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United States Department of State
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors
Office of Inspector General

Report of Inspection

The Bureau of African Affairs

Report Number ISP-I-09-63 August 2009

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PURPOSE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE INSPECTION

This inspection was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspections, as issued by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Inspector's Handbook, as issued by the Office of Inspector General for the U.S. Department of State (Department) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG).

PURPOSE

The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the BBG, and Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and the BBG. Inspections cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980:

- **Policy Implementation:** whether policy goals and objectives are being effectively achieved; whether U.S. interests are being accurately and effectively represented; and whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately coordinated.
- **Resource Management:** whether resources are being used and managed with maximum efficiency, effectiveness, and economy and whether financial transactions and accounts are properly conducted, maintained, and reported.
- **Management Controls:** whether the administration of activities and operations meets the requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal management controls have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the likelihood of mismanagement; whether instances of fraud, waste, or abuse exist; and whether adequate steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken.

METHODOLOGY

In conducting this inspection, the inspectors: reviewed pertinent records; as appropriate, circulated, reviewed, and compiled the results of survey instruments; conducted on-site interviews; and reviewed the substance of the report and its findings and recommendations with offices, individuals, organizations, and activities affected by this review.



**United States Department of State
and the Broadcasting Board of Governors**

Office of Inspector General

PREFACE

This report was prepared by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, as amended. It is one of a series of audit, inspection, investigative, and special reports prepared by OIG periodically as part of its responsibility to promote effective management, accountability and positive change in the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

This report is the result of an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the office, post, or function under review. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observation, and a review of applicable documents.

The recommendations therein have been developed on the basis of the best knowledge available to the OIG and, as appropriate, have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is my hope that these recommendations will result in more effective, efficient, and/or economical operations.

I express my appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "H. W. Geisel".

Harold W. Geisel
Acting Inspector General

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CONTEXT

AFRICA AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE (1958-2009)

In 1958, the birth of Ghana, the first sub-Saharan African state to achieve independence, coincided with the creation of the Department's Bureau of African Affairs. The bureau then covered Africa from the Straits of Gibraltar to the Cape of Good Hope. For the purposes of diplomacy, however, Egypt was included in the Bureau of Near East Asian Affairs (NEA), and soon the Department placed the rest of North Africa in the Bureau of Near East Asian Affairs as well. In a sense, pan-Arabism dictated the Department's approach to North Africa at a time when pan-Africanism was inspiring some 30 African states to establish the continent-wide Organization of African Unity in 1961. This too was the idealistic time when the first Peace Corps volunteers arrived in Ghana and Tanzania, and the United States opened embassies across Africa.

From the outset, Cold War priorities figured prominently in policy towards Africa, as toward other regions. Relations with North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally Portugal, for example, trumped support for the independence of Mozambique and Angola. African leaders themselves sometimes played off East against West, with rhetoric obscuring single-party or military dictatorships and corruption. At the same time, U.S. diplomacy was haunted by the seeming probability of racial conflict breaking into open warfare in southern Africa.

Some 30 years after Ghana's birth, in 1990, an extraordinary man walked out of prison in South Africa: soon Nelson Mandela was elected President of South Africa and apartheid ended peacefully. Meantime, a wall had fallen in Berlin and communism's appeal was overwhelmed by a wave of elections throughout Africa. The tired Organization of African Unity, with its policy of "nonintervention," gave way to a revitalized policy of "nonindifference" under the African Union, established in 2002. However imperfect were elections in Nigeria, Kenya, and elsewhere on the continent; Ghana, which had suffered so many trials and tribulations in its brief history since independence, saw its fourth model transfer of power in January 2009, and South Africa its own peaceful transition of power in April 2009.

The end of the Cold War opened up new policy opportunities worldwide, as democracy promotion, human rights, the environment, and other global issues rose higher on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. Likewise, the end of apartheid opened up new opportunities for cooperation in Africa. However, resources were cut, with particularly severe results in Africa. After the Cold War, the Department opened many new embassies across Central Europe and the former Soviet Union without gaining any new personnel. Congress reduced diplomatic and development budgets as well: this combination of factors led to staff shortages worldwide, a hiring freeze, and reduced training opportunities. The United States Information Agency was merged into the Department, a move designed to link policy and public diplomacy more closely. However, funding for cultural exchanges and other public diplomacy programs was reduced along with the rest of the foreign affairs budget. Concurrently, genocide, famine, conflict, terrorism and narcotics trafficking stalked Africa. Not even the 1998 bombings of U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam halted the decline in experienced staffing at U.S. missions in sub-Saharan Africa; leadership and management suffered perceptibly. And as security was tightened at U.S. embassies, the fundamental ability of diplomats to understand and analyze the continent was correspondingly restricted. The United States appeared ill-prepared to deal with the post Cold War era, including terrorism and failed states in Africa.

September 11, 2001, delivered a horrendous shock to America's sense of self, and the Federal Government began reversing the nation's disengagement around the world. One effect was the growth of law enforcement and military personnel at U.S. missions and a reconfiguration of military commands. By 2007, there was a new well-funded actor on the African scene: a unified U.S. Military command for the African continent, AFRICOM. At the same time, U.S. foreign assistance policy saw extraordinarily generous but unbalanced increases in U.S. efforts to halt the spread of killer diseases in Africa, notably HIV/AIDS and malaria, and the entrance of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, which supplanted the traditional development role of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Personnel at U.S. embassies and in AF were swamped not only by seemingly endemic conflicts from Sudan to the Congo, but also by an onslaught of increased military and development activity. In FY 2008, U.S. official development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa reached a record high of \$7.8 billion (\$6.5 billion bilateral and \$1.3 billion being the imputed U.S. government portion of multilateral grants). FY 2008 U.S. security assistance to sub-Saharan Africa totaled over \$251 million.¹ The difficulty of work was compounded by 76 evacuations due to actual or threatened outbreaks of violence in the last decade alone.

¹The figure for FY 2008 U.S. security assistance does not include Department of Defense Title X funds.

These sometimes sweeping generalizations are meant to serve as a backdrop for this inspection, which coincides with a period of transition in AF as it and the new Office of the United States Special Envoy for Sudan organize and plan their responses to the ever-changing realities of sub-Saharan Africa.

EXECUTIVE DIRECTION

The bureau was inspected during a period of transition from one Administration to the next. Notwithstanding whatever criticism this report contains, AF performs extraordinarily well in light of the constant, exhausting crisis management that characterizes much of its work.

There were great expectations in the bureau and in Africa that the election of President Obama signaled a new era for bilateral relations across the continent. However, the reality of the generous humanitarian and developmental programs of the outgoing Bush Administration may prove hard to match in current troubled economic times.

During the inspection, new policies and programs had not been enunciated and were not expected until the President's trip to Africa in July 2009. A new Assistant Secretary had just been confirmed, and the FY 2011 Bureau Strategic Plan (BSP) was under review. In terms of priority problems, the Department named a special envoy for Sudan, whose office AF will support. Somalia's troubles remained the hottest of many policy fires within the bureau.

The bureau was in the hands of a confident, experienced acting Assistant Secretary from mid-January to mid-May 2009. He opened the bureau to renewal after a period when three of AF's four ranking leaders had been noncareer appointments. Their departure decapitated the bureau. The acting Assistant Secretary had to draft office directors to serve as deputy assistant secretaries (DAS) and bump up deputies to be office directors. This stretched an already weakly populated bureau at a time when there was no abatement in African crisis management. Retired AF hands could have been plugged into the bureau's directorial holes, but the OIG team was told that resources prevented such fixes. The welcome management style of the acting Assistant Secretary and a willingness to encourage discussion, indeed dissent, and the almost universal respect bureau personnel hold for him helped temper the pressures of work and transition. Bureau morale was on the upswing.

A highly qualified Assistant Secretary assumed leadership of the bureau on May 8, 2009. The new Assistant Secretary, perhaps the best known and most popular of AF's senior career officers, used his first session with the interagency community, as well as smaller in-house meetings, to stress the importance he will attach to trans-

parency and communication. He took immediate steps to remedy complaints from U.S. Ambassadors in Africa as well as from senior interagency colleagues that the bureau did not report and share what it was doing. The Assistant Secretary underlined the importance of communication, coordination and interagency collaboration, and he ordered his colleagues to report promptly all relevant meetings with foreign leaders to their respective ambassadors. He clearly was aware of what OIG team members themselves were finding in their interviews and questionnaires. He knows what it is to be in the field and not know how the Department may be affecting bilateral relations.

If African policy issues were not enough to overwhelm the best of leaders, internal bureau issues are almost as daunting.

- Leadership shortcomings often compound acute staffing problems.
- Embassy platforms are collapsing under the weight of new programs and staffing without corresponding resources to provide the services required by new tenants and requirements.
- Within AF, public diplomacy integration is a failure ten years after State-USIA consolidation.
- Policy planning focuses on near term contingencies, such as outbreaks of violence, upcoming elections, or ailing leadership. While the United States helps feed Africa, it is not focusing as it might on helping Africans feed themselves; even laudable HIV/AIDS programs spend more on medication than prevention.
- A \$2 billion peacekeeping program lacks the resources for adequate management controls.
- The country desks are not staffed with enough officers possessing relevant overseas experience.
- The U.S. Military is stepping into a void created by a lack of resources for traditional development and public diplomacy.

These serious management issues are discussed throughout the report.

LEADERSHIP

From the outset, AF's fundamental idealism enabled it to attract, retain, and further the careers of Foreign Service officers both in Washington and in the field. A sense of adventure, meaningful work, and rewards for service overcame what could be severe hardship assignments. Although the continent's promises and challenges still attract dedicated talent, the luster of service in AF has faded over the past decade, and there is an undercurrent of dissatisfaction with the uneven quality of leadership that affects recruitment to key positions in some cases, and retention in others.

In July 2004, OIG prepared a memorandum report on leadership at hardship posts in Africa,² compiled from observations made during inspections of 27 African embassies and the bureau itself. That report included recommendations that are as relevant in 2009 as they were five years ago, and are equally applicable to leadership in the bureau and in the field. In its response to the 2004 report, AF noted that the bureau had instituted specific criteria for the recruitment of senior officers and staff, emphasizing, among other criteria, team building qualities. Despite this commitment, the OIG team found that leadership in AF itself and in the field remains uneven.

Between January and mid-May of 2009, because of post-election transfers or resignations, all of AF's deputy assistant secretaries and several of its office directors have been "acting;" in effect, working at a level of responsibility greater than that for which they were initially assigned. Because all were experienced AF hands and had considerable substantive knowledge, they were able to advance AF's policy initiatives at a critical time. In the long term, however, recruitment for the bureau's top management positions—deputy office director and higher—has to focus on a candidate's supervisory and leadership qualities as much as on substantive knowledge if AF is to develop and maintain a strong cadre of leaders who can rotate between the field and the bureau, advance into positions elsewhere in the Department that keep AF's priorities alive, and attract a dynamic team of next-generation supervisors and managers.

²Memorandum Report ISP-I-04-54, July 2004.

Although virtually all the work requirements statements for deputy assistant secretaries, office directors, and deputy office directors include mentoring and development of subordinate personnel, that performance element usually comes close to the bottom of a list of several elements that focus on the employee's mastery of a specific issue or resolution of a crisis. An OIG review of performance evaluations covering the 2007-2009 timeframe confirmed that most of the evaluations did not discuss subordinate development at all or, at best, in a very cursory way. During OIG interviews in the bureau, AF employees rarely failed to praise their supervisor's knowledge of the issues, but they also cited examples of those same supervisors' shortcomings as communicators, mentors, or role models. Some supervisors are inaccessible most of the time, with doors closed, and rarely share information or seek advice from subordinates; others reach out only to criticize or communicate in writing rather than face to face; one or two so intimidate their staff that subordinates avoid interacting with them whenever possible.

