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AFRICA COMMAND

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ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

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AFRICA COMMAND

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[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]	

AFRICA COMMAND

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, November 14, 2007.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:08 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for bearing with us. And, ladies and gentlemen, we welcome you to the Armed Services hearing on the United States African Command (AFRICOM).

We have appearing before us the Honorable Ryan Henry, Principal Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Ambassador Stephen Mull, Acting Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; and General Kip Ward, the Commanding General of Africa Command.

And, General, we welcome you and thank you for being with us today.

This is a reminder today that there are places in the world well beyond Iraq and Afghanistan that we must be concerned with, and this is a new thought, a new venture, and we in our country need to pay a great deal of attention to it.

When you stop and think about it, Africa represents a range of real and potential national security-related concerns and deserves great consideration by us.

First, of course, is that Africa is a theater in the war on terror. We remember the attacks on the American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998.

And today Operation Enduring Freedom—Trans Sahara (OEF-TS) is ongoing as we speak, with American forces working with their African counterparts in places like Algeria, Chad, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria and Tunisia to strengthen the region's counterterrorism efforts—one or more of those nations and large portions of territory where no state government really exists and terrorists can find safe haven, sadly, in those ungoverned places.

So we do welcome you gentlemen. We look forward to your testimony. I will ask that the balance of my prepared statement be put in the record without objection.

And I will ask our esteemed ranking member for his comments at this time.

Mr. Hunter.

**STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES**

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for holding this hearing.

And welcome to General Kip Ward, who appears before this committee for the first time as the commander of the new United States Africa Command.

And, General, we value your continued commitment and services. We recognize the growing importance of stability on the African continent and its significant impact on the international security environment and especially the global war on terror.

We also welcome the Honorable Ryan Henry and Ambassador Stephen Mull, who will certainly provide insight into both the creation of AFRICOM and its future as a model of interagency cooperation.

Ever since the Department of Defense (DOD) released its latest Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in February of 2006, we in Congress have been watching to see how the Department would translate its multitude of findings and recommendations into some concrete steps that will help the young men and women of our U.S. military meet the challenges of a changed and still-evolving security environment.

Earlier this year, President Bush announced his decision to create AFRICOM as one such step. At the time, he noted that “this new command will strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa. Africa Command will enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa.”

Over the last several decades alone, we can all recall the horrifying genocides, rebellions and civil wars and the natural disasters that have occurred on the African continent.

These events, which raised death tolls to unimaginable levels and caused massive influxes of refugees and internally displaced people, serve as a grim reminder of what we all stand to lose in the face of massive instability.

We see this reminder still in the current situation within the Darfur region of Sudan and in the continued saber-rattling within several other Africa subregions.

So I agree with the President’s goals as he laid out earlier this year—development, health, education, democracy and economic growth.

The question becomes, though, how a United States combatant command can best work toward these goals which, to be honest, may contribute to national security but are not viewed as traditional military goals.

My questions are therefore twofold. First, many media outlets and regional experts report that Africa officials have expressed significant misgivings that the establishment of Africa Command will lead to the militarization of our relations with their nations.

In light of the number of coups and armed conflicts that have occurred in Africa since many of those nations gained independence, I imagine that those officials are justifiably wary of anything with even a hint of militarization.

In addition, in a briefing I recently received, I learned that the U.S. Government spends about \$9 billion per year in Africa on health, development, trade promotion and good governance activities.

Yet we spend only \$250 million annually on building capabilities and capacities for peacekeeping, border and coastal security, and logistics and airlift support for peacekeeping, as well as holding training exercises and bilateral events.

Mr. Henry, you also highlighted this disparity in your written testimony.

Given their possible distrust of foreign military influence and given this disparity in the focus of U.S. aid, how are we reassuring our African friends that this new command will not lead to increased U.S. efforts to control or otherwise influence their militaries?

And how have you responded to their concerns as expressed to date? And what is your plan for continued engagement on such future concerns?

My second question focuses on the interagency aspect of this new command. I understand that AFRICOM is attempting to establish a complementary mix of military and civilian personnel with officials from the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) working side by side with Defense Department officials.

However, I have also heard rumblings that U.S. embassy personnel in African capitals and elsewhere may be suspicious of an overarching regional construct, particularly one that is essentially a military combatant command.

The best way I think of to ensure that a player is fully invested in a successful team-oriented outcome is to make certain that player is literally invested.

Given that a significant number of AFRICOM personnel will be State Department and USAID officials, please describe the cost-sharing arrangement for Fiscal Year 2008 and in future fiscal years so that we can rest assured non-DOD players are full stakeholders in the success of this command and its interagency missions.

And particularly, gentlemen, I have always been concerned with the standup of military operations which end up being viewed as a money payer by the other agencies, and I hope that we will see burden-sharing in this, what really has to be considered to be a joint venture in Africa.

In closing, we have seen how ungoverned and undergoverned spaces can become safe havens for terrorists. By partnering more closely with nations on the African continent, we can help to develop more secure borders, more responsible and capable military forces and security institutions that are more responsive to national governments, and we can help to close the doors of any safe havens located there.

I look forward to hearing how standing up AFRICOM will expand upon those efforts.

And once again, General, as we discussed a little earlier, General Ward, I think that one of the real values of the combatant commands around the world and the military presence is the develop-

ment of those relationships between military leaders in those countries and American military leaders.

And to a large degree, I have seen our military leaders as being really, truly our best ambassadors, our best diplomats. And I would think that establishing working relationships with the military leaders of the African states will accrue to our benefit in the future.

And it is an area that we should prioritize in terms of developing relationships, having lots of visits to American training commands, and trying to build long-term, stable relationships that will pay off 5 years, 10 years, 15 years, 20 years from now.

So thank you, gentlemen. Thanks for being with us this morning.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this very important hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

I have invited Don Payne, the subcommittee chairman on Africa from the Foreign Affairs Committee, to join us, and without objection he will be with us today.

And with that said, Secretary Henry, welcome.

**STATEMENT OF HON. RYAN HENRY, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY**

Secretary HENRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are genuinely appreciative of the opportunity to come and talk to you today.

We have found that dialogue and discussion not only helps inform people of where we are trying to go with the command but also enriches our efforts in standing up this new command with a new construct. So we genuinely look forward to it.

The fact that Africa is rising in significance to the United States is undeniable. The reorganization of our military structure within the Department of Defense to accommodate a continental unified command is just a manifestation of that growing importance.

In my submitted statement, I outlined the rationale, structure and objectives for guiding the creation of AFRICOM and addressed some of the ranking member's second question. Hopefully, in my oral statement, I will address some of your first question.

Because over the course of hundreds of consultations regarding AFRICOM, we as a group have learned that the vast majority that we talk to have initial reservations about the new command, and especially those on the African continent, and that these misgivings are fed by misperceptions and recirculated myths.

These misunderstandings—they tend to cloud the dialogue until they are adequately addressed, and therefore I would like to use the brief period I have for my oral statement to address these misunderstandings and thereby afford General Ward and Ambassador Mull the opportunity to address the proactive aspects of AFRICOM in their statements.

First myth: Many Africans and even some of their leaders suspect that we are establishing AFRICOM to further some specific Department of Defense agenda on the continent. And it usually comes down to three variants of that.

Either we are there solely to fight terrorism and thereby will make the continent a bigger target for terrorist activity, or we are there to counter growing Chinese influence and thereby we are going to polarize the continent between two superpowers, or even

we are there to secure Africa's mineral wealth—usually it is specifically oil they think that we are after—and thereby exploit the continent in a neo-colonial fashion.

These myths just are not true. Violent extremism and the safe havens afforded to them by ungoverned, misgoverned and undergoverned areas is a concern which we will address in cooperation with our African partners in a manner similar to the way we do today, each and every day, but it is not the singular focus of the command.

The United States, China and other countries share a common interest in a stable, secure and rising Africa. And though we may differ on the means, we look forward to cooperating with China as a responsible international stakeholder to achieve that end.

Additionally, while natural resources represent much of Africa's current and future material wealth, it is in a stable environment where Africans have unimpeded access for bringing their goods to the world marketplace that will deliver the most benefit to Africans and, I might add, non-Africans.

The second set of myths swirl around the claim that AFRICOM is a manifestation of a militarization of foreign policy, the Pentagon's effort to make inroads in the area of foreign policy. This is also false.

AFRICOM will not change the State Department's role as the lead in foreign policy.

Each of our ambassador's authorities as the chief of mission in any country will not just be respected but will be reinforced by AFRICOM's cooperative and integrated whole government approach to security issues under the country team leadership of the ambassador.

And I think it is notable with Ambassador Mull being here today—and in each and every meeting or deliberation that we have had regarding AFRICOM, there has been a representative of the State Department there.

The third generic myth is that some accuse AFRICOM of being a unilateral mechanism for seizing control of security issues on the continent. Again, this is not why we need an AFRICOM.

Africans will continue to lead efforts to address their own security challenges. The Department of Defense recognizes and applauds the leadership role that Africans both on a regional and individual basis and also the African Union are taking to promote security and stability.

We seek to complement these efforts in a supporting role, not to compete with them in a leadership role. Through many of our capacity-building programs, we seek to support, not supplant, African leadership.

