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USAF MANPOWER TRENDS

1960-1963

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by

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FOREWORD

USAF Manpower Trends, 1960-1963, is an account of Air Force efforts to adjust to requirements for a high quality technical and professional force and to the ever-growing demands from the Administration and Congress for greater economy in the use of manpower. Continuing technological developments and changes in national military strategy dictated the recruiting and holding of better trained people, shifts in personnel assignments, and modifications in the mission of many Air Force units. Perhaps most immediately significant were preparations to meet the Berlin and Cuban crises of 1961 and 1962 and to counter the Communist threat to wage "wars of national liberation." The author has approached the various subjects discussed in this study from the viewpoint of the highest echelons of the Air Force--Headquarters USAF and the Office of the Secretary--attempting to explain how they met new problems and conditions, particularly how they adjusted to the demands of the Administration and Congress.

Prepared as part of a larger History of Headquarters USAF, Fiscal Year 1963, the study is being issued separately to make it readily available in a convenient and useful form. It also serves as a follow-on study to The Changing Character of Air Force Manpower, 1958-1959, issued in April 1961.

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C O N T E N T S

USAF MANPOWER TRENDS, 1960-1963

I. GENERAL TRENDS

Two contradictory pressures influenced USAF manpower from 1960 to 1963: the recurring shortages of trained people, particularly people with training in science and engineering; and the persistent demands of Congress and the White House for reductions in manpower strengths and costs, or at least no increase in them. The first pressure made it difficult to satisfy the second. The continuing increase in the technical complexity of weapons and equipment demanded a larger number of well-trained people to develop, man, and maintain them. And higher pay scales were needed to obtain and hold these people.

There were other reasons why it was difficult to hold a line on manpower costs. Because of the scarcity and high cost of trained manpower, a general pay raise was granted civilian employees in 1962 and military personnel in 1963. The growing experience of Department of Defense (DOD) workers also inevitably raised grades and cost. Even enlisted men, whose turnover rate was relatively high and therefore costly, were now generally older and had more dependents. This raised costs for family housing, education, medical care, and other expenses associated with military dependents. The only way to cut manpower costs, or even hold them in check, was to substantially reduce the number of people on DOD payrolls, and there was a general downward trend in numbers, from 1955 through most of fiscal year 1961. But two developments temporarily reversed the trend: the Berlin crisis in the fall of 1961 and the Kennedy Administration's decision to prepare to meet Communist threats of "wars of liberation" in underdeveloped regions. As a result, DOD manpower rose in June 1962 to a new six-year high. USAF growth was not comparable, but its military personnel strength reached its highest point since 1957. Civilian employment increased by only a few thousand, however, and by fiscal year 1963 it dropped back below the total of two years earlier.[1]

Manpower Strengths

Between 30 June 1959 and 30 June 1963, total DOD manpower increased by 166,954--from 3,582,488 to 3,749,442. This portrayed only a part of the change, however, for manpower totals had increased from a low of 3,523,555 in 1960 to a high of 3,877,362 in 1962, an addition of 353,807. Actually, nearly all of the growth had taken place between 30 June 1961 and 30 June 1962. Air Force military strength grew from 814,752 on 30 June 1960 to 884,025 on 30 June 1962.

All the services experienced a steady decline in the number of civilian employees with only a small jump in the summer of 1962. For DOD, the decline was from 1,078,178 in June 1959 to 1,049,765 in June 1963. For the Air Force, it was from 313,466 to 296,982, the lowest in a dozen years and a loss of 16,484 since 1959.[2]

The increases in military manpower were followed by a rather sharp reduction in fiscal year 1963, when DOD military personnel strength fell from 2,807,819 to 2,669,677 and USAF strength from 884,025 to 869,431. This took place despite the crisis caused by the Soviet placement of strategic missiles in Cuba in the fall of 1962. The cutback stemmed partly from a "budget crisis" produced by the mushrooming costs of several new projects launched by the Kennedy Administration, such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's drive to put a man on the moon by 1970, the strengthening of the airborne alert, the civilian pay raise, and measures to stimulate the national economy and lessen unemployment. Conditioning the whole defense budget problem was the unfavorable international balance of payments, which threatened to deplete U.S. gold reserves. Whenever it seemed necessary to restrict costs, Congress examined manpower totals with an exceedingly critical eye.[3]

Rising Costs

In examining defense budgets, Congress, particularly the House Subcommittee on Manpower Utilization, became increasingly critical of the upward trend of the grade level. The trend was strongly supported, however, by Roger W. Jones, Chairman of the Civil Service Commission. Appearing before the subcommittee in December 1959, he maintained that the "grade creep" was inevitable and fully justified. Jones cited a number of reasons for the rise in pay grades and for a likely continuation of the upward trend. One was the impact of the technological revolution on the character of the work force, particularly the increase in scientific, technical, and managerial personnel. While overall government employment had increased 12.3 percent, its increase in the biological sciences had been 77 percent, in engineering 42 percent, and in the physical sciences 76 percent. Another important factor was the decentralization and delegation of authority, which called for more administrators and supervisors with higher grades. A third reason that Jones listed was the automation and mechanization of work which eliminated many low-paid employees, raising the average pay grade of those remaining.

Jones also reminded Congress that pay for professional civil servants lagged considerably behind pay for comparable workers in the civilian economy despite attempts in recent years to correct the disparity. Therefore Congress would have to authorize higher salaries in the future to enable the government to keep competent people, and this would further increase manpower costs. His prediction was borne out by passage of the Federal Salary Reform Act of 1962, which not only raised salaries but provided for a periodic reassessment of their adequacy.[4]

The Air Force also urged the necessity of offering attractive positions to highly competent people, particularly for work in aeronautical research, development, test, and evaluation. It wanted to raise the number and salaries of super grades (GS-16 through GS-18) and P.L. 313 positions. In October 1961 Congress approved a slight increase in the number of DOD high-level positions, bringing the total to 407 super grades and 530 P.L. 313 positions. Air Force super grade positions rose from 83 to 86; P.L. 313 positions from 126 to 144.

Then, in 1963, the number of USAF super grades increased to 98. In addition, the salary reform act of October 1962 raised the pay ceiling of super grade positions from $18,500 per year to $20,000, establishing a salary range of $16,000 to $20,000. The average grade for Air Force civilians rose from GS-6.6 in June 1960 to GS-7.1 in June 1963, the average pay from $5,528 to $6,693 per year.[5]

General pay increases did not add to the cost of military manpower until the fall of 1963, but the demand for a higher proportion of well-trained people created similar problems and aroused the same concern as with civilian employees. Proficiency pay was required for more airmen with special qualifications, and manpower costs swelled with the rising percentage of officers with college degrees, the greater number afforded undergraduate and graduate training in science and engineering, and the technical training provided approximately 100,000 airmen per year.

The first military pay bill since 1958, which passed the House of Representatives in May 1963 and the Senate in August, also raised DOD manpower costs. Pay for military personnel with more than two years of service rose from 5 to more than 31 percent, depending on rank and length of service. By encouraging individuals with training and experience to follow a military career, the law was designed to help eliminate much of the very expensive training of replacements.[6]

II. MANPOWER ADJUSTMENTS

One major difficulty in national defense planning was that of keeping manpower costs within the limits deemed reasonable by the congressional committees that controlled appropriations. The over-riding consideration affecting manpower controls in the defense establishment was the size of the budget. DOD expenditures rose between fiscal year 1960 and fiscal year 1963 from a little more than $41 billion to about $53 billion, and manpower costs accounted for nearly 40 percent of these totals. USAF expenditures rose from approximately $18 billion to about $20.4 billion, with manpower costs accounting for 30 to 31 percent.[1]

For several years prior to 1963, Congress, the President, and the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) repeatedly criticized the management by the services of military personnel appropriations and related manpower programs, particularly the significant appropriation deficiencies in fiscal years 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959, and 1961.* The services were unable to determine the current status of, or predict with reasonable accuracy, the future requirements for military funds. And numerous inaccurate estimates of the personnel costs of approved programs had caused considerable embarrassment and reprogramming.[2]

Many of the difficulties arose from payroll procedures that had originated during World War II in order to speed up operations and

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*In 1961, however, the Air Force had erred in the opposite direction, over-estimating its military personnel costs by $87 million.

allow prompt payment of the fighting men on the battle fronts. Too many of these procedures continued during peacetime. Although some changes had occurred since the war, they had not been of great significance from the standpoint of financial control. Meanwhile, the corps of skilled military professionals had been expanded by the addition of new entitlements and incentives. Obviously, a large, worldwide force of this kind created new and extremely difficult manpower management problems, particularly in cost accounting. The continued failure of the services to master them brought strong criticisms and raised doubts in Congress as to the ability of the military to do so. This criticism stimulated the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the services to renewed efforts to reshape and improve manpower controls.[3]

During 1962 and 1963, the services exerted great effort to overcome deficiencies in manpower management. Although they did not entirely succeed, for some problems could not be solved without new legislation, they made sound progress in improving the management of personnel funds and the use of manpower. By June 1963 the Air Force had become widely recognized as a leader among government agencies in this endeavor. It eliminated a number of units and reduced personnel overseas, eliminated many intermediate headquarters both overseas and in the United States, set up a new system for evaluating personnel management at subordinate headquarters, initiated a program for retraining employees whose skills had been made obsolete by technological change, and established valid standards of performance for military and civilian personnel. These successes drew praise from the Civil Service Commission and OSD and attracted highly favorable attention from government agencies in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom.[4]

Congressional and White House Pressures

To some undeterminable degree, the substantial improvement in the use of their manpower by the services could be attributed to the constant pressure for greater economy exerted by Congress and the White House. Probably the most constant and insistent congressional critic was the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Manpower Utilization, headed before January 1963 by Representative James C. Davis of Georgia, and after that date by Representative David N. Henderson of North Carolina.

