Chapter 13

Europe

Rethinking Euroatlantic Security Structures

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), backed by strong U.S. military and political commitments to the Alliance, has been the primary guarantor of Europe's defense from armed attack since 1949. With the end of the Cold War, NATO assumed new roles: building defense and security partnerships with new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe that prepared many for Alliance membership; extending dialogue and cooperation on political-military issues to Russia, Ukraine, and other states of the former Soviet Union; and leading complex military and stabilization operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Throughout its existence, NATO also has performed the vital job of promoting intra-European as well as transatlantic collaboration regarding threat assessments, political-military strategy, defense planning, equipment standards and interoperability, and training and exercises.

Yet NATO's "unipolar moment" has passed. Most Europeans want to preserve robust transatlantic links through NATO that are reinforced, in many cases, by basing, information-sharing, and other bilateral ties to the United States. Russia's behavior in Georgia in the summer and fall of 2008 and its muscular statements of intent to "protect the life and dignity of [Russian] citizens wherever they are" have renewed interest in NATO's collective defense role, particularly among Eastern and Northern Europeans. Many Europeans, however, no longer view the most pressing threats to their security, or the tools needed to address them, as predominantly military. And while public opinion polls indicate a modest recovery in positive European views of the United States since the Iraq-related nadir of 2003–2004, European publics remain less confident than a decade ago that

DOD (Chad J. McNeeley)

NATO members discuss expanding ISAF operations and missions in Afghanistan, June 2006

U.S. interests, strategy, and policies will closely match their own. Hence, Europeans increasingly endorse the notion that, to protect and advance their common interests and values in defense- and security-related matters, NATO must share the stage with the European Union (EU).

Defining how this shared responsibility should be carried out in practice will prove difficult for Europeans, notwithstanding the fact that 21 of 27 EU member states belong to NATO and 5 others work with NATO, sometimes quite intensively, through the Partnership for Peace (PFP). This task is complicated by profound differences between NATO and the EU in terms of their respective functions, structures, and procedures, as well as internal tensions over strategy, capabilities, and the uneven political will of their members.

NATO under Pressure

NATO's solidarity and effectiveness are being tested in the caldron of Afghanistan, where European Allies and PFP members are contributing some 27,500 of nearly 56,500 troops that make up the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).[1] European leaders broadly agree that if Afghanistan were to become a "failed state" rather than a fragile one, terrorist networks would again be able to operate there with relative impunity, posing a direct threat to an unstable and nuclear-armed Pakistan and, eventually, the European and North American homeland. At the same time, many European officials fear the trends in Afghanistan are unfavorable, and public support in Europe for the ISAF effort is wavering. Despite Allied and PFP member troop increases in Afghanistan since NATO's April 2008 Bucharest Summit, there is little prospect that Europe will provide significantly larger forces in 2009 and beyond. Indeed, over the next 2 years, some Allies plan to scale down or terminate their presence in southern Afghanistan where, contrary to initial expectations, their involvement in combat missions frequently has overshadowed peacekeeping and reconstruction tasks.

NATO's difficulty in meeting force requirements for ISAF extends beyond troop levels. Some Allies continue to invoke so-called caveats that restrict how and where their nation's forces can be employed by the ISAF commander. European leaders understand the inherent dangers of a two-tier NATO, in which some members are more fully committed than others. Still, certain important ISAF contributors would face serious domestic opposition were they to shift their focus from the relatively stable northern and western regions to higher risk operations in the south and east. None of the European Allies is prepared to contemplate military involvement inside Pakistan, despite the acknowledged problems posed by virtual sanctuaries for Taliban, al Qaeda, and other opposition militant forces along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

In addition, the costs associated with ISAF are taking a heavy toll on some troop contributor nations. Under standard NATO practice, nations must absorb the lion's share of costs associated with their participation in operations. This is a particular disincentive to Allies who have the political will to sustain or increase troop contributions in the most demanding missions but lack sufficient resources to do so. Several Allies nevertheless resist suggestions to increase NATO's common funding for operations or collective assets; faced with low and relatively stagnant defense budgets, they fear greater NATO common funding would come at the expense of national programs and priorities.

Afghanistan also raises hard questions regarding NATO's role in long-term stabilization missions. The "Comprehensive Approach" agreed at the Bucharest Summit aims to integrate international civilian and military assistance to support the Afghan government's efforts to build capable security forces; develop the economy; improve governance and rule of law; and tackle the narcotics problem. Europeans, however, have not taken a common approach regarding their militaries' engagement in such nontraditional roles. And some European officials worry that the United States might try to have NATO build its own civilian capabilities for use alongside the military in stabilization operations—a move that, in their view, would duplicate and undermine efforts by the United Nations (UN), EU, and other international actors.

Finally, NATO's deepening engagement in Afghanistan has raised doubts in several European capitals regarding overall strategy and priorities. None of those governments openly contests the need for NATO's commitment and success in expeditionary operations or advocates a return to Cold War models of territorial defense. But their officials increasingly fret that NATO might lose its raison d'être of collective defense—and vital parliamentary and public support—by focusing too heavily on out-of-area missions that seem disconnected from threats closer to home. For some Allies, the scaling back of the 25,000-strong NATO Response Force after its failure, in 2007, to maintain full operational capability—due, in part, to troop and capability shortfalls that many Allies attributed to their commitments in Afghanistan, the Balkans, and Iraq—exemplifies tensions between the requirements of ongoing missions and those that might be needed for Article 5 contingencies. This sentiment is reinforced by a widespread European perception that U.S. strategic priorities have shifted, perhaps permanently, from Europe to the greater Middle East and northeast Asia.

Russia, for example, is a growing security concern for several European Allies. Even before long-simmering tensions between Russia and Georgia exploded into violent combat in August 2008, Moscow had taken a series of moves—suspending its compliance with the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, opposing Kosovo independence, warning of military countermeasures to the planned deployment of U.S. missile defense assets in Poland and the Czech Republic, and (according to some European officials) abetting the 2007 cyber attack against Estonian public and private institutions—that signaled a more assertive posture vis-à-vis NATO. Some, especially Poland and the Baltic states, have argued for additional signs of NATO's preparedness to meet its collective defense commitment, along the lines of increased NATO contingency planning and exercises to deter and, if necessary, respond to any direct military intimidation by Russia. Meanwhile, other Europeans question whether the Alliance is doing enough to prevent or, if necessary, respond to the proliferation of dangerous weapons technologies and delivery systems in the greater Middle East, potential large-scale terrorist attacks against NATO countries, or the threat of energy supply interruptions.

Faced with such questions, many Europeans foresee difficult debates during preparation of a new strategic concept for the Alliance, a process launched at the NATO 60th anniversary summit in April 2009. The purpose of this public document is to help reestablish a solid transatlantic consensus on, and renewed commitment to, Alliance goals, strategy, and capabilities. This presupposes, of course, that NATO successfully manages its most pressing challenges—notably in Afghanistan—in the meantime.

EU Seeking to Define Its Role

Nearly a decade after its formal launch, the EU's European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) is firmly rooted within the EU's legal and institutional frameworks. ESDP is supported by civilian and military decisionmaking structures that roughly parallel NATO's (albeit with much smaller staffs), and the 2003 European Security Strategy document (updated in late 2008) that underlies ESDP sets out a broad vision of EU policy goals and approaches. The record of some 20 ESDP military and civilian operations undertaken to date is generally positive, although most of these have been modest in size, of limited duration, and relatively low risk. The notion once floated by a few European officials that ESDP would develop into a "counterweight" to American influence in Europe and beyond has been largely discredited. But while EU governments frequently differ over the priorities and resources they are prepared to assign to ESDP, even the most "Atlanticist" among them have come to accept ESDP as a legitimate and important pillar of the EU's global influence.

AP Images (Bundesregierung/Bergmann, HO)

Leaders from Germany, France, and Great Britain discuss financial crisis during EU summit, October 2008

Within the EU, debate regarding ESDP largely revolves around the balance between military and civilian tools for crisis management and how best to generate additional military and civilian capabilities. ESDP's initial focus was largely military, very ambitious, and heavily influenced by European lessons learned from the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s. For example, in 1999 the EU pledged to develop, by 2003, the ability to deploy, within 60 days, some 50,000 to 60,000 military personnel to crisis spots thousands of miles from Europe, and to sustain them for at least 1 year for tasks ranging from humanitarian operations to peacekeeping and separating warring parties. Faced with substantial capabilities shortfalls, however, the EU shifted its attention in 2004 to creating some 15 battle groups, each comprised of approximately 1,500 troops; two such formations serve in alert status for 6-month periods and, in theory, would be able to deploy within 10 days of an EU decision and sustain operations for up to 120 days. (To date, the EU has not operationally deployed a battle group, but EU officials cite Africa as the most likely venue for any future use.)

