

**HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON
UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND,
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND,
AND UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA**

THURSDAY, MARCH 19, 2009

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Webb, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Burris, McCain, Inhofe, Thune, and Martinez.

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Russell L. Shaffer, counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; Paul C. Hutton IV, professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel; and Dana W. White, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Jessica L. Kingston, and Breon N. Wells.

Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite, assistant to Senator Byrd; Elizabeth King, assistant to Reed; Bonni Berge, assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple, Greta Lundeborg, and Caroline Tess, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; David Ramseur, assistant to Senator Begich; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Sessions; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; Brian W. Walsh, assistant to Senator Martinez; Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker; and Chip Kenneth, assistant to Senator Collins.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. We have with us today three of our combatant commanders to get their assessment of the issues and challenges facing each of them. On behalf of the committee, I'd like to welcome: Admiral Tim Keating, Commander of the United States Pacific Command; General Kevin Chilton, Commander of the United States Strategic Command; and General Skip Sharp of the United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea.

The committee appreciates your long and faithful service to the Nation and the many sacrifices that you and your families have made for us. Please thank, on behalf of the members of this committee, the men and women that you lead, both military and civilian, for their service and patriotism. And their selfless dedication helps keep our country strong.

Now, this may be Admiral Keating's last hearing with us as Commander of the Pacific Command, as his new—or I guess as his current tour is soon going to be over. That's what we have heard. That's what the announcement yesterday was, and it's an expected announcement, so it comes as no surprise. However, there's obviously an element of sadness because you've been terrific and you've been a wonderful help to this country, to our committee. We congratulate you on a successful tour of PACOM and again thanks for all the cooperation and support and counsel that you have provided us over the years. We wish you and your family all the best.

Although much of our Nation's military and diplomatic efforts are understandably centered on the ongoing challenges in Afghanistan and Iraq, it's critical that we also stay engaged elsewhere in the world.

At today's hearing we will hear the views and assessments of the senior U.S. commanders in the Asia and Pacific region, together with those of the commander responsible for our worldwide strategic capabilities. The U.S. Pacific Command's vast geographic area of responsibility includes 36 countries, over half the world's population, three of the world's five largest economies, and five of the world's six largest militaries. Security and stability in the region is vital to our interests and the interests of our allies and our partners. While the region remains largely stable, we cannot afford to take that stability for granted. Indeed, there are pockets of significant instability in the region which demand our attention.

We must reassure our allies that we will continue to work with them to further our mutual interests and continue to make it clear to those who would contribute to instability and threaten security that we're prepared to stand in their way.

China's influence continues to grow regionally and globally. In 2009 China will increase military spending by nearly 15 percent, which is their 20th straight year of double digit growth in defense spending. In addition, China's economic growth, although slowing, appears to be on track to surpass Japan as the number two economy in the world.

We need to continue to assess what this military and economic growth means to the region and the world, while also of course continuing our efforts to find common ground. To this end, mutually beneficial military to military relations with China need to be de-

veloped further. The recent incident involving the harassment of the U.S.N.S. *Impeccable* by Chinese ships in the South China Sea, while disconcerting, appears to be less about military might and more about a disagreement over claims of sovereignty and freedom of navigation. Such a disagreement is an example of what we may benefit from if we had meaningful military to military conversations designed to reduce misunderstandings and to avoid miscalculations.

Admiral Keating, we're interested in your assessment of China's military modernization and the way forward on establishing and maintaining mutually beneficial relations with China.

On the Korean Peninsula, North Korea's rhetoric has grown increasingly acerbic in recent months and their plan for a satellite launch in the next few weeks has raised concerns. The Six-Party Talks have stalled, frustrating efforts to identify nuclear capabilities and to move to phase three, which would go beyond phase two's disablement requirement into a verifiable dismantlement of the full North Korean nuclear weapons program. At the same time, the U.S. alliance with South Korea remains strong, and this week our two militaries are wrapping up another round of combined military exercises.

General Sharp, the committee is interested in hearing your assessment of the U.S.-South Korean relationship, the progress being made toward the force positioning and command and control changes which are planned in the next several years, and what needs to be done to ensure peace and strategic on the peninsula as those changes reach fruition.

In South Asia, the interests and fates of India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan are linked. The Mumbai attacks of last November and the aftermath remind us that tensions still exist between India and Pakistan and that stability between these two countries is important to stability in the region. Likewise, the recent unrest in Pakistan and the continuing threat of terrorism in both Pakistan and India highlight the precariousness of the situation there and raise questions about what more can be done to stabilize Indo-Pakistan relations and to address the threats that are common to each.

This is of particular concern as both Pakistan and India possess nuclear weapons and a regional nuclear arms race would be dangerous and destabilizing. The challenges and responsibilities of the Strategic Command are global, varied, and vital. From an operational perspective, Strategic Command has three main mission areas: strategic deterrence, space operations, and cyberspace operations.

In addition, Strategic Command has coordinating responsibilities across the combatant commands for missile defense, combatting threats of weapons of mass destruction, allocating high demand, low intensity intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, the ISR assets, and integrating information operations.

Over the course of the last 2 years, our nuclear program has come under necessary increased scrutiny as lack of discipline appeared. Now, after multiple panels, boards, and teams have completed numerous reports, it is time for action to be taken to ensure that discipline is restored.

General Chilton, we look forward to hearing from you on your view of the status and progress of the security of the U.S. nuclear forces, the safety, security, and reliability of nuclear weapons.

A new nuclear posture review is due at the end of the year, which I hope will bring about a new and carefully considered discussion of the role of nuclear weapons in national strategy and the size of the stockpile to support that role. The START Treaty also expires at the end of the year and a new replacement treaty will need to be negotiated. CTBT remains unratified. Strategic Command will be closely involved in the analysis to support the decisions that will be reflected in those efforts. General Chilton, we look forward to working closely with you to ensure the necessary reductions are made in the size of the nuclear stockpile and that excess weapons are dismantled.

A second domain over which the Strategic Command has responsibility is space. As the leading spacefaring Nation, the United States must sustain and protect its space assets. On the other hand, how these space assets actually contribute to military operations is not always well understood. Today we have an opportunity with General Sharp and Admiral Keating here to understand the importance of space systems and what would happen to our military abilities if these capabilities were lost or degraded.

Finally, the role of the military and combatting weapons of mass destruction and how these capabilities are integrated with other elements of the U.S. Government and the international community is an additional challenge confronting the Strategic Command.

The Asia Pacific region continues to be one of the hotbeds of proliferation for both nuclear and missile technologies. Remnants of the A.Q. Khan network may still be active in the region and, with A.Q. Khan recently released from house arrest, what becomes of this network is very uncertain.

It is again a pleasure to have each of you with us this morning. We look forward to a very interesting discussion on the range of very challenging topics.

Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to join you in welcoming the witnesses here today. I want to thank each of you for your long and honorable service to our country and express my appreciation to all the men and women who serve under your command.

Perhaps no region of the world is undergoing change as rapidly as the Asia Pacific. 9 years into what some have termed as the Pacific Century, we see economic power migrating east and Asian militaries growing in strength as well. The United States as an Asian nation has a vital national interest in supporting stability, prosperity, and human rights throughout Asia. I look forward to our witnesses' views on how we can further that interest in the future.

Key to that endeavor is maintaining and strengthening our alliances. I have long viewed our alliances with Japan and South Korea in northern Asia, together with our alliance with Australia in the South Pacific, as the pillars of U.S. engagement in the re-

gion. Now we have opportunities to go further with closer military ties to India, Vietnam, and Indonesia, among others.

As a country that faces terrorism within its own borders and cooperates with the United States in its counterterrorism mission, Indonesia is a key partner in the war on terror. Admiral Keating, I'd invite you to comment on our current military to military relationship with Indonesia and how we are assisting Indonesia in developing more effective counterterrorism strategies. I'm especially interested in hearing about how our IMET program is fostering closer military ties with the Indonesian military.

I also look forward to hearing our witnesses' views on how to deal with the challenges that plague the region. Burma remains a pariah in the world, where Aung San Suu Kyi remains under house arrest, minorities and political opponents face certain retaliation, and the junta shows no sign of relenting in its violent oppression.

The military imbalance across the Taiwan Straits continues to grow and there have been repeated naval skirmishes in the South China Sea and Islamic terrorists are still active in the heart of Southeast Asia.

With respect to China, I am growing, and we all are, growing increasingly concerned about China's irregular engagements with U.S. vessels in the Pacific. As Chairman Levin pointed out, last week Chinese fishing boats harassed the ocean surveillance ship USNS IMPECCABLE, which was conducting standard operation in international waters east of Hainan Island. I'd very much appreciate your comments on that.

Asia Pacific boasts some of America's most mature and formidable alliances, none as robust as the U.S.-Japanese alliance. Admiral Keating, I'm interested to hear your views on the strategic benefits to the Asian region of the defense policy review initiative, specifically our agreement with the Japanese government to invest over \$10 billion in the next 5 years to relocate 8,000 U.S. marines and their families from Okinawa to Guam. I'd like to ensure this committee understands the full range of benefits to be gained from the substantial cost of this move.

North Korea continues its belligerent and inscrutable ways, and I'm encouraged by testimony before this committee that the U.S. can intercept a North Korean missile targeting our homeland. Pyongyang still poses multiple threats to the world, from assisting other countries in developing ballistic missile programs to the atrocities it commits against its own people to the chaos that a collapse of the North Korean regime may threaten.

General Sharp, I look forward to hearing about the progress of transferring wartime command to South Korea and your assessment of the readiness and capabilities of both the South Korean and North Korean militaries.

General Chilton, the United States Strategic Command serves as the steward and advocate for our Nation's strategic capabilities. In the face of an increasingly complex strategic environment, U.S. STRATCOM is a vital element of our National security structure and the mission of your command is critical to our Nation's defense and long-term strategic goals. I look forward to hearing your assessment of the progress you're making in adapting our strategic forces to deal with today's new threats.

Admiral Keating, I understand this will be your last appearance, at least in uniform, before this committee. I want to thank all three of you for your service to the country, but especially you, Admiral, for a long and outstanding career of service to this country. I thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]

[COMMITTEE INSERT]

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Senator McCain.

I understand that there are three votes scheduled at 10:50, at least as of late yesterday, and then there's going to be, I believe, a 30-minute debate and then final passage. So we may have as many as four votes here this morning. It's our hope that we'll be able to work right through those votes.

Admiral, let's call on you first this morning, Admiral Keating.

**STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL TIMOTHY J. KEATING, U.S. NAVY,
COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND**

Admiral Keating: Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the committee: Thanks very much for the opportunity and the privilege to represent the 325,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines of the U.S. Pacific Command in annual testimony before your committee.

I'd like to introduce three members of our party. You'll understand what an understatement that is. First, Chief Master Sergeant Jim Roy, who's our senior enlisted leader, a man who has remarkable impact in his travels throughout our area of responsibility.

Next, Ambassador Gene Christy, our foreign policy adviser, who's making great strides in helping us realize and implement smart power throughout the Asia Pacific region.

Finally, most important, my wife Wanda Lee, proud mother of a naval aviator and mother-in-law of a naval aviator. She too serves in very important ways for all of us.

Chairman LEVIN. A special thanks to your spouse, but welcome to all of you.

Admiral Keating: Thank you, Chairman.

Senator MCCAIN. Where did they go wrong?

[Laughter.]

Admiral Keating: We should change places.

Chairman, Senator McCain, as you both highlight, the importance of our region to the United States and to the world we think is hard to overstate, particularly given what all of us expect in the future, given current economic, energy, and demographic trends. We at the Pacific Command are pleased with our current conditions in the region and we are optimistic about continued progress. We're proud of our legacy and leadership role in the region and we're committed to doing everything we can to guarantee continued success. We want to ensure our capacity and capability to succeed in our primary mission is not diminished, and that is to defend our Nation and our allies and our interests in the region.

To do all that, we employ a strategy which concentrates on partnership, readiness, and presence. We think this is a blueprint for enhancing United States relationships and we think we take ad-

vantage of the capability of our allies and regional partners to address challenges and leverage significant opportunities in the Asia Pacific region.

We want to enhance our position as the indispensable partner with all of those in the region through sustained and persistent collaboration and cooperation, and by employing those forces that are necessary to strengthen the partnerships and support all those conditions which preclude the necessity for combat operations.

Senator McCain, you asked for a little bit on the defense policy review initiative. We regard Guam as a strategic centerpiece for us in the decades ahead. It is a United States possession. We have our flag flying there. So any and all efforts we can make to ensure continued access to the waters and the air and the training areas around Guam we think are vital to our strategy.

Our region's characterized by what is today a remarkable level of stability. The continuation of those conditions underpins freedom and prosperity. It is not a foregone conclusion. There are challenges, to be sure, and you both addressed some of them. Foremost is the spread of violent extremism or curtailing and extinguishing violent extremism in our region.

You asked for an opinion on Indonesia, Senator. Indonesia has become an increasingly important partner of ours. We have the Leahy amendment to observe and there are aspects of that which cause Indonesia certain problems. I'll be happy to elaborate on those if necessary. Writ large, however, we are increasingly active with Indonesia. I have been there three times.

