it frequently had to make substitutions in grade and skill levels and fill positions in one specialty with men from a related one. Most units in the combat theater were manned up to 98 percent of standard, but shortages in many specialties even as late as June 1967 were solved only by waiting until on-the-job training prepared enough men to fill the gaps.[13]

Changing the Tactical Forces

[redacted] Of the major USAF commands, the Tactical Air Command (TAC) felt the greatest pressure from the buildup in the western Pacific and the escalation of military operations in Southeast Asia. In addition to fighter and airlift units, it had to furnish a steady stream of reconnaissance aircrews, special air warfare forces, and support troops. It also had to conduct a large training program and prepare forces for possible contingencies elsewhere in the world.

[redacted] As a result, TAC's operational capabilities gradually declined during 1966. Part of the difficulty lay in the Air Force's slowness in shifting from the nuclear weapon policy of the 1950's to the limited warfare policy of the 1960's. In 1965 TAC still had too few people skilled in the use, maintenance, and handling of conventional weapons, and it had to obtain quickly more ammunition load crews, munition mechanics, and men to store and inspect ordnance.

([redacted]) The pace of the Vietnam war accelerated so rapidly that more than half of TAC forces were in the western Pacific by the end of 1965. To complete the initial phase of deployment required more than one-half of TAC's operational squadrons--68 percent of the tactical forces and 64 percent of the airlift fleet. Before the end of 1966, the deployments reached 76 and 73 percent, respectively. At the same time there were frequent rotations of aircrews, maintenance men, and other technicians. To provide men for both the units and as individual replacements, TAC had to expand greatly its training program.[14]

([redacted]) The war also increased the demand for aircrews qualified in special air warfare (SAW) operations. The 1st Air Commando Wing, Eglin AFB, Fla., could no longer supply enough men, and in December 1965 the Air Force established the 4410th Combat Crew Training Wing (SAW), also at Eglin, to obtain about 500 to 600 more crews per year. For this unit, composed of 997 officers and airmen and equipped with 74 SAW aircraft, the Air Force tried to obtain instructors who had served in Vietnam and flown at least 200 A-1E sorties.

([redacted]) The emergency brought on by the Vietnam war prompted a Headquarters USAF study during the summer of 1965 which concluded that a change in organization might permit a more rapid deployment to meet future commitments, both in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. In September the Air Staff recommended standardizing tactical fighter wings at three squadrons of 24 aircraft each. (Several wings were currently organized into four squadrons of 18 aircraft.) More important from a manpower standpoint was the call for an increase in the crew ratio from 1.22 to 1.55 per aircraft and

in the aircraft utilization rate from 25 to 40 hours monthly. JCS recognized the TAC need for a better training and rotational base but held back on approving the proposal. Secretary McNamara did not formally approve it, but he directed in December that combat crew training and replacement training units (RTU's) raise their utilization rate to 45 hours a month as quickly as possible.

[redacted] By June 1966 TAC was still far from solving its manpower problems. Units sent to the combat theater had a 1.5 crew ratio, but training units in the United States were as short of qualified pilots as ever. The F-4C sortie rate had jumped from 1,337 in May 1966 to 3,015 in July. In addition, there were high F-105 pilot losses in July and August. Both TAC and U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) had to send more units--TAC said "overmanned" units--to Southeast Asia, regardless of the effect on other missions. TAC also had to send many instructor pilots. It protested that units in the combat theater were manned at 115 percent of utilization while its own units were at only 73 to 77 percent. Its planning figures, used to establish RTU student loads, quickly became obsolete. In August 1966 General McConnell cut major command (except the Pacific Air Forces) pilot strength to 87 percent of authorized manning to supply the war demands of the coming year. He allotted TAC 749 of the pilots returning from Southeast Asia during 1967.[15]

The Wider Effects

[redacted] The Southeast Asia buildup also affected the strategic and defensive forces in the continental United States. Between July and October 1965 Headquarters USAF accelerated reduction of Strategic Air Command (SAC)

units in order to free 3,200 rated officers for the burgeoning airlift force that was flying men and supplies across the Pacific. And in November 1966 General McConnell hastened the deletion of two B-52 squadrons to obtain 300 jet mechanics for the Military Airlift Command (MAC). The war demand for jet pilots continued to be so large that in February 1967 Headquarters USAF informed SAC that, beginning in September, it would have to provide as many as 150 per month. This required SAC's combat crew training school (CCTS) at Castle AFB, Calif., to increase the number of its graduates from 96 to 137 pilots per month. The demand placed a severe strain on the school, which only in January 1967 had raised its training rate from a normal of 64 per month to 96. The first of these pilots, mostly KC-135 crewmen, reached tactical units in January 1968. Meanwhile a JCS study in October 1966 had noted that two fighter interceptor squadrons had to be withdrawn from the Air Defense Command (ADC) to obtain experienced men for the combat theater. The JCS decided that meeting the stated requirements for 1966 and 1967 would have a harmful impact on the services and the unified commands and "entail undue risks," a conclusion that probably had a restraining effect on the buildup.[16]

([redacted]) On 12 November 1965 Secretary McNamara inquired about the effect of a large-scale dispatch of forces to Southeast Asia on U.S. commitments to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Air Force replied that such deployments might result in a lack of active fighter squadrons in the United States. While formal commitments would be met, a promised augmentation of NATO forces would not be possible without recalling fighter squadrons from Southeast Asia and mobilizing units of the Air National

Guard. In October 1966 the JCS informed Secretary McNamara that the withdrawal of qualified pilots from Europe for use in Vietnam had reduced the capacity of the U.S. Air Forces in Europe to a point where that command could barely meet requirements should an invasion of Western Europe take place, and any further withdrawals would worsen an "already critical situation."[17]

(U) Because of the war and the need to reduce the unfavorable balance of payments, Secretary McNamara in the summer of 1966 placed strict ceilings on the number of people in the Department of Defense who were working outside the United States. Any increase had to be obtained through a Program Change Request (PCR), and any change in country ceilings other than those in Southeast Asia required OSD approval. Even in Southeast Asia, there was a subceiling for each country, and all proposals for change had to be minutely detailed. Adjustments in that area were made automatically when the Secretary of Defense approved a new development plan.[18]

[redacted] In the spring of 1966 it was clear to the Air Force that most shortcomings in the mobilization for the Vietnam war lay in the nature of the peacetime establishment and in the failure to plan realistically to fight an insurgency that might and did become a conventional war. In the period before the war, the Air Force designed its assignment policies to provide enough permanence to enable men to plan for their future welfare and that of their families. The Air Force tried to pledge at least 18 months in PCS assignments, intermingle oversea assignments with tours of duty in the United States, distribute equitably the tours in restricted, undeveloped or isolated oversea areas, and insure at least a 60-day notice of a permanent

change of station. As the war accelerated, these desirable goals had to be waived to some degree. All personnel, wherever based, were subject to service in Vietnam and Thailand. Some men served consecutive oversea tours, going directly from Europe to Southeast Asia or the reverse. And, in many cases, they moved with less than a 30-day notice. Because of rigid personnel ceilings overseas when the buildup began, people were frequently on TDY, although an effort was made later to change their status to PCS or to replace them. The Air Force believed that the Department of Defense needed to be able to make quick changes in ceilings to meet contingencies and thereby avoid feverish moves that confused and upset officers and airmen and contributed to the rise in resignations and retirements and the drop in reenlistments.[19]

[redacted] The mobilization also revealed weaknesses in the training establishment. Air Staff planners maintained that more preparations should have been made in peacetime for a rapid and large expansion of training to meet an emergency. If the United States intended to be ready for quick deployment of limited war forces anywhere, as national policy after 1961 envisaged, it had to be willing to pay the costs of an expandable peacetime training establishment. This had not been done. The training of undergraduate, combat crew, and replacement pilots had been restricted by estimates of peacetime needs and by the existing facilities.* The Vietnam experience showed the wisdom of retaining at all times a larger establishment than required for peacetime. Facilities could operate with reduced

* For example, few men besides SAC and TAC combat aircrews had received survival training, and the USAF Survival School had to be greatly expanded to instruct rated officers from non-tactical units who were assigned to combat.

manpower and at a lower tempo, but the Air Staff believed that they should remain largely intact. Although this policy would be costly, it would protect the Air Force's capacity to expand, for if "keeping the line open" was valid for aircraft production it seemed equally valid for training pilots and technicians.[20]

The Reserve Forces

(U) Many of the problems of the Air Reserve Forces--the Air Force Reserve (AFRes) and the Air National Guard (ANG)--had existed long before the Vietnam war. In October 1963 an Air Staff study group on the Reserve Forces outlined their main requirements as: (1) more pilots; (2) greater incentives to attract competent, experienced airmen and good people without previous service; (3) greater support from the Regular establishment and the public; and (4) more drill spaces to permit full manning in peacetime. Despite substantial improvements in the ensuing years, most of these difficulties remained in 1967 and the Air Staff did not expect dramatic changes during the foreseeable future.

(U) Secretary McNamara believed in financing only those parts of the Reserve components that would be comat-effective in an emergency. In May 1964 he requested a description of the contingencies in which Reserve forces might be used, the criteria for determining their size and composition, the identity of each unit with its authorized and actual equipment, their readiness objectives as related to actual readiness, and the average cost of typical units. After reviewing this information, the Secretary

directed deletion of 83 AFRes recovery groups and 203 recovery squadrons* by March 1965, and the number of Ready Reserve people receiving drill pay dropped from 67,269 in June 1964 to 45, 011 in December 1965.[21]

(U) Ready Reserve manpower rose from 250,673 (73,217 in the ANG and 177,456 in the AFRes) in June 1964 to 287,780 (87,758 in the ANG and 204, 020 in the AFRes) in June 1967. During these years the Standby Reserve increased from 129,903 to 144,007. All ANG personnel were organized into units and classified as Ready, while a large share of the AFRes personnel served in the "individual" program and in an emergency theoretically would fill vacancies in active or mobilized Reserve units. In June 1965 the Secretary of Defense ruled that only individuals assigned specific mobilization positions could draw drill pay, and the number receiving this pay went up to about 50,800 in 1967.[22]

(U) The Vietnam conflict had important effects on the Reserve forces. In August 1965 administration leaders decided not to use Reserve units for the initial buildup but to place selected elements in a high state of readiness. They believed that requirements could be met without mobilization of the Reserves and that these units would be more useful as a ready backup for dealings with other crises or for possible future needs in Southeast Asia. The Air Force then made a concerted effort to improve the readiness of AFRes airlift units. Under Project "Beef Broth," 11 of the 19 C-124 groups

* For a description of these units, see George F. Lemmer, The Changing Character of Air Force Manpower, 1958-1959 (AFCHO, 1961) pp 48-53, and USAF Manpower Trends, 1960-1963 (AFCHO, 1965) pp 54-56.

were designated "select units" and authorized 100 percent manning to permit immediate mobilization. By June 1967 the 11 groups were at 98 percent of authorization. The Air Force also achieved comparable results with nine tactical fighter groups, four tactical reconnaissance groups, and one tactical control squadron, all of the ANG.

(U) In its effort to get rid of outmoded aircraft, the Air Force converted eight AFRes C-119 groups to C-124's. In March 1967 General McConnell stated that within the next few years the AFRes and ANG would exchange all C-97's, C-119's, C-121's, and C-123's for C-124's. Then, as the Regular forces acquired more C-141's and eventually C-5A's, the Reserves would replace the C-124's with C-130's.

(U) In July 1966 the AFRes activated six military airlift support squadrons to assist MAC in aircraft maintenance and in traffic, command post, and forward supply management at en route stations--McChord AFB, Wash., Travis AFB, Calif., McGuire AFB, N.J., and Charleston AFB, S.C. To help the Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) prepare for extended limited wars, the Air Force in July also established seven maintenance and seven supply squadrons at Tinker AFB, Okla., Kelly AFB, Tex., McClellan AFB, Calif., Hill AFB, Utah, Robins AFB, Ga., and Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. An airlift support squadron was authorized 16 officers and 149 airmen, and the maintenance and supply squadrons one officer and 38 airmen. At the end of June 1967 these 20 units were manned at from 57 to 59 percent of authorization, and they expected to achieve 71 percent by June 1968 and 90 percent a year later.[23]

(U) While preparing to go on active duty if necessary, the Reserves increased their support of the active forces during the Vietnam war. In 1966 they carried about 9.4 percent of MAC cargo, flying to Alaska, Southeast Asia, Japan, South America, and Europe. In air defense, the ANG assumed about 26 percent of ADC's runway alert duty and also performed radar surveillance and control. In aeromedical evacuation, ANG units airlifted patients within the United States and nearby offshore areas, carrying 6,375 patients and 5,720 other passengers during 1966. AFRes medical units assisted casualty staging units at Travis AFB, Calif., and Andrews AFB, Md. Working under AFLC, 17 ANG squadrons did much of the communication installation and maintenance, including work on vital parts of the NATO network. In May 1967 five ANG refueling groups went to Europe to augment USAFE and they expected to remain through 1969. During 15-day active-duty tours at Travis and Norton AFB's, Calif., Hickam AFB, Hawaii, and Elmendorf AFB, Alaska, 12 AFRes air terminal squadrons provided valuable assistance to MAC. In 1966 ANG tactical fighter, reconnaissance, aerial refueling, and air commando units bore the major USAF burden in the joint air-ground exercises in Hawaii, Alaska, and South America as well as in the continental United States, making these exercises possible.[24]

(U) The Reserves, to a greater extent than the active force, faced shortages of pilots and experienced airmen, since the abundance of civilian jobs discouraged these men from joining the Reserves when they left the active establishment. Pilots posed the most critical problem. Between 1963 and 1967, Air Training Command (ATC) trained from 115 to 187 pilots

annually for the ANG, but Secretary McNamara disallowed any pilot training for AFRes.* Representative John J. Rhodes (Ariz.) criticized the Air Force for training young pilots for the ANG while the active force was using older men in combat. Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown defended the practice, noting that the ANG needed new pilots each year to remain a competent organization, that both the ANG and the AFRes would soon be critically short of young pilots, and that the civil airlines where many pilots took jobs after leaving active duty did not permit the men to join the Reserves. Secretary Brown and General McConnell maintained that the Reserves would constitute a necessary complement of the active force through the 1970's. A RAND study completed in October 1967 agreed that the ANG and AFRes were valuable and economical additions to the general purpose and airlift forces, although not to the strategic offensive forces.[25]

