

# Stabilization, Peacebuilding, and Sustainability in the Horn of Africa

*Stephen F. Burgess, PhD*

STABILIZATION, PEACEBUILDING, and sustainability in an unstable and famine-prone region like the Horn of Africa are predicated on a holistic approach that addresses environmental degradation, conflict, and their interrelationship.<sup>1</sup> They posit a set of options intended to bring sustainable development as well as security from conflict and struggles over scarce resources. This approach is especially salient in the Horn of Africa because the region combines high levels of environmental stress (manifested in periodic famine and struggles over diminishing arable farm and grazing lands) and conflict (interstate wars, civil wars, and communal clashes).<sup>2</sup> The region is also one in which environmental disasters (especially famine) and conflicts have been interrelated.

This article addresses the problems of peacebuilding, sustainability, and stabilization in the Horn of Africa and the interrelationship of environmental degradation, instability, and conflict. It assesses the extent to which degradation causes instability and focuses on the spiraling effect of natural disaster, degradation, and conflict on famine, destabilization, and conflict. It examines efforts, especially in Somali pastoral areas of Kenya and Ethiopia, to mitigate environmental degradation and conflict as well as extremism and terrorism. Thus, a sustainability and stabilization assessment is used to examine environmental degradation, conflict, and their interrelationship and what can be done to overcome degradation and conflict.

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Dr. Stephen F. Burgess is associate professor of international security at the Air War College and associate director of the USAF Counterproliferation Center at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. His areas of expertise include African regional and cultural studies, peace and stability operations, and South Asian security issues; he has conducted field research and published numerous journal articles and book chapters on these subjects. His books are *South Africa's Weapons of Mass Destruction*; *The UN under Boutros-Boutros Ghali*; and *Smallholders and Political Voice in Zimbabwe*.



**Figure 1. Political map of Horn of Africa region.** (Borders of the disputed regions of Darfur, the Ogaden, Somaliland, and Puntland indicated here are approximate and are included for orientation purposes only. Some overlap exists between the claims of Somaliland and Puntland along their shared border. The inclusion of such labeling does not represent or imply recognition by the author or by any agency or department of the US government.)

## The Horn of Africa Region

The “core” of the Horn of Africa refers to the area adjacent to where the “Horn” juts into the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean and includes Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, and Djibouti. The core features a cultural clash between “lowland” Islamic pastoralists from Somali, Oromo, and other ethnic groups and “upland” Orthodox Christian farmers from Amharic and Tigrayan ethnic groups. The struggle between uplanders and lowlanders has

been going on for several hundred years and has centered on control over land and wealth.<sup>3</sup>

The larger Horn refers to countries that have close relations with or are rivals of the core states, especially Sudan and Kenya, and to a lesser extent Uganda. Sudan is especially important because of its rivalry for the past century and a half with Ethiopia. Sudan features a core group of Arab-speaking Muslim farmers from the banks of the Nile and surrounding areas who have managed to control (often with force) vast outlying sections of the country composed mostly of nomadic pastoralists and some farmers. The struggle between Sudan and Ethiopia began with the Mahdi in the late nineteenth century and resumed in the 1950s with the independence of Sudan. Ethiopia tended to back southern Sudanese rebels who were fighting against Sudanese government attempts to “Arabize” and “Islamize” them. Sudan tended to back Eritrean separatists who were fighting for independence and against Ethiopian annexation.

Kenya fits into the Horn because of its relations with Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan. Kenya was a British settler colony from which the British projected power during the colonial era and attempted to control pastoralist areas in the north of the country (including Somali pastoralists). Kenya has been a peacemaker in the region, especially in Somalia and Sudan. Uganda fits into the Horn because of its relations with Sudan and Kenya and its pastoralist population (in the northeast) who move across borders. In addition, the Blue Nile and White Nile both flow through the region.

The Horn of Africa features pastoralists, drylands, and semiarid topography (80 percent of the more than five million square kilometers). Sixty-two percent of land in the Horn of Africa is occupied by pastoralists, who are 12 percent of the population of the region and who live on semiarid land with a lack of water.<sup>4</sup>

All of the states mentioned came together to create the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) in the mid-1980s to deal with famines, which were afflicting the region.<sup>5</sup> In the mid-1990s, the IGADD became the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and became a peacemaking body, playing a role in the end of conflicts in southern Sudan and Somalia and authorizing the development of an early warning system to prevent or stop environmental degradation and conflict.<sup>6</sup>

The Horn is greatly influenced by Egypt, which has had long, close relations with the region. Egypt’s primary concern has been guaranteeing the

free flow of the Nile for national survival and ensuring navigation through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia has influence over Sudan and Somalia and has exported its version of “Wahhabist” Islam to the Horn. Yemen is just across the strategic strait (the Bab el-Mandeb) from the Horn and takes an interest in its affairs. Yemen has also been a crossing point for al-Qaeda from the Arabian Peninsula to the Horn.

Islamic extremism exists in the Horn of Africa and has flowed down from the Arabian Peninsula. Osama bin Laden was welcomed to Sudan in the early 1990s by Islamist leader Husain al-Turabi and built al-Qaeda there. In 1996 the Sudanese regime asked bin Laden to leave. In 1993 Islamic extremists arose in Somalia in opposition to US, UN, and Western intervention. Today extremism persists among some members of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), and foreign Islamic fighters have been fighting the Ethiopians. However, it is uncertain if al-Qaeda has made serious inroads into Somalia. In Kenya and Tanzania, the discontent of coastal Muslims who have been neglected by regimes dominated by non-Muslims from the interior led some to join al-Qaeda and participate in the 1998 embassy bombings and the 2002 attacks on an Israeli hotel and airliner in Mombasa.<sup>7</sup> At issue is the degree of al-Qaeda presence today, especially in Somalia and coastal Kenya and Tanzania. In previously religion-tolerant Ethiopia, reports have asserted that both Islamic extremism (especially Wahhabism) and Orthodox Christian fundamentalism are growing.<sup>8</sup>

### **Stabilization Challenges and State Failure in the Horn of Africa**

State failure in the Horn of Africa has provided considerable material for research and literature.<sup>9</sup> Somalia is the most obvious case.<sup>10</sup> State disintegration in Uganda under Idi Amin in the 1970s and Milton Obote in the early 1980s is also well known.<sup>11</sup> In Sudan, the central government has tried to “conquer, Arabize, and Islamize” the South for most of half a century, as well as ethnically cleanse Darfur and subdue other outlying regions, instead of seeking to build legitimacy—this has constituted state failure in those regions.<sup>12</sup> Less obvious cases of “partial failure” include Ethiopia in the Somali Ogaden, Kenya in the Somali Northeast, and Uganda in the Acholi North (facing the Lord’s Resistance Army).<sup>13</sup>

At the macro level, the Horn of Africa is a difficult region in which to build and sustain states. There are widely differing topographies (mountains,



**Figure 2. Topographical map of Horn of Africa region**

savanna, and desert) and modes of production (commercial and smallholder agriculture and pastoralism). Before the European colonial powers arrived, there were only two significant states extant—Amharic-Shoan Ethiopia and Mahdist Sudan.<sup>14</sup> Boundaries drawn and colonies created in the late nineteenth century have remained sources of contention. The colonial legacy is one in which relatively strong states (e.g., Ethiopia, Sudan, and British settler Kenya) were surrounded by nonstate groupings (mainly pastoralists). Indirect colonial rule in Uganda and Sudan meant little integration of ethnic groups, especially pastoralists. The division of Somalis into five colonial territories helped to accentuate clan fissures.<sup>15</sup>

In the Horn of Africa, pastoralists resisted state intervention and controls such as boundaries, fencing, and pest eradication programs and did not need states as much as farmers did.<sup>16</sup> In general, there was little environmental control or agricultural extension and livestock control in the region. Thus, there was little positive institutional interaction between pastoralists and states. Therefore, the tasks of post-independence state building and regional integration were difficult in the vast lowland expanses of the Horn.<sup>17</sup>

In the 1950s and 1960s, Ethiopia annexed Eritrea—which led to war—and came into rivalry with newly independent Sudan and Somalia, which set the stage for a range of destabilization activities. Ethiopia supported rebels in the southern Sudan, while Sudan supported the Eritrean liberation movements. Somalia laid claim to the Ogaden in Ethiopia, which led to an invasion and war in 1977–78. Somalia's defeat and subsequent Ethiopian subversion contributed to state decline, failure, and collapse. These rivalries paved the way for state failure, especially for Somalia and Sudan, regime change in Ethiopia, and the independence of Eritrea. After Eritrea became independent in 1993, it quickly came into conflict with its erstwhile ally, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) regime in Ethiopia.