Some EU governments continue to place priority on the development of military capabilities within ESDP. They favor the periodic conduct of "autonomous" military operations—that is, operations without NATO assistance available through the "Berlin Plus" arrangements agreed between NATO and the EU in 2003—to demonstrate ESDP's practical value, encourage higher defense spending, and build habits of intra-European cooperation in increasingly challenging missions.[2] They also favor expanded joint research, development, asset pooling, and acquisition programs managed by the EU's European Defense Agency (EDA). That said, in recent years the limits of such efforts have become clearer. For example, the 2008–2009 ESDP operation in Chad and the Central African Republic proved more difficult and expensive than anticipated. In addition, European defense budgets remain stubbornly low and in many cases excessively weighted toward personnel expenditures, limiting the possibilities of significant new investments in EDA programs, especially if such programs are seen by some members as duplicative of NATO efforts or biased to give advantage to another member's defense industry.

AP Images (Kyodo)

Turkish president and first lady attend memorial ceremony in Japan

Increasingly, EU members look toward their civilian capabilities—including police mentors and experts in justice, corrections, customs, and public administration—as key tools to be deployed in crisis prevention or crisis management operations. These capabilities can be used in conjunction with EU financial and developmental assistance and, depending on the circumstances, alongside an ESDP or NATO military component. Recruiting, training, and deploying qualified civilians for these purposes have not been easy in some cases; the EU finds itself, in effect, competing with its member governments. Still, the EU is accumulating valuable experience through several ongoing civilian ESDP missions, notably in Kosovo and Afghanistan.

European governments will remain careful to protect national prerogatives in the conduct of foreign, defense, and security policies. As a former EDA chief executive has pointed out, no EU member "will allow itself to be forced to enter conflict, or to change how it spends its defense budget, by 'Brussels'—whether an EU institution, or a majority of its partners."[3] The past decade's trend toward greater coordination within the EU, however, is unlikely to be reversed, despite the setback to ratification of the Lisbon Treaty occasioned by its defeat in the June 2008 Irish referendum.

This will not be an easy transition for the EU. It will need time to overcome its institutional impasse. Depending on the issue at hand, the EU might sometimes appear more assertive with its transatlantic partners and, at other times, more hesitant. A deep and enduring transatlantic rift is not preordained, since most Europeans favor continued engagement with, not estrangement from, the United States. But as their "European" sense of identity continues to deepen, their past deference to U.S. "leadership" will continue to erode.

A New Security Triangle?

For most Europeans, the need for a close, cooperative, and pragmatic relationship between NATO

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Europe: A Normative Superpower?

The real power of a postmodern, post–Cold War state, some scholars allege, lies not in military or economic or other coercive power but in *normative power.* States exhibit normative power by successfully promoting principles such as democracy, rule of law, or human rights across the international arena through processes based on legitimacy, leading by example, and suasion rather than use of material or physical force and threats. By resting on legitimacy, normative power is independent of force and possibly undermined by its use. In this dimension, the argument continues, Europe is a superpower, outstripping the United States and other major or emerging powers in flexing a new kind of muscle on the world stage.

Normative power has resonance among both those who fret that Europe has a limited autonomous security capacity and those who disapprove of it possessing one. Neither the concept of normative power nor the assessment of its ascendance in Europe finds much empirical validity, however. This sidebar briefly notes the areas in which Europe has allegedly demonstrated normative power, reviews the concept of norms, and suggests some ways (albeit ones not diametrically opposed to security power) in which Europe has indeed done influential things with them.

The normative power approach argues that through dialogue and example, Europe, and especially the European Union (EU), has raised the salience of some issues and has promoted changes in domestic and international practices and understandings, thus acting as a "civilizing power."[1] A core set of EU actions and priorities is usually associated with the normative power approach. The most cited example is its role in spreading international human rights in the form of promoting the abolition of the death penalty, first within the EU and then abroad. But supporters of this view also claim Europe has spread values such as civil activism, transnational collective action, and support of peace by promoting development rather than intervention, making "sustainable peace" initiatives a central part of policy in the Balkans and Afghanistan, and championing other policies that emphasize crisis prevention rather than military intervention.[2] In truth, however, the EU has not significantly shaped domestic opinion regarding the death penalty in the state that has been the biggest target of its rhetorical action: the United States. And norms that explicitly favor crisis prevention and eschew intervention have not taken hold, even among Europe's leadership. Normative authority, then, does not seem to be a significant source of power and certainly not one that Europe can easily harden to meet specific policy objectives.

Moreover, the emergence of an EU defense and security dimension, from rapid reaction forces to the European Defense Agency (EDA), is often construed by "normative power Europe" proponents as a further challenge to the idea. They mournfully note an EU "march towards military potency"[3] that undermines the concept of a normative actor. Normative power, thus, seems a fragile thing: difficult to leverage where it does exist and easy to erode, if it is part of a zero-sum game juxtaposed with the use of force. This is ironic, as the EU has been one of the most innovative international organizations in history with respect to the creation of more formal international law and rule-based commitments. It is also unclear that EU influence in either security affairs or the creation of international rules has shrunk over time, making it worth reconsidering what we mean by "norm" and what the EU has done with norms.

It is generally accepted that one of the most innate human social behaviors is rulemaking—and rules or norms, whether constitutions, contracts, or table manners, underpin social interaction over groups and time. They allow people to make all kinds of social transactions from building communities to doing business where the delivery of goods or services is separated by long distances or periods of time. Far from being a special and exclusive concept, international human

ISAF/NATO

ISAF French task force commander and district governor inaugurate new bridge in Kalakan, Afghanistan, May 2008 rights norms are simply one kind of rule that fall on a spectrum of what scholars such as Douglass North have identified as "institutions."[4]

Broadly construed, institutions can be said to vary along two dimensions: specificity and "bindingness." At one end of this spectrum fall something like commercial contracts—binding, specific, and detailing what parties will do and the consequences for failing to do so—so that everyone shares a fairly clear understanding of what it looks like if they are out of compliance with those rules.

International law, which is typically only applicable to broadly aggregated actors such as states, tends to reside at the more distant end of the binding spectrum. However, detailed charters of human rights, for example, can be influential in that the more specific they are, the more precise and concrete grounds they provide for negotiating behavior and discussing whether, at a minimum, actions are consistent or not with those rules. General norms like democracy, civic activism, and rule of law—the various alleged examples of the EU's normative power by cultural example—reside at the extreme far end of the binding *and* specific spectra, however, which is why they are rather dubious levers in international arenas. A focus on general concepts also overlooks some interesting things the EU has done with rules.

At its inception in the 1950s, what is today called the EU—comprising weak supranational bodies, using procedures strongly favoring unanimous decisionmaking by member states, and governed by treaties that established an international law that was binding only on states rather than individuals—did not look particularly different from other international organizations. Over time, however, it dramatically transformed how rules are created and used within Europe and, as it became more of an international actor, across the world. Through a series of activist rulings in the 1960s, the EU's high court, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), used a set of technical, concrete cases dealing with the details of trade law to announce some principles of broad importance. In these rulings, it established the supremacy of EU law over national law and the principle that EU law is applicable to citizens as well as member-states and is "intended to confer upon them rights." This "constitutionalization" of the treaties and turn to precedent-based decisionmaking by the ECJ was the first step toward the dramatic "institutionalization of European space," a trend that continued as the European Parliament and Commission grew in power, yielding a vast legislative output that significantly structures what can and cannot be done within and by Europe.

This body of law has had consequences for both European security policy and EU interlocutors. Detailed, binding, and technically specific EU rules have diffused across the EU and beyond. The most sweeping example of this has been the adoption of the *acquis communautaire*—the body of EU law accumulated thus far—by its new member states, which has in the matter of a decade transformed the business, tax, and contracting landscape and inserted a modern legal code into former communist countries. EU antitrust laws now significantly affect international firms, and its new regulations on defense procurement and the creation of a European defense market will have an impact on non-European as well as European technology research and development. Detailed EU provisions on passenger screening and data privacy have direct implications for U.S. homeland security and immigration practices.