U.S. national security is enhanced most on the continent when African nations and organizations can address and resolve emerging security issues before they erupt into regional and international crises that will require, then, international intervention.

Finally, despite such misrepresentations, AFRICOM was not developed in a vacuum. Our outreach campaign was comprised of hundreds of separate engagements with African nations both on the continent and here in Washington, D.C., with Congress, non-

governmental organizations, the media, multilateral institutions and numerous foreign governments in Europe and Asia.

Constant and continuing dialogue with our African partners has genuinely influenced the development of the command. I have personally been to the continent twice to consult with the key leaders of 14 different nations.

And despite some public accounts to the contrary, almost all the African nations expressed their appreciation for the greater U.S. engagement in Africa and their support for our desire to work with the African Union (AU).

Overwhelmingly, once people are educated about the command, their fears subside and their interests are heightened.

Of course, no matter the extent of our outreach efforts, rumors will persist, and the key to dispelling rumors, in addition to speaking with you here today, is to stand up AFRICOM and demonstrate that these fears have no foundation.

We are thrilled to have General Ward in command of AFRICOM and believe his efforts to execute defense policies on the continent will be successful and continue to be received favorably by Africans. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Henry can be found in the Appendix on page 45.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thanks so much, Mr. Secretary.
Ambassador Mull.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR STEPHEN D. MULL, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS

Ambassador MULL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Hunter. It is a great delight to appear before the House Armed Services Committee again today to talk about AFRICOM.

Africa today is a place of promise and opportunity linked to the United States through culture, history and commerce. But it is also a place of severe challenges such as poverty, disease, terrorism and instability that all together pose critical risks for U.S. interests.

From the very first conversation between the Departments of State and Defense on the idea of AFRICOM more than a year ago, we at State have enthusiastically welcomed the idea of a unified command for Africa which would feature a number of exciting innovations, including the transformation of the U.S. military strategic approach to the continent from three separate commands into one; expanded attention to building the military capacity of our African partners so that they can better work together with us in confronting the common threats we face such as terrorism, ungoverned areas, and civil and international conflicts, as the chairman mentioned; but also feature a more coherent approach to important regional security concerns that affect America's vital interests.

It would provide a more efficient way of giving emergency humanitarian assistance and managing the response to military crises.

And it would provide an unprecedented new way of interagency cooperation that would feature opening the door to substantial ci-

vilian agency involvement in the command, including by putting senior civilians in leadership positions in the command.

Our enthusiasm for the idea only increased with the appointment of General Kip Ward, whose strong leadership skills and warm personal relationships across the continent will only augur well for the command's success.

From the very beginning of planning for AFRICOM, State was an integral partner. We assigned officers to join the command design team here in Washington and later in Stuttgart, and many aspects of the new command reflect substantial input by State and other civilian officials.

We collaborated in briefing your staffs here in the Congress, appropriate nongovernmental organizations, African governments and in briefing the press.

We joined in officially briefing key African partners on a series of trips to the region and at a conference here in the United States. And we joined in briefing key allies and partners around the world on our intentions.

The result of this collaboration is a command that will substantially improve the U.S. Government's effectiveness in responding to Africa's unique challenges and in creating an atmosphere that is favorable to America's considerable interests there.

In describing AFRICOM, it is probably more important to describe what it is not. It will not take the place of the Department of State and of U.S. embassies in the field as the voice of American foreign policy in our relationships with African states and organizations.

It will not have any authorities beyond those that U.S. military commands already enjoy.

It will not establish new military bases on the African continent.

It will not have any less responsibility to obtain chief of mission concurrence and coordinate all its activities in individual countries.

Its civilian officials will not exercise any authority on behalf of their parent agencies.

And finally, to Congressman Hunter's remarks, I believe that will not supplant U.S. foreign assistance activities. Last year, total U.S. foreign assistance for Africa totaled to be about \$9 billion. AFRICOM's resources will be substantially less than that, three percent to five percent of that, depending on how the budget turns out.

Now, conversely, here is what the command will allow. Instead of a more traditional focus on preparing for combat, AFRICOM will concentrate on a more strategically coherent focus on our security cooperation and military relationships in Africa and more effective support of important programs that we fund with Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), peacekeeping funds and Section 1206 funds.

These programs include the President's Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI), which aims to train tens of thousands of new troops for peacekeeping operations; the Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Initiative, which aims to improve the capacities of northern and central African states to respond to the terrorist threat; the Maritime Security Initiative in the Gulf of Guinea which aims to increase the ability of the region's states to provide

for their own maritime security and other African coastal and border security programs.

It will help support the East African counterterrorism initiative and support for peacekeeping missions in Africa such as the United Nations (U.N.) mission in Darfur.

AFRICOM will also help support security sector reform in such key places as Liberia and southern Sudan.

Also, importantly, it will allow civilian agencies like State and AID to have a seat at the table in shaping the military support of these programs, working in close liaison with all of our embassies on the continent.

We are proud that the State Department has already contributed Ambassador Mary Carlin Yates as one of the two deputies to the commander and look forward to contributing a number of other officers to assist and guide the command in its work, such as a foreign policy adviser, Jerry Lanier, who joins me here today.

There will obviously be substantial challenges to overcome in standing up this command regarding the location or locations of the command, security and infrastructure concerns, winning political and diplomatic support for the command on the continent, and sorting out the status of AFRICOM's forces in the countries where they reside both with host governments and resident U.S. embassies.

But we are confident, based on our extremely productive inter-agency partnership thus far, that we are going to succeed in overcoming those challenges and scoring a real win for America's interests in Africa in the longer term.

Thanks very much for the opportunity to appear before you today, and I look forward to taking your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Mull can be found in the Appendix on page 52.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much. General Ward, please.

**STATEMENT OF GENERAL WILLIAM E. "KIP" WARD, USA,
COMMANDER, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND**

General WARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Hunter, distinguished members of the committee. I am honored to be appearing before you in my position as the commander, United States Africa Command.

U.S. AFRICOM was created to consolidate and focus the work of the Department of Defense and to enable us to better support United States policy in Africa.

I believe that U.S. AFRICOM will add value to America's security cooperation projects and the delivery of American security assistance programs in Africa, thus making them more efficient and responsive.

The leadership of the African Union was positive in their support for this objective during my visit with them just this past week. And I might add that I discussed this with 23 separate African ambassadors to the A.U.—again, overwhelming support for the objectives of the command.

It is in our national interest to build an enduring organization designed to enhance our government's capacity to help Africans care for their stability, development and prosperity.

AFRICOM is a command under construction. We are building the team. We would like to realize a complementary mix of Department of Defense civilian and military staff and, as has been noted, representatives from across the interagency departments of our government.

With the goal of achieving full operational capability as a unified command by October 2008, U.S. AFRICOM endeavors to be innovative in its construct.

Our intention is to move beyond the traditional concept of liaison officers and instead have our interagency partners serve in staff positions alongside their Department of Defense counterparts.

U.S. AFRICOM will complement, as the under secretary pointed out, not compete with, the activities of other U.S. governmental activities and organizations.

U.S. AFRICOM will, indeed, add value and, in so doing, do no harm to the collective and substantial ongoing security cooperation programs and other efforts on the continent.

We will do everything in our power not to disrupt or confuse current security and stabilizing efforts in Africa. We do need to be aware of those other activities.

We will add value by harmonizing U.S. military efforts to maximize the effectiveness of our programs in Africa.

U.S. AFRICOM will respect the leading roles for the U.S. Department of State in our Nation's foreign policy and U.S. Agency for International Development in our Nation's development and humanitarian assistance programs.

U.S. AFRICOM will seek to promote relationships and build partnerships to enable the work of Africans in providing for their own security. It begins with listening and understanding our African partners' definitions of their own environment and interest.

Appreciation of their perspective will allow us to jointly identify ways and means that address both African and American interests.

Our intent is to build mutual trust, respect and confidence with our partners in Africa and our international friends through sustained engagement by a single unified command dedicated solely to Africa.

We will work with African nations and their security organizations as partners.

I would like to reaffirm that AFRICOM will sustain ongoing activities as it accepts new missions in a seamless transition from the three existing geographic combatant commands in Africa.

Past activities have made visible and measurable differences on the ground, through professionalism of military units and by showing that America is a caring and loyal partner. These types of events and programs will continue.

They include medical readiness exercises. You are familiar with MEDFLAG and Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP).

Communications interoperability enhancements through Africa Endeavor, disaster preparedness exercises. You are familiar with Natural Fire and Golden Spear.

Capacity-building exercises. You are familiar with Flintlock.

Security sector reform activities such as in Liberia. And State partnership programs where we are now up to eight in Africa.

U.S. AFRICOM will actively support the State Department in training African peacekeepers under the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program, or ACOTA.

New U.S. activities such as the African Partnership Station (APS) demonstrate the types of activities that U.S. AFRICOM will promote as forces for good in bringing stability to the continent of Africa.

Showing our commitment to these relationships requires enhanced and expanded resources for our African partners. International military education and training, as was mentioned, and foreign military financing remain important tools for building capacity on the continent for generations to come.

U.S. AFRICOM represents the United States Government's long-term commitment to strengthen our security ties with Africa.

We will endeavor to assist African nations in enhancing security and stability for the peoples of Africa where growth and expanded horizons exist for future generations, thus increasing our stability here in America.

