

# The European Union and the Comprehensive Civil-Military Approach in Euro-Atlantic Security

## Matching Reality to Rhetoric

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WHEN THE European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)<sup>1</sup> was founded just over a decade ago, it was to be one of the crown jewels in the European Union's emergence as a new, soft civilian-superpower. The ESDP was erected on the premise that the future security environment will be defined less by traditional, state-centric military threats and much more by a wide range of diverse challenges that are transnational, multifaceted, and especially complex in nature,<sup>2</sup> and that such complex challenges will require the comprehensive integration of a range of civilian and military capabilities. This so-called comprehensive approach would mean that future success would depend not just on a state's ability to wield military power but its ability to employ and leverage state and nonstate civilian power as well, including "the political, security, development, rule of law, human rights, and humanitarian dimensions of international missions."<sup>3</sup> On this front, the EU was determined to become a leading force. According to former EU high representative for the common foreign and security policy, Javier Solana, "The comprehensive approach underpinning ESDP is its value added. The logic underpinning ESDP—its distinctive civil-military approach to crisis management—was ahead of its time when conceived."<sup>4</sup>

Nevertheless, 10 years into this effort, progress has failed to live up to expectations. The civil-military integration hoped for at the outset has been plagued by an ESDP institutional design that has served to separate and isolate the military and civilian aspects rather than integrate them.

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Moreover, the vision of building the ESDP into a vehicle for EU civilian power has been plagued by chronic civilian capacity shortfalls, both in the planning and control structures of the ESDP itself and in the ability to deploy civilian experts in an operational capacity. Most problematic, however, is that rather than seize the opportunity to forge the ESDP as an integrative transatlantic and, indeed, global leader in civilian aspects of security, it has maintained a primarily insular focus on iterative institutional reforms and a series of small-step, functionally circumscribed security missions. This has severely limited the potential of a value-added relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and has served as an obstacle to effective US–European cooperative capacity-building efforts. The insular focus has persisted despite an ESDP founding concept defined by a smart-power strategy involving complimentary development in diplomacy, defense, and comprehensive approaches to operational challenges like crisis prevention, stability, and reconstruction. These concepts are now broadly embraced on both sides of the Atlantic, and ESDP founders very early recognized and acted on the importance of such holistic integration of security capabilities. If, however, in its second decade the ESDP is to fulfill the EU’s hope of becoming a more significant force for security and stability in the world, the EU must move beyond the insular focus on institutional design that has defined its first decade. It must grow to partner and take more of a leadership role in this vital area. With the Lisbon Treaty and recent ESDP institutional reforms providing important new powers of unity and coherence across the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) domains, there is no time like the present.

### **The Comprehensive Approach and the European Union—A Slow Start to a Big Idea**

Of all Western attempts to forge a more comprehensive approach to security challenges, the EU’s efforts to build integrated civilian and military capabilities under the European Security and Defense Policy held for many the greatest early promise. Unlike existing state and multilateral security structures, the EU was not burdened with preexisting security institutions, departments, and agencies requiring negotiation to bring them into closer cooperation. The ESDP was to be uniquely constructed and resourced from its inception to provide the civilian and military integration

necessary for smart-power strategy and comprehensive approaches to operations. Despite these aspirations, however, ESDP progress toward truly integrated security functions, planned by an integrated staff and carried out by integrated executors on the ground, has been slow to develop. Indeed, even as an organization billed as the embodiment of comprehensive approach operations, the ESDP has struggled through repeated reforms to achieve more coherence and cooperation across its civilian and military domains and continues to suffer from capacity shortfalls in a variety of key functional areas.

The European Security and Defense Policy was first announced in 1998 at the British-French summit in St. Malo, France, and formerly confirmed in June 1999 as a central feature of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. The initial announcement at a bilateral summit between Europe's two most important military powers was no mistake. From the beginning, the ESDP would be defined by political contestation and compromise between Britain's desire to see it focus on the building and projection of civilian crisis-management capacities, thereby avoiding the duplication of NATO's traditional defense responsibilities, and France's desire for it to develop a separate and autonomous military capacity capable of carrying out independent combat operations. This schizophrenia of purpose meant that not one but two ESDPs were consummated at St. Malo. The first ESDP was to be the civilian power, whereby, according to Javier Solana, the EU would be uniquely suited to "use its longstanding experience and considerable resources on the non-military aspects of crisis management;"<sup>5</sup> the second ESDP, the military power, established for the first time an independent European military force. The result of these dual births and the member state political motives behind them can be seen most clearly in the burgeoning planning, command, and control structures within the ESDP headquarters and, especially, the near-constant attempts at their reform.