Thus, the EU has constructed a densely institutionalized space in which binding and specific—indeed, notoriously technocratic—norms are promulgated with great consequence for actors, whether they are individuals, governments, or international firms. When these norms have security implications and are coupled with Europe's economic weight, they are increasingly significant for non-Europeans in ways that have real implications in international space. It is also an instructive case study in the conditions under which norms *can* come to matter internationally—as they move further down the dimensions of "bindingness" and specificity, driven by motivated, activist international actors. Therefore, although Europe as a normative superpower—in the sense depicted by academics—has not and is unlikely to ever come to pass, it is perhaps the most compelling example extant of the growing importance and dynamics of rules and institutions in the international setting.

NOTES

[1] See Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A contradiction in terms?" *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40, no. 2 (2002), 235–258; Ian Manners, "Normative power Europe reconsidered: beyond the crossroads," *Journal of European Public Policy* 13, no. 2 (2006), 182–199; François Duchêne, "Europe's role in world peace," in *Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead*, ed. R. Mayne (London: Fontana/Collins, 1972).

[2] Manners, "Normative Power Europe."

[3] Ibid.

[4] Douglass North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). See also Martin Shapiro and Alec Stone Sweet, eds., *On Law, Politics and Judicialization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

▲ *Continued from p. 288*

and the EU is no longer seriously contested. The operational strains on Europe's pool of forces caused by commitments in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Africa, combined with projected low levels of European defense spending, serve as a powerful brake on efforts within either organization to expand existing missions or create new and potentially duplicative structures. And when it comes to doctrine, training, and equipment interoperability, European military commanders understand that inconsistent practices within NATO and the EU could increase the inherent risk of military operations.

A formal "division of labor" between the two organizations, advocated by some European security experts, is unlikely for the foreseeable future. EU governments would find it as difficult to agree on a fixed ceiling for ESDP military operations—in terms of force size, capabilities, and deployment regions—as NATO would find it difficult to set a bottom limit for its involvement. And neither organization is prepared to subordinate its decisionmaking autonomy to the other. In practice, however, certain notional differences in each organization's level of ambition already are taking shape. On the one hand, for example, none of the EU members is prepared to engage in large-scale combat operations without the United States, although only the United Kingdom (UK) has been willing to state this publicly. On the other hand, many Europeans believe that the EU has a comparative advantage, thanks to its array of developmental and civil-military tools, in crisis prevention and management in Africa.

Moreover, some initial assumptions on the nature of NATO and EU cooperation have proved too narrow. For example, many European defense and military planners believed during the period from 1999 to 2002 that NATO and the EU would not be involved simultaneously in the same country. The transitions from NATO-led to EU-led security operations in Macedonia in 2003 and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2004, followed by continued partnerships between the organizations in both instances, demonstrated otherwise. More recently, civilian ESDP missions, focused on rule of law and police training, have taken hold alongside NATO operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Although formal NATO-EU linkages are hampered by continuing political blockages—largely due to disputes involving NATO ally Turkey and EU member Cyprus—the precedents set by practical cooperation in Kosovo and Afghanistan are promising indicators of improved collaboration between the two organizations on a "comprehensive" civil-military approach.

From a European perspective, however, Euroatlantic security cooperation cannot be limited to the NATO–EU relationship. Globalization has blurred the dividing lines between external and internal (or homeland) security. Many problems of greatest concern to European publics fall under the purview of EU structures that have little or no connection to ESDP instruments; among these are illegal immigration, so-called homegrown extremism, transnational crime, critical infrastructure protection, and environmental security. And while such problems can have a serious impact on transatlantic relations, many have limited, if any, direct connection to NATO's core competencies.

An important and growing bilateral U.S.–EU relationship already exists in areas such as counterterrorism, transportation security, nonproliferation, and combating transnational crime. Moreover, pragmatic approaches can open the way for expanded operational cooperation, as demonstrated by the 2008 U.S.–EU agreement to place some 100 American civilian trainers and mentors within the EU civilian ESDP mission in Kosovo. But as the EU increasingly serves as the Europeans' venue for strategic discussions and decisionmaking on these and other interrelated security issues, the United States will want to ensure that its views are taken into account before EU policies are set in stone. This, in turn, will pose an increasingly difficult policy question for Washington: where does it draw the line between discussing strategic questions at NATO, where there is a U.S. seat at the table alongside its European Allies, and at the EU, where the United States and "Europe" sit at opposite sides of the table?

There are inherent limits to bilateral U.S.–EU relations insofar as defense matters are concerned. One is the obvious mismatch of memberships: the United States is more loath to put at risk its military and political relationships with the non-EU Allies (Canada, Turkey, Norway, and Iceland) by circumventing NATO councils to consult, plan, and operate with the 21 other Allies who are EU members. Another, albeit less obvious, factor is equally important: NATO's strength and effectiveness derive, in large part, from the multinational nature of its civilian and military structures, where Americans, Canadians, and Europeans sit side by side to discuss, plan, decide, and implement a broad range of political and military functions. A bilateral U.S.–EU relationship would not include those structures, and duplicating them makes little sense. Similarly, letting them atrophy is a recipe for "decoupling" the United States from Europe in a manner that would put both at risk.

One point seems clear: the transatlantic community is unlikely to come to grips with today's wider, more complex security agenda absent a continued transformation of both NATO and the EU, much improved cooperation between them, and a demonstrated willingness by the United States and Europe to work flexibly and pragmatically with both organizations to advance common interests and values.

European Strength in an Unpredictable World

September 11 came late to Europe, but more than 7 years after 2001, it is in the European consciousness. Among Europe's larger countries, the analysis of the changing security environment is converging with that of the United States. Germany's *Weissbuch* ("White Book") of October 2006 and France's *livre blanc* ("White Paper") of June 2008 overlap with the most recent national strategy papers released by Britain (March 2008) and the United States (March 2006). These are all compatible, too, with the NATO Comprehensive Policy Guidelines of November 2007. In a world that is described in the French White Paper as "neither better nor more dangerous" than two decades ago but "more unpredictable" and "exposed to new vulnerabilities," the transatlantic partnership is no longer divided along Robert Kagan's celestial lines of Mars and Venus. A healthier understanding of Europe's capabilities and a sobering appreciation of America's limits now define the transatlantic partnership as a more balanced relationship between relative strengths and weaknesses.

Following sharp clashes over Iraq, Europe's newest political leaders are generally pragmatists who can work well together and with their main partner across the Atlantic. So it is, most visibly, with French president Nicolas Sarkozy, whose warm embrace of the United States parallels his interest in closer relations with the UK and support for an enhanced ESDP that would complement rather than compete with NATO. "We need both," said Sarkozy in June 2008, adding, "A NATO and European defense that oppose each other makes no sense." This apparent willingness to end the so-called French exception is welcome in the UK, whose most important bilateral relationship is with the United States, and Germany, which traditionally has been torn between its two central but estranged partners and institutions of choice. As a result of these shifts in perspective, the four main Euroatlantic powers can at last agree on the main precondition of Euroatlantic solidarity: *there can be a distinctive "European" way only to the extent that it is framed as a cooperative Euroatlantic endeavor, but conversely, there can be no cohesive "Atlanticist" way unless it acknowledges specific European preferences and needs, even when these seem distinct from U.S. preferences and needs.*

Learning to Say "Yes"

The French "return" to NATO in 2009 is significant not only in terms of added value for NATO, but also because of the opportunity it provides for a broader rethinking of U.S.-European and intra-

EU/NATO Defense Expenditures as Percentage of GDP 2007



**EU 2006 figures*
Note: Iceland has no armed forces

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2008.*

European relations: the EU with the United States, and NATO with the EU. Admittedly, current French expectations echo those of former president Jacques Chirac, who in December 1995 called for America to share leadership responsibilities (including high NATO command assignments for Paris), and for Europe to build up its defense policy (with an indispensable assist from the UK). At the same time, the French government does not want to abandon its "freedom to commit [its] armed forces" by having them "permanently placed under NATO command in peacetime." Yet changed political circumstances should now make it easier for both France and the United States to voice and manage these expectations more effectively. The United States must help the UK to say "yes" to France in Europe, now that the French government is willing to say "yes" to NATO. France in turn should help Germany say "yes" to a more vigorous ESDP, based on a more consistent security strategy than was put in place by Javier Solana in 2003. Finally, the United States, Britain, France, and Germany have to be willing to say "yes" to each other, so that the 32 members of the EU and NATO (including the 21 common European members) can achieve a much-needed strategic unity along national and institutional lines.