We will move forward in a very deliberate manner so that decades from now all of us will be able to look back and see that the foundation we laid for this new command is something to be proud of, something that America stands to benefit from.

It is an honor to continue to serve alongside the outstanding soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and statesmen of the United States Africa Command. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of General Ward can be found in the Appendix on page 61.]

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you so much.

I have two quick questions before I ask Mr. Hunter and the other members of the committee.

The headquarters today is in Stuttgart, Germany, am I correct?

General WARD. Correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And where will the new headquarters of the Africa Command be, please?

General WARD. Mr. Chairman, that decision has not been established. At the current time, there are activities taking place on the continent to determine, based on a series of factors, including items such as infrastructure, stability, political receptiveness, locations, locale, the ability to move around—those are all being looked at now.

The construct of the headquarters on the continent has not been determined. There are models that are discussed under deliberation with respect to a distributed headquarters where elements of the staff might be located in various parts of the continent.

But again, Mr. Chairman, those decisions have not been taken and will not be taken until further deliberation and understanding is there and in consultation with you, with the Administration here, has taken place.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a judgment as to when that decision will be made?

General WARD. Sir, at this time I do not. We are looking closely at the various factors because we understand the implications for

the follow-on budgetary cycle, but as I pointed out, sir, we have been cautioned to be very deliberate in that.

We are moving apace with the work to determine the potentials, but then the negotiations—we have to be invited to a particular location, and so those are the efforts that are still to be accomplished.

And as we move those efforts along, we will certainly keep you informed. But I cannot put a timeline on it now. We do have a goal, Mr. Chairman, that by the time we achieve full operational capability, which is October of 2008, that some element of the headquarters will be operating on the continent.

The CHAIRMAN. On the continent.

General WARD. Correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. One last question. We all know the stretch and the strain under which the United States Army is operating today. Where will you get your manpower for this new command?

General WARD. At the current time, sir, the manpower for the new command is being distributed from existing activities of the joint manning apparatus. As you are aware, currently U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) do activities on the continent.

The initial operating capability that we will continue to work toward achieving throughout this coming series of months will draw upon those assets as well as other assets that would be redistributed into the command from existing combatant command accounts.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Just very briefly, the chairman went over an important aspect. That is the pull on personnel necessary to staff the command.

Have you done an analysis on what the incremental increase in DOD costs will be that will be attributed to the African Command above and beyond what we are spending in that area now under the existing commands?

Secretary HENRY. Well, we will stand up AFRICOM within our top line. As far as the funding goes, it will come out of funding that is—we have the funding for the coming year, and the funding takes—during this year, General Ward and his staff will be laying out the program over a five-year program to determine what that funding will be.

So we have brought that forward as an issue in our budget build for this coming year and have reallocated dollars. The size of the command will be on the small size of what normal combatant commands are.

And just a minor nuance to what General Ward said. The staffing is coming from those officers that we currently have in joint billets, many of which will be in joint combatant commands, but some which might be in other joint billets that we will use to man that.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ortiz, the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a question for anybody that would like to answer. I understand that in late October 2007 members of the Pan-African Parliament, which is the legislative body of the African Union, voted in favor of a motion to prevail upon all African—Americans' government request to host AFRICOM anywhere in the African continent.

They voted that they, at this point, did not understand exactly what we wanted to do. And I know that what we are trying to do now is to stay ahead of the curve. We are doing something differently than what we have done before, like after 9/11 and some of the other things now.

How much longer do you think that it will take for us to convince this legislative body that what we are trying to do is the right thing to do for the African nations and for the continent?

And I don't know what you have been working on, but is this a true fact that they voted against trying to accede to the United States demand that we—if somebody can answer that question.

Ambassador MULL. Yes, sir. I can tell you that as both Secretary Henry and General Ward mentioned in their remarks, the launch of AFRICOM when we went public with it did generate some skepticism on the African continent.

And so that is why we have decided to approach this very deliberately. And we find that as we consult with people privately, the response has generally been very, very positive.

However, we want to make sure that we don't establish a formal presence on the continent until such time that the diplomatic climate and the political climate is right.

And fortunately, our good allies the Germans have said that they would welcome our continuing there in Stuttgart for as long as it takes to do that. So we have a place not too far from the African continent where we can continue to operate.

I would note that—there has been a lot of positive response to this initiative as well. Certainly, president Sirleaf-Johnson of Liberia has publicly said that she welcomes us and, in fact, would like Liberia to be the host of the headquarters.

That is only one of many options that we are looking at. But we will not stand up this command on the continent until we are welcome to do so by the countries there. And we are confident that that day will come.

Secretary HENRY. I might add that both General Ward and myself have been to the African Union on several different occasions and talked to the top leadership, the members, the ambassadors, and consistently they are positive in regard to what we are trying to do.

Early on, there had been a fourth myth, one I didn't address, that is Africa-specific, and that is that with the coming of AFRICOM there would—be the large infusion of American combat forces and basing on the continent.

So normally when we go to talk to them, that is the first rumor that we knock down. There are no new bases envisioned in AFRICOM, and there are no combat troops.

There is a staff element to which General Ward talked about, that a portion of which will be interfacing with Africans, we believe is important that they are on the continent.

Once we get by that myth and the other three myths, then people are positive. They are looking forward to Americans participating.

Uniformly, among the African nations, they ask us to have a close relationship with the African Union. That is who they look to for continental security and who they would like us to work with. And again, we have had a very cordial relationship with them.

Mr. ORTIZ. Another problem that I see—and I am all for trying to nourish that relationship with the African countries and the African continent.

But there was a little problem not too long ago when some of the employees of the State Department decided that they did not want to be assigned to Iraq because of the seriousness of the problems and the war zone.

Do you anticipate that maybe we will have the same problem by assigning State officials to an area that we are not sure whether they like us or not or whether it is the proper time to move in or not?

You don't think that will play a role in moving some of the State Departments to an area that we don't know what we are going to do?

Secretary HENRY. Well, Ambassador Mull is the expert on that. I will let him follow up. But to date, we have had a surprisingly strong request for information about how interagency personnel can participate, requests from people to find out where they get in line to be able to sign up for it.

We haven't come up with exact billet structure, so we can't put billets against individuals or agencies yet. But from what we can see, that will be the least of our problems.

Ambassador MULL. I would add that since we have begun working with the Defense Department on the standup for this command there has been substantial interest from within the ranks of the Africanists within the foreign service to be assigned to participate in this command, and we have had more expressions of interest than we, frankly, have spaces to fill.

And if I could, I know the subject of today is not Iraq. I just would like to give you an update on Iraq in that of the 250 positions that we are filling this year, we now have volunteers identified for 240 of them and expect to find volunteers for the remaining 10 in the next week or so.

Mr. ORTIZ. My time is up.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Remembering all those years when I sat in one of the lower rows and never had a chance to ask my question, I am going to yield my time to the most junior member in attendance today, which happens to be a gentleman from my birth state, Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. I thank the gentleman.

The interagency reform issue is a very personal one with us, and I am watching some really good things that have happened in Africa.

Particularly the operations in the Horn of Africa right now I consider one of the better-kept secrets that are there and look with some optimism to the standup of this command and what it could be accomplishing in the region, particularly with long-term strategic significance for much of the world there.

One of the questions, looking at personnel issues, looking at the challenges that we face in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Somalia, going all the way back to Grenada, for that matter, in the inter-agency world of working effectively together, I see a real opportunity for us to, let's say, put a lead on a lot of our nonkinetic assets from a least intrusive through information outreach, diplomacy, across to economic development, and finally having those other options as well-placed deterrents on the table.

One of the questions that comes up from time to time as we talk about this are barriers between the agencies, statutory barriers in regulation, authorization, appropriation, for the ability to inter-mingle funds, to collaborate, particularly when you have a relatively short time frame to put together the kind of package for support.

And I was wondering if you could comment for a moment and really would open it up to all three, but perhaps begin with Ambassador Mull, on areas in the law that we can change from an authorizing perspective in the respective committees in Congress to allow this command to truly be empowered, to avoid many of the challenges that we faced on the ground in theater right now.

Ambassador MULL. Thank you very much, Congressman Davis. As General Ward mentioned, this is a command under construction right now.

And in our planning, from the very beginning of the planning process for this, when we began to sit down and consult with our Defense colleagues last autumn, we agreed that at least early on we would not envision any statutory changes to how U.S. military commands operate and interoperate with U.S. embassies in the field, that the authorities that exist now would remain intact.

That said, we believe that creating this command will create a lot of efficiencies by putting people from the Agency for International Development and the State Department with expertise in those particular authorities and areas right there at the table with General Ward when he does his planning for his operations of the command.

So as we stand this up and we get people staffed and working together, that may change. We may decide that there may need to be a change in the legal structure.

But for the time being, certainly speaking on behalf of the State Department, we don't see any need to change the existing authorities we have now.

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. Part of the reason I asked the question was about 6,500 people in the foreign service, for example, compared to seven-figure numbers in the Defense Department of available resources—there certainly is a difference in scale there.

In many of these areas I think we have just a fraction of what we had in the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) program in Vietnam now in terms of our actual provincial reconstruction outreach.

And this is where I come back to the question of if you have limited resources, the payment question could be a challenge. I am well aware of what happened in terms of standing up additional Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) support with our reinforcement that took place earlier this year in Iraq.