The committee kept a sharp eye out for any evidence of manpower waste or duplication, and it required frequent reports on service efforts to improve controls and efficiency. Davis, in particular, opposed any evasion of civilian strength ceilings by substituting military personnel or by using contract employees when government employees could do the work. Since he believed that a reduced work force would contribute to efficiency, Davis wanted only the most important jobs filled when they became vacant, and he charged in March 1961 that there was much duplication of effort and overlapping of functions in the Department of Defense.

At the same time, members of Davis' committee and other congressmen criticized the services for periodically discharging so many people that there was a widespread insecurity among employees that resulted in a great loss of skilled workers, as well as decreased productivity. And Davis thought the Air Force should have been able to do more ballistic missile work instead of contracting out most of it, even though this would have kept many additional military and civilian scientists and engineers on the payroll.[5]

These not entirely consistent demands of Congress often placed the Department of Defense between the two horns of a dilemma. In January and February 1960, both Charles C. Finucane, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Personnel, and Reserves (M,P,&R), and Lewis S. Thompson, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower, Personnel, and Reserve Forces (M,P,&RF), recognized that the effort to obtain the strongest defense at the lowest cost, in the face of annual, fluctuating budgets, often worked injustices on individuals. Finucane stated that efficient operation constituted the overriding consideration, but he wanted the services to follow enlightened and fair procedures in handling people and to keep a stable work force.

Thompson replied that the Air Force was doing the best that could be expected, since it dealt with factors beyond its control, such as annual budget changes and new technological developments. He claimed that the Air Force gave primary consideration to careful manpower management, followed correct and fair procedures in reductions in force, and eliminated low priority jobs first.

The conflict between demands for economy and for stable employment remained a perplexing issue. The frequency with which the

Secretary of the Air Force had to explain reductions in employment in congressional districts graphically pointed up this problem. A congressman's enthusiasm for reductions in employment seldom applied to his own district.[6]

Much of the ammunition for congressional charges of inefficiency and waste came from reports of the General Accounting Office (GAO). In April 1963 Joseph Campbell, Comptroller General of the United States, appearing before the House Subcommittee on Manpower Utilization, pointed out numerous instances in the last five or six years of ineffective use of manpower in maintenance work and in the handling of personnel records.[7]

Campbell asserted that if USAF and Army vehicle maintenance was as efficient as that of the Navy and the commercial fleets, the Air Force could have reduced its maintenance staff by 10,000 men and saved $55 million a year, the Army 2,000 men and $10 million. Neither service, he said, had adequate maintenance controls or a reasonable basis for evaluating its efficiency. After reviewing activities at installations in Japan, the GAO also concluded that none of the three services knew how many people they needed to maintain facilities or operate utilities. Local officials had not applied the management practices expected of competent administrators and, consequently, the installations in that country were overstaffed by about 1,800 employees at an annual cost of approximately $2.7 million.

Campbell also stated that during fiscal years 1957-61, servicemen had received over one million overpayments totaling more than $100 million, of which about 18 percent, or $18 million, could not be recovered. He estimated that about 500,000 underpayments, coming to about $22 million had also been made. Because personnel records had not been screened properly, the services in one five-year period made about $10 million in erroneous reenlistment bonus payments and about $16 million that had to be recouped from servicemen who failed to complete their reenlistments.

According to GAO, these errors resulted mainly from the high turnover rate and lack of qualifications of the administrators. Most of them were military personnel who did not have formal training in disbursing funds or keeping personnel records. The GAO found that civilians who administered this work made far fewer errors.[8]

Campbell attributed inefficiency and waste to weaknesses on the part of heads of agencies and their top administrators and to the assignment of untrained military personnel. Strong administrators used manpower effectively; weak ones permitted or caused unnecessary work, duplicating functions, diffusion of responsibility, and costly procedures. Failures could be corrected only by continuity of assignment and proper training. Campbell asserted that, because of the tremendous complexity of their operations, the subdivision of functions, and the consequent fragmentation of individual responsibility, the services had come to rely on "management by exception," whereby individuals were presumed to be performing adequately except when the contrary could be demonstrated. As a result, incompetent people were retained in a great variety of positions.[9]

When Joseph S. Imirie, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Materiel), asked members of his office and the Air Staff to comment on Campbell's statement, most of them denied that the GAO had given a fair description of current conditions in the Air Force or Department of Defense. Pointing out that Campbell had constructed his case from GAO reports going back as much as six years, staff agencies declared that in the past two years the Air Force had conducted a vigorous campaign to improve management, cutting out nearly 4,000 jobs in maintenance alone. They freely admitted failures, mainly because of the weaknesses of individuals and the size of the system, but they thought the wastes cited by GAO represented only a very small percentage of the overall operation. Nevertheless, Aaron J. Racusin, Imirie's deputy for procurement management, asserted that Campbell's strictures were highly pertinent. He thought that the Air Force had been neglecting its most valuable asset--its people--and relying too heavily on written procedures, guidelines, and regulations. Racusin thought the Air Force should improve efficiency by attracting competent people, promoting those already in the system, and placing its best talent in responsible positions.[10]

Meanwhile, Congress had gone considerably beyond criticism and cajolery in its effort to improve the military use of manpower. Legislation in July and August 1960 specifically limited the number of military personnel and civilians, the number of military officers on duty in each headquarters of the armed services, and the dollars spent for headquarters administration. In addition, Congress placed a limit on the number of officers on flying status. Although Secretary of the Air Force Dudley C. Sharp expressed grave concern lest too rigid a limitation on headquarters personnel hamper management of advanced weapon systems, his successor, Eugene M. Zuckert, stated that he usually found it possible to operate under the ceilings without undue difficulty.[11]

In August 1961 Congress threatened additional severe restrictions on the use of manpower. In its report on the DOD Appropriations Bill of 1962, the House Committee on Appropriations noted the continuing rise in manpower costs despite large reductions in numbers, and it repeated with new vigor the old charge that there must be something drastically wrong with the military system of manpower management. The committee warned that personnel costs would soon reach an "unacceptable level" if the services did not make basic and far-reaching improvements. Carlile P. Runge, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower), thought that the report portended great danger for defense programs unless the services furnished convincing and comprehensive rejoinders.

In reply, the Air Force pointed out that rising personnel costs were a direct reflection of the growing demands for higher quality. It argued convincingly that an honest effort had been made to control costs, demonstrating that manpower costs were not consuming any larger share of the budget than in former years. Nevertheless, as expenditures rose, the pressures for manpower economies grew stronger. In May 1963 Zuckert and his staff faced a new and thorough examination by the Manpower Utilization Subcommittee, which asked for information and an explanation of almost every phase of military and civilian manpower management.[12]

Congressional insistence on greater economy in the use of manpower was reinforced by similar sentiments from the White House, especially after the Kennedy Administration came to power in January 1961. USAF efforts to obtain relief from what it considered unreasonable manpower ceilings were frequently denied on the ground that strength totals were so closely supervised by the White House, through the Bureau of the Budget, that OSD could increase manpower for one function only by taking it away from another. Consequently, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara had to make many difficult decisions as to which function had the greater priority. The decisions became increasingly difficult, of course, when President John F. Kennedy created several new projects, all of which required manpower.

Pressure from the White House became especially persistent after Congress passed the Federal Salary Reform Act of October 1962. In conformity with promises he had made to Congress, President Kennedy instructed each government agency to keep the number of its employees to an absolute minimum. The BOB, the Civil Service Commission, and the heads of all departments and agencies were directed to undertake systematic manpower inspections and reviews. BOB, which was primarily responsible for seeing that the directive was carried out, scrutinized anew all procedures for insuring economy. President Kennedy was especially concerned about the use of scientists and engineers, since in this field the government was competing for skills that were very scarce.

At the end of October, BOB issued Circular A-44, which stressed, as had President Kennedy, the necessity for keeping manpower at a bare minimum. In addition, it required defense agencies to submit statements describing in detail their programs for improving manpower controls. On 3 December OSD directed the armed services to make replies covering both military and civilian personnel. Narrative materials were due on 21 December, 18 days later, with a complete schedule of specific actions being taken or planned due by 15 March 1963.[13]

The difficulty and uncertainty imposed on approved programs by such directives was illustrated by their effect on the Air Force's attempt to strengthen its laboratories. Shortly before President Kennedy issued his directive, Brockway McMillan, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (R&D), and his Special Assistant for Laboratories, Edward M. Glass, had received tacit OSD approval for a plan to nearly double professional staffs in the laboratories. Since White House directives often tended to "snow-ball" and transform constraints into inflexible restrictions, Glass feared that he would not be able to carry out the laboratory program which he considered essential for the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) and the Office of Aerospace Research (OAR). He feared that centralized control of scarce manpower, lengthy justifications, detailed reviews and inspections, and mountains of paperwork would smother the project before it was under way.

After urging McMillan to discuss this problem with Zuckert and Dr. Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E),

Glass talked to Maj. Gen. Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., Director of Manpower and Organization, who explained that seemingly contradictory directives were common and that officials had to use mature judgement in acting on them. Glass agreed, but he stated that mature judgement was often lacking at "middle management and base level." He made a final plea to DDR&E to insure that the application of BOB Circular A-44 would not disrupt the manning of the laboratories.

In April 1963 Glass was still uncertain as to the effect of the manpower squeeze. He was still unable to obtain spaces or exercise flexibility in assignment and reassignment, and two AFSC laboratories had been notified that substantial cuts were forthcoming. At the same time, however, Gen. William F. McKee, Vice Chief of Staff, assured Dr. McMillan that AFSC and OAR had been directed to administer their reductions without adversely affecting the laboratories. At least through the remainder of fiscal year 1963, this seemed to have been accomplished.[14]

OSD and USAF Responses

For more than two years before the Kennedy directive of October 1962, the Air Force had been making strenuous efforts to economize on the use of manpower. Headquarters USAF exercised constant surveillance over the use of personnel at all echelons of the Air Force, strictly controlled space authorizations by function, and conducted periodic surveys to determine manpower requirements and check on economy measures. During this period, the Air Staff rapidly reduced noncombat mission support flying, as well as the number of aircraft assigned to this activity. In January 1960 the Air Force began consolidating pilot training by providing a student with all phases of his undergraduate training at one base, saving about 500 spaces and $1.6 million.