At the Nice European Council meeting of 2000, the EU began the process of establishing political and military bodies that would provide the ESDP its structural makeup. Chief among these structures would be the Political Security Committee (PSC), which would have the job of ensuring "synergy between the civilian and military aspects of crisis management."<sup>6</sup> Below the PSC, a European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and a supporting European Union Military Staff (EUMS) were established to provide military planning, command, and control. Remaining in its

own directorate and responsible for providing planning and control functions for the civilian side would be the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). These bodies would form the organs of the comprehensive approach design, but despite the stated importance of coherence and synergy between the civilian and military aspects of the ESDP, it would soon become apparent that this design would face several basic challenges. First, there was no integration of civilian and military aspects below the political PSC level. This practically guaranteed incoherence and disunity as an institutional inheritance. Second, and equally as important as the divisions, was the comparative disparity in resources between the two elements. While the EUMC was composed of very experienced senior military officers, the CIVCOM was largely comprised of junior diplomats, and while the EUMC was supported by a military staff of approximately 140 officers, the CIVCOM had no independent staff.<sup>7</sup>

This disparity in capacity between the civilian and military staff structures persisted despite a number of attempted reforms. A civilian mission-support section of 20 officials was added in 2003 to improve support for the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Also in 2003, the UK, Italy, and the Netherlands, on the one hand, and France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg, on the other, brokered a compromise on the long-standing issue of whether the ESDP should be equipped with a permanent operational command headquarters. Finding it duplicative of NATO capabilities, the British, among others, were opposed but compromised and allowed for the establishment of a civilian-military operations cell within the EUMS. To stress its distinctiveness as an EU structure, the cell was billed as a civilian-military integrative mechanism. The reality is it was a substitute for a full operational headquarters capacity, and its addition to the Military Staff meant that it was quickly dominated by the military with little connection to the remainder of the civilian staff in the Council Secretariat.<sup>8</sup>

From the beginning, then, efforts to constitute an ESDP planning, command, and control structure up to the comprehensive-approach task have been plagued by an inability to achieve effective staff integration and adequate resourcing of the civilian component. There are a number of reasons for these shortfalls, but paramount was the disagreement in purpose between the two primary European military powers. The French continued to resist any effort to merge civilian and military staffing functions for fear of this diluting traditional military effectiveness. The British

continued to champion a more integrated civilian-military capability as a needed complement to the traditional defense role of NATO. In the end, the ESDP headquarters structure has been the Janus-faced progeny of both visions, finding it difficult to fully succeed on either account.

As the ESDP has been plagued by its internal civilian-military divisions, the broader effort to forge a vehicle for more comprehensive and integrated security approaches has been characterized by intragovernmental divisions that have served as models of bureaucratic infighting and turf competition. The most important of these divisions sprang from the decision to institutionally separate responsibility for development assistance into two entirely different branches of EU government. Development that was focused on short-term intervention and crisis management was located inside the Council Secretariat with the ESDP, albeit in a different directorate. The lion's share of the EU development budget, however, would be focused on long-term assistance and be made the purview of the EU Commission (the EU's executive arm). While this institutional division was meant to ensure that development assistance would maintain a sustained focus and not be instrumentalized for short-term security purposes, the distinction was far from clear and was not accompanied by coordinating mechanisms adequate to ensure the two efforts were complementary.

This less-than-clear bifurcation of development authority has posed an ongoing challenge for ESDP operations. In a recent review of Europe's role in nation-building activities over the last several decades, James Dobbins and his co-authors speculate that this division of developmental assistance authority between the Council and the Commission is one likely reason the EU has lagged behind the United States in the provision of development aid in long-term support of stability and reconstruction missions.<sup>9</sup> It is a shortfall that has emerged in operations from the Balkans to the Congo, and it persists despite Europe's position as the world's leading overall contributor of official development assistance.<sup>10</sup>

A third important challenge to the realization of the ESDP as a comprehensive-approach instrument has been a continued inability to achieve its goals for deployable civilian capacity and accurately anticipate the expanded range of civilian expert requirements. At the 2000 Feira, Portugal, European Council meeting, four civilian capacity areas of police, rule of law, civilian administration, and civil protection were established as organizing areas for a comparable civilian capacity to the military side of the ESDP. Goals for this capacity were set for each area in what would

become Civilian Headline Goal 2008. Though there was much excitement over the subsequent rapidity by which member states would commit to meeting the goals, actually getting member states to fulfill these pledges of expert support has proven more difficult. The Civilian Headline Goal 2008 identified significant potential shortfalls in critical areas like police and rule-of-law functions.<sup>11</sup> These were areas that had been a central focus of capacity-building efforts but where deployable capacity regularly fell behind demand in a burgeoning EU mission set. There has proven to be a major difference between having a list of potential civilian experts capable of deploying in ESDP missions and actually deploying these individuals. Every judge or police officer deployed with the ESDP detracts from local governance capacity within member states. By 2009, reports on the status of civilian capacity building in critical areas had become even less sanguine. According to the European Council on Foreign Relations, the EU posted a 1,500-person total shortfall in 12 ongoing 2009 missions. The report singled out Spain as the most egregious overall example of pledge breaking, deploying only 2.8 percent of its total Civilian Headline Goal obligation.<sup>12</sup> Launched in June 2007, the European Police training mission in Afghanistan was scheduled to include 400 police officers from around the EU. Due to member-state abdications, however, the mission has habitually fallen around 130 officers short of that goal.