At the intermediate level, all states in the region have suffered problems with institutional viability and state weakness. Patronage networks developed and then shriveled in Somalia and Sudan in the 1960s and 1980s, leading to state failure. In Kenya under Pres. Daniel Arap Moi (1978–2002), patronage networks shrunk and ethnic conflict over land intensified, bringing warnings of possible state failure.<sup>18</sup> In the 1960s Ugandan president Milton Obote shut out the predominant Buganda kingdom from patronage networks and removed the Kabaka as head of state, which led to Idi Amin's 1971 military coup and state disintegration.<sup>19</sup>

At the micro level, all states in the region have suffered from shocks of various sorts—including famine, economic downturns, and revolution—which contributed to state failure. The Ethiopian famines of 1973 and 1984–85 contributed to regime changes (the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 and Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991). In the late 1970s, the revolutionary Dergue regime instituted land reform and attempted to radically reorganize farming, which disrupted traditional agricultural systems and productive capacity.<sup>20</sup> The disruption and famine gave impetus to the Eritrean People's Liberation Front and the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front, which came to power six years later. The Somalia famine of

1991–92 was partly the result of state failure and conflict. The rise of clan warlords, who used food to empower themselves, made the reconstitution of the Somalian state all but impossible.<sup>21</sup>

### **Stabilization Challenges in Somalia**

The case of state failure and collapse in Somalia (1990 to the present) is the most pronounced of any in Africa and the world and has been examined thoroughly by a number of scholars.<sup>22</sup> At the macro or structural level, the principal problems have been pastoralist clans who have long contended for resources, the colonial misdivision of Somalis, and the resulting irredentism. Pre-colonial Somalia was characterized by pastoralist clans who contended over water holes, grazing lands, and livestock and who raided sedentary agriculturalists—poor social capital for the building of nation-states.<sup>23</sup> In the scramble for Africa, Italy took southeastern Somali areas, while Britain took northern and southwestern Somali areas and Ethiopia took the western Ogaden region.<sup>24</sup> The Italians did little to build colonial administration and infrastructure from 1900 to 1941, while the British put little into the north (Somaliland) from 1900 to 1961 and the south that it governed from 1941 to 1961.

From independence in 1961 until 1969, small elites struggled to create a successful Somali state but were unable to control contention and political chaos. They established patronage networks that drowned in a sea of corruption. They promised the recovery of Somali lands in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti but were unable to bring about the irredentist promise of a larger Somalia.

The military coup of 1969 and the Siad Barre dictatorship were reactions to the weakness and corruption of the new Somali state and the civilian elites' inability to bring promises to fruition. The Barre regime made a concerted effort to strengthen and extend the state's reach (e.g., they attempted to transform pastoralists into fishers) and build the Somali nation. The adoption of "scientific socialism" helped to bring Soviet assistance, including large amounts of military aid. In 1977 and 1978 Somalia used that military aid to invade Ethiopia and take the Ogaden. Defeat in 1978 dealt a blow to the Barre regime from which it never recovered.

At the intermediate level of institutional viability and state weakness, dictator Siad Barre established patron-client relations in the 1970s (with the help of Soviet aid) with the various clans. However, after the defeat in 1978, the switch from Soviet to American patrons, and economic downturn in the

1980s, the regime narrowed the range of clan clients until only Barre's sub-clan of the Darod clan was benefiting.<sup>25</sup> In April 1978 the Somali Salvation and Democratic Front launched guerrilla operations in southern Somalia with Ethiopian support. In 1981, the Somali National Movement launched a campaign in the north that would lead to the nominal independence of Somaliland in 1991. Repression by the regime's security system did not prove effective and actually backfired, increasing violent opposition. Siad Barre refused to negotiate with the opposition and reacted by narrowing his power base to three sub-clans of the Darod clan.<sup>26</sup>

At the micro level, the United States suddenly withdrew aid to the Barre regime in 1988 as the Cold War was coming to an end. The evaporation of resources crippled the state and enabled the rebels' advance, which led to regime failure in the course of 1990 and collapse in January 1991. Siad Barre continued to refuse to negotiate, even as opposing rebel groups closed in on the capital, Mogadishu.

After the collapse, the inability of opposition movements and clans to reach agreement led to the failure of the Somalian state and the rise of the warlords.<sup>27</sup> The failed state and clan warfare in Somalia immediately had ramifications for environmental sustainability and the welfare of Somalis. The great Somalia famine of 1991–93 was a direct result of state collapse and the conduct of the warlords. Warlords seized food from Somali farmers and relief agencies and used the proceeds to buy weapons, provide patronage, and grow in strength. With no state, fights over grazing lands and water holes went unresolved. As clan warfare intensified, there was no state to step in to resolve disputes. The interconnectedness of state failure, warfare, and environmental degradation and famine became clear.

Efforts were mounted to reconstitute the Somalian state, but all failed. In 1993, the United States and the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) tried to gain agreement on rebuilding the state. The special representative of the UN secretary-general and chief of mission, ADM Jonathan Howe, and his advisors were determined to take a "bottom up" approach to reconstituting the Somalian state. In March 1993, they negotiated an agreement with a range of local leaders to build local governments, then provincial governments, and then the central state. However, Howe and his colleagues attempted to circumvent the powerful warlords after already agreeing in principle to a "top down" power-sharing arrangement among them. The warlords rejected the bottom-up approach and mounted an insurgency that eventually drove the United States and the United Nations out of Somalia.<sup>28</sup>



After US and UN withdrawal, the warlords continued fighting each other in and around Mogadishu for more than a decade. In contrast, peace prevailed in Somaliland (in the north of Somalia), which declared independence in May 1991 and held democratic elections in 2003. However, Somaliland has failed to win recognition as a sovereign state. In 1998, Puntland (in the northeast of Somalia) declared autonomy from Mogadishu under Pres. Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and has remained relatively peaceful (though there have been clashes with Somaliland forces over the contested Sool region). In 2004, Yusuf was elected by his peers as president of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) for all of Somalia. Elections were held in Puntland in January 2005, and Mohamed Muse Hersi was voted president.

After 1993, peacemaking in Somalia fell to the IGAD under Kenyan and Djiboutian leadership. In 2004 the TFG and Somali Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) were formed and elected President Yusuf. Each of Somalia's four major clans was allocated 61 seats in the parliament, while an alliance of minority clans received 31 seats. The TFP and TFG agreed on a charter for the reconstitution and governing of the Somali state. A split occurred between President Yusuf's group (based in the Darod clan) and a Mogadishu-based faction (mainly the Hawiye clan). At the beginning of 2006, the split ended, and the TFG moved to Baidoa, Somalia.

In early 2006, the Islamic Courts Union arose as an armed group and by June defeated the warlords in and around Mogadishu. By September the ICU controlled much of Somalia outside Somaliland and Puntland as well as Baidoa, where the Ethiopian army protected the TFG. In December 2006, the Ethiopians launched a counteroffensive and drove the ICU out of Mogadishu and other major centers. In February Uganda sent 400 troops as an advance contingent of 1,600 peacekeepers to Mogadishu as part of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM); Nigeria, Ghana, and Malawi failed to send peacekeepers because of continuing violence. In March the TFG moved to Mogadishu, which was rocked by violence that drove tens of thousands out of the city. Eritrea, in its feud with Ethiopia, has armed and trained the ICU as part of a coalition dedicated to driving the Ethiopian army and the TFG out of Somalia. At issue is whether or not the TFG can survive and the Ethiopian army can be replaced by African Union (AU) peacekeepers.

Francois Grignon, Africa director of the International Crisis Group (ICG), finds that the conflict in Somalia is a greater challenge than the

conflict in the African Great Lakes region (including the Democratic Republic of the Congo). He has been pessimistic about the prospect of Ethiopia holding Mogadishu for the TFG and even more so about the Ethiopian army being replaced by AU peacekeepers or a new Somalian army.<sup>29</sup> Lt Col Scott Rutherford, US defense attaché to Kenya, observed that the longer Ethiopia meddles in Somali affairs, the longer it will take the TFG to become independent.<sup>30</sup>

### **Stabilization Challenges in Sudan**

Sudan is a state that has failed though it has never collapsed. Since independence in 1956, the government in Khartoum has been unable to achieve legitimacy in vast outlying areas of Africa's largest country. Instead, the regime has mostly engaged in repression, which has devastated the South and other areas. The civil war in the South, 1955–72 and 1983–2005, has contributed to massive dislocation of farmers and pastoralists and to famines that have killed hundreds of thousands of people (as well as livestock). Planted landmines have inhibited agricultural and pastoral activities in many parts of the South. Genocide in Darfur has brought even greater dislocation and death in a shorter period of time.<sup>31</sup>

At the macro level, the slave trade (especially in the nineteenth century) by the Arab North in the African South (and other regions) created hegemonic relations that have endured until today.<sup>32</sup> In the 1880s and 1890s, the Mahdist state fought against nonbelievers in outlying regions that it claimed. The British inherited the tensions and minimally managed Sudan as a “condominium” of Egypt, with the goal of protecting the Nile and the Suez Canal. For much of the period, the North and the South were separate entities. However, as independence approached in the early 1950s, they were thrown together by the British. In the early 1950s, the northerners' old hegemonic tendencies reemerged as they attempted to spread Islam as the religion and Arabic as the language of instruction in the South.<sup>33</sup>