These economies raised questions in the Chief of Staff's Office as to whether the Air Force would have enough people to carry out its missions, particularly after the limitations of the fiscal year 1961 budget became evident. In June 1961 Gen. Emmett O'Donnell, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), told Zuckert that the increased workload imposed by the Communist threat to Laos and South Vietnam made it imperative that he be given the authority to hire more maintenance people. Before the end of December, OSD raised the ceiling slightly, but in the meantime the Berlin crisis had tightened the manpower squeeze.[15]

In March 1962 Secretary Zuckert directed the Air Staff to explore every possible avenue for decreasing the number of USAF personnel in Europe. This action, taken in large part to diminish the flow of gold from the United States, resulted in closing or reducing activities around London, eliminating many units in the United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), transferring work to the United States, and moving certain Military Air Transport Service (MATS) missions from Europe to the United States. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) cut about 5,000 jobs in Britain and Spain by expanding use of the reflex concept--assigning B-47 squadrons to Europe for short periods instead of stationing wings there on long assignments. In June 1963 McNamara obtained the consent of President Kennedy to a further reduction of SAC forces in Europe. By reducing and consolidating reflex forces in Britain and Spain, OSD planned to return two bases to Great Britain and transfer functions of the 7th Air Division in that country to the 16th Air Force in Spain. This plan was scheduled to go into effect on 1 July 1964.[16]

Determined that organizational adjustments within the services should not increase manpower, OSD insisted that all proposed decisions on organization, reorganization, consolidation, or transfer of functions contain detailed staffing plans, both of the old and the new organization. OSD would furnish guidance, set manpower ceilings, and make the final decision. These tight controls and McNamara's reluctance to approve increases often created serious problems within the Air Force.

In May 1962, after McNamara had turned down an urgent USAF request for additional manpower spaces, Zuckert told Chief of Staff Curtis E. LeMay that this appeared to be a forerunner of the "attitude downstairs"* toward USAF personnel requirements and that "...there is just going to be no give in manpower ceilings, even for very important items." Zuckert believed that the Air Force would have to review its functions and make painful decisions concerning activities that could be eliminated or cut back. He wanted the Chief of Staff's views on what measures should be taken.[17]

Acting for the Chief of Staff, General McKee agreed that the Air Force would have to re-examine its activities and eliminate or reduce those of lowest priority. Admittedly, this would bring the Air Force face to face with painful decisions, but the other alternative was to have USAF management directed by OSD. McKee proposed to set up a board

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*OSD was located on the floor below OSAF in the Pentagon.

of general officers to conduct a thorough study and then recommend elimination or reduction of those functions, organizations, or installations not absolutely necessary to the USAF mission.

About the time McKee received Zuckert's memorandum, he had also received McNamara's Project 29, which required a detailed review of general support forces and their substantial reduction, and Project 39, which called for reduction in headquarters staffs, military and civilian, and in the number of intermediate headquarters--those between Headquarters USAF and the basic troop units. McKee thought these comprehensive studies would result in a substantial cut back in manpower, but he wanted a still broader study that would examine each function and then set priorities that were related to the amount of money the Air Force expected to obtain.[18]

A Manpower Posture Improvement Board was established, which prepared a report in September. Its reception in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force was not acclaimed. Benjamin W. Fridge, OSAF Special Assistant for Manpower, Personnel, and Reserve Forces, asserted that the board had failed to abide by McKee's instructions. It had decided not to recommend abandonment or transfer of missions, dramatic or extreme actions, or any action not within the capacity of the Air Force under its current budget and manpower ceiling. Since these limitations precluded the imaginative thinking which McKee had requested, the board recommended manpower cuts in such comparatively minor items as mail and records, information, and legislative liaison services. Fridge sharply criticized the board because it failed to make recommendations concerning command and control or research and development--areas which most needed improvement.[19]

In his advice to Zuckert, Fridge enumerated six alternatives: (1) accept the board's report and the small improvements it recommended; (2) disregard the report and set up a new board, which might not do any better, "human relations in the military being what they are;" (3) place the project in the hands of civilian experts, who would have to be educated in military parlance, probably prohibitive in cost and time; (4) set up a small working group of officers in the Office of the Secretary to serve over a long term and attack each function as a separate problem; (5) issue an order to the Chief of Staff, specifying required actions; or (6) maintain the status quo, and eventually OSD would evaluate USAF missions and tell the Air Force what to do. Fridge advised Zuckert to adopt the fourth of these alternatives, and the Secretary appeared to have agreed with him.[20]

In December 1962 Zuckert convinced OSD, at least temporarily, that the Air Force needed more manpower, mainly because of increased airborne alert training and preparations for special warfare in Southeast Asia. McNamara assured Zuckert that, during the next five months, whenever OSD approved a change in the Air Force program that required additional people, he would add them to the current strength ceiling. Before the end of the five months, however, Zuckert would have to "...complete and review with me a thorough analysis of the Air Force strength requirements and ... relate such requirements to the approved force structure and to the support program, including bases associated with that force structure."

This seemed to reinforce Fridge's warning that the Air Force might lose all flexibility in managing its manpower if it did not soon come up with imaginative plans for more economical use of its personnel.[21]

It should not be assumed, however, that the Air Force failed to make progress in economizing on manpower, or that OSD was generally dissatisfied with USAF accomplishments. In some respects, the Air Force was doing a better management job than the other services and winning wide acclaim for its achievements. In May 1962 James N. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production Management), declared that OSD was very favorably impressed with the management of maintenance personnel on USAF bases, that Air Force maintenance was improving greatly, and that the Air Force had the most effective audit and control system in the Defense Department. Davis wondered if the Air Force planned to exert the same scrutiny and control over other base personnel. He said OSD was "getting in the habit of looking to the Air Force for leadership in such matters."

Fridge replied that the Air Force had made encouraging progress in manpower utilization in many fields. Management of maintenance workers was merely the furthest along, but there were also effective controls in supply, civil engineering, comptroller, and communications. Fridge explained that the Air Force employed the Manpower Validation Program, inaugurated in July 1960, to analyze manpower requirements. This program, derived from standards generally accepted by industry, work sampling, historical experience, and manpower surveys, was used to determine the man-hours required to do a specific job. After sufficient data were accumulated and validated, they were employed in setting standards which were turned over to supervisors as aids in management. When sufficiently tested, the standards were used as one factor in distributing manpower resources. The validation program paid rich dividends, the Air Force estimating that by May 1962 it had saved about 4,000 spaces for transfer to more essential work, and by June 1963 more than 6,500.[22]

The manpower validation program attracted wide attention and emulation throughout the U.S. Government and abroad during 1962 and 1963. In February 1962 the Bureau of the Budget became interested and a few months later published an article on the subject in the "BOB Management Bulletin." In June 1963, BOB asked General Davis, Director of Manpower and Organization, to lecture on the program before interdepartmental conferences and the Society for Personnel Administration. The Federal Aviation Agency asked for two USAF officers to help put the system into effect in that agency. The Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and the Royal Air Force sent representatives to study the system, and in June 1963, the RCAF began putting a similar program into operation.[23]

To perfect manpower controls, Vice Chief of Staff McKee in June 1963 advised the Force Estimates Board that he believed it needed to pay more attention to manpower needs and costs while developing Air Force programs. Before giving its approval, the board should demonstrate that the program could be carried out with currently authorized manpower.

Otherwise the board should be able to explain to OSD how additional manpower might be justified.[24]

By January 1963 the Air Force had well-organized and effectively functioning machinery for controlling the use of manpower. In the Office of the Secretary, the machinery was controlled by the Special Assistant to the Secretary (M,P,&RF), Mr. Fridge; at Headquarters USAF, by the Director of Manpower and Organization, General Davis. Headquarters allocated authorizations to the major commands and separate agencies to support approved programs to the extent possible within OSD-imposed ceilings. Requirements that could not be met within the ceiling were deferred until more people became available. The commands and separate agencies apportioned their manpower and then prepared unit-manning documents that reflected the numbers and kinds of people needed to carry out each mission. The total numbers and grades within a command or agency could not exceed the strength and grades authorized for that command or agency by Headquarters USAF.

The Air Force divided its total task into homogeneous groupings of about 70 task groups or functions, each described and identified by a functional reporting code. This code, the foundation of the USAF manpower control system, applied to both military and civilian personnel. Air Force Manual (AFM) 26-1 delineated broad guidance on integration of manpower and jobs to be done, determination of rated officer requirements, control of officer grades, control of airman grades and skills, officer-airman distribution, utilization of civilians, standard man-hour requirements, and justification of increased requirements. The Air

Force also studied specific functions or individual units, organizations, and oversea deployment. These studies led to economies whenever possible, such as the consolidation of support activities in the Tokyo area.[25]

During the spring of 1963, the Air Force's studies of manpower requirements and its admitted success in achieving economy continued to receive plaudits. In June 1963, Gus C. Lee, OSD Director of Manpower requirements and Utilization, told General Davis that the latest study of Air Force manpower requirements and management was excellent, that it greatly increased OSD understanding of Air Force requirements, and that the Air Force would benefit from this better understanding.[26]

Nevertheless, the Air Force often felt overburdened by the welter of reports, studies, and reviews requested by OSD. After a request for a new report on the USAF program for improving productivity and manpower controls, Davis commented that the Air Force had already submitted a quarterly report on this subject which had furnished much of the same information. He thought it would be in the interest of economy to expand the format of the existing report rather than prepare a new report. James P. Goode, OSAF Deputy for Manpower, Personnel, and Organization, also complained about the duplication of reports. Since the Air Force had an unusually heavy burden of work and too few people to do it, he needed more time than OSD allowed to prepare manpower programs. Moreover, both Goode and Davis seemed to agree that when the Air Force saved manpower spaces in one function or area, OSD frequently cut the Air Force ceiling instead of allowing the spaces to be used where they were desparately needed.[27]

III. MILITARY MANPOWER

USAF military manpower difficulties during the 1960's were frequently those of earlier years, rendered more acute by the passage of time and the advance of technology. New problems, however, also arose from new issues or crises that monopolized effort and resources. In April 1961, for example, the Air Force inaugurated a specific program to train forces for counterinsurgency operations in underdeveloped countries, especially in Southeast Asia.*

In the officer corps, the major difficulties were the shortage of general officers, the removal of older men from flying status and the training of young ones to replace them, the attraction and retention of scientists and engineers, and relief from grade limitations in the field grades. With airmen, the old difficulty of the retention of trained people still seemed to defy a satisfactory solution. Other important problems were administration of proficiency pay, shortages in certain skills and grades, restrictions on noncommissioned officer (NCO) grades, and the general training of technicians. Women in the Air Force (WAF) presented no particular problems except that of recruiting, which could be attributed chiefly to the exceptionally high standards the Air Force demanded of its female contingent.