The reason I am asking you first is I hear from the military all the time that the interagency is a challenge both from a structure, funding and authorization standpoint.

And perhaps General Ward can comment for a second on that.

General WARD. Thank you, Congressman Davis, for that. As Ambassador Mull pointed out, as we move down the road with the command and look at ways of being more effective in delivering the very fine programs that the United States of America wants to implement on the continent, there may be opportunities to come back and ask for authorization deviations that will allow us to do that in a more effective way.

What I will say is that in my previous role that I played in many theaters, the ability of us to deliver timely and effective American security cooperation and American security assistance, regardless of its source, is important.

And so as we move through this effort of this command and bringing value added to our ongoing programs, I am very confident that should we find a way that we can come back and recommend that we can do a better job, that we will come back to you with that, because it is something that we would be paying very close attention to as we implement the standup of the command.

Secretary HENRY. Mr. Chairman, I apologize, but if I just might add—because we have asked for new authorities, and I just would like you to be aware of them.

We have asked for a global commanders emergency response fund—gets to the issue of timeliness. Right now, that is limited to the theaters of Iraq and Afghanistan, and AFRICOM is an excellent example of where that will make a difference.

We have also asked for increased 1206 authorities. That is something that sits between the Title 10 and the Title 22 authorities where both secretaries approve them, but it is extremely responsive. It meets the needs and it gives the capability that you are asking about on how do we work those interagency seams.

We think with a deputy commander—deputy to the commander from the State Department we will be able to work the Title 10, Title 22 issues for FMF specifically much better than we have in the past.

But I would emphasize that those—the 1206 authorities and the global commander emergency response funds would be a critical addition to the capability here.

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Reyes.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and particularly, thank you for holding this hearing.

I have concerns that we are taking too long to establish where the Africa Command is going to be located. I hope we get a resolution soon.

I led a trip of Members through the Horn of Africa, so there are going to be huge issues. When you factor in Libya, the bridge to Spain and the impact they are having on Europe, when you factor in Yemen and the other countries in and around the Horn of Africa, intelligence is going to have, I think, a huge part of the role that will be played by this new command.

So I hope we have a decision soon on where it is going to be located.

I have a couple of questions. The first one deals with the establishment of the J-2 in the Africa Command. How will that change our intelligence coverage in the region?

Specifically, how will the Africa Command's J-2 differ from the current command's—European Command—J-2?

And will there be—I am assuming there is going to have to be, but will there be emphasis on long-term issues? One of the big concerns that we have, and it was verified when we took the trip into the Horn of Africa, is the rise of fundamentalism in the region, particularly in the Sahel region.

So will there be more emphasis on those kinds of issues as the new command stands up?

And then the last thing I would like for you to address is how will the Africa Command affect counterterrorism operations which have been ongoing as we look at and talk about issues like the pirates off of the coast of Somalia, the interaction between Ethiopia and Kenya, in that vital region?

That is why I am hoping we make a decision quickly on where that command is going to be located. So if you can cover those areas, I would appreciate it.

Secretary HENRY. Let me just start, and I know that General Ward will have more specifics for you.

First of all, we understand your impatience on where the command is going to be, and each and every one of us, as we have approached the problem, that is the first thing we ask. But as we have gone into this and looked at it deeper and deeper, the key is how does the command operate, not where it is.

And the worst thing we think we could do is rush into a bricks-and-mortar solution that has a lot of military construction (MILCON) associated to it and will lack adaptability.

And rather, we have tried to create a command and a command structure that will be able to be out there and interfacing and gathering information that you are concerned about, not just at one specific place, but across the entire area of responsibility.

And we think that we have come up with a tiered innovative structure that will allow us to do that. Part of that tier has been a concept of reach back to individuals who do not need to be on the continent.

And for purposes not necessarily for collection but of intelligence analysis, it is not necessarily essential that the analysts be at the spot that he is looking at.

And so initially a part of the intelligence personnel are going to be currently where they are within the—Jack Molesworth, as part of where the European Command intelligence is, and they will be separated off and be the AFRICOM cell that will respond directly to General Ward.

And he will also have a staff at his headquarters supporting him. But I would like to emphasize that not only do we need intelligence in Africa, but we also need information.

And so we will be putting probably a much greater reliance on open source information and being able to use that, and interfaces through the diplomatic reporting.

So we plan to take a 360-degree approach in getting information to the commander so that he can make the best decisions.

General WARD. Mr. Chairman, you mentioned the J-2. One of the things that will cause this command to be different from the existing combatant commands is that our J-2 is the Director of Intelligence and Knowledge Development.

We know that we have to integrate in a very substantial way all sources of intelligence—the traditional sources as you are so familiar with; as the under secretary pointed out, also the open source piece and how we will interact with other partners on the continent, many of whom, although have very good access to information, are not in typical classified channels.

But we know the importance of all of that, and understanding what is happening on the continent from a strategic level, quite frankly, down to the tactical level.

This command and its intelligence and knowledge development construct will have to be able to look at strategic-level intelligence, through the operational level, down to the tactical level as our personnel are out doing what they do to help increase the capacity of our partner nations.

And we understand the role that we also have to ensure that what we are doing as a part of the Operation Enduring Freedom—Trans Sahel, as a part of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCP) program in the north, in the Horn of Africa with what is being done by the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)—Horn of Africa, understanding those programs, integrating those efforts, and ensuring that we can provide the type of overarching intelligence infrastructure that will be able to fuse intelligence, understand the situation, and then as appropriate do something with it.

So we will look to build a command to, in fact, do those very things.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Kline.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

General Ward, it is great to see you again. I think it has been some 15 years since we had a chance to chat when we were much younger and serving together, in fact, in the Horn of Africa.

In that operation, Operation Restore Hope (ORH), that was under Central Command. In this new construct, were that same operation to take place with the existence of AFRICOM, it would be the same militarily except it would fall under your command rather than Central Command, is that correct?

General WARD. That is correct, Congressman.

Mr. KLINE. And with the current training operations that are going on across Africa, many of which are being conducted by forces from Special Operations Command (SOC), that is now under the overwatch, I suppose, mostly of EUCOM.

That will continue just as it is today, except under AFRICOM, is that correct?

General WARD. Correct.

Mr. KLINE. Just a couple of—I assumed that was the case. I just wanted to make sure that was the case.

I am constantly concerned about—and this is probably more addressed to Secretary Henry. When you look at the number of combatant commands—I was looking at a number yesterday.

Our combatant commands consume something over 15,000 people and over \$3 billion a year to run these combatant commands. And now we are creating a new one. So a number of my colleagues have already addressed this issue, and I don't want to dwell on it.

But what this is going to cost is important. We are using up people. And you have explained that we are going to, at least initially, draw from joint billets.

That implies that we have some spare joint billets out there, and I am not sure that is the case. So in the long term, the size of this command does matter.

And then to the point that my friend and colleague from Texas Chairman Reyes made, where the headquarters exist probably does matter. I don't share his urgency in getting an answer to that, but this is a question for anybody who would like to address it.

Can AFRICOM work effectively from Stuttgart, from Europe today, and could it next year and the year after that? In other words, in terms of being able to provide the command structure and the overwatch and the things that are necessary, can it function effectively out of Europe? Anybody.

Secretary HENRY. Yes, it can function effectively. Will it be at its optimum level? We definitely think not, and we think to get the most effectiveness out of it, it is important that the commander and his key staff are on the continent.

Right now, Central Command functions out of Tampa—

Mr. KLINE. Exactly.

Secretary HENRY [continuing]. Pacific Command out of Hawaii, and Southern Command out of Miami. So it is not necessary, but—

Mr. KLINE. Well, let me interrupt, then, just for a minute. Then why do we feel this urgency to rush into the continent, when it has been already presented that right now there is nobody eagerly seeking our presence there, when we—as you pointed out—we are working out of Tampa, we are working out of Hawaii.

That is a long way from anywhere in the Pacific Command where we might employ forces. Why do we feel this rush to put something on the ground on the continent?

Secretary HENRY. Well, I guess there are two things I would take exception with. One is that there is not people that want us there. There are a number of countries that have come forward, one publicly, several privately, that have asked us to consider them.

And we don't feel we want for places, if we were to put in a headquarters, on where that would be.

The second thing is I would take issue with the fact that we are rushing. Actually, we have been very deliberate. We have been thinking about this over a year, and we still are telling you that

we are out gathering facts. We are doing it in a deliberative fashion.

One thing that we think will be somewhat—I don't want to say special, but this command will be a leader in its adaptability and the ability to change to the environmental circumstances.

And as we come forward and think about the command structure and its placement, that is one of the considerations we want to have, is how will this be able to adapt to security situations on the continent.

And we don't want to get locked into some place that would cause difficulty later on. So I would just take issue that we are rushing into it.

It is the goal of the Secretary to have a decision on where the physical and geographical location of the different elements of the command will be as it initially comes on the continent, not necessarily the final disposition, by the end of this fiscal year.

To address your issue on manpower and manning, another thing that is somewhat unique about AFRICOM is this is the first time we have stood up a command that hasn't been in the shadow of some sort of emergency or conflict.

And we are doing it in an anticipatory fashion. And in so doing, it has caused us to go back and look at the manning across all of the combatant commands.