The efforts of Indonesia to curtail terrorism are beneficial and productive as a direct result of 2106 funding from this body. The Indonesians are cooperating in a much greater fashion with the countries in the region. As a direct result of this cooperation, enhanced by or improved by 1206 money, incidents of terrorism and piracy in the Strait of Malacca have gone from 45 or so 3 years ago in 2006 to 2 in 2008. We think that's a direct reflection of the support provided by 1206 money, amongst other reasons, including cooperation and collaboration by those countries.

The second important challenge, and we work with Chilly and his folks, is the spread or curtailing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and watching technology proliferation in our region. Of course, of particular concern there is North Korea, and we work closely with Skip Sharp and his folks in that area, and happy to address that in questions.

Finally, a few words about the People's Republic of China. We think we made some real headway in the first part of 2008 after, you will recall, the denial of port access by the Chinese to the U.S.S. *Kitty Hawk* battle group for Thanksgiving of 2007. Since then we've installed a hot line, we've provided several immediate response efforts, a couple of C-17s each time, to cold weather and earthquake relief. We've had senior-level officer exchanges. The aforementioned Chief Master Sergeant Jim Roy led an inaugural senior enlisted leader delegation to China and they reciprocated by coming back to our headquarters in Hawaii.

All that said, the relationship certainly isn't where we want it to be. The Chinese suspended mil-to-mil activity following the announcement of our arms sales to Taiwan and the USNS IMPEC-

CABLE incident of 2 weeks ago causes us significant concern. Those are vivid reminders that a mature, constructive mil-to-mil relationship is hardly a reality today and that the PRC's behavior as a responsible stakeholder has yet to be consistently demonstrated.

To be sure, the slight warming in relations across the Strait, particularly following the election of President Ma in Taiwan, we think that warning is a good sign that China and Northeast Asia are somewhat stable and are willing to consider alternatives. But the *Impeccable* incident is certainly a troubling indicator that China, particularly in the South China Sea, is behaving in an aggressive, troublesome manner, and they're not willing to abide by acceptable standards of behavior or rules of the road.

Thanks again for this opportunity, Mr. Chairman. I think the more familiar you become with the region and the issues, the more you appreciate and experience our environment, our people, and our challenges, the better you and our Nation will be able to retain, influence, and remain indispensable. Thank you very much. We'll be happy to take your questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Keating follows:]

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Admiral.

General Chilton.

**STATEMENT OF GENERAL KEVIN P. CHILTON, COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND**

General Chilton: Thank you, Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the committee. I certainly appreciate the opportunity to be with you here today, and also appreciate the opportunity to testify with my colleagues and friends, Skip Sharp and Tim Keating.

If I might take a moment to add my congratulations to Admiral Keating and Mrs. Wanda Lee. I had the distinct pleasure of being their next door neighbors on a previous assignment when he was the commander of NORAD-NORTHCOM. I think it's not insignificant that this Nation has had the trust in this man's leadership to command two combatant commands back to back, two very important combatant commands, for this Nation, and he's done it in such a spectacular fashion.

I can't begin to describe the love and passion this couple has for the men and women under their command. I saw it in person as their next door neighbor and I've admired it from afar. So I give my best congratulations to them both.

Sir, since my last opportunity to testify before this committee, which was in the fall of 2007, I've been honored by the committee's counsel and in the close relationship we have. I want to thank you all and your staffs and their time, for the time they've spent out at Omaha at STRATCOM and visiting our folks and getting to understand U.S. Strategic Command's mission even better, and particularly for your strong support of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civil servants in U.S. Strategic Command which make the mission happen for us every day.

Today America faces unique national security challenges and equally unique leadership opportunities. These challenges include global population changes, serious economic difficulties both at home and abroad, resource competitions, bids for regional and glob-

al power, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and an era of often persistent and irregular warfare, coupled with an exceptional rate of technological challenge that often outpaces capabilities and policies.

These challenges make this year an especially noteworthy year as we look forward to the report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States and prepare to conduct both the Quadrennial Defense Review and a Nuclear Posture Review. The recommendations made in these studies will shape our National security capabilities long into the future.

As a combatant command chartered with a global and operational perspective, our responsibilities and relationships uniquely position STRATCOM to execute global operations, to support the regional combatant commanders and to close potential seams between those combatant commands and provide a clear and consolidated warfighter position on future global capability requirements.

I'm pleased to tell you that today U.S. Strategic Command's capability to execute deterrence, space, and cyberspace operations has been enhanced and continued robustly every day. Additionally, our unique global perspective has given us a good platform for advocating for the Nation's needs for missile defense, information operations, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, and the things we need to both enhance our information operations and our planning for combatting weapons of mass destruction.

Focusing on our three main lines of operations: Today deterrence remains as essential to America's national security as it was during the Cold War, because, as ever, we prefer to deter war rather than to wage it.

Last year the Secretary of Defense approved our strategic deterrence plan, a significant first step toward integrating deterrence activities across our government. Still, credible deterrence rests first on a safe, secure, reliable, and sustainable nuclear enterprise, including our stockpile of weapons, on delivery, on command and control systems, and on ISR platforms, on space-based capabilities, on our laboratories and industrial base, and most of all on our people, our most precious resource.

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has substantially reduced our deployed nuclear weapons, dismantled our production capability, and ceased nuclear testing. Despite our reductions and lack of modernization of weapons and infrastructure, other states still seek nuclear weapons. Additionally, many of our closest allies continue to rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. This reliance should be considered as we look forward to address nuclear proliferation issues.

The most urgent concerns for today's nuclear enterprise lie with our aging stockpile, our aging infrastructure, and our aging human capital. This year will be an important year to act to relieve growing uncertainty about the stockpile's future reliability— and I emphasize "future" because it is safe, secure, and reliable today—and the stockpile's sustainability by addressing these important issues.

Space-based capabilities provide our Nation and our forces essential but often unnoticed abilities to act and operate. The satellite constellations that carry these capabilities, however, require more careful attention to eliminate delays that can leave us just one

launch failure away from an unacceptable gap in coverage in the future.

We have made progress in space situational awareness, but capability gaps remain and required sustained momentum to fulfil, as evidenced by the recent collision between an active communications satellite and an inactive Russian satellite.

Turning to cyberspace, this domain has emerged as a key warfighting domain and one on which all other domains in the warfighting environment depend. We remain concerned about growing threats in cyberspace and are pressing changes in the Department's fundamental network, culture, conduct, and capabilities to address this mission area and share our best practices. Still, the adequate provisioning of the cyber mission, especially with manpower, remains our greatest need.

Finally, the command's advocacy efforts for missile defense, ISR management, information operations support, and plans to combat weapons of mass destruction continue to mature and I believe positively influence its acquisition processes with inputs that we collect from all of the combatant commands.

In this uncertain world, your support is critical to enabling successful execution across the command's assigned missions and realizing our vision to be leaders in strategic deterrence, preeminent global warfighters in space and cyberspace.

Thank you again for this opportunity and for your support, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Chilton follows:]

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, General Chilton.

General Sharp.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL WALTER L. SHARP, COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND; COMMANDER, REPUBLIC OF KOREA-UNITED STATES COMBINED FORCES COMMAND; AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA

General Sharp: Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the committee: I am honored to be here before you today. I would also like to thank and recognize Tim Keating and Wanda Lee for their friendship over the years. I had the honor to be able to follow Tim as the Director of the Joint Staff and then continued to work with him while he was at NORTHCOM and now at PACOM, and I have learned a lot and it's been a great, great honor.

As the Commander of United Nations Command, the Republic of Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command, and U.S. Forces Korea, it is a privilege to represent the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, Department of Defense civilians, and their families who serve in the Republic of Korea. On behalf of all these outstanding men and women, thank you for your continued commitment to improving the readiness of our forces and the quality of life for all of our service members and their families. Your support is vital and it allows us to ensure the security of the Republic of Korea, promote prosperity and stability in Northeast Asia, and protect our shared national interest in that region.

The Republic of Korea plays a vital role in the region that accounts for 22 percent of all U.S. goods. It is a first class economic power, our seventh largest trading partner, and one of the most

technologically and scientifically advanced countries in the world. It is also our partner in what must I believe be considered our strongest and most successful alliance, an alliance that has maintained its strength and grown stronger over the last 50 years, an alliance that was forged in blood and maintained by an enduring commitment and the friendship and the commitment of the Korean and the American people.

Republic of Korea armed forces have fought alongside Americans in Vietnam. They participated in Operation Desert Storm and deployed troops to Iraq and Afghanistan. The Republic of Korea has participated in United Nations peacekeeping operations and currently have presence in six of those operations around the world. The Republic of Korea deployed a 4,500-ton destroyer and an anti-submarine helicopter to the waters off of Somalia for the conduct of anti-piracy operations.

Most recently, the United States and the Republic of Korea demonstrated their enduring commitment to the alliance by signing a special measures agreement that will provide ROK funding, Republic of Korea funding support, for U.S. forces in Korea over the next 5 years.

I want to thank you, the members of Congress, for passing legislation that elevated the Republic of Korea foreign meeting sales status to that of a level on par with the countries of NATO as well as our other nations that we have longstanding U.S. alliances. This legislation will go a long way to enhancing the alliance's combined warfighting capability. If I might note, the Republic of Korea now has over \$12 billion worth of FMS cases that are open, 566 FMS cases, and this legislation you passed will continue to contribute and increase our warfighting capability.

While Northeast Asia generates a significant share of the world's commerce, it is also characterized by uncertainty, complexity, rapid change, and has constantly posed the most difficult security challenges. Beyond the North Korean threat, the presence of four of the world's six largest militaries and two proven nuclear powers, as well as historical animosities, territorial disputes, and resource competition, all combine to pose long-term regional security challenges. The Republic of Korea sits at a nexus of a region that is influenced by and they are influencing an emerging China, a resilient Russia, and a prosperous Japan.

North Korea remains the primary threat to stability and security in Northeast Asia. Regime survival remains North Korea's overriding focus. North Korea remains the world's leading supplier of ballistic missiles and related technology and remains a major proliferator of conventional weapons as well. North Korea's recent provocation actions, to include severe restrictions on the Republic of Korea activity at the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the Mount Kumgang Tourist Resort, threats to the Republic of Korea in the West Sea, unilateral nullification of South-North Basic Agreement, the North Koreans' stated inability to protect the safety of civilian airlines traveling through their air space, and its intent to launch a ballistic missile are all an attempt to ensure regime survival and improve its bargaining position in international negotiations to gain concessions.

We continue to be concerned with the threat posed by North Korea's large conventional military, artillery, ballistic missiles, and special operating forces, all located very near the Republic of Korea and the North Korean border.

My first priority as a commander is to maintain trained, ready, and disciplined combined and joint command forces that is prepared to fight and win in any potential conflict. Facing any number of challenges that could arise on the peninsula with little warning, our commitment to the alliance spans the entire spectrum of conflict. Given the varied potential challenges, our forces constantly strive to maintain the highest possible level of training and readiness.

My second command priority is to continue to strengthen this great alliance. In addition to improving combined military capabilities, U.S. and the Republic of Korea forces are adapting to the changing conditions in this dynamic region and are transforming into a more modern and capable force. This will enable the Republic of Korea forces to retain wartime operational control on the 17th of April 2012.

An enduring U.S. force presence in Korea after OPCON transfer in 2012 will ensure a strong alliance which is fully capable of maintaining security in this critical part of the world. I am absolutely confident this transition will be a success for both the United States and the Republic of Korea and will serve as a key foundation for future regional stability.

My third command priority is improving the quality of life for all service members, DOD civilians, and families serving in Korea. Our goal is to make Korea the assignment of choice for all service members and their families. Our implementation of tour normalization, which is normal 3- year tours for the majority of our accompanied service members, will significantly increase our warfighting capability improve the quality of life for our personnel, while eliminating long and unnecessary separation of service from their families.

The Yongsan relocation program, which moves U.S. forces stationed in Seoul to Camp Humphreys, which is approximately 40 miles south of Seoul, and the land partnership program, which provides for the relocation of the Second Infantry Division to south of the Han River, will also significantly improve the quality of life for our service members and their families as they move into world-class training and living facilities.

The U.S. presence in Northeast Asia is a long-term investment in regional stability, and the Republic of Korea-U.S. alliance today is more relevant to the National security interests of the United States than it has ever been before. The alliance will remain essential to the protection and the advancement of U.S. national interests in this strategically vital part of the world well into the future.

The ROK-U.S. alliance could not have been successful over the last 50-plus years without the significant contribution of the non-commissioned officers serving in Korea. The Army has declared 2009 to be the Year of the NCO and it is my great privilege to have the dedicated and professional NCOs from all services defending this great alliance. Without them, none of the advances we have

made in the Republic of Korea-U.S. alliance would have been made possible.

I am extremely proud of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, the DOD civilians and families serving in the Republic of Korea, who selflessly support the alliance and help maintain stability in this important region. On behalf of them, I want to thank you for your continued support and know you will agree how important it is to provide these fine Americans the very best working, living, and training environment possible.

Again, thank you for your support of our troops and their families and I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Sharp follows:]

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, General Sharp.

General, let me start with you and ask about the situation on the disablement of the nuclear facilities in North Korea.