* AFRes scheduled about 6,500 airmen without previous service for training during 1967, with about 60 percent to attend technical training courses for assignment to Reserve units where they would receive on-the-job training for specific jobs. (Hist, Dir/Pers Planning, Jul-Dec 66, pp 142-43)

II. ADJUSTMENTS AND SHORTAGES

(U) When the U.S. war effort suddenly expanded in the summer of 1965, speed of adjustment to the situation was essential. But numerous contradictions and anomalies hampered USAF efforts to shift from the relatively static operations of peace to war. As noted earlier, the shift came at a time when DOD was in the process of closing down many bases, reducing the number of military and civilian personnel, and moving them from one place to another. The preparation for and engagement in war led to a rapid expansion of all military activities, not just those directly associated with combat. When it became necessary to increase manpower, the bureaucratic nature of the huge DOD organization made it almost inevitable that the response would be slower than the need. OSD raised personnel ceilings slowly and piecemeal to keep costs from skyrocketing, and because it had underestimated the magnitude of the effort that would be required. Through October 1965 the Air Force, like the other services, reinforced the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) much faster than it was permitted to expand its manpower base.[1]

[redacted] Training facilities and staffs, geared to peacetime, were too small and sparsely equipped to absorb the load. When the Air Force was permitted to expand, most of the new people that it obtained were inexperienced. They had to be trained quickly, overworking instructors, administrators, and planners, from the smallest unit in the Air Training Command to officials in the Air Staff. The rush, confusion, and overwork undoubtedly were detrimental. The Air Force was also improperly prepared for this kind of war. It had assumed after the Korean War that tactical air forces

would use nuclear weapons in a future war and after 1961, had hesitated in re-adopting the old tactics. Many officers noted that special air warfare forces were weak, conventional tactics had not yet been relearned, conventional munitions were mostly old and scarce, older tactical aircraft were still being replaced by new models, and assault airlift (except for the C-130) were insufficient for the task ahead. Although better prepared for active intervention in the Vietnam war than at the beginning of any previous war, the Air Force still encountered serious difficulties, particularly in view of its commitments elsewhere.[2]

[redacted] By the end of 1965 the Air Force faced the following vital manpower shortages: well-trained fighter and transport pilots; instructors for combat crew and undergraduate pilot training schools; aircraft mechanics, conventional munition handlers and loaders; radio, radar, and photographic specialists; instructors in technical schools; and high-level supervisors to give on-the-job training to recently graduated technicians and other partially skilled airmen. With Southeast Asia getting first priority, these shortages spread throughout the Air Force, adversely affecting units in the United States and Europe.[3]

Adjustments to Wartime

[redacted] The buildup of USAF personnel in Southeast Asia without a declaration of a national emergency or the callup of Reserve Forces necessitated a radical rearrangement of units, men, and functions throughout the Air Force. Since units in the combat area had precedence in manpower, most stateside units and to some extent all units not in Southeast Asia became little more than service organizations. While

additional skilled people to man and support the combat forces was the most urgent requirement, the demands of logistics, airlift, and training caused even greater manpower shortages. Secretary Brown admitted in September 1966 that estimates of the amount of extra work required had been unrealistically low, and he noted that an unexpected upsurge of activity in one command or agency (MAC, for example) caused personnel shortages and skyrocketing costs in others.

(U) Meanwhile, on 10 May 1966, General Gabriel P. Disosway, TAC Commander, told the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, headed by Senator John Stennis (Miss.), that his command was short of both officers and enlisted men. It had less than half the required air liaison officers, only 65 percent of the air operation supervisors, 40 percent of the lieutenant colonels in the transportation field, and insufficient aircraft maintenance and logistic officers. Too few airmen were qualified in engine, radio, navigation, photography, and weapon maintenance and repair. The airmen shortages would be more difficult to overcome than the officer shortages and, in some specialities, could not be eliminated before late 1967.* Between May and November 1966 TAC would have to provide on-the-job training for between 10,000 and 12,000 mechanics.[4]

([redacted]) As it turned out, the problem was more serious than General Disosway had anticipated. During 1966 TAC permanently assigned many of its units to the combat theater and converted most of the remainder to replacement training, but this did not stop the heavy flow of skilled mechanics

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* See pp 47 and 61 for the special difficulties in training and retraining airmen.

and other maintenance men to Southeast Asia. In June an Air Staff inspection team noted that the requirement to provide proficient maintenance people for Southeast Asia had left TAC primarily with recent graduates of technical schools or others with little experience. The remainder of the experienced technicians could not, even by working 12-hour shifts plus overtime, properly supervise training of the new men.*[5]

[redacted] In September 1966 General McConnell approved an increase of about 1,100 in TAC technical maintenance airman strength, bringing the combat crew training schools (CCTS's) and RTU's to 80 percent of authorized manning. In November the USAF Military Personnel Center agreed to provide the CCTS's and RTU's with about 150 more technicians returning from Southeast Asia than authorized. Not until January 1967 were TAC requirements met for weapon mechanics and loaders, and many of these men, fresh from technical schools, could not be fully qualified before the end of the year.[6]

[redacted] TAC difficulties in getting and holding officers for aircrews and supervisory positions arose from the acute overall shortage of F-4 crews, the impossibility of accurately forecasting the number of men that TAC had to train for Southeast Asia, the problem of providing crews

* [redacted] At George AFB, Calif., 79 percent of the maintenance men of the 479th Tactical Fighter Wing were in the lowest (level 3) skill category. Maintenance supervisory competence in the 4410th Combat Crew Training Wing declined to such a degree as to threaten safety. The shortage of qualified maintenance people threatened the effective operation of combat crew training schools and replacement training units, contributing to many accidents and abortive sorties between December 1965 and December 1966. (Hist of TAC, Jul-Dec 66, pp 274-76).

for a widely and rapidly fluctuating number of aircraft, and the need for changes in the content and duration of CCTS and RTU courses. In addition TAC had to provide crews and technicians for operational tests and exercises. When the need for qualified officers in Southeast Asia accelerated during the latter half of 1966, TAC sent 265 pilots and 181 nonflying officers. USAF planners forecast that 9,400 officers (440 a month) would enter the CCTS's and RTU's between October 1966 and June 1968.

[redacted] To alleviate the pilot shortage, interceptor pilots from ADC squadrons were assigned to TAC. These pilots could be trained quickly to operate fighter bombers and, not having served in Southeast Asia, they were available for assignment there. Also helping to relieve the problem was the fact that by the end of 1966, more than 55 percent of TAC's pilots had served in Southeast Asia and were ineligible to return under the one-tour rule. At the Special Air Warfare Center, the number in this category doubled during the second half of 1966. If this trend continued, TAC would obtain a stable, all-veteran pilot force. Only time and events could determine whether this trend would be good for the Air Force or the effective prosecution of the war.[7]

[redacted] Southeast Asia operations also called for a great increase in airlift, resulting in a steep rise in the utilization rate of transports which, in turn, multiplied the need for crew and maintenance personnel. The additional assault airlift helped produce the aforementioned TAC manpower shortages. Since strategic airlift also grew far faster than anticipated, the Military Airlift Command (MAC) experienced similar difficulties. To make more efficient use of both manpower and planes, in August 1965

Secretary McNamara approved an Air Force proposal to increase by July 1966 the daily flying time of MAC C-130E's, C-133's, and C-141's to eight hours, of TAC C-130E's to five, C-130A's and B's to 2.5; and PACAF C-130E's to five, C-130A's and B's to 2.5 and most C-124's to three. In July 1965 the Air Staff had estimated that the expanded airlift would require an additional 18,350 trained people, but as Secretary Brown remarked in September 1966, this estimate proved unrealistically low and the demand continued to grow.

[redacted] The chief immediate source of additional aircrews for multi-engine aircraft was the Strategic Air Command, which, by direction of Headquarters USAF, accelerated the scheduled reduction of flying units and gave MAC badly-needed pilots, navigators, and maintenance technicians. Reallocation and return to flying of pilots on staff duty provided another third of aircrew requirements. Finally, MAC upgraded training for a large number of recent graduates of flying and technical schools and other inexperienced personnel.[8]

[redacted] In the short run, by extraordinary effort, the Air Force managed to send qualified aircrews, supervisors, maintenance men, and replacements to the combat area. But by the spring of 1966 the longer-range implications were causing concern. Air Staff planners feared that the eventual replacement of F-100's and F-105's with two-pilot F-4's and F-111's, plus higher utilization of airlift forces and a greatly increased crew ratio in TAC, would overwhelm the training establishment during the next two or three years.

(U) Because of the manpower shortage, in March 1966 General McConnell stated that TAC could not continue large-scale augmentation of

the combat theater and at the same time provide adequate forces for other contingencies without calling up the Air National Guard. A year later, he said more optimistically that the major problem was the long-range one of providing enough trained crews for sustained conflict. He noted that the scheduled expansion of the combat crew training base, approved by OSD, would eventually relieve combat units of their heavy training load, while fighter wings would receive more people, insuring a higher aircrew ratio and more flying per day per plane. Other relevant information indicated the possibility, however, that there might be no great improvement until mid-1968.[9]

The Pilot Shortage Question

(U) During the week of 10-16 September 1967 the Stennis Subcommittee stated that the Air Force had a pilot shortage of about 4,810 men and that the shortage would continue well into the 1970's. It claimed that the combined deficiency of the services totaled about 12,500, with USAF's Reserve Forces probably in the worst condition of all. OSD denied these allegations, declaring that there were almost 20 percent more pilots than needed and the services could continue to meet Southeast Asian requirements. Moreover, expanded training would increase the total number by about 6,800 before the end of 1969.*[10]

* (U) In some respects the Navy and the Marine Corps had a more serious shortage than the Air Force, and the Army was also short of pilots. Since civil airlines depended heavily on militarily trained pilots and the national economy was growing more dependent on air freight, the shortage was a national problem. In 1960 the Department of Labor had predicted that the airlines would need 14,500 pilots and all civilian needs, 53,000 by 1970, but in 1965 the airlines had 17,100 and a year later there were more than 56,600 civilian pilots. The Air Force and the Labor Department tried to determine the national extent of the shortages, trends in industrial growth relating to aviation, and efficiency in the use of pilots and navigators. A total callup of Reserves might take so many pilots that the airlines would not be able to function effectively.

(U) Actually, the disputants were discussing different subjects and putting different interpretations on a given set of facts. OSD apparently thought in terms of the total number of men trained as pilots. Noting that in January 1966 the Air Force had more than 45,770 pilots, Secretary McNamara might understandably question the existence of a shortage. Senator Stennis and the Air Force, however, had in mind the number of pilots qualified to fly and supervise operations in Southeast Asia, man units committed to other possible emergencies, serve as instructors in flying schools and replacement units, and be available to meet an unexpected contingency. To USAF planners and commanders who had transformed TAC into essentially a training organization, withdrawn pilots from other commands in the United States and Europe, pulled officers from staff jobs and retrained them, and made people in training units work excessively long hours, there could be no doubt about a pilot shortage.[11]

[redacted] As early as the first months of 1964 the Air Staff had been convinced that there was a shortage of 9,500 pilots who were 30 years of age or younger and a surplus of about 12,000 in the 40-year or older bracket.* To redress the balance between the younger pilots and those with World War II experience, the Air Force decided to control closely the assignments of new graduates. Meanwhile, pilot training, hampered before 1961 by a

* (C-Gp 4) Almost half the USAF pilots had been trained during World War II and another large group during the Korean War. (In 1944, 81,000 pilots had graduated; in 1954, 6,000.) Since a large pilot surplus apparently existed, in 1961 the Bureau of the Budget and OSD required the Air Force to move many pilots from active to waivered status and make no further attempts to keep them proficient in flying. In 1963 the Air Force adopted the 45-22 rule whereby most pilots 45 or older with 22 years of rated service were waived from flying. In addition, the training rate for new pilots fell to a low point of about 1,300 in 1962 and 1,430 in 1963.

popular belief that missiles would rapidly replace aircraft and obviate the need for a large number of pilots, was stimulated by the limited-war policies of the Kennedy administration. In the 1960's the Air Force moved toward an eventual annual training rate of 3,400 pilots. Before it reached the figure of 2,760 planned for 1967, SAC and ADC forces began shrinking as B-47's and older interceptors left the inventory. In mid-1965 the Air Force believed that it would have enough pilots for Vietnam because of the current training program and the large number of waivered pilots who could be retrained for combat duty. Although aware by January 1966 of the magnitude of the demands of the war, it still foresaw no long-term change. By June, however, the Air Force was convinced that there would be a shortage of rated officers through 1975 and, at Secretary Brown's request, in November OSD approved a new pilot training rate of 3,247. Nevertheless, in December staff planners were predicting a deficit of at least 3,000 pilots by 1975.[12]

[redacted] At the end of 1966 the Air Force had 3,825 pilots authorized for Southeast Asia, but it actually required over 4,500, while at least another 3,000 were in training or on their way to and from combat zones, making a total of about 7,500. Furthermore, by the end of June 1967, 637 USAF crew members had been killed in action, reported missing, or captured.

[redacted] The Air Force moved about 2,000 pilots from waivered to active status during 1966, and it retained many others who had been scheduled for release. By December about 2,400 active pilots who were 46 or older had returned to the cockpit or to flying positions. More than

3,000 pilots who were older than 45 were still flying, mostly in propeller-driven aircraft. The average age of jet fighter pilots was about 30, but some were 48.[13]

[redacted] At the end of 1966, there were 37,490 active pilots (56 percent of whom were 35 or under) and about 24,000 (64 percent) of them were assigned to aircrew duties. Aircrews and supervision of air operations claimed 86 percent as opposed to less than 80 percent 11 months earlier. About 5,100 or 14 percent served in support functions as compared to 7,310 a year earlier. Of these 5,100, nonflying support duties, such as maintenance and research and development, claimed 3,500. These shifts to flying prevented the Air Force from broadening the experience and knowledge of many captains and majors. Older pilots were also taken from high-level staff jobs that could not ordinarily be filled by younger, inexperienced officers. The transfer of more men from vital support duties, such as maintenance, without obtaining qualified replacements threatened to keep aircraft on the ground. Furthermore, the great demand for men in cockpits badly upset USAF plans for orderly career development, since few rated men could obtain advanced schooling.[14]

[redacted] In January 1967 the Air Staff presented its ideas on developing a rated officer corps that would satisfy requirements through 1975. The forecast was based on historical trends, estimates of future developments, and the assumption that the Vietnam war would be over by 30 June 1968. A pilot was considered not only as a flier but as a full-fledged member of the officer corps who might serve as aircrew member, crew supervisor (wing commander or his staff officer), operations officer, squadron commander, or

official in various headquarters (through the Air Staff) and outside agencies --joint staffs, OSD, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and Federal Aviation Agency. Pilots might also serve in professional schools, perform nonrated staff and support duties, and provide a rotational base for long conflicts. In the past, USAF planners had assumed that recalled ANG units and Air Force Reservists could supply much of this "crew augmentation," but the Vietnam experience convinced them that the Reserves would not be recalled except in a severe crisis.