In the two North-South civil wars, the rebels were supported at various times by Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, and other states.<sup>34</sup> At the institutional level, the Sudanese government excluded the South and other regions from patronage networks that were established under successive dictators and during brief electoral democratic interludes in the mid-1960s and mid-1980s. From 1972 to 1983, peace prevailed—the only period in which Sudan emerged from state failure. In the late 1970s and early

1980s, growing indebtedness led to state decline.<sup>35</sup> During the 1980s, a series of economic shocks and the resumption of the North-South civil war in 1983 led Sudan to sink back into state failure. In 1989, Gen Omar al-Bashir staged a military coup, which deepened state failure. The Islamist military regime intensified its war against the South, with help from growing oil revenues in the late 1990s, but was unable to defeat the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement and army. The impasse and intervention by international peacemakers in the early 2000s led to the negotiation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which went into effect in July 2005 and which promises a referendum for the South in July 2011 to decide whether to become independent or remain part of Sudan. The future of North-South relations remains uncertain.<sup>36</sup>

The same symptoms of state failure that the Khartoum regime had exhibited towards the South could be observed in its relations with Darfur and other outlying regions. In 2003 and 2004, the government dispatched the *janjaweed*—pastoralist militias who were already struggling with Darfur farmers over diminishing land<sup>37</sup>—to ethnically cleanse Darfur so that various rebel movements would lose their base of support. Also, the *janjaweed* militias have many mercenaries.<sup>38</sup> The result has been a genocide in which hundreds of thousands have been killed or raped and millions displaced since 2003–04 and in which widespread atrocities have continued ever since. As in the case of the South, the intervention of international peacemakers has been required to put an end to Khartoum's abusive behavior.<sup>39</sup>

Francois Grignon finds that the CPA between North and South Sudan is in danger. Darfur is a dramatic humanitarian catastrophe, but it is really a smokescreen for the real power struggle between North and South. However, if Khartoum loses Darfur, it stands a good chance of losing the South.<sup>40</sup>

Solomon Gomes of the AU Peace and Security Commission finds that the Northern Sudanese are “playing for time” and that the AU and international community must be wary of Khartoum-sponsored militia groups in southern Sudan and must be prepared for the secession of the South followed by a resumption of hostilities by Khartoum. If the South secedes, Darfur will seek the same route.<sup>41</sup> Gomes notes that Khartoum accepted aspects of the Darfur Peace Agreement and now the hybrid UN/AU force. However, the problem now is persuading the government and the fractious Darfur rebel movements to meet and discuss. In the meantime, the violence and humanitarian catastrophe continue.

In regard to stabilizing Somalia and Sudan, Gomes observes that the Peace and Security Commission (as the “locomotive” for action) has the responsibility to inform the Peace and Security Council and the entire AU membership regarding the “pulse” in conflict zones. However, the commission is understaffed and limited in taking action. It provides reports, for example, from Sudan and Chad but cannot take action. Another problem is a lack of authority; for example, the AU has called on all rebel movements to leave Chadian territory but has been unable to enforce its request. Gomes believes that the AU should leverage support for Chad’s interests from France and the European Union (EU). The diplomatic track on the Chad-Sudan conflict has been slow to materialize and has only come to fruition lately through French leadership.<sup>42</sup>

### **Stabilization Challenges in Ethiopia’s Ogaden Region**

Since annexing the Ogaden in the late 1800s, the Ethiopian state has traditionally failed to reach out to pastoralists in the Somali Ogaden region and to other pastoralists, including Oromo and Borana herders.<sup>43</sup> The problem of weakness and failure has been based upon the bias of the Ethiopian state in favor of highland Ethiopian Orthodox farmers versus lowland Islamic pastoralists. Also, Ethiopian suspicions about the loyalties of Ogaden Somalis rose in the 1960s, reached a crescendo during the 1977–78 Ogaden war, and have persisted ever since.

In 1991, the Tigrayan-dominated Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front regime took power and instituted a system of ethnic federalism that promised autonomy and self-rule to the Ogaden Somalis, Oromos, and others.<sup>44</sup> If properly instituted, ethnic federalism would have enabled the various ethnic pastoralist groups to look after their own development needs. However, the EPRDF regime has kept a tight rein on the federal regions, especially since the 1998–2000 war with Eritrea. The lack of autonomy helps to explain the revived insurgencies of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Basic government distrust of Oromos and Ogaden Somali pastoralists continues in spite of ongoing projects for the lowlands and pastoralists by government and international development agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGO). Meanwhile, the number of people and livestock continues to grow, as do sustainability and stabilization challenges.<sup>45</sup>

The ONLF and OLF continue to operate against the government and its forces. The killing of nine Chinese oil workers and 65 Ethiopians by the

ONLF showed a level of sophistication that points to Eritrean involvement.<sup>46</sup> The escalation of hostilities in the Ogaden has created a humanitarian crisis in which pastoralists are finding it increasingly difficult to survive.<sup>47</sup> The massacre of oil workers has led Ethiopia to increase its military operations, made aid programs difficult to sustain, and caused problems for government officials and international aid agencies. The International Committee of the Red Cross has been experiencing trouble, and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has been considering pulling out of the Ogaden, even though the humanitarian situation has deteriorated rapidly.<sup>48</sup>

### **Stabilization Challenges in Pastoral Areas of Kenya and Uganda**

Kenya has had particular problems relating to Somali pastoralists in eastern Kenya. In the 1960s, Somalis fought against incorporation into Kenya and were regarded as either nationalist secessionist guerrillas (by Somalis) or merely bandits (by the government). In the colonial era, the British did not incorporate Somalis living in Kenya into the prevailing order. At independence, the British reversed previous colonial policy and decided to force unity among disparate ethnic groups (including Somalis) in Kenya. In 1961 the establishment of the Republic of Somalia inspired Somali political leaders in Kenya to rally for secession from Kenya and incorporation into Somalia. Subsequently, the Somalian government supported the *Shifita* (“the lawless”). Eventually, the *Shifita* depended too much on Somalia and lost its internal drive for self-determination.<sup>49</sup> The *Shifita* war has colored Kenya’s relationship with pastoralists from the 1960s onwards and helps to explain (along with a number of other factors) state failure to deal with growing populations and development problems that have threatened the way of life and ecosystems in much of the north of the country.<sup>50</sup> The same hostility applies in Uganda’s National Resistance Movement regime’s relations with the Acholi and pastoralists in the north of the country, due partly to the two-decade-long struggle with the Lord’s Resistance Army.<sup>51</sup>

A fundamental problem for both Kenya and Uganda is that the regimes are based around ethnic groups engaged in farming in the south of their respective countries that have trouble relating with other groups, especially pastoralists. Lt Col Scott Rutherford, US defense attaché to Kenya, notes that the Muslim population there has been marginalized by the government. For example, the Swahili population along the coast has a special passport, which is a mark of government distrust. The vast majority of Muslims are not extremists but have

felt oppressed by the Kenyan government. US-Kenyan cooperation in the global war on terrorism (GWOT) has further marginalized them.<sup>52</sup>

### **Stabilization Challenge: The Ethiopia-Eritrea Confrontation**

A fundamental problem for the EPRDF regime is the fact that it is based on the Tigrayan ethnic group, which is less than 10 percent of the population.<sup>53</sup> In the May 2005 elections, the regime was surprised by the strength of the opposition and, according to EU observers, rigged the results.<sup>54</sup> The confrontation with Eritrea is another problem for the EPRDF regime, and thousands of Ethiopian troops remain in the vicinity of the frontier. The war ended in 2000, and the Boundary Commission's decision was rendered in 2002. However, Ethiopia has refused to accept the awarding of the village of Badme and contested territory to Eritrea, which threatens a resumption of hostilities if resolution is not achieved.<sup>55</sup> Eritrea is playing a destabilizing role in the Horn of Africa, supporting the Islamic Courts Union and other movements that oppose the Transitional Federal Government and the Ethiopian presence. Ethiopia has thousands of troops tied down in Somalia trying to protect the TFG. Eritrea has moved thousands of militias and troops into the demilitarized zone bordering Ethiopia, thereby increasing the chances of an incident escalating into another all-out war. In regard to Sudan, Ethiopia has become very dependent on Sudanese oil and will be cautious in relations with Khartoum.<sup>56</sup>

The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea remains the major stumbling block in the stabilization of the Horn of Africa according to Grignon of the ICG.<sup>57</sup> Solomon Gomes of the AU Peace and Security Commission asserts that the AU views Ethiopia-Eritrea as the most serious crisis that it currently faces.<sup>58</sup> The animosity between the Eritrean president and the Ethiopian prime minister is a major obstacle to peace and impacts the whole region. The Eritrean president is isolated, which renders peacemaking difficult.