By the way, I think we'll have a 7-minute first round here and try again to work through. We now expect these votes I made reference to to be at around 11:00 or 11:15 rather than 10:50.

In October of 2007, General, there was a so-called phase two actions agreement signed at the Six-Party Talks, including North Korea. In that agreement, North Korea pledged to disable certain facilities. I understand that 8 of the 11 disablement tasks have been completed and the ninth task is 80 percent completed. Is that accurate, first of all?

General Sharp: Yes, sir, it is.

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Now, there was a threat last year by North Korea to halt their disablement activities after the talks broke down. In fact, are the phase two disablement activities ongoing?

General Sharp: Yes, sir. The halt was when we initially did not take them off the terrorism list. Once we did take them off the terrorism list, they started up again the disablement, meaning specifically they started disabling and taking some of the rods out of the reactor. They are continuing to do that today, however at a very slow pace.

Chairman LEVIN. Now, there's also commitments made to deliver I guess fuel oil to North Korea as part of this agreement. Have we lived up to our commitment in that regard?

General Sharp: Yes, sir, we have.

Chairman LEVIN. Has Russia?

General Sharp: Sir, I'll have to get back to you on Russia. I'm not sure.

[The information referred to follows:]

[COMMITTEE INSERT]

Chairman LEVIN. Do you know whether Japan has lived up to their commitment?

General Sharp: Sir, again, I'll have to get back to you on that.

[The information referred to follows:]

[COMMITTEE INSERT]

Chairman LEVIN. Maybe the Admiral can—

Admiral Keating: Mr. Chairman, it's my understanding that Japan is withholding movement of fuel oil pending some resolution of the abductee issue.

Chairman LEVIN. Was there a condition to their commitment to deliver fuel oil in the agreement that was reached with North Korea?

Admiral Keating: I am unaware of it. We'll find out, chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Admiral, you made reference to military to military relations with China and the importance to try to improve those relations. Would one helpful improvement be if there was a direct phone line between you as commander and your Chinese counterpart?

Admiral Keating: It would, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Has that been proposed to the Chinese?

Admiral Keating: It has.

Chairman LEVIN. What has been their response?

Admiral Keating: There has been no response. Now, to be clear, there is a Washington-Beijing hot line which has been used recently by the Chief of Naval Operations. I have used it from Hawaii. But it is not a direct link from me to my counterpart.

Chairman LEVIN. It is not a what?

Admiral Keating: It's not a direct link. We have to go through other switchboards.

Chairman LEVIN. So the most direct link and a dedicated link would be if you had a line directly to your counterpart in China?

Admiral Keating: That's correct, sir, and we do not have that.

Chairman LEVIN. All right. But you'd like it and have proposed it?

Admiral Keating: You bet.

Chairman LEVIN. Admiral, what is the U.S. Pacific Command doing to assist with counterterrorism efforts in India?

Admiral Keating: Several efforts, chairman. We have sent our lead intelligence team—an intelligence team comprised—led by Rear Admiral Rogers, to India in the immediate aftermath of the Mumbai attacks, to begin the process of initiating intelligence and information sharing with India. That is under way.

We have had a previously scheduled exercise, that is to say scheduled before the attacks on Mumbai, which we elected to continue with the support of India, for counterterrorism terrorism for some special operations forces in India. And we have increased dialogue with senior levels of the Indian leadership, during which we discuss aspects of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

General Chilton, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation has issued two recent reports that express concerns about the operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense, GMD, missile defense system. One of the reports says: "GMD flight testing to date will not support a high level of confidence in its limited capabilities."

You and I have talked about these reports. Would you agree that it's important to address the concerns that are raised by the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation about the GMD system?

General Chilton: I would, Senator, and I've met with General O'Reilly, the new Director of MDA, and I've taken a review, a high-level review of his plans for addressing testing issues as we go forward there. I think he's on the right track to address some of these important points.

Chairman LEVIN. General, your predecessor at the Strategic Command, General Cartwright, had constructive interaction with his Russian counterparts. Since you've become commander of the Strategic Command, I don't believe you have yet met with your Russian counterparts for strategic forces or for space, either one.

Do you believe it does make sense to pursue engagement and cooperation with Russia on security matters, including the possibility of cooperation on missile defense efforts?

General Chilton: Sir, I've always been a great supporter of mil-to-mil dialogue with both friend and potential adversary, for the benefits that I think Admiral Keating has spoken about—transparency and understanding. But I think they have to be in line with, of course—mil- to-mil has to be in line with our greater government policy.

You're correct, I have not had the opportunity to engage with either my Russian counterpart in space or in the nuclear area. The last time those engagements occurred were with General Cartwright back in 2006, and those positions have turned over as they've obviously turned over here in the United States.

As we look forward to this administration's policy adjustments with regard to Russia, I'm anticipating and hoping that there will be opportunities there to reestablish those mil-to-mil contacts.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Admiral, Senator McCain made reference to the relocation of the marines from Okinawa to Guam. In your estimation, are there any hard spots that could complicate or delay this move?

Admiral Keating: Sure.

Chairman LEVIN. Could you identify what would be possible problems that could arise?

Admiral Keating: There is an violence impact statement affecting the construction of the Futenma replacement facility in the northeast portion of Guam, initiation of which is essential to begin moving our marines out of Camp Schwab. So that impact statement, which is working its way through the system, that could possibly delay our initial move.

There are some infrastructure challenges in Guam that will have to be addressed as we move 8,000 marines and a number of their family members from Okinawa to Guam. So there are several aspects of the initiative that could be challenging.

Chairman LEVIN. Are you expecting, however, that this will move as scheduled and that those hurdles can be overcome? Or are you worried that they may not be overcome?

Admiral Keating: I'm sure they'll be overcome, chairman, and the goal remains implementation by 2014.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much.

Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Again, thank the witnesses for being here. Admiral Keating and General Sharp, today there's an article that states that "Japan's ambassador to the United States said Wednesday that North Korea should not escape punishment from the United Nations if it goes ahead with a planned missile launch." We all know that North Korea has announced it will launch a "communications satellite" between April 4 and April 8. But the United States and other coun-

tries think it will be a test of a long-range ballistic missile that could reach Alaska.

One, what is your assessment of that launch? Do you recommend any action taken of any kind if that launch takes place? And what is the potential if that launch is successful? Is it a threat to the United States, or is it—exactly what is this all about?

I don't care who goes first here. Maybe the oldest, Admiral.

[Laughter.]

Admiral Keating: Senator, we at the Pacific Command are continuing our planning efforts to support various contingencies that would be coordinated with—

Senator MCCAIN. First of all, with all due respect, what does this mean? What does it mean that they announced that they're going to launch a satellite, which is interpreted as could be an intercontinental ballistic missile that could reach Alaska?

Admiral Keating: I think it means nothing more or less than that, Senator. There are activity—there is activity under way—

Senator MCCAIN. I mean, is that a threat?

Admiral Keating: No, sir. I would not think North Korea would have issued it as a threat. It is a normal notification process, which they didn't do in 2006 when they attempted a launch from the same facility.

But there is equipment moving and there are personnel, increased levels of personnel—

Senator MCCAIN. I guess I'm talking about, that capability along with a nuclear weapon, does it pose a long-term threat to America's security in your view?

Admiral Keating: That would pose a long-term threat, yes, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. Or a short-term threat?

Admiral Keating: It could be a threat as early as 4 April.

Senator MCCAIN. Okay, please continue.

Admiral Keating: We're continuing our planning efforts to support the lead element, Department of State diplomatic efforts, to ensure that our government is fully prepared to respond, we through the military channels, should it be so directed, should that response be so directed. We're watching Taepodong carefully. We're talking with Skip minute by minute. We're getting reasonable intelligence as to the activities around Taepodong and we'll be prepared to respond.

Senator MCCAIN. If the decision was made, do we have the capability to shoot that down?

Admiral Keating: The United States has a capability to do so, yes, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. General?

General Sharp: Sir, first off, if North Korea launches any sort of ballistic missile, as they claim they will do somewhere between the 4th of April, it is against UN Security Council Resolution 1718, which specifically says, demands that North Korea not conduct any future nuclear test or launch of a ballistic missile. It goes on to say there's a moratorium on missile launching, and it is very clear that this will be against UN Security Council Resolution 1718.

Second, I think that the threat that Admiral Keating was talking about is real. It is felt in South Korea, the threat of having the capability to be able to deliver any sort of warhead anywhere in the

world is indeed a threat, and we call on North Korea not to act in this provocation - - do this provocation, but instead go back and focus on what they promised to do during the Six-Party Talks.

Senator MCCAIN. We're not the only country that has the capability of intercepting that launch; is that true?

General Chilton: Senator, if I could try to address that.

Senator MCCAIN. Yes.

General Chilton: For a launch from there that might threaten the continental United States or threaten the islands of Hawaii, I believe we are the Nation that would have that capability, and rightly so, to defend ourselves.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you.

General Sharp, I don't expect you to have a great answer to this, but what do you make of the obviously very erratic, even more erratic, behavior on the part of the North Koreans? They've always been erratic, but there is rumors about the health of the "Dear Leader." There's threats of retaliation against South Korean naval exercises. You could chronicle them for the committee and for the record.

What do you make of all this behavior on the part of the North Koreans, and how do you feel that the Chinese—what's your view of whether the Chinese have been constructive or not in our efforts to rein in some of these activities in the most oppressive regime on Earth?

General Sharp: Sir, I think Kim Jong Il is doing everything in his power to try to ensure regime survival and his personal survival. I think the issue that he had, health issue that he had last summer, maybe woke him up and his people up a little bit, and saw that he is not immortal. You take a look at some of the actions as far as the balloons that have been going into North Korea that have been telling the truth about Kim Jong Il, the fact that Kim Jong Il has cut off in the western industrial complex the ability to be able for workers to bring simple things like CDs and newspapers into North Korea. You look at the number of open air markets that are continuing to stay open longer than they have in the past.

I think that Kim Jong Il realizes that some of the people, a small amount but some of the people, within North Korea right now are starting to realize what an oppressive regime they have and what conditions they live under and how just south of the DMZ they are living in totally different conditions.

So I think that what he is trying to do is, number one, demonstrate he is in control, he has control of his military, and to be very, very forceful of that within North Korea, all going back towards two things: regime survival and getting the most he can out of the international community as far as concessions.

Senator MCCAIN. And the role of China?

General Sharp: Sir, I believe that China through the Six-Party Talks has tried their best to be helpful. Their influence in North Korea I think is questionable now and into the future. But over the recent history of Six-Party Talks, especially after the nuclear test that North Korea did in 2006, I think that they have been helpful.

Admiral Keating probably has done much more talking to them, but I believe that they've been helpful on those lines.

Senator MCCAIN. Are not the Chinese balancing the problem they would have, huge problem they would have, with the collapse of the North Korean government and the subsequent refugee and economic problem, with the need to cooperate so that we don't have an escalation of profound consequences in the region?

General Sharp: Sure they are, yes, sir. They would be happy just to have the status quo and a non-nuclear North Korea if they could get to that point where they're not threatened in any case, I think.

Senator MCCAIN. So the question of succession of leadership in North Korea is a very big factor, you think, in some of the behavior recently, particularly since the illness of the Dear Leader?

General Sharp: Yes, sir. I think that there is—Kim Jong Il was schooled by his father for many, many years before he actually took command, took the leadership role and not much of that, if any, has gone on at this time. I think that the illness not only for Kim Jong Il himself, but within the leadership in North Korea, they are looking much more, okay, what is going to be the future.

But at the same time, I can't underestimate: Kim Jong Il is in charge. Every major decision is coming directly from him, I believe, and he's trying to shore up that ability right now.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain.

Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

As I said to the chairman while Senator McCain was asking his questions, on this committee we think of Senator Levin as the "Dear Leader."

[Laughter.]

Chairman LEVIN. Listen to him.

Senator MCCAIN. And a great leader.

Senator LIEBERMAN. And a great leader, too.

Chairman LEVIN. I decline both, but thank you.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks to all three of you for your service and leadership.

Admiral Keating, it's been a great honor to know you in your various commands and I thank you for everything you've done. I thank your wife for the way she supported you. It strikes me, may I take the liberty to say, as I look out at the two of you, that you must occasionally be asked the question I am asked, which is: How did you end up with such a good-looking wife? You don't have to answer that question, though.

I want to get serious, of course, because this is serious business. I want to focus in on missile defense, both because of the extraordinary progress I think we've made, remarkable progress, in developing missile defense, but also frankly because this program as well as others maybe recommended for cuts in the budget we're going to get. So I want to explore this with you.

I want to go to the North Korean situation that we talked about. Admiral Keating, do you agree that there's good reason to believe that the North Korean launch will not be a communications satellite, but more likely a test of the Taepodong 2 intercontinental ballistic missile of North Korea's?

Admiral Keating: I don't think we can make that definitive a statement, Senator.

Senator LIEBERMAN. General Chilton, General Sharp, do you have an opinion on it?

General Chilton: I would agree with Admiral Keating, but I would say, just looking in history, at our own history, we used similar rockets—the Atlas, the Titan—both on the intercontinental ballistic missile mission and to launch payloads into orbit. So even if there is a satellite launch on this as the North Koreans have said it will be, it will help advance the technology of long-range missiles.