The past 5 years have shown that the states of Europe cannot play an effective role in the world, in analytical or in policy terms, when only one or two national capitals collaborate at a time. To be effective and credible in that role, the EU must mitigate its internal divisions, which can lead any of its 27 members to block the will of the 26 others, as happened with the June 2008 Irish referendum on the 2007 Lisbon Treaty. Thus, ESDP is an intra-European debate that begins with two participants (France and Britain). Germany then joins in before the debate is enlarged to six or seven (with Italy, Poland, Spain, and even Sweden). Eventually, it is extended to all EU members.

Although better aware of their own limits, the French remain torn between their traditional passion for autonomy and their newly found need for interdependence. The French military's current equipment and capabilities are the product of a Gaullist orthodoxy that prevailed some 30 years ago and still assumes a state-based, symmetric enemy (that is, the Soviet Union). But the rise of asymmetrical threats and operations that are smaller and of greater frequency is compelling France's strategic planners to make changes that were not part of France's previous White Book released in 1994. The goal of France's forces now is to be the first to enter a major theater of operations—apparently on the principle that security concerns convey a right of interference (*droit d'ingérence sécuritaire*). Paris, however, does not wish to do so alone, nor with only a few poorly prepared EU partners. The new tests for the French military are tests of efficacy and synergy: with a shrunken army said to be inadequately equipped and resourced, France needs to do more with less. It can only hope to do so by working with its Allies. The questions remain: if not with the United States and thus with NATO, with whom; if not with the UK and through the EU, how; if not now, with Sarkozy, when?[4]

EU/NATO Defense Spending on Personnel and Equipment



**EDA 2006 figures*

Source: European Defence Agency, *NATO 2007*.

The French approach to ESDP is not yet compelling for Prime Minister Gordon Brown or for the UK in general, where France's longstanding interest in a fully operational EU military headquarters to plan and manage EU military operations remains especially contentious. Some fear such an EU headquarters will partially duplicate NATO capabilities without bringing added value. Over the years, British skepticism regarding an EU operational headquarters has been shared by the United States. The UK's opposition to such a move, however, is less a vote for NATO, where France is poised to increase its participation, than it is a vote against the EU, which the UK always appears about to depart. The United States can now encourage the UK to join France in an effort to build new capabilities for a Euroatlantic West that combines NATO and the EU. At the very least, and to facilitate the next steps of the European security debate, the EU needs to constitute a new mechanism to help coordinate the work of the EU's civilian staff with NATO's military personnel.

Besides the importance of Anglo-French unity, Germany holds the key to the future of ESDP, and the key to Germany is its leadership. That a German commitment has been missing since the EU established ambitious new headline goals in 2004 is all too clear. For the past two decades, German defense expenditures have fallen steadily—from 2.8 percent in 1989 to 2.2 percent in 1991, to 1.5 percent in 2001, to 1.3 percent in 2006. Yet the goals of the 2006 *Weissbuch* are compatible with ESDP and NATO targets (Headline 2010 and Comprehensive Political Guidance), especially as they relate to threat assessment, force transformation, and *Bundeswehr* reform. In the new political context created by closer bilateral and multilateral relations (between France and the United States within NATO; Britain and France within the EU; and the United States, the EU, and NATO within an expanding Euroatlantic community), a second Angela Merkel–led governing coalition after the autumn 2009 elections in Germany could exert, by 2010, the leadership needed to resume an evolution in German security thinking that began in 1994, when a constitutional court ruling enabled the deployment of German troops abroad during the waning years of Helmut Kohl and the contentious chancellorship of Gerhard Schroeder.

Converging Views

Without a doubt, the states of Europe and the United States faced one of their most difficult crises ever over the use of force in Iraq. Before the war, a more united Europe might have better influenced the Bush administration's decisions for war or provided, within a more cohesive alliance, the additional capabilities needed for the nonmilitary missions that followed the decision to go to war. Aside from Iraq, however, the United States and the states of Europe,

Members of NATO and the European Union


European Members of NATO
European Members of the EU
Albania
Croatia
Iceland
Norway
Turkey
Belgium
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
United Kingdom
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Austria
Cyprus
Finland
Ireland
Malta
Sweden

as well as the institutions to which they belong, do or can now agree on many endogenous factors (political and economic interests, ambitions, values) and exogenous realities (threats, risks, and partnerships that are all in turn nurtured by historic experiences and geographic location). Thus, it is mostly agreed that:

- A diverse and interconnected array of issues—military (including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction), political (good governance), economic (access to and manipulation of vital resources), social (pandemics and even poverty), environmental (climate change), and human (demographic curves)—creates an increasingly complex, unpredictable, and unfamiliar security situation. The members of the Euroatlantic defense community and their institutions are neither adequately prepared nor properly equipped to address many of these, whether in terms of capabilities and know-how, organization, or policies. Nor can many, if any, of these threats be addressed exclusively with any single tool, military or otherwise. Most of them require a mixture of military and civilian capabilities, as well as a combination of national and institutional tools. Thus, the new goal of an emerging strategic vision is for a "more integrated" or "comprehensive" approach that can "bring together the objectives and plans of all departments, agencies, and forces involved in protecting our [Britain's] national security"—a view also articulated in the new French strategy, which is designed to combine, "without confusing them, defense policy, homeland security policy, foreign policy, and economic policy."
- Such multifaceted security concerns require a major overhaul of national and institutional capabilities, including national capabilities for the exercise of hard power, nonmilitary capabilities for the use of soft power, and joint capabilities that will enable the use of both hard and soft power. Admittedly, the United States (and NATO) has pursued this path for some time, though not as effectively with regard to the nonmilitary dimensions of security policy: in 2002, the United States Government still spent a mere $13 billion in external assistance versus the EU's $36 billion. For the countries of Europe and their Union, it is especially difficult to upgrade military power because of budget pressures that leave national governments with little more than cost-cutting options. The intensity of this pressure varies from country to country, however; it is less in France than in Germany, but more than in the UK, for various reasons. The UK, for instance, is not sensitive to the EU pressures exerted on euro-zone members. The resulting emphasis on "capability over quantity" may sound more like a political alibi than strategic thinking or raw necessity, but even in the UK, where defense spending has had its longest period of sustained growth since the 1980s (with the 2010 budget projected to be 11 percent higher in real terms than in 1997), it is recognized that the armed forces are stretched to the point of exhaustion, and the defense industry is approaching panic levels over the thinness of its order books.
- Relative to such a community, the notion of exclusive security "neighborhoods" for either side of the Atlantic is too limiting. In a globalized world, everywhere "over there" can intrude anywhere "over here." Seemingly eager to cure the EU of its "parochial myopia," the states of Europe should be willing to strive for a strategy that goes global—along the strategic arc sketched by the French and stretching from the Atlantic via the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa, and on to South Asia. For the French, this means a commitment of scarce

Estimated Proportion of Muslims in Selected European Countries, c. 2000



funds in areas that would enable them to know early (intelligence) and thus, like the UK, engage promptly (carriers), strike visibly (Rafale fighters), and stay late (gendarmerie, which represents a sizable share of the French defense budget). Germany's goal is to contribute quickly with smaller, more mobile crisis intervention forces for high-intensity, short-durability conflicts, or to field longer duration, low-intensity operations for postconflict stabilization. But no strategic paper and no declaratory policy can make up for the limits of national capabilities and will: the French White Paper anticipates 377 billion euros in military spending from 2009 to 2020, which, even at the current favorable exchange rate ($581 billion), would barely exceed the current annual U.S. defense budget. Hence an emphasis, again, on the virtues of efficacy: while French defense spending remains relatively high (2.5 percent of gross national product, about the same as in 2001), it falls to 1.7 percent if pensions and gendarmerie are excluded; more tellingly, 40 percent of that budget is for combat personnel and operational duties, as opposed to about 60 percent for administration and supporting roles (the reverse of the British budget, which the French government aims to emulate).