[redacted] The planners desired an average of 3.5 crews per aircraft, a figure they considered quite reasonable since some airlines had 7 pilots per seat (Eastern Airlines kept 3,000 pilots to man 199 planes). The USAF average for manning units had fallen to 92 percent of authorization by the close of 1966. The major command average stood at only 88.8 percent. SAC had kept a 95-percent rate for primary crews, cutting crew ratios from 1.8 to 1.5, and it expected to achieve 100 percent for primary crews by dropping other crews to 75 percent. TAC's manning had fallen to 78 percent, MAC's to 86. USAFE's combat-ready crews were manned at 89 percent, and only by obtaining men directly from the combat theater after they had served their tours had the USAFE crew ratio remained at one to one. ADC, because its pilots could quickly switch to the aircraft used in Southeast Asia, had dropped to 78 percent. ATC's pilot contingent, composed mainly of overworked instructors, was about 90 percent. PACAF, excluding Southeast Asia, varied from 88 to 96 percent, but F-105 units had only 88. Southeast Asia units were manned at 100 percent of authorization, but by the end of 1966 the crew ratio in some types of aircraft varied from 1.5 to 1.25.[15]

[redacted]

[redacted] In July 1967 Secretary McNamara estimated that the Air Force needed 5,000 to 7,000 fewer pilots than it had claimed. He believed that the Air Force had an adequate supply of pilots, particularly when the recently approved training rates became fully effective in 1969.* (The Air Force maintained that there would still be 9,000 less than it desired.) Mr. McNamara thought USAF requirements for augmentation overstated. He also doubted the need for two pilots in F-4's and F-111's, noting that a replacement of the second pilot by a navigator-observer would reduce the pilot requirement by about 6,400. Secretary Brown's office then suggested cutting the number of pilots from 2 to 1.7, and by the end of 1967 the crew ratio was 70 percent pilot and 30 percent navigator-observer.** The Air Force in June 1967 had tentatively established its pilot requirement at 42,740 for 1970, with a gradual decline to 41,340 in 1973, a total which would remain steady for the foreseeable future. The compromise suggested by the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force reduced these figures to 41,300 and 39,820.

[redacted] Mr. McNamara also acknowledged that the Air Force had to have enough pilots to fly U.S. aircraft in war while, at the same time,

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* See discussion of Training rates on pp 53-56.

** Although some believed that the second pilot of the F-4 and F-111 could safely be replaced by a navigator-observer, the official Air Staff position had specified two pilots. In June 1967, USAF studies revealed a worldwide shortage of navigators. During the coming year, depending on the type of navigator, manning would vary at 79 to 90 percent of the requirement. Less than three years earlier, the Air Force had believed that there was a surplus and had scheduled a reduction in the annual training rate from 1,000 to 800, effective in fiscal year 1967. (Interview, author with Air Staff personnel planners, Aug 1967; Hist, Dir/Pers Planning, Jul-Dec 64, p 118 and TIG Brief, 9 Jun 67, p 18)

[redacted]

insuring that the men had reasonable workloads, adequate opportunities for career development, and no unreasonably long period of separation from their families. To him, the "core" requirements included the pilots who manned the cockpits, supervised and controlled aircraft operations, and conducted training. There also had to be a sizeable surplus to meet wartime "surges," fill gaps caused by attrition, and be available for insurance. But he saw little need for pilots to serve as logistic officers, maintenance specialists, and personnel supervisors. Many nonflying jobs had come to be identified as pilot billets after both World War II and the Korean War, and he said that the Air Force had determined requirements by adding up billets. To Mr. McNamara, this procedure resulted in an overstatement of legitimate requirements.[16]

[redacted] In reply, Secretary Brown supported the Air Staff contention that pilots were leaders of aerial warfare with widely usable knowledge rather than solely aircraft operators. Therefore, some positions in research and development, maintenance, and safety should be reserved for pilots with less than 15 years of service to prepare them for higher management positions. Also, OSD had underestimated the number of pilots needed to meet emergencies and the number that could quickly be withdrawn from supervisory positions in a crisis. During a war the workload everywhere increased, and the withdrawal of experienced supervisors would reduce managerial competence when it was most critical. Furthermore, USAF planners, who had employed accepted manpower engineering techniques during a two-year study to arrive at the estimates, believed their conclusions to be very conservative since they had used peacetime factors plus

an additional number for a three-year nonnuclear contingency.[17]

(S) Aside from these disagreements, the chief different between the premises upon which OSD and the Air Force based their estimates were: (1) OSD did not want to keep pilots proficient in flying after they had accumulated 15 years of rated service, while the Air Force held to its 45-22 rule; (2) OSD supported a 1.25 crew ratio for TAC, the Air Force a 1.5; (3) OSD based its estimates on 23 tactical fighter wings, the Air Force on 24; (4) OSD omitted about 1,500 pilots required for advanced flying schools, according to the Air Force; (5) OSD's estimated supervisor figure was 1,345 under the USAF figure; (6) OSD had not included 1,375 pilots that the Air Force considered essential for supporting functions; and (7) OSD's supplement for a wartime surge was too low from the USAF standpoint.

(S) Mr. McNamara also noted that the Air Force had admitted that the major commands often performed their missions with between 79 and 85 percent of stated requirements. The Air Force replied that this could be done only for short periods and that on 30 June 1967 pilot manning, except in Southeast Asia and the prime crews of SAC, had already fallen to 79 percent and would probably continue to drop. And many pilots, especially in training schools, were working from 70 to 100 hours weekly, a pace that could not be maintained and that would eventually drive many good men out of the service. Secretary Brown wanted to prevent such situations from ever arising again.[18]

(S) Through mid-1967 the Air Staff continued to struggle with the immediate problem of supplying enough pilots to Southeast Asia and preventing manning in the major combat commands from falling below the danger

point. USAF planners wanted to man TAC, MAC, and USAFE at 100 percent of authorization and PACAF at 86.5. By staffing professional schools with colonels, they could release about 255 pilots. Deferral of retirement and resignation of certain Regular officers (colonel and below) for one year would save 540 in fiscal year 1968 and 1,200 each succeeding year. By the end of June the Air Force also decided to put the following "stop-loss" proposals into effect: (1) permit officers to stay on who had reached mandatory retirement after having been twice passed over for promotion; (2) assign as many graduates of undergraduate pilot training as possible to CCTS's and RTU's; (3) assign most of the pilots who had served tours in Southeast Asia to the commands from which they had gone; and (4) cut the length of tours of rated officers serving on headquarters staffs.[19]

[redacted] The Air Staff Board also considered two drastic actions, but they were not put into effect during the summer and fall of 1967. In May 1967 the board began preparing a proposal, obliquely referred to by OSD in September as a "cushion" against an emergency, that would extend the tour in Southeast Asia from 12 to 18 months. It also considered extending the tour of pilots who had completed their allotted 100 missions over North Vietnam in less than a year. Instead of leaving Southeast Asia, as current policy dictated, they would serve as forward air controllers or air liaison officers until the 12 months were over. The board believed that the Air Force could meet Southeast Asia commitments and maintain an adequate training capability through mid-1970 without second combat tours, but after 1970 the picture was cloudy.

[redacted] Findings of an Air Staff Board pilot requirements study in June 1967, appeared to agree to some extent with the OSD position that the pilot shortage resulted largely from bad distribution. There were 3,700 pilots in duties that did not require fliers, and by December 1967 the Air Force planned to reduce the number to 3,400, a figure it considered an absolute minimum. There were also too many pilots--3,600--in advanced training or between assignments.[20]

[redacted]

III. RETENTION

(U) For more than a decade the Air Force had made vigorous efforts to decrease the high loss rate of its military personnel. Each year, with almost monotonous regularity, the Secretaries of the Air Force and the Chiefs of Staff commented on the tremendous cost of training thousands of young officers and airmen and then losing many of them after one tour--usually four years, five for rated men. Each year fewer young officers decided to stay in service after fulfilling their commitments, and fewer first-term airmen reenlisted.[1]

The Pay Incentive

(U) There was some evidence that military pay raises since 1963 and new promotional opportunities after 1966 halted the trend, but this was by no means conclusive. Military pay raises were linked to those for government civilians. The Salary Reform Act, approved 11 October 1962, had provided a two-step (October 1962 and January 1964) pay raise of about 9.6 percent for civilians. On 2 October 1963 Congress approved an average increase of about 14.2 percent in base pay for military personnel. To encourage young officers and enlisted men to remain on active service, this measure offered graduated raises to people with more than two years of service, reaching almost 32 percent for some senior noncommissioned officers. Substantial raises also went to men subject to hostile fire. These civilian and military pay raises, plus an increase in quarters allowances for military personnel adopted in 1962, added about $1.9 billion to the DOD budget during the first full year.[2]

(U) Although these laws went a considerable distance toward correcting inequities between Government and industry salaries, they did not achieve President Kennedy's aim of "comparability." Late in 1963, OSD proposed that military pay rates be adjusted each year to changes in the cost of living. While the Air Force agreed, it did not think OSD took into account the full extent that military pay had fallen behind civilian income and the cost of living before October 1963. To catch up with the rise in the cost of living, the 1964 pay raise, effective 1 September, provided a 2.5 percent raise for officers and airmen with over two years of service and about 8.5 for officers and warrant officers with less than two years. The latter group had received no raise in 1963. Civilians received raises varying from three percent for workers in the lower and intermediate grades to 22.5 percent for a GS-18.[3]

(U) Despite these raises, the Air Force supported further military pay increases. It estimated that about 8,000 families of USAF enlisted men were living on incomes below the poverty level* as defined by the President's Council of Economic Advisors. To supplement incomes, approximately 148,000 airmen (21 percent of the force) had part-time jobs and 133,000 other members of airmen households also worked. According to an Air Force study in February 1965, the income of officers was about 83 percent of that of their civilian counterparts; of enlisted men, about 73 percent. In April 1964 General McConnell had directed that no married men without previous

* The Council of Economic Advisors considered a family of four members with an income of less than $3,300 per year in an urban area or $3,000 in a rural area to be living in poverty.

service be accepted for enlistment because the pay was too low to support a family. This policy stayed in effect until November 1965 when draft deferment of married men was dropped and all services needed more men for the Vietnam war.[4]

(U) In May 1965 the Air Staff endorsed a bill proposed by Representative Mendel Rivers (S.C.) which would raise basic military pay about 10 percent. They believed that the 4.8-percent increase supported by the administration would fall $400 million short of providing equality with civilians and that the military would need a 10.7-percent raise if civilians received a proposed three-percent increase. P.L. 89-132, approved 21 August 1965, was essentially the Rivers bill. It provided the 10-percent increase, raised hostile-fire pay from $55 to $65 a month, increased retired pay, and offered variable reenlistment bonuses of as much as four times the normal ones for men with technical qualifications in greatest demand.*

(U) The 1965 pay act also required the Secretary of Defense to make a comprehensive study of military compensation at least once every four years, with the first report due before the end of 1966. Since civilian employees received an average increase of 3.6 percent, military personnel did not believe that they had achieved parity. In July 1966 P.L. 89-501 and 89-504 increased both military and civilian pay by about 3.2 percent. Another bill passed in December 1967 gave the military a 5.6-percent increase and civilians 4.5 percent, both retroactive to October, and provided for automatic raises on 1 July 1968 and 1 July 1969.[5]

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* (U) Between 1 January 1966 and 30 June 1967, about 12,000 airmen received this bonus, 6,220 in fiscal year 1967. The cost was about $5.1 million per year.

(U) To encourage highly skilled airmen to remain in military service, the Air Force rapidly increased its expenditures for proficiency pay. An original sum of about $2.5 million in 1959 rose to $42.1 million in fiscal year 1967, and OSD approved $49.8 million for the next period. Convinced that proficiency pay kept men who would otherwise leave, in 1964 Headquarters USAF had sought more funds for this purpose. Both the Air Force and OSD wanted to raise people with long service in highly skilled jobs from the first (P-1) to the second (P-2) step, or from $30 to $60 per month, but OSD kept a ceiling on the total sum allotted. In April 1964 OSD agreed to a raise to the second step for about 16,500 airmen in 14 specialities, but the ceiling compelled the removal of proficiency pay from about 9,000 other airmen and a cutback from P-2 to P-1 for about 5,000. To limit adverse effect on morale, the Air Force gave a six-month notice of these changes.

(U) In 1965 the Air Force wanted to spend $97.4 million to place 149,500 in the P-1 group and 50,790 in P-2, but OSD limited the sum to $40.2 million. In October 1966 the Air Force asked for $72.1 million to increase the number of recipients from less than 80,000 to about 180,000 (including an additional 45,000 aircraft and weapon maintenance men), but OSD authorized only $42.1 million, permitting P-1 for 7,000 more men and P-2 for 14,000. While aircraft mechanics did not obtain the pay, weapon mechanics did. Before the new rates went into effect in July 1967, about 48,000 men were getting P-2 pay and 30,000, P-1. Despite the ceilings, the Air Force kept missile electronic specialists at the P-2 level, and all men overseas received the pay even if they did less-skilled work or held positions that would not ordinarily qualify them. Proficiency pay also continued for men, mostly weapon

maintenance technicians and munition handlers, who had been taken off their jobs to teach in technical schools and training centers.[6]

The Promotion Incentive

(U) An upward trend in the grade structure had decidely beneficial effect on the morale of military personnel. Because of Congressional failure to amend or repeal the Officer Grade Limitation Act of 1954, promotion of USAF field grade officers had lagged about a year behind that in the sister Services. Despite OSD and USAF urgings, Congress did not pass the long-pending Bolte bill which would have provided a permanent remedy but adopted annual "relief" measures, thereby making long-range planning for orderly advancement of officers virtually impossible and inhibiting promotions. In June 1965, 256 lieutenant colonels, 482 majors, and 1,096 captains had been selected for promotion but could not be advanced because of the lack of vacancies. P.L. 89-57 in August 1965, another one-year authorization, permitted 1,133 more colonels and 5,458 more lieutenant colonels and a good promotion program through June 1966, but the Air Force still faced the possibility of having to release or demote thousands of field grade officers after July 1966.