Senator LIEBERMAN. General Sharp?

General Sharp: Sir, I agree. They have said it's going to be a satellite launch and, just to reiterate what I said a moment ago, even if it is a satellite launch, it's still in violation—

Senator LIEBERMAN. It's still a violation.

General Sharp:—of the UN resolution.

Senator LIEBERMAN. That's a very important point. I'm glad you made it.

Assuming it is a Taepodong 2 intercontinental ballistic missile, how close could it come to U.S. territory, including, obviously, Hawaii and Alaska? General Chilton?

General Chilton: First of all, Senator, this is all theoretical—

Senator LIEBERMAN. Sure.

General Chilton:—estimations, because they have not successfully flown this version of the missile. But we worry about defending its ability to reach the West Coast of the United States, as well as the Hawaiian Islands, and of course Alaska.

Senator LIEBERMAN. So it's that serious.

Admiral Keating, let me ask you this question. Based on the current state of our missile defense, if the North Koreans did fire a missile, an intercontinental ballistic missile that was aimed at the United States, what's the probability that we could knock it down?

Admiral Keating: We have a high probability, Senator.

Senator LIEBERMAN. In other words, that we have brought our missile defense, presumably what's in Alaska and in California, to a point that you're prepared to say that there's a high probability that we could knock down, hit an incoming missile?

Admiral Keating: Yes, sir. We can provide you specific probability of intercept numbers through Chilly and Northern Command, sir. But in this forum we can say we have a high probability.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Good.

General Chilton, do you want to add anything to that, anything to that?

General Chilton: The only thing I would add, sir, and that's if given adequate warning, which we obviously I believe have, with the collection capability, because the system still does revert back and forth between test and on-line. That's one of the things that U.S. Strategic Command oversees and monitors and makes recommendations on.

Senator LIEBERMAN. So we've come a long way in the development of our missile defense.

General Maples from the Defense Intelligence Agency was here testifying last week and cited what he described, I believe the words were, a rising threat of ballistic missile capability, not just

in North Korea and Iran, but a lot of other countries that might not wish us or our allies around the world well.

General Chilton, in your testimony you emphasize that the missile defense programs provide a critical deterrent against certain existing and potential threats, increase the cost to adversaries of already expensive technologies, and reduce the value of their investments. You also emphasize the importance of "increasing the redundancy and depth of the ballistic missile system."

General Sharp, in your testimony you point to the importance of the development of airborne laser systems.

I want to ask the two of you—and Admiral, if you want to get into it—about how important you feel it is to fund the ongoing development of our missile defense, including the redundancy of it, the various systems that we're developing?

General Sharp: Senator, I'll start.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Good.

General Sharp: First, I think it's important that when we talk about missile defense we look at it in a couple contexts. One is with regard to our strategic deterrent, because it was developed under a policy that included that in the calculus of how we position ourselves to deter against a potential adversary like North Korea, who may not be otherwise—who may not be looking for a one on one confrontation with the United States, but for an opportunity to perhaps blackmail the United States or perhaps dissuade the United States' engagement in the Pacific region or on the Korean Peninsula in a conventional conflict.

So that links then—so we have to take it in the total context, which is why the NPR this year, having the NPR this year, is important, I believe, to see if that still fits as part of our nuclear posture review and our calculus for deterrence.

Then we also need to look at it with regard to how the missile defense system writ large, which not only includes the defense of the United States, but also includes technological development to defend our troops deployed forward and all the regional combatant commanders. In my view, I think we have to make sure we strike the careful balance between those two and continue to look at missile defense in light of its strategic importance for the defense of the United States, but also for its operational and tactical importance for the defense of our regionally deployed forces.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Well said.

General Sharp, do you want to add anything to that?

General Sharp: Just that, with the number of missiles in North Korea and that threat, the ability to have a multi-layer defense, to be able to not only see them early, but to be able to knock them down at various stages after they launch, I think is critical.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Admiral Keating, let me ask you a final question, and it's this. Obviously our Nation's focus generally speaking in recent years has been on the Middle East and now South Asia. But it strikes me that within the context—allowing for the exception of the threat that North Korea represents and the challenge we have, we're doing pretty well at peacefully, constructively managing our relations with China.

My impression is that our relations in the region that you're overseeing, the Asian Pacific region, are about as good as they've

been in a long term, with growing alliances with Japan, India, South Korea, Australia, and a lot of smaller nations. Do you agree?

Admiral Keating: Senator, I do and we do. Wanda Lee and I have been able to visit nearly 30 of the 38 countries in our AOR in 2 years and, to varying degrees, roger that. But each and every visit we have, not just mil-to-mil, but with ministries of foreign affairs, with other international bodies, including commercial partners, they regard, all of them, the United States as the indispensable partner throughout the Asia Pacific region. So I think your statement is correct, sir.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I thank you for the very important role that you've played in bringing us to that point.

General Chilton: Mr. Senator, if I may make just one more comment on the Taepodong 2, just to remind the Senators. Last time when they tried to launch a Taepodong 2, about the same time they also launched six other missiles. We are watching very closely to see what else they will do between the 4th and the 8th of April and we're prepared for that.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that. So we should be prepared for more than the one launch. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.

Senator Inhofe.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am reminded that this week is the 26th anniversary of the initiation of the program that's dominating this hearing right now by Ronald Reagan. I think it would be appropriate to read two sentences into the record that were made 26 years ago this week:

"What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies? Wouldn't it be better to save lives than to avenge them?"

I think that's a very appropriate statement to be reminded of today.

During Senator McCain's questioning of General Sharp and others, I think your response on Kim Jong Il was that he would do anything. He's at a point in life where he would try almost anything. Then the scary thing is, to me anyway, that they're going to be launching a missile. Is it correct or do you feel that there's any way of determining, when something has been launched, whether it has a warhead or whether it's a satellite?

General Sharp: Sir, I'd like to defer to General Chilton. He's been studying that very hard.

General Chilton: Senator, that's a really difficult problem. There are different trajectories that you would fly depending on whether you want to go to space or a ballistic missile. A ballistic missile typically goes on a very high trajectory. Space usually flattens out early and then tries to accelerate because the velocity is very important to stay in orbit.

But being able to make that determination in real time is really—can be very difficult for us.

Senator INHOFE. Which is scary.

We were talking about where our weaknesses might be. I have a chart that I've been using for quite some time, and I know things

change, but it's my understanding we have some level of comfort when you look about the boost phase, the midcourse phase, and the terminal phase. In terms of the midcourse phase, we actually do have some redundancy, and the terminal phase. It's the boost phase that concerns me.

Can you respond as to what our capabilities are and then what we're looking forward to to try to improve that?

General Chilton: Right, Senator. I think the approach for missile defense has been a layered defense, as you've described, that looks at opportunities to engage in the boost phase, in the midcourse, and then terminal. The boost phase is attractive because obviously the vehicle's moving slower, a lot of heat coming out of the back of the rocket. So it has some easier signatures to track.

The midcourse phase gets more difficult, relying heavily on radar today. Then the terminal phase, of course, the issue with that is it's hard to have a broad area defense in the terminal phase. You've really got to have your defensive capabilities pretty closely located to what could be an indeterminate target from the adversary.

So we look for capabilities and advocate for capabilities in all these areas, and I would say the area that's least mature, least mature, is the boost phase.

Senator INHOFE. Well, the reason I bring that up is because there is always resistance. They say, well, we have redundancy; you don't need both systems. I think that we're all on record saying, yes, we want redundancy in all three phases. Anyone disagree with that?

[No response.]

Senator INHOFE. During our command hearings I have wanted to get a response from all commands that deal with some of my favorite programs, 1206, 1207, and 1208, train and equip, which, Admiral Keating, you and I talked about and you've already mentioned in your opening statement, as well as the CERP program, and then the globalization with the CCIF, I guess, program, and IMET.

Could you comment on those programs and the significance of those programs?

Admiral Keating: Thank you, Senator. Each of those to the Pacific Command are very important. We cited 1206. We hope to continue support there. 1207, of similar importance. Commanders Emergency Response Fund, we did not enjoy funding in 2008. We would enjoy re-initiation of that support. It can be of critical importance to our allies who have lower, less capabilities than we do, and if our forces are not in the immediate area we can provide funding to an area, a country who has been adversely affected by natural disaster and they can use that money for immediate relief. Short-term relief is probably a better term.

Senator INHOFE. So the CERP should be continued to be globalized?

Admiral Keating: We would appreciate that, yes, sir.

On the issue of IMET, it is one of the most important tools in our box. We have around 185 students attending various educational institutions, foreign students attending various educational institutions in the United States as we speak. There are some 70 foreign students at our military academies. These are

short-term investments that will have significant long-term dividends.

Senator INHOFE. I think, General Sharp, you made some comments to the value of that program in Korea, IMET.

General Sharp: Sir, of course Korea pays for their own way to come, to send students. But the philosophy of being able to have students from other countries attend all of our schools, which Korea has hundreds of them doing, just pays great value that we see over and over again.

Senator INHOFE. I bring that up because there was a time when people thought that when we had an IMET program that we were somehow doing them a favor. I've always felt that—that's why we made the change in the Article 98 requirement—that they're really doing us a favor, and that there are countries like China out there that have aggressive programs and they would be doing it if we didn't, which I think you probably would agree on that.

Admiral Keating, you mentioned this President Ma. You referenced him, the president, and the fact that he's reached out to China in an effort to improve the relations. How much success do you think he's having?

Admiral Keating: We would regard his success as significant, Senator. The measures of effectiveness are not quite that startling, perhaps: exchange of rare animals, increased cross-channel commercial flights, the consideration of confidence-building measures; all of these steps relatively small in and of themselves, but they have led to an obvious decrease in tension across the Strait, and each day that goes by that there isn't kinetic military activity, we would view that as a day closer to an eventual solution. And President Ma's efforts have been significant.

Senator INHOFE. You mentioned the mil-to-mil is always a good idea. But I think if I understood your testimony, it hasn't achieved the success that we'd like to have it achieve with Russia so far.

Admiral Keating: Is that from the Pacific Command perspective, Senator?

Senator INHOFE. Well, actually I believe it was General Sharp that made that comment. Maybe it wasn't.

Okay, fine. My time has expired. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.

Senator Reed.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me join my colleagues in thanking you all for your service to the Nation, particularly, Admiral, for your distinguished service, you and your family, to the Navy and to the Nation. Thank you very much.

Let me follow up on the line of questioning about the activities in North Korea. I'll address it to Admiral Keating first, but, General Sharp, General Chilton, please feel free to respond. Does the intelligence community have any indication that North Korea is planning to launch a ballistic missile, or does it assess that this is a launch of a satellite, which are two different systems? Admiral Keating?

Admiral Keating: Senator, I don't believe the intelligence community has information that would specifically rule out either option. It is a missile body that could be used for either.

Senator REED. General Sharp?

General Sharp: I agree with that completely.

Senator REED. And General Chilton?

General Chilton: I would agree we have just the North Koreans' statement that the intent is to be a space launch at this point.

Senator REED. If it turns out to be a launch of a satellite, does that automatically assume that they have the capacity to launch a ballistic missile, intercontinental ballistic missile? Or is there much more work that has to be done to design a reentry vehicle, to design a system that will deliver a missile?

General Chilton: Yes, Senator, there's other elements that would have to be matured. As you point out rightly, a reentry vehicle, which is not a trivial thing—obviously, the difference between a reentry vehicle for a shorter, medium-range, and a long-range are different, because it's a much hotter environment for a long-range flight to survive. So working on the reentry vehicle. Then weaponization is an issue as well.

But we have no insights into their efforts in this area. But certainly they also require a booster with that performance capability.

Senator REED. So at this juncture we have their statement, which offers a range of possibilities, and in fact from your previous testimony this statement is a warning that they didn't give prior to the previous launch, and the statement would be, ironically I think more consistent with the practice of nations who are preparing to launch vehicles; is that correct?

General Chilton: You're correct, they did not make a similar statement last time and today spacefaring nations around the world do make announcements of their plans for launching into space.

Senator REED. So again, this is hard to ascribe to North Korea, but they seem to be following, at least procedurally, what other nations do in terms of preparation for a launch of a satellite or any type of space vehicle, correct?

General Chilton: I would say that there may be an attempt there, not probably a specific procedure that it has done. But I would also pile on to General Sharp's comment, that there's this UN resolution. That is really the big, big difference.

Senator REED. This might be completely inadvertently complying with the rules of the road, but it is something I think that you've noted and I think bears emphasis.

Let me shift gears. Admiral Keating, we have special operations forces that are stretched considerably—the situation in Iraq, build-up in Afghanistan. You have an area of operations running through Indonesia, through the Philippines, which requires and has extensive commitment of special operations forces. Do you think you have sufficient special operations forces in your theater of operations, and associated resources?

Admiral Keating: We could use more, Senator. An earlier question as to the dialogue we have, the activity we have with India, is a case in point. If we had access to more special forces, it is likely we could conduct more small unit level training with countries

who have terrorism challenges beyond those that we're conducting now.

Senator REED. A related question is the platforms, the delivery platforms for special operations troops, the surveillance platforms. Again, you could use more?

Admiral Keating: The same answer.