And we are in the process of taking the study and understanding of how we rationalize manning for combatant commands, what are critical functions, which things can be replicated in different commands and what things need to be unique in different commands.

And that will all be folded into how the long-term manning for AFRICOM is handled.

Mr. KLINE. Okay. Thank you very much.

I see my time is about to expire, and ever in my continuous effort to set the example for my colleagues, I will yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

The gentleman from Arkansas, Dr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you all for your service. I can see Ambassador Mull is looking around. There we go.

I think it was 10 years ago or maybe even more when General Joulwan was here—and I had worked in Africa a couple times as a doctor in the olden days, 6 months in Sierra Leone and 3 months as part of the Ethiopian refugee relief in 1985.

And so I asked him if he would benefit from more resources. We would like to be able to do more as far as work in Africa. And he was almost pleading for additional help.

And General James Jones has made very eloquent statements here at some length about the need to be more involved in Africa.

So I think what you are doing is very important. I am glad that you all are being very sensitive to dealing with some of the concerns expressed by some of the nations down there. I mean, the whole point of this is to help us and not to hurt us.

I will have to say—this is just one person's opinion—my own view is that our foreign policy for the last several years has been far too dependent on military, and to the exclusion of the diplomatic corps.

I would think that perhaps some of that apprehension you are hearing is in view of what has gone on for the last several years. My own view is that we have underfunded the State Department.

We should have more redundancy in the State Department so you could respond to more things around the world. But hopefully we will deal with those issues.

Ambassador Mull, I wanted to ask you a question, if I might, on a somewhat related topic, but when the town meeting at the State Department was held a couple of weeks ago, one of the concerns that was expressed was inadequacy of treatment of health care—specifically, mental health conditions—from people who had served in Iraq as State Department employees.

Our Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee has been looking at these issues of why people from the civilian side are less inclined to go to Iraq. And it concerned me that that was expressed openly, that this person thought that she had received inadequate mental health care.

What is your feeling on that? You responded to the other question. Perhaps you can enlighten us about the status of mental health services for employees when they return from Iraq.

Ambassador MULL. Thank you, Congressman Snyder, for the opportunity to comment on that issue. My friend and colleague, Ambassador Harry Thomas, recently was appointed as the Director of Human Resources at the State Department and Director General of the Foreign Service, and he has set as one of his top priorities addressing those concerns.

It is true it has been a long time since American Foreign Service officers have been serving in war zones, as they have in the past five years.

And I am not an expert. I am not responsible for this area within the State Department. But I think it is probably fair to say that our institutional capability to respond to the unique needs of Foreign Service officers who serve in combat zones perhaps are not all that they could have been.

I know Ambassador Thomas is working very hard to look at what institutions we have in place and has already made some progress in coming up with some plans to make sure that not only do we take care of our own when they come back, not only take care of any physical medical problems they have but any mental or emotional problems as well.

And not just for the employee, but also to make sure that we are taking care of their families as well.

Dr. SNYDER. So what you are saying today is that it is still a work in progress in terms—

Ambassador MULL. Yes.

Dr. SNYDER [continuing]. That person's public comment that was picked up by the press was not an inaccurate description of the current state of things, that there is a need for better resources for State Department personnel when they return from a war zone.

Is that what you are saying, that it is still a work in progress?

Ambassador MULL. Yes.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

And one specific question, if I might ask Secretary Henry, would you—if I might—and tell me if it is inappropriate to ask today.

Would you make any comments you would like to make on the status of the relationship currently and the likelihood of military hostilities between Eritrea and Ethiopia and what the posture of the United States is with regard to that potential shooting war again? Thank you.

Secretary HENRY. Yes, I will take it to a certain degree and then let Ambassador Mull also take it. The State Department does have the lead in foreign policy in our government.

But we are monitoring it. We have concerns as we have seen the buildup of forces. Here lately we have seen a backing away of that which we find encouraging. But we don't think that it will be to the benefit of either party or the United States if conflict were to break out there.

Ambassador MULL. I agree with the Under Secretary. It is obviously a critical fault line in African security. The potential conflict between these two states has deep historic roots.

We have been working very energetically through diplomatic channels to try and prevent it from happening, and we continue to monitor it very closely.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Dr. Gingrey.

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I know the issue of the command headquarters, gentlemen, has been discussed a good bit this morning.

I would like to just specifically ask you, in regard to the temporary headquarters that I guess is shared jointly with European Command in Stuttgart, how much investment have we already made there in regard to bricks and mortar and security and infrastructure?

And the question I think from Colonel Kline and maybe some others and the response indicating that a lot of our commands are not necessarily located in a central area of the particular command—so if you can address that.

And then the other thing that hasn't been asked—I notice that Egypt, which is very much a part of the African continent, is not part of this new Africa Command.

Maybe it would seem obvious why it isn't, but it is not totally obvious to me, certainly not from a geographic perspective. You would think that clearly it should be part of this new command.

And maybe we can start with that specific question, since the other has already been touched on to some extent.

And I think I would like to start with General Ward in regard to that question, Commander, if you could respond to that.

General WARD. Congressman Gingrey, I think the question of Egypt is more appropriately dealt with by the Under Secretary here, so I will leave that to him with respect to the unified command plan as currently set.

With regards to the headquarters, the interim headquarters in Stuttgart—Stuttgart, as a part of our current set, is an enduring location for our Department of Defense posture.

As the decision was taken to stand up AFRICOM there in Stuttgart, it takes advantage of several things. First, it takes advantage of the physical location of EUCOM currently dealing with Africa

quite a bit, so as many of those personnel transition to AFRICOM, any costs associated with moving them is taken away.

Looking at Kelly Barracks where the current headquarters is established for AFRICOM—again, already in place, infrastructure already there, set, no additional bricks and mortar required. There are costs incurred with respect to bringing—

Dr. GINGREY. General, that satisfies me on that question, and I thank you for that response.

Let's go directly to Secretary Henry in regard to the issue of Egypt.

Secretary HENRY. Egypt took some thought, a lot of consultation with the current combatant commanders. We have had consultations with the Egyptians.

And we, for reasons of a large foreign assistance and security assistance account that we currently have with Egypt—the administrative processes are already set up through Central Command.

And plus, you know, Egypt does look toward the Middle East, and has large and significant involvements there. We felt for administrative purposes it would be best to keep Egypt in Central Command.

But that being said, any activity that we are doing on a multinational basis that Egypt is invited to attend—I am sure that when General Ward has his different meetings and that that their representatives will be invited to attend.

And so for purposes from an operational perspective, the administrative aspect on our part, our military organization, that Egypt will be invited in to participate to the same degree that any other of the other 52 countries on the continent will be.

And they are a member of the African Union, and we plan on treating them as such.

Dr. GINGREY. Absolutely. And, Mr. Secretary—or maybe, Ambassador Mull, you may want to comment on this as well in the little bit of time I have got left—it seems to me that it could lead to some confusion.

And that is there a possibility that somewhere down the line, after we achieve victory in the Middle East in Operation Iraqi Freedom specifically—that at some future date we may want to take another look at that and include Egypt as part of AFRICOM?

Secretary HENRY. The unified command plan is actually under continuous review. It comes up for a formal review every two years. And we are always looking at seam issues. And this is what we refer to as a seam.

And we have previously had difficult seams on the African continent. This is the one on the continent that remains, and there are reasons to go either way, but we do continue to look at it, though.

Dr. GINGREY. Well, it looks like some of these political gerrymandered maps that we have for congressional districts. So hopefully at some point we can clarify that. Thank you.

And I yield back.

Mr. TAYLOR [presiding]. The chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Sanchez.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen, for being before us today and for your service to our country.

I had the opportunity last year between Christmas and New Year's to go to Darfur and Sudan and Chad and Djibouti to visit troops and to see what was going on. And I do believe that we need to concentrate more time, obviously, on Africa and that continent.

So I do believe that something like an African Command would be important, and I think it would be important to put it in Africa someplace. I don't know where that is. I guess that is one of the things we are trying to figure out.

I also represent Orange County, which has one of the largest refugee resettlement programs from all different types of conflicts, so you can imagine that our current resettlement happens to be those people from that continent, quite a few conflicts having gone over the last few years and continuing there.

My question really deals with this whole issue of the fact that since we have had this war on terrorism and we have—it seems to me that the complaints that I have received from so many different places around the world—not just Africa or Europe or anyplace, but from our embassies around the world is that in many cases, we now have—because of the issue of terrorism, we have so many resources going into and have more military people within the umbrella of our embassy missions in countries.

And some have even stated that there seems to be more military people than even State Department and Commerce Department and other people that we have traditionally had within the embassy enclaves, if you will.

And to some, in particular at the State Department, there seems to be a faltering in the sense that maybe we are using too many military assets. Certainly, there is more money coming in from that direction, and so they feel this emphasis coming in from the military where they think maybe that might be hindering what they are doing.

So my question is when we are looking at this African Command, it is really the first model of how do we put in some of this other infrastructure from the State Department.

My question is how will we ensure that, in fact, we do those stabilization and regrouping, if you will, in these countries more to the extent of peacetime sorts of activities rather than another emphasis and another dumping of money into the military side of things?

And I would ask both the General and the Ambassador to comment on—you know, it is important we stand this up, and it is important to have that model of both working together.