Desk officers in several directorates noted that policy often is formulated without their input, and they struggle to articulate those decisions in written products because they had not been part of the policy formation process. Because AF tries to provide good opportunities in the field for its domestic staff, many of the current deputy assistant secretaries, office directors, and deputies will rotate to ambassadorships, deputy chief of mission (DCM) positions, or section chief positions in the next few months. Leadership skills that have not been honed, tested, or evaluated in the Department will not emerge overnight when officers take over a management role at an embassy, particularly at a small and isolated capital where quality of life issues can be determined by the Ambassador's own interpersonal strengths. AF does not have leadership skills as a cornerstone of its position descriptions, nor does it hold its supervisors to demonstrable standards for interpersonal skills and team building that parallel those for intellectual knowledge and policy savvy. The new Assistant Secretary has emphasized team building and valuing AF's personnel in his first few days on the job, which bodes well for a renewed focus on leadership if that articulated priority is converted into positive action at all levels.

Recommendation 1: The Bureau of African Affairs should make responsibility for leadership, team building, staff development, and morale as prominent as policy development and implementation in the work requirements statements of all ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, section chiefs, office directors, and deputy office directors and require that employee evaluations comment on performance in these areas with concrete examples. (Action: AF)

During the inspection, the OIG team polled AF staff at all levels to assess the performance of AF's ambassadors in the field. AF office directors identified several embassies that had significant morale, performance, or leadership issues. However, these weaknesses were not reflected in the performance evaluations for the ambassadors at those embassies. Senior Foreign Service officers, FS-01s and FS-02s, which include most of the ambassadors and deputy chief of missions in Africa, prepare the first part of their performance evaluations, as the Department requires. The following two segments are purportedly prepared by the rating officer and the reviewing officer. For ambassadors, the deputy assistant secretary normally writes the rating statement, and the Assistant Secretary writes the reviewing statement. In practice, most ambassadors prepare all three segments of their evaluations, including the area for improvement, and submit them for review. The raters and reviewers then change the text in "their" parts if warranted. It appears that there is little opportunity or encouragement for country directors or desk officers to incorporate their actual experience with an ambassador's performance or awareness of post morale into the final product. The preparation of performance evaluations for office directors follows a similar process, but since they work closely with the rating and reviewing officers, there is a better chance that statements from their supervisors will be more informed.

Given this process, it is not surprising that performance evaluations focus on successful high level visits, public relations efforts, and substantive knowledge, all admittedly important factors, rather than harder-to-quantify team building skills. Occasionally, the OIG reviewer noted that the discussion under leadership and interpersonal skills in fact focused on how well the ambassador dealt with foreign counterparts but never mentioned relationships within the embassy. For example, the OIG team was told of one ambassador who allegedly screams, at and belittles embassy staff in public on a frequent basis, but the relevant performance evaluation does not mention these much-discussed interpersonal and leadership weaknesses at all and, in fact, vaunts the ambassador for working well with the embassy team. For office directors and their deputies, the performance evaluations show a similar paucity of comments about interpersonal and team building skills even when AF's leadership knows that the rated employees demonstrate patterns of behavior that intimidate their subordinates. One desk officer commented that the supervisor's lack of interpersonal skills had "shut down most of the staff."

Promotion precepts for senior-level officers include: creating an environment that encourages innovation; encouraging staff to accept responsibility; motivating and inspiring; developing a sense of cohesiveness and implementing strategies to improve the workplace, morale and achievements of team members; and fostering a climate based on mutual respect. It is difficult to assess these leadership skills from afar, even when rumors about embassy or office morale filter upwards, perhaps

valid but perhaps not. In order to evaluate leadership qualities, rating and reviewing officers need to solicit input from the field. This can be done in a variety of ways: when AF representatives visit the embassies for which they are responsible and meet with staff individually; by soliciting comments keyed to the promotion precepts from both domestic and overseas employees on their supervisors' performance; and through the routine desk officer and country director interaction with personnel in the field. Most of the country directors know where ambassadors are, in fact, exhibiting strong leadership and team building skills or neglecting them.

Recommendation 2: The Bureau of African Affairs should survey embassy employees and the bureau's professional and support staff to assess supervisors' leadership skills, and include that feedback when preparing performance evaluations, making recommendations for performance pay, or nominating ambassadorial or deputy chief of mission candidates, including repeat supervisory assignments. (Action: AF)

Large embassies usually have multiple resources for addressing staff morale, team building, and mentoring issues. In such cases, while an ambassador is fully engaged as the outward face of the embassy, the deputy chief of mission, management counselor, or consul general focus on internal management issues, providing the kind of leadership that increases the overall strength of the organization. At small embassies, however, especially at hardship posts, the engagement of the ambassador with the embassy staff from top to bottom can make the difference between a productive and motivated embassy team and a contingent of stressed employees struggling to meet their professional commitments and anticipating a better tour the next time. Several years ago, the Bureau of Consular Affairs, where many new officers work in a demanding environment that may not be their ultimate career track, developed a series of leadership tenets emphasizing the responsibilities of its consular managers for far more than producing passports or visas. The Bureau of Consular Affairs reiterates those tenets regularly and tries to ensure that officers are counseled, evaluated, and assigned based on their demonstrated leadership performance. Given the number of its small embassies and the crisis nature of the work in the bureau itself, AF would do well to adopt leadership tenets of its own and emphasize them routinely as a way of refocusing the bureau on the development and retention of its human resources. The OIG team made an informal recommendation on this issue.

PROMOTING AN EFFECTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MILITARY

The U.S. Africa Command reached unified command status on October 1, 2008, with headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. The mission statement explained that the purpose was to work in concert with other U.S. Government agencies to conduct military-to-military programs that promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy. The command consolidated responsibility for all of Africa, excepting Egypt, thereby unifying what had been divided among European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Central Command, and Pacific Command. The Africa Command had been in pre-activation activities for about four years and various temporary duty military missions had been visiting U.S. embassies, fulfilling Department of Defense strategic requirements for a better understanding of Africa, and learning how best a new command might support diplomatic objectives.

Unfortunately, the activation and role of the command was misunderstood at best, if not resented and challenged by AF. OIG inspected embassies that were bewildered at first, as AFRICOM representatives not familiar with the embassy environment tried to open shop in chanceries with little introduction from AF. AFRICOM officials themselves did not fully understand a chief of mission's responsibility to oversee U.S. Government activity in their countries of assignment. Direction from AF was slow to come owing to a lack of consensus on the design and objectives of the command, and missteps were made by visiting, can-do military missions. Nevertheless, by 2008 AFRICOM was a reality, and there is every indication that the new Assistant Secretary and the AFRICOM Commander are working cooperatively.

Much of the pre-2008 discussion centered on where AFRICOM was to locate its headquarters: in Africa, Europe, or the United States. African nations themselves generally opposed location on their soil for reasons of sovereignty as well as misapprehension about AFRICOM's intentions. The question of location also divided AF and AFRICOM. Keeping the command in Stuttgart quieted the debate so that attention could be paid to the command's blossoming activities irrespective of its location. (Most of AFRICOM came from EUCOM, which is based in Stuttgart.)

Initially, AFRICOM (actually EUCOM, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. Pacific Command before 2008) sent military teams to various African countries to develop some sense of the security challenges in each country. Poverty was seen as one of many reasons why countries fall prey to terrorists, conflict, and other malaises. Therefore, the teams suggested that military assets be used for a wide variety of humanitarian and developmental purposes, combating HIV/AIDS, hunger, and sinking wells in addition to support for traditional military reform, training, advisory, equipping, and other military-to-military activities. AFRICOM sought coordination with

USAID and nongovernmental organizations. Many nongovernmental organizations were and remain reluctant to have their activities associated with the U.S. military, believing the association can create mistrust among the people they are trying to assist.

AFRICOM also provided military information support teams (MIST) to engage the public. MIST teams have exponentially more money to spend in a country than do embassy public affairs offices. In Somalia, for example, the Embassy had \$30,000 to spend on public diplomacy while the MIST team had \$600,000. Given the urgency of combating terrorism in Somalia, money was needed and the reported successes of MIST programs elsewhere served as a recommendation. Under MIST, AFRICOM inherited an established military practice of working closely with embassy public affairs officers to develop and fund effective programs.

Militarization of Diplomacy

There continues to be some public and considerable internal debate about the wisdom of military funding of U.S. developmental and public diplomacy activities in Africa. An AFRICOM policy document counters, “USAFRICOM will NOT militarize U.S. foreign policy.” It continues that “the State Department remains the lead, and Country teams lead decision-making on noncombat USG activities conducted in-country.”³

Need to Share Lessons Learned

As mentioned earlier, U.S. embassies in Africa were bewildered by the early efforts of AFRICOM to establish a role in country. There were frequent questions of where to house newcomer programs, who would pay for services, and what immunities if any would be granted. The first arrivals, although well-intentioned and geared to combat terrorism, were not fully prepared to assimilate into their role within the embassy and country team. Embassies for their part had received little guidance from the Department of State, where career and noncareer officials alike worried about the possible militarization of diplomacy. AFRICOM did not appear to have an appreciation of an ambassador’s authorities and responsibilities, as detailed in the President’s letter of instruction to chiefs of mission (COM). Conversely, some chiefs of mission were not fully aware of the parameters of their authority. Although there

³U.S. Defense Policy Toward Africa: The Role of AFRICOM, February 11, 2009, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs.

was a perception among some chiefs of mission that AFRICOM's initiative eroded chief of mission authority, it was the wiser, more experienced ambassadors, as well as AFRICOM's leadership, that soon reflected their own mutual understandings of their respective roles. Ambassadors could and would send embassy-based or sponsored AFRICOM personnel home if they did not perform or behave as required. As far as this inspection could determine, U.S. ambassadors possess all the authority required to oversee AFRICOM's work in their countries of assignment. At the same time, U.S. military commands agreed to respect the National Security Decision Directive-38 process on staffing embassies, and in an action welcomed by most ambassadors, the Department of Defense established a senior defense official/Defense attaché (SDO/DATI) at each embassy. The senior defense official/Defense attaché serves as the ambassador's point of contact on military issues and reduces the possibly overlapping roles of the military assistance office, Defense attaché office, and other military representatives at post.

AFRICOM is an established fact with needed resources to pursue U.S. policy in Africa. The new Assistant Secretary for African Affairs should reiterate his bureau's support for AFRICOM's mission and instruct U.S. embassies in sub-Saharan Africa on how to handle AFRICOM requests for temporary duty facilitation including country travel clearances, and share best practices of effective embassy-military relationships with each other. A dialogue with the field should uncover areas where there might be uncertainty or confusion, for example on subjects such as security and force protection responsibilities or immunities. The bureau should establish a clear point of contact for questions related to military activities. A restructured Office of Regional and Security Affairs within AF is the logical choice, as discussed separately in this report.

Recommendation 3: The Bureau of African Affairs should instruct African posts on how to handle Africa Command requests for embassy support and include an appendix of best practices of effective embassy-military relationships. (Action: AF)

THE EMBASSY AS A PLATFORM

Staffing questions are at the top of management issues facing both bureau leadership and overseas chiefs of mission. An OIG survey of U.S. embassies in sub-Saharan Africa, conducted prior to the inspection, squarely put staffing as the

number one issue, be it a need for experienced U.S. officers or for retention of the most capable LE staff. During the inspection, the OIG team requested LE staff statistics from posts regarding the percentage of attrition in the last few years and the primary reasons for the attrition. Thirty out of 48 posts responded to the survey. The responses indicated that two posts suffered 11 percent attrition and one, 4 percent. The others reported attrition of 1.5 percent or less. In most cases, posts said that inflation and the paucity of cost of living increases were factors in declining morale, and could result in greater attrition. These results are similar to those reported in the OIG report, *Review of Locally Employed Staff Compensation Issues*⁴ that placed overall attrition in AF posts at 2.5 percent. These statistics do not convey the concern felt by many African posts, a concern that is not validated by statistics.