Senator REED. General Sharp, in your theater of operations do you feel pressure in terms of special operations forces and capacities?

General Sharp: Sir, of course we have a very small contingent that's actually assigned to the Republic of Korea, mainly to help bring in additional special operating forces during times of conflict. In fact, we have a number that are there right now during our Key Resolve-Full Eagle annual exercise, doing training with the Korean SOF, which are also very good.

They are key to our warfight because of the ability to be able to get into North Korea, to identify ballistic missile launches, to identify different locations. So their requirement is key to our war fight.

Senator REED. Let me pose a question to both General Chilton and Admiral Keating. That is, in January 2007 the Chinese demonstrated a capacity to knock down satellites in low Earth orbit, which would be a significant challenge to our infrastructure, telecommunications, GPS, etcetera. What do you make of that? You've had continuing dialogue with the Chinese. Was that part of a conscious strategy to suggest their ability, or was that an activity that now it's being reassessed and perhaps not being pursued?

Can you comment on that, both gentlemen?

Admiral Keating: We visited China shortly after that anti-satellite test, Senator, and the military officials with whom we had conversations kind of shrugged their shoulders and said it wasn't any big deal, the shot wasn't any big deal; what's all the commotion? When we mentioned the fact that it was unannounced, that it was in violation of the same United Nations resolutions that Chilly and Skip have cited, that it introduced massive amounts of space debris which remain a challenge for us, those Chinese military officials said—they indicated something less than full knowledge of the event, shall I say.

So we encouraged them to be more forthcoming. This is a recurring mantra in our discussions with them.

As to their continuing pursuit of that technology, I think Chilly is much better capable than I in addressing that part of it.

Senator REED. General?

General Chilton: Senator, clearly in my view that was an irresponsible move on the part of the Chinese. We're very concerned about debris in space. They added over 2,000 pieces of trackable debris, we expect tens of thousands of other, that won't be up there for days or months or years, but decades, at an orbital altitude that impacts other nations' low Earth orbiting satellites.

A day does not go by at U.S. Strategic Command where I do not receive reports of potential conjunctions or collisions or close passes from debris from that test with other satellites that are of interest to the United States of America and other countries.

So contrast that to what the U.S. did a year later, with the great work and coordination with U.S. Pacific Command, to intercept an errant NRO satellite for the sole purpose of protecting the populace of the Earth. We did that responsibly, at an altitude such that all of the debris, all of the trackable debris from that intercept, has reentered the Earth's atmosphere and no longer poses a threat to our orbiting assets. Clearly there's a difference between those two tests. Clearly the Chinese were developing an anti-satellite capability, and I think irresponsibly so.

Senator REED. Do you think that they have received that message that you've just made very clear to us?

General Chilton: I would anticipate that they have, sir. I've spoken of this, we have all spoken of this, on many occasions.

Senator REED. Thank you.

General Chilton: I'd turn to Admiral Keating—

Senator REED. If you have a final point—my time has expired, but if you have a final point, sir.

Admiral Keating: It's been a subject of discussion and they've no doubt received it, Senator. Whether or not it has sufficient impact or not, I can't say.

Senator REED. Thank you very much.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed.

Senator Thune.

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you to all of you for your outstanding service to our country, and to all those who serve under your command.

Admiral Keating, during last weeks' hearing on current and future worldwide threats Lieutenant General Maples, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said: "China from an air defense standpoint has developed a very modern layered air defense capability in depth and is seeking additional air defense capabilities that will project even out to a range of 400 kilometers. This significantly affects potential U.S. operations in that region."

In an article published in the *Foreign Affairs Journal* in January 2009, Secretary Gates wrote that "China's improved air defenses, coupled with investments in other asymmetric capability such as cyber warfare, anti-satellite warfare, and anti-ship weaponry, all threaten our ability to project power in the Pacific and will require us to rely on long-range over-the-horizon systems, such as the Next Generation Bomber."

My question, Admiral, is do you agree with Secretary Gates and Lieutenant General Maples' assessment of China's anti-access capabilities?

Admiral Keating: I do, sir.

Senator THUNE. As the combatant commander that's responsible for the Pacific Theater, how important is it to you that the Air Force field a new long-range bomber in the 2018 time frame that's capable of penetrating these advanced defenses?

Admiral Keating: Any capability that our country can provide to the men and women in uniform, should the necessity arise to engage in that sort of conflict, is a capability we would support, sir.

Senator THUNE. That would include the Next Generation Bomber?

Admiral Keating: That would be true, sir.

Senator THUNE. General Chilton, as the combatant commander that's responsible for long-range strike missions, how important is it to you that the Air Force field a long-range bomber in the 2018 time frame?

General Chilton: Senator, thank you. As an advocate for the regional combatant commanders and the expressed need for the penetration capability for the conventional bomber capability, we would advocate in support of that, development of that weapon system. But also, when I look at our nuclear deterrent, our current nuclear deterrent posture and we look to the future, part of the credibility of that air-breathing leg is the ability to get to the target and to deliver its weapons. So from a nuclear posture, deterrent posture, we also support that that type of platform have a nuclear capability, in line with current policy where we are today. Of course, this will be an issue that we'll look at in the next nuclear posture review as well.

Senator THUNE. Right. And that was going to be my next question, is, from your responsibility of maintaining deterrence, the importance of making sure that that system has nuclear capabilities is a high priority?

General Chilton: In our current strategy and policy today, that is an important—and one that we have advocated for in U.S. Strategic Command, and the Air Force has told us they will include as part of the requirement set for that weapons system.

Senator THUNE. Good.

I would, just as sort of a follow-up to that, make the observation that the B-52s are old, the B-1s don't have that nuclear capability any more, the B-2s are becoming less survivable against modern defenses. Having said, stated, the importance that you place, the priority that you place on developing that bomber, I guess my question is is that something the DOD and the White House in their fiscal year 2010 defense budget, as they go through that process, is that something that you are advocating for, that's on your priority list in terms of modernizing the Air Force and the weapons systems that it provides to your commands?

Admiral Keating: Yes, sir, it is part of our integrated priority list for Pacific Command.

General Chilton: And although I can't discuss any deliberations, out of ignorance, at some level certainly, as I've said, we have advocated for the nuclear requirement on the so-called Next Generation Bomber as a requirement that should be part of that, and supported the need for a penetrating bomber capability under our current policy.

Senator THUNE. I'm not asking you to divulge your internal discussions, but simply saying, as the people who are responsible for the commands, you are in the best position to determine what those requirements and needs are.

General Chilton: Absolutely, Senator, and we have a seat at the table.

Senator THUNE. Terrific. Thank you.

Those are the only questions I had, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Thune.

Senator Akaka.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me express my welcome and my aloha to our esteemed panel of military leaders; and also express my appreciation to all of the men and women of the military who serve under you and with you to secure our country; and also my personal and warmest mahalo to my close friend Admiral Keating and his lovely lady, Wanda Lee, for being here today and coming all the way from Camp Smith in Hawaii; and let me thank our panel for the dedicated service that you've given to our country over the years.

I want to commend Admiral Keating since we've learned that this is his last appearance here in Congress and thank him for his outstanding leadership and for maintaining the high level of capacity among our military; and second, for the good relationship that you've brought internationally with other countries in your Asia Pacific jurisdiction. Thank you so much for that.

Admiral Keating, I'm afraid this morning that, due to the importance of PACOM to my home State of Hawaii, all of my questions will be addressed to you. Admiral, only a few weeks ago—and this was mentioned by Senator McCain. He asked about the United States and China incident that occurred off Hainan with the vessel, U.S. ship IMPECCABLE. I've read some of the accounts that happened there.

My question to you, because of your relationships with China, what do you think this incident has shown to our country? Is it a sign of increased military aggressiveness from China?

Admiral Keating: Senator, the short answer is I'm not sure. To elaborate a little bit upon that, at the same time the Chinese are behaving in such an irresponsible, one would say illegal, fashion in the South China Sea, as you know they have three ships conducting anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, working in close concert with the commander of the task force there, working for Vice Admiral Bill Gortney and General Dave Petraeus, while in the Gulf of Aden they're doing things the right way, if you will. Our commander has gone to have lunch with their commander, and vice versa. They exchange bridge-to-bridge communications. They email each other.

So at the same time they're playing by the rules in the same sandbox, they're clearly in violation of longstanding, centuries old rules of the road and responsible maritime behavior. So it's conflicting to us and it is confusing. And this goes to the root cause, we think, root issue of what are really their intentions, what is their strategic intent, where does China expect to be 10, 20, 50 years from now, and do we the United States have a prominent role in their mil-to-mil calculations.

I think the answer to that question is yes, we do have a prominent role, but for us to realize productivity and benefit we have to engage in discussions, and right now we are not able to do so because they have suspended mil-to-mil relations.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Admiral.

I am very pleased that PACOM has developed an approach to its mission of protecting our Nation and enhancing the stability of the Asian Pacific region through a strategy of partnership, presence,

and military readiness. As I pointed out, I think you've done a tremendous job in this area. And I feel that PACOM's emphasis on these three components will go a long way towards preserving the security of this region.

Do you feel that the Pacific Command has the military personnel, equipment, and facilities to effectively implement this approach?

Admiral Keating: Yes, sir, we do. We report our readiness on a monthly basis on a classified level to the Secretary of Defense, and in 2 years our readiness has remained steady. There are, of course, assets, as Senator Reed mentioned, as an example special operations forces, we would like more of them. It's not just a case of give us more, more, more. We think we can utilize a wide range of forces both in capabilities and services across a very broad spectrum throughout the Asia Pacific region, and the JOs in the command have a bumper sticker now that says "Virtual Presence Equals Actual Absence. Nothing replaces boots on the ground, jets in the air, marines coming ashore, whatever the service component you want to describe, and for us to continue to do so will require significant support from the Congress, and we hope we can continue that.

Admiral Keating: You have mentioned that China is looking towards the future and so I'd like to ask you, Admiral Keating, about China's continuing their efforts to become a viable blue water navy. For example, I recently saw a report that China was considering adding an aircraft carrier to its navy. Cooperation, collaboration, partnerships will be vital if China continues to build its blue water navy's capability.

What is your assessment of China's ability to extend its operation reach to the high seas in the near future?

Admiral Keating: China's ability is growing in terms of power projection capacity and capability. It is not close to that that we enjoy in the United States at Pacific Command, but it is growing, Senator, and is a cause for concern for us at United States Pacific Command.

Senator AKAKA. Finally, Admiral, you recently completed the U.S.'s signature exercise in the Asia Pacific region, the exercise, Cobra Gold. This multinational exercise has long been an important mechanism in our commitment to fostering multilateral relationships to enhance stability in the region. What is your biggest takeaway from this year's exercise?

Admiral Keating: This is about the 30th Cobra Gold exercise we've conducted, Senator, maybe 25 to 30, something like that, each of them more complex, each of them more demanding, each of them more sophisticated, each of them literally field training exercises. Thailand affords us a great opportunity to train in a multi-lateral, multinational joint way, coalition way.

Interestingly, People's Republic of China Liberation Army forces observed this exercise at our invitation for 3- 1/2 days during this latest Cobra Gold. So you counter that, their desire to watch these exercises and we hope eventually participate to a degree, because an aspect of Cobra Gold included humanitarian assistance, disaster relief exercises, and United Nations peacekeeping operations. So Cobra Gold is, as you say, it's a signature event for us. It gets

tougher, harder each year in terms of the level of engagement and the quality of play by all those involved, and it's a very important part of our theater cooperation plan.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much for your responses.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Akaka.

Senator Ben Nelson. Excuse me for interrupting, Senator Nelson.

Senator BEN NELSON. I was just checking on the votes.

Chairman LEVIN. The first roll call has just begun, so at least some of us hopefully can vote now or early in this roll call, and then maybe at the end of the second roll call—there's no certain way of figuring who will go next, but our staff will do the best to keep this in order.

Senator Nelson.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Admiral Keating. We I know all look forward to a very happy voyage into the sunset years, and we appreciate your service. We thank General Chilton and General Sharp for your service as well.

General Chilton, you've testified before and we know that within DOD and STRATCOM it's the global warfighter for cyberspace that's charged with operating and defending the global information grid, planning and acting when directed to maintain our freedom of action in this domain. Obviously, cyberspace is a key front and is itself a warfighting domain upon which all others depend to one degree or another.

So those who hack into the network vary from the unsophisticated to trained military hackers who can target industry, academia, government, and the air, land, maritime, and space domains.

We know that U.S. STRATCOM is protecting DOD, but I guess the question is who's protecting the networks of dot- gov sites, such as our networks here in Congress? My question truly is: Is this a mission that STRATCOM could or should undertake?

General Chilton: Senator, the policy has been that that mission set beyond the defense of the military networks, defending the remainder of the critical networks of America is a mission set for the Department of Homeland Security, one that has not been given to the Department of Defense. That said, we are asked to support the Department of Homeland Security and we have been sharing lessons learned with them, exchanging personnel between our command and control centers.

So we have learned a lot, I would say, in the Department of Defense and particularly at U.S. Strategic Command about what it takes to defend our DOD networks, and we're ensuring that we are sharing those lessons in support of the Department of Homeland Security today.