But how do we really move away from such a military presence in countries versus a more nurturing sort of relationship that we really need in Africa?

Ambassador MULL. I will be happy to take that question first, Congresswoman Sanchez. Thank you very much. You raise a very good question.

And as a diplomat who has spent much of the last 10 years myself working overseas, I agree with you that we have to be concerned that we not convey to our partners around the world that we have a militarized foreign policy.

And so I think you are right to raise the concern. But I don't think we have to worry about it so much in that when we look at the total amount of assistance that we provide to Africa, it is of an

overwhelming nonmilitary nature in terms of providing economic development funds, humanitarian assistance, assistance to infrastructure building, to building democratic society, civil society.

In many of these countries, the amount of military assistance or military-oriented assistance that we provide is really just a tiny fraction.

And I think that will continue even with the standup of AFRICOM because the problems that we face in Africa are overwhelmingly nonmilitary in nature.

That said, the military plays a very important role in these countries in providing stability and responding to fast-moving humanitarian crises.

And we hope that through AFRICOM we will be able to coordinate on our own side of the table, too, on the U.S. Government side, in making sure that AID and the State Department and the various resources that the military has to bring to the table are all coordinated in responding to it.

I would note that the White House did designate the State Department as having the lead within our government in responding to stabilization and reconstruction activities.

Secretary Rice has a special coordinator, Ambassador John Herbst, who is in charge of those efforts. And that will ensure that our response to these emerging situations is not primarily military in nature.

Although the military does play a very, very important part, nevertheless the State Department will be in the lead.

Ms. SANCHEZ. If I could just give a chance to the General to comment on that.

Mr. REYES [presiding]. Very quickly, General.

General WARD. The role of the United States military, ma'am, is an important role because what we do as we interact with militaries, and given the point that was made by the ambassador, the role that militaries play in those societies—we are able to interact.

We are able to be a force for causing their work to be more reflective of a situation that causes them to be seen as protectors of their people, as opposed to oppressors.

And so that example, that side by side—you take the example today of our African Partnership Station, where we have a platform that is offshore, with ship riders—that is, representatives from other African countries who come aboard, get instructions on how to be better maintainers of equipment, better sharers of information, and in so doing, doing things that help enhance their society.

That is the role that we play in these emerging and maturing democracies that causes the military to be seen as a force for a positive development, as opposed to otherwise. And that is our role, and I think it does not supplant the role of the other agencies. It just complements those additional efforts.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. REYES. I thank the gentlelady.

And I just advise the members there are going to be four votes. We should be able to get through probably two members.

Mr. Thornberry, you are up next.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Henry, let me just clarify. You talked about some of the intelligence assets, followed to Chairman Reyes' question, coming from EUCOM—Molesworth and so forth.

Are intelligence assets being transferred from CENTCOM as well?

Secretary HENRY. I am not aware of any specific ones, but let me take that for the record to be able to get back to you. Obviously, we do have the activities going on in the Horn of Africa.

[The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.]

I know those responsibilities and resources will be transferred over. We haven't made that transfer of the Horn of Africa to the sub-unified command of Africa yet, so those haven't taken place yet, and I will have to get back to you on exactly what the plan is for doing that.

Mr. THORBERRY. Well, it obviously may be worth attention. If you have got intelligence analysts expert in that region, and now it is going to be under General Ward, obviously they need to go—

Secretary HENRY. Yes, and I would differentiate between those at the command level of Central Command and the intelligence assets and that that we are using both at Joint Task Force Horn of Africa and then those that are part of Special Operations Forces, too.

Mr. THORBERRY. Of course.

General Ward, it seems to me you have a tremendous opportunity building this command from the ground up without a crisis. Secretary Ryan said the watchword was going to be adaptability.

You have had numbers of questions about the interagency piece, how this can be an example for others about the agencies actually working together.

But the other side of it is if you are successful in really leading the way on interagency, you are going to meet resistance. I mean, one of two things is going to happen.

You are either really going to do it and the folks whose interests are threatened are going to complain about it and try to stop it, or it is going to be lip service and there won't really be change at all.

I guess what I am most curious about is how are you going to overcome that resistance when it comes. Because I believe when there is real change there is inevitably resistance from the institutional interests that are threatened by that.

General WARD. Thank you, Congressman. I think we are going to overcome it—by demonstrating on the ground through the execution of programs that we will bring value added.

And right now, we have examples of that. We have the work that is going on, quite frankly, in OEF-TS, in CJTF-Horn of Africa, where we brought together an interagency, a multidisciplinary team of folk to cause results to be enhanced because of our collective efforts, as opposed to doing it in separate, independent stove-pipe ways.

The more that we do, sir, the more all will be seeing that this construct works to their advantage as well, and being a part of that construct enhances the work that they do.

The Africans will see it, and I believe our international and interagency partners likewise will see that, that it makes sense.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, I think you are right. It was suggested to me last week, for example—Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) issued a report that called for a major global health initiative.

And it was suggested to me this would be an excellent opportunity for AFRICOM to take that in a supporting fashion, but to prove that this is not a militarization or to dispel all the myths that you laid out at the beginning, that that could be an opportunity to prove it with more than words.

But I hope, as you try to do that, that you will be willing and able to go however high you need to go, including coming to this committee, to overcome the obstacles to make you effective.

I yield back. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. I thank the gentleman.

We have five votes on the floor. I believe we have time for Ms. Davis, and then we will adjourn.

And, gentlemen, we will ask you to remain until we come back. Ms. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to all of you for being here and certainly for your service as well.

I am going to try and move through this really quickly. I appreciate the comments of my colleague Mr. Thornberry, because I, too, have some concerns about the interagency focus and how we do that.

I did have an opportunity to be on the continent in August. And we talk a lot about the vision for the African Command.

And one of the things I did hear, and I guess I heard this from men and women serving on the ground, is that there was so much confusion for them for what that might be, because there were multiple commands that were essentially giving orders, and they seemed to be sometimes at odds.

So I think, you know, that is something that obviously is a work in progress in some ways. And I hope that we can work through that.

My other question really is how we bring in not just the State Department and the Pentagon, essentially, but how we expand that to other tools of government. We know, certainly, in Iraq and Afghanistan, whether it is commerce, whether it is agriculture, but those also need to be important tools as well.

And where I think would be important to demonstrate is how decisions that are made might well go—you know, this is the thing we need, but we are going to give the tools to USAID, because they can do that better than the military can do it.

How do you see that process working so that this is really a shared pool of resources, as opposed to one that seems to be more in the hands of one department or another?

Secretary HENRY. Again, I am concerned maybe that we are not getting our message across—\$9 billion the U.S. Government invests in Africa, 3 percent of that, \$250 million, is in DOD. Ninety-seven percent of it is in other places where they can do a better job.

What AFRICOM is about is understanding that many of those programs—part of their success has to do with the security aspect of it. It is very few programs that are going to be successful in trying to build the civil society that only go to one pillar of what that civil society is.

And that is what the recognition within AFRICOM is, is it is going to take a multidisciplinary approach to do it. And to date, when it comes to the military and the stability and security aspect of it, the DOD has been involved episodically, when there has been a crisis or when there has been an exercise.

And now we are making the investment of putting one of our best four-star commanders on the continent with a staff that can be sustained and involved but approach those problems from an interagency, integrated fashion, of which the majority of the time DOD, within the U.S. Government, will be in a supporting role, and almost all the time the U.S. Government will be in a supporting role to African endeavors.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, I appreciate that. What I am reflecting somewhat is the perception of people that were on the ground and their feelings about this. And so I think that it is important to try and make clear—I appreciate that—

Secretary HENRY. And we will continue. Our interactions have been with the ambassadors, and not other members of the staff, as we have gone to stand up AFRICOM.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. A quick question—I just want to make sure and get this in—in terms of personnel, because we have said that, in fact, you are going to be pulling from other resources in some cases, and that seems like an appropriate thing to do.

But the kinds of resources, I think, that you need are in health care, perhaps, in special ops, and we know that we are struggling in those areas in other places. And so I would like to know how we are doing that.

A second question is whether or not we need to expand services at Stuttgart or, again, whether—if we do locate a command—however you want to call it—on the continent, what arrangements would be made for people to have families accompanying them in that effort?

And especially, I think, in the Stuttgart situation, are we able to do that now? And will we be able to do it as well for State Department officials?

Secretary HENRY. In regards to the Stuttgart, we are making some improvements on an interim basis since that is not a permanent headquarters.

In regards to accompanied tours, State Department does that very successfully already on the continent. We are looking at different models where we can work with State Department to have commonality of services.

As we build our regional integration teams, their specific role with the local embassy, we are looking at different models where we can get economies of scale.

So those are all part of the process that we are looking at now.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. And health officials to be part of this mission? Where do you see those?

Secretary HENRY. Yes. There will be an element of that. To what degree depends on which programs are there, which agency has the leadership on it, and how it is best for us to interface it.

We are sensitive to this issue of DOD coming in and overwhelming either other programs within the U.S. Government or, in some cases, the African host state and their security capabilities.

And so one of the feedback that we have gotten as we have gone around is don't overwhelm us, and the lower the profile, probably the more effective you will be. And that has a lot to do with what our approach is.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

We will return after the votes, and we appreciate your being with us when we return. Thank you.