Embassies were alarmed by the growth of agencies and programs such as AF-RICOM and the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and continuing congressionally mandated reporting requirements without suitable staffing to respond to these needs. In the past, the Special Embassy Program provided relief for some reporting requirements. The OIG team recognizes that congressionally mandated reports are never exempted. This issue has been raised in a number of OIG inspection reports of smaller embassies, but a resolution is not yet forthcoming.

In response to OIG questions, the Executive Office (AF/EX) estimated that its embassies support 60 percent more people than previously as other agencies increase their staff in Africa. These employees require a variety of embassy services, from office space to housing. Nevertheless, the number of direct-hire American International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) support staff rose by only 17 percent. The LE ICASS staff grew about 52 percent at the same time. Rightsizing, LE staff empowerment, eligible family member employment, and other post actions helped, as did regionalization and outsourcing, but none of these steps fixed the problem. Moreover, budget and space constraints also complicate efforts to increase ICASS staff.

Not even these statistics convey the pressure upon a post when a new program arrives with its managers, a need to hire staff in accordance with local law, importation issues, security against rising crime, schooling, health, computer support, and so on. The logical recommendation would be to freeze all growth or roll the clock backwards to when a reasonably small embassy could manage overseas aspects of bilateral relations. However, those were the days before crime and terrorism figured as high on the U.S. foreign policy agenda, and when there were fewer mandated reports.

⁴Office of Inspector General, *Review of Locally Employed Staff Compensation Issues*, Report Number ISP-09-13, dated January 2009.

U.S. embassies in Africa cannot function without sufficient ICASS staff. Ambassadors will have to deny National Security Decision Directive-38 requests for additional non-State personnel, or see their missions collapse. Leadership in the Department and overseas must do a better job of documenting management challenges, challenges that might be mitigated if more experienced managers were being assigned to some of the most affected posts in Africa.

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POLICY AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

REGIONAL ISSUES AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

There are three functional offices in the bureau that focus on regional policy priorities: the Office of Regional and Security Affairs (AF/RSA); the Office of Economic and Policy Staff (AF/EPS); and the Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (AF/PDPA). The top six of nine goals in the FY 2010 BSP relate to the work of AF/RSA and AF/EPS. A seventh, and the last of the substantive goals, relates specifically to the work of AF/PDPA. This report will discuss AF/PDPA in detail later.

Peacekeeping Support Operations and Security

AF/RSA has two deputy directors. One heads the regional security function and the other heads the contingent that is focused on regional political issues. The regional security portion of the office oversees peacekeeping support operations, peacekeeping operation (PKO) funds, security sector reform, foreign military financing grants, and the International Military Education and Training program.

The substantial regional security elements of AF/RSA are split between two locations. The African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program is located in a Department annex approximately one mile away from its AF/RSA colleagues in the Harry S Truman building. The management of other PKO-funded activities of AF/RSA is colocated with the regional political portion of the office. This was apparently done because of the lack of space in the Truman building. In the meantime AF/RSA has continued to grow. The Civil Service employee who heads the ACOTA staff of contractors does attend AF/RSA staff meetings, but this is not sufficient to integrate ACOTA fully and harmoniously with AF.

Recommendation 4: The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, should consolidate the elements of the Office of Regional Security Affairs at a single location that is conveniently located for continuing frequent interaction with the Front Office and other offices of the bureau. (Action: AF, in coordination with A)

The goals of resolving regional conflicts and preventing and responding to terrorism are the top goals of the FY 2010 BSP. AF/RSA deserves high praise for the results of the PKO-funded programs it manages. The staff of AF/RSA have a heavy burden of duties in program management, contract oversight, and logistics planning. Most frequently, the same person handles all three functions for a specific country program. The bureau is unique in this regard. Under these programs, a large number of African troops have been trained and deployed in PKOs in Africa; some have been deployed in PKOs beyond the region in Haiti, East Timor, and Iraq as well. It is in the U.S. national interest to promote stability in Africa, and it is in the interest of African countries to provide the troops to man PKOs in Africa.

African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program

ACOTA and its precursors, the African Crisis Response Force and the African Crisis Response Initiative, have trained over 163,000 African peacekeepers since 1997. Funding has grown from \$15 million in FY 1997 to over \$81 million in FY 2008. The allocation for ACOTA in FY 2009 is \$49 million, a return to more traditional program levels. Initially, the program of necessity focused on the direct training of African peacekeepers. As the program continues to mature, it focuses on observing and mentoring African trainers who have gone through the program and now are learning to train others.⁵ The goals are greater self-sufficiency and developing a sustainable, indigenous peacekeeping support operations training capacity. Training African peacekeepers, providing some nonlethal soldiering equipment, and then deploying them to other African countries under the auspices of the United Nations, the African Union, or of subregional African groupings such as the Economic Community of West African States, is a seminal development that is transforming Africa. Funding has come from the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) since FY 2005, an FY 2007 - FY 2008 Sudan Supplemental, FY 2008 Somalia funding, FY 2009 PKO funds, and funds provided by the Government of the Netherlands.

⁵Based on data supplied by the ACOTA program office, of 158,995 ACOTA trained African peacekeepers in the period May 1997 to February 2009, 57,338 were trained by ACOTA-trained African trainers. The remaining 101,657 were trained by U.S. ACOTA trainers. AF and PM have not yet developed an agreed-upon methodology for quantifying the number of indirectly trained African peacekeepers.

The ACOTA program has grown from 12 African partner countries to 24.⁶ Some 80 to 85 percent of those trained have been deployed. Troops from 18 ACOTA troop contributing countries are currently deployed in 11 ongoing UN and African Union peacekeeping support operations in Africa. Today more than 30 percent of peacekeeping troops in Africa are Africans. There is a waiting list of candidate partner countries. It is a win-win situation in which minimal numbers of U.S. military troops are involved, African professionalism and capacity are built up, and the participating African troops are rewarded well when deployed. One of most impressive statistics is that there have been minimal disciplinary problems and no ACOTA trained troops have been cited for atrocities or notable human rights abuses. Also, the training modules for troops includes instruction in human rights issues and conduct.

Funding Military Mentors. Most training of African troops in the ACOTA program is done by contractors or by a pretrained African cadre with oversight from ACOTA contractors. For some time the ACOTA program was able to use funds remaining from the African Crisis Response Initiative to fund active duty military mentors from AFRICOM or temporarily assigned to AFRICOM for the purpose of assisting with training. Those funds were exhausted in March 2009. At that point, ACOTA program funds began to be used for this purpose. AF/RSA has sought, and the Bureau of Political Military Affairs (PM) has agreed to provide GPOI PKO funds to underwrite the continued use of military mentors to supplement the work of contractors.

Other Peacekeeping Support Operations and Security Sector Reform

PM manages GPOI. There is an interagency GPOI Coordinating Committee that meets annually, co-chaired by the Assistant Secretary of PM and his Department of Defense counterpart. The committee allocates money to six geographic regions at that meeting based on proposals submitted. AF receives approximately 60 percent of funds in the GPOI global program. ACOTA accounts for about 50 percent of the GPOI global program. The GPOI program is intended to build capacity. GPOI money is allotted to the Combatant Commands, but AF is an exception. The Southern Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and EUCOM are all managing GPOI funds on a day-to-day basis, including contracting. (b) (2)

⁶Current ACOTA partner countries: Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia.

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(b) (2)(b) (2) If AF cannot provide the proper oversight, then the OIG team strongly believes that the day-to-day implementation of peace support operations, capacity building, programs, events, and activities should be taken out of AF/RSA and become the responsibility of AFRICOM, with PM to provide the GPOI funding needed, in keeping with what is already the norm in other geographic bureaus.

The African Crisis Response Force, African Crisis Response Initiative, and ACOTA all pre-dated GPOI. However, for five months in 2005, from June to November, ACOTA was under PM. Both before and after that, ACOTA and its precursors African Crisis Response Force and African Crisis Response Initiative were not under PM. GPOI funds come out of the Department’s PKO account, but not all such operations are funded with GPOI money.

AF/RSA is currently conducting four security sector reform projects. They are in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, South Sudan, and Somalia. These projects are funded by money from the Department’s PKO account, foreign military financing, and international narcotics and law enforcement funds from the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. These projects support the development of professional armed forces and security personnel through a program to train and equip such forces, build infrastructure, and strengthen the institutions of civilian governments. These projects have included assistance for the civilian police and justice sectors. However, in general, when the totality of security programs in AF/RSA is examined, the preponderance of resources goes to the military sector.

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership and the East Africa Regional Security Initiative

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, established in 2005, seeks to protect the Sahelian states (Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, and to a lesser extent Nigeria and Senegal) and deny them as a space for al Qaeda to operate. The East Africa Regional Security Initiative is an effort to counter terrorist inroads in East Africa.

Strategic Planning and Interagency Coordination

The bureau has a two-person staff in AF/RSA that shoulders the burden of coordinating and developing the bureau’s responses to extensive reporting requirements imposed by the Director of Foreign Assistance and the Bureau of Resource Management Office of Strategic Planning and Performance. The head of this strate-

gic planning unit has frequent direct contact with the bureau front office. The work of the unit includes assisting the 48 individual embassies with their responses to strategic planning requirements, which are principally the country operational plan prepared for the Director of Foreign Assistance and the Mission Strategic Plan prepared for the Bureau of Resource Management. In addition, this two-person staff takes the lead in coordinating the BSP, which is intended to be a comprehensive statement of the bureau's major activities and goals to further U.S. policy in Africa. The Director of Foreign Assistance manages the assistance database, including economic support funds, with the help of the strategic planning unit in AF/RSA and its USAID counterparts. Most of the foreign assistance implementation work is done by USAID, if there is a USAID mission in country, or by USAID regional offices. If not, the Department takes the lead. U.S. embassies in Africa send country operational plans to the Bureau's strategic planning unit, which does a rigorous analysis and then sends it to the Director of Foreign Assistance. Most of the Bureau's foreign assistance monies are earmarked by Congress or notified to Congress.

The focus in the bureau appears to be more on the process and timeline for generating new MSPs and the new BSP rather than on the content, including the goals and performance indicators. This is because of procrastination, a lack of buy-in to the enterprise, or poor understanding of performance measurement on the part of missions and other offices. Moreover, the strategic planning unit lacks the leverage to get other parts of the bureau and missions in the field to follow through with its recommendations to improve these products. With such a large number of missions, the bureau has been correct in its approach of carefully scrubbing 10 to 15 MSPs annually based on including the most important and adding to them a selection of other missions, with attention given to those that have had the most years since such a review. For the others, the country desks in the subregional directorates, in consultation with the strategic planning unit, take the lead in providing feedback to the missions in question. Nevertheless, some missions have complained about what they see as a lack of guidance from the bureau front office in the preparation of MSPs. This may help account for the lack of alignment in some cases between MSPs and the BSP.

Regarding performance indicators in the BSP, there is sometimes a disconnect between the goal description and the performance indicators. Although the goal description may give a lucid description of the end state desired, the performance indicators, in some cases, measure something unrelated or something specific to a sub region. Alternatively, there may be no indication of how an indicator is to be

measured or whether the bureau will fund the measurement of things difficult to measure. Likewise, the work plan of the office principally responsible for submitting a goal paper to the BSP may not be in alignment with the work needed to help bring about the hoped for outcomes of the BSP.

Recommendation 5: The Bureau of African Affairs should review its Bureau Strategic Plan and implement a plan to improve goal performance indicators, ensure that the work plans of each bureau office are in alignment with the intended outcomes of the related portion of the Bureau Strategic Plan, and that Mission Strategic Plans are in alignment with the Bureau Strategic Plan. (Action: AF)

Regional Political Issues

The political side of AF/RSA includes the strategic planning unit. AF/RSA also has the portfolios for congressional affairs, good governance, democracy and human rights, counterterrorism, China watching, and regional political integration and cooperation, including the African Union desk. It works closely with the country directorates and coordinates a wide variety of papers in response to Department taskings or for congressional testimony by the bureau leadership.