Gomes observes that in attempting to stabilize the Ethiopia-Eritrea standoff, the commission and the AU Peace and Security Council have not done enough. The AU heads of state have tried quiet diplomacy, without success. The Algerians mediated from 1998 to 2000 but cannot be called on again. Libya's behavior has been erratic in attempting to mediate. South African president Thabo Mbeki and Ghanaian president and current AU chairman, John Kuofour, have tried to mediate without success. At the moment, the IGAD is an organization in name only due to politics, and Eritrea's withdrawal from the body has undermined its credibility. Pres.

Mwai Kibaki of Kenya is not well enough to mediate. Tanzania and the United States should both do more. The United States signed the Algiers Agreement in 2000 as a guarantor and is obliged to do more. At the moment, the United States is too focused on Somalia and the war on terrorism. The United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) forces have been reduced, while Ethiopia and Eritrea have lots of forces near the temporary zone and Eritrea has sent militias into the zone.<sup>59</sup>

### **Radical Islamist Stabilization Challenges**

Radical Islamists are said to be hiding and operating on the Kenyan coast and in Somalia. Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) civil affairs personnel are conducting projects on the Kenyan coast to try to win hearts and minds and assuage fears, but Islamic residents are not responding. The local population is not turning extremists over to Kenyan government authorities or to US personnel. Islamists are thriving on the protection of the local population. They are securing funds and can travel freely between Kenya, Somalia, Yemen, and the Gulf states (e.g., Oman). The security situation in Kenya is no better than at the time of the 1998 embassy bombings, in spite of the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI). The Pakistani population in Nairobi is also a source of concern. In the ranks of the irredentist Somali movements (e.g., the ICU and the ONLF) are radical Islamists trying to defeat Ethiopia and establish an Islamist state. Eritrea is backing the Islamists against Ethiopia. However, Eritrea would not try to stage an Islamist attack on the CJTF-HOA in Djibouti like the attack on Chinese and Ethiopian oil workers in the Ogaden.<sup>60</sup>

The situation in Nairobi and Mombasa is better than in 2006, when there was a stream of reported threats. Nine years since the embassy bombings, the region is as volatile as ever. Zanzibar remains a problem. Kenya has not made much headway—the border is porous, and northern and coastal Kenya are largely ignored by the central government. The border is closed in the northeast; it is difficult to handle Somali refugees, and there is little international pressure on Kenya to do something about them. There are no terrorism laws on the books in Kenya yet because of the December 2007 elections.<sup>61</sup>

## **Peacebuilding-Sustainability-Stabilization Challenges**

Taken together, peacebuilding, sustainability, and stabilization manifested in the interrelationship between war and famine have been devastating in the Horn of Africa. Already noted was the close relationship between famine, conflict, and the undermining of regime legitimacy in Ethiopia in 1973–74 and 1984–85 as well as in Somalia in 1991–93. Drought and dependence on foreign aid, along with corruption, undermine sustainability and legitimacy. Global warming is affecting the region, but direct evidence of warming causing conflict is difficult to confirm. For example, a study of the Turkana in northern Kenya did not find a direct link.<sup>62</sup>

Among pastoralists, sources of conflict include scarce resources such as water holes and grazing lands, particularly during times of extreme hardship.<sup>63</sup> Desertification (caused in part by climate change) has contributed to conflict among pastoralists. There is conflict between neighboring ethnic groups in pastoral areas that often crosses borders, mainly because of cattle raiding.<sup>64</sup> Previous analysis has discussed the underlying reasons for conflict, including a lack of infrastructure to support pastoral livelihood.<sup>65</sup> In addition, promoting sedentary agriculture can cause alienation among pastoralists who are being forced to give up a generations-old lifestyle.

In regard to pastoralists and sustainability and stability, their level of support for Islamic extremism/terrorism is open to question. In Somalia (and to a lesser extent Sudan), it could be said that sustainability and stabilization challenges have created dissatisfaction among Muslim populations and have opened the door to at least tolerating Islamic extremism/terrorism even if not supporting it.

In Ethiopia, desertification and declining grazing lands have led to impoverishment of Somali and Oromo pastoralists, disaffection, and declining legitimacy of the state. In areas with large clans, there is plenty of conflict over land and resources and strong and continuing ethnic tensions. In the area where Somalis and Oromos border each other, there is lots of conflict and fighting.<sup>66</sup>

Some disaffected Somali pastoralists in Ethiopia have supported continued destabilization of the Ogaden by the ONLF against Ethiopian security forces. The sustainability and stabilization crises in the Ogaden could open the door to safe havens for Islamic extremists and could conceivably generate recruits. The same could be said of some Oromo pastoralists and support for the OLF.



Conflict appears to be decreasing in northeastern Kenya, but structural problems remain. With good rains, there is less conflict over natural resources. There have been drought and famine over the past two years.<sup>67</sup> Drought has caused a recent spike in pastoralist unrest. Pastoralists have restocked their livestock after drought by raiding other livestock from farming areas to the south. Somali pastoralists in Kenya identify more with Somalia than with their country of residence.<sup>68</sup> Historical neglect at the pastoral level compounded by lack of understanding by elites leads to conflict. Land titling is unpopular with pastoralists and has led to a groundswell of political dissent. In the meantime, irrevocable damage has already been done.<sup>69</sup>

In Moyale, on the Kenya-Ethiopia border, local politicians are being divisive and have helped to create new political divisions among pastoralists along ethnic lines. Previously, several generations had lived peacefully together and intermarried.<sup>70</sup>

Coastal populations have been discriminated against by the central government. The problem goes well beyond environmental sustainability. Political factors alienate the population. This is a region with a rapidly growing population maintaining the same practices. Therefore, the people will become increasingly alienated, and it is uncertain what will they do. As for al-Qaeda, it is a mystery not well understood, especially in East Africa.<sup>71</sup>

In Sudan, population displacement, lack of governance, conflict-related resource exploitation, and underinvestment in sustainable development, all produce sustainability and stabilization challenges. There are five million internally displaced persons (IDP) and international refugees (Sudan has the largest population of IDPs).<sup>72</sup> Competition over oil and gas reserves, the Nile River waters, and timber, as well as land use issues related to agricultural lands, are factors in the instigation and perpetuation of conflict in Sudan. Confrontations over range lands and rain-fed agricultural lands in the drier parts of the country demonstrate the connection between natural resource scarcity and conflict. In northern Darfur, high population growth, environmental stress, land degradation, and desertification have created the conditions for conflicts, which have been sustained by political, tribal, or ethnic differences. This is an example of the social breakdown that can result from ecological collapse.<sup>73</sup>

## **Stabilizing and Peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa**

In overcoming state failure and stabilizing the Horn of Africa, the approach must be sophisticated—managing macro, intermediate, and micro levels and forging a range of partnerships from the United Nations to African regional organizations and from states in the region to NGOs and to the United States and the European Union.

In stabilizing the Horn of Africa at the macro or structural level, the Horn is the only region in Africa where the structural solution of secession (i.e., Eritrea, southern Sudan, Darfur, and Somaliland) seems to be a realistic option that could make matters more peaceful rather than increasing bloodshed (e.g., Nigeria). The question is: Should secession be allowed to run its natural course? Or, should the international community encourage compromise solutions (e.g., federalism or confederation)? Thus far, secession has only been allowed in the case of Eritrea, where the Eritrean People's Liberation Front won military victory and where a friendly (at that time) Ethiopian government agreed.

At the intermediate level, building state capacity and institutional viability remains an ongoing process in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, involving international aid agencies and NGOs. The three states have a long way to go before they can provide services to all of their people. In Somalia and Sudan, the issue is one of reconstituting the state through either peacebuilding or neotrusteeship. Thus far it seems that neotrusteeship is too costly for the international community and will be perceived as neocolonial in Africa. Thus, a gamble will be made on lower-cost peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

In regard to managing micro-level challenges (short-term shocks), the IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) has developed policies for sustainability, food security, conflict resolution mechanisms, and an early warning system that is intended to ameliorate the impact of state weakness and failure and environmental disaster.<sup>74</sup> However, the IGAD early warning and prevention capabilities are only in their initial stages. Problems with the IGAD early warning system include the fact that three key countries (Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia) are not involved and the system remains focused on low-level pastoral conflicts in northern Uganda and northern Kenya. Furthermore, measures for resolving conflicts over resources in Uganda and Kenya have not been implemented.<sup>75</sup>

The Golden Spear Disaster Management Center provides early warning to 11 African states. Regional organizations and governments need to have the political will to act and fund early warning and prevention.<sup>76</sup>

### **Standby Capability**

Member states of the IGAD and the East African Community (EAC) are building the East African Brigade of the African Standby Force (ASF) to intervene to stop state failure and its consequences. However, the “Eastbrig” has fallen behind its western and southern counterparts because Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda have been slow to cooperate and implement prior agreements. In fact, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) brigade of the ASF, led by South Africa, has already deployed to Darfur ahead of the Eastbrig. In any event, the UN will play the lead role in Southern Sudan and appears to be assuming leadership in Darfur.<sup>77</sup>