On occasion, the general question of the morale and physical condition of U.S. military people attracted the attention of the highest

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*For a discussion of this program, see Charles H. Hildreth, USAF Counterinsurgency Doctrines and Capabilities, 1961-1962, AFCHO, Feb 64, pp 6-18, 22-26, 20-33, 45-50.

councils of government. In February 1960, Gordon Gray, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, asked the Secretary of Defense for a report on this question, stating that the National Security Council Planning Board had become concerned about the morale, motivation, and physical condition of draftees.

Based on studies conducted by the three services, OSD replied that general attitudes toward military service, discipline, and willingness to undergo hardship were a little more favorable than during past peacetime periods. Absences without leave and the number of prisoners had declined significantly within the services between 1957 and 1960. The Air Force had experienced a drop of one-third in serious offenses and prisoner population during these years. The chief adverse effects on morale seemed to derive from the beliefs of servicemen that there were relatively abundant economic opportunities in civilian life and the public held a low opinion of military service.

The services could find no evidence that the physical condition of men of draft age was deteriorating. Perhaps they had become softer because of the fewer physical demands of modern living, but noneffectiveness rates for medical causes were lower in June 1960 than ever before. For the Air Force, this was still true in June 1963. The Air Force believed that its men could develop strong endurance and stamina in a short time when necessary. Most of its jobs, however, required relatively little heavy exercise. It should be noted that since 1957 only the Army had been compelled to draft men. The other services accepted only volunteers.[1]

Officers

The shortage of field-grade officer positions caused by the Officer Grade Limitation Act of 1954 has hampered the Air Force since 1959.* Recognizing the inequity of the law, in June 1959 Congress permitted the Air Force to exceed temporarily the legal ceiling for majors by 3,000, but it provided no permanent relief. Six months later Secretary Sharp declared that without relief by the end of June 1961, when the temporary authorization expired, the Air Force would have to curtail temporary promotions to grades above captain. In September 1961 Congress favored the Air Force again by authorizing, through June 1963, 4,000 new lieutenant colonel positions.

Meanwhile, in January 1961 a special OSD committee, headed by Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolte, USA (Ret.), recommended a uniform field-grade authorization table and a single selection system for the three services. The Air Force supported legislation to put these recommendations into effect since they would have provided most of the positions the Air Force needed. OSD did not transmit a legislative proposal to Congress until March 1963, however, and at the end of 1963, it was stalled in a legislative log jam.[2]

The Air Force received authority, however, to fill its quota of regular officers. In 1956, Congress had passed the Regular Officers Augmentation Act, which authorized the Air Force to increase its regular officer strength from 27,500 to 69,425. At the same time, however,

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*For an explanation of this situation, see George F. Lemmer, <u>The Changing Character of Air Force Manpower, 1958-1959</u>, pp 22-26.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower, on the recommendation of OSD, set an interim ceiling of 55,540 to be reached during 1963 in order to insure an orderly buildup and high quality. By March 1961 the Air Force was approaching the interim ceiling and had increased the educational level and career potential of its regular officers. To encourage maximum professionalism within the officer corps, Zuckert asked McNamara to obtain removal of the interim ceiling and allow the Air Force to continue its orderly buildup to the statutory ceiling. McNamara agreed and persuaded President Kennedy to remove the interim ceiling.[3]

Joint, combined, and OSD staffs appreciably increased during the Kennedy administration and aroused concern within the Air Staff. By December 1961 the Air Force had supplied from its severely limited resources more than 7,000 spaces to joint activities, and some USAF officials believed that the drain threatened to reduce combat effectiveness. By May 1962 the figure had grown to 10,000, including 103 general officers, approximately 24 percent of the Air Force's total. Headquarters insisted that the Air Force was already considerably short of general officers and that its own workload had increased.

The Air Staff was equally concerned, however, that the Air Force have sufficient representation in OSD and joint agencies. Officials in both the Air Staff and the Secretary's office felt that the other military services had controlled positions that exerted substantial influence on the USAF role in national defense. These officials recognized that the future of the Air Force depended on decisions by the joint agencies and by OSD, since they controlled USAF combat commands, resources, and to a large extent, supporting forces. Since this centralization of control was likely to continue or even become greater, the Air Force realized that it had to assign its best people to the joint staffs, particularly in OSD, if it were to influence its future.

Because of the shortage of general officers, the Air Force felt unable to meet commitments to either its own operating forces or outside agencies. Zuckert believed that the situation could be eased by better use of the generals. He thought that too many were assigned to positions that did not require them, particularly as air division commanders of SAC. In May 1962 the Air Staff decided to set up a permanent committee to study the situation and recommend a long-range solution.[4]

The Air Force made a number of important adjustments in the management of its rated personnel--pilots and navigators. Ever since the Korean War, Congress had strongly criticized the Air Force for spending large sums of money to maintain the proficiency of flying officers actually surplus to its needs. The Air Force clearly recognized the necessity of reducing the number of flying officers after the war when its combat aircraft units were reduced and emphasis shifted to strategic missiles. It also saw that it had to find some means of cutting the cost of "proficiency flying." On the other hand, the Air Force needed to provide an incentive to new pilots and navigators by protecting their future careers and income.

In February 1959 the Air Force proposed an "accrual" pay system, and in 1960 the Bureau of the Budget suggested "requital" pay to compensate men removed from flying status "for the convenience of the Government." Both systems would have entitled these men to a certain percentage of their flight pay even though they did no flying. Under the accrual plan, men with 20 or more years of "rated service" would have received 100 percent of their flight pay. Neither plan ever cleared Congress, and in 1963 the Air Force asked that they be held in abeyance.[5]

Meanwhile, in March 1961, the Air Force reported to OSD that the elimination of approximately 7,400 surplus rated officers would probably save $24.2 million the next year, including reductions in flight pay and operation and maintenance costs. Requital pay for men removed from flying would have decreased the saving by $1 million. To help the Air Force cut these costs, Congress authorized the waiver of flying requirements for officers with 20 or more years of rated service. In the fiscal year 1961 appropriation act, Congress limited the number of aviators in the Department of Defense who would actually fly. As pressure increased, the Air Force waived flying requirements for officers rated more than 20 years, removed certain men from flying status, and reduced proficiency flying. Utilizing a provision of the 1962 appropriations act, the Air Force excused about 3,800 pilots and navigators with more than 15 years of flying experience from proficiency flying, effective 1 July 1962. Beginning 1 July 1963, it excused from flying most officers who were 45 years old and had completed 22 years of flying service. Between 1960 and 1963, about 6,000 pilots were withdrawn from mission-support flying.

These moves just about balanced the number of rated officers and current requirements. But this was no clear-cut issue. Buttressing the USAF argument that it was dangerous to cut back too far, the Berlin crisis in the fall of 1961 brought a temporary reversal of emphasis. Because of this crisis and concurrent preparations for possible local conflicts, McNamara asked Congress to remove the statutory ceiling on the number of officers on active flying status. During this crisis the Air Force's requirement for rated officers rose from about 62,300 to about 69,930.[6]

Soon after the Berlin crisis, the Air Force had to shift its attention from the rated-officer surplus to the threat of pilot shortage, since the need for pilots increased steadily and substantially. Despite the surplus in the older-age group, the Air Force faced a rapidly growing shortage of young pilots. About half of the older pilots had been trained during World War II and would not be available for combat much longer. In August 1962 OSD agreed to increase the pilot training rate by 1966 to 2,000 per year for the active establishment, plus 224 for military assistance and the Air National Guard. By the fall of 1962, Headquarters USAF could see that this increase would be insufficient. On 19 June 1963, it proposed a rate of 3,400, to be reached in 1968, even though this would require far-reaching curriculum changes or a crash expansion of training bases. OSD did not approve this new proposal* and at the end of June 1963 had not released enough construction funds to insure that the 2,000-per-year rate could be achieved.[7]

The Air Force also experienced a pressing and growing need for experienced officers trained in science, engineering, and management. Since 1961 General LeMay has proclaimed this as the most critical need of the modern Air Force. In December 1961 only 18,152 of the 30,370 officers in positions that required scientific or engineering training had degrees in these fields. Fifty-six percent of the majors and 46 percent of the captains filling jobs that called for this education did not have college degrees. Of the 55,800 officers in the grade of major and below without college degrees, more than 15,550 were regular officers. Yet among these men were the future leaders of the Air Force.

During 1961 and 1962 the Air Force estimated the number of officers trained in science and engineering that it would need through 1970, as well as its likelihood of obtaining them. The conclusions were far from encouraging: no less than 95 percent of its new officers should possess college degrees and there would be a shortage of at least 10,000 in officers with graduate training. In trying to fulfill these needs, the Educational Requirements Board at Air University encountered varying degrees of resistance. A considerable number of officers were reluctant to apply for schooling in the Air Force Institute of

*In October 1963 OSD did approve gradually increasing the rate to 2,700 per year by 1968.