Economic Affairs: Wellbeing, Development, Trade, and Economic Integration

Over half of the goals in the FY 2010 BSP relate to the focus of AF/EPS, an office with 11 staff including two academic fellows on one-year details. Only two in the office are Foreign Service officers. However, the focus of much of the work in AF/EPS is the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of 2000,⁷ and the Group of Eight (G-8) leading economies' partnership for Africa. AF/EPS has the bureau lead for each AGOA and G-8 event. This includes preparing papers for the annual AGOA meetings and the annual G-8 summit. AF/EPS is also the bureau's interface with the Bureau of Economic and Energy Affairs, the Bureau of Oceans, Environment, and Science, and with agencies with an economic or human wellbeing focus, such as USAID, the U.S. Special Trade Representative, Treasury, and the Commerce Department, the multiagency President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief,

⁷19 U.S.C. §§ 3701- 3741.

the Export-Import Bank, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. AF/EPS itself does not manage large programs or grants. It does manage the small Ambassador's Special Self Help fund.

Much of AF/EPS' work entails representing the bureau in the interagency policymaking process. This includes participating in the Interagency Policy Committee. Interagency coordination of development assistance is achieved via the State – USAID joint strategic plan, the country operational plans approved by the Director of Foreign Assistance process, and the Interagency Policy Committee. Coordination of development assistance with other donor countries is achieved primarily through the commitments made at the Gleneagles summit of the United States and other G-8 leaders, and through the U.S. role with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the African Development Bank. Although China is a significant donor in sub-Saharan Africa, it rarely coordinates its development assistance with the United States. Working with the G-8, the United States can take steps to avoid overwhelming the ability of some African countries to absorb flows of development assistance. U.S. policy also supports Africa's regional economic communities through several agencies. It is at this level that AF/EPS plays an active support role working in the interagency process and with U.S. missions.

African Growth and Opportunity Act

AF/EPS has the bureau lead for AGOA, the system of trade preferences for eligible African countries, and is heavily involved in planning the annual AGOA Forum. Forum preparations involve extensive logistics planning. It is for its work on AGOA that AF/EPS is known, but the economic impact of AGOA has been limited even though most of sub-Saharan Africa is now in AGOA. At times, there has been a vigorous interagency debate over the AGOA eligibility or recertification of specific countries. Many African countries have yet to benefit substantially from AGOA preferences. Poorly developed infrastructure, a lack of affordable credit, weak merchandising, and an inability to meet U.S. phytosanitary regulations are among the many factors that thus far have limited the intended trade promotion and diversification effects of AGOA. Most U.S. imports from Africa come under the AGOA preferences. Two-way trade between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa has grown from \$28.3 billion in 2001 to \$104.7 billion in 2008. That total trade is substantial, but relatively small when compared with U.S. trade with other regions. The bulk of AGOA

exports result from petroleum and other extractive industries. When U.S. imports of African petroleum products are excluded, the sum of trade for which AGOA can make some boast for promoting is relatively small. From 2001 to 2008 non-oil AGOA trade grew from \$1.4 billion to \$5.1 billion. Over emphasis on AGOA may have reduced the bureau's focus on important structural impediments to trade and development, including corruption.

Corruption is an issue that receives insufficient attention as an impediment to trade, development, and investment. While it goes hand in hand with good governance, it does not appear once in the FY 2010 BSP. This is a serious omission and could be rectified by including anticorruption efforts under the BSP goal paper on promoting trade and a positive investment climate. Anticorruption efforts could include capacity building in the judiciary and civilian law enforcement agencies in Africa as well as promoting investigative journalism from a vibrant free press.

Recommendation 6: The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, should explicitly address the issue of corruption in Africa and include performance measures of anticorruption effectiveness, beginning with the fiscal year 2011 Bureau Strategic Plan. (Action: AF, in coordination with INL)

Anticorruption does figure prominently in the bureau's cooperation with the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Treasury, and the Department of Justice on the stolen asset recovery program known as STAR. AF/EPS works with the Bureau of Economic and Energy Affairs, which has the Department's lead on the extractive industries transparency initiative. The initiative is a voluntary process aimed at improving fiscal transparency between extractive industries and the host governments of the countries in which they operate. AF/EPS also monitors the activities of the Kimberly Process, which governs trade in conflict diamonds and oversees economic support funding to support related programs.

The global financial crisis that began in 2008 has been a disaster in Africa as in other parts of the world. This, along with the issue of terrorist finance, has raised the profile of the international finance portfolio of AF/EPS. AF/EPS works with the Bureau of Economic and Energy Affairs and Treasury on debt relief, financial sector reform, and the activities in Africa of such international financial institutions as the African Development Bank, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Regrettably, AF/EPS has only one financial economist position and one international economist. This makes the bureau an unequal partner in discussions with the Bureau

of Economic and Energy Affairs and Treasury. Similarly, Department staff in AF embassies, with only a few exceptions, are weak in these skill sets notwithstanding the fact that some missions are in countries experiencing hyperinflation.

Food security and health issues are portfolios in AF/EPS that are important to sub-Saharan Africa and are backed by substantial U.S. Government assistance. The United States programmed over \$1 billion in food security assistance worldwide in FY 2008 and FY 2009. Most of that went to Africa. Food security is an important contributor to stability, and stability is a major challenge in sub-Saharan Africa. In recent months, AF/EPS has assumed a greater role in food security discussions thanks to the presence in the office of an academic fellow with expertise in the field. U.S. assistance to Africa on the healthcare side dwarfs other categories of development and humanitarian assistance. The FY 2009 President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief budget alone for sub-Saharan Africa is more than \$3.4 billion.

Restructuring Regional Functional Offices

The current structures of AF/RSA and AF/EPS are counter intuitive and not in the best interests of the bureau. As recommended earlier, the security portions of AF/RSA should be colocated. In addition, the bureau should merge AF/EPS with the political portion of AF/RSA to reap opportunities for synergy. It also makes sense, particularly given the concerns with piracy, for all maritime security issues to be consolidated in AF/RSA.

Recommendation 7: The Bureau of African Affairs should develop and implement a plan to restructure its regional functional offices, including merging the political and planning functions of the Office of Regional and Security Affairs with the Office of Economic and Policy Staff, creating a new Office of Regional Policy and Planning, and consolidating the counterterrorism portfolio in a renamed Office of Regional Security Affairs. (Action: AF)

Recommendation 8: The Bureau of African Affairs should attach the bureau's congressional affairs officer to the Front Office, rather than to the Office of Regional and Security Affairs, regardless of the physical location of the work area. (Action: AF)

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

“Despite the [October 1999] merger, public diplomacy is not integrated with policy determinations and issue analysis ... There is a widespread perception among AF/PD officers that their AF colleagues neither appreciate nor value their programs ... Public diplomacy officers believe that they are often not included in policy deliberations, even those with a clear public diplomacy content ... ⁸”

AF/PDPA was a failed office in 2002, and, if anything, the inspection team found the situation worse in 2009. PDPA is still not integrated into AF, and time is past due for the bureau to commission a frank “after action review” to determine why integration failed so utterly, and what must be done to create a functioning, productive office of public diplomacy and public affairs. Unsurprisingly, morale is poor in an office that feels estranged, in an office whose skills are not put to their best use.

The issue is not whether public diplomacy and public affairs are important to AF. They are. The issue is that AF/PDPA is not an active contributor to the bureau’s policy goals. AF/PDPA officers counter that AF “does not understand public diplomacy.” If that is truly the case after ten years, irrespective of why, AF/PDPA should be closed down and its functions dispersed among existing offices in AF and the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Bureau of International Information Programs, and the Bureau of Public Affairs. In an era of very tight resources, a nonperforming 17-member office should not be tolerated.

Any restructuring should require colocation of AF/PDPA officers with their AF bureau counterparts. The current situation, with AF/PDPA offices across the street from the main Department building, exacerbates the alienation between AF and AF/PDPA.

If the sense of geographic isolation were not bad enough, AF/PDPA’s current information technology (IT) equipment did not have enough memory to support all of the software applications commonly used by public diplomacy offices, both in the field and Washington, such as Microsoft Office 2007. On occasion, PDPA officers went to other AF offices in the bureau to find unused workstations so they could complete their work on time. As an interim solution, AF/EX, using bureau funds, purchased and, at the time of the inspection, was expecting consolidation staff to install additional memory on the PDPA workstations. If and when funding of the Department’s Global Information Technology Modernization (GITM) program resumes, PDPA is at the top of the list for equipment upgrades.

⁸Report of Inspection, Bureau of African Affairs, Report Number ISP-I-02-52, September 2002; p. 11.

Since both AF and PDPA are parties to the failure of the PDPA office, it is incumbent upon the bureau's new leadership to require an "after action report," analyzing why integration failed and what must be done to establish a functioning, productive office that supports the policy goals of AF as well as those of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (R). The work of the four AF/PDPA desk officers who support the 35 overseas public affairs offices should be more closely integrated with their counterparts in the respective geographic directorates. The work of those who support public diplomacy programs in the field should likewise be more closely aligned with bureau policies and objectives. The work of the four-member public affairs section, which prepares daily press guidance, writes articles for placement on State websites and with U.S. media, drafts speeches, and arranges for speaking engagements by AF representatives might be consolidated into one of AF's regional policy offices.

Recommendation 9: The Bureau of African Affairs should commission and produce an independent review of why integration failed, and what must be done to create a functioning, productive, valued public diplomacy and public affairs office for the future within 90 days of receipt of the inspection report. (Action: AF)

PDPA offices take policy direction and get resources from R. Absent clear direction from R on what is expected of offices of public diplomacy and public affairs in the regional bureaus, it falls to each regional bureau to determine how best to use the resources of public diplomacy and public affairs and integrate them fully into the bureau.

There is no true strategic plan for public diplomacy and public affairs in AF; there is no overarching document that addresses the philosophy and role of public diplomacy and public affairs in forming and contributing to the policy of the bureau in the medium and longer term. This cannot be done in isolation by one office in AF; nor should it be done without considering the role and influence of R, both in terms of domestic support (through the Bureau of Public Affairs) and overseas support (through Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and Bureau of International Information Programs resources). By addressing the overall strategy, tactical problems such as allocation of resources in the field and in Washington (that is, location of the PDPA office; IT equipment for PDPA) can be addressed and resolved.

Recommendation 10: The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with the Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, should draft and implement a strategic plan for public diplomacy and public affairs in the Bureau of African Affairs for the next three to five years, within 90 days of receipt of the inspection report. (Action: AF, in coordination with R)

COUNTRY DIRECTORATES

Acting directors led three of four country directorates at the time of the inspection, leaving deputy director positions vacant. Fully half of the 20 country desk officers were Civil Service employees, many in their first government jobs. Most newcomers had some exposure to Africa, for example on six-week to six-month rotations. A few had more experience on the continent, either in prior careers or in Foreign Service assignments. Each directorate had two office management specialist positions, a few of which were occupied by Foreign Service specialists and one by a contractor.

Some country directorates were exceptionally well managed, with acting directors described as open to ideas, accessible, good mentors, focused, and not micromanaging. In other offices, desk officers cited their managers for failure to share information, forbidding attendance at expanded staff meetings, lack of interest in career development of subordinates, reluctance to grant leave, and inability to focus on any issues other than the crisis at hand. The inspection team addressed those issues as discussed below.

Internal Communication

The most successful country directors communicated constantly with staff, through meetings, walking around the office, copying emails widely, and encouraging interruptions.