A related problem has been in identifying and building capacity within a wide range of expert areas not initially considered. As indicated previously, this includes the need for a cadre of civilian crisis-management planners to balance military planning capacity within the ESDP headquarters. It also, however, includes deployable experts in a wide range of security sector reform areas, including key functions like democratic oversight of the security sector and transparent financial management. Areas like these are necessary to build long-term security sector sustainability and effective democratic oversight and were only belatedly recognized as necessary expertise in efforts like security sector reform.<sup>13</sup>

Finally, the structural and capacity problems that have challenged efforts to build a comprehensive approach within the European Union have been mirrored in the circumscribed nature of ESDP operations to date. Since 2002, the ESDP has taken on 19 separate operations. These missions include the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia (2003), Military Operation in Bosnia–Herzegovina (2004), Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (2005), Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq

(2005), Police Mission to Afghanistan (2007), and the Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (2008), among others.<sup>14</sup> Of significance in these missions is the decidedly narrowly defined nature of each. Far from engaging in holistic, comprehensive integration of the ESDP's four civilian capacity areas with that of the military, ESDP operations generally follow the same pattern of separation and distinction that characterize its organizational structure. Much of this has, of course, been by design, as the EU has been careful to limit the scope of its missions as a means of ensuring some early successes and building ESDP momentum. Nevertheless, one area where limiting mission scope has proven difficult is in security sector reform (SSR), an area in which a 2009 EU Commission report concluded that

despite an EU SSR policy which defines the security sector in a broad manner and which endorses a holistic approach to SSR, in practice EU SSR support to a partner country tends to concentrate only on one or two individual parts of the security sector—mainly either defence, police, justice, or border management . . . linkages between the different parts of the security sector are mostly neglected.<sup>15</sup>

Thus, though the ESDP was born of a vision to more effectively integrate a broad range of civilian and military expertise, efforts to effectively operationalize that vision in the field have been slow to develop.<sup>16</sup>

## **New Reforms and New Hopes—A Decade of Institution Building Comes to an Active End**

Despite these difficult beginnings and ongoing capacity problems, there has, nevertheless, been increasing optimism that a recent series of reforms will serve to punctuate the ESDP's first decade of existence and bring better parity and integration to EU comprehensive-approach efforts. The first such significant reform came in 2007 with the creation of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). For the first time, the disparate and inadequate command and control structures that were to underpin civilian operations within the ESDP would be unified and bolstered in the same way the EUMC and the EUMS had done for the military component. This emerging resource and staffing parity was followed by integrative reforms in December 2008, when High Representative Solana gained approval for his plan to establish "a new, single civilian-military planning structure for ESDP operations and missions."<sup>17</sup> What was named the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) would merge the separate civilian and military directorates under a single

civilian head with a military deputy. The CMPD is to be located under the Directorate General for External and Political-Military Affairs in the Council Secretariat and, in its composition, is intended to bring together a diverse range of capabilities and administrative cultures with the mission to plan, prepare, and execute ESDP operations in a more holistic and integrated manner. Finally, the most far reaching of these decade-closing reforms has been ushered in with the final approval of the EU's long-incoming Lisbon Treaty. Among many other things, the Lisbon Treaty amended the practice of six-month rotation of the Council presidency among member states by establishing a sitting president of the European Council. More importantly, perhaps, Lisbon consolidated foreign policy responsibility between the Council Secretariat and the EU Commission in the form of a more unified high representative for common foreign and security policy, complete with an external action service (EAS) to give the new office a foreign-service capacity that had not previously existed.<sup>18</sup> Though plans to combine development and diplomatic direction within the EAS and create a strong link back to the ESDP are still forthcoming, the unification of foreign and security policy under a single high representative should at least help to smooth some of the earlier disjunctures. The question going forward, however, is the degree to which these hard-fought reforms can be translated and implemented into a more tangible comprehensive approach. The test of this answer is to be found more in the nature of the EU's external relationships than in continued internal line and block reforms.

### **The EU and the US—The Need for an Expanded Comprehensive-Approach Partnership**

Even as the EU has muddled through its decade-long coming of age for the comprehensive approach ideal, on the other side of the Atlantic, the United States has proven to be a zealous convert to the integrative security and holistic approach teachings. Signaling the potential of a new American way of war, US chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ADM Michael Mullen, has made it a central point of emphasis that “defense and diplomacy are no longer discrete choices . . . but must complement one another throughout the messy process of international relations.”<sup>19</sup> The question remains, to what degree can such converging concepts and efforts regarding civilian power and civilian-military integration find



expression in transatlantic cooperation. It is an area with much potential for a US–EU strategic partnership, if a series of persistent stumbling blocks can be overcome.