(U) The Air Force finally obtained a long-term remedy in September 1966, when President Johnson approved P.L. 89-606. Effective for six years, the law permitted promotion of 7,815 officers to colonel, lowered the time for advancement to lieutenant colonel from 18 to 17 years, to major from 13 to 11 years, and to captain from 4 1/2 to 3 1/2 years, (permitting promotion of 18,964 captains and more than 7,500 first lieutenants). By the end of December, USAF selection boards had chosen 708 new officers

for promotion to colonel, 2,728 to lieutenant colonel, and 11,192 to major. The law permitted a general increase in the officer corps from 130,285 in July 1966 to 137,822 by the end of June 1968. Although the law permitted long-range promotion planning, the Air Staff was disappointed by the six-year limitation since it had hoped for permanent authorizations. Under Secretary Paul estimated that the new legislation would increase USAF manpower costs by $10 million in fiscal year 1967.[7]

(U) Airmen promotions were largely a result of the Vietnam buildup. In July 1964 the Air Force had wanted to advance 85 percent of its airmen, or 421,842, to the top six grades--E-4 through E-9, or sergeant (then airman first class) through chief master sergeant. This change would also have increased by more than 8,300 the number in the top four grades (technical sergeant and above). OSD first authorized 414,000 by July 1966 and then, responding to an Air Force request, raised the figure to 418,000 and allowed 12,000 promotions. However, it denied another USAF proposal to advance 62.3 percent of the 690,820 airmen to the upper six grades by 30 June 1966.

(U) In dramatic changes after September 1965, OSD first approved placing 437,827 of a total airman strength of almost 756,600 in the top six grades by July 1966. The Air Force made about 173,000 promotions in these grades, of whom 87,200 were noncommissioned officers, the largest number promoted in one year since the end of the Korean War. Because of the buildup, the Secretary of Defense again lifted the top-six grade ceiling during the latter half of 1966 to 469,234 by July 1967, permitting promotion by this date of every airman who had entered service at the beginning of the buildup. At about this time Secretary McNamara also agreed to another

increase within a year to 481,200, bringing the percentage of enlisted personnel in the upper six grades to 64.5 percent, as compared to the Air Force objective of 71 percent.[8]

(U) Starting in March 1965, the Air Staff placed more emphasis on quality in justifying airman promotions and less on seniority, although the latter had been suggested by ATC Commander, Lt. Gen. William W. Momyer, and others. Headquarters USAF believed that men with 20 or more years of service who lacked the qualifications for further promotions were blocking the advancement of abler men with less service. General Hunter Harris, Jr., Commander-in-Chief, PACAF wanted to give more consideration to service in Vietnam, but the Air Staff held that the waiver of skill requirements was a sufficient concession to these men.[9]

Officers

([redacted] Traditionally, young pilots who had successfully served a tour of duty had tended to stay in the Air Force for a military career, but after 1965 the trend turned abruptly downward. The percentage of pilots with less than 14 years of service who left of their own volition increased from 3.5 in fiscal year 1965 to 4.8 for the next period and then to 6.8 during the last six months of calendar year 1966. In the past, 70 percent of the pilots were still in the Air Force after seven years of service, but by the end of 1966, only 60 percent were remaining. In May 1966, General Disosway stated that TAC alone had recently lost 26 to 27 pilots a month. For a longer term, however, in 1965, 241 TAC officers asked for release and in 1966, 239. Enough pilots to man 10 squadrons had left the service. TAC estimated that the cost of training each man was about $225,000.

[redacted] The Air Force could fill immediate needs by pulling older men from nonrated jobs, but most of these men would retire in a few years. If younger pilots also left at their first opportunity, the long-term effect might be critical by 1972 or 1973, since the losses could cancel out much of the increased training effort. In addition, the Air Force counted on younger officers to replace their older colleagues in responsible staff positions.[10]

(U) USAF planners had little specific information on the reasons why younger officers, especially pilots, were leaving the service. The planners cited the constant movements, too much temporary and alert duty, poor promotion opportunities, and especially better prospects for advancement in civilian life.* When men compared five more years of long hours of hard work, danger, and uncertainty with civilian prospects, it was reasonable to assume that many could not resist the latter's appeals, especially for airline work. In 1963 and 1964, only about five percent of the pilots requesting release said they were attracted by opportunities with airlines but by June 1966, 60 percent were interested and, before the end of the year, 80 percent. In May 1966 General Disosway said that the airlines were "proselytizing among USAF pilots rather vigorously." The Air Force did not know how many actually accepted employment.[11]

* (U) In March 1967, General McConnell denied that pilots in Southeast Asia wanted to leave the Air Force because their morale had suffered since they could not strike certain lucrative targets in North Vietnam. A month earlier, he had listened to the suggestions and gripes of at least half of them, and none had suggested this type of unhappiness. He said they all recognized that they were fighting the war under certain restrictions and were willing to do the job. Some congressmen had apparently received letters from officers suggesting a contrary view. (See Hearings before Subcommittee on Appropriations, 90th Cong, 1st Sess, DOD Appropriations for 1968, Part 2, pp 808-809)

[redacted]

(U) The airlines offered far greater compensation than the Air Force could. Airline copilots not only received more pay than USAF pilots with far greater experience, but also substantially the same fringe benefits, such as leave, travel expenses, moving expenses, and hospitalization. In addition, an airline pilot's retirement pay exceeded that of the military pilot by about the same amount as his salary did military pay. A 1964 investigation indicated that an airline jet pilot could retire with a monthly income at least equal to that of a brigadier general on flying status. While a USAF pilot received a low salary during his first year with an airline, it rose rapidly thereafter.

(U) The dangers facing the military pilot were undoubtedly a significant factor. The USAF pilot mortality rate nearly doubled that of any civilian occupation, although other USAF duty hazards were relatively negligible. During the peacetime years of 1957-1961, one of every 10 new pilots replaced a man who had been killed or seriously injured. And by June 1967 about 635 fliers had been killed, captured, or missing during the Vietnam war.[12]

(U) To keep pilots, the Chief of Staff considered a suggestion in April 1967 that those with more than five but less than 20 years of service be offered a "continuation incentive," of a stipulated amount--$3,600 was suggested--for each year they remained on active duty beyond the five-year commitment. The money would be held in escrow and paid when they left the service, provided they did not stay the 20 years necessary for full retirement benefits. There was also thought given to making the money free of income tax. If approved by the Air Force Council and OSD, the Air Staff would submit a legislative proposal to Congress.

General McConnell also directed a study of the possibility of basing flight pay on risk and responsibility, or a combination of these and other factors, in order to assess the effectiveness of additional incentive pay.[13]

(U) The departure of highly skilled nonrated officers was in some cases equally damaging. For example, in TAC during 1965, 135 such officers asked for release; in 1966, 108. In May 1966 General Disosway noted that his command received 15 to 20 requests each month. Many of these officers had five to 15 years of service and were sorely needed in support positions, especially to replace pilots who were vacating staff jobs to return to flying. In the case of electrical engineers and scientists, the Air Force was managing to keep only seven and 18 percent, respectively, past their five-year obligated tour.[14]

(U) By 1966 some planners began to doubt that the familiar explanations for the losses, most of which the Air Force could do little about, were wholly adequate. Some officials wondered whether there was something wrong with the "military image" that made it difficult to keep the men in service. Secretary Brown believed that the Air Force had to find better ways to choose people, insure efficient use of their talents, and provide for their rapid advancement. Talented officers had to be identified quickly, given proper training, and permitted to use that training. In May 1965 and again in July 1966, General McConnell and Lt. Gen. William S. Stone, Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, warned that each individual needed a worthwhile job, adequate responsibility and proper recognition.[15]

(U) In November 1966 a "New View" study*, published by the Directorate of Studies and Analysis in Headquarters USAF, seemed to confirm the ineffective use of young officers and to blame internal policies and practices in part for the high losses. The young officers who were interviewed looked beyond monetary or material gains for satisfaction in their careers. If satisfied with their jobs, they were usually well-adjusted, productive, and favorably inclined toward a USAF career. If dissatisfied, the opposite was true. Rated officers were motivated primarily by love of flying, especially in tactical aircraft, and they objected to long assignments as copilots in SAC and MAC. They disliked too much temporary duty and standing alert, poor duty assignments, and bad administrative planning of their careers. Most young officers wanted a regular commission to stay on as career men. They believed that a Reservist could expect to receive less consideration in almost every respect than a Regular.[16]

(U) Active duty itself apparently unfavorably influenced the attitude of the junior officer toward an Air Force career. When the young officers had started on active duty, 50.1 percent indicated an interest in a USAF career, 34.6 percent were undecided, and 15.3 percent were uninterested. When interviewed in 1966, only 41.9 percent were still interested, 31.5 percent undecided, and 26.6 percent were not interested. The number not interested

* (U) Two-hour interviews were conducted with 428 officers on 62 bases in 12 commands. The men had more than two but less than five years of service and were ostensibly a representative sample of 15, 775 in their age and length-of-service group. The study attempted to identify the factors that motivated them toward or away from an Air Force career. All interviewees were well-educated with bachelor degrees or higher and had high potential for growth.

had risen by 74 percent and, ironically, the greatest shift away from a career occurred among fliers--from 65 to 36.6 percent--particularly in MAC, TAC, and USAFE. They gave as their reasons for leaving the military service: (1) too much temporary duty, (2) poor scheduling of crews and missions, (3) lack of control over their careers and (4) the opportunity for better-paying jobs, especially with the airlines.*

(U) In describing their dissatisfaction, the young officers mentioned (1) unreasonable policies and poor administration, (2) incompetent supervisors who lacked integrity and were indifferent to the welfare of their subordinates, and (3) dull and unimportant work. Three commands (TAC, SAC, and MAC) were cited as the greatest offenders. The young officers disliked immensely dull, routine jobs which, they said, did not require handling by college-educated officers. Advancement was very important, but they indicated that this meant progression from less to more responsible work and not necessarily promotion in rank or salary. They believed that performance was not a major factor in promotions. They commented on pay in terms of their ability to provide for their families, but it did not appear to be an important factor in job satisfaction.[17]

(U) The Air Force stressed service to country (patriotism) and individual security in its officer training schools. It emphasized the "whole man" or "generalist" concept and identified the profession of its leaders as "USAF officer." But these young officers had the same educational background as

* (U) Contrary to a common assumption, there was no significant difference in ability, as measured by effectiveness reports and college educational achievements, between those officers who intended to remain in the Air Force and those who did not.

members of the prevalent civilian professions and occupations, and 58.4 percent thought of themselves as engineers, scientists, aviators, teachers, etc. If they did not accept the concept of "USAF officer" as primary, they could not be solidly "career-minded."

(U) The New View study concluded that the Air Force would have to provide younger officers more opportunity for growth and achievement in order to hold them. They needed challenging, important work, responsibility, recognition, and advancement directly related to achievement. The Air Force needed to discard many policies, supervisory practices, and working conditions that the officers found frustrating or considered unfair. Any profession contained its share of frustrations and disappointment, but it seemed that the Air Force could avoid much of the disillusionment that followed a few years of active duty by refraining from overselling itself in order to combat the idea that private industry contained "green pastures." Young officers could have been better prepared for unavoidable routine work if they had not been led to believe that every assignment would be interesting and challenging.[18]

Airmen

(U) The inability to retain airmen created almost as many serious difficulties as the failure to hold officers. In May 1966 General Disosway stated that TAC had a greater shortage of airmen technicians than of pilots and that it would last longer. Like the officers, a large number of highly trained and experienced airmen were reaching retirement age. During the first six months of 1967, 8,525 USAF airmen with more than 20 years of service retired, or more than 60.7 percent of the number who had retired

during the entire previous year and 2,725 more than during the corresponding period of 1966. The outlook for the next two years was that retirements would increase by more than 3,000 per year.

(U) Because of a decline in volunteering, airmen strength had fallen by June 1965 to about 6,500 below OSD authorizations. By intensifying recruiting, the Air Force doubled enlistments in fiscal year 1966, inducting 165,700 airmen, 159,580 without previous service. During the following year, it recruited 116,370, 110,000 without prior service. But this large increase did not furnish the trained, experienced people that were in such short supply. Most disappointing of all, only a small proportion of the airmen reenlisted for a second or subsequent tour. Aside from damaging operational capability during a crisis, this situation required a large, expensive, and continuous training establishment to replace the experienced men who had departed.[19]

(U) As noted earlier, the Air Force tried to stem the loss of skilled technicians by pay and promotion incentives, but none of the attempts proved effective. The reenlistment rate of first-term airmen, the best index of retention, slid steadily from a relatively encouraging 35 percent in fiscal year 1963 to 21 percent in 1966 and then still lower to 16.8 percent in fiscal year 1967. The usual explanation of this exodus, an unfavorable comparison between the lot of airmen and the life they might lead as civilians, seemed plausible, since the drop in reenlistment accompanied a rise in the demand for technicians in industry (almost every airman received technical training). In addition to complaints about scarcity of promotions and poor pay, airmen pointed to the unsettled and uncertain life in military service, long

separations from families, and the desire to get more education by taking advantage of the "G.I. Bill of Right."*[20]

(U) As the need to hold skilled men became more critical, the Air Staff and the Office of the Secretary redoubled efforts to make an airman's career more satisfying. The Air Force did more testing and retraining to insure that people had jobs suited to their talents and desires. The airman also received more upgrade training and retraining earlier in his tour so that he could qualify for promotion and proficiency pay at an earlier date. Secretary Brown believed that the New View finding that officers were motivated by a sense of achievement applied to airmen also.