The ASF’s biggest problems are logistics and sustainability within the AU framework. Within the African Union, there is little vision regarding where the ASF is headed. For example, the military planning cell has drafted terms of reference for its missions, but AU administrators do not seem to know that the planning cell exists. Thus, a sustainable ASF remains a dream. African states contribute less than one percent of their defense budgets to fund the ASF and support staff. Most support comes from the United States and the European Union. A Marshall Plan for Africa is needed to overcome this deplorable situation.<sup>78</sup>

According to Marcel LeRoy of the EU, the EU provided €243 million in support to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in Darfur from 2004 to 2007. The AU deployed AMIS with hope and heart, not with plan. The EU cannot withdraw support, which would lead to the collapse of AMIS and massive looting. The switch to a hybrid AU/UN Darfur mission may help, but there will still be problems. The EU is more reluctant to fund AMISOM in Somalia and the AU Peace and Security Commission because of the AMIS experience.<sup>79</sup>

### **Stabilizing Somalia and Peacebuilding**

Top-down and bottom-up approaches to overcoming state failure have been implemented in Somalia. Since 1993, one bottom-up approach has NGOs working with Somali groups and civil society.<sup>80</sup> A second bottom-up approach was undertaken by the “Islamic Courts.” Islamism arose in the 1990s and was manifested in the Islamic courts that were founded

to administer sharia law and justice in an anarchic environment. They formed the Islamic Courts Union, defeated the warlords in May 2006, and established control of Mogadishu and large swaths of southern Somalia until being defeated by Ethiopian forces backing the Transitional Federal Government in December 2006.<sup>81</sup>

Another approach has been multilateral and top down, with the IGAD, led by Kenya, bringing various Somali elites together to establish the TFG and then sending them back to Somalia to assume control with Ethiopian assistance.<sup>82</sup> It is uncertain whether this approach will succeed or if bottom-up approaches will pay dividends. It is also uncertain whether Somaliland will ever become part of Somalia again or if it will become independent, as appears to be the prevailing sentiment. Reconciliation talks between the TFG and the Islamic Courts were held twice in 2007, but no progress was made. The problem of Ethiopian troops as a “lightning rod” in Somalia remains.

According to Solomon Gomes of the AU Peace and Security Commission, Somalia is high on the AU list of countries to stabilize. The AU did not want to go into Somalia until the UN Security Council guaranteed logistics. However, Uganda jumped into Somalia, while Ghana, Nigeria, and Malawi did not. If four countries had sent four battalions, it would have sent a visible message, but the situation on the ground makes it difficult for the Ugandans to sustain peacekeeping operations. In the peace process, a “carrot and stick” approach is needed, and the ICU must be made stakeholders.<sup>83</sup>

Peacebuilding in Puntland, Somaliland, and Somalia requires a long-time horizon. Shifting political, military, and social dynamics demands up-to-date knowledge and understanding of the situation on the ground to facilitate peacekeeping. Institutions that the NGO Interpeace helped build in Puntland and Somaliland have helped keep peacebuilding going. Ingredients for success include bringing stakeholders together, creating institutional dynamics, and providing technical assistance and support. Pastoralists must be made part of the stakeholder process. For example, nomads were consulted before the date was set for the recent Somaliland elections.<sup>84</sup>

An early warning system has been established all over Somalia consisting of partnerships with organizations that have contacts and offices throughout the country. Since Somali nomads are found all over Somalia and in parts of Ethiopia and Kenya, mobile education systems and clinics

are the answer to the cross-border dilemma. Somalis and other pastoralists live for movement. Therefore, regional integration is very important. An IGAD framework has been set up to enable the informal sector to benefit from regional integration, especially pastoralists, and to make a contribution to environmental sustainability.

The TFG is not the permanent solution for Somalia. The reconstruction of Somalia is an ongoing process in line with the tasks given by the 2004 charter. Reconciliation talks between the TFG and the ICU must be used as a springboard to the next stage. The international community must push for a settlement in Somalia and needs to bring other countries and organizations into the process.<sup>85</sup>

Interpeace is continuing to conduct extensive public consultations, workshops, forums, and stakeholder dialogue on issues essential to peacebuilding and state reconstruction. As there was no central government, it adopted a regional approach—setting up projects in Puntland (Garowe), Somaliland (Hargeysa), and south-central Somalia (Mogadishu). In Somalia, the Center for Research and Dialogue, with the help of the traditional elders, has successfully facilitated a number of reconciliation processes among major clans in the region. Work is being carried out on the ground by three non-partisan partner organizations that promote peace and reconciliation in Somalia. After months of reconciliation and power sharing among clans, people of the Bakool region went to the polls to vote for local and regional authorities, including the governor, district commissioners, and regional and district councilors. The region became the second area in Somalia to elect its officials through a community-based, participatory process.

According to Francois Grignon of the ICG, reconciliation negotiations must open the door to legitimate claims by clan representatives. A third-party facilitator is needed to negotiate between the TFG and the ICU. Trade control is a factor in the negotiations. A disarmament process has to be included in negotiations. Since fear is entrenched in Mogadishu, confidence-building measures need to be agreed upon and implemented.<sup>86</sup>

In Somalia, Islamic activists have taken advantage of the absence of a central government and ascendancy of the ICU. For now, a possible Islamist onslaught has been pushed into the background. A number of things are needed to prevent people from joining Islamist movements. There should be no guarantee that the lifestyles of protagonists will be maintained if and when peace comes. The Islamists will be victims of peace and will continue to act as spoilers. At the moment, Djibouti is

playing the mediator role. It is difficult to see if Somalia's problems can be overcome. There is a need for the international community to strike a fair balance to help stabilize Somalia. Reconstitution of the state is crucial, as is political will. Then the United States and others can come into support, playing a facilitative role.<sup>87</sup>

It appears that the US Department of State is providing support for the TFG government because US policy makers do not want to be involved in Somalia again. With no presidential directive, there has been no US action. Western partners are waiting for the United States to act. Somali reaction to Ethiopian intervention has been strong and negative. Intervention in Somalia is costing Ethiopia politically and economically. Ugandans want their peacekeeping force to be Africanized and brought under the UN umbrella so that resources can start to flow their way. Nigeria failed to send a force because of internal problems. Ghana decided that the situation was too volatile and is not sending a force. The Burundians are sending more than 1,000 troops, but they need to be trained and equipped. In regard to building the capacity of the AU Peace and Security Commission to do military planning, there are 1,000 positions, only 500 personnel, and 350 quality people. With AMIS and AMISOM plus operations planned for the Comoros, Chad, and the Central African Republic, the AU has its hands full. The AU has no expertise in large-scale peace-support operations. The EU wants to have a voice but is not giving sufficient funds. The AU has a lack of fiscal capacity.<sup>88</sup>

In Somali areas, the various streams of Islam and Islamist movements are affecting the entire Horn. What happens in Somalia provides opportunities for Islamism to emerge in different forms and spread. In Somalia, the sources of Islamism include Wahhabi extremism due to Saudi funding. Wahhabists have been taking students to Saudi Arabia and Yemen in the last 15 years. In dealing with Islamism, there must be a recognition that Islamism is not going to stop. Thus, a long-term approach must be taken. The moderate voice within Islam must be enhanced, for example, with investment in moderate madrassas.<sup>89</sup>

### **Stabilizing Sudan**

The future of Sudan remains just as uncertain as that of Somalia. Whereas it seems difficult if not impossible to reconstitute the Somali state, the problem with Sudan is the concentration of power in Khartoum. As the oil boom continues, Khartoum will continue to reap the lion's share

of the benefits, will grow in power, and will become increasingly capable of preventing the South and Darfur from seceding.