■ Spurred by its members, the EU now agrees that international terrorism is a "significant threat"—though not "the decisive ideological struggle of the 21st century" postulated by the United States—whose global reach and potential access to weapons of mass destruction make it fundamentally different from previous expressions of local terrorism in postwar Europe. Even Germany agrees on the "need to expand the constitutional framework for the deployment of armed forces," including on home soil, as "a result of the growing threat that terrorist attacks pose to German territory," and in order "to secure access to energy resources" as a primary security interest potentially threatened by nonstate aggressors. Yet while every EU country has been making significant efforts in all areas singled out in the EU's counterterrorism strategy—"prevention, protection, pursuit, and response"—Europe offers nothing comparable to a homeland strategy *à l'américaine*, still makes little room for the use of military instruments abroad, even in the areas of "pursuit" and "response," and continues to show a deep national reluctance to share intelligence widely within the EU.

■ NATO and EU member expectations that Russia might emerge quickly as a strategic partner have dampened. In August 2008, the war between Russia and Georgia confirmed that traditional threats, in the form of massive territorial invasion by large military forces, remain real and can demand the sort of collective response mandated by Article 5 of the North Atlantic treaty, but now over a much larger geographic area than was envisioned in April 1949. This means that while NATO must keep the membership door open to Georgia and Ukraine, no date for such enlargement can be set until NATO's current members reach a consensus over the most effective ways to discourage Russia from trying to reestablish a commanding influence at its periphery. Outside Europe and beyond Russia, emerging poles of power in Asia (especially China, but also India and Japan) will need to be brought in as stakeholders in a new multilateral order. The members of the EU and NATO will also need to engage, reform, and strengthen other institutions—including the Group of Eight, UN Security Council, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank—a goal that is especially emphasized in the British national strategy paper. In this context, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's renewed emphasis on "transformational diplomacy" as a display of "realistic idealism" restores the old-fashioned imperatives of stability and order, and suits Europe's predilection for a new multilateralism that insists on good governance, civil society, social and political reforms, rule of law, and so forth.

Learning to Act Together

As the Obama administration prepares for the difficult agenda that looms ahead, in and beyond Europe, it is comforting to find that in recent years, the views of at least the 32 states of the EU and NATO have become more compatible regarding their total security environment; the logic of unity can at last prevail over that of division. Nevertheless, in a reversal of Cold War conditions, even as Europeans and Americans are growing closer in spirit, the risk is that they might remain distant in practice. This is especially true with regard to the use and usefulness of military force, and it is especially significant with regard to Iran, a key priority outside the Euroatlantic area. Relations with Iran will be a driver of future policy decisions involving the expected but gradual withdrawal of American and coalition forces from Iraq, improved stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, the instability of Pakistan, and some resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Over the past few years, EU unity, U.S.–EU cooperation, and Alliance solidarity on Iran have been impressive—but only thus far. As is to be expected from the members of an alliance, as distinct from a single-mission coalition, some Allies have agreed at least to delay what they might otherwise have done sooner (a military strike), while others have agreed to what they otherwise are reluctant to do (impose more economic sanctions). Throughout, consultation has been a prerequisite to consensus, although it was originally by and for a few (the United States and the so-called EU–3—Britain, France, and Germany) before it was extended to the EU and NATO. Yet there should be no illusion: however united the Alliance may seem to be on the goal—to deny Iran access to nuclear weapons—its members are still divided over the means, whether it is the use of military force by members or an Israeli decision to make use of its forces, with or without U.S. consent. Notwithstanding vague references to "preemptive engagement [that] can void serious problems in the future" written into the EU strategy paper after its endorsement by member states at the Thessaloniki Summit of June 2003, there is little place for preemption in the national strategy of the leading European states and their Union. In 2009, or possibly a bit later, that distinction will be tested as Americans and Europeans are called upon to debate what is to be feared more, a nuclear Iran or a war with Iran. The question will be how and when best to deter Iran—with military threats before Iran achieves, or approaches, nuclear status, or afterward with threats of instant "obliteration," as then-president Jacques Chirac warned.

The United States and Europe do not always share the same priorities regarding other problems in the Greater Middle East. "Why are we in Afghanistan?" or "Why should we be involved with Pakistan?" are questions raised in Europe with a different sense of urgency than in the United States. Nor is there much discussion on either side of the Atlantic of the "years after" in Iraq, when the withdrawal of most coalition forces will have been completed, likely ahead of the next U.S. Presidential election in 2012. Nor, finally, is there a solid consensus on the terms of diplomatic engagement in the Middle East, for instance, on whether Syria or Hamas or Hizballah can be legitimate interlocutors for some even when they are dismissed by others, or even between Israel on the one hand, and the United States and the states of Europe on the other.

On these and many other issues, one of Chirac's earlier questions lingers unanswered: "Who does what?" he asked in 2000, during the EU's so-called finality debate. It is an equally valid question for an emerging Euroatlantic finality debate. The question raises three distinctive but overlapping sets of national and institutional issues: what degree of autonomy can or should the EU and its members have relative to NATO and to each other; what degree of autonomy can or should NATO and its members have relative to the EU and to each other; and what degree of autonomy can or should the United States have relative to NATO? Admittedly, these questions cannot be answered convincingly on paper until they have been tested empirically, over time. Still, the appeal of recent strategic documents—the recent British, German, and French White Papers, as well as the past EU Strategy Security Paper, the White House national security paper, and even the NATO Comprehensive Political Guidance—lies not only in what they and their state sponsors want to do about the world and its problems, but also in what they say, directly or by implication, about the Alliance or the EU, and their members.

For Europe, the EU, the United States, and NATO, in all their various relationships, asserting a will to act in common on the basis of compatible values, overlapping interests, and common goals may go a long way toward recasting an alliance that has seemed to be adrift in recent years. At this moment, there is an unusual opportunity for the Obama administration, as it reviews its National Security Strategy in 2009, to rely on the areas of convergence discussed here to define a compatible, if not identical, Euroatlantic strategic approach (EU–U.S., U.S.–NATO, and NATO–EU–U.S.) to the daunting challenges of the post–Cold War, post-9/11, post-Iraq world ahead.

Balkan Challenges

Since the end of the Cold War, the Balkan region has presented major security challenges to the United States, NATO, and the EU. Several Balkan wars erupted from the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia in 1991, leaving a powerful legacy of distrust among the region's governments and populations.

After a slow initial response from Europe (and hesitation by the United States) to wars involving Croatia, the former Republic of Yugoslavia (dominated by Serbia), and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the NATO-led Operation *Joint Endeavor*, backed by a 60,000-troop Implementation Force, began its deployment in December 1995 to enforce the Dayton Peace Agreement. In March 1999, in an effort to halt a humanitarian catastrophe involving Serbian-led ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, NATO launched an air campaign, Operation *Allied Force*, against Serbia. Three months later, when Serbian forces began to withdraw from Kosovo, NATO established Operation *Joint Guardian* with the 50,000-troop Kosovo Force (KFOR). In December 2004, NATO transferred its military security tasks in Bosnia-Herzegovina to an EU force (EUFOR-Althea), but some 16,000 KFOR troops remain in Kosovo.

In February 2001, interethnic tensions flared into armed conflict between Macedonian government security forces and Albanian extremists. NATO and the EU responded by coordinating negotiations that led to the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement, opening the door to numerous amendments to the Macedonian constitution and far-reaching legislative changes. NATO also launched successive operations to disarm ethnic Albanian groups, destroy their weapons, and protect international monitors overseeing the implementation of the Ohrid settlement. Operating under the Berlin Plus arrangements, NATO transferred its military security role in Macedonia to the EU's Operation *Concordia* in March 2003, which was followed in December by an EU civilian police mission, Operation *Proxima*, through December 2005. By July 2006, Macedonia was able to conduct parliamentary elections that, while marked by confrontations within ethnic Albanian and ethnic Slav political parties, were assessed to meet EU and NATO standards.

Despite the qualified successes of NATO- and EU-led stabilization efforts, regional conflicts and the risk of state failure have reemerged as looming challenges in the Balkans. These have become even more pronounced since the declaration of Kosovo's independence in February 2008.