Many desk officers would welcome the opportunity to participate in meetings where they could interact with peers and more senior staff. Some noted their director had forbidden them to attend the weekly bureau expanded staff meeting, even on a rotating basis with their peers. Others felt they lacked the time to attend. This limits their exposure to a wider range of issues and contacts from other bureaus represented at the meeting, as well as to the bureau's full agenda and priorities. The inspectors

made an informal recommendation that country directors encourage junior staff to attend the bureau's weekly meeting on a rotational basis whenever possible.

Some desk officers noted they had been specifically precluded from attending meetings with visiting dignitaries and some were unsure which meetings it was appropriate for them to attend. Desk officers reported that some meetings took place without a note-taker, with the result that there was no way to brief overseas U.S. embassy officers or follow up on any undertakings that might have been agreed.

Recommendation 11: The Bureau of African Affairs should establish a standard operating procedure for desk officers to attend meetings with visitors from their assigned countries, take notes, brief their posts on the proceedings, and follow up on any commitments. (Action: AF)

Some directorates hold their regular internal staff meetings at a time of day incompatible with operational requirements, including preparation of press guidance and telephone contact with posts in distant time zones. The inspection team made an informal recommendation that country directors select a meeting time minimally disruptive to their staff.

Professional Development

Because of the shortage of mid-level Foreign Service officers, country directors recruit desk officers through a variety of programs, including Civil Service, Presidential Management Fellowships, American Academy of Sciences fellowships, and the career entry program. Successful country directors take time to learn about the requirements and limitations of each program, take into account the diverse backgrounds of the desk officers, and adjust their mentoring, training, evaluation, and career development advice accordingly. Where this is the case, the officers exhibit high energy, enthusiasm, and commitment, and foresee future opportunities in the bureau. But the inspection team learned of several instances of missed evaluation deadlines; desk officers being told it was not their job to think about policy, only to carry it out; and failure to recruit acknowledged high performers for bureau vacancies. The lack of consistency in developing its least experienced staff members is a barrier to retaining AF's future leaders.

Civil Service desk officers, as well as those who convert to Civil Service after completing their various fellowships, will likely occupy their positions longer than the two years that is the normal assignment span for a Foreign Service officer. While this can contribute valuable institutional continuity, managers need to be alert to the potential for the officers to burn out, as well as for the need to bring a fresh mind to their portfolios.

One country director recently reshuffled some of his officers' portfolios and hired a desk officer from another directorate, but met some resistance from his peers when he suggested that other offices might profitably do the same thing. Yet, AF would benefit from more systematic rotation of its Civil Service officers, including exposure to the work of its regional directorates and its posts. Orientation travel is essential, particularly for those who have not served in the region, and temporary duty assignments in the bureau's posts could help build regional expertise. When positions open, Civil Service officers can apply for lateral transfers, but a more informal rotation system could provide opportunities for temporary rotations without disturbing the Merit Promotion System. The inspection team made an informal recommendation to this effect.

Country directors drew the inspection team's attention to several examples of taskings that should have been completed by bureau-wide offices with information at hand, being re-tasked to already overstretched desk officers on tight deadlines. The inspection team suggested country directors address the issue with the directors of the bureau-wide offices in order to set and reinforce appropriate boundaries.

Several country directors talked to the inspectors about things they had learned while managing their offices and expressed their regret that AF had no natural forum for sharing those experiences with their peers. Expanded and senior staff meetings are focused and often devoted to discussing urgent operational issues. The inspectors informally recommended that one or two senior staff meetings each month be devoted exclusively to issues that managers commonly face.

Orientation to Substance and Process

New country desk officers told the inspectors that they had received no formal orientation to AF, with the exception of instructions on how to prepare paper for the Executive Secretariat. They feel their lack of understanding about the activities of other AF offices makes it hard for them to know whether they are successfully integrating the bureau's range of knowledge into the process of making policy recommendations for the countries assigned to them. The inspectors made an informal recommendation for improving orientation in the management section of the report.

Some desk officers expressed frustration that, other than for products destined for the Secretary, there is no updated guidance for them to consult when preparing and clearing briefing check lists and other documents. The brief guidance on the AF website is at least six months out of date.

Coordination on Consular Matters

Desk officers and country directors demonstrate a good understanding of and appreciation for the requirements of the Department's policy that all Americans have access to the same security threat information made available to official Americans (known as the "no double standard" policy). A representative of the overseas citizens services directorate in the Bureau of Consular Affairs regularly attends AF's expanded staff meeting, where issues relating to drawdowns, ordered departures, and evacuations are regularly discussed. A number of desk officers and one acting director have considerable consular experience, and reported being consulted by others in the bureau about consular questions.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Responses to OIG questionnaires gave the bureau's executive office, AF/EX, high marks. Narrative responses from embassy management officers and some ambassadors and deputy chief of missions indicated that staffing, funding, and for some, deteriorating and unsafe chanceries are concerns (see Appendix A). Many posts' responses noted that African posts do not attract the most qualified people for key positions because hardship⁹ posts are not desirable and many bidders do not or cannot meet fair share¹⁰ requirements. (b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)

⁹Posts qualifying for hardship pay may have poor medical facilities, substandard schools for children, severe climate, high crime, political instability, physical isolation, and the lack of spousal employment opportunities.

¹⁰A fair share employee is someone who has not served at least 20 months at a post with 15 percent or greater combined hardship and danger pay or at least 10 months at a post with a one-year standard tour of duty, during the eight years prior to the bidding year. Two tours after tenure must be at hardship posts and fair share bidders must bid on three hardship positions in two geographic areas.

Context and Staffing

The Bureau Profiles for staffing are:

AF BUDGET RESOURCES					
Fiscal Year	Domestic Operation	ICASS	Public Diplomacy Domestic and Overseas	Program Funding	Total AF Bureau Budget Allocation
2009	\$13,874,200	\$117,435,800	\$22,972,000	\$71,638,500	\$225,920,500

AF BUREAU FOREIGN ASSISTANCE	
Fiscal Year	(\$ in thousands)
2009	\$6,145,316*

Domestic			
Foreign Service	Civil Service	Contractors	Total
77	81	23	181

* includes \$240,000 estimate for P.L.480

AF Overseas Department of State Staff				AF Overseas Other Agency Staff		
Foreign Service	Civil Service	LE Staff	Total	U.S. Direct Hires	LE Staff	Total
1030	29	8282**	9341	1038	3426	4464

** This does not include 352 eligible family members who are both Department and other agency. It does include local guards at some posts that are personal service agreement guard forces.

For Foreign Service officers, allowances are not the financial incentive they were in the past, especially compared with Washington, DC, locality pay. Moreover, the system currently rewards those serving in Iraq or Afghanistan with linked assignments to preselected posts. Additionally, some said that the Bureau is disinterested in all but crisis posts and that entry level staff assigned to hardship posts often do not get needed mentoring because there are few mid-level and senior managers to provide guidance and direction.

Answers to OIG's workplace and quality of life questionnaire designed for domestic staff also indicated a high level of satisfaction with AF/EX. Information resource management was an exception, as detailed below.

Overall, AF/EX divisions are responsive and productive. Staff in the human resources section have well-defined portfolios and back-up assignments. AF/EX provided one full-time equivalent position to the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs and the Bureau of International Organizations' joint executive office in return for classification services for position descriptions. This arrangement was done under the Department's shared services concept. AF/EX has not yet received the service, and continues to rely on the Office of Civil Service Personnel for classification of position descriptions. The slow hiring process by the Office of Civil Service Personnel continues to be a problem. The budget section works well and manages large sums of money for domestic and overseas operations. The staff has a full grasp of what is required and provides timely outcomes. Likewise, the small staff in the management support section also provides satisfactory service.

DOMESTIC INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SERVICE LEVEL REDUCED

The Bureau of Information Resource Management consolidated the Department's IT support, security, and infrastructure. The consolidation centralized desktop support services for domestic bureaus' classified and unclassified computers and associated IT infrastructure including email, the Microsoft® Office Suite, and domestic IT help desks. Bureau information technology managers and executive offices were expected to meet bureau-specific applications requirements, handle requirements outside the scope of the consolidation, and continue providing service to overseas posts.

Bureau personnel complained that the consolidation compares unfavorably to what they considered AF/EX's gold standard for information technology support. Bureau of Information Resource Management representatives themselves praised the AF/EX systems staff. Employees reported that customer service is no longer timely and technicians often cannot resolve problems. For example, the special envoy to Sudan needs support daily, and the bureau continues to struggle with connectivity between AF offices in SA-3, SA-23, and the Truman Building. Notwithstanding continuing workload, a contractor position was eliminated with consolidation.

The use of consolidated IT services is mandatory. AF/EX now houses a contractor hired by the Bureau of Information Resource Management who is not devoted exclusively to AF but rather responds to any call that comes in. In addition to having relinquished a highly valued staff, AF/EX is now paying \$1,408 per desk for support for about 400 desks, compared to the earlier cost of about \$700 per desk.

OVERSEAS SUPPORT STRONG

AF/EX's systems group services 50 overseas posts in myriad and uncounted tasks, including systems support, training, and filling staffing gaps. This work is now performed by four IT contactors. The loss of a fifth position could mean less attention for posts. The systems staff assists posts with, for example, database and website development, secure and unclassified digital videoconferencing, training, troubleshooting, and implementing SharePoint to allow employees to share information. The staff also preconfigure and deploy servers, personal computers, switches, secure video/phone devices, and other such equipment. This staff is heavily involved in IT planning for new embassy compounds, and also manages staffing gaps overseas.

The systems staff know their overseas counterparts and LE staff, and interacts with them on a frequent, indeed sometimes hourly basis. OIG inspections and surveys have found that AF/EX's talented systems staff is much appreciated overseas.

Funding shortfalls have not permitted valued workshops for about three years. Such workshops not only update IT training, but allow local staff to network with each other and be available for later troubleshooting.

AF/EX has provided Cisco Systems 7985/Tandberg 150 videoconferencing capability to 15 posts and throughout the bureau. The personal-sized videoconferencing equipment, designed for desktops and small conference rooms, allows users to place and receive calls quickly and reliably. To mitigate vulnerabilities, the system uses ClassNet rather than local telephone lines. This equipment costs about \$2,200 each. Tempested or low signal emitting equipment for overseas installations is priced at \$7,000.

Another tool is the Broad Global Area Network (BGAN) Inmarsat terminal, costing \$3,400 each, that provides high-speed Internet and telephone service, attaches simply to laptop computers, and uses satellites to connect. BGANs do not require IT personnel to operate. This light weight, notebook-sized antenna can be used for emergency connectivity. It is not necessary to place it on a roof. It operates from an interior space provided the window faces the satellite. About 19 AF posts have them.

Originally the Department was providing them but no longer. AF/EX hopes to have sufficient funding to continue supplying Cisco Systems 7985/Tandberg 15 secure video devices and the BGANs and to conduct local staff workshops. The OIG team endorses these goals and endeavors.

HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

There is no bureau that is more difficult to staff overseas than AF. These and other human resource needs are addressed by a nine-person AF/EX staff.

All but seven of its 48 posts have hardship pay over 15 percent. Eight receive danger pay. AF posts are also home to many entry-level officers, whose mentoring often suffers in the absence of seasoned supervisors. AF posts share the Department-wide deficiency in mid-level staff and a world-wide deficiency in ICASS staffing in relationship to other agencies' overseas growth. The problem is exacerbated in AF posts because career and financial rewards are reserved for service in places like Iraq and Afghanistan.

To some extent, the Department remedied the problem of unfilled positions in Africa by freezing unfilled positions everywhere. As of May, 90 percent of African positions were filled, although not necessarily with sufficiently experienced personnel. In another step in the right direction, the Department and AF have encouraged posts to employ eligible family members, and 350 of 650 available positions are filled. Some major staffing gaps continue to occur, and the bureau uses a cadre of retired officers on when-actually-employed (WAE) status to cover short-term vacancies, and it recruits Civil Service employees to fill hard-to-staff positions approved by the Bureau of Human Resources.