(U) During 1964-1967 several thousand high-grade noncommissioned officers advanced into positions traditionally held by commissioned officers, freeing officers for jobs requiring more education and different kinds of experience. The Air Force expanded its efforts to guide talented airmen toward the more responsible and satisfying jobs. It also began to explain the advantages of a USAF career to men earlier in their tours and attempted to provide more suitable administrators to advise airmen and make them feel that the Air Force was sincerely interested in their welfare.[21]

* (U) An August 1967 RAND study concluded that if the Air Force increased the pay for electronic technicians by $1,000 per year, their reenlistment rate would rise about 20 percent. About 67 percent of those who left used their Air Force training in civilian jobs and earned about $6,000 per year as median incomes, or $800 more than those who took jobs but did not use their USAF training and experience. Approximately 16 percent of those who left returned to school. Taking into account pay, allowances, retirement, tax rate, etc., airmen who reenlisted and reached grade E-5 earned about as much as those who obtained employment in industry. (John McCall and Neil Wallace, Training and Retention of Air Force Airmen: An Economic Analysis, RM-5384-PR, Aug 1967, pp v-vi, 27-29)

(U) In its "program for people," USAF planners attempted to improve living and working conditions, expand educational opportunities, refine the promotion system to insure equality of opportunity, and make airmen better informed about the service and, consequently, take greater pride in their work. In early 1967 the Air Staff established procedures whereby airmen could appeal unfavorable performance ratings directly to Headquarters USAF. It also created an NCO advisory council at each level of command to serve as a sounding board for airmen. Although the situation seemed critical by June 1967, only time would determine how these measures would affect the retention of experienced technicians and how much attention commanders could devote to this matter in the midst of a war.[22]

Military Housing

(U) Inadequate housing had an indeterminate, though probably large, impact on the degree of discontent among military personnel. During 1964 and 1965, they complained to congressmen and other officials on this subject more than any other. Since about 85 percent of USAF officers and 55 percent of the enlisted men were married, the availability of family housing at reasonable cost was obviously extremely important. The situation worsened after 1965 when Secretary McNamara, to restrict costs not vital to the prosecution of the war, deferred construction of the housing authorized for fiscal year 1966 and refused to request any housing in the 1967 budget. The Air Force estimated that there was a requirement for about 10,000 new housing units per year as a minimum but was able to get only about 3,000. Furthermore, it did not even program housing for airmen below

the rank of E-4 (sergeant) or those who had less than four years of service.*[23]

(U) The Air Force believed that its housing shortage was growing progressively more serious, that OSD consistently minimized the deficit and exaggerated the amount of money airmen could afford to pay for housing, and that consequently OSD overestimated the availability of housing for enlisted men. In February 1964 Secretary Zuckert asked the Secretary of Defense to recognize the need for more units at a faster pace, but the request apparently had little effect. And the base closings of 1965 deprived the Air Force of about 23,000 units it formerly possessed. By June 1965 the Air Force had devised and OSD had tentatively approved a variable allowance which would reimburse military people for excessive housing expenses in high-cost areas of the United States. USAF planners hoped that this allowance would permit its personnel to rent or buy housing on the local market, and reduce military housing construction requirements. The proposal, however, because of the likely cost, did not reach Congress. Before the end of 1966 Secretary McNamara released some fiscal year 1966 funds for critically needed housing projects. He also approved a fiscal year 1968 program that, together with the remainder of the funds still to be released, would provide about 7,870 units. To the Air Force, this was a significant if minor step in the right direction.[24]

* (U) Men of lower rank or years of service could obtain Government housing if their bases had a surplus, but this was usually not the case. (Intvw, Lemmer with Col. Joseph R. Cafarella, AFPDP, 19 Feb 68)

[redacted]

(U) On 13 March 1967 Secretary Brown and General McConnell presented a strong case to Congress for more and better base facilities as well as family housing. They insisted that the condition of the buildings in which people lived and worked profoundly influenced their effectiveness, their attitude toward their employer, and the USAF ability to hold them in military service. The indefinite use of World War II dormitories, dining halls, offices, shops, chapels, and gymnasiums was both unfair and uneconomical. The large and expensive construction program of the past had been designed to satisfy new or expanded requirements, but little had been done to replace or rehabilitate older facilities, and their modernization was long overdue. Concerning family housing, the Air Force needed new units for 68,000 eligible families, but this figure did not include the thousands ineligible because of low rank and short service whom the Air Force was anxious to retain.[25]

[redacted]

IV. TRAINING

(U) Many USAF training difficulties after 1964 could be attributed to the conflict in Southeast Asia. The short tour of duty in the combat theater and the heavy turnover of qualified technicians who had to be replaced there with raw recruits, plus the great expansion of most USAF activities placed an excessively heavy burden on the Air Training Command (ATC) and caused a near breakdown in some of its functions. The heavy emphasis on tactical operations, special air warfare, and related applications of airpower required a great deal of training in the types of aircraft, weapons, and procedures that the Air Force had largely neglected during the previous decade.

[redacted] The USAF response to the emergency indicated that the Air Force had not been able to expand its training system with sufficient rapidity because of too much emphasis on economy in peacetime plus an inadequate appreciation of the manifold demands of a limited war conducted 10,000 miles away. Some of the lack of training capacity could be attributed to OSD disapproval of USAF plans for undergraduate pilot training and basic technical instruction and for more facilities. Since the Air Force quickly expanded all phases of training without enough facilities and instructors, many undesirable innovations resulted: (1) a six-day work-week; (2) three and four-shift, round-the-clock operation in many technical schools, CCTS's, and RTU's; (3) cuts in basic military training from 30 to 24 days; (4) reduction in airman housing space below established health standards; and (5) a hurried buildup of the Amarillo Technical Training Center

(scheduled to close by 30 June 1968) to accommodate overflow students from Lackland AFB, Tex., and others taking jet aircraft mechanics courses. Not until the first half of 1967 did these "crash" operations in basic military and technical schools return to normal. The CCT's, RTU's, and advanced technical courses continued to function at an unusually high tempo.[1]

Flying Training

(U) As early as October 1963 Secretary McNamara had approved a gradual increase in the undergraduate pilot training rate to 2,760 per year. But training increased slowly, despite the war. The output of new pilots totaled 2,018 in fiscal year 1964, 2,373 in 1965, 2,321 (a drop of 52) in 1966, and 2,996 in 1967. For the active Air Force, however, these figures included only 1,675 in 1964, 1,992 in 1965, 1,967 in 1966, and 2,702 in 1967. The remainder were for the Air National Guard and countries in the Military Assistance Program (MAP). Undergraduate navigator training declined during the period--from 1,052 in 1964 (984 for the Air Force) to 895 (782 for the Air Force) in 1967. In addition, many fliers received navigator-bombardier and electronic warfare training each year. Of the pilots, all received jet training except those who would fly helicopters and some MAP students.

(U) To train more men without adding new bases, the Air Force in July 1965 shortened the undergraduate pilot course. A civilian contractor now provided 30 hours of light plane (T-41) flying, while the Air Force gave 90 hours instead of the previous 132 in the T-37 and 120 in place of 130 hours in the supersonic T-38. (The T-38 replaced the subsonic T-33--a training version of the old F-80--which graduated its last USAF pilot in

February 1967.) In October 1965 the Air Force also adopted an undergraduate navigator course that was five weeks shorter than its predecessor, and it streamlined the navigator-bombardier and electronic warfare officer courses.*

(U) To some degree these economy measures were practicable because improved teaching devices simplified training and saved time. The Air Force increased its use of flight simulators to train pilots and navigators. (It applied devices also to teach operation and maintenance of missiles, electronic countermeasures, radiological survey, and simulation of space travel.) As part of the "instruments first" method, flight simulators gave beginning students practical knowledge and familiarity with high-speed training planes before they actually began to fly them. The greater use of simulators, plus the greater-than-expected savings of time and money in operating the T-38, probably induced the Air Force to cut procurement of this plane too drastically in 1965, and plans to increase flying training were hampered in 1966 and 1967 by a shortage of aircraft as well as instructors.[2]

(U) In June 1966 the Air Force proposed an increase in the annual pilot training rate to 3,868--3,360 for the active USAF, 299 for the ANG, 70 for the AFRes, and 139 for the MAP. In November, Secretary McNamara cut the total by nearly 400, approving 3,481--3,247 for the USAF, 145 for the ANG, none for the AFRes, and 89 for MAP. The Air

* (U) Largely because of the lack of modern training planes, navigator training became progressively outmoded. (See Report of Support Panel Meeting 68-9, 5 Apr 68, w/1 atch, "Undergraduate Navigator Training" in AFCHO files)

Force then calculated that it could graduate 3,067 pilots for the USAF by the end of June 1968 and the full rate of 3,247 a year later. Concurrently, the Secretary of Defense approved a flying training school at Randolph AFB, Tex. ATC opened a ninth pilot training center at this historic "West Point of the Air" in March 1967, and training got under way in the summer. Even a busy base like Randolph could now be used for this purpose because so many aircraft had been deployed to Southeast Asia and techniques had improved for regulating aircraft flights in the vicinity. The use of Randolph for flying training required the movement of two instructor schools to Tyndall AFB, Fla., and Perrin AFB, Tex., and MAP T-28 training to Keesler AFB, Miss.

(U) In late June 1967, Secretary McNamara asked the Air Force to train 50 pilots for the Marine Corps by fiscal year 1969 and 175 per year thereafter. This additional demand would push the undergraduate pilot training capacity almost to its limit through June 1969, for it would require about 350 additional instructors, all available facilities, and an undetermined number of new planes. Many extra instructors could be obtained from among pilots returning from Southeast Asia, but facilities and training aircraft could not be expanded farther until after June 1969. In March 1967 General McConnell told Congress that USAF pilot training needs were covered through fiscal year 1969 but requirements beyond that date could not be foreseen.[3]

(U) Other requirements added to the training burden. In September 1965 the United States agreed to train 170 West German pilots annually, hopefully reaching this rate by the end of June 1968. The Air Force planned

to reach 112 per year by June 1967, but the first class of 22 did not graduate until September. Although the Germans agreed to pay most of the expenses, including the purchase of T-37 and T-38 planes, this effort was a strain on available instructors and aircraft.

(U) About June 1966 the United States agreed to equip the South Vietnamese Air Force with A-37's (an attack version of the T-37 trainer). In December Secretary McNamara directed the Air Force to conduct a combat evaluation of the plane. A squadron with 25 aircraft trained at England AFB, La., from April to July 1967, went to Vietnam in August, and completed the evaluation on 30 November. This project required 40 officers and 225 airmen.

(U) In January 1966 ATC started preparing a 10-week course for FB-111 crewmen in navigation, bombing, and electronic warfare. This course would precede their attendance at SAC's CCTS. ATC also planned a less comprehensive course, mainly emphasizing radar techniques, for Australian pilots who expected to fly the F-111.

[redacted] In November 1966 TAC asked ATC to prepare specialized training for F-4 pilots assigned to the important "Wild Weasel" project, which was designed to counter and destroy surface-to-air missiles and other radar-guided antiaircraft weapons in North Vietnam. This project also included developing training equipment as well as instructing aircrews in antiradar techniques and the use of Shrike missiles. Both commands cooperated in developing the curriculum. In December ATC proposed that this training be integrated with F-4 combat training at Nellis AFB, Nev., and that a detachment be established at that base for the specialized

instruction. TAC and Headquarters USAF agreed to begin the course in October 1967 at Nellis, not in March as had been though possible, and expected it to be completed by October 1968.[4]

[redacted] Manning TAC CCTS's and RTU's posed a major problem for the Air Force after mid-1966. The CCTS's taught the use of a particular aircraft as a military weapon to recent graduates of undergraduate schools and to older pilots returning to cockpits from staff jobs. The RTU's trained replacements for the fliers returning from Southeast Asia. The magnitude of these tasks could be appreciated by noting the large variety of tactical aircraft used in the war. The CCTS's of MAC and SAC also had a difficult job because of the great increase in airlift and aerial refueling and the steady rise in the tempo of B-52 operations.[5]

[redacted] Since the importance of their mission ranked second only to that of units in the combat theater, the CCTS's and RTU's had to be reasonably well manned. But frequently, on short notice, TAC had to remove instructors from aircrew training and send them to Southeast Asia. During the first half of fiscal year 1966 TAC lost about 64 percent of its instructor pilots at a time when its CCTS's needed about 50 percent more of them. As combat sorties increased, pilots completed their tours in Southeast Asia more quickly and replacements had to be sent from the United States. The situation became so critical that in October 1965 General McConnell authorized TAC to gradually transfer 13 fighter squadrons, three C-130 airlift squadrons, nine RB-66 reconnaissance aircraft, and 12 F-102's to crew replacement training. Demand in the combat theater remained high, and near the end of 1966 TAC converted three squadrons of its last

"operational" F-4 wing to replacement training. Some of the men were soon ready for deployment to Southeast Asia, and the remainder established an RTU designed to turn out 170 combat-ready pilots by July 1967. Although General McConnell promised enough people by January 1967 to keep its CCTS's and RTU's at 80 percent of authorized strength, TAC feared that so much was being devoted to replacement training that few units could regain combat readiness quickly if a new emergency arose.[6]

(U) In April 1966 the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force agreed that the Army would transfer all CV-2 aircraft to the Air Force, effective 1 January 1967. The Air Force then set up a training program to obtain crews and maintenance men for the six squadrons in Vietnam. Training started in April at Fort Benning, Ga.; by May, all USAF instructor crews were in training; and by June, the first replacement crews for Southeast Asia had entered the course. Although the Army gave the early instruction, the Air Force soon began CV-2 (called C-7A by the Air Force) combat training at Sewart AFB, Tenn., in conjunction with the C-130 course.[7]

[redacted] The demand for combat-ready pilots was so great that the CCTS's and RTU's often had to accept fewer recently graduated pilots in favor of experienced men who could qualify in a hurry. While this increased the number of ready crews, it was a temporary expedient. As the demand for forward air controllers, air liaison officers, and tactical aircrews grew, many combat squadrons were converted into RTU's and located wherever available airspace would permit more training.

[redacted] These measures stripped TAC's combat units of a large portion of their trained people. In July 1966 the Air Staff believed that the

only real solution was to expand CCTS's and RTU's so that they could provide virtually all replacements. The policy that no pilot should serve a second combat tour until all had served one added immensely to the training load. F-4 pilots returning from combat manned the F-4D RTU's which had to be expanded, but the Air Staff thought that this would barely provide enough qualified pilots for squadrons already in Southeast Asia. Men for new F-4 squadrons would have to be obtained when the training base was further expanded, possibly in early 1968.[8]

(U) The Air Staff concentrated on the long-term problem of expanding the combat crew training base. General McConnell noted that the shortage of tactical fighter pilots resulted from the lack of a wartime training base when the Vietnam war started and that the accelerating demand for pilots for both Southeast Asia and for training units came at the same time. Secretary Brown pointed out that the effort to avoid sending pilots to Vietnam for a second tour contributed substantially to the difficulty. Both men hoped to increase greatly the number of people in, and almost double the aircraft for, combat crew training units, but they doubted that these units could be fully manned until June 1968.