Ten years ago, while policymakers in the European Union were talking about the importance of civilian aspects of crisis management, the United States was focused on concepts like a revolution in military affairs and rapid decisive operations, perfecting a system of war that relied on technological superiority and rapid targeting to quickly overwhelm enemy systems. The dominant question was not whether the United States could realize such a vision but, rather, whether its closest European allies would be able to keep up or, given apparent divergence in threat perception, whether many of those same allies even thought it worth the try.<sup>20</sup> Observers wondered aloud if either this divergence spelled the useful end of much of the transatlantic security partnership or if, at best, there might be some room for a looser cooperation through combat versus constabulary functional specialization.<sup>21</sup> Nevertheless, one of the most important occurrences in the Euro-American security relationship in the last 10 years is the growing US realization that the early European focus on civilian power concepts and comprehensive security ideas has, in many important respects, proven prescient. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the US security establishment has come to appreciate the absolute central role that issues like societal and human security, development, rule of law, and good governance play in achieving successful stability and reconstruction. In strategic threat assessments, too, once divergent US and EU views of future global challenges have begun to converge around similar concerns. Issues like increasing attention to the prospect of a growing global multipolarity, on the one hand, and challenges like climate change, migration, resource scarcity, and nontraditional transnational threats, on the other, were first prioritized in EU security documents but have recently received focused attention on the western side of the Atlantic as well.<sup>22</sup> Though technological disparities have persisted as a concern on defense matters, the US security establishment has come to appreciate the many ways in which future security will be impacted by a variety of factors outside the traditional realm of defense and the corresponding importance of building capacity in areas from development to diplomacy to deal with these challenges. Though the EU proclaimed itself an early leader in this area, the benefit of first mover alone will not be enough. New multilateral and collective

concepts will be required to capitalize on the transatlantic attention these ideas have received.

### **NATO: Necessary but Not Sufficient**

NATO's central role has been to guarantee the transatlantic space against existential threat, undergirding the stability of a zone of trade and economic exchange that forms the foundation of the global economy.<sup>23</sup> If NATO does nothing but provide for territorial defense in this space alone, it has contributed immeasurably to North American and European member state interests. Nevertheless, absent reliable comprehensive approach alternatives, the last decade has seen NATO grow into an organization that has operated increasingly out of area, both in terms of its military functional and European geographical responsibilities. In stability and reconstruction operations from the Balkans to Afghanistan, NATO has responded to complex crisis management and counterinsurgency demands with force structures that were organized and maintained for traditional defense missions. The question, going forward, for NATO has been whether these kinds of missions will be institutionalized with the level and breadth of civilian capacity required to improve effectiveness in these areas. The answer almost assuredly will be no.

At the early insistence of Denmark and facing a growing, complex insurgency in Afghanistan, the alliance endorsed the concept of the comprehensive approach at the Riga Summit of 2006. It took the following 18 months ahead of the Bucharest Summit of 2008 to agree on an action plan for developing and implementing NATO's contribution to comprehensive-approach operations, the subsequent policy details of which were assigned to a newly formed comprehensive task force within NATO Headquarters. Since Bucharest, however, translating conceptual agreement on the importance of comprehensive approach has proven exceptionally difficult. In fact, the effort to expand the potential scope of NATO operations into the broader areas of security-related activity have been plagued by a number of inveterate obstacles, any one of which is likely to prevent the defense alliance from playing anything more than a military support role to more comprehensive operations. The most important of these challenges has been the simple existence of the ESDP. As previously discussed, the EU had already set about defining its niche in security affairs in terms of a unique mixture of civilian and military strategic and operational capacity required for comprehensive-approach

operations. With 21 of the 26 NATO members also member states in the EU,<sup>24</sup> there has been scant desire to risk functional competition between the two organizations by building a similar civil-military capacity in each. The point could not have been made more precisely in a recent EU Institute for Security Studies report on the future of the ESDP in which the authors were keen to stress NATO's role as "a military alliance and not a crisis management organisation."<sup>25</sup> Second, in addition to alliance apprehension over nondefense functional expansion, there is also mounting concern regarding NATO's role in out-of-Europe operations.<sup>26</sup> This latter point has been a central feature of ongoing negotiations over a new NATO strategic concept. The concern is that out-of-area operations have served to dilute and confuse NATO's central role as a Euro-Atlantic guarantor against existential threats.<sup>27</sup> Since this is its chief value for European parliaments and publics, there is sensitivity against risking further NATO popular support by employing the alliance in anything other than core mission areas. In light of the 2008 conflict between Georgia and the Russian Federation and more recent Russian military exercises in Belarus, Eastern European NATO allies have been particularly keen to see NATO affirm its territorial defense role more emphatically.

The result of these trends is the likely inability of NATO to develop significant civilian-power capacity. Instead, the alliance will continue to define its role as providing defense support to comprehensive-approach efforts. This circumscription of the alliance to a supporting role presents Europeans and Americans with two choices: leave transatlantic cooperation in the increasingly important nondefense security field to bilateral relationships, or forge a new EU-US partnership framework on comprehensive security approaches. As will be argued in the subsequent section, it is in the interest of both the EU and the United States to seek the latter arrangement.