[Recess.]

Ms. CASTOR [presiding]. The committee will return to order.

I am pleased to recognize Mr. Wilson for questions.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

And thank all of you for being here today. And in lieu of questions, I want to extend a warm and cordial invitation for General Ward to move to Charleston, South Carolina.

And this is on behalf of my two colleagues, Congressman Henry Brown, Congressman Jim Clyburn, who both represent Charleston. I was born in the holy city of Charleston. It is a wonderful place to be.

It would be a wonderful site for the African Command. In fact, I have presented you an invitation from the Charleston Metro Chamber of Commerce inviting the African Command to be located in Charleston.

And there is so much in common that we have, particularly with West Africa, that would make persons feel right at home. And indeed, I have had the privilege of visiting in Sudan, and Kenya, and South Africa, and Ghana, and Liberia and Cape Verde.

And as I was visiting with people in those countries, I found such a kinship with South Carolina, but Charleston and the low country in particular.

And I would want you to be aware that the Naval Weapons Station Charleston would be an ideal location. It has ample acreage, a secure military facility. It is home of Space and Naval Systems Command (SPAWAR) Charleston, which can provide all the technology needed for the command's security and communications systems.

Additionally, it has already been cited that there is the precedence of commands located outside of the area that they cover. Particularly we have the Southern Command in Miami, the Central Command in Tampa, the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) in Honolulu.

Charleston, again, has such a strong relationship with the African continent. And specifically where it could be so beneficial, Charleston is the transportation hub for the United States Transportation Command as well as the primary seaport for container cargo between the United States and the south Atlantic.

The Port of Charleston ranks number one for container traffic, handling approximately 50 percent of all container traffic to and from the south Atlantic.

Charleston Air Force Base provides nearly all of the strategic airlift support for Africa for our government, to include embassy support.

SPAWAR Charleston is the leading provider for command and control and communication for European Command's (EUCOM) role in Africa. SPAWAR also supports embassy security operations and could stand up an AFRICOM command center at SPAWAR Charleston in a matter of days.

Other relationships include the greater Charleston medical community, which is a world-class medical community for training and education, as well as patient support.

Additionally, most of the rapid deployment forces which would support an African operation to include special operations are in the southeastern part of the United States surrounding Charleston.

Charleston is the hub for all military transportation, airlift, sea-lift and prepositioning. Also, the cultural linkages between Africa, Charleston and South Carolina have existed for centuries, and this could bring enormous development and cultural opportunities for both Africa and the United States.

In fact, a few minutes ago I was speaking with Congressman Clyburn and he and I, both of Charleston background, were commenting how the local dialect of Gullah, which is spoken in South Carolina, actually originated in West Africa.

Additionally, the AME Church, the African Methodist Episcopal Church of South Carolina, is partnered with the AME Church of Liberia, and I have visited the AME University of Monrovia. And so there is a close connection.

And so I want to make it perfectly clear that Charleston and all of South Carolina would welcome the Africa Command, that indeed visiting dignitaries of Africa and persons assigned would enjoy living and visiting in America's most historic city.

The invitation is clear. It is wide open. You are welcome to Charleston, South Carolina for Africa Command.

I yield the balance of my time.

Ms. CASTOR. Ms. Shea-Porter.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you.

And I absolutely agree with my colleague. I would like to see it anywhere except on the continent of Africa, and so that is my conversation here today.

I am very concerned about actually having a physical presence, as you have stated, because I do believe that while it looks reasonable to us, the rest of the world is not going to accept our reasons for it.

And so I wanted to ask, what are the top three reasons for actually physically placing this on the continent somewhere? And right now, there is one country, I believe, Liberia, that has expressed an interest, right?

Secretary HENRY. Publicly.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay, publicly.

Secretary HENRY. One country publicly has. Several have privately.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Well, it is pretty important that they can be public and not private. Whatever people say privately does not count because I think that the private ones are reflecting the will

and the attitude of their own people, which is that they don't want it.

So I understand all the reasons for paying attention to the continent of Africa. I think it is a wise idea. I do not understand why we need to be there physically. So could you please tell me, anybody, the top three reasons?

Secretary HENRY. I will be glad to give you the top three that I have been associated with. The first is actually, contrary to your feelings, as we have gone around and talked to leaders of the different African countries, they said it would be important to have the commander on the continent.

It would show a sense of commitment, a sense of equality, that we are treating them as equals, rather than a sense of colonialism, which is something that they are sensitive to. So that is the first reason.

The second one is we think that we can do a more effective job of having the commander, his key staff members, and those that interface with the Africans to be there and to be living in the environment.

They will have more empathy for the type of problems and issues that they are going to be faced with rather than if they are displaced.

And the third one is while we have done it in four different locations, had the combatant command displaced, we have found that is not the most effective way to do it. And given the opportunity to go back and re-look at those, we might not have made the same decision that we originally made.

So for those three reasons, that is—

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. By that thinking, though, we probably should also move our other centers of command, right, because we have one in Hawaii instead of actually in any of the Pacific nations, other nations.

So has anybody considered how this might look to the rest of the world, considering our difficulties right now in the Middle East and our inability to convince people that our motives, while good—you know, we are having trouble getting that across.

Secretary HENRY. Yes, Congresswoman, we have. And that has been a subject of consultations both with multinational organizations, extensive consultations in Europe to get the non-African opinion.

And all of them applaud not only standing up AFRICOM but having a presence on the continent.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. All of them.

Secretary HENRY. Yes.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay.

Secretary HENRY. Of the non-African countries that we have consulted.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. Would you be able to get that list to me so that I could also look at that? I was surprised to hear my colleague earlier talk about the resistance from some about having us physically there.

We have to look at the appearances of it.

Secretary HENRY. We will be glad to share with you those in—of the Europeans, and that—there is not an issue.

With some of the African countries, though, they gave us that information in confidentiality, so if we were to send it up here, it would have to be currently on a classified basis.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. And again, I am concerned that they don't feel they can speak publicly. It says that their nation or they suspect that their nation's people would not support that also, if they cannot speak publicly about this.

Secretary HENRY. That is one issue. The other issue is one of timing and when they think it would be appropriate to come forward on that.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. And my other question is exactly how many people are you envisioning there. I heard earlier, and maybe I didn't hear right, but how many people would you think would be wherever we wind up building?

And how many would be military and how many would be State Department?

Secretary HENRY. We don't have the exact numbers on the mix because that is something we are still determining.

The command structure, again, being sensitive to what Africans have told us—they said it is important to be there, but it is also important to be low profile.

So currently the thinking is that there would be a command hub where the commander and members of his immediate staff would be, and then there would be five regional integration teams dispersed throughout the continent.

And then there will be a presence in approximately 26 of the embassies, too, so it is a very dispersed, low-profile presence that we are trying to achieve for the very reasons that you are concerned with, desire by the Africans to have us there, to have a commander there, but also not to have too high of a profile.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Is there a reason we can't get this done with our embassies there right now, that we can't have that face-to-face contact that you are talking about?

Is there some reason we can't utilize our embassies and our embassy personnel and actually have—

Secretary HENRY. We definitely are now and we will continue to do that in the future. That will not meet all the needs, though, of a command staff for a unified command.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. And the last question is do you have any idea what this would cost annually?

Secretary HENRY. We are looking at the cost. It will be part—the cost will be reapportioned between other combatant command activities we are doing now, so the net cost to the taxpayer is zero.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Oh, let us go back over that. The net cost to the taxpayer is zero. Do you have to build something there?

Secretary HENRY. Yes, we do have to build something. We have to build something for military construction. Then we will delay—

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay, so there is cost.

Secretary HENRY. We will delay military construction other places, so we would re-prioritize this higher than where those dollars were going to be spent previously.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay, but there is cost. Any time we build anything, whether it is good or bad or whatever, we are paying for it.

Secretary HENRY. They are not paying more to the Defense Department accounts to have this capability.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. So you are deferring, is what you are saying. Okay. But do we know what your annual budget would be? Do you have any—how far along are you? That is what I am trying to figure out. How far are you along in this planning?

You have used terms like fully operational by, and, you know, I am a little surprised to hear you are so far along. So do you have a budget?

Secretary HENRY. We have a budget for the current year, and during this year we are going to be building what we refer to as a program, a five-year look at what the costs are.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. And what would that be?

Secretary HENRY. Do you have the dollar amount for this year?

General WARD. Congresslady, those dollar amounts in the out years aren't known. Right now for our current operating profile, it is about—and I am not exactly sure, but it is about \$75 million for just the year 2008.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay, and you said we have a \$9 billion a year aid cost, right, to the continent? Okay. All right. Thank you.

I appreciate your being here to share this with us, and—I am sorry, one last thing. When will this be fully operational?

Secretary HENRY. It will have a fully operational capability, which means that it will be able to assume all the current missions assigned to that geographical area, on October 1st, 2008—is when it becomes fully operational.

That doesn't mean that it will have all the infrastructure or it will be in the places it is going to be, but it will be able to assume the mission set.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. And how long have you been planning this?

Secretary HENRY. The President made the decision on December 15th of last year. He announced it in February. Prior to taking that to the President, Secretary Rumsfeld had different planning activities that had been going on for, I don't know, a year or two prior.