(U) By June 1967 there was sharp congressional criticism of the Defense Department's management of rated personnel. Representative Glenard P. Lipscomb (Calif.) and Representative John J. Rhodes (Ariz.) blamed what they considered a serious pilot shortage on the Secretary of Defense's earlier disapproval of USAF plans to expand the training base. Less than a decade before, congressmen had been just as critical of the Air Force for retaining a surplus of pilots and spending large sums of money to keep them proficient in flying.[9]

Technical Training

(U) A dramatic rise took place in the number of airmen graduating from technical schools--from 116,965 in fiscal year 1964 to 157,350 in fiscal year 1967. In addition, during the latter year about 13,600 officers completed technical courses. However, between July 1964 and June 1965 the number of graduations dropped by more than 13,000 partially because OSD believed that it would be uneconomical to give formal schooling to so many airmen who would soon leave the service and that it would be more practicable to give them on-the-job training in the techniques and equipment used in their specific assignments. Fiscal year 1966 saw the impact of the Vietnam war and graduations increased by 41,180, nearly tripling the increase of any year of this period and placing the greatest strain on facilities and personnel in nearly 15 years. The growth during fiscal year 1967 was 12,350. On-the-job training proved a large and difficult task also, for most of the graduates had little more than apprentice-level skills and were far from ready to assume the intricate tasks demanded of them in a combat unit.[10]

(U) In July 1965 the Air Staff laid out plans for a two-year expansion of technical training to meet wartime demands. Subsequently, the Secretaries of Defense and Air Force decided to telescope it into one year. The increase required the recruiting of about 127,600 men without previous service, the largest number since fiscal year 1955, when 158,180 had been recruited. As it turned out, the Air Force inducted 159,580 recruits in fiscal year 1966, and the new people overloaded the induction and basic military training (BMT) center at Lackland, and, later, almost all of the

technical training centers. ATC hesitated at accepting so many men for it feared that by fall of 1965 Lackland might have as many as 24,000 men and the base could only accommodate 17,700 without danger to health--perhaps 20,000 in summer.[11]

(U) The crisis did not develop as rapidly as feared, but by January 1966 it was clear that another training base would be necessary before July. The only practicable choice seemed to be Amarillo which had been marked by OSD for closure, and in March General McConnell and then OSD approved the use of this base provided that the closure would not be delayed beyond June 1968. An outbreak of spinal meningitis among recruits at Lackland in February undoubtedly hastened the decision. Despite the addition of Amarillo as a technical training center and as an overflow station for inductees, the Air Force had to cut BMT from 30 to 24 days, place all basic technical training on a six-day week, and go to three or four-shift operation of many courses. Lackland, home of the main induction center, BMT, and the Officer Training School (OTS), had to house men in substandard quarters, and at times housing space fell far below the 72 square feet per man considered necessary to preserve health. An OTS expansion for fiscal year 1967 further complicated the housing problem. Finally, in October 1966 OSD released funds to build 1,040 housing units at Lackland and directed the Air Force to use 2,540 substandard units at that base. These measures increased the space per student to at least 55 square feet, the amount permitted in emergencies and during the summer.[12]

(U) To support Southeast Asia operations, ATC hastily expanded or modified several technical courses. The course for munition specialists

could not provide the large number of the "5 skill level" men required for Vietnam, and men with related specialties were trained in a special six-week course instead of the normal 12. Weapon mechanics were in such great demand that they were given courses in three shifts, six days a week, and then assigned to stateside units which in turn sent their experienced men to the combat theater. For a time, weapon mechanics in F-100, F-105, and B-57 units had to take four weeks of special training en route to the theater. And munition officers with only limited experience in conventional weapons received a four-week refresher course at Lowry Technical Training Center, Colo., before deployment. By October 1965 demand for conventional weapon mechanics was so great that ATC stopped dual (i.e., conventional and nuclear) instruction for men going to Southeast Asia. When several commands objected, the course was changed again to include dual training during the first seven weeks and specialized training thereafter. Technicians for SAC and ADC were fully instructed on nuclear weapons.[13]

(U) Before the end of 1965, Southeast Asia combat requirements deprived TAC units of so many experienced technicians that their combat capability was seriously weakened. In addition, the experienced specialists and supervisors spent so much time instructing less qualified men that they had to neglect their primary duties. On-the-job training in lieu of school training, as envisaged by OSD, did not work as planned.

(U) When in October 1965 the shortage of maintenance technicians in F-105 and F-4 units became acute, Headquarters USAF directed ATC and TAC to set up a coordinated training program. By December ATC field training detachments were operating jointly with TAC to provide enough

replacement technicians for the fighter units in Southeast Asia. Since even operational units were often short of equipment, ATC schools and detachments had difficulty obtaining up-to-date equipment of certain types with which to instruct technicians. For example, in October 1965 ATC wanted a C-130 for training purposes, pointing out that if its schools could not give instruction on late-model planes, TAC would have to do it later. And TAC could not train a large number of C-130 mechanics for Southeast Asia in addition to those for its own units. Nevertheless, Headquarters USAF ruled that no C-130's were available for ATC.[14]

(U) During this entire period, 1964-1967, a significant portion of USAF technical training was devoted to retraining and "upgrade" training, primarily on the job. Retraining consisted of instructing airmen in new skills, upgrade training in work at a higher skill level. During fiscal year 1965, 10,370 airmen completed their retraining and 13,870 were so engaged on 30 June. In this fiscal year about 113,000 airmen completed upgrade training, and at one time 121,000 were increasing their skills. As the Vietnam war grew in intensity, a high point was reached when 213,680 received upgrade instruction during December 1966. On-the-job training placed an almost intolerable burden on commands whose primary commitments lay elsewhere.[15]

(U) ATC also had to provide unscheduled retraining to meet unanticipated demands. Between January and June 1966, nearly 8,000 airmen entered either formal courses or on-the-job training to fulfill unforeseen requirements, and about 2,500 completed courses. More than half the men volunteered to take advantage of an opportunity to move into technical skills in great demand, and about 3,000 NCO's were selected individually. For

example, in September 1966 PACAF complained that many men in Southeast Asia did not have recent training or experience in high explosives. In October ATC prepared a short course to familiarize men with the munitions they would have to handle, but they continued to arrive without sufficient knowledge, placing an unjustified training burden on units in the theater. In December ATC announced that a special munition-handling course would be established at Lowry AFB, Colo., in February 1967. The managers of the Lowry course would maintain close liaison with Eglin AFB, Fla., where tactical combat training was concentrated. In addition, the Air Staff directed that munition technicians get special job knowledge tests to insure that they possessed the necessary skills.[16]

(U) Despite the giant technical training effort, too many technicians were recently graduated 3-level apprentices and were not ready to perform effectively with combat units (where at least a 5-level man was essential). In August 1966 the Air Staff decided to determine how many of the 3-level men might qualify for jobs at a higher grade. Between September 1966 and June 1967 about 1,500 men in training at Nellis AFB, Nev., and Luke AFB, Ariz., were chosen to take tests. If they passed, they were raised to the next skill level (usually 5) and assigned to more difficult and responsible work. Not many who passed qualified immediately for jobs in Southeast Asia, but they replaced people in U.S.-based commands who did qualify.[17]

(U) Most PACAF replacements were airmen who had been taught to handle 5-, 7-, and 9-level jobs by special training units operated jointly by ATC and TAC on TAC bases and later given weapon familiarization training in Southeast Asia. In July 1966, Headquarters USAF decided to use nearly

4,100 airmen who had graduated from these units to instruct 10,000 to 14,000 more technicians by May 1967. In October 1966, however, PACAF reported that its needs were declining since more qualified technicians were arriving by way of routine assignment. As a result, TAC believed that it could reduce by 1,500 the number it had planned to train during the next six or seven months. After 1966 it could not send many of its own technicians to Southeast Asia because they had already served a tour in the area. By the end of 1966 the ATC-TAC special effort had met the most critical demands of the combat theater.[18]

(U) In 1966 the technical training establishment gradually returned to a nearly normal operation. In July ATC restored the six-week, 30-day period for basic military training, and in November it reinstated the normal five-day week for basic technical courses. Nevertheless, the training load remained heavy, since nearly 83 percent of the 116,800 USAF recruits who completed BMT attended technical schools. Lackland and Amarillo remained overcrowded. Since Amarillo was still scheduled to close in June 1968, housing promised to remain tight despite the beginning of new construction at Lackland in 1967. Finding enough airmen qualified at the 5- and 7-skill levels remained difficult. Not enough experienced airmen were available to conduct on-the-job training, and in several specialties it was replaced by formal instruction. In 1967 the Air Force still found it necessary occasionally to set up special technical courses to meet new needs in Southeast Asia, such as explosive ordnance disposal.[19]

(U) No assessment of technical training would be complete without taking into account the work of the Extension Course Institute (ECI), a

division of Air University. Aside from the professional courses it afforded to squadron officers, ECI taught technical subjects to airmen by correspondence. In 1963, one group of airmen began taking the career development courses* that were mandatory for everyone in the OJT program, and in 1967 ECI offered 195 of these courses and expected to have 225 within the next few years. Other airmen, acting on their own initiative, took technical courses covering more than 40 USAF career fields. During 1964-1967, ECI had an average enrollment of about 450,000 students, with about 50,000 new men enrolling each month. By 1967, ECI had recorded four million people on its rolls and two million had completed courses.[20]

Professional Education of Officers

(U) The Vietnam war both stimulated and diminished officer education. The number of officers obtained from the 180 colleges in the USAF Reserve Officer Training Corps (AFROTC) program, the chief source of new commissioned officers, grew steadily--from 3,692 in 1964 to 4,509 in 1965, 4,790 in 1966, and 5,896 in 1967. On 13 October 1964 President Johnson approved the first major revision to ROTC in nearly 50 years. The law authorized a two-year ROTC program in addition to the four-year course and allowed

* (U) Career development courses, designed to educate airmen through self-study within a career field, covered theory and general knowledge. Job proficiency grew out of practical experience under the supervision of a trainer, usually a skilled technician. All study materials were sent to a unit training office, not to the student. His supervisor, who kept a record of his progress, did not permit the student to take the specialty knowledge test until he had completed the course. Successful completion of the course and a passing score on the test led to upgrading and promotion. TAC reported that in 1966, 11,680 of its men had passed tests and risen to higher skill levels.

scholarships for promising students. The two-year program permitted juniors who had not previously participated in ROTC to do so, provided they first took six weeks of field training.* By 1967 nearly 3,030 AFROTC juniors and seniors were receiving tuition, textbooks, laboratory fees, and $50 per month subsistence pay in exchange for a four-year service commitment (six years for an officer who became a pilot).[21]

(U) The size of the Officer Training School (OTS) program fluctuated with the need for officers beyond the number obtained from AFROTC. Not surprisingly, this program underwent a great expansion between July 1966 and June 1967. Young men and women with a college education received 12 weeks of military training--10 during the 1966 buildup--and those who successfully completed the course were tendered commissions. OTS also provided officer training for enlisted men in the airman education and commissioning program (AECP). Talented airmen, who were often sent to college for as long as 24 months to obtain degrees, entered OTS and received commissions upon graduation. OTS contributed 4,439 officers in 1964, 3,582 in 1965, 2,596 in 1966, and 7,383 in 1967. Each year, between 315 and 375 of this number were AECP products.

(U) The Air Force Academy provided 495 regular officers in 1964, 505 in 1965, 469 in 1966, and 414 in 1967. In March 1964 the President signed a bill enlarging the Academy's enrollment from 2,530 to 4,417. Since this required additional construction, the school did not plan to reach the authorized enrollment until 1971, after which it would graduate about 1,000 students

* (U) Shortages of field training spaces made it necessary to excuse some and cut the training of others to three weeks. (Hist, Dir, Personnel Resources and Distribution, Jul-Dec 66, p 69, App. D-10)

each year. The Academy received a setback in January 1965, when cheating incidents attracted nationwide attention and caused 109 cadets to resign in March.[22]

(U) The Air University professional schools--Air Command and Staff College, Air War College, Squadron Officers School, and Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT)--experienced adversity because of the Vietnam war. During the Korean war, most professional schools closed entirely for a few months. This did not happen in the 1960's, but operational units could not release enough officers to fill educational quotas. After January 1966, the Air Staff became concerned about a possible cut in officer professional education, but in April General McConnell decided against a reduction unless manpower demands became more compelling. By October, however, the demands became so pressing that he directed a 70-percent reduction in the enrollment at all professional military schools. In June 1967 it appeared that the reduced program would continue through June 1969. The number of students at the Command and Staff College, Air War College, and Squadron Officers School* was cut by about 1,030 per year. Joint and international schools, such as the National War College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Armed Forces Staff College, and the Allied colleges in Australia and Canada retained their full quotas.[23]

(U) Reduction of educational quotas dealt a distinct setback to the Air Force's plans to progressively raise the educational level of the officer

* (U) Squadron Officers School was reduced by about 60 percent. (Atchd comments to Memo Routing Slip, Lt Col D.D. Zurawski, Ex, AFPTR, to AFCHO, 24 Jul 68.)

corps, plans that had been pursued vigorously since 1961 when General LeMay advocated that all officers should be college graduates. In the technological world of the 1960's and 1970's the Air Force assumed that its need for highly educated officers would expand rapidly. And it believed the greatest need would be for people trained in technology, sciences, and management. At AFIT, which operated a resident college at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, the Air Force attempted to set the following quotas: 45 to 50 percent in engineering, 14 percent in science or mathematics, and 27 to 31 percent in management. Also, in 1966 the demand increased significantly for officers trained in computer technology and electronic data processing.