Technology (AFIT),* as well as other programs, because they feared that prolonged absence from their assigned commands would jeopardize their careers. Furthermore, until procedures were changed in November 1961, their applications often were delayed unreasonably when processed through channels to Headquarters USAF.[8]

Authoritative sources of information, including the Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Science Foundation, and Engineers Manpower Council, anticipated a critical shortage of trained manpower during the decade of the 1960's. In the federal government alone, demand for engineers was expected to increase by 77,000 or 44 percent, for scientists by 86,600 or 82 percent. The civilian economy would need an additional combined increase of about 1,000,000 persons trained in these disciplines. Headquarters USAF believed that the Air Force would require at least 11,000 new officers trained for jobs directly related to science and engineering.

The future prospects of the United States for graduating these specialists appeared inauspicious, especially when compared to prospects of the Soviet Union, its chief competitor in the cold war. In 1961 the United States graduated 90,000 scientists and engineers, the Soviet Union reportedly 190,000. By 1970, the Soviet Union was expected to graduate 250,000 scientists and engineers per year, the United States no more than 138,000 before 1965. Admittedly these calculations were rough estimates that had to be viewed with skepticism. Less open to

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*AFIT, a division of Air University, trained most of its students through contracts with civilian universities. A few hundred a year (about 20 percent) studied at the Resident College, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio.

question, however, was the conclusion that in the United States, between 1960 and 1970, there would be an annual deficit of about 28,860 scientists and 36,140 engineers. There would obviously be sharp competition among employers for these men. With much justification, the Air Force felt that it would be difficult to obtain the trained people it needed.[9]

Under LeMay's aegis, higher education for USAF officers became the subject of a concerted drive. After 1961 the Air Force made every effort to insure that no less than 95 percent of its new officers possessed a college degree. It planned to increase AFIT's educational program drastically, and it expanded the Officers Training School (OTS), which enrolled only college graduates, until by fiscal year 1963 OTS graduated more officers than the Air Force Reserve Officers Training Corps (AFROTC) in the colleges. The Air Force also entered into an agreement with George Washington University whereby the latter offered undergraduate and graduate work to students of the Air Command and Staff College and Air War College. Off-duty (Bootstrap) education was increased at civilian colleges and universities, including a program for launch-control officers at Minuteman bases.[10]

The Air Force also reformed AFROTC, now obsolescent because so few basic students became advanced students and officers. A proposal, originating at Air University in August 1960 and soon accepted by the Air Force Council, recommended that the four-year course be abandoned in favor of a two-year merit scholarships for career officer training. Under this proposal, college students who accepted scholarships, and upon graduation were tendered commissions, would serve four years on active duty. It took until July 1962 to devise legislation acceptable to the other services and OSD. A proposed bill sent to the Bureau of the Budget in September 1962 proved unacceptable, and a new one was submitted in June 1963. If passed by Congress, it would permit the military departments to operate two-year ROTC protrams, with scholarships, instead of or in addition to current programs.[11]

Despite the growing need for college-trained officers, at the end of June 1963 it appeared that the near future would witness a contraction, rather than an expansion, of educational programs.* OSD cut back sharply the Air Force's plan to expand AFIT's student body to 4,500 in fiscal year 1964 and withheld funds for expansion of the resident school at Wright-Patterson AFB. OSD also limited tuition funds for officers attending civilian colleges to about $2.9 million in fiscal year 1964. Headquarters USAF considered this figure about $775,000 short of the requirement. Because of the chronic shortage of funds, the Air Staff set up a committee to examine all officer education and training courses and eliminate those not absolutely essential. The committee deleted 18 short college courses for fiscal year 1964 and

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*The Air Force did achieve a considerable gain in college-trained officers during fiscal year 1963. At the end of June 1962, out of a total of 134,908 officers, 65,613 (about 49 percent) had bachelor or higher degrees. A year later there were 75,260 bachelor or higher degrees (about 56 percent) out of a total of 133,763. Of those with college degrees at the end of June 1963, about 13,570 had taken them in science or engineering. Of these, 164 had earned doctorates; 2,080, masters; and the remainder, bachelors. (Information furnished by USAF Data Services Center, 10 Feb 64.)

planned to cut spaces in others by 20 percent. Although these measures were necessary to stay within budget restrictions, they did not conceal an acute shortage of trained people that might seriously limit the Air Force's ability to perform its mission.[12]

Airmen

The Air Force continued to confront the old problem of obtaining and holding enough skilled and experienced airmen to sustain operations and combat capability. In the 1960's the failure to hold these men became more serious because of the increasing complexity of equipment and the greater variety of missions. In the summer of 1960, Headquarters USAF decided that 55 percent of the airmen should have career status (four or more years of service). Actually, in some of the highly technical fields, such as electronics and mechanical maintenance, the desired proportion was 60 percent or higher. To meet this objective, the Air Force needed to enlist airmen who could absorb a high degree of technical training and then be selective in inducing a large number of them to reenlist.[13]

Beginning in 1960 both the percentage of career airmen on duty and the rate of reenlistment dropped severely. From June 1959 to June 1961 the percentage fell from close to 60 to well below the desired 55 and the first-term reenlistment rate from about 46 percent to about 24. The Air Force attributed these losses to the withdrawal of reenlistment benefits, such as six-year enlistments, bonuses, travel pay, and special assignment considerations, and low incentives as compared to opportunities in industry.

Although the situation improved substantially in 1962, the Air Force continued to fall short of its retention goals. In fiscal year 1963 it needed to retain almost 70 percent of its trained airmen but reenlisted only 35 percent of its first-term airmen and not enough of the remainder of its experienced men. For fiscal year 1964 it expected to retain only about 85 percent of the men it needed.* This meant that the Air Force had little chance during the foreseeable future of holding enough high-caliber, trained, and experienced men.[14]

This failure caused growing concern in the late summer of 1960. In August of that year, Headquarters USAF estimated that SAC was short about 5,700 trained airmen and the Air Force as a whole about 20,000. The loss of experienced men plus a slump in recruiting occurred during the activation of several new missile units. This occasioned a sharp rise in technical training requirements, further heightening the shortage in combat commands, especially SAC. In addition, measures taken during the military crises of 1961 and 1962 to improve combat readiness, such as the retention of medium bomber and fighter units previously scheduled for deactivation and an augmented alert, increased personnel requirements by several thousand. Since the Air Force was already plagued by airman shortages, these measures aggravated the problem of achieving combat readiness. There was also an inevitable drop in quality, difficult to measure accurately but nevertheless real.[15]

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*Actually, first-term reenlistments for fiscal year 1964 reached only 29.5 percent of those eligible--about 60 percent of the stated requirement. (Statement from USAF Military Personnel Center, 8 Feb 65.)

In March 1961 OSAF concluded that the high turnover among enlisted personnel could be reduced only by affording more opportunities for promotion--increasing the proportion of men in the top six grades--airman first class (E-4) through Chief Master Sergeant (E-9). About 35,000 airmen with more than four years of service were stagnating at the E-3 level. During one 18-month period, approximately 8,300 airmen--70 percent of them in the lower grades--left the Air Force because, with their number of dependents and low pay, they were suffering hardships.

OSAF recommended raising the proportion of airmen in the top six grades to 60 percent and promoting approximately 10,000 E-3's. It believed that promotions of more good men fairly early in their first term of service would encourage many of them to reenlist. Lack of funds prevented this, but OSAF declared that if only 1,000 skilled men could be held during fiscal years 1961 and 1962, the expense of these promotions would be more than recouped by the saving in training costs. OSD was not easily persuaded, however. Its manpower program for fiscal years 1963 and 1964 still held the Air Force's proportion of airmen in grades E-4 and above to well below the 60-percent mark.[16]

To hold trained airmen, the Air Force relied chiefly on the proficiency pay plan, first put into effect in November 1958. Under this scheme, airmen in the most critical skills could, by maintaining high proficiency, qualify for extra pay--$30 per month in step P-1 and $60 per month in P-2. The law provided for a third step and higher rates, but until October 1963, OSD did not permit these to go into effect.

Although the Air Force hoped to give 15 percent of its airmen proficiency pay by June 1962, OSD never allowed more than 11.5 percent. After 1960, the Air Force thought that the rates for P-1 and P-2 were too low and ought to be raised to $50 and $100, respectively, and that P-3 ought to be established at $150. OSD agreed to smaller raises, effective in October 1963, and authorized the P-3 rating at $100 per month. But OSD denied additional funds, and the Air Force could not apply the new rates without removing many skilled, experienced technicians from proficiency pay status. Since the removal of so important an incentive might have had a deleterious effect on morale, and possibly in performance, the Air Force obtained OSD's permission to continue a larger percentage of airmen on proficiency pay at the old, lower rates through fiscal year 1964 within the constraints of a $35.7 million ceiling.[17]

The greatest penalty for the inability to hold skilled technicians was the inordinate effort and expense of training replacements. In the 1960's an average of more than 100,000 airmen per year graduated from formal technical training courses. This figure did not include the several hundred thousand who received on-the-job training. The Air Force devoted about 18 percent of its manpower to training in one form or another, and as technology advanced, training time and expense continued to increase. Most young enlistees were high school graduates who needed technical skills before they could perform usefully. According to Lt. Gen. James E. Briggs, Commander of Air Training Command (ATC) from August 1959 to July 1963, it usually took five months of schooling in basic electronics to prepare a recruit for intensive instruction in this field. Ordinarily, it required two years--half his first enlistment--to make him a skilled electronic technician. Few jobs required this much training, but many demanded as much as one year. The government obviously lost time, effort, and money when a trained airman left the Air Force at the end of his first enlistment.[18]

The chief benefactors of the huge military training effort, aside from the recipients, was American industry. Lt. Gen. Robert W. Burns, Briggs' successor at ATC, declared that the skills acquired in Air Force service were almost wholly applicable to jobs in industry, and he suggested that the nation's benefits included the hundreds of thousands of USAF-trained technicians who were now civilian workers. He stated that the Air Force, through ATC, was turning out the largest share of this country's "aerospace age technicians."