In earlier reports,¹¹ OIG has suggested various alternatives to reduce staffing gaps, increase incentives, and mitigate hardships by establishing regional centers at more desirable locations. Although many approaches have been attempted, the staffing situation often remains less than satisfactory. Appendix B to this report includes alternatives, some tried, some not.

¹¹Information Memorandum, Highlights of Recent Inspections of African Posts, dated March, 1997; *Report of Inspection, Bureau of African Affairs*, Report Number ISP-I-02-52, dated September 2002; and *Strengthening Leadership and Staffing at African Hardship Posts*, Memorandum Report, ISP-I-04-54, dated July 2004

The 2002 OIG inspection report recommended that the Bureau recruit, hire, and train a full-time employee to work on contract-related issues in AF/RSA.¹² The office has two contractors, hired under a blanket purchase agreement, who work on contract-related issues and two CORs on its staff, plus the COR in the ACOTA program. Another employee, on detail from another agency, has been designated to become a COR but has not taken the required training. The issue of training is addressed later in this inspection report. The OIG team assessed that given the amount of money involved in the security program, more employees are needed in the AF/RSA program office to do field reviews, monitor records, and do cost studies. Although having direct-hire employees may be viewed as costly, it will ensure continuity and prevent potential conflicts of interests. Three CORs are not sufficient to cope with the future expanded workload. The time to act is now. Without more federal employees, AF/RSA is at risk of insufficient contract administration including the review and approval of invoicing and assuring contract compliance.

Recommendation 12: The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, should hire at least five additional full-time direct-hire employees with contracting skills to serve as program managers and contracting officer representatives in the Office of Regional and Security Affairs. (Action: AF, in coordination with HR)

Orientation

Throughout the inspection, the OIG team received a stream of complaints about the lack of adequate orientation for new employees. Usefulness of the bureau's orientation program scored unacceptably low in OIG's Workplace and Quality of Life Questionnaire. Although AF/EX has a comprehensive checklist available for all its incoming officers, many of them felt it was not sufficient. Many complained that they found out on their own about requesting services, and nobody explained what each office in the bureau does, including AF/EX. Others could not find information on the bureau's website. The bureau would benefit by establishing a formal orientation program to enable new employees to have a better understanding of bureau operations. Further, an orientation that introduces fellow AF employees to each other might improve communication within the bureau. With today's technology, the orientation could be recorded and shown to new employees at any time. An informal recommendation was made about this issue.

¹²OIG Report Number ISP-I-02-52, Inspection of Bureau of African Affairs, September 2002, p. 19.

Performance

During the course of the inspection, the OIG team observed that some supervisors are unfamiliar with all of the elements involved in supervising Civil Service personnel, particularly with regard to managing and resolving performance issues. The guidance in 3 FAM 2810 and on the U.S. Office of Personnel Management's website (Ensuring the Federal Government has an effective civilian workforce) explain how to address and document poor performance, counsel staff, and accurately rate performance.

Country directors and their deputies are generally Foreign Service officers with little experience managing Civil Service employees. They told inspectors that they are not aware of how to cope with Civil Service performance, conduct, and time and attendance issues. With more awareness and specific information, AF's supervisors would be better prepared to face and resolve performance and conduct issues promptly.

Managing and documenting subordinates' performance is an essential part of every supervisor's job. Because there was no documentation to support alleged unsatisfactory performance, ratings reflected satisfactory performance. Some staff members said they had not been counseled about their performance. Others said they were counseled only two or three months before the inspection.

The Human Resources Division is always available to assist supervisors with guidance on how to address performance issues. The bureau's website offers guidance on how to address performance and conduct issues for Foreign Service employees. The OIG inspection team made informal recommendations on ways the bureau can guide supervisors to address, counsel, and document performance issues for Civil Service and Foreign Service employees.

Equal Employment Opportunity and Civil Rights

In OIG's questionnaires and personal interviews, many employees scored awareness and sensitivity of Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) issues low. In many cases, employees were referring to the quality of leadership or supervision. Leadership issues are addressed in this report in the Executive Direction section.

The bureau has one EEO counselor. A second employee has been identified but has not been trained. The OIG team noted that information about the EEO process and the names of EEO counselors are not posted in high traffic areas in AF offices

in the Truman Building or the annexes. The names of the bureau EEO counselors are listed under the Human Resources Division duties on the bureau's website. Although employees are free to contact any Department EEO counselor, employees should know who can be contacted in their own bureau. There was one active EEO case at the time of the inspection. The case is going through the normal process in the Department's Office of Civil Rights. The bureau also needs to name a Federal Women's Program coordinator. The OIG team addressed these issues through informal recommendations.

BUDGET AND FINANCE DIVISION

The Budget and Finance Division is one of AF/EX's strongest offices. This division provides good financial support and service to the bureau and overseas posts. The division is responsible for budget formulation, financial planning, developing financial processes, and financial oversight for all funds appropriated and allotted to AF. There were a few complaints about the vendor payment processing for foreign assistance in Sudan. These are not AF/EX responsibilities but those of the Bureau of Resource Management that can certify, process, and pay vouchers. The budget section administratively approves bills for payment. In reviewing accounts, the OIG team found that the foreign operations funds have been tracked effectively. The OIG team made several informal recommendations addressing minor operational weaknesses.

MANAGEMENT SUPPORT DIVISION

A Civil Service administrative officer leads the four-person Management Support Division. The division is effective and provides adequate support to bureau personnel. The administrative officer also serves as one of the bureau's five post management officers.

Some employees expressed dissatisfaction with receiving supplies, mail services, and support for office moves and renovations. The OIG team believes there is a need for more and better supervision over general services and more attention to providing administrative support for offices located in State annexes. Weaknesses in some operational areas have been addressed in informal recommendations. The use of the purchase card issue is discussed in the management controls section.

Travel

There were significant complaints about timeliness of travel voucher processing in OIG's Workplace and Quality of Life Questionnaire. In reviewing the process, the OIG team found that AF/EX's Management Support Division provides adequate support and good customer service. Interviews with AF employees revealed that their experiences with Carlson Wagonlit's E² Solutions travel software are the primary problem. Although the bureau has provided training, users said that E² Solutions requires multiple unnecessary amendments and is not user-friendly. In addition, some bureau employees, including the office management specialists who create the travel authorization for some principals, have not taken the necessary training.

In reviewing the travel process, the OIG team also found that some requests for travel authorizations are made at the last minute, vouchers include improper claims for reimbursement and must be returned, vouchers are submitted several days and even months late with demands for prompt payment, and few filings of vouchers are actually outstanding. Adding to the problem is the volume of authorizations and vouchers that must be processed. The inspection team left informal recommendations addressing these issues.

POST MANAGEMENT DIVISION

The Post Management Division is composed of a chief, five post management officers, and a program assistant. In responses to the OIG questionnaire sent to the AF posts, the team received complimentary responses about the post management officers. Many in the field said that the post management officers cared about them. That level of caring has filtered from the management of AF/EX, through the Post Management Division, to their serviced missions. As mentioned earlier, AF/EX is known for its teamwork. That has led to an ability to handle crises adroitly, such as multiple and simultaneous post evacuations and prompt processing of the separation maintenance allowance.

MANAGEMENT CONTROLS

The bureau provided reasonable assurance that the referenced management control objectives were achieved in its 2008 management control assurance statement. The statement disclosed potential material weaknesses and/or significant deficiencies for which there were separate reports defining the scope of the problems, the impact on Department operations, and the status of actions taken and/or to be taken to correct the weaknesses. This information was forwarded to the appropriate Department officials. In Embassy Abuja, post management was unable to account for \$585,000 worth of property under the annual Non-Expendable Property Application inventory. Embassy Gaborone suffered cashier irregularities involving at least \$57,000. Embassy Monrovia experienced massive shortages of bulk fuel deliveries based on fraudulent receipts. Although all posts included a corrective plan of action in their submissions to the bureau and sent informal updates on corrections, it was not until the inspection team asked for verification that the posts had completed actions that the bureau sought the documentation about the respective corrective plans. By the time this inspection report is issued, the bureau will be preparing the 2009 management control assurance statement. The inspection team discussed with the bureau's management control officer the need to maintain supporting documentation of corrective action plans to prevent deficiencies from occurring again.

Although the operations of the Management Support and Budget and Finance Divisions were good, the inspectors identified some management controls weaknesses and issued informal recommendations to tighten loose controls.

PURCHASE CARD PROGRAM

The purchase card program lacks sufficient attention. Although the administrative officer reviews invoices, the inspectors found deficiencies in the way that purchase cards were used. For instance, one purchase card was used to pay for a recurring service in a particular office. AF/EX was paying for the rental of furniture using the government credit card for several months. During the course of the inspection, AF/EX stopped using the purchase card to pay for such service. Also, a review of invoices revealed that the required procedures for purchasing supplies or services are

not always followed. Three to four local companies are used too often in purchasing office supplies. Although there was no indication of impropriety and there are no requirements for competition, OIG informally recommended that the bureau's purchase card holders more frequently make their purchases through the General Service Administration's website. Doing so will ensure that the requirements relating to sources are met.

CONTRACTING OFFICER REPRESENTATIVE TRAINING AND CONTRACT OVERSIGHT

AF's CORs have not received the revised continuous learning the Office of Management and Budget prescribed November 26, 2007.¹³ The memorandum to all Executive Branch agency Chief Acquisition Officers establishes a structured training program for contracting officer technical representatives (COTRs), CORs, and other individuals performing these functions, which standardizes competencies and training across agencies and improves stewardship of taxpayer dollars. Each agency is to implement the Federal Acquisition Certification (FAC) for COTRs and requires 40 hours of refresher training every two years.

AF's CORs have followed the Department of State Acquisition Regulation 642.270(d) (1) and 14 FAH-2 which requires refresher training every five years. The OIG team asked the Department's Office of the Procurement Executive (A/OPE) about the 2007 requirement and why it had not been implemented. The Department acknowledged that its current COR training requirements were outdated and indicated it intended to change them this year.

The bureau does not have adequate mechanisms for keeping track of refresher training for CORs. The OIG team believes that CORs who have not taken the refresher training in the past two years need to do so immediately so that they can gain the latest federal and Department regulations governing procurement, contract development, and administration and comply with the FAC COTR.

¹³The FAC-COTR memorandum is found at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement/memo/fac-cotr.pdf.

Recommendation 13: The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration's Office of the Procurement Executive, should require its contracting officer representatives to take refresher contracting officer representative training every two years and maintain the training information to ensure compliance with the Federal Acquisition Certification for Contracting Officer Technical Representatives requirements. (Action: AF, in coordination with A)

Travel oversight of the contractors is inconsistent in the bureau. For some other AF/RSA projects, the CORs travel twice a year to perform on-site monitoring. For the programs in Mogadishu, Somalia, and elsewhere in East Africa where more frequent oversight is desired, A/LM/AQM/IP worked with AF/RSA to designate third-party contractor government technical monitors to assist the CORs.

The ACOTA program has grown from 12 African countries contributing troops in FY 2005 to 24 in FY 2009. Although the ACOTA program has expanded to many more partner countries and training sites, at the same time the travel budget for the COR has been reduced. It has dropped from a high of \$136,505 in FY 2006 down to the \$20,000 for FY 2009. The amount of money for travel is insufficient to oversee contractors' performance. This was done in a tight fiscal environment to permit others in AF/RSA to travel and because ACOTA program funds cannot be used for the travel of the COR. The result is that the COR depends heavily on telephone conferences and trip reports from contract regional training and operations managers. This is not an ideal situation and requires attention. It is in the best interest of the Department for CORs to travel to provide oversight in the continuation of peacekeeping support operations and capacity building initiatives through GPOI.