(U) Even before the war, however, the Air Force had experienced difficulty in finding enough officers with aptitude in science and mathematics who could be spared from staff and operational jobs to go to school. Officers with adequate language proficiency were also scarce, particularly in the languages of the Near East and Southeast Asia. Releasing officers from staff and operational duties for educational purposes, of course, became increasingly difficult as the Vietnam war grew in intensity. Nevertheless, in 1966 the Air Force was able to find 1,440 officers to fill the fiscal year 1968 quota of 1,744. They would attend AFIT courses to obtain degrees or advance their technological training.

(U) The Air Force also wanted some of its officers to possess advanced graduate degrees, especially those who would pursue or supervise research and development work. For several years a few officers had been sent to civilian universities to work toward advanced degrees, and in August 1964 Secretary Zuckert announced the first doctoral program for AFIT's resident

college, to begin in fiscal year 1966 with 12 students. The students worked in aeronautical engineering, using actual USAF problems as subjects for their dissertations. In May 1966 the Air Force estimated that it would need nearly 14,000 officers with master and doctorate degrees by 1971 plus another thousand for assignment to outside agencies. At the beginning of 1966, for example, the Air Force had 1,298 working outside the Department of Defense, including 211 at NASA.[24]

(U) During 1966, some civilian administrators in OSD and Secretary Brown's office expressed doubt on the need for military officers with Ph. D's. They believed that whatever need existed in a military organization could be supplied by civilians. Mr. William L. Lehmann, Assistant for Laboratories, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Research and Development, expressed the formal Air Force position. He argued that the services needed officers with doctor degrees because civilians were more devoted to science and technology as such than to their military application. Like most high-ranking Air Force officials, he was convinced that military strength required men in uniform competent in the sciences and technology upon which that strength depended.[25]

(U) Despite its difficulties, both long-term and those after 1965, the Air Force could point to substantial achievements in raising the educational level of its officer corps. In 1949 only 27 percent had college degrees; in 1962, 49 percent; in June 1967, 74 percent. Excluding the medical, legal, and chaplain officer corps, in 1963, 2,080 officers had master and 164 had doctorate degrees; in 1967 the figures had risen to 12,109 and 543, respectively.

(U) It is also worthy of note that many officers and airmen pursued higher education on their own initiative, assisted by a government stipend to pay part of the costs. During fiscal year 1966, for example, TAC personnel on their off-duty time earned 36 master and 155 bachelor degrees. This type of educational effort went on in almost every USAF command, both in the United States and overseas.[26]

V. MANPOWER MANAGEMENT

(U) As the manpower requirements increased after the summer of 1965, President Johnson and Secretary McNamara applied strong pressures on the services to concentrate their people on essential military functions. Manpower specialists were convinced that the Air Force, along with the other services, could improve the training, assignment, distribution, and utilization of personnel. In November 1965 Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance established the Manpower Management Planning Board to conduct a coordinated program of improving manpower management.* Beginning in 1967 the services also submitted to OSD semiannual reports listing improvements in military management.[1]

Military Manpower Management

(U) In October 1966 several of the Secretary of the Air Force's top-level assistants voiced their concern about the handling of career officers in specialized fields. In the case of scientists, engineers, procurement officers, system analysts, computer systems engineers, and technical managers, they pointed out that the Air Force was becoming increasingly dependent upon these men, yet it paid too little attention to enhancing their professional careers or making best use of their talents. As a result, many were leaving the service.[2]

* (U) As chairman, Mr. Vance named Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower Thomas D. Morris and, as members, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and the Undersecretaries for manpower of the three departments. The board was given a budget of $1.5 million for fiscal year 1967. In July 1966 the board granted $95,000 to review the testing, selection, and assignment of new enlisted personnel and help find a means of predicting their future performance, particularly if they were in the low mental category.

(U) Dr. Alexander H. Flax, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Research and Development, stated that the personnel managers who controlled the assignment and promotion of specialists made decisions in accordance with rank or convenience of the service and did not sufficiently consider the judgment of other professionals who were highly qualified in research and development. R&D priorities, he said, should be based on national and Air Force needs, not on organization.* The Radiobiological Research Institute of the Defense Atomic Support Agency was not necessarily more important than the Weapons Laboratory of the Air Force Systems Command, yet the former had priority for the best R&D officers. The Air Force, he thought, often did not fully use an officer's education and experience, leading some outstanding men to lose confidence in the service and go into industry. Greater emphasis should be placed on performance and potential and less on seniority, since the traditional policy that no officer should serve under another of lower rank or later date of rank often prevented the ablest men from attaining influential positions. While the Air Force was powerless to solve many of these difficulties, Dr. Flax asserted that it needed to assume leadership in correcting those that could be corrected, otherwise, it might not hold the people upon whom it depended for its advanced technology and resulting military superiority.[3]

* (U) The National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Defense Atomic Support Agency, the Air Force Technical Applications Center, and the Air Force Office of Aeronautical Research had priority for all research and development positions.

(U) The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Financial Management, Leonard Marks, Jr., believed that many of these comments were equally applicable to the comptroller field. The chief impediments to rational career development were the size and wide dispersal of the USAF organization, the lack of agreement on ways to improve the assignment system, and the fact that personnel management was an "inexact science," which could seldom give an entirely correct answer to any question. The large number of officers sent to service schools and universities and the continuous shortage of qualified people for middle and senior level professional and technical positions indicated that something was obviously wrong. Mr. Marks did not believe that any of the many studies of the subject had given a satisfactory explanation of the failure to retain highly qualified officers. The Air Force, he concluded, should consider giving up the "whole man" concept for the bulk of its young officers and encourage them to specialize, since only a very few could aspire to general officer positions.[4]

(U) Unlike the others, Hugh E. Witt, the Deputy for Supply and Maintenance thought that R&D people tended to live in a world of their own and complain about conditions that other officers accepted as part of the military life. In supply, maintenance, and logistics, career development worked well and could be improved by closer adherence to existing policies. In early 1967 Dr. Eugene T. Ferraro, Deputy Under Secretary for Manpower, told the Chief of Staff that this was a serious matter that deserved his close attention. At his urging, in March 1967 General McConnell established a study committee to examine ways to improve career planning in these fields.

In May, after the committee reported, the Air Staff Board concluded that the situation could be improved by offering additional Regular commissions, converting unused warrant officer spaces to Regular officer spaces, and requiring a commitment from all people who accepted Regular commissions.[5]

(U) After mid-1965 there was a rising tide of complaints from USAF civilian and military personnel to the White House and to members of Congress. At first the Air Force considered trying to halt this practice. However, in June 1966 the Inspector General, Lt. Gen. Glen W. Martin, decided that the letters were useful since they indicated problems of administration and morale which the Air Force might be able to head off before they became serious. In any case, it would have detailed data upon which to base corrective recommendations to OSD and Congress.[6]

(U) Typical of the letters General Martin had in mind, was one sent by an airman in Thailand to Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier (Wisc.) and then submitted in December 1966 to Secretary McNamara. It claimed that most USAF specialities in that country were ridiculously overmanned while men were badly needed in South Vietnam and that this overmanning caused boredom, low morale, poor work, and general frustration. Deputy for Manpower, Personnel, and Organization James P. Goode replied that temporary manpower surpluses in some fields obviously existed and were being corrected as quickly as possible. Some overmanning would occur in wartime despite USAF efforts, since the military situation in Southeast Asia was in a constant state of flux.[7]

(U) Dr. Eli Ginzberg, a distinguished Columbia University scholar and consultant to the Air Force, surveyed USAF bases in Japan, Korea, and

Southeast Asia, and reported in February 1967 that most commanders knew the importance of using their people wisely and were doing an excellent job of it. Nevertheless, he found that the Air Force sometimes failed to recognize and reward commanders who conscientiously and often successfully economized on manpower. Efforts to replace military personnel with civilians had failed in the Pacific area, he said, because of contradictory instructions and budget restrictions. Dr. Ginzberg held that the sharp distinction drawn by the Air Force between manpower and personnel was irrational and confusing, and he suggested concentrating on simple economy and straightforward assignment and promotion policies. This was not the type of report the Air Force would be apt to use as a basis for specific action, but it was one of many that supplied invaluable information on how effectively manpower was being utilized in various parts of the world.[8]

(U) In August 1966 Secretary McNamara announced a plan--Project 100,000--that he and President Johnson* had been considering for several months to increase the number of people available for military service. About 600,000 men--nearly one-third of those reaching military age annually--failed to qualify for service under current draft standards because of physical or educational deficiencies. Under Project 100,000 the services would induct about 40,000 of these in fiscal year 1967 and 100,000 per year thereafter. OSD set the USAF quota at 15 percent of the total, causing the Air Force to train men in the Category IV mental group for the first time since 1958.

* (U) In November 1967 President Johnson stated, "I sold Mr. McNamara on the plan." ("Selected Statements by DOD and other Administration Officials, July 1-Dec 31, 1967," Res and Analysis Div, OSAF, Jan 26, 1968, p 168.)

ATC set up six courses for slow learners and studied how to train and assign them most effectively. It decided that men who could not absorb more difficult instruction would be trained as air police, fire fighters, fuel handlers, pavement maintainers, auto mechanics, plumbers, and routine administrative and clerical personnel. In September 1967, after one year of operation, OSD announced that the services had taken in 49,000 men under the project and that 96 percent had successfully completed basic training. Further studies would analyze the performance of these men during their military careers.

(U) Also of special interest to President Johnson and Secretary McNamara was Project Transition, which aimed to ease the military man's return to civilian life. About half of the 750,000 who left the services each year wanted this orientation and training during the last 30 to 180 days of their tours. Begun in June 1967, the project gave priority to men injured in battle or without skills in a civilian occupation. To help men get jobs, the Department of Defense cooperated with the Departments of Labor and of Health, Education and Welfare, the Postal Service, and state and local agencies. Before the end of 1967, pilot projects had been established at five military installations and planned for 86 major bases and many more smaller ones. ATC established an experimental project at Randolph AFB, Tex., and scheduled programs at other bases where appreciable numbers of servicemen left the Air Force.[9]

Civilian Manpower Management

(U) For many years the Air Force has been subjected to pressure for economy in the use of civilian employees by the White House, OSD, the Manpower Utilization Subcommittee of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, headed by Representatives James C. Davis (Ga.) until January 1963 and then by David N. Henderson (N.C.), the Comptroller General of the United States, and the Bureau of the Budget (BOB). White House pressure was especially persistent after passage of the Federal Salary Reform Act of October 1962, and almost every increase in civilian manpower costs was reviewed in detail by higher echelons of the Air Force, OSD, and BOB.[10]

(U) During 1964-1967 civilian employees were affected by efforts to eliminate nonessential military functions and installations, to replace the military with civilians and free the former for combat or related operations, and to rationalize and centralize control over training and assignment. To hold down average grades and salaries, in January 1965 a "freeze" limited positions in grades GS-14 and above to 4,245, the number filled or committed on 31 December 1964. In May 1965 the Air Force established a committee to maintain the ceiling and restrict average salaries. Although no serious offender in grade inflation--its average grade rose from GS-6.3 to GS-7.2 between 1959 and 1964--the Air Force reduced the average to GS-7.02 by June 1966, largely by hiring more inexperienced beginners at GS-1 through GS-3. Wartime demands and an expanding economy then pushed up wages and salaries and the requirement for qualified people brought the average grade to GS-7.15 by June 1967. The removal of

specific numerical controls over high-grade positions permitted the Air Force by mid-1966 to have 4,234 people who were GS-14 and above and 4,462 authorized for June 1967.[11]

(U) Secretaries McNamara and Brown and Director of the Budget Charles L. Schultze also pressed the services to control overtime costs but without significant success. Overtime pay had doubled in DOD during fiscal year 1966, and the Air Force had been one of the leading users of overtime. Although Secretary McNamara recognized that the increase resulted from an inability to hire people fast enough to handle the increased workloads of the war, he tried to limit overtime by directing that the percentage for fiscal year 1967 go no higher than for 1964 and 1965. He required each service and agency to establish strict controls and make quarterly reports to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller.[12]

(U) In July 1966 Secretary Brown set an overtime limit within the Air Force for fiscal year 1967--at 1.4 percent of estimated civilian costs. He hoped to cut overtime by hiring more employees, but in September he admitted that the estimate had been far too low and that overtime was running about 50 percent higher than planned. Secretary Brown stated that the Air Force had underestimated the overtime needed in logistics, airlift, and training, much of it arising from the shortage of maintenance men.*[13]

(U) Despite the extra work caused by the war, the BOB believed that increases in overtime pay had been too large and indicated poor management.

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* (U) There had been a large amount of unforeseen overhauling of jet engines, particularly of the J-57 which powered the F-100, B-52, B-57, and KC-135. There had also been a 50-percent increase in cargo and a 70-percent increase in passenger airlift since the USAF budget for fiscal year 1967 had been prepared.

In September 1966 Mr. Schultze announced that the President's fiscal year 1967 budget provided for payment of 25 percent less overtime than for the previous period. However, in 1967 and thereafter this problem receded as BOB made the overtime ceiling more flexible and the Air Force hired more maintenance and other support personnel.[14]

(U) During the middle and late 1960's, the closing of military installations and changes in functions led to reductions in force and related disruptions and inconveniences for civilians not unlike some of those experienced by military families. During the closure of the Rome, N.Y., Air Materiel Area, for example, some of the 2,700 employees who lost their jobs complained of unequal and unfair treatment, and a few even questioned the integrity of the Government administrators charged with helping them find employment at other locations.