This judgement took on added national significance when the combined efforts of the military services were assessed. In November 1963, Norman S. Paul, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower), told the Senate Subcommittee on Employment and Manpower that more than 1.5 million of the 1.9 million enlisted men and women discharged in the past six years had acquired skills with civilian counterparts. Among them were 403,000 mechanics, 320,000 electronic technicians and equipment operators, 79,000 medical and dental technicians, and 47,000 construction craftsmen. Obviously, the services were providing a large part of the country's technical education, and some observers averred that it entailed a burden that the military services should not have to bear.

Since the nation refused to assume a legitimate responsibility for educating its citizens, they implied that it paid for much of this education under the heading of national defense.[19]

IV. CIVILIAN MANPOWER

The most significant problems relating to civilian manpower grew out of the requirement for a greater proportion of well-educated and experienced people, the changing functions and missions of the Air Force, and the incessant drive of Congress and the Administration for economy. Changes in functions and missions frequently resulted in a lessening of work in one function or location and a heavier workload in another. Rapid technological changes, the Berlin and Cuban crises, and preparation for local war or insurrections made such shifting frequent during 1960-1963. But rigid controls and justification procedures often delayed the shift in manpower to the function or area where activity had increased. The reigning political climate also favored reducing employment whenever possible. Because of Congressional pressure, in fiscal year 1963 OSD directed a careful review of every vacancy at grade GS-11 or above.[1]

Therefore it was more important than ever for the Air Force to obtain flexibility in using its civilians. Even before 1960 it had wanted to be free to move higher-ranking employees from one station to another within the United States. This required compensating them properly for expenses connected with these moves. It wanted to insure that all qualified employees would be considered in filling vacancies in grades GS-15 and above. By June 1963, USAF procedures made this mandatory. The Air Force also wanted to set up an orderly interchange of career employees between the United States and oversea installations.

In most cases these procedures required new legislation or changes in civil service regulations. At the end of June 1963 the Air Force had not yet achieved all of these aims.[2]

Administration and Training

Although Air Force agency heads had legal authority to move employees from one geographical area to another, they seldom exercised it against the employees' will because the moves usually cost far more than the small government allowance. A Civil Service Commission study of employees who accepted geographical reassignment during fiscal year 1962 showed that four out of five lost money; 17 percent lost more than $1,000 each. By August 1962 high-ranking civilians generally agreed to move where they were most needed, but Congress did not authorize a relocation allowance, probably because a GAO report of September 1962 charged that NASA contractors had wasted nearly $1 million by paying these allowances to employees who stayed on the job less than a year after they were hired. GAO estimated that contractors spent millions more in this fashion and that ultimately the government paid the bill.[3]

The Air Force frequently needed to fill oversea positions with employees familiar with stateside operations and, conversely, stateside positions with employees who had gained experience overseas. Since the best people were reluctant to accept foreign assignments without a guarantee of reemployment when they returned, the Air Force wanted to afford such return rights at an equal or higher grade. This required new legislation and changes in civil service regulations. The legislation and regulation changes were obtained by October 1960.

By June 1963 the Air Force was working on regulations that would require civilians to return to the United States from oversea jobs periodically. Secretary Zuckert told Representative Tom Murray, Chairman of the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee, that in the near future it might be necessary for a command to get the approval of Headquarters USAF to keep an employee in an oversea job more than five years. Because of complaints from some employees and the need for giving employees ample time to prepare to move, the Air Force was moving slowly in this direction. It appeared likely, however, that such a requirement would soon go into effect.[4]

Most professional civilian employees had good educational backgrounds before they were hired, but many still needed training. This included management courses for supervisors and methods and standards courses for many other workers. Some civilians attended the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and Air Force Institute of Technology, and a few went to universities for full-time graduate study. DCS/Personnel of Headquarters USAF tried to insure that civilians were trained to meet existing needs or retrained to meet new needs. Because of the scarcity of scientists and engineers, the Air Force constantly sought new ways to use them more effectively. It freed some laboratories from rigid, centralized manpower controls to permit them to reassign their people to meet changing professional needs. During 1963 the Air Force tried to work out a reciprocity arrangement with civilian universities whereby USAF scientists and engineers could work toward advanced degrees in the universities and do research in their laboratories, while university people worked in Air Force laboratories. At the same time, OSD supported legislation to permit more training of government scientists and engineers in colleges and universities.[5]

In early 1963 the Civil Service Commission assessed USAF personnel management as, on balance, "highly effective," but it did find weak spots that needed attention. In some areas, neither supervisors nor employees had a clear understanding of promotion policies. A sizeable number of employees refused to believe that promotions were administered fairly. In developing policies, officials apparently had not made enough effort to obtain the views of employees. And overly rigid procedures had adverse effects on classifying jobs and recruiting new employees.

One of the worst situations occurred in 1961-1962 in Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC), the largest USAF civilian employer, where the number of positions, rather than the type of work performed, appeared to determine grades. In some instances AFLC had upgraded positions after classification review but had not raised grades. Under current regulations management was required to classify positions in accordance with Civil Service Commission standards once it had determined the duties to be performed in these positions. AFLC refused, however, arguing that grade ceilings and job freezes had restricted the number of available higher grades. Although employees performed duties at one grade, they held and received pay for a lower grade.

One reason for this problem was apparently the lack of flexibility inherent in a large, centralized organization. Managers of research and development units also complained that this inflexibility did not permit them to get enough people to do the work or to use properly those they had. They wanted freedom to make commitments early enough to obtain high-caliber college graduates as well as to offer more people fulltime graduate training.[6]

In December 1961 John W. Macy, Jr., Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, stated that the key to a better civil service lay in recruiting capable young people, especially college graduates. He did not believe that the government effort in this direction had been a good one. Federal agencies had not planned college recruiting properly, and their representatives were often mediocre people who discouraged applicants by creating a bad impression. These people were probably chosen because they could be spared for recruiting. But the greatest failure resulted from the fact that agencies did not have funds to hire the students when they were available. Macy asked Zuckert, as head of one of the large government employing agencies, for assistance, and the Secretary's office pledged full cooperation. But 1962-1963 were not favorable years for recruiting.[7]

Controls and Reductions

Constant pressure from Congress and the Administration to cut the cost and number of employees on government payrolls, coupled with changes in technology and attendant shifts of emphasis from one function to another, often resulted in substantial layoffs of employees. These reductions in force (RIF's) often worked undeserved hardship on individuals, damaged morale, and gave rise to unjustified rumors.

During fiscal years 1958 through 1963, nearly 40,900 people were separated or resigned as a result of RIF's, and many other positions were abolished.* By far the largest reduction occured in the logistic support area, where about 30,000 employees were dropped between July 1958 and October 1962. The training function also lost a significant portion of its civilians. Not all of these employees were separated involuntarily, of course, but most RIF's occurred in these functions, and from these commands came most of the complaints and rumors.[8]

As early as November 1960, Secretary Sharp voiced alarm lest RIF's and attendant rumors reduce morale and performance and cause an undue loss of the best trained and most experienced civilians. He stated that these employees provided the essential continuity of knowledge in almost all USAF activities, that previous losses due partly to RIF's had already damaged important programs, and that job insecurity might cause many competent civilians to seek employment elsewhere. To the numerous complaints that flowed into the Pentagon, usually through congressional and White House channels, OSAF could only reply that the reductions were caused by adjustments to technological changes, new weapon developments, restrictions on manpower and money, and efforts to achieve an appropriate balance between effectiveness and economy. The Air Force promised, in conjunction with the Civil Service Commission, to try to soften the impact of RIF's on employees and protect those with long tenure.[9]

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*Approximate figures for these fiscal years were: 1958 (19,170), 1959 (5,658), 1960 (6,047), 1961 (6,200), 1962 (1,704), and 1963 (2,094). (Memo, Dep Spec Asst to SAF (M,P,&Org), to ASOD(M), 14 Mar 61, subj: Backup Material for Davis Subcommittee, OSAF file 7-61, Vol 1; conversation with Mrs. Ruth Miller, Office of D/Civ Pers, 4 Feb 64.)

Although RIF's continued and complaints, especially from employee organizations, grew more numerous and vociferous, the Air Force gained in government and in the public press a reputation for doing an excellent job of minimizing the bad effects of reductions. It achieved this reputation by making careful preparations, such as instituting hiring freezes before the job cuts became effective and finding new positions for people whose jobs were abolished. The Civil Service Commission stated that during fiscal year 1962 the Air Force held the number of people who became unemployed to a minimum by careful placement and retraining. In April 1963, Robert F. Steadman, OSD's Economic Adjustment Advisor, congratulated the Air Force for minimizing the bad effects of RIF's and for making proper use of its employees. In May the civil service columnists in Washington, D.C.'s metropolitan newspapers praised the Air Force for softening the effects of a five-percent RIF it had been directed to make.[10]

One reason for the greater effort to protect individuals affected by RIF's in 1962 and 1963 was the increasing pressure exerted by OSD and the Civil Service Commission. Undoubtedly this was closely related to the Kennedy Administration's effort to lessen nationwide unemployment. OSD informed the armed services that it expected them to give every possible assistance to employees who had to find new jobs, and it furnished a representative to coordinate the effort. OSD also issued a new set of instructions which included longer advanced warning and the placement of employees on furlough while they looked for new positions.

In March 1963, when substantial cut backs were pending at several installations in the southeastern United States, OSD's Assistant Secretary Paul stated that hardships to individuals could be alleviated by placing them in other DOD installations in the area. At his instigation, representatives of OSD, Army, Navy, and Air Force, Civil Service Commission, and 40 DOD installations in the Southeast met at Maxwell AFB, Ala., on 29 March. In addition to matching as many as possible of the persons to be let out with likely vacancies at other installations in the Southeast, the conferees agreed to: (1) provide DOD funds for moving expenses, (2) give more attention to seniority in deciding who would be laid off, (3) give three months advance notice, and (4) put pressure on installation commanders to assist employees.