Senator BEN NELSON. Are you comfortable that in sharing the lessons learned that the Department of Defense—or the Department of Homeland Security is achieving some level of excellence in its ability to protect the dot-gov sites?

General Chilton: Senator, this mission set was just given to the Department of Homeland Security last year, and then funding is just beginning to flow into this area. So they are still standing up.

We have been working on this problem in the Department of Defense since I believe the mission was first given to U.S. Space Command back in 1998-99 time period, and of course that mission transitioned to U.S. STRATCOM when U.S. Space Command merged with us along with our space mission.

So we've had the advantage of working this problem for 11 years in the Department of Defense. So we not only just share—we do more than just share information with the DHS team. We also share knowledge we have of threats that are coming in and how we're addressing those specifically.

Senator BEN NELSON. So it's more than the technology. You're also sharing information and intelligence, right?

General Chilton: Yes, sir.

Senator BEN NELSON. I think it was last week or the week before in the hearing on worldwide threats, I asked Admiral Blair if we have the capabilities to determine if an intrusion into our cyberspace is a criminal act or an act of war? In other words, can we determine the perpetrator by the intrusion? I guess I'll ask you, General Chilton.

General Chilton: The question on how do we come to grips with activity in cyberspace and whether or not they are acts of war is one that is still open for debate and discussion, and needs to be looked at. There are some easy things to say. That is, if some activity in cyberspace caused death or destruction of American citizens or American resources then I think that would be an easy one to say.

But there are other issues as well, for example stealing of information or espionage, which is classically handled in this country you the FBI. Then in the middle there's criminal activity, so espionage, criminal activity, and then threat to life and property of the United States of America. So how we think about that and lay that out for the future I think is an important discussion point.

Senator BEN NELSON. Well, we wouldn't necessarily be stumbling over ourselves in trying to determine that. I suspect we would be talking to the appropriate entities to try to straighten out and assign responsibility at this point in time and into the future as well?

General Chilton: Absolutely, Senator. Today we work very closely with the other agencies, to include the FBI, and other intelligence agencies and other authorities, because, as you can imagine, the cyber domain crosses multiple authorities here—Title 10, Title 50, and Title 18. So it's key for us to—and we have put in place in U.S. Strategic Command a group that allows us to make sure we're integrating and coordinating across those various bodies and authorities to make sure we follow the appropriate instructions.

Senator BEN NELSON. In another field, we've been reducing our nuclear warheads around the world for some period of time as an indication of reducing level of hostility potential and to try to develop deterrent factors or having them work as dissuasive efforts of others to not engage in nuclear development.

Given the fact that we are faced with North Korea and Iran moving toward their own nuclear capability, do you think that our efforts at reducing our own arsenal, with the former Soviet Union reducing its arsenal—have we achieved any deterrence or dissuasive effect in your opinion?

General Chilton: Senator, a couple facts here. One, both the Soviets, the former Soviet Union, now Russia, and the United States have made dramatic reductions in our strategic stockpiles and inventories since the end of the Cold War.

Two, there have been new actors on the international scene that, in spite of that reduction, have launched or continued more likely nuclear weapons development programs. But also, we can count many, many friends and allies who have not started nuclear weapons programs because of their confidence in the U.S. strategic deterrence which they can still maintain today and should.

So there's linkages between friends and allies and confidence in our ability to support them and proliferation, potential proliferation. But there's also a fair question to ask, have our reductions influenced certain countries, and the hard part is to prove the negative. Maybe there was another set of countries out there who have observed this reduction and have not started programs that they otherwise would have. I think this area bears further study.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Have you voted, Senator Nelson?

Senator BILL NELSON. I have not.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you want to start, or should we just put us in recess?

Senator BILL NELSON. May I just ask a couple of quick questions?

Chairman LEVIN. Sure. After you're done, if there's no one else here would you put us in recess until someone returns.

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. How much time is there?

Chairman LEVIN. 6 plus 5.

Senator Bill Nelson [presiding]: General Chilton, what do you feel is our highest missile defense priority? Should it be to provide our regional combatant commanders with an effective missile defense against the many existing short and medium-range missiles?

General Chilton: Senator, we have to look at both support—in my view, support to the regional combatant commanders, but certainly defense of the United States of America. So I think we need a balanced missile defense program that goes forward that addresses both those critical needs, both for our citizens at home and for our deployed forces abroad.

Senator BILL NELSON. Let me ask Admiral Keating and General Sharp: Since you are commanders that are facing many of the short and medium-range potential threats from North Korea, would you agree that you don't have sufficient missile defense capabilities to meet your operational needs to defend against those existing short and medium-range missiles?

Admiral Keating: Senator, we can provide for the defense of American citizens and America territory in the Pacific Command AOR with the assets that we have. We could obviously use more assets, in that we are not at a one to one ratio. They have more potential offensive weapons than we have extant defensive weapons.

General Sharp: Sir, North Korea's got over 800 missiles. We have currently on the peninsula 64 Patriots from the U.S. and the Republic of Korea just purchased 24 and we're starting to incorporate those into the defense also. Could we use more? Yes. We are work-

ing hard to make sure that the ballistic missile defense of the Patriots are properly linked together, that we have the intelligence to properly queue, and that we have them positioned at the right places to be able to defend our most critical warfighting assets. But it does leave other areas uncovered and we could—both we and the Republic of Korea could use more and we're working hard at that.

Senator BILL NELSON. So for the two of you, your highest missile defense priority is fielding effective capabilities to meet your operational needs?

Admiral Keating: Yes, sir.

General Sharp: Yes, sir.

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay.

General Chilton, hackers are trying to invade our military computers and you recently had a statement which was very good: "Every day"—and I'm quoting you: "Every day there are attempts to penetrate our network."

Since I'm down to 3 minutes to go vote, let me say that we're working at a lot of different levels, classified, and I just came from a hearing with regard to non-classified computers in the Commerce Committee, to try to get our arms around this problem, which we have to. This Senator has had his office computer—I have had my office computers invaded three times in the last month, and one of them we think is very serious.

So we're going to have to continue this and I underscore that for you.

If you will excuse me so that I can record my vote, the committee will stand in recess subject to the call of the Chair. Thank you.

[Recess from 11:20 a.m., reconvened at 11:21 a.m.]

Senator Udall [presiding]: Admiral and Generals, if that fits your pleasure, thank you for responding. We have a series of votes on, as I think everybody knows. But the committee is eager to take full advantage of your presence here. Thank you again, all three of you, for being here.

I thought I would, General Chilton, with no disrespect meant to your colleagues here, turn to STRATCOM and ask you a couple of questions in that area. Great to see you here. I know both you and Admiral Keating have Colorado ties and Colorado roots. You were a great leader at the Space Command, as was Admiral Keating at Northern Command.

General, in your testimony you noted the strengths gained from our space-based and cyber-enabled capabilities, but you also warned that asymmetric advantages carry asymmetric challenges. We can't rule out the need for capabilities force on force conflict areas. But you also note: "In the near term, it's unlikely that any state would choose such a course with the United States." I think we probably all agree that that's the reality.

In your view, how do we best prepare for such an uncertain future at a time when our resources are so constrained? You talked in particular about cyber activities, cyber attacks. So if you would respond I'd appreciate it.

General Chilton: Thank you, Senator. U.S. Strategic Command is our Department of Defense's cyber command and we take that mission of defending the DOD global information grid exceptionally se-

riously. What I believe we need to do in the cyber domain is to look at our culture, our conduct and capabilities, the three C's, I say.

We have all grown up with computers on our desks and they have been looked at as a convenience. I think all of us in America have. First we ignored them, and then we got used to them. Now we're kind of chained to them.

But we have to change the culture, and when we think about our military networks and computers, to clearly appreciate the fact that they are integral to the way we conduct military operations. So they are no longer a convenience; they are a necessity.

The conduct piece. We need to make sure that we approach our systems from a commander's perspective. Every commander needs to be concerned, not just about the readiness of their airplanes, the readiness of their ships, the readiness of their tanks, but the readiness also of their networks to support their operations.

In the capability area, there are technologies that we can field and field faster that will help us better understand what's going on on our networks, who's trying to get into them, what the configuration of the defenses of our networks are, etcetera. I think it's important to invest in those, in addition, I would say, in our people. We still in my view have not adequately resourced the people element of this to address the threats, the requirements to operate.

In the other what I would say asymmetric advantage domain that we have, and that would be in space operations, again space capabilities have become integral to not only our daily life as Americans, but also to military operations, whether it be missile warning from space, communications that we rely on to control Predators from the United States of America on the other side of the world, or to pass critical command and control information in support of nuclear forces, GPS, weather warning.

We have come to take these things for granted, I would say sometimes. But they are—they have become dependencies. So as we look to the future, we need to be thinking about these constellations as something that we could not ever afford to gap or have a degradation in capability. We need to take better care, in my view, as we look to the future to ensure that we never put ourselves in a position where we're counting on every single launch of a satellite capability 100 percent to be successful, because history tells us, we know, that that won't always happen.

Thank you, Senator.

Senator UDALL. Admiral, did you want to make a comment?

Admiral Keating: No.

Senator UDALL. I think the General covered it quite well and certainly covers all the service branches and the concerns that have been expressed.

I'd like you to talk a little bit about the space situational awareness concept and this collision we experienced recently. If you might just explain how this happened briefly, and what can we do to take some steps to ensure that we reduce, if possible to zero, the probability that this happens in the future?

General Chilton: Happy to, Senator. We took a real close look at this most recent collision between a U.S.- owned and operated communications satellite and a non- functioning Russian satellite. Our conclusion is, looking at it, that there really wasn't much—there

was nothing in fact that could have been done, given the way that satellite operator operated their satellite, given the way we surveil space today and do our work today, that could have prevented that collision.

But as we look to the future, there are things that we can do to improve space situational awareness in three areas: One, increase the amount of surveillance capabilities that we have. So we surveil space with radars and telescopes today. We need to have a more robust—sustain what we have, but also spread out that capability. There's opportunity here, I believe, to partner with other nations to increase this.

Believe it or not, geography matters in this case as you surveil the heavens. Most of our sensors are in the Northern Hemisphere, placed there because we were most interested in the Soviet Union of old. But we do need to increase the amount of energy we put up, if you will, to collect and refresh our databases more frequently on what's up there and its position.

Second, as you bring that data in—and, oh, by the way, there's opportunities to cooperate with other satellite operators that can give us the information we need, rather than us having to look for it. Once we bring that data in, we have the opportunity to improve our computer capabilities and our display capabilities at our Joint Space Operations Center, to improve the fusion of that information, which today we're still kind of trying to do in the commander's head out there by looking at Powerpoint charts.

Then improving the calculation capability to calculate and anticipate potential collisions in the future is another area that we could improve. Today we only do collision analysis on the top priorities for the United States of America, which are manned space flight vehicles, space shuttle, space station, and then our most valuable national security satellites. So we're not doing collision calculations for the 19,000-plus pieces of debris and the 1300-some odd active satellites up there today. We don't have the capacity. We can get better at that, I believe, in the future.

Senator UDALL. Thank you for that analysis.

It's tempting for me, sitting here as the acting Chair, to continue to ask questions and prevent my colleague from Alaska from having the floor. But I did want to yield to him, with comment for the record. You and I have talked about continuing our work for a comprehensive space treaty and there are some in place, but there are certainly some analogues, and the way we treat the Antarctic is one that's been mentioned. It's not one to one, obviously. There are differences between space and how we treat as a world the Antarctic.

But there's still more work to be done there and I look forward to working with you and through the committee to find a way to use space as we all want to, for peaceful purposes, for economic development, for all the marvelous advances that it's presented us with.

So thanks again to the panel, and it's an honor to yield to the Senator from Alaska, Mr. Begich.

Senator BEGICH. Thank you very much.

Thank you all for being here. When you're toward the end, most of the questions have been asked that I'm interested in, especially

since I saw so many Senators interested in Alaska and in missile defense. So I was very pleased about that. I hope that continues as we get to the budget process.

But let me follow very quickly on what Senator Udall mentioned on cyber security, and I don't know who could answer this question. Within all the military—and I might have missed this because I came in toward the end of his commentary on this—is there a coordinating body that works together within the military operations on cyber security? Not by just agent, by Army or Air Force, but a coordinating body that actually looks at how to improve the technology and what you can do together?

General Chilton: Well, in our command, in the combatant command of U.S. STRATCOM, I have two component commanders that work together very closely for operating and defending the network every day. That requires sending out orders, sending out updates to antiviruses, checking on the status and configuration of the network, supporting degradations in the network.

It also includes a great and robust relationship with the National Security Agency, which provides us tremendous intelligence support in this area. When we think about, as directed, if we are directed to do offensive operations in cyber space, we need to have close ties with all of the potentially affected parties within our government, and we have established a coordinating body to do that, whether it's with the FBI—

Senator BEGICH. Justice, whatever.

General Chilton: Exactly right, Senator.

So we recognize the complexities in this area and have put pieces in place to address them. Again, I'd say our biggest challenge is properly manning those command and control elements, those centers, for the future.

Senator BEGICH. Let me if I can—again, any one of you three can answer this or all of you. But again, I appreciate your commentary and your discussion on the missile defense system, especially because in Alaska, not to be too parochial, but we think it's important where it is strategically and otherwise. I think you've laid out many reasons because of the issues with North Korea.