The Future of Kosovo and Serbia

Kosovo and Serbia will determine future Balkan stability and security. The Serbian parliament unanimously approved a new constitution in September 2006, declaring its independence and reaffirming its position that Kosovo—with its overwhelmingly ethnic Albanian population—remained an integral part of Serbia. Two international efforts—led first by a UN special envoy and later by a "troika" of the United States, the EU, and Russia—failed to broker an agreement between Belgrade and Pristina during 2006–2007. After Kosovo declared independence in February 2008, the United States and more than 40 EU and non-EU countries extended recognition to the new Kosovo state, while Serbia, Russia, China, and some Balkan neighbors opposed it. This ambiguous situation has resulted in a hardening of nationalist positions and increased political instability.

Limited international recognition of Kosovo's independence has serious consequences. Kosovo's ethnic Serbian population, which constitutes the majority of the population north of the Ibar River, wants nothing to do with Pristina. They consider themselves part of Serbia and enjoy support from Belgrade, backed by Russia. Under its continuing UN mandate, KFOR protects both ethnic Serbs and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. After the Kosovo constitution came into force in June 2008, full powers devolved from the UN Mission in Kosovo to Kosovo's state institutions, except in the areas of justice and policing, which remain, for a transition period, under the jurisdiction of a new EU rule of law mission.

Since Serbia and Russia do not recognize the legitimacy of an independent Kosovo, the EU mission could come into conflict with Belgrade's efforts to create a separate Kosovo Serb parliament and to protect ethnic Serbs (which Belgrade considers as Serbian citizens) in northern Kosovo. With tensions seething just below the surface, KFOR will be needed for some time to protect the ethnic Serbs who remain in small enclaves south of the Ibar River and those ethnic Albanians still living north of the river. The longer the existing standoff continues, the more regional tensions will increase, possibly creating a new "frozen" conflict that will undermine long-term prospects for Balkan stability.

However the Kosovo question is resolved, the integration of Serbia and Kosovo into the Euroatlantic mainstream will be a major challenge. Serbia's politics are still roiled by bitterness and resentment over the wars of secession that split apart Yugoslavia. NATO invited Serbia to join PFP in November 2006 and has encouraged its cooperation with other partners and Allies in the region. In April 2008, the EU and Serbia signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA).[5] NATO and the EU will need to reach out to Serbia to help democratic reform there and coordinate its PFP and SAA activities, while working with its Balkan neighbors to create a secure and stable surrounding environment. At the same time, KFOR will need to continue to protect both ethnic communities while the EU mission in Kosovo facilitates the institutional development of judicial and police authorities.

Bosnia-Herzegovina: Unresolved Issues

In many respects, the transition in 2004 from a NATO-led stabilization force to EUFOR-Althea has become, after a bumpy start, a positive example of cooperation through the Berlin Plus arrangements. Some 2,200 EUFOR-Althea troops remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina under a UN mandate, coordinating closely with a small NATO headquarters in Sarajevo, which assists Bosnia-Herzegovina in defense reform, counterterrorism, and intelligence-gathering. Meanwhile, the EU has shifted its overall emphasis from stabilization to support for Bosnia-Herzegovina's "integration" into Euroatlantic structures. For example, the EU Police Mission has mentored the fledgling multiethnic police service, which is struggling to cope with exploding organized crime and human, drug, and arms trafficking.

More needs to be done. NATO and the EU will need to better focus and coordinate their programs and activities to combat organized crime and to counter terrorism. Areas needing priority attention include police reforms and amendments to the Bosnia-Herzegovina constitution that would strengthen the powers of the central government relative to the ethnic entities.

For example, although Bosnia-Herzegovina created a new state-level defense ministry in January 2006 and joined PFP later that year, it faces obstacles, largely explained by ethnic mistrust, to moving other institutions from the entity level to the state level. The prime minister of Republika Srpska (the ethnic Serbian region of the country) continues to resist police reform under a state-level ministry of the interior. In 2006, proposed amendments to the Bosnia-Herzegovina constitution, which would have accomplished such reform, failed to acquire the necessary two-thirds majority in both houses of parliament. The Bosniak (Muslim) leadership wants to eliminate the separate ethnic entities and build a stronger centralized state, while ethnic Croats want constitutional reforms to guarantee their security and equality. For their part, Republika Srpska leaders want, at most, a loose federation of two entities; some have threatened to use the Kosovo "precedent" to hold a referendum on its constitutional status within Bosnia-Herzegovina.

EUFOR-Althea's mission will be accomplished when Bosnia-Herzegovina's state-level institutions have been consolidated and are functioning adequately. No one can predict when this will happen, however. Recognizing that local politicians must ultimately accept responsibility for the result, the EU Office of the High Representative believes it is still premature to shift to state-level institutions, preferring that the EU Special Representative remain in the country for at least another year. The issue of a new constitution is now coming to the fore as well. Since 70 percent of the population wants to join the EU, the EU agreed to sign an SAA in June 2008 not as a reward for merit, but as an incentive for administrative reforms.

▼ *Continued on p. 301*

ISAF/NATO

Italian ISAF troops search for weapons cache in Musahi Valley, south of Kabul

Turkey at a Crossroads

Turkey faces a defining moment in its history as it tries to handle the twin challenges of deteriorating civil-military relations and maturing demands from its ethnic Kurdish population. How it manages these challenges will significantly affect its relations with the United States, the EU, and NATO.

Relations between the civilian government—led by the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, or AKP) and its popular prime minster, Recep Tayyip Erdogan—and military leaders have taken a turn for the worse since April 2007, when the military attempted to counter AKP's nomination of foreign minister Abdullah Gul to become Turkey's president. (Gul's wife wears a headscarf, which the military, in particular, sees as a threat to secularism.) The AKP picked up the challenge by calling for early elections in July 2007, which handed Erdogan an unprecedented victory. Turkey, it seemed, had once again narrowly averted the abyss of a coup d'état.

Another showdown, however, developed a year later, when the constitutional court—at the instigation of the judiciary, military, and other elements of the arch-secularist establishment—agreed to consider charges that the government had violated constitutional provisions guaranteeing a secular state. A ruling against the government would have closed down the AKP and effectively banned its members from holding office and other political activity. In July 2008, faced with domestic and international pressure, the court by a narrow margin decided not to close the AKP, but to punish it by imposing a fine.

These developments have alarmed EU members who have generally been sympathetic to the AKP's efforts—however erratic—to substantially reform Turkey's judicial and political system in line with the EU's Copenhagen Criteria. Had the constitutional court banned the AKP, the EU likely would have suspended its accession negotiations with Turkey, further distancing the Turks from Europe and, more broadly, from Western institutions. At a minimum, EU consideration of Turkey's membership would have been pushed down the road for several years. The court case demonstrated the fragility of Turkish-EU ties. Those Europeans who have second thoughts about Turkish accession will be scrutinizing the evolution of the civil-military divide.

The court's decision was a setback for hard-line secularists, but this does not mean that the Turkish political system is out of the woods. The decision clears the way for the consideration of a badly needed new and liberal constitution. By recalibrating the role of the military in society and politics, such an effort could reignite the divisions in Turkey between the vast bulk of the population and elites, between civil society and the state apparatus, and between democrats and those who believe that the state trumps individual liberties and rights. A more turbulent political picture could also have economic reverberations.

Similarly, continued political uncertainty will affect the other challenge facing Turkey: the Kurdish question. Turkish Kurds are far more politically mobilized than ever before. They have drawn inspiration from the Kurdish experiment in autonomy in northern Iraq and, while unwilling to secede from Turkey, are adamant in their demands for certain cultural and basic rights from Ankara. The two issues intersect in another way: the main Kurdish political party (which, like the AKP, has been threatened with closure) and the AKP account for the totality of Kurdish votes in Turkey. Kurds expect that these parties will deliver new solutions to their problems and likely will rally behind the party that best meets their aspirations for greater autonomy. The Kurdish question is another arena of civil-military discord and is the single most important determinant of Turkey's policy toward Iraq.