Local personnel officials, surprised and pleased that these representatives attached such importance to their problems, agreed that most of the displaced employees could be relocated in other jobs. This was very difficult, particularly at Mobile Air Materiel Area, Ala., Chennault AFB, La., Donaldson AFB, S.C., and at Memphis, Tenn., and progress in finding new jobs was slow. But this effort was a landmark in DOD concern for its civilians, particularly since OSD insisted on a continuing check on the results of the Maxwell conference.[11]

Despite these efforts, civilian employment opportunities within the Department of Defense during the foreseeable future did not look bright. In April 1963 McNamara directed his Comptroller to write into the next five-year budget program a cumulative reduction of 1½ percent per year in civilian personnel. He believed reductions of this magnitude could be made as a result of gains in productivity. This cut would begin in fiscal year 1965, but the Air Force had already taken or planned its reductions for fiscal years 1964 and 1965 and would not be affected until 1966, when the cut would be 4,521. For 1967 the cumulative total would rise to 8,979; for 1968, to 13,379. It was not clear whether this plan encompassed the cuts announced by President Lyndon B. Johnson in January 1964.[12]

Equal Opportunity

The Kennedy Administration also broke new ground in launching an intensive effort to insure equal employment and promotion opportunities for members of minority groups, especially Negroes. In March 1961 Executive Order 10925 provided for nondiscrimination and set up the President's Committee on Equal Opportunity, headed by Vice President Johnson. In the Defense Department this program was supported for McNamara by Deputy Secretary Roswell L. Gilpatric. In May 1961 Chairman Macy of the Civil Service Commission reminded Zuckert that the new administration stressed equal opportunity and that the commission would review carefully all government hiring and promotion practices. He wanted the Air Force to review its regulations, standards, and guides to insure compliance with the President's policy.[*13]

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*In March 1963 President Kennedy also instituted a program to prevent discrimination against employees on account of age, since, as he said, older people constituted a growing portion of the nation's work force. See memo, Kennedy to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 14 Mar 63, subj: Policy on Utilizing Older Workers in the Federal Service, OSAF file 186-63, Vol 1.

Theoretically, the President's program portended no change of policy for the Air Force. As Zuckert explained to Macy, since its creation in 1947, the Air Force had adhered to a policy of nondiscrimination on account of race, age, sex, color, national origin, physical handicap (if the individual could do the work), marital status, or lawful political affiliation. Zuckert assured Macy that no regulations needed to be changed and that the Air Force would continue to hire and promote workers solely on the basis of merit.[14]

Although the other armed services could probably repeat this assurance, McNamara and Gilpatric were not satisfied. They believed that the military departments were holding many Negro civilian employees at grades significantly below their capacity and that this was a great waste. The Army reported in April 1963 that a recent survey had found many employees who thought they were being "under-utilized" and that a significant number had been placed in higher-level jobs.

Ostensibly encouraged by the Army survey, Gilpatric directed the services to survey workers at grades GS-6 and below (GS-11 and below at the service headquarters) and discover how many could work at a higher grade. He wanted the survey completed by 1 September 1963 and a report made to OSD by 15 November. He also demanded a follow-up report in September 1964, stipulating the number of under-utilized people who had been promoted or transferred to more challenging positions.[15]

In early June 1963, Gilpatric focused attention more directly on the Negro worker in the south. He directed the services to dispatch policy officers to their major employment centers in the South to make on-the-spot surveys of employment patterns, by occupation and grade, and to correct restricted or unfair use of minority-group workers. He wanted the services to examine recruiting techniques and sources, placement, and promotion and training practices. Early in June President Kennedy let it be known that he was personally interested in seeing more Negroes employed at certain installations in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, South Carolina, and Georgia.

By early July the Air Force had completed its survey of minority-group employment at 54 installations in 14 states, and its report, covering the situation through May, showed a very low rate of Negro employment at southern bases. At Maxwell AFB, Ala., for example, only 285 out of 2,227 civilians were Negroes, and of these only 27 had grades equivalent to GS-5 or above. Most Negroes at Maxwell were Wage Board (paid by the hour) workers, and the highest grade held by a Negro was L-10, equivalent to Between a GS-6 and a GS-7. On 30 June 1962 there were 8,462 Negro workers at 54 Air Force installations, 9 percent of the total. By 31 May 1963 these figures had dropped to 7,931 and 8.6, respectively. At no time were as many as 3 percent of the Classification Act (white collar) workers Negroes. Most of the Negroes made less than $5,000 per year. Only 0.1 percent of the classified workers held GS-12 grades or above, and only 0.2 percent of the Wage Board workers made $8,000 per year or more.[16]

Between June 1962 and May 1963 civilian employment at the bases surveyed dropped by about 1,633. More than 530, nearly one-third, of this number had been Negroes, although they made up only 9 percent of total civilian employment in June 1962. This disparity resulted in large part from the fact that temporary workers, who were predominantly Negroes, were the first to go during reductions. Under the practice of "last hired, first fired," the Negro usually had the least retention rights.[17]

Probably as a result of Presidential and OSD pressure, southern Air Force bases did some successful recruiting of Negroes at high schools and colleges, despite the opinion of some commanders that they had no such responsibility. About 10 percent of the students at Negro colleges were interested in Federal employment, rather high for any recruiting campaign. With Civil Service Commission assistance, it appeared that the services would hire more Negroes while staying within regulations that favored the best qualified applicant. Although the Negro might look forward to somewhat expanded opportunities within the military departments, he could not expect great gains in the near future, however, since civilian employment in the services was tending downward.

V. THE AIR RESERVE FORCES

In February 1960 the Air Force Council and Chief of Staff LeMay approved a concept for future development and employment of the Air Reserve Forces (AFRes), a planned force structure for the decade 1960-1970, and a new plan of management. This plan, under study since December 1958, provided for units to reinforce USAF combat strength in war or emergencies, base support and recovery units to help alleviate the consequences of nuclear attacks, and other units for certain subsidiary peacetime functions. The council decided that the Air Force Reserve would maintain 15 wings with 50 squadrons, and the Air National Guard (ANG) 24 wings with 92 squadrons. Individual training would be reoriented, with the individuals formed into support and recovery units as quickly as practicable. In February 1960 the Air Force decided to transfer supervision of training and inspection of AFRes units from the Continental Air Command (ConAC) to the combat commands (TAC, ADC, and MATS) which would control them in war or emergency. Headquarters USAF, through the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces, assumed tighter control over the AFRes than heretofore.[1]

During 1960 the Air Staff worked out a concept, approved by the Force Estimates Board (FEB) in December, that established recovery planning as an integral part of USAF war planning and made ConAC responsible for regrouping and reconstituting residual forces after a nuclear attack. The FEB calculated that the recovery units should include 82 recovery group headquarters, 200 recovery squadrons, 96 air base groups, 118 base support squadrons, 24 aircraft maintenance squadrons, 24 medical service wings, 45 evacuation squadrons, 82 radiological survey squadrons, 5 communication groups, and 7 communication squadrons.[2]

This somewhat ambitious plan never came to fruition. Since McNamara doubted its utility and money and manpower were lacking, OSD, in January 1962, limited the recovery program to 292 units established by that date. These included 82 recovery groups with 200 squadrons, 6 base support groups, 1 air base group headquarters, 1 air base squadron, 1 evaluation squadron, and 1 radiological survey squadron. These units, scheduled to continue on a provisional basis through June 1964, were restricted to 20,000 paid drill spaces and $11 million per year. The 20,000 men could be paid for only 24 drill periods per year instead of the 48 the Air Force had requested. The Air Force protested that at least 22,600 men and 48 paid drill periods per year were necessary, but the protest went unheeded.[3]

Manning

Between the end of June 1960 and the end of June 1963, ready reserve strength declined from 273,326 (70,820 in the ANG and 202,506 in the AFRes) to 242,704 (74,325 in the ANG and 168,382 in the AFRes). During the same years, standby reserve strength (all in the AFRes) dropped from 303,677 to 116,874. All ANG members remained in the ready category during this period.[4]

The number of Air Force reservists who could be paid for participating in training was limited to 135,000--72,000 for the ANG and 63,000 for the AFRes. This severely handicapped the reserve program throughout the period, especially the AFRes. In September 1960, Lyle S. Garlock, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (FM), warned OSD that the new recovery role assigned the Air Force in February 1960 could not be effectively carried out under this manpower ceiling. He requested 142,000 paid positions for fiscal year 1962, about 157,000 for 1963, and 171,500 for 1964, declaring that this was the minimum needed to insure a really effective program. Although the 135,000 limit would provide less than half the number needed to man recovery units, OSD refused to grant a substantial number of new paid positions, ostensibly because of the tight budget.[5]

By June 1962 the reserve forces faced a severe shortage of officers. Even in 1961 the AFRes was not attracting enough young officers, and the situation promised to become progressively worse because the majority of reserve officers, who had received commissions during World War II, would retire during 1968-1973. In June 1961 the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces estimated that the reserves needed at least 900 new lieutenants each year and about 1,350 after 1968. Since the officer education program (OTS and AFROTC) could not supply the demands of the active establishment, the outlook for the reserve forces appeared gloomy.[6]

AFRes also faced a serious pilot shortage, based on experience to date and estimated projections in early 1963. AFRes pilots were men who had been separated from the active establishment. Recruiting barely kept pace with losses, and, because of the age and length of service of the pilots, losses would soon far exceed gains. Establishment of an AFRes pilot training program appeared the only solution, but the Air Force encountered difficulties in expanding active pilot training, let alone reserve training.[7]

Before the end of June 1962, a critical shortage of skilled airmen had also occurred. The best source of trained airmen for the reserves were the thousands separated each year from the active force. But relatively few of these joined the reserve forces, apparently because there were not enough incentives to do so. The scarcity of paid drill periods no doubt contributed to their reluctance.[8]

Had it not been for the six-year military obligation of men without military service, the Air Force would have been unable to man its reserve units. When the House Armed Services Committee inquired in July 1962 as to the effect of lowering the obligation to four years, the Air Force stated that this would cut its annual reserve enlistments about 75,000 by 1968, and that by 1970 the unpaid reservists would be eliminated entirely. To replace the loss with men in paid positions would have cost approximately $4.7 million per year.[9]

The Berlin crisis, which required the call-up and deployment to Europe of a large number of tactical reserve squadrons, revealed a lack of rapport between the Air Force and its newly recalled reserves that seriously threatened morale. Some men and their wives wrote the President, congressmen, or high-ranking Air Force officials, complaining about deplorable living conditions at hastily readied stations and bases, both in the United States and overseas. Few complaints came from members of recalled units, but some of the "fillers," called to bring units up to full strength, resented the call to active duty in peacetime. They apparently had thought that they would never be called except in an extreme emergency.