(U) The elimination or reduction of nonessential functions and installations confronted the Air Force with the task of finding jobs for nearly 50,000 employees between 1965 and 1969. By the end of June 1966 it had closed five major bases, scheduled the closure of seven others, and had found new positions for about 19,000 displaced employees. All of those separated had been offered other jobs, and about 82 percent had obtained equal or higher grades. Expansion of civilian employment and delay in closing some bases, as in the case of Amarillo, made it less difficult to find jobs for displaced people during 1966 and 1967.[15]

(U) To find positions for displaced employees, OSD in March 1966 established a Centralized Referral System at Dayton, Ohio. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower Thomas D. Morris soon found that the

system was not working satisfactorily. Many employees who had registered could not be found when positions opened up, while others were unqualified to handle the jobs for which they registered. Some agencies also unreasonably questioned their qualifications, delayed filling positions until registrants were no longer available, or downgraded or temporarily abolished jobs to permit favored candidates to get them. Mr. Morris insisted that these practices be stopped and the referral system be used as intended. In August OSD established a training program to instruct people in operating the system.[16]

(U) Responding to Secretary McNamara's request that civilians replace military people to free the latter for combat or direct combat support duties, frequently called Project Mix-Fix, the Air Force between January 1966 and June 1967 put 17,000 civilians in jobs previously held by 3,000 officers and 17,000 airmen. The officers, mostly weather forecasters and photographic technicians, were replaced by GS-9, GS-11, and a few GS-13 employees, while the airmen--primarily photographic technicians, air conditioning and refrigeration mechanics, and air passenger controllers--were replaced by Wage Board workers, GS-7's, and GS-9's. Maj. Gen. Duward L. Crow, USAF Director of the Budget, estimated that Mix-Fix initially cost about $67,287,000 but because of indirect military costs and allowances would eventually save $92,336,000. Under OSD pressure, the Air Force in March 1967 agreed to replace another 15,900 military personnel with about 14,000 civilians during fiscal year 1968. However, Secretary Brown agreed with the Air Staff that further changes would reduce the U.S. rotational base to a point where the military, who could not stay overseas indefinitely, would have few worthwhile duties to perform on their return.[17]

(U) Because the Government Accounting Office (GAO) questioned the economy and even the legality of contracting for certain personnel services with private industry, the Air Force between July 1965 and June 1967 replaced 3,000 contract workers with 2,500 civil service employees and planned to substitute over 300 more during the next few months. In July 1966 the GAO sharply criticized the Air Force for hiring so many people from private firms to operate the USAF Satellite Control Facility at Sunnyvale, Calif. In late 1965, this installation had 1,125 contractor, 890 military, and 56 civil service personnel. GAO declared that DOD and USAF regulations permitted only temporary employment of contract workers and that the lack of qualified civil servants was not an excuse for hiring contract people. The Air Force denied that the hiring of more Government employees would save money, complained that GAO had ignored its partially successful efforts to hire them, and noted that the General Services Administration had failed to obtain qualified custodial people for this installation. Nevertheless, the Air Force agreed in September to start substituting civil service for contract workers in July 1967. To give new employees the necessary technical training and keep up the morale of the contract workers, the Air Force moved slowly and did not expect to complete the conversion in less than two years.[18]

(U) An indication of the pressures applied on the Air Force, at least indirectly, by Congress was the April 1967 report of the House Manpower Subcommittee, which it made after a 25-day survey of military installations in the Far East and Europe. The subcommittee believed that the services, including the Air Force, should further centralize recruiting,

training, and management of local national employees, lengthen military tours in Southeast Asia, and place more civilians in non-combat jobs. It charged that service "foot-dragging" had delayed progress in converting from contract to Government employees and from military to civilian workers. Representative Henderson's subcommittee did not believe that Government employees in Germany and Japan, many of whom had been there between five and 20 years, would return to the United States in accordance with the DOD plan to rotate them every five years. For this reason it recommended that the plan be applied only to new employees. The House group also requested a comprehensive history of negotiations with Japan and Germany on U.S. employment of their citizens since it would be useful for future planning.[19]

(U) Indicating a growing centralization of civilian manpower management,* Assistant Secretary of Defense Morris established career fields for all GS-5 through GS-18 employees in the Department of Defense engaged in the procurement aspects of four job series: general business and industry, contract and procurement, industrial property, and industrial specialist. The Air Force, which was responsible for managing the program, set up a data bank in November 1966 at Hill AFB, Utah, containing the names of qualified civilians in grades GS-14 and above, and effective 1 March 1967

* (U) This trend in manpower management extended beyond the Department of Defense when on 17 November 1966 Executive Order 11315 established the first federal executive inventory system in the Government. It consisted of a roster of executives (GS-15 to GS-18), along with their employment histories and qualifications, which all Government agencies could use to fill important administrative positions.

these people had to be considered for all promotions in the four series. This career management program also included recruitment of college graduates for procurement jobs, maximum mobility of employees within DOD, and recurrent training throughout an employee's career. The first of these programs started in January 1967.

(U) The Air Force wanted to retain control of the career development of USAF civilians, and it feared that this centralized control of procurement specialists might serve as a precedent for similar efforts in the future. Mr. John A. Lang, Jr., Acting Special Assistant for Manpower, Personnel, and Reserve Forces, insisted that OSD control would weaken service management and deprive the Air Force of the depth of knowledge and stability of organization that civilians offered. Nevertheless, in June 1966 Mr. Morris asked for other career fields suitable for centralized control, and on 13 June Dr. Ferraro recommended additional logistical specialities, such as quality assurance and supply; financial management, including budgeting, accounting, management analysis, and data automation; civil engineering; and civilian personnel administration.[20]

Equal Opportunity

(U) In March 1961 President Kennedy began a drive, directed in the Department of Defense by Deputy Secretary Roswell L. Gilpatric, to insure equal opportunity for persons of all races and religions and of both sexes. The drive was pressed with even greater vigor by President Johnson and Secretary McNamara during 1965-1967. On 18 December 1964 OSD directed stronger measures and asked for periodic reports on their effect. During

the next two years the Air Force concentrated on obtaining equal educational opportunities for dependent children of USAF families, fair housing, and equal access to recreational activities. Obtaining off-base housing for Negroes posed the most difficult problem because the Civil Rights Act of 1964* did not provide a specific remedy. And, because of the prejudices of white people, including some servicemen, Negro troops encountered discrimination in off-base recreational facilities in several southern states and even overseas.[21]

(U) To counteract unfair practices, the Air Force conducted inspections, held conferences on bases and with community leaders to explain the Civil Rights Act and OSD regulations, and advised parents of children segregated in public schools of the legal action they might pursue. At Maxwell and Craig AFB's, Ala., Myrtle Beach AFB, S.C., Robins AFB, Ga., Tyndall AFB, Fla., and Ramey AFB, Puerto Rico, the Air Force operated schools to prevent children from having to attend segregated or substandard schools. During the latter half of 1966 the Department of Defense worked with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to insure that all educational institutions receiving Defense contracts were desegregated. OSD obtained agreements from the universities, and since the Air Force handled the largest number of university grants, it assumed responsibility for getting letters of assurance from educational institutions and furnishing the information to HEW.[22]

* (U) Title VI of the Act states: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."

(U) Starting an intensive OSD drive to obtain adequate desegregated housing for Negro troops and their families in communities near military installations, Mr. Jack Moskowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Rights and Industrial Relations, asked the Air Force in August 1966 to prepare a special report on Negro housing conditions around Andrews AFB, Md. This report, plus the failure of owners and managers of multiple-unit developments to desegregate voluntarily, culminated in Secretary McNamara's order of June 1967 that military personnel moving into the area could not rent or lease apartments or trailers within 3 1/2 miles of Andrews unless these accommodations were available to people of all races and religions. This open-housing campaign soon extended to the whole Washington, D. C. metropolitan area.

(U) Between June and September 1967, according to OSD, the number of off-base housing facilities in Maryland open to all races rose from 47 with 4,580 units to 195 with 19,500 units, an increase of 300 percent. In the metropolitan area open units increased from 10,000 to 28,000. Revealing how difficult it was to remove this deep-seated, emotionally-charged prejudice, the Secretary stated on 7 November that many landlords had refused the Government's first appeal for voluntary compliance with the open housing policy. Some landlords had faced genuine economic pressures, and the application of countervailing economic pressures had been necessary. Meanwhile, on 7 September, Mr. McNamara announced that his next big target area would be in California.[23]

(U) During 1966 and 1967 OSD was concerned that relatively few Negroes had obtained officer rank within the armed forces. In August 1966 Whitney M. Young, Jr., Executive Director of the National Urban League, publicly deplored the "terrible lack of Negro officers" in Vietnam. Mr. Morris immediately directed each service to report the number of Negro officers in Vietnam and, later, within the whole military establishment. In September 1966 Negroes made up about 10 percent of the military strength of the armed services--one percent less than of the total U.S. population--but only 1.6 percent of the officer corps. They constituted about 9.1 percent of all USAF personnel, and about 1.6 percent of the officers. In Vietnam, 10.2 percent of USAF military personnel but only 1.5 percent of the officers were Negroes--77 out of 5,028 officers.

(U) As early as June 1966, Mr. Moskowitz had suggested that the Services set specific objectives for recruiting, training, and promoting Negroes. Both the Army and Air Force objected to any type of quota that would "raise the spectre" of preferential treatment. The Air Force stood firmly on its policy of equal opportunity based on merit, ability, and requirements of the service, without regard to race, color, or national origin. It suggested that the Department of Defense encourage members of minority groups to seek careers in military service, and it admitted that USAF efforts could be improved. In December 1966 the Secretary of Defense set up a special staff to study means of obtaining more Negro officers, and he requested each service to designate a representative. OSD wanted a large number of the 83,710 new officers for fiscal year 1967 to be

to be young Negroes. In December 1967 the Air Force had 2,415 Negro officers, 1.8 percent of the total.*[24]

(U) Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance continued the effort to improve opportunities for civilians who were either members of minority groups or women. In April 1966 he demanded more effective use of employees who, because of custom or restrictive practices, held jobs that did not fully employ their skills and aptitudes. Mr. Vance requested a survey of positions in grades GS-1 through GS-11 similar to a 1963 study and correction of any pattern of exclusion that kept these people in unimportant jobs. He noted that, if necessary, they should be trained for and promoted to better positions. Also, more effective use could be made of part-time women employees who did not get a chance to use the subprofessional and administrative skills that they possessed. The USAF report, submitted by the Director of Civilian Personnel in March 1967, tried to explain any lack of full utilization that had been uncovered and outlined corrective action taken.[25]

(U) In July 1966 Representative Martha W. Griffiths (Mich.) told Secretary McNamara that qualified women at Tinker AFB, Okla., and Blytheville AFB, Ark., claimed that they were not only denied jobs because they were women but also that men were trained for jobs to avoid promoting women. She asked Secretary McNamara to review the evidence, threatening to hold a Congressional investigation if the situation were not corrected. At the suggestion of Mr. Morris, the USAF Directorate of Civilian Personnel,

* (U) The Army had 5,471 Negro officers (3.4 percent of the total); the Navy, 280 (0.3 percent); and the Marine Corps, 167 (0.7 percent). The total DOD figure was 8,335, or 2.1 percent. (Information furnished by Col. James R. Hillard, Dep ASOD (CR&IR), 17 Apr 68.)

AFLC, and SAC investigated employment practices at the two bases. Their report, submitted on 9 December 1966, revealed no evidence of discrimination and apparently satisfied Mrs. Griffiths. Since an October 1967 amendment to Executive Order 111246 and a change in AFR 40-713 specifically prohibited discrimination on the ground of sex in hiring and promotion, this issue promised to become more contentious in the future.[26]

(U) The Air Force had a good reputation for effective manpower management, fair treatment of all races and religions and both sexes, and for opening jobs to young people as part of the President's youth opportunity program. Nevertheless, in April 1966 Civil Service Commission Chairman John W. Macy pointed to some weaknesses. There had been a lack of effective coordination between Headquarters USAF and the field organizations, and the latter had a spotty record in carrying out official policy, at least with the vigor desired by President Johnson. Mr. Macy suspected that grade and salary controls might be having an adverse effect in some instances. Here, he touched on a basic dilemma confronting the Air Force, and probably all Government agencies, during these years of war and social turmoil. It was caught between the desire, on the one hand, to do more for people and, on the other, the necessity to hold down grades and salaries. Even in the affluent 1960's, there was never enough money to satisfy demands.[27]

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GLOSSARY

Actys	Activities
ADC	Air Defense Command
AECP	Airman Education and Commissioning Program
AFB	Air Force Base
AFCHO	USAF Historical Division Liaison Office
AFIT	Air Force Institute of Technology
AFLC	Air Force Logistics Command
AFOAR	Air Force Office of Aeronautical Research
AFPDP	Air Force Directorate of Personnel Planning
AFRes	Air Force Reserve
AFROTC	Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code; Air Force Systems Command
AFSCF	Air Force Satellite Control Facility
AFTAC	Air Force Technical Applications Center
ALO	Air Liaison Officer
AMA	Air Materiel Area
ANG	Air National Guard
Appns	Appropriations
ASAF (FM)	Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Financial Management
ASAF (I&L)	Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Installations and Logistics
ASAF (M&RA)	Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Manpower and Reserve Affairs
ASOD (Comp)	Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller
ASOD (M)	Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower
ASSS	Air Staff Summary Sheet
Asst VC/S	Assistant Vice Chief of Staff
ATC	Air Training Command
BMT	Basic Military Training
BOB	Bureau of the Budget
CCTS	Combat Crew Training School
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific
Cmte	Committee
Cong	Congress
C/S	Chief of Staff
CSAF	Chief of Staff of the Air Force

DASA	Defense Atomic Support Agency
DDR&E	Director of Defense Research and Engineering
Decn	Decision
Dep ASOD (CR&IR)	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Civil Rights and Industrial Relations
Dep Under SAF (M)	Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force, Manpower
Dir	Director (ate)
DOD	Department of Defense
ECI	Extension Course Institute
FAA	Federal Aviation Agency
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FY	Fiscal Year
GAO	Government Accounting Office
Gdnce	Guidance
HEW	Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
H.R.	House of Representatives
IG	Inspector General
Intvw	Interview
Inves	Investigation
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
L & L	Office of Legislative Liaison
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MATS	Military Air Transport Service
Mgt	Management
Mil	Military
Msg	Message
Mss	Manuscript

NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
NORAD	North American Air Defense Command
NCS	National Security Council
OJT	On-the-Job Training
Ops	Operations
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OTS	Officer Training School
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
PCR	Program Change Request
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
PDP	Directorate of Personnel Planning
P.L.	Public Law
Plt	Pilot
PME	Professional Military Education
P-1	Proficiency Pay, Step 1
P-2	Proficiency Pay, Step 2
R&D	Research and Development
RIF	Reduction in Force
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Corps
Rqmt	Requirement
Rpt	Report
RTU	Replacement Training Unit
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SAF	Secretary of the Air Force
SAM	Surface-to-air Missile
SAW	Special Air Warfare
SECNAV	Secretary of the Navy
Sess	Session
SOD	Secretary of Defense
Subcmte	Subcommittee
TAC	Tactical Air Command
TDY	Temporary Duty
TFS	Tactical Fighter Squadron
TFW	Tactical Fighter Wing

USAF	United States Air Force
USAFE	United States Air Forces in Europe
VC/S	Vice Chief of Staff
WAF	Women in the Air Force

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