### **The Comprehensive Approach—New Avenues for US–EU Partnering**

The EU no longer has a monopoly on smart-power appreciation and comprehensive-approach aspirations. Indeed, six years after observers faulted US military operational efforts in Iraq as severely limited by an unhealthy separation between military and civilian domains of action,<sup>28</sup> the larger US interagency planners appear capable of talking about little else than the importance of civil-military and civil-civil integration in comprehensive security approaches. At the tactical and operational levels, the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) model and new Army and Marine

Corps doctrines have emphasized the centrality of concepts like good governance, economic development, and rule of law in stabilization and counterinsurgency activities. At the strategic level, the 2005 DoD Directive 3000.05 instructed the US military to treat stability and reconstruction operations on equal priority with combat operations, and National Security Presidential Directive 44 established the secretary of state, through the newly formed office of the coordinator for reconstruction and stabilization (S/CRS), as the lead entity for integrating US government efforts in the stability and reconstruction domain. Indeed, the quest for more effective interagency operations has become what one recent report described as the “weather issue,” for its ubiquity in US national security discussion and debate.<sup>29</sup> Thus, as the EU absorbs its latest round of reforms for forging more effective civilian-military security integration, the United States finds itself in the midst of its own comprehensive-approach renaissance.

Despite this convergence of vision on both sides of the Atlantic and a 60-year history of deep security cooperation, there has been precious little effort to expand cooperation in this area. In light of the recent embrace of comprehensive-approach principles in the United States, the likely position of NATO as a support player rather than a comprehensive-approach leader, and the near completion of a decade of EU institutional redesign and refinement, there is an important opportunity for a strategic framework between the United States and the EU on comprehensive-approach cooperation.

A number of areas exist where such a relationship might quickly prove beneficial on both sides of the Atlantic. First, for Europe moving forward from the Lisbon Treaty, expectations for a more coherent leadership role for EU foreign policy have been high. Nevertheless, the selection of relatively unknown politicians for the Lisbon-created posts of a permanent president and a newly empowered high representative for foreign and security policy have done little to satisfy anticipation that Europe might finally be capable of matching its global economic might with a leading foreign and security policy voice.<sup>30</sup> Moving to formalize and expand transatlantic comprehensive-approach cooperation would provide an opportunity for visible European foreign and security policy leadership at a pivotal time. Second, EU–US strategic partnering in this area could serve to ease pressure on the NATO alliance regarding the proper location of these broader aspects in the transatlantic security architecture. This would avoid the unwanted EU prospect of comprehensive-approach cooperation

becoming a bilateral matter between the United States and individual EU member states. Third, the ability to forge a closer security relationship directly between the EU and NATO has consistently been blocked by alliance member Turkey in an attempt to extract concessions from the EU on both Turkish membership and a satisfactory resolution to the Cyprus dispute. A closer EU–US comprehensive-approach relationship would help circumvent this inveterate obstacle to closer NATO–EU security cooperation, allowing the United States to be a more effective interlocutor between the defense role of NATO and the comprehensive capabilities of the EU–US partnership.

Finally, though the EU has proclaimed itself a global leader in comprehensive security approaches, it has, nevertheless, resisted efforts to view development and diplomacy primarily through a security lens.<sup>31</sup> This cautious perspective on foreign policy writ large has been at the heart of EU self-concepts regarding its global identity as the world's first “normative power.” By contrast, the United States, though working to dampen these perceptions, has been plagued by criticisms that it is overly military-centric in its security and foreign policy.<sup>32</sup> Much of this military-centric focus, however, has been influenced by the prevailing security environments in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the United States emerges from these two conflicts, there will be an expanding need to think about the application of comprehensive security solutions in light of a foreign and security policy not dominated by the immediacy of ongoing stability and support missions. Issues like crisis response and, especially, crisis prevention will become increasingly important. By acting to forge a strategic partnership now, the EU has an opportunity to play an influential role in this debate. In sum, Europe has default strategic connection with the United States in a broad security domain that far exceeds the need for traditional defense capabilities.<sup>33</sup> It is not in the EU's interest for the only security relationship between Europe and the United States to remain in the circumscribed area of traditional defense. Both the United States and the EU increasingly recognize that future threats will require more expansive and holistic solutions.

The United States, similarly, should welcome the prospect of EU partnership and, at times, leadership in this area as having great potential to improve comprehensive approach legitimacy and future civilian capacity. First, the current US administration has been keen to find visible global partners to deal with a growing list of current and future security challenges.

With the EU viewing itself as a comprehensive-approach leader, a bilateral Euro-Atlantic partnership could encourage the EU to take a more active role in operationalizing this vision. Second, for reasons of legitimacy, future crisis management and prevention missions should not be defined by unilateral US involvement. Indeed, successful crisis management and prevention missions, from humanitarian and peacekeeping to stabilization and reconstruction, require a level of international, host nation, and even donor country domestic legitimacy that is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve through unilateral effort.