This episode aroused a feeling of uneasiness at Headquarters USAF and within the JCS, because some of the men seemed not to understand the nature of deterrence. They did not appear to understand that the presence of combat-ready forces in an area of possible agression constituted a deterrent to war. The Air Force and JCS agreed that commanders should have made a greater effort to explain this concept when the men were called to duty, or preferably before. Since citizens ought to know why they prepare to fight, it seemed clear that a better information program to condition them for occasional military service was badly needed.[10]

Support of the Active Establishment

During 1960 and 1961 the combat effectiveness of reserve units improved rapidly. By the end of June 1960 two-thirds of the tactical reconnaissance units, nearly half of the tactical fighter units, and more than three-fourths of the troop carrier units available to TAC in an emergency belonged to the ANG and the AFRes. Also a significant portion of USAF interceptor units were in the ANG. By June 1961 several ANG units were converting from fighter planes to four-engine C-97's and transport missions, others to century-series jet fighters, while a number of AFRes squadrons were exchanging two-engine C-119's for four-engine C-124's. All ANG and AFRes units not in the midst of these conversions were rated combat-ready.[11]

The Berlin crisis and the Cuban crisis afforded the reserve forces two opportunities within two years to demonstrate their readiness. In October and November 1961, a tactical control group, 36 flying squadrons, 8 weather flights, and support elements for the flying units were ordered to active duty, thereby increasing active strength of troop carrier units by 17 percent, heavy transport units by 28 percent, tactical reconnaissance units by 28 percent, and tactical fighter units by 37 percent. In November, seven ANG fighter squadrons, the tactical control group, and one tactical reconnaissance squadron were deployed to Europe. The squadrons flew about 200 F-86H's, F-84F's, and RF-84F's across the Atlantic in the largest single oversea flight of jet fighters in history. The deployment was completed without accident. The aircraft of three ANG F-104 squadrons were dismantled and flown to Europe in MATS cargo planes, and the squadrons were changed from interceptor to tactical fighter units. Despite many logistical and other problems, these units were quickly incorporated into the United States Air Forces in Europe and became a part of the U.S. contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In late December General LeMay commented, "Never before has the United States Air Force depended so heavily upon the ability of the ANG and the AFRes to respond so quickly and effectively. Never before have the Air Reserve Forces met a challenge with such speed and efficiency."[12]

Recalled units that remained in the United States performed other important missions and intensified their training. Fighter and reconnaissance units assigned to TAC participated in Strike Command exercises and joint exercises with the Army and the Navy. Five AFRes troop carrier squadrons completed transition from C-119's to C-124's and began flying airlift missions for the Air Force and the Navy. ANG heavy transport units, recently converted from jet fighters to C-97's became a part of MATS and flew strategic airlift missions to Europe, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Elsewhere.[13]

On the night of 27 October 1962, at the height of the crisis caused by the presence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba, President Kennedy ordered eight AFRes troop carrier wings (24 squadrons) and six AFRes aerial port squadrons to report for duty the next morning. More than 93 percent of the men reported within 24 hours, and 75 percent of their aircraft were ready for operation that day. Even before recall, AFRes troop carrier squadrons had been flying supplies and equipment into bases in the southeastern United States. ANG heavy transport squadrons assisted MATS in flying cargo to bases in many countries of the world. On their overwater training flights, they flew missions that MATS could not fulfill because its aircraft were performing missions directly related to the emergency alert.

Beginning on 23 October, reservists from approximately 30 recovery units volunteered to assist in Air Force dispersal activities and Army deployment to the southeastern states. Between 23 October and 6 December they worked about 6,000 man-days for SAC, ADC, and several Army units, assisting in transportation, fire and crash rescue, refueling, and aircraft maintenance. More than 25 ANG and AFRes bases supported dispersal operations of the USAF combat commands. The diligence of reservists was praised by Zuckert, General Thomas S. Power, SAC commander-in-chief, and other Air Force and Army officials involved in the emergency. McNamara stated that he was "tremendously impressed" by the reserve units during the Cuban crisis, terming their quick reaction a "fantastic performance."[14]

Approaching Difficulties

The Reserve Forces undoubtedly provided important peacetime support to the active Air Force during the period 1960-1963, contributing significantly to national security during periods of stress and crisis. The efficiency and effectiveness of the ANG and AFRes also improved during 1962 and 1963. But problems remained which, if not soon solved, could badly damage the reserve forces' effectiveness.

Personnel losses became especially serious, for many men refused to volunteer for further service after completing their periods of military obligation. Many highly skilled airmen dropped out of the reserves because they feared recurring recalls. After the Berlin call-up, a growing number of employers were reluctant to hire reservists or to approve their employees' continued reserve activity. The public, as well as many reservists themselves, seemed to have only a theoretical commitment to the value of military power in reserve; a commitment that often grew weak when personal sacrifices became necessary. And the nation's commitment to a reserve force sometimes did not extend to approving a large enough budget to make it really effective.

Shortage of equipment, especially aircraft, continued to handicap the reserve forces and no doubt would continue to do so for several years. After the Berlin crisis, the Air Force kept most of the ANG F-84's and the AFRes C-124's in the active inventory. Therefore many squadrons had far too few planes of recent models to maintain combat effectiveness or adequate crew readiness. The AFRes remained too dependent on the old C-119. Members of AFRes also complained that their equipment and facilities were inferior to those in the ANG.* Deficiencies could not be corrected, of course, until the Air Force obtained more new aircraft and turned a large number of the current models over to the reserves.[15]

In the summer of 1963 the Air Force needed to take certain important steps to improve the effectiveness of the reserve forces. If it wished to attract high-caliber men, it would have to offer at least enough compensation so that these men would not need to make financial sacrifices in order to serve. Some form of reenlistment bonus seemed appropriate to persuade men to serve beyond their period of military obligation. The Air Force would have to provide sufficient aircraft of relatively recent models, for the continued use of obsolete or

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*Captain D.O. Priddy, AFRes, Blanket, Tex., declared in January 1964, for example, that the only way for a reservist to get to fly a decent plane was to join the ANG. He maintained that equipment in the AFRes was so bad he was surprised it had any pilots. Maj. Alf Olsen, Fargo, N.D., agreed, listing lack of adequate equipment and facilities among the important reasons for what he considered a weak AFRes program.

obsolescent aircraft and other equipment would prevent achievement of acceptable operational effectiveness. During the Kennedy Administration, with its emphasis on general purpose forces, the reserves seemed destined to play a more important role in military strategy than at any time since the Korean conflict. Nevertheless, it appeared obvious that they would need stronger support from OSD if they were to make their maximum contribution. Not all of the doubts and criticisms of the 1958-1959 period had been dissipated by June 1963.[16]

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GLOSSARY

AC/S	Assistant Chief of Staff
Actg	Acting
ASA	Assistant Secretary of the Army
ASA (M,P,&RF)	Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower, Personnel, and Reserve Forces)
ASAF (FM)	Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management)
ASAF (M)	Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Materiel)
ASAF (M,P,&RF)	Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower, Personnel, and Reserve Forces)
ASN	Assistant Secretary of the Navy
ASN (P&RF)	Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Personnel and Reserve Forces)
ASOD	Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASOD (Compt)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
ASOD (I&L)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics)
ASOD (M)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower)
ASOD (M,P,&R)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Personnel, and Reserves)
ASOD (PA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
ASSS	Air Staff Summary Sheet
Asst	Assistant
Asst SA (I&L)	Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Logistics)
Asst SN (I&L)	Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Logistics)
ATC	Air Training Command
BOB	Bureau of the Budget
Chmn	Chairman
Cmte	Committee
C/S	Chief of Staff
CSC	Civil Service Commission
DAF	Department of the Air Force
D/BOB	Director of the Bureau of Budget
D/Civ Pers	Director(ate) of Civilian Personnel
DCS/P	Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel
DCS/S&L	Deputy Chief of Staff for Systems and Logistics
DDR&E	Director of Defense Research and Engineering
D/DSA	Director of Defense Supply Agency
Dep	Deputy
Dep ASOD(M)	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower)
Dep ASOD (Prod Mgmt)	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production Management)

Dep D/Civ Pers	Deputy Director(ate) of Civilian Personnel
Dep D/Proc Mgmt	Deputy Director of Procurement Management
Dep Spec Asst SAF (M,P,&Org)	Deputy Special Assistant Secretary of Air Force (Manpower, Personnel, and Organization)
Dep SOD	Deputy Secretary of Defense
D/M&O	Director(ate) of Manpower and Organization
DOD	Department of Defense
D/Ops	Director(ate) of Operations
D/Pers Plng	Director(ate) of Personnel Planning
D/Plans	Director(ate) of Plans
Econ	Economy
Exec Dir	Executive Director
GAO	General Accounting Office
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
n.d.	No Date
NSA	National Security Agency
OSAF	Office, Secretary of the Air Force
OSD	Office of Secretary of Defense
Pers	Personnel
Res Forces	Reserve Forces
Ret	Retired
RIF	Reduction in Force
ROTC	Reserve Officers Training Corps
SA	Secretary of the Army
SAF	Secretary of the Air Force
SN	Secretary of the Navy
SOD	Secretary of Defense
Subcmte	Subcommittee
U/SAF	Under Secretary of the Air Force
USAF	United States Air Force
USAFE	United States Air Forces in Europe
VC/S	Vice Chief of Staff
V/P	Vice President