Recommendation 14: The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration's Office of Acquisition Management, should explore approaches that would ensure that all of its contracting officer representatives have sufficient travel funds, in concert with other mechanisms, to conduct oversight of their contractors. (Action: AF, in coordination with A/LM/AQM)

LEAHY VETTING

The Department is required to ensure that foreign security forces units that have participated in gross human rights violations do not receive training at U.S. Government expense in accordance with an annual requirement in the Department's appropriation legislation, commonly referred to as the Leahy Amendment. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) publishes guidelines for the process of making these determinations on its Intranet website. After briefly locating this work in AF/RSA, AF assigned Leahy vetting to the country directorates. Country directors have assigned designated office management specialists the primary responsibility for conducting classified name checks and securing clearances for the cables transmitting this information to posts. Each office management specialist spends about 20 percent of the work week on this activity.

The office management specialists report the classified name checks results to relevant desk officers. AF does not have a system for spot-checking or independently verifying the name check results. The OIG team left an informal recommendation on this issue. Country directors approve the final cables, which are cleared by DRL and other bureaus as appropriate.

SECURITY

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The program is managed by a bureau security officer (BSO). The BSO is a Civil Service officer employed by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Information Security, Programs and Applications Division (DS/IS/APD), and one of ten BSO's serving in a direct-support role to the Department's geographic and functional bureaus. This program was created in 2004 with the purpose of having subject matter expert BSO's serve as the "hub" in all matters concerning security. The BSO is responsible for developing, inspecting, and advising on procedures and controls for safeguarding classified and administratively controlled information and for enforcing all associated security regulations. As a Civil Service officer, the BSO provides the continuity needed for internal security within AF. There are also 14 primary and alternate unit security officers, rotated once a year and usually assigned at the directorate or equivalent level.

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Security Incident Program

The OIG team found the security incident program well managed. Department regulation 12 FAM 553.1a. requires all security incidents to be reported to DS/IS/APD. There were a total of 10 security incidents in the last 12 months and all were investigated. The investigations concluded that the incidents were infractions and not violations. (b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)(b) (2)
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Annual Security Refresher Briefing

AF does not have an annual security refresher briefing program. Annual security refresher briefings are conducted Department-wide to reinforce security awareness among personnel. Under 12 FAM 564.2, all functional bureaus within the State Department must provide, at a minimum, annual security refresher training for personnel having continued access to classified information. This is one of many tools used to prevent personnel in becoming indifferent to good security practice.

Recommendation 16: The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, should develop a bureau specific annual security refresher briefing for employees having continued access to classified information. (Action: AF, in coordination with DS)

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Positive control of TS documents is crucial not only in protecting national security information, but in many instances, other U.S. Government agencies are the originator of the documents and the Department of State is a custodian.) (b) (2)

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Information Systems Security Officer Responsibilities

The BSO is the primary information systems security officer (ISSO) for AF. She has an alternate ISSO who is a senior systems analyst contractor. Both have the responsibilities for the IT security gamut. All the requirements of 12 FAM 622 are being met. The ISSO is a collateral duty for the BSO. However, preserving the bureau's information systems integrity and the many duties this entails can be time consuming.

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ISSO problems created as a result of the Bureau of Information Resource Management consolidation are a Department-wide issue and therefore no recommendation will be made specifically for AF.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: The Bureau of African Affairs should make responsibility for leadership, team building, staff development, and morale as prominent as policy development and implementation in the work requirements statements of all ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, section chiefs, office directors, and deputy office directors and require that employee evaluations comment on performance in these areas with concrete examples. (Action: AF)

Recommendation 2: The Bureau of African Affairs should survey embassy employees and the bureau's professional and support staff to assess supervisors' leadership skills, and include that feedback when preparing performance evaluations, making recommendations for performance pay, or nominating ambassadorial or deputy chief of mission candidates, including repeat supervisory assignments. (Action: AF)

Recommendation 3: The Bureau of African Affairs should instruct African posts on how to handle Africa Command requests for embassy support and include an appendix of best practices of effective embassy-military relationships. (Action: AF)

Recommendation 4: The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration, should consolidate the elements of the Office of Regional Security Affairs at a single location that is conveniently located for continuing frequent interaction with the Front Office and other offices of the bureau. (Action: AF, in coordination with A)

Recommendation 5: The Bureau of African Affairs should review its Bureau Strategic Plan and implement a plan to improve goal performance indicators, ensure that the work plans of each bureau office are in alignment with the intended outcomes of the related portion of the Bureau Strategic Plan, and that Mission Strategic Plans are in alignment with the Bureau Strategic Plan. (Action: AF)

Recommendation 6: The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, should explicitly address the issue of corruption in Africa and include performance measures of anticorruption effectiveness, beginning with the fiscal year 2011 Bureau Strategic Plan. (Action: AF, in coordination with INL)

Recommendation 7: The Bureau of African Affairs should develop and implement a plan to restructure its regional functional offices, including merging the political and planning functions of the Office of Regional and Security Affairs with the Office of Economic and Policy Staff, creating a new Office of Regional Policy and Planning, and consolidating the counterterrorism portfolio in a re-named Office of Regional Security Affairs. (Action: AF)

Recommendation 8: The Bureau of African Affairs should attach the bureau's congressional affairs officer to the Front Office, rather than to the Office of Regional and Security Affairs, regardless of the physical location of the work area. (Action: AF)

Recommendation 9: The Bureau of African Affairs should commission and produce an independent review of why integration failed, and what must be done to create a functioning, productive, valued public diplomacy and public affairs office for the future within 90 days of receipt of the inspection report. (Action: AF)

Recommendation 10: The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with the Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, should draft and implement a strategic plan for public diplomacy and public affairs in the Bureau of African Affairs for the next three to five years, within 90 days of receipt of the inspection report. (Action: AF, in coordination with R)

Recommendation 11: The Bureau of African Affairs should establish a standard operating procedure for desk officers to attend meetings with visitors from their assigned countries, take notes, brief their posts on the proceedings, and follow up on any commitments. (Action: AF)

Recommendation 12: The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Human Resources, should hire at least five additional full-time direct-hire employees with contracting skills to serve as program managers and contracting officer representatives in the Office of Regional and Security Affairs. (Action: AF, in coordination with HR)

Recommendation 13: The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration's Office of the Procurement Executive, should require its contracting officer representatives to take refresher contracting officer representative training every two years and maintain the training information to ensure compliance with the Federal Acquisition Certification for Contracting Officer Technical Representatives requirements. (Action: AF, in coordination with A)

Recommendation 14: The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration's Office of Acquisition Management, should explore approaches that would ensure that all of its contracting officer representatives have sufficient travel funds, in concert with other mechanisms, to conduct oversight of their contractors. (Action: AF, in coordination with A/LM/AQM)

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Recommendation 16: The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, should develop a bureau specific annual security refresher briefing for employees having continued access to classified information. (Action: AF, in coordination with DS))

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INFORMAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Informal recommendations cover operational matters not requiring action by organizations outside the inspected unit and/or the parent regional bureau. Informal recommendations will not be subject to the OIG compliance process. However, any subsequent OIG inspection or on-site compliance review will assess the Bureau's progress in implementing the informal recommendations.

Leadership

AF has a number of supervisors in the bureau and the field who do not exhibit the leadership skills that the promotion precepts require of senior level employees. Lack of leadership skills appears to be contributing to the bureau's efforts to recruit and retain staff, and to quality of life problems in the field.

Informal Recommendation 1: The Bureau of African Affairs should develop written leadership tenets, reinforce them at chief of mission conferences and in bureau senior staff meetings, and use them to counsel supervisors.

The bureau relies heavily on Civil Service foreign affairs officers who get mixed results from their supervisors in terms of mentoring and career advice. Likewise, they feel they have no one individual to speak for them and their issues.

Informal Recommendation 2: The Bureau of African Affairs should designate the principal deputy assistant secretary to be the mentor and advocate for the bureau's Civil Service foreign affairs staff.

Internal Communication

Many desk officers would welcome the opportunity to participate in meetings where they could interact with peers and more senior staff. Country directors do not encourage junior staff to attend the bureau's weekly meeting.

Informal Recommendation 3: The Bureau of African Affairs should encourage its country desk officers to attend the bureau's weekly expanded meetings on a rotational basis whenever possible.

Some directorates meet at a time of day incompatible with operational requirements, including preparation of press guidance and telephone contact with posts in distant time zones.

Informal Recommendation 4: The Bureau of African Affairs should schedule staff meetings in the country directorates at a minimally disruptive time of day.

Professional Development

Civil Service desk officers will likely occupy their positions longer than the two years that is the normal assignment span for a Foreign Service officer. While this can contribute valuable institutional continuity, managers need to be alert to the potential for the officers to burn out, as well as for the need to bring a fresh mind to their portfolios.

Informal Recommendation 5: The Bureau of African Affairs should develop a rotation policy and offer rotation opportunities to its Civil Service officers.

Several country directors talked to the inspectors about things they had learned while managing their offices and their regret that there was no natural forum in the bureau for sharing those experiences with their peers. Expanded and senior staff meetings are focused and often devoted to discussing urgent operational issues.

Informal Recommendation 6: The Bureau of African Affairs should devote one or two senior staff meetings each month exclusively to issues of staff management.

Human Resource Management

Throughout the inspection, the OIG team received a litany of complaints about the lack of adequate orientation for new employees. Usefulness of the bureau's orientation program scored unacceptably low in OIG's Workplace and Quality of Life Questionnaire.

Informal Recommendation 7: The Bureau of African Affairs should institute a formal orientation program for new employees.

Some supervisors in the bureau are not aware of how to address performance issues; therefore many have been unwilling to address these issues.

Informal Recommendation 8: The Bureau of African Affairs should disseminate and encourage the use of the guidance currently available in the U.S. Office of Personnel Management's website and in the Department regulations.

Informal Recommendation 9: The Bureau of African Affairs should encourage its supervisors to complete Foreign Service Institute training on employee relations. (Action: AF)

Informal Recommendation 10: The Bureau of African Affairs should hold a round-table or a one-day session with supervisors on how to address and document performance issues for both Civil Service and Foreign Service employees.

Equal Employment Opportunity

The EEO process and the names of EEO counselors are not posted in high traffic areas in AF offices in the Harry S Truman building or the annexes.

Informal Recommendation 11: The Bureau African Affairs should place Equal Employment Opportunity information in high traffic areas in bureau offices in the Harry S Truman building and annexes.

AF has not named a Federal Women's Program Coordinator.

Informal Recommendation 12: The Bureau of African Affairs should name a Federal Women's Program Coordinator and submit the information to the Office of Civil Rights.

Management Support Division

The Management Support Division does not maintain proper recordkeeping for its disposal and reconciliation functions.

Informal Recommendation 13: The Bureau of African Affairs should implement better daily procedures for property records, such as consolidating disposal records in a single binder, marking entries to denote the classified/unclassified status of personal property, and scheduling the inventory well in advance to permit adequate time for reconciliation of any discrepancies.

There is no process on how to obtain supplies. Some people go directly to the supply area while others place orders directly with the Management Support Division.

Informal Recommendation 14: The Bureau of African Affairs should establish a standard operating procedure for obtaining office supplies.

AF/EX does not maintain a list of expendable supplies to track usage and ordering levels.

Informal Recommendation 15: The Bureau of African Affairs should keep a list of its expendable supplies electronically to track usage levels and know when to order supplies.

Although the review of the purchases of each purchase card is done monthly, an annual review of the purchase cards is not being done.

Informal Recommendation 16: The Bureau of African Affairs should review its purchase cards annually.

Some employees, including the office management specialists who create the travel authorization for some principals in the bureau, have not taken E² Solutions training.

Informal Recommendation 17: The Bureau of African Affairs should require all employees who travel frequently, along with office management specialist staff who make travel arrangements for others, to take the E² Solutions training.