Finally, though the United States has made important progress in the establishment of civilian operational capacity, including increased budgets for development and diplomacy and the ongoing establishment of a 4,200-person Civilian Response Corps.<sup>34</sup> The scale and scope of demand in areas like rule of law, agriculture, governance, and economic development is likely to outstrip the United States' ability alone to respond to all but the most limited of contingencies without again leaning heavily on its military. Despite the above mentioned civilian capacity problems, EU member states provide approximately €60 billion per year in official development assistance (ODA); approximately €12 billion of this is managed by the European Commission. The EU's humanitarian assistance budget is approximately €937 million, and its operational European Security and Defense Policy budget is €250 million.<sup>35</sup> In addition, the ESDP maintains a roster of over 10,000 deployable experts in the primary areas of civilian crisis-management expertise. Chief among these has been a variety of civilian expert areas where the United States, for reasons of national experience, has no capacity at all.<sup>36</sup> This includes, for instance, the EU's ability to draw on gendarmerie forces, like the Italian Carabinieri and the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF), as well as the EU member states' experience and capacity in interior ministry-based rule of law and justice functions—a structural similarity shared with most developing states but an area in which the US federal and state governments operate quite differently.<sup>37</sup> The United States would greatly benefit from an EU partner in these areas, but these are relationships that must be established and cultivated before the call to crisis occurs.

In this vein are a number of areas where the advantages of EU–US strategic partnering are quickly apparent. The supporting elements of doctrine and concepts, education and leadership, and training and planning will need further development as these integrative civilian capacities

mature and the comprehensive approach assumes a more coherent role in ordering security thinking and responses. Most of these areas received attention in the 2007 joint EU–US work plan on crisis management; however, with the exception of a data sharing agreement, little effort has been made to act on the plan.<sup>38</sup> Nevertheless, the above mentioned trends offer an important new window of opportunity for EU–US cooperation across a range of issues.

The most important area in which collaborative effort has the potential to sustain long-term commensurability and cooperation is in the development of an intellectual foundation for comprehensive-approach strategies and operations, especially the need for a common comprehensive approach definition and concept.<sup>39</sup> This is something that has long been required in the transatlantic community but, as previously discussed, has been hampered within NATO by disagreement over its role in other-than-defense-related activities. The US Institute of Peace (USIP) recently released its *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*;<sup>40</sup> USIP and EU planners should seize the opportunity to create such a document for the Euro-Atlantic space.

A common document of this sort would provide the intellectual foundation required for a shared system of transatlantic education and training in the comprehensive approach domain. The EU has the potential to become a much needed global leader and US partner in civilian education for comprehensive security approaches, including courses and programs from the tactical-functional to the ministerial-strategic levels. For instance, the German government supports, through an implementing nonprofit partner, the provision of a course in development diplomacy which has been heralded as a model for the kind of educational opportunities required for future US diplomats.<sup>41</sup> The EU might seek to replicate programs of this nature. In fact, one recent document went so far as to recommend the establishment of a US–EU school for conflict prevention, conflict management, and postconflict stabilization that would serve to further a common understanding and approach to comprehensive operations.<sup>42</sup> In short, with a common conceptual foundation come numerous opportunities for Euro-Atlantic burden sharing in the critical task of building the intellectual capacity for comprehensive approaches to security challenges.

In the area of training and planning, too, the end of a decade of ESDP institutional fluctuation offers hope of useful cooperation and collaboration. Planner exchanges, for instance, have proven to be critical means

of strengthening professional development, communication, cooperation, and understanding within the framework of alliance military operations. The EU's ongoing establishment of the Crisis Management Planning Directorate provides an excellent opportunity for US interagency planners to participate in an organization going through the early struggles of integrating civilian and military crisis prevention and response planning. Such an experience would be useful for US planners, who would return to take part in the Civilian Response Corps' continued maturation. Perhaps no proposal has been more ambitious in this area than that offered in February 2008 by US ambassador to NATO, Victoria Nuland, who argued, "If we truly believe in a transatlantic comprehensive approach to security—one that combines the best of our soft and hard power—we need a place where we can plan and train for such missions as a NATO–EU family."<sup>43</sup> Given the obstacles to establishing such a NATO–EU fusion cell in the near future, an initial step to address the current dearth of transatlantic planning capacity in the area of comprehensive civilian-military operations could be to begin with a bilateral US–EU arrangement.<sup>44</sup> Operational exchanges and integration also provide the opportunity to offer mutual personnel assistance while bolstering individual professional development. In this area, there are already some modest examples of US–EU operational cooperation, including the US Customs and Border Protection's participation in the EU Commission's Customs and Fiscal Assistance Office (CAFAO) program in Bosnia and the US participation in the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo, which included the agreement to provide up to 80 police officers and eight judges and prosecutors.<sup>45</sup>

Of course, the first place the United States would like to see enhanced cooperation in civilian-power operational participation is in Afghanistan. Assuming a significant civilian-power role in Afghanistan would provide a single-stroke opportunity to affirm the maturation of the EU comprehensive-approach vision. Nevertheless, there are a number of other areas where attention has not been as focused but where EU forethought and action could prove similarly important. One need only review the range of failed state indexes to identify some leading suspects. Somalia, for instance, has habitually topped even Afghanistan as the leading failed state in the world. So, too, there is increasing concern about the stability of Yemen, a nation with great potential as a terrorist-harboring, ungoverned space but also with great potential as a demonstration case for EU crisis-prevention leadership. In a world with a strong EU–US crisis management



relationship, these are the kinds of discussions of forethought that would occur before the ad hoc pleas of assistance once again emerge to dominate the discourse.