Can you—and if this puts you on the spot just let me know. But on a one to ten scale, if each one of you could kind of give me a sense of how you see North Korea in the overall global picture of threats, and especially to our country, but around the world? I know that's—if you don't feel like you want to put a number on it, because I'm sure the people over here at this table with the press will probably pin you to it, so I won't hold you to it.

I just want to get kind of a feel of how you see. Because you know, from Alaska, we are very concerned with the missile activity or their launching activity, I'll just say, their launching activity. It does concern me. It concerns our community and their capabilities of what they will do or what they say they will do and what will really happen.

Admiral?

Admiral Keating: Senator, from a theater perspective, as we talk with countries throughout our region, the 37 in addition to North Korea, I would think it would be fair to characterize North Korea as the largest day to day concern in the eyes of most of the coun-

tries in our region. And it is not just because of potential Taepodong activity.

Skip is the best qualified amongst us, so I'll stop in just a second. Their leadership is perhaps characterized as erratic. The succession, which Skip discussed earlier, is not clear. What happens next is not clear. Their day to day activities are unpredictable and can be very confrontational. They close certain international air space routes. They close their own border, to their own economic disadvantage.

So, writ large, North Korea is probably one of, if not the, most unsettling—their policies are the most unsettling—of any in the region.

Senator BEGICH. Do most people agree with that?

General Sharp: Yes, sir. And I'll just add, it's a regime that in order to survive depends almost solely on provocations and their ability to get what limited amount they can by selling technology, missile technology, and proliferation, and have publicly stated that they have a—we know that they've done a nuclear test and they're working hard to be able to show the world that they have the power to be able to do, to deliver that anywhere in the world.

So it is definitely, I believe, a regime that we have to watch very closely and we have to be prepared for.

General Chilton: Senator, must from a global perspective, at STRATCOM I look at their activities that give me greatest concern: nuclear development, of a nuclear weapon, and a long-range missile capability; they could hold the continental United States at risk; and their proliferation activity with regards to their missile technology, and it gives me concern with where they might go with proliferation of their nuclear technology that they've developed, given the characterization that the other commanders here have given of the motivations of this country in the past.

So I look at their behavior and they do give us pause.

Senator BEGICH. Very good. Thank you. I have maybe one or two more questions. Again, if these have been asked I apologize. But how do you see, with North Korea and China, the international impact of the economy around the globe and how that's impacting their ability or their capacity to move, to improve or add to their military capacity? In other words, is the economic conditions of the country, of the world, having an impact on them in a positive or a negative way, or are they taking some efforts because of the situation to take advantage of what's going on?

I just want a little discussion on that. Admiral?

Admiral Keating: To the best of our ability to determine, Senator, there has been no short-term demonstration of a reduced capability, capacity, or intention on the part of the People's Republic of China in terms of military development. Counter that with the observation that containers are stacking up in Shanghai, so their export market is reduced. There have been numerous, hundreds and hundreds of factory closings in the past couple of months. Their economic growth, while not—while a number that might be the envy of other countries, 6 to 8 percent if that's an accurate forecast, it's down by about 50 percent from what China had been advertising, 12 to 15 percent growth hoped for in '09.

So all of that combines to lead us to be a little skeptical of their professed percentage of gross domestic product applied to defense in the People's Republic of China. Those are suspect numbers to begin with. The Chinese tell us, we are beginning—we China are beginning to understand the costs attendant to an all-volunteer army. They don't have that yet, but they are realizing, because of the efforts of folks like Chief Master Sergeant Jim Roy, how important a senior noncommissioned officer corps is, how expensive quality of life improvements are for their forces. And they say most of their percentage—a large percentage of their budget is going towards those human factors elements and less toward hardware and technical capabilities. We don't necessarily subscribe to that theory.

Long answer to a short question. We don't see any short-term impact because of economic downturn. We're watching it very carefully.

Senator BEGICH. And North Korea?

General Sharp: The same. North Korea, because of the very few amount of exports, the amount of money they come in has for years—and Kim Jong Il just recently said again in his, if you will, state of the union address several months ago that it's a military-first policy and that he will do everything to make sure that his military's as strong as possible, and even went as far as asking the common people to understand the shortages that they will have to endure in order to be able to maintain and continue to improve a strong military.

Senator BEGICH. Thank you very much. My time has expired and I do have to go, so I'm turning it back to the chairman, even though I would love to hold this away from him. But I will turn it back to Chairman Udall.

Thank you.

Senator UDALL. I think Senator Begich and I are thrilled to be able to have a chance to have a conversation with all three of you. I know the second vote was voiced and we're now in the process of debating the third vote, so I'd like to take advantage of your presence, and also alert you. If there's something you didn't have a chance to mention in your earlier testimony you'd like to touch on, I'm happy to make sure that we hear it.

But, Admiral, I thought I'd turn just to an interesting question. I know you're well aware of this, but when you look at the interface between CENTCOM and PACOM, you have oversight of India, General Petraeus has oversight of Pakistan. So much of what we see in Pakistan we believe is the Northwest Territories and that interface with Afghanistan. But when you drill down into what's happening in Pakistan historically and politically, often it's about their relationship with India.

Would you talk to whatever extent you're comfortable about that relationship and how you interact with General Petraeus and his important responsibilities?

Admiral Keating: Yes, sir. Thank you. It's a great question. It's an important question and it's topical. There are those who think a reexamination of the unified command plan, which as you describe affords CENTCOM authority and oversight of Pakistan and affords Pacific Command oversight and mil-to-mil relations with India. We at Pacific Command think the unified command plan is

well written, it is sound, and we don't think that there is sufficient reason to change the border between CENTCOM and Pacific Command with respect to the India-Pakistan border itself.

The reasons are several. I had the privilege of going to India in the mid-1980s as a member of the Pacific Command staff and I have been there once. I'm going in a couple of weeks and, as I mentioned earlier, we have frequent dialogue at many levels of mil-to-mil and diplomatic agencies throughout India. The dialogue today is much healthier, it is more robust, it is more vigorous, it is more comprehensive, it is more forthcoming than that I observed in the mid-80s.

In addition, India is a significant strategic partner for us, the United States writ large and us the Pacific Command in particular. Their demographics are significant. Their economic engine continues to churn. They are the world's largest democracy, of course, and their national elections are coming up. All this combines for me to recommend to you that the unified command plan as written is sound and that I assure you that mil-to-mil relations and Pacific Command and India are solid and actually bearing direct productive fruit.

Senator UDALL. Thank you for that insight. Of course, India is already a strong economic powerhouse, as you point out, the world's largest democracy. I see nothing but a bright future for our relationship with the kind of leadership and the kind of connections we have. I too have spent time in India. They're wonderful people, a fascinating culture, a long history, a much older nation than the United States of America. They have the potential to teach us.

General Sharp, they're trying to hook me, but I thought I'd give you a chance to talk a little bit about the point you made, that one of the challenges you face is insufficient training range capacity and capability when it comes to our air forces in Korea. You have some ideas, I'm sure, about how those challenges could be mitigated. Could you take a minute or 2 and share those with the committee?

General Sharp: Yes, sir. I also have a connection with Colorado in that my son will graduate, get his master's degree, from the University of Colorado in climatology on the 8th of May, and I look forward to visiting back to your State on that day.

Senator UDALL. Outstanding. Forgive me for not mentioning your connection as well.

General Sharp: You should get a better intel officer, sir.

[Laughter.]

Senator UDALL. Maybe one of my fellows could be your intel officer.

General Sharp: Yes, sir.

[Laughter.]

General Sharp: Sir, first let me comment upon the strength of this ROK-U.S. alliance and the capabilities that we have and what we need in the future. First, I was stationed in Korea from 1996 to 1998 as a colonel and a one-star. The Korean military at that time were good. But the professionalism and the capability that has improved over those 10 to 11 years is absolutely phenomenal. They track and abide by and believe in our training, the way we

train our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. They completely work through the AAR systems, after action review systems, and they really have got a strong capability right now, especially on their ground forces, in order to be able to do what we're doing or be prepared for any sort of a contingency.

I am absolutely confident when they take command of the war fight and take control of that on 17th April 2012 they will be ready for that. We are going through many different exercises in training and establishing plans, processes, and organizations to make sure that we are ready for them to do that.

After OPCON transfer the U.S. will be just as necessary, but we'll be in a supporting to supported role rather than the opposite. The 28,500 troopers that we have there now from all services I believe to be about the right number for the future well past OPCON transfer to stay in this very, very important part of the world, in a country that has wanted us there for over 50 years and is key to security and stability in Northeast Asia.

We are working very closely with the Republic of Korea military in order to make sure that we do have all of the training ranges that we need in order to be able to properly train our service members. The most difficult one is the one that you mentioned, is ranges for the new modern systems of our air forces to be able to have significant size and safety in order to be able to drop the ordnance, given the precision and the safety requirements that we have. They're committed to it. We're committed to working this very closely together to be able to do it.

The last thing I'll say is the agreement by our Department of Defense and the direction to move to 3-year accompanied tours also will greatly increase the capabilities we have in Korea. 3 years instead of 1 year at a time just gives me great capability. It reduces stress. Why have an unaccompanied tour anywhere in the world if you don't have to? And it really does show our commitment, not just to Korea, but to all of Northeast Asia, which I think goes straight back to the security and stability for this important part of the world.

Senator UDALL. Your point's important, but Wanda Lee's really nodding behind you like that would really make a big difference.

I thank you for your indulgence and, on behalf of the ranking member and the chairman, thank you all. The committee's going to stand in recess until further notice. Thank you very much.

[Recess at 11:44 a.m., reconvened at 11:45 a.m.]

Chairman Levin [presiding]: Well, you folks have been around here long enough to know how the Senate works. I won't apologize for it. It just goes with the territory.

We'll be back in order and Senator Webb is recognized.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

If any of you gentlemen can figure out how the Senate works and let me know, I would appreciate it. It's the one body in government where they say you can keep things from getting done rather than doing things. We tend to be pretty good at that.

Gentlemen, I would apologize also for the delay here.

We've got a couple hearings going. We had a hearing on Russia in the Foreign Relations Committee this morning and also these other delays. I would say, first of all, I appreciate the visits that

a number of you have made personally to my office to talk with me and with my staff, and I hope we can continue to do that.

General Chilton, as you may know, my father served in the Strategic Air Command. We had a discussion about that. I'm very proud of his service. He was not only a bomber pilot, but was a pioneer in the missile program, put the first Atlas missile in for the United States Air Force. As I think I told you, I used to play baseball right across the street from where you live right now. So I have great memories of the Air Force and also of Offutt.

Admiral, I'd like to wish you and your wife the very best into the future, and thank you for your long years of service. Actually, as some of this testimony was going back and forth I was thinking about how long I've been doing this as well. I think I was in my last year at the Naval Academy your plebe year.

We were talking about the move to Guam. I actually wrote about this proposing this 37 years ago. it's kind of scary to say that. I wrote the first book that I wrote on our strategic positioning in the Pacific and how it would affect a Guam-Mariana Islands axis. I went out, I spent time as a consultant to the governor of Guam, walked or drove every square inch of that territory in Guam, Tinian, and Saipan. I'd like to reiterate my offer to your staff or your successor: If they want to come by and bounce any of these thoughts off of me, I'm happy to respond. I don't think Guam and Tinian have changed that much over the years. I've had a number of conversations with the Marine Corps in terms of what they are attempting to do.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to say something. I had a long conversation with Admiral Keating in my office the other day with respect to China. I'm not going to go into it in the same kind of detail during my time today, but I would like to say that I have concerns, I think, that are greater than any of those that have been expressed, at least in the parts of the hearing that I've been involved in today.

One of the things that Admiral Keating and I were discussing was what is this going to look like 10 years from now. It actually came back to me that I wrote fairly extensively on this 10 years ago. I wrote a piece 10 years ago last month in the New York Times about China's change in military policy from defense to power projection. I wrote a piece in the Wall Street Journal right after the E-3 incident in April of '01 expressing my concern about how vulnerable we'd become strategically to the Chinese, not only in the military sense, but in an overall national strategic sense, with the way that we overinvested in their economy, to our potential detriment.

I just think we tend when we have these hearings and when we talk about these snapshots to confuse the ramifications of tactical confrontations with what we might be taking away with respect to China's larger strategic goals. I think we must keep those on the table. I think that these tactical confrontations—it's rather interesting thinking about the P-3 incident 8 years ago because it was very similar in terms of responding on a tactical level to what had gone on to the incidents that occurred early this month.

But these tactical confrontations are largely data points that, if we think about them, can illuminate the larger changes that are

taking place in this region. They're not simply military issues, which makes them difficult to discuss in a military context or even in this committee. They are very largely with respect to the waters off of East Asia sovereignty issues.

They have taken place in concert with our unprecedented vulnerability in terms of our own economic situation and our trade policies and these sorts of things, and they aren't limited to us. You could do the data points on the Spratly Islands from 1996, when I was out there as a journalist, '96 and '97, compared to today in terms of China's presence and its military capabilities.