Popular opinion in the South and Darfur indicate that the optimal approach would be to allow the South to secede in 2011 and provide the same option for Darfur. The two regions have been brutalized by Khartoum, and it is hard to visualize their remaining part of even a confederation. The problem is that Khartoum will not allow secession without a struggle. As for the rest of Sudan, federal arrangements would be most suitable, but it is difficult to see how Khartoum could be persuaded to accept constitutional changes.<sup>90</sup>

According to Gomes, peacebuilding efforts are ongoing in southern Sudan. First, there is a need to disarm all militia groups in the South. Second, the international community must take seriously the possibility of the South seceding.<sup>91</sup>

International actors need to think ahead to the 2011 Sudan referendum and the possibility of southern Sudanese independence. The Saudi government is working to influence actors in the region to help to stabilize Sudan. In Sudan, the ruling Congress Party and the associated National Islamic Front are making concessions for peace, but it is uncertain if they will follow through. The Bashir regime has sidelined the Wahhabi faction that used to dominate the government but is also reluctant to yield to international pressure.<sup>92</sup>

If Khartoum gets the lion's share of resources, it may be prepared to let southern Sudan become independent. The Sudanese "Arab" mind-set has been to make peace when it suits them; otherwise, they wage war.<sup>93</sup>

Grignon, of the ICG, says there is a great need to stabilize Somalia and Sudan and to create a level where differences can be regulated. Peacemakers must find centers of gravity and create equilibrium in the region. A new (or revitalized) regional security architecture would help in Sudan and Somalia. The IGAD supported negotiations in Sudan and Somalia, but it needs to be strengthened to promote dialogue in the region. There is no good alternative to a regional peace process because of the connectivity of conflicts.<sup>94</sup>

### **Stabilizing Ethiopia vs. Eritrea**

Resolving the Ethiopia-Eritrea confrontation is a daunting task, especially now that the two countries are fighting in Somalia.<sup>95</sup> Even if the border issue is settled, the confrontation will not end because the pride of national leaders and their survival is the main issue, not borders. Pres. Issaias Afwerki had exaggerated expectations that Eritrea would be the Singapore or Malaysia of the Horn of Africa and would become a dominant

political, economic, and technological center. He assumed that the Eritrean Defense Force was invincible. As a result of dashed expectations, Eritrea has not been flexible.<sup>96</sup>

The US role has been and will continue to be crucial in Eritrea-Ethiopia talks. Unfortunately, the US preoccupation with its alliance against terrorism has relegated the Ethiopia-Eritrea confrontation to the background. The Boundary Commission decided to “virtually” demarcate the boundary, as neither side would allow access for physical demarcation. This decision led Eritrea to demand the withdrawal of UNMEE peacekeepers from its territory, which began in March 2008.<sup>97</sup>

According to Grignon, the international community should not attempt to reengage via Libyans and other actors that have been associated with Eritrea in negotiating an end to the confrontation. Instead, the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia should be called upon to put pressure on the two parties. Peacemakers have to take into account Ethiopia’s internal dynamics and constraints on the regime.<sup>98</sup> Prime Minister Meles Zenawi cannot make major concessions because of pressures from Ethiopian nationalists. Gomes believes that peacemakers should be using back channels. Uncontested areas along the border should be demarcated, with disputed areas left until later.<sup>99</sup>

### **Kenya as an “Anchor State” in the Horn of Africa**

Kenya is an industrializing state and is relatively stable and democratic. According to noted scholar and development expert Michael Chege, the democratic Kibaki regime has made great strides; for example, helping to reduce poverty by 10 percent between 2003 and 2007. He believes that Kenya is becoming an economic dynamo as well as a center of peace and stability. There are concerns about the possibility of Sudan and Somalia dissolving into even greater chaos. However, Kenya will probably follow the reactive stance that it assumed in the past, even if its interests in southern Sudan are harmed. Finally, Islamic extremists on the Kenyan coast remain a cause for concern.<sup>100</sup>

Kenya remains engaged in the diplomatic process, including Darfur negotiations, recognizing that the region is very unstable. According to Brigadier Maurice Walugu of the Kenyan Ministry of Defense, there are two levels on which Kenya deals with Sudan—the political level of negotiating with the Sudanese government and the practical military level—as the peace process (e.g., the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between North



and South) does not guarantee results in reducing conflict or the number of internally displaced people. Although the Sudanese government does not seem willing to accept change in Darfur, Kenya remains engaged.<sup>101</sup>

Peace in Somalia is the main focus of Kenyan military engagement. Some parts of Somalia have been stabilized. The role of the Kenyan military is to participate in line with AU rules of engagement to advise, train, coordinate, and liaison. Kenya is working with Uganda, Ethiopia, and Djibouti to limit collateral damage in Mogadishu as well as to control the influx of terrorist groups and with the United States on Somalia, antipiracy operations, and sea lanes regulation. Kenya is willing to train Burundian peacekeepers for service in Somalia. However, Kenya cannot send its own peacekeepers because it borders on Somalia and because peace has not been secured. Djibouti is trying to defuse the Somali conflict as well as the Ethiopia-Eritrea confrontation.<sup>102</sup>

In regard to the Eastbrig of the ASF, Kenya is hosting the planning elements and the independent mechanism for coordinating security and socioeconomic development. The headquarters of Eastbrig is in Ethiopia, and, according to Brigadier Walugu, Kenya enjoys good partnership with Ethiopia. Kenya is ready to respond to contingencies thanks to US and EU training and support. Kenya has peacekeepers in UNMEE, alongside Jordanian forces, the only forces remaining between Ethiopia and Eritrea.<sup>103</sup> Kenya does not want to be in Somalia because “frontline states” are not supposed to operate there. As for the Ugandan peacekeepers, Walugu believes they were not deployed too early in Somalia; just too few troops and not enough support. The problem is deploying into Somalia. It takes a lot of time and considerable risk.<sup>104</sup>

As for dealing with Kenyan pastoralists and communal conflict, Walugu likened the Kenyan army to the 7th Cavalry in the western United States. It takes time to educate and change the culture of people (i.e., pastoralists). The drilling of boreholes and the development of water resources and pastures can help to contain the conflict.<sup>105</sup>

In the operations against the Islamic Courts Union, the Kenyan military joined with the Ethiopians on occasion, which caused tensions. The Ethiopians were not easy to deal with and blamed the Kenyans when something went wrong. The planning cell is on Kenyan real estate.<sup>106</sup>

## **Ethiopia as an “Anchor State” in the Horn of Africa**

Besides intervening with troops in Somalia, Ethiopia has sent peacekeepers to three different peacekeeping operations and is prepared to send more. At the moment, cordial relations exist between Ethiopia and Sudan, partly because Ethiopia is importing oil from Sudan.<sup>107</sup>

EU and US policy towards the EPRDF regime is necessarily “nuanced.”<sup>108</sup> After the rigging of elections and shooting of students in May 2005 and the trial of opposition leaders in November 2005, the EU and the United States downgraded some ties. With the 2006 intervention in Somalia, full relations have been restored. However, Congress recently sanctioned a number of regime leaders for the 2005 events. Ethiopia is disappointed at not being compensated by the United States for its intervention and peacekeeping role in Somalia in 2007.<sup>109</sup> In fact, Ethiopians cannot leave Somalia without a guarantee of security, so the costs continue to mount.

Ethiopian nationalists believe that the best approach to stabilizing the Horn of Africa is to bring Eritrea under control—through regime change if necessary. They want the United States to support the TFG in Somalia with billions of dollars. Nationalists want universal recognition of Somaliland as an independent state (with the ulterior motive of further dividing Somalis). They want a united democratic federal Sudan and believe that secession of the South is destabilizing. They demand that the United States induce Egypt to negotiate with Ethiopia over sharing Blue Nile water.<sup>110</sup>

Ethiopian moderates note that, following 11 September 2001, the Horn of Africa attracted more attention as a region perceived to be a base for radical Islamists and terrorists. Ethiopia was thought to be a target, and Somalia and Sudan were suspected of sponsoring terrorists. One of the problems has been governance failure in most of the countries in the region. For example, Ethiopia cannot build national consensus. Sudan has improved since the CPA in 2005, but Darfur remains a disaster.<sup>111</sup>

## **Regional Organizations as Partners**

Stabilization and peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa have involved considerable efforts at peacemaking by IGAD states, the AU, the UN, and the United States. The UN has mounted peace and stability operations between Ethiopia and Eritrea and in Somalia (which failed in 1993–94) and southern Sudan, and the African Union has done so in Darfur and Somalia. In the Horn of Africa, the IGAD must be rejuvenated as a forum in which disparate member states air their differences (aiding stabilization

efforts) and work to prevent humanitarian disasters by addressing sustainability challenges. The East African Community has demonstrated even greater potential to build cooperation for sustainability and stabilization. The Common Market of East and Southern Africa (COMESA) has been working on economic and sustainability challenges and is moving to work on issues of stabilization.

According to Ambassador Wane of the African Union Peace and Security Commission, a regional approach is needed, given the interconnection of conflicts. The problem is that the IGAD is dysfunctional due to political differences.<sup>112</sup> According to Walter Knausenberger, the COMESA is more dynamic and promising than the IGAD.<sup>113</sup>

**The IGAD** has been playing a mixed role in stabilizing the Horn of Africa for two decades. The Intergovernmental Association on Development was founded in the wake of the 1984–85 Ethiopian famine, and a main priority was dealing with drought and desertification that helped to bring about famine and instability in the region. In the early 2000s, the IGAD played a role (along with Kenya and the United States) in the resolution of the North-South conflict in Sudan and in negotiating a transitional federal government for Somalia, which moved back to the country in February 2006 and attempted to establish authority from Mogadishu in 2007. A conflict the IGAD does not have the capacity to resolve is the continuing confrontation between Ethiopia and Eritrea in the wake of the 1998–2000 war, which has spilled over into Somalia and has affected the entire region.<sup>114</sup> Only UN peacekeepers are preventing a resumption of hostilities, while Saudi Arabia and Algeria are being suggested as possible mediators.