## Conclusion

It has been said that US expectations of the EU are at once too high and too low.<sup>46</sup> On the issue of the comprehensive approach in particular, this is a fitting statement for the great partnership potential the EU represents as compared to the abiding American incredulity that this potential will be realized. Europe was correct in its early emphasis on the expansiveness and complexity of future security challenges and the need to look beyond defense to more comprehensive solutions to these problems. This vision was, indeed, as Javier Solana contended, “before its time.” Yet, as a result of the events of the past decade, the EU is no longer a lone convert to the comprehensive approach faith. The question from the newly converted is rightfully: now what? With the tidal waters of institutional formation and redesign receding on a more settled EU institutional landscape, there is an important opportunity for the EU to fully embrace its stated role as a global civilian power partner and leader. The world and the United States, in particular, would be most wise to welcome this coming of age. **SSQ**

## Notes

1. European Security and Defense Policy is referred to as Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) with the Lisbon Treaty. However, since *ESDP* was the term employed for much of the history discussed here, the term is retained for use in this article.

2. Nicole Gnesotto and Giovanni Grevi, *The New Global Puzzle: What World for the EU in 2025?* (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2006).

3. Rintatoski and Autti point out that there is no universally shared definition on comprehensive approach; however, it is generally accepted that it includes these dimensions. Kristiina Rintakoski and Mikko Autti, eds., *Comprehensive Approach Trends, Challenges and Possibilities for Cooperation in Crisis Prevention and Management, Crisis Management Initiative* (Helsinki: Finland Ministry of Defence, 2009), 9.

4. As described here by Javier Solana, the terms *comprehensive approach* and *civil-military cooperation* will be used interchangeably throughout the article to refer to this general integrated security effort. Javier Solana, “Remarks by the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy,” in *ESDP@10: What Lessons for the Future?* (Brussels: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2009), 7.

5. Daniel Plesch and Jack Seymour, *A Conflict Prevention Service for the European Union* (London: British American Security Information Council, 2000), 15.

6. “Presidency Report on the European Security and Defence Policy,” in *Presidency Conclusions of the Nice European Council (7–9 December 2000)*, annex VI, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00400-r1.%20ann.en0.htm](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00400-r1.%20ann.en0.htm).

7. The Swedish presidency in 2001 did add a police unit to the Council Secretariat to provide planning expertise on police missions. However, this unit was not assigned to support CIVCOM but was instead placed in a separate directorate; also, it came with only eight officers. For more on this, see Carmen Gebhard, *The Crisis Management Planning Directorate: Recalibrating ESDP Planning and Conduct*, vol. 7, no. 4 (Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies, 2009).

8. Decision making within the EU resides in three primary and distinct institutions. The Parliament is elected by and represents the citizens of the EU; the Council of the EU represents the member states; and the European Commission is the executive arm, representing the EU itself. For more on these distinctions, see “EUROPA—European Union Institutions and Other Bodies,” [http://europa.eu/institutions/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/institutions/index_en.htm).

9. James Dobbins et al., *Europe’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Balkans to the Congo* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), xxix.

10. *Euromapping 2009* (Brussels: German Foundation for World Population and European Parliamentary Forum, 2009), 19, <http://www.euroresources.org/euromapping>.

11. *Final Report on the Civilian Headline Goal 2008* (Brussels: Ministerial Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference of EU, 2007), 14807/07.

12. Daniel Korski and Richard Gowan, *Can the EU Rebuild Failing States? A Review of Europe’s Civilian Capacities* (London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2009), 14.

13. Maria Derks and Sylvie More, *The European Union and Internal Challenges for Effectively Supporting Security Sector Reform* (Clingendael, Netherlands: Conflict Research Unit, Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme, Netherlands Institute for International Relations, 2009), vi.

14. Stéphane Pfister, “La Gestion Civile Des Crises: Un Outil Politico-Stratégique Au Service De L’union Européenne” [“Civil Crises Management: A Political Strategy Tool of the European Union”] (PhD diss., University of Geneva, 2008).

15. Derks and More, *European Union and Internal Challenges*, v–vi.

16. One recent report went so far as to claim that “the truth is that most EU missions are small, lacking in ambition and often strategically irrelevant.” Korski and Gowan, *Can the EU Rebuild Failing States?* 22.

17. *Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council (11–12 December 2008)*, doc. 17271/1/08, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st17/st17271-re01.en08.pdf>.

18. Antonio Missiroli, *The Impact of the Lisbon Treaty on ESDP* (Brussels: Directorate General Policy Department External Policies, European Union, 2008).