We've seen incidents in the Shikaku Islands, which are claimed by Taiwan, Japan, and China. I was in Vietnam in December and they were very concerned about, as I mentioned to you, Admiral, during our meeting, with the pressures that the Chinese government have been putting on American companies doing business in Vietnam.

So this isn't something that can clearly be addressed in the context of an incident, but I think it's very important for the record, Mr. Chairman, that we attempt to examine these issues in a larger strategic framework if we're going to make judgments about what relation really look like between our two countries.

The piece that I wrote in the Wall Street Journal I started with a quote from Sun Tzu when he said: Draw them in with the prospect of gain; take them by confusion; use anger to throw them into disarray." If you compare the tactical with the strategic, that's probably a fairly good summation of the way that these incidents have accumulated.

So I don't really even have a question about that, and wanted to say it for the record and I wanted to extend my appreciation to you, Admiral Keating, for all the service you've given to our country and all of you for what you've been doing to try to maintain the balance in that region as we sort this out, hopefully on a national perspective.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Webb.

General Sharp, let me go back to the issue of the Six-Party Talks with North Korea and who hasn't done what and who has done what according to the phase two agreement. My understanding is there was a commitment, in exchange for dismantlement, that there would be a delivery of some fuel oil, about apparently a million tons of fuel oil, to the North Koreans. I guess the right word is "disablement" instead of "dismantlement." Phase two is disablement.

My understanding is that we and South Korea and Russia have completed our 200,000 tons, the Republic of Korea—I'm sorry. We, China, and Russia have completed the 200,000 tons. The Republic of Korea has gotten most of it, like 145,000 tons, but the missing piece of the million is that Japan has not provided any energy aid because of the question of the abduction. Is that a fair summary of where we are?

General Sharp: Yes, sir, very close. I've got 146 is what the Republic of Korea has donated, so 54 short.

Chairman LEVIN. All right.

General Sharp: I think I ought to point out also, though, that the agreement was kind of a step by step in order to be able to make sure that as much as possible North Korea lives up to its expectations. So of really the 11 steps that need to be able to take place, as you noted, 8 are complete, so around 80 percent. About 80 percent of the rods have been pulled out of the fuel pond, so again about 80 percent. And the amount of heavy fuel oil that has been given to the Republic of Korea is right at 75 percent.

So again, there's a balance there, I think, of them, North Korea, doing what they promised as this fuel oil gets delivered.

Chairman LEVIN. All right. My understanding is it's 8 of the 11 disablement tasks have been completed and the ninth is 80 percent complete; is that correct?

General Sharp: That is correct, the ninth being the taking of the fuel rods out.

Chairman LEVIN. Now, whether or not the Japanese work out with the North Koreans the issue that obviously is a major issue in Japan, that military ton commitment is not conditioned upon the Japanese and the North Koreans working out their difference, is it? In other words, the million ton commitment has got to come from somewhere?

General Sharp: I would have to go back and look at the exact language, whether each of the five countries promised 200,000 or whether there was a million total promised, and I'll get back with you on that, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

[COMMITTEE INSERT]

Chairman LEVIN. If you would, that we be helpful.

Now, one other question. I think you were the one who testified about the interest of the North Korean regime being their own survival, essentially. That's it; I mean, that's their goal. They'll starve their own people in order to support their military, but their goal is the survival of that regime, number one, number two, and number three goal. Is that basically fair?

General Sharp: Yes, sir, that is fair, and he has proven that over the years, and will go to any measure in order to make sure that happens.

Chairman LEVIN. Is there any doubt, do you think, in their mind that if they attack the United States that that would be the end of their regime?

General Sharp: I think there's no doubt if they attack the alliance, the Republic of Korea alliance and the United States, which has been so strong over the last 50 years, that they would not be successful and that their regime would end. They would cause huge damage, though, on South Korea.

Chairman LEVIN. I understand that. The damage is clear. But could there be any doubt in their mind that if they attacked us or the South Koreans that that would be the end of their regime?

General Sharp: Sir, there should not be, because I believe it would be.

Chairman LEVIN. General Maples, who's Director of the DIA, at our hearing a few days ago said that the North Koreans announced that they are going to do a space launch, "and I believe," he said, "that's what they intend." That's our DIA Director. Do you have

any reason to disagree with his assessment, any of you? Well, let me start with you, General. General Chilton?

General Chilton: I wouldn't disagree with the DIA assessment on that. That's what their assessment is.

Chairman LEVIN. General Sharp, do you have any reason, or Admiral?

General Sharp: Sir, I know no reason to disagree. Again just to remind, as I said earlier, I believe he will do other things that day also, as he tried to do back in 2006.

Chairman LEVIN. General Chilton, I made reference before to the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation's report, where he said that "The GMD flight testing to date will not support a high level of confidence in its limited capabilities." Your testimony is that there's a high degree of probability that we could knock down a North Korean attack or missile. There seems to be a pretty clear difference. Do you agree there's at least a difference between the two of you on that point? I'm just wondering, how do you explain that difference between our Director of OT and E saying that the testing to date won't support a high level of confidence in the limited capabilities of GMD and your statement earlier today?

General Chilton: Senator, I have not had the conversation specifically with the individual, so I would presume as part of this now a contextual issue here on this particular point. One point that I'd make is the testing that was done in the deployment of this system, which really didn't begin until around 2003, I guess, time period, is very different than what you would do in a classic development program. In fact, if we followed a classic development program—I'll just use an aircraft development for example—we would have nothing deployed today, because there is much more rigorous testing in that development area.

But a decision was made to take risk in the testing part and also to allow different authorities to the Missile Defense Agency to accelerate the development of this program because of the perceived need. I think as a result of that we're in a pretty good position today to be ahead of North Korean capabilities as they field them.

Not to say that this—so my position is that I believe that we have in the limited deployment capabilities that we have out today for the system, it is adequate to defend against what we believe the North Koreans could potentially put forward as a threat to the United States today. For the future, I would say no. So as we look to the future, we have an opportunity—and I think General O'Reilly is on the right path here—to improve the testing of the current system, to fill in, if you will, the dots on the matrix of a normal test plan for the purposes of increasing our confidence, but also to fill out the models, the points on the models. Realizing we can never test this system, because of cost and expense, at the level that you would take an airplane to Edwards Air Force Base and fly hundreds of times, we will rely on sophisticated models for the future to anticipate its performance. And filling in those key elements of that model I think is the right path forward here to ensure that we stay ahead of threats as they develop in the Pacific.

Chairman LEVIN. Are you saying that we're going to rely on modeling; we're not going to have testing to show that it's operationally effective?

General Chilton: No, sir. I think you need both. You need both. But I think there's a realization—if you look at a classic test regimen, for example, for an airplane, you have the opportunity, because of the affordability and the availability, to do a lot of testing.

Chairman LEVIN. A lot more testing.

General Chilton: To fill in those test matrices. So here the key will be to continue testing, but pick the points on the graph that allow you to connect the dots, if you will, through modeling to increase your confidence in the system and validate the design of the system.

Chairman LEVIN. You used the word that North Korea has limited capability and that we're ahead of that current limited capability. It's your goal and our goal hopefully to stay ahead of their capability. One way to stay ahead of it would be if we can negotiate the end of their nuclear program. Now, that doesn't directly affect the missile program, but it affects the strength or the impact of their missile program. So the effort to get them off of their nuclear program I think you would agree would be also very, very important in terms of limiting their capability in the total world?

General Chilton: Senator, when you combine what General Sharp has described I think very accurately, the Korean leadership, North Korean leadership and regime, and their motivations, and combine that with a long-range missile technology that can reach the United States and combine that with their nuclear weapons program, it gives us great concern. So I agree—

Chairman LEVIN. I understand the concern.

General Chilton: —that eliminating that part of it would be very important to us.

Chairman LEVIN. I understand the concern, but I think it's also—what General Sharp said is also I think generally agreed upon, which is that the North Korean leadership has only their own survival in mind. That's their goal. And if they believe—and General Sharp I think agrees with our intelligence that they do believe and must believe—that any attack on us or the South Koreans would lead to their own destruction, in other words defeat their number one goal, that that deterrence should work with North Korea.

It may not work with Iran. It's a different kind of regime. But it ought to work with a regime whose only goal in life is their own survival; should it not?

General Chilton: Well, you bring up a great point, that there's no one size deterrence that fits all. So your point about an Iranian, what would deter Iran versus North Korea versus another potential adversary, is I think an incredibly important point. We need to think about our deterrence posture force and the way our government approaches this and look at each individual country.

The only thing I would offer, as not even a counterpoint, but a consideration with respect to North Korea, is this. One, there is always the possibility that when put in a corner where one's survival is recognized to be very, very low probability of the use-or-lose capability that you might develop, and so being postured to defend against that low probability but high consequence condition I think is important to us.

Then the other thing, we always have to—

Chairman LEVIN. Who would put them in the corner?

General Chilton: If you could imagine a conflict, a conventional conflict that would break out on the peninsula, and our great South Korean-American alliance would be very effective, I believe, in defending that and then bringing that to resolution in our favor, that could be a case where the leadership there could feel cornered.

The other thing we have to ask ourselves, though, as we look at ourselves, what deters us and what might influence us, and does the risk of this capability alone, the thought of would you trade an attack on the United States versus our desire to engage on a particular problem on the Korean Peninsula, etcetera, etcetera, how we perceive that potential threat is something we have to consider as well when we consider the value of a missile defense system against this type of regime.

General Sharp: Sir, there's another element of this deterrence of North Korea. I agree that if he ever attacked us, or South Korea, the regime would come to an end. But his ability to be able to launch a ballistic missile and demonstrate he has that capability goes a long way in the road of helping him proliferate that to other countries around the world and to be able to get cash back in order to go again back into regime survival.

So this missile launch is not so much in my view about the ability to attack the United States. It's: I've got the ability; countries that need this and would be willing to negotiate with North Korea, they'd now have a demonstrated capability. That's where I think the real threat is, is the proliferation side.

Chairman LEVIN. I agree with you.

[Pause.]

Chairman LEVIN. I don't know if anyone else has asked this question. But Admiral, let me ask you this question. In terms of the current readiness of our forces, given the focus that's been on Iraq and Afghanistan, has that, if you haven't already been asked, in any way detracted from your ability to deal with the challenges you face?

Admiral Keating: Senator, Chairman, it has, but not to a great degree. In the case of supporting Skip should we be so tasked, we would not have at our immediate disposal as many ground forces as we would have absent commitments to the Central Command. That said, we work with Skip all the time and we could in some cases supplant or supplement the ground force requirement with naval and air power projection capability.

I report our readiness on a monthly—we report our readiness on a monthly basis to the Secretary, and in 2 years it has not worried. The actual valuation is classified, but it hasn't changed in 2 years, sir.

General Sharp: Sir, just to follow on to that, I agree that where we are in Iraq and Afghanistan affects the ground forces, the way that Admiral Keating—but there should be nobody that has any concern those forces would get there and we would win the conflict. It would be a little longer than what we would like if forces are not committed in other places around the world. But they would get there and we would be successful in our war plan. There is no doubt in my mind about that.

Chairman LEVIN. Well, that's reassuring news

There just was one other question about the disablement issue, if I can just get the facts on this. It has to do with the parts that were disabled of the nuclear—in the nuclear program, we were disabling the—the disabling of the reactor and the reprocessing facility, those two facilities, began, as I understand it. And there was a threat on the part of North Korea that they would reverse it.

General Sharp: Roger.

Chairman LEVIN. Has it been reversed, do you know?

General Sharp: There was a threat when we did not immediately take them off the terrorism list, that they were going to—in fact, they did—kick the IAEA inspectors out. They said they were going to start taking the seals off the different parts.

We then took, we then took them off the list, and then now they have continued down the process of those 11 steps, to the point where the secondary cooling loop has been disabled, the drive mechanisms have been disabled, some of the overhead cranes have been disabled, the mechanism for fuel and de-loading has been disabled.

So as you accurately said, 11 steps that are required for the disablement, 8 of them have been completed. The ninth one, of removing the rods, is about 80 percent. Then there is the last two that will need to happen after the rods are completed, of the rod control mechanism being disabled; and the final one is the disablement of the fresh fuel system, for all 11 of those steps to be completed.

Chairman LEVIN. But the threat to reverse the disablement was not carried out and the disablement has continued, as I understand it. The threat was made at the time they were not taken off the terrorism list; and when they were taken off some months later, I believe, then that threat was removed and the disablement has continued?

General Sharp: That's correct, although at a very, very slow rate. They could have been well done with this months ago if they had done it at a reasonable rate.

Chairman LEVIN. And the rate that was continued, at the same rate as fuel has been delivered, approximately?

General Sharp: Approximately, yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. And you're going to let us know for the record whether or not the commitment to deliver the fuel is going to be carried out by four countries if Japan does not participate?

[The information referred to follows:]

[COMMITTEE INSERT]

General Sharp: My great staff says that it was agreement of one million tons; did not break it out, 200,000 per for each one of the five other countries. And I don't know whether there's been discussions among the five countries in the Six-Party Talks of how to make that up or not.

Chairman LEVIN. We thank you all. Sorry for this kind of chaotic way to approach this, but your service has been terrific and constant, a lot more constant than our hearing this morning. We will stand adjourned, again with our thanks to you and your families.

[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]