The AKP closure case distracted the Turkish body politic from more pertinent and important issues of foreign and domestic policy. Turkish-American relations improved with Washington's decision to support limited Turkish cross-border operations in Iraq's Kurdish area. Yet those relations continue to face an important test in Iraq—in particular, over northern Iraq. The United States expects that Turkey will engage with the Kurdistan Regional Government to resolve outstanding disputes. The AKP government has indicated that it is interested in greater dialogue with Iraqi Kurds and Baghdad, but it will need U.S. support. The question of relations with the Iraqi Kurds is an explosive issue because of their ties to Turkey's Kurds. How the AKP government manages the competing pressures coming from Turkey's disparate influential sectors will help determine the future character of Turkey. The danger is that a Turkish government that just muddles through may alienate Europe and Turkey from each other. Such an outcome will mean that Ankara will be less likely to cooperate on issues such as Iran or human and drug smuggling. Alternatively, Ankara may seek to invoke Turkish "exceptionalism" to win American support, thereby placing Washington in a quandary with regard to its European Allies.

▲ *Continued from p. 299*

Macedonia: Renewed Tensions

Though Macedonia passed the elections test in 2006, recent Kosovo events have renewed interethnic tensions. Skopje has so far refused to recognize Kosovo's independence. Ethnic Albanians want to do so, but Macedonian Slavs remain hesitant to upset Belgrade and feel threatened by growing Albanian nationalism. Immediately before NATO's April 2008 Summit, the Democratic Party of Albania left the ruling coalition because the government did not meet its demands, which included recognizing Kosovo. It only returned to the coalition because of its desire to see Macedonia invited to join NATO. When Greece blocked Macedonia's invitation (due to a longstanding dispute over the formal name of the Macedonian state), this shock also heightened interethnic relations and contributed to violent incidents surrounding the June 2008 parliamentary elections, further clouding Macedonia's international image.

A near-term solution to the name dispute appears unlikely. Meanwhile, Macedonia's frayed interethnic relations, heightened by differences over Kosovo, will bedevil the government and cast an additional shadow over regional stability.

Avoiding a Wider Crisis

Issues surrounding Kosovo's independence have helped to stoke renewed Balkan tensions. If left unattended, these could well provoke a series of uncontrolled and enormously damaging events. Considering NATO's post–Cold War investment in the Balkans, the Alliance's prestige would experience a considerable setback if its Balkan missions unraveled. The EU, which has made enormous strides since the early 1990s, more than ever needs to coordinate its efforts with NATO. If the EU and NATO fail in the Balkans, transatlantic ties could be weakened at the time of greatest need.

European Counter-radicalization Strategy

Europe's security challenge is as much focused internally as externally. Preventing terrorism is a high priority across Europe, and that objective is being pursued by major European nations through various counter-radicalization policies. The UK may well be the bellwether for countering terrorism in Europe. Although there have been terrorist attacks in the UK since September 11, it has also successfully thwarted prospective attacks. The UK counterterrorism plan, called Operation *Contest*, was developed in 2003 (but was made public only in 2006). The UK plan differs from the approach taken by France, the European country with the largest Muslim population.[6]

The UK Experience

The UK has suffered repeated terror attacks or attempted attacks in the past few years, beginning with the Dhiren Bharot radiation plot in the summer of 2004, the July 2005 London underground/bus bombings (known as the 7/7 bombing), the Heathrow airline plot in August 2006, and the Haymarket/Glasgow airport episodes in June 2007.

The Heathrow plot, in particular, might have been a watershed for the UK government, which had been largely focused on managing the threat through the criminal law system. Shocked to find that the majority of the perpetrators in the 7/7 bombing and Heathrow plot were born and raised in the UK, authorities realized that they had a homegrown terrorism problem, albeit one with a pervasive link to Pakistan and Kashmir, the original homelands of the majority of British Muslims. The radicalization of British Muslim youths begins at home, often with advanced training in violent extremism at al Qaeda training camps in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas over which the government of Pakistan has minimal control.

ISAF/U.S. Navy (John Collins)

Australian soldiers patrol in Tarin Kowt, Afghanistan, as part of ISAF mission

In addition to building up its security and police departments, the UK government in late 2006 made a strategic decision to focus on prevention by reaching out to British Muslim youths before they were at risk of becoming violent extremists. Significant funds were allocated over several years to the Department of Communities and Local Government to deepen contacts between municipalities and local Muslim communities. The government is also funding counter-radicalization projects through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to assist cities and villages in Kashmir and Pakistan where the extended families of many British Muslims still reside. Finally, a nerve center for counter-radicalization efforts, the Office of Security and Counter Terrorism, has been set up in the Home Office. Part of the government's goal is to build up resilience within the wider community while encouraging moderate Muslims to stand up, as some did following the Glasgow attack, and say, "Not in my name."

The government also created a strategic communications unit to ensure that all government departments and civil servants are giving a consistent message, which is to emphasize the "shared values" of all Britons and to avoid language or labels that demonize the Muslim community.[7] The key to successful prevention, in the government's view, is the ability to mobilize its own Muslim community to isolate and identify those who are espousing violent extremism and plotting attacks in Britain.

The French System

At the heart of traditional British and wider European multiculturalism is a reluctance to assert the superiority of any value system and an attitude of tolerance toward the diverse immigrant communities. The traditional French approach, by contrast, is to impose its state-derived value system: the republican ideal that subordinates ethnic or religious identity to a universal secular citizenship based on *Liberté*, *Egalité*, *Fraternité*. Those who reject republican ideals face a system defined by *laïcité*, or secularism, which sets limits on expressions of religion in the public sphere. In short, the French approach relies on assimilation.

When it comes to combating extremism, the French system of assimilation is buttressed by a tougher legal regime than is found in the UK and other European countries. French law prohibits hate speech and authorizes the preventive detention of those who incite violence, more or less indefinitely. These measures make it easier to deport extremists, even if they hold French passports. French law also permits the security apparatus to engage in more extensive surveillance techniques. A specialized judiciary branch for terrorism has evolved, with judges who act in some ways as prosecutors.

The French do not devote nearly as many resources to counter-radicalization as the British because, in their view, Muslims in France have not become nearly as radicalized. The French challenge is more socioeconomic. "Angry young men" in the depressed, largely North African and African areas outside Paris and other major cities suffer from joblessness and social exclusion, and the solutions may lie less in UK-style counter-radicalization than in affirmative action–type outreach programs, not unlike those adopted in the United States in the 1960s, following race riots in several American inner cities.

While France has been spared much of the extremist Islamist rhetoric and pressure for cultural "shariaization" that appears elsewhere in Europe, the UK model is perhaps more relevant to the rest of Europe than France's assimilation policy. This is because most other countries, like the UK, have had a "live and let live" policy of multiculturalism toward their Muslim communities until Islamist terrorism came to their cities. They will be watching closely to see whether the UK's counter-radicalization program is successful.

Where Europe May Be Heading

Certain assumptions are made by European counterterrorism strategists about the causes of violent extremism. The very use of the term *violent extremists* in the title of the UK Home Office's 2008 "Prevent Strategy" report appears to suggest that nonviolent extremists—or extremism in and of itself—are not the primary concern. British politicians are debating whether it makes sense in the long term to engage and empower political Islamists, including supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, who espouse nonviolence, as a way of isolating and diminishing the violent extremists from the Takfiri/jihadi/Salafist schools. Some argue that the government should reach out beyond the so-called gatekeepers, such as the Muslim Council of Britain, whose agenda promotes primarily grievance politics and "victimhood," in which criticism of Islamist radicalism is often branded "Islamophobia."

Rather than adopting a simplistic binary view of European Muslims as either violent or moderate, it may be useful to adopt a three-tier differentiation comprising:

- extremists who blend Takfiri/jihadism with Salafism and who justify violence against fellow Muslims for apostasy and against non-Muslims deemed infidels;

- political Islamists who advocate cultural separatism and sharia, Muslim issues in foreign policy, and a politics of victimhood and grievances, and who put their British, Dutch, or Danish national identity and civic responsibilities second to their obligations to fellow Muslims at home and transnationally; and
- the majority of Muslims who view Islam as a faith, not a political ideology, and who identify primarily as citizens of the European country where they live, not as members of a transnational political community.

Some contend that the Muslims who should be empowered by governments are those who reject the ideological underpinnings of jihad, which postulates a possible religious-based war in the near term or long term between Muslims and non-Muslims. They argue that it is shortsighted to empower political Islamists who are ideologically committed to long-term jihad and the establishment of Islamic governments, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, in the hope of weakening violent extremist al Qaedists, who advocate the immediate political decapitation of Western and moderate Muslim leaders.