Some requests for travel authorizations are made at the last minute, vouchers include improper claims for reimbursement that must be returned, and vouchers are submitted several days and even months late with demands for prompt payment.

Informal Recommendation 18: The Bureau of African Affairs should strengthen and reissue its standard operating procedures on travel.

The Management Support Division does not participate in the weekly AF/EX staff meeting because the chief of the division is also a post management officer.

Informal Recommendation 19: The Bureau of African Affairs should allow the head of the Management Support Division to attend the weekly staff meetings of the Executive Directorate.

Budget and Finance Division

The Budget and Finance Division does not post status of funds on the bureau's SharePoint.

Informal Recommendation 20: The Bureau of African Affairs should post on its SharePoint site the status of funds by office in a quarterly basis.

Although 5 FAM 523 requires employees to use personal calling cards to make personal long distance calls, the Budget and Finance Division still bills employees for personal calls.

Informal Recommendation 21: The Bureau of African Affairs should issue a notice on mandatory use of calling cards from its landline extensions, stop billing employees for personal telephone calls, and establish a plan to spot check for questionable calls in the future.

The budget and finance staff monitors current allotments reported by the AF posts, but is not reviewing regularly the post allotments for potential problems, such as excessive travel advance and suspense account balances.

Informal Recommendation 22: The Bureau of African Affairs should develop a schedule to review more often its field allotments for anomalies in potentially problematic accounts such as travel advance and suspense account balances.

The budget and finance staff follows up with employees who are delinquent in their government travel card but does not always provide the Bureau of Resource Management with the documentation demonstrating that counseling with those employees took place.

Informal Recommendation 23: The Bureau of African Affairs should provide to the Bureau of Resource Management with documentation showing that counseling about the necessity to pay travel card account balances on time took place.

The staff is using purchase cards too often to purchase office supplies from three or four local companies.

Informal Recommendation 24: The Bureau of African Affairs should instruct its purchase card holders to use the General Service Administration's website more often to purchase supplies.

Leahy Vetting

Although office management specialists report the classified name checks results to relevant desk officers in the bureau's Leahy vetting process, AF does not have a system for spot-checking or independently verifying the name check results.

Informal Recommendation 25: The Bureau of African Affairs should have its Office of Regional and Security Affairs conduct periodic random spot checks of Leahy vetting name check results.

Annual Review of Classified and Sensitive But Unclassified Hard Copy Material

AF currently does not adopt a policy of reviewing and purging SBU and classified material that is no longer needed for the fulfillment of the mission. (b) (2)
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(b) (2)(b) (2) Although there is not a formal Department of State policy regarding the purging of classified/SBU files, this is good security practice.

Informal Recommendation 26: The Bureau of African Affairs should dedicate one hour annually to allow all employees to review classified and sensitive but unclassified documents in their holdings in order to identify material for destruction.

In-Out Processing of Personnel

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Informal Recommendation 27: The Bureau of African Affairs should place the bureau security officer on the checklist given to incoming and outgoing personnel, to ensure that all matters concerning security are given due diligence.

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS

	Name	Arrival Date
Executive Office:		
Assistant Secretary	Johnnie Carson	5/07/2009
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary	Phillip Carter III	8/11/2008
Deputy Assistant Secretary (Acting)	Karl Wycoff	9/05/2007
Deputy Assistant Secretary (Acting)	Mary Jo Wills	8/20/2007
Deputy Assistant Secretary	Vacant	

Office Directors:

Executive Director	Margaret Keeton	9/15/2008
AF/EPS	Ann Breiter	9/05/2007
AF/RSA	Louis Mazel	11/03/2007
AF/E	James Knight	8/27/2007
AF/S (Acting)	Makila James	10/01/2007
AF/C (Acting)	Siria Lopez	6/30/2008
AF/W (Acting)	Don Heflin	8/07/2006
AF/PDPA	Claudia Anyaso	7/24/2006

ABBREVIATIONS

ACOTA	African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program
A/LM/AQM/IP	International Programs Unit, Office of Acquisition Management, Logistics Management, Bureau of Administration
AF	Bureau of African Affairs
AF/EPS	Office of Economic and Policy Staff, Bureau of African Affairs
AF/EX	Executive Office, Bureau of African Affairs
AF/PDPA	Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs
AF/RSA	Office of Regional Security Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs
AFRICOM	United States Africa Command
AGOA	African Growth and Opportunity Act of 2004
BGAN	Broad Area Global Network
BBG	Broadcasting Board of Governors
BSO	Bureau Security Officer
BSP	Bureau Strategic Plan
COR	Contracting officer's representative
COTR	Contracting officer's technical representative
DAS	Deputy assistant secretary
DRL	Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor
DS	Bureau of Diplomatic Security
DS/IS/APD	Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Information Security, Programs and Applications Division
EEO	Equal Employment Opportunity and Civil Rights
EUCOM	U.S. European Command

FAC	Federal Acquisition Certification
FAH	Foreign Affairs Handbook
FAM	Foreign Affairs Manual
FSI	Foreign Service Institute
G-8	Group of Eight
GPOI	Global Peace Operations Initiative
HR	Human resources
ICASS	International Cooperative Administrative Support Services
IDIQ	Indefinite-delivery indefinite-quantity
ISSO	Information systems security officer
IT	Information technology
LE	Locally employed
M/DG/HR	Bureau of Human Resources
MIST	Military information support teams
M/PRI	Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing and Innovation
OES	Bureau of Oceans, Environment and Science
OIG	Office of Inspector General
PKO	Peacekeeping operation
PM	Bureau of Political Military Affairs
R	Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs
SCI	Sensitive compartmented information
TSCO	Top Secret control officer
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
WAE	When actually employed

APPENDIX A

Questionnaire to U.S. Embassies for Chief and Deputy Chief of Mission

The OIG team sent several questions to the 48 U.S. Missions in sub-Saharan Africa. Well over half of the missions responded. Issues mentioned most often in responses are tabulated below.

1. Which two African policy or security issues occupy most of your time?

- Regional security issues (peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and management of the U.S. military relationship) – 23 responses.
- Promotion of democracy and good governance (elections, human rights, anti-corruption and economic sanctions) – 22 responses.
- Economic development (education, trade) – 10 responses.
- Humanitarian assistance (HIV/AIDS, health) – 9 responses.

2. Is your mission reporting adequately on these issues and receiving feedback from Washington end-users (primarily country desk)?

- Yes 36 (84%)
- No 07 (16%)

3. What is the single public diplomacy issue that occupies you most?

- Lack of recognition of U.S. efforts to help or lack of public support for the U.S. government in general – 15 responses.
- Need for public support for U.S. democratic and humanitarian (HIV/AIDS) goals – 9 responses.
- Need for guidance on regional African issues, including U.S. support for democracy in Africa, regional peacekeeping activities, and U.S. security policies - 7 responses.

4. Does the Department provide relevant, timely public affairs guidance?

- Yes 32 (74%)
- No 11 (26%)

5. Which two developmental issues are the focuses of American assistance in your country? In your opinion, are these issues appropriate targets for American aid and is assistance coordinated multilaterally?

- HIV/AIDS (PEPFAR) - 27 responses.
- Food Assistance and agricultural programs – 9 responses.
- Economic Growth (Millennium Challenge) – 7 responses.
- Security Assistance (IMET, Counterterrorism) - 6 responses.
- Education – 4 responses.

OIG Summary Comment: Health and hunger assistance dominate responses, with concern that such assistance is not accompanied by attention to urgent developmental needs, such as education. Multilateral coordination appears satisfactory, but there is considerable frustration that Washington-centered domination of assistance (the new F process and congressional earmarks) sharply reduces the role of the field.

6. Which two management issues concern you the most? What support or guidance does the Department (primarily AF/EX) provide on these issues?

- Staffing inadequacies (Need for management personnel, regional support, training, recruitment, and LE staff retention) – 27 responses.
- Facilities (Chancery and housing) – 13 responses.
- Inadequate budget – 6 responses.

OIG Comment: Support is the source of complaints, but the subject encompasses regional support, ICASS services, need for new offices, insecurity (crime), and frustration with IT facilities.

7. Are African posts able to attract and staff key positions with qualified personnel?

- Yes - 58%.
- No - 42%.

If not, why not in your opinion?

OIG Summary Comment: AF has great difficulty attracting personnel to what are viewed generally as undesirable posts, although there is some bidding for Africa based on a desire to avoid tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, where families must be left behind. Often poor morale at hardship posts is due to housing, crime, health and schooling concerns, staffing gaps, and sometimes poor leadership. The field complains that the hardship allowance is not the financial incentive it

was in the past, with service in Washington mentioned as being almost as lucrative in terms of pay and retirement. Moreover, the system must currently reserve its rewards for those serving in the highest priority countries, namely Iraq and Afghanistan.

8. Is the Bureau an effective advocate for any pressing Consular, IT (Information Technology), Security or other key areas that are its indirect responsibility?

-Yes 21 responses or 63%.

- No 12 responses or 38%.

9. Anything further you wish to add on the foregoing or new subjects?

OIG Summary Comment: There is considerable dissatisfaction with the African Bureau, ranging from lack of communication from the regional desks to front office disinterest in all but the crisis posts.

APPENDIX B

Options to Improve the Staffing Situation

Various alternatives to address staffing challenges are listed below. Some approaches have been already been attempted to a certain measure. Other options have not yet been tried but are offered for consideration.

1. Move funding for WAEs to the central system. (Bureau does not endorse this idea. For AF, about \$4 million is provided in domestic programs. Bureau would have less flexibility and could lose known WAEs who are willing to serve in AF.)
2. The central system could reimburse the bureau for long-term temporary duty assignments (more than 6 months to cover gaps and time serving in Iraq and Afghanistan).
3. Extend time on WAEs. (The Director General has provided exceptions to the pay cap, as needed.)
4. Extend mandatory Foreign Service retirement if the individual agrees to serve at a hard-to-fill post. (The Director General has granted limited career extensions.)
5. Enforce fair-share rules and require fair-share bidding and serving in fair-share assignments earlier, that is, upon the first mid-level assignment if the previous entry-level assignments have not met fair-shares rules.
6. Waive the Civil Service annuity penalty for Civil Service employees who wish to serve at hard-to-fill posts after retirement. (The waiver authority comes from the U.S. Office of Personnel Management. Pending legislation may authorize the waiver permanently.)
7. Use more personal service contracts. (Personal service contractors cannot make obligations for the U.S. Government or provide roles that are inherently governmental. Limited authority.)

8. Hire more ordinarily resident Americans and apply for an exception rate range if necessary. (Done frequently.)
9. Extend PL 3161 for other countries, similar to the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan.
10. Use more excepted service employees such as Schedules B and C and other employment vehicles for overseas service.
11. Make more judicious use of the National Security Decision Directive -38 process.
12. Hire more local staff, with the obvious increase in ICASS and other budget funding, where possible and practical.
13. Contract for office management staff and other not inherently governmental positions.
14. Follow pending legislation to include locality pay in overseas salaries.
15. Use more fellowship programs. (Could work for domestic requirements but full-time equivalent positions are needed for Presidential Management Fellows. They are inexperienced staff who need mid- or senior-level supervision and guidance.)
16. Fill the positions at the mid-level more judiciously. (Might take five or so years to recruit and train the new officers.)
17. Provide linked assignments to a desired post after serving at a hard-to-fill post. (Similar to Iraq and Afghanistan.)
18. Given lack of mid-level supervision and guidance capabilities, do not assign entry-level officers to posts without appropriate supervision and experience unless they have requisite knowledge from prior work experience.
19. Coordinate with M/PRI regarding right-sizing the Department while other agencies are growing.
20. Freeze the number of positions to equal the number of employees bidding.

FRAUD, WASTE, ABUSE, OR MISMANAGEMENT
of Federal programs
and resources hurts everyone.

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to ensure confidentiality.