**The COMESA** has helped to reduce tariffs among member states and boost intraregional trade, which has helped Kenya and several other states prosper. Trade in livestock and animal products has been demonstrated to help pastoralists become more prosperous in the Horn of Africa.<sup>115</sup> The biggest problem continues to be the low level of African trade. A second problem is the plethora of organizations to which states belong.<sup>116</sup>

### **Promoting Sustainability, Stabilization, and Peacebuilding**

Policies that could promote sustainability, stabilization, and peacebuilding include the development of federalism, improving the lives of pastoralists, and regional early warning and intervention. Programs include expanding

and strengthening the IGAD-CEWARN early warning and action system and programs that aim to build links between pastoralists and governments in Addis Ababa, Nairobi, and Kampala, including the building of wells, schools, and clinics and the provision of marketing centers for the buying of herds. International aid programs are enabling the building of schools and clinics and helping to extend the presence of states in previously ungoverned regions. Stakeholders include state and nonstate actors, international governmental organizations (e.g., the IGAD), and NGOs. A participatory approach to project development and implementation should be promoted, and local pastoralist institutions such as trading associations and peace committees should be built. Pastoral self-governance should be strengthened.<sup>117</sup>

Moderate forces exist among the Somalis; they need to be understood, strengthened, and supported. Somalis as a group are not susceptible to extremist philosophy, but if forced to choose sides, they will go with the Islamists, even though Somalis are not strict Sunnis. The key is to provide economic growth equitably and to engage with people who know the area.<sup>118</sup>

The Kenyan government requires a mind-set change in relation to Somalis and other politically marginalized groups to move towards sustainability-stabilization. The government needs to be properly engaged but thus far has taken a divisive approach, making issues political as well as resource based. Pastoralists must be assisted in managing the excessive growth of population and animals. Ways must be found for herders to move to other pasture and water areas so that conflict can be avoided with sedentary agriculturalists. Visual tools, including ones that show ethnic overlay, trade routes, and markets, have been developed to assist pastoralists and enable them to deal with resource and pasture access issues. Access to the political process is essential to providing pastoralists with voice and participation at the national and provincial levels. Fifty percent of the GDP in Kenyan agriculture comes from pastoral activities throughout the country; so, the marginalization of pastoralists is partly due to misperceptions. Marginalization is now being overcome by technology—with cell phone access (cell phone towers in the rural areas), pastoralists now have access to market information. Alternative access means rural banking and livestock sales can develop. Funds can go into other entrepreneurial areas besides livestock. Therefore, providing access to economic resources and development is the best counterterrorism initiative.<sup>119</sup>

**The RELPA** (Regional Enhanced Livelihoods in Pastoral Areas), managed by the Nairobi regional office of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), is attempting to promote sustainability and stabilization in pastoralist areas with a number of NGO partners.<sup>120</sup> One such partner is the NGO “Pact,” which works with partner NGOs and the USAID for conflict mitigation and provides conflict resolution training to deal with pastoralist water disputes and subclan conflicts.<sup>121</sup>

RELPA represents sound thinking, is a step forward, and is intended to use a joint programs approach. It is regional, integrated, and comprehensive, which is essential because pastoralism is regional and boundaries do not constrain groups. The task for RELPA is to make steps forward. Thus far, there have been procurement issues and delays. RELPA needs more than two years’ funding to be effective. Thus far, livelihood interventions have not had the impact desired, as they have not addressed or understood underlying conflict dynamics among pastoralists. In any case, it is unlikely that the RELPA approach and “alternative livelihoods” programs can mitigate support for Islamic extremism and terrorism.<sup>122</sup>

A consortium of groups has formulated a cross-sectoral program across borders. Case studies in Ethiopia and Kenya indicate that there is now better reporting response regarding conflict, early warning, and drought (this is difficult to do in Somalia). The Integrated River Basin Management Project works with the private sector. There is a need for resources to provide access to safe water. In addressing issues of education and health, mobile schools and clinics have been proposed in pastoral areas. The health issue is vital—a quarter of the pastoralist population has acute malnutrition compounded by a lack of stable health service and good hygiene.<sup>123</sup>

**The IGAD-CEWARN early warning mechanism** holds promise for preventing conflict among pastoralists as well as famine. The IGAD-CEWARN, established in 2001, has lacked strategic direction; however, state-of-the-art software is its strength. There are 52 sets of selected indicators of communal variance, areas reported, media reporting on conflict, and environmental context. Field monitors provide weekly reports on specific incidents as they happen. Information flows to the national level and to the IGAD-CEWARN, but lack of government action is a major weakness. The well-established response mechanism needs to be programmatically designed and developed. Another problem is the diverse source of funds (60 percent from the USAID, 30 percent from the German GTZ, and only 10 percent from member states).<sup>124</sup>

The Ugandan government has used daily reports from the IGAD-CEWARN to deal with problems of drugs, arms, and human trafficking by pastoralists. The Ugandan government adopted a disarmament strategy with NGO funding. The Ugandan army was used to disarm the pastoralists. Many community members died as a result (Karamojong in the Karamoja region).<sup>125</sup> The IGAD-CEWARN needs to work at early warning and conflict management among pastoralists at a lower level. Then, it can be developed to manage bigger conflicts and disasters involving states.<sup>126</sup>

Interpeace partners in Somalia, Puntland, and Somaliland have initiated various efforts to prevent environmental devastation, notably uncontrolled tree cutting for charcoal. This began during the late 1970s by refugee influxes from the Ogaden in neighboring Ethiopia but was further aggravated by a lack of governance following years of prolonged conflict.<sup>127</sup>

## **Conclusion**

The Horn of Africa is one of the world's most fragile regions; only West and Central Africa surpass it in terms of state failures and instabilities. This article underlines the importance of a regional focus on the problem of state failure and the danger of conflict spillover. In regard to a sustainability assessment, clearly failed states cannot deal with environmental degradation and disaster. Disasters (e.g., famines) and the lack of sustainability contribute significantly to state failure. State failure means that struggle over resources occurs in a state of anarchy and results in a downward spiral.

The macro-level or structural factors are important in explaining sustainability and stabilization challenges. The clan-based Somali society made state building difficult in the 1960s, made state collapse possible, and is making state reconstitution even more difficult in the 2000s. In Sudan, long-standing historical and cultural differences between Khartoum and outlying regions led to state failure from the outset. In Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, the center of power has rested in agricultural centers, with pastoralists the outsiders.

The intermediate or institutional level also helps in explaining sustainability and stabilization challenges. Certainly, in the case of Somalia, institutional mismanagement and state weakness contributed to failure. In Sudan, discrimination against outlying regions was important, but the impulse to subjugate those regions was even more significant. State weakness helps to

explain why pastoralists in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda did not receive adequate attention, but the structural divide was more important.

The Horn of Africa is one region of the world where short-term shocks have played a significant role in creating acute sustainability-stabilization challenges. The susceptibility of the region to drought, overpopulation, and famine has brought several cataclysmic events that have contributed to state failure. Sudden changes in conflicts, such as the rebel success in Somalia in 1990, led to state collapse. The sudden defeat of Somali forces in 1978 in the Ogaden had a crushing effect on the Siad Barre regime.

Clearly there is a gap on the continuum of state failure between (1) state collapse in Somalia, (2) failure by Khartoum to deal with its outlying regions in a peaceful and fair way, and (3) failure of Ethiopia and Uganda, and to a lesser extent Kenya, to relate to and provide services to pastoralists. State failure and sustainability and stabilization challenges in the Horn have been distinctive and unusual.

This article has extensively examined sustainability challenges, including climate change, population growth, and desertification, as well as water shortage, famine, and rivers that are linked with conflict. It has demonstrated that there is a degree of interrelationship among ethnic conflict, weak states, and interstate rivalry, as well as extremism, terrorism, and sustainability challenges. It has focused on a specific problem of sustainability-stabilization—the challenges facing Islamic pastoralists who may be attracted to Islamic extremism and terrorism—as well as solutions.

This article has offered solutions at the macro level (e.g., the reduction of greenhouse gases and improving education and employment to reduce birthrates) and at the micro level (e.g., development projects for pastoralists, farmers, and women, as well as the development of market infrastructure, local governance, and tree planting). Stabilization measures were also examined, including early warning and preventive action, peacemaking, and peace and stability operations, as well as peacebuilding, development and trade, and the role of anchor states and a range of organizations. The article confirmed the utility of peacebuilding and stabilization and promoting sustainability together.

Threats in the Horn of Africa from sustainability and stabilization challenges are moderate in severity. Certainly, the threats from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region and from Iraq and Iran are much greater. The 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania indicate that there are threats and that actions to build peace and bring greater sustainability

and stabilization to the region will advance wider security. Somalia and Somalis are the focus of efforts to prevent ungoverned areas and underdeveloped pastoralists from being used by extremists. The development of a coordinated approach among diplomats, development experts, and defense personnel to bring sustainable development to Somalis and to help reconstitute the Somalian state could bear fruit if sustained over the long run.