19. Greg Jaffe, “Joint Chiefs Chairman Mullen Outlines a more Restrained Art of War,” *Washington Post*, 5 March 2010.

20. Collectively, the European Union states have ranked second behind the United States in total military expenditures per year. However, the real difference in these expenditures is quite significant. Moreover, many European militaries were finding it difficult to reform beyond their manpower-intensive, territorial defense–focused past, making the actual disparity in technological sophistication even greater than spending alone indicates. Bastian Giegerich, “European Positions and American Responses: ESDP–NATO Compatibility,” in *European Foreign Policy in an Evolving International System: The Road toward Convergence*, eds. Nicola Casarini and Costanza Musu (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

21. John Hillen, “Superpowers don’t do Windows,” *Orbis* 41, issue 2 (1997).

22. *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World* (Washington: National Intelligence Council, 2008); and Giovanni Grevi, "Scanning the Future: American and European Perspectives," EU Institute for Security Studies policy brief, 2008.

23. Trade and investment between the United States and Europe alone is worth \$3.75 trillion in total commercial sales each year and leads to the employment of 14 million people on both sides of the Atlantic. Daniel Hamilton and Joseph P. Quinlan, *The Transatlantic Economy 2009: Annual Survey of Jobs, Trade, and Investment between the United States and Europe* (Washington: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2009).

24. These dual-member countries include Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

25. Álvaro de Vasconcelos, ed., *What Ambitions for European Defence in 2020?* 2d ed. (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2009), 19.

26. Peter Viggo Jakobsen, *NATO's Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Response Operations: A Work in Slow Progress* (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2008), 15.

27. Daniel Hamilton et al., *Alliance Reborn: An Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century* (Washington: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2009), 21.

28. See, for instance, Robert Egnell, "Explaining US and British Performance in Complex Expeditionary Operations: The Civil-Military Dimension," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 29, no. 6 (2006).

29. Christopher Lamb et al., "National Security Reform and the Security Environment," in *Global Strategic Assessment: America's Security Role in a Changing World* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2009), 412.

30. Selected by member state vote on 19 November 2009, the compromise for first president of the European Council was Belgian prime minister Herman Van Rompuy, and the high representative for foreign and security policy chosen was little-known European trade commissioner Catherine Ashton.

31. Vasconcelos, ed., *What Ambitions for European Defence in 2020?* 14.

32. See, for instance, Ann Scott Tyson, "Gates Warns of Militarized Foreign Policy," *Washington Post*, 16 July 2008; and "Defining the Military's Role toward Foreign Policy," in *Senate Foreign Relations Committee* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2008).

33. For more on this argument, see Vasconcelos, ed., *What Ambitions for European Defence in 2020?* 19. Also, Daniel Hamilton and Frances G. Burwell, *Shoulder to Shoulder: Forging a Strategic US-EU Partnership* (Washington: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2009).

34. *Introduction to the Civilian Response Corps* (Washington: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 2009), <http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.display&shortcut=4QR>; and B. Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, and Heather Peterson, *Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations* (Arlington, VA: RAND, 2009).

35. For more on these figures, see Benia Ferrero-Waldner and Louis Michel, *Annuel Rapport sur les Politiques Communautaires en Matière de Développement et D'Aide Extérieure et sur leur Mise en Oeuvre en 2008* (Brussels: Commission Européenne Office de Coopération EuropeAid, 2009); Julia Streets et al., *Improving Humanitarian Assistance: A Transatlantic Agenda for Action* (Washington: Center for Transatlantic Relations and Global Public Policy Institute, 2009), 13; and Hamilton and Burwell, *Shoulder to Shoulder*, 42.

36. Robert M. Perito, *The Interior Ministry's Role in Security Sector Reform* (Washington: US Institute of Peace, 2009), 13.

37. For a discussion of EU advantages in these areas, see Hamilton and Burwell, *Shoulder to Shoulder*, 42.

38. This work plan followed the April 2007 EU–US Washington Summit assessment on crisis management and included pledges to improve cooperation in capacity building, analysis, and response and the coordination of crisis prevention and response activities.

39. See, for instance, Julian Lindley-French, *Enhancing Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations: A Report of the Global Dialogue between the European Union and the United States* (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), viii. Also see Rintakoski and Autti, eds., *Comprehensive Approach Trends*, 30.

40. *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* (Washington: US Institute of Peace and US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 2009).

41. The statement regarding the Inwent (Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung gGmbH) course being a model educational opportunity for US diplomats was provided by Dr. Anne Marie Slaughter, US State Department director of policy and planning, “Speaking Event at the Center for American Progress,” Washington, DC, 16 November 2009.

42. Hamilton and Burwell, *Shoulder to Shoulder*, 49.

43. Victoria Nuland, “US Ambassador to NATO Victoria Nuland’s Speech in Paris: Ambassador Discusses Strengthening Global Security for Europe,” (speech to Press Club and US Chamber of Commerce, Paris, 22 February 2008), <http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2008/February/20080222183349eaifas0.5647394.html>.

44. Hamilton and Burwell, *Shoulder to Shoulder*, 47.

45. “Assistant Secretary Fried Welcomes US Participation in EULEX Kosovo Mission,” US Mission to the European Union, 2008, <http://useu.usmission.gov>.

46. Statement delivered by the former foreign minister of Hungary, Janos Martonyi, speaking at Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC, 3 December 2009.