While tactically it may make sense for police and security officials to engage with nonviolent political Islamists in order to thwart imminent terrorism from homegrown violent extremists, there is a seemingly well-placed concern that violent extremists come from and are nurtured by communities where political Islamism is the prevalent ideology.[8] If so, the crucial task of governments would be to empower those Muslims who are willing to debate the ideological Islamists over their respective visions for Muslim life in Europe. In short, some experts argue that the visions of Islamist and counter-Islamist Muslims are vastly more different than the visions of violent extremists and political Islamists.

By recognizing the full implications of the Islamist challenge as a war of ideas, governments might avoid the trap of empowering one group of Islamists to outflank another. Currently, the UK government is promoting Islamic studies as a way of countering the narrative of violent extremists who prey on Muslim youth with only a superficial understanding of the Koran and Islam. While the idea of teaching the benevolent and tolerant aspects of the Koran is laudable, the actual funding for new Islamic studies initiatives in British universities, typically starved of state funding, comes from Persian Gulf countries that often are interested in promoting a rigid Wahhabist perspective of Islam. Once again, some worry that it is shortsighted for the government and British universities to promote Islamic studies and scholarship that dilute rather than reinforce identity with British national interests.

Cold War Analogy

While historical analogies can be as misleading as they are illuminating, the Cold War provides useful lessons on how—or how not—to conduct battles for ideas. During the Cold War, the United States sought ways to buck up Western Europe against the inroads of communism. While some Cold Warriors such as Sidney Hook railed against socialists and other leftists together with communists, the Central Intelligence Agency took a different tack by funding *Encounter*, a European cultural and political magazine dominated by socialists who opposed communism. Just as the West embraced the Stephen Spenders of British cultural life to win the hearts and minds of Europeans in the propaganda war with the Soviet Union, today European governments are reaching out to moderate Muslims to engage in the battle of ideas with anti-Western Islamists. Again, the question of which so-called moderate Muslims to engage is critical.

The European socialists who received support from others in the Western community fundamentally supported, and were loyal to, their respective governments, though they clashed over certain of their policies. Similarly, the Muslims who might be empowered in the current battle for hearts and minds are those who feel they are citizens in their countries, with affirmative responsibilities as well as rights, and who support European values notwithstanding sharp disagreement over specific domestic and foreign policies. Some groups, however, may simply be pursuing long-term goals that are inconsistent with the future of the liberal democratic state system in Europe.

Non-Muslim Elites Begin to React

There is a new phenomenon in British intellectual life. Among the majority, non-Muslim community, there appears to be an increasing willingness to assert and promote "Britishness," a British version of the national aspirations associated with the "American dream." A more coherent British identity would make it easier for immigrants to become British and understand their obligations as British citizens. *Standpoint* magazine was launched in 2008 to celebrate, debate, and articulate Western values, albeit in an inclusive way intended to engage non-Western British citizens. Such measures appear to be early signs of pushback against assertive Islamism. Some Europeans are beginning to question the reflexive moral relativism of a hyper-secularized society where people are reluctant to assert that some values are better than others. There is, arguably, a general, increasing recognition that the liberal values of toleration, equal opportunity, and gender equality are superior to those value systems that promote intolerance and the subordination of women to men.

KFOR (Armend Aqifi)

Portuguese KFOR soldiers patrol in Mitrovica, April 2008

Convergence between Multiculturalism and Assimilation

Countries such as Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands were steeped in multiculturalism and respect for cultural autonomy among ethnic and religious groups. They are, however, slowly moving in the general direction of a French-style state-derived identity. Meanwhile, under President Nicolas Sarkozy, the French are backing off from a rigid assimilation model by recognizing distinctions among their religious and ethnic communities, albeit as a means of targeting deprived ethnic communities in order to further their upward mobility and integration into the French system.

Europe is likely to pursue a multipronged, sometimes contradictory policy of reaching out to the moderate elements in Muslim communities, beefing up community policing and counterterrorist surveillance, clamping down on immigration from countries outside the EU with large Muslim populations (for example, ones in South Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, and perhaps Southeast Asia), and thinking harder about what it means to be British, Danish, or Dutch, so that immigrants can have a better idea of what social norms they are expected to accept.

Meanwhile, long-term demographic trends loom over the entire integration and social cohesion and radicalization issue. As indigenous European birthrates plunge and Muslim families remain larger than non-Muslim families among the second and third generations, it may be crucial for societies to find a way to encourage Muslim women to avail themselves of educational opportunities and join the workforce. Statistics show that the birthrates of educated working Muslim women will converge with the lower birthrates of indigenous Europeans. The rates for stay-at-home Muslim mothers without higher education will not.[9]

A vocal minority of political Islamists in a Europe that is 5 percent Muslim would seem a manageable challenge.[10] Presently, the offspring of non-Muslim immigrants tend to intermarry, become secular, and have fewer children than the offspring of Muslim immigrants, who tend to marry within their own ethnic group, remain religious, and have several children.[11] If demographic trends continue, we are looking at a Europe in 2050 where one out of every three children under the age of 15 is Muslim.[12] Security officials worry that the demographic preponderance of Muslims in cities and towns across Europe would make it far more difficult to counter the separatist agendas of Islamists and the cultural penetration of sharia law. The long-term prognosis for terrorism in Europe would seem to depend on the ability of governments to empower Muslim counter-Islamists with a narrative that is convincing for the next and much larger generation of European Muslims. **gsa**

NOTES

[1] "International Security Assistance Force Fact Sheet," available at <www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf>. NATO figures are current as of February 13, 2009. NATO Ally Canada and non-NATO member Australia provide an additional 2,830 and 1,090 troops, respectively, to ISAF. The United States contributes approximately 25,000 military personnel to ISAF and 13,000 to Operation *Enduring Freedom*. In February 2009, President Obama

authorized the deployment of an additional 17,000 U.S. military personnel to Afghanistan.

[2] For an explanation of "Berlin Plus" arrangements, see NATO Web site at <www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/evolution.html>.

[3] Nick Witney, "Re-energizing Europe's Security and Defence Policy," European Council of Foreign Relations, July 29, 2008, available at < www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/european_security_and_defence_policy>.

[4] For a survey of current French defense issues, see Leo G. Michel, *Defense Transformation* à la française *and U.S. Interests*, Strategic Forum No. 233 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, September 2008).

[5] The Stabilization and Association Agreement process establishes special political and trade relations between the EU and Western Balkans countries with a view toward promoting democratic reform and economic development in those countries and their eventual accession to the European Union.

[6] UK Home Office Guide, "The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England: Stopping People becoming or supporting terrorists and violent extremists," and a shorter companion guide, "Preventing Violent Extremism: A Strategy for Delivery," both issued in May 2008.

[7] The Research, Information, and Communications Unit is a cross-governmental strategic communications resource on counterterrorism set up in 2007 and located within the Home Office.

[8] Some argue that engaging political Islamists even on a tactical basis does not make sense. See Melanie Phillips, "This country is so pro-Muslim it is giving succor to the extremists who would destroy us," *Daily Mail*, July 8, 2008, available at <www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1033189/This-country-pro-Muslim-giving-succour-extremists-destroy-us.html>.

[9] Kirk Scott and Maria Stanfors, "Fertility of the Second Generation: Do children of immigrants adjust fertility to host country norms?" Lund University, Sweden, 3, available at <http://epc2008.princeton.edu/download.aspx?submissionId=80047>.

[10] Currently, the number of Muslims in Western European countries ranges from 1 percent in Spain to several countries in the 3 to 5 percent range to over 8 percent in France. See B. Marechal, *A Guidebook on Islam and Muslims in the Wide Contemporary Europe* (Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia Bruylant, 2002).

[11] Eric Kaufmann, "Eurabia? The Foreign Policy Implications of West Europe's Religious Composition in 2025 and Beyond," paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference, San Francisco, CA, March 26, 2008, 13, 16.

[12] Anne Goujon et al., "New Times, Old Beliefs: Projecting the Future Size of Religions in Austria," in *Vienna Yearbook of Population Research 2007*, available at <www.oeaw.ac.at/vid/publications/VYPR2007/Yearbook2007_Goujon-et-al_pp237-270.pdf>.

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