In this regard, this article has identified a range of intervention policies and programs as well as tools and technologies that could increase sustainability and stability and delay, defer, or prevent failure. The article also identified the range of stakeholders, including state and nonstate actors (intergovernmental organizations and NGOs). The article determined their likely reactions to stabilization and sustainability efforts, as well as their willingness to accept constructive roles in the process of sustainable development or the likelihood that they will oppose efforts. The task of winning over partners to assist the Horn of Africa in achieving sustainable development and stabilization is very difficult and requires an ongoing effort to change structures and attitudes. **ISSQ**

## Notes

1. Michael Renner, *Fighting for Survival: Environmental Decline, Social Conflict, and the New Age of Insecurity* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1996); Thomas Homer-Dixon, *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature," *Journal of Peace Research* 35, no. 3 (May 1998): 381–400.

2. See *Mapping Climate Vulnerability and Poverty in Africa: Where are the hot spots of climate change and household vulnerability?* Report to the Department for International Development submitted by the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), Nairobi, Kenya, in collaboration with The Energy & Resources Institute (TERI), New Delhi, India, and the African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS), Nairobi, Kenya, May 2006, [http://www.acts.or.ke/pubs/books/docs/Mapping\\_Vuln\\_Africa.pdf](http://www.acts.or.ke/pubs/books/docs/Mapping_Vuln_Africa.pdf). See also Stephan Faris, "The Real Roots of Darfur," *Atlantic Monthly* 299, no. 3 (April 2007). Faris points to global warming and resulting desertification as major causes of the conflict between *janjaweed* pastoralists and Darfur farmers.

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*Stabilization, Peacebuilding, and Sustainability in the Horn of Africa*

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16. Mustafa Babiker, "Resource Competition and Conflict: Herder/Farmer or Pastoralism/Agriculture?" in M. A. Mohamed Salih, Ton Dietz, and Abdel Ghaffar Mohamed Ahmed, eds., *African Pastoralism: Conflict, Institutions, and Government* (London: Pluto Press, 2001), 134–44. See also Paul Spencer, *The Pastoral Continuum: The Marginalization of Tradition in East Africa* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1998).
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21. Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies of Political Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), 7–24.
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44. Abdi Ismail Samatar, "Ethiopian Federalism: Autonomy Versus Control in the Somali Region," *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 6 (2004): 1131–54.
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46. Eric Wong (deputy political and economic counselor, political affairs, US Embassy, Addis Ababa), interview by author, 30 May 2007. The ONLF has not been declared a terrorist organization by the US government in spite of the attack on the Chinese and Ethiopian oil workers.

47. Kaleyesus Bekele, "Ethiopia: Humanitarian Situation in Ogaden Raises Concern," *Reporter* (Addis Ababa), 29 September 2007. A recent United Nations interagency mission to the Somali Regional State observed that humanitarian conditions within the conflict areas have deteriorated substantially over the past several months. Government restrictions of commercial and livestock trade aimed at preventing contraband activity have markedly aggravated an already fragile food security and livelihood situation. Livestock prices have fallen by as much as one-third due to a drastic reduction of export trade from the areas of military operations. Food reserves at the household level are nearly exhausted among the communities visited. Moreover, food aid operations in the zones affected by military operations have been seriously delayed.

48. John Graham and Yacob Wondimkum (USAID), interview by author, 31 May 2007. In contrast, independent NGOs such as Save the Children UK have been working successfully in the Ogaden.

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52. Rutherford, interview.

53. Lahra Smith, *Political Violence and Democratic Uncertainty in Ethiopia* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, August 2007), 1–20.

54. Wong, interview. The Carter Center found that there were significant flaws but not enough to change the outcome of the elections. The EU cut direct aid to Ethiopia because the elections were found to be unfree and unfair.

55. Terrence Lyons, *Avoiding Conflict in the Horn of Africa* (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 2007); and Wong, interview.

56. Wong, interview. The Carter Center found that there were significant flaws but not enough to change the outcome of the elections. The EU cut direct aid to Ethiopia.

57. Grignon, interview.

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64. Philip Dobie (UNDP Drylands Development Center), interview by author, 6 June 2007. According to Dobie, Darfur and other conflicts over pastoral land are development failures, not meteorological disasters. Local populations have been adept at dealing with climatic fluctuation for hundreds of years.

65. Woldentensaie, interview.

66. Graham and Wondimkum, interview. In Somali areas with small clans, there is no conflict. However, in Gambella is another area where the USAID has been assisting with conflict-

mitigation work, even though environmental issues are not relevant in such a lush and sparsely populated area.

67. Simon Richards (Pact director for African Region), interview by author, 5 June 2007.
68. Dobie, interview.
69. Ibid.
70. Walter Knausenberger (senior regional environmental officer, USAID, East Africa Regional Mission, Nairobi), interview by author, 5 June 2007.
71. Ibid.
72. UN Environment Program, Sudan: Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment, June 2007.
73. Ibid.
74. Susanne Schmeidl and Cirù Mwaùra, *Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa: Protocol on the Establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism for IGAD Member States* (Trenton, NJ, and Asmara, Eritrea: Red Sea Press, 2001); and IGAD-CEWARN personnel, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, interview by author, 31 May 2007.
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76. Col Don Zimmer (director, Kenya-US Liaison Office [KUSLO], US Embassy, Nairobi), interview by author, 4 June 2007.
77. Jakkie Cilliers and Mark Malan, *Progress with the African Standby Force*, ISS Paper 107, May 2005, 1–21.
78. Maj Gen Benon Biraaro, Ugandan Peoples Defence Force (director, strategic planning, African Union Peace and Security Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia), interview by author, 1 June 2007.
79. Marcel Leroy (political advisor to the EU special representative, Addis Ababa), interview by author, 31 May 2007.
80. Maruga Peter (coordinator, Peacemaking, Healing and Reconciliation Programme, Nairobi Peace Initiative [NPI]–Africa, Nairobi), interview by author, 8 June 2007. NPI and Interpeace officials interviewed in Nairobi, 7 June 2007, have adopted extensive bottom-up programs to end state failure and build a new state and society.
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84. Abdurahim Raghe (senior program officer, Somali Program) and Johan Svensson (regional director, East and Central Africa, Interpeace, Nairobi), interview by author, 8 June 2007.
85. Ibid.
86. Grignon, interview.
87. Amb. Cindy Courville (US Mission to the African Union), interview by author, 31 May 2007.
88. Col Timothy Rainey and Bob Cunningham (advisors to the US Mission to the African Union), interview by author, 31 May 2007.
89. Richards, interview. In discussion is a broader regional conflict mitigation program. Security is needed for NGOs specializing in conflict mitigation and doing work in conflict zones.
90. ICG, *A Strategy for Comprehensive Peace in Sudan*, Africa Report no.130, 26 July 2007, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4961&l=1>. One contested area of high value

(rich oil deposits) is the Nuba Mountains, which lie between North and South on the west bank of the White Nile.

91. Gomes, interview.
92. Courville and Wong, interviews.
93. Amb. David Kikaya and Prof. Moses Onyango (International Relations, US International University, Nairobi), interview by author, 6 June 2007.
94. Grignon, interview.
95. Lyons, *Avoiding Conflict*; and Wong, interview.
96. Wong, interview.
97. Ibid.
98. Grignon, interview. See also Lyons, *Avoiding Conflict*.
99. Gomes, interview.
100. Michael Chege, interviewed in Nairobi, June 7, 2007.
101. Brig Maurice A. Walugu (operations director, Ministry of Defence, Nairobi), interview by author, 4 June 2007.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
106. Col Don Zimmer, interview by author, 4 June 2007.
107. Wong, interview.
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid.
110. Kinf Abraham, interview by author, 31 May 2007
111. Prof. Berhanu Kassahun (Department of Political Science and International Relations, Addis Ababa University), interview by author, 1 June 2007.
112. Amb. Wane (African Union Peace and Security Commission, Addis Ababa), interview by author, 1 June 2007.
113. Knausenberger, interview. Also, COMESA is tied into the New Partnership for African Development, which is attempting to hold states accountable in areas of governance, accountability, and development.
114. Lyons, *Avoiding Conflict*.
115. Stephen Karingi (chief, Trade and International Negotiations Section, UN Economic Commission for Africa, Addis Ababa), interview by author, 29 May 2007.
116. Joseph Atta-Mensah (director, UN Economic Commission for Africa, Regional Integration Office, New Partnership for African Development Unit, Addis Ababa), interview by author, 29 May 2007.
117. Ann Muir, *Customary Pastoral Institutions Study* (Washington, DC: USAID, March 2007).
118. Knausenberger, interview.
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121. Richards, interview.
122. Ibid. In discussion is a broader regional conflict mitigation program. Security is needed for NGOs specializing in conflict mitigation and work in conflict zones.
123. Knausenberger, interview.
124. Woldentensaie, interview.
125. Ibid.

126. Paul McDermott (office director, Regional Conflict Management and Governance Office, Regional Economic Development Services Office, East and Southern Africa, USAID, Nairobi), interview by author, 7 June 2007.

127. Raghe and Svensson, interview.