We looked at a number of different models, finally gave him a way that he felt comfortable with to take forward to the President.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Maybe around 2004, is that what you are telling me, two years previous to—

Secretary HENRY. The initial thinking on this, I would say, was in the 2005 time frame at a very low-level conceptual thought process. Then in 2006 he instituted formal planning processes to deliver options to him.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. And again, I would like to say that I do think it is a good idea to pay attention to the continent of Africa, and I am very concerned about actual physical presence there.

Thank you very much for being here.

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you.

And, gentlemen, could you take some time and describe our current military presence on the continent of Africa, what our missions are?

And also sketch out for us, to the best of your knowledge, the extent of the State Department and USAID's work on the continent in Africa, how they work together now and how you would see the designation of a new command on the continent. How will those missions change over time?

General WARD. The current military mission profile is being carried out through U.S. European Command and through U.S. Central Command, and specifically its Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa most predominantly.

U.S. Pacific Command has some limited activity in the ocean islands off of the east coast of Africa.

Programs include in the northern part of Africa things such—the program Operation Enduring Freedom—Trans Sahara, which is the military element of the TSCTP, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, which is a counterterrorism activity where we are partnering with nine north African nations, improving their military capacity to control their borders as they deal with the current terrorist threat that is there in the northern part of the continent.

Additionally, you swing around—in the current Central Command area of responsibility, the Horn of Africa—the military efforts include counterterrorism, also include humanitarian as well as efforts to improve and increase the capacity of militaries in those Horn of Africa nations into central Africa to improve their military capacity and capability.

In the west of Africa, the Gulf of Guinea area, our attempts to improve and enhance the maritime information and maritime safety and security element of the Gulf of Guinea are ongoing.

Those efforts are being carried out through our—currently the naval component of U.S. European Command. And I will go back to say that the activity in the north of Africa is being carried out predominantly through the Special Operations Command of the U.S. European Command.

In each case, those activities would fall under the work or the umbrella of the U.S. Africa Command once it is stood up. This notion of full operational capability implies many, many elements, one of which is the notion that there are certain things being done by other parts of the Department of Defense.

And instead of making redundant capabilities, there may be instances where U.S. Africa Command will engage in a memorandum of agreement, a memorandum of understanding with another Department of Defense entity such that, you know, the work that would be done, as opposed to being duplicated, will be being done by that currently existing command construct.

In addition to that, on the continent of Africa we are engaged in support of the State Department in their various contingency operations and training assistance programs as they are building the militaries of other nations to participate in peacekeeping programs very specifically.

There is a support that is provided to that. There is work that is being done in the form of other humanitarian efforts—again, not that would be competing with the various efforts going on—as an example, PEPFAR, the President's Emergency Program for AIDS Relief, where there is a military piece of that, because as we look

at working with militaries in Africa, as they want to engage in peacekeeping operations, one of the constraints that has been placed on those forces by the African Union is that those forces be HIV/AIDS free.

And so as we work with those militaries to cause, to the best that we can, them be able to produce a force that is as healthy as it can be, we then get involved military-to-military as they certainly look toward that capacity.

There are other programs that are going on that we work on the continent. Many of these programs are Title 22 programs out of the Department of State, but they are being implemented with our support and with our assistance.

Our foreign military financing, our international military and educational training programs, whereby we work with the Department of State country teams as they identify military members that would come back to America to receive training, that hopefully will go forth to them professionalizing their forces.

There are additional training activities at the unit level where we take into account the maturing level of militaries, partnering them with their Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) professional development programs, their professional development programs, again causing those militaries to be seen within their countries as—I call it forces for good, so that the potential for them being seen as being oppressors of their people goes away and they see in a better light insofar as being protectors of their populations.

So this range of programs from military-to-military assistance—I mentioned the State partnership program, where we bring in our State partners, National Guards, Reserves, working initially to enhance various military capabilities, from maintenance training to increased awareness of air domain, to moving on to additional areas of relationship-building—are all ongoing.

And we would look to reinforce these efforts, focus these efforts much better, and ensure that those efforts in particular are efforts that are more supportive of and complementary to efforts being taken by other elements of our government in the developmental activities that they pursue.

Ambassador MULL. Speaking on behalf of the State Department, Madam Chair, for many, many years, the State Department has aimed to pursue a policy of diplomatic universality in which we have posts in as many countries as possible in the world.

And we currently have 50 embassies in Africa. There is only a small handful of countries where we do not have embassies, either very tiny countries or places where there are security concerns such as in Somalia.

And the U.S. Agency for International Development, because of our extensive foreign assistance operations, has either a presence in each of those embassies or has regional responsibilities for covering those places where we might not have an AID mission in the country.

Military assistance is an important part but only a very small fraction of the kinds of assistance that we provide. As General Ward mentioned, our foreign assistance budget includes such things as assistance for education, empowering civil society, economic empowerment, antipoverty programs, women's empower-

ment, helping people combat trafficking in persons, human rights, humanitarian assistance, and response to natural disasters and so forth.

We currently coordinate the military assistance that we do provide. Previously, before AFRICOM was established, the European Command had responsibility for Africa.

And in most of these embassies there is a Defense attaché or a security assistance officer who, up until this point, had been coordinating with the European Command. Now they will coordinate with AFRICOM in making sure our military assistance is properly targeted.

Ms. CASTOR. Can you tell us how many personnel of the Department of Defense are currently on the continent and how many from the State Department in embassies and through USAID?

Secretary HENRY. General Ward might correct me if I don't get these right, but for the Department of Defense, we have about 1,300 to 1,400 in the Task Force–Horn of Africa, which is our major presence that we have.

We have Marine detachments at many of the embassies which are a handful of people. We have Defense attachés in the different embassies and offices of military cooperation. And these are individuals to a few individuals in each of the embassies.

And then we have periodic activities that we do as part of the Trans-Sahara initiative.

General WARD. I think that is an accurate portrayal of the presence. The most persistent presence is in the form of that element that is in the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa headquartered in Djibouti.

As the under secretary pointed out, in selected embassies there are the Defense attachés. And we only have insofar, as security assistance officers, in what was the EUCOM area—that was only in 9 countries, and I think there are another 3 or 4 in the CENTCOM area, so some number less than 15 security assistance officers.

And each of those officers would have anywhere from one to four or five military personnel associated with them.

There are other military members on the continent, but they are in their rotational basis in and out, conducting specialized training activities and exercise-related missions. Once those training activities and exercises are conducted, then they leave, so they are in there on a Temporary Duty (TDY)-type of a basis.

Ambassador MULL. And, Madam Chair, for the State Department, we have 853 State Department officers at embassies in Africa, and that that is of a total—we estimate that there—when you count all U.S. Government agencies attached to an embassy in Africa, it is about 2,000.

Ms. CASTOR. Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. Meek.

Mr. MEEK. Thank you, Madam Chair.

And I want to welcome the Secretary and General and Ambassador for coming before the committee. There has been a lot of running around with all of us with the votes and all, and serving on other committees.

I know that you all have been talking a lot about placement today, and that is not going to be—I don't want to spend a lot of time on that.

But I think it is important, since we have gotten off to a rocky start, which has improved from the people that I have talked to, on the continent—and I wasn't here, and I don't know if the chairman had an opportunity—who oversees the African Subcommittee, Chairman Payne—did he have an opportunity to ask any questions?

We were here having a discussion about some of the things people are upset about on continent—and there is a lot of work to be done. And I am glad that State is at the table.

I am glad that USAID and—I mean, there is just a number of—and DOD—at the table to help smooth over some of these issues.

But I think what I don't want to happen—I don't want to get—I guess, Mr. Secretary and Ambassador, since you all are representing jointly the two agencies in question—and, General Ward, if you wish to chime in—on this issue of all of a sudden I pick up the *Washington Post* and learn that the command has been set in a country.

And it was based on an agreement where either the President or the Secretary of State said that we would be, you know, we would put our command there.

Because we have so many different issues amongst the African countries—some get along with others, some don't get along with others—down in Southern Command (SOCOM)—I mean, Southern Command was once talked—it was once in Colombia. Where was it located?

Secretary HENRY. Panama.

Mr. MEEK. Panama, I am sorry. In Panama. And then there was a big discussion about moving it to Miami.

And the reason why they moved it to Miami and they didn't move it to Tampa or move it over to Louisiana, there were a couple of places that wanted the Southern Command, and other countries, was that it had to be neutral ground, where all of the partners, just about all of the partners, felt comfortable in being there. Because it is South America, a Spanish language or bilingual city was important.

And so I don't know if once we talk about should we be on the continent or should we not be on the continent. I want to know how this decision is going to be made.

Is it going to be made here in Washington? Is it going to be made in the area? Will these countries be consulted? Do we take a vote? I mean, what happens?

Because I am just trying to find out, because I think as we look at this command, and as it starts to stand up and, fully functional, and build its relationships within—because that is going to be hard enough, and I know how clannish people are about power and being able to control certain things.

And I know General Ward. He has to be a praying man to make sure that everyone understands what has to happen here. And I just want to know how that—I want to go a little deeper, because I don't want to spend a lot of time on it.

I just want to—just give me a feel of how this decision is going to be made. Is it going to be our decision or is it going to be something that we work with our friends with on?

Secretary HENRY. Well, it is a United States decision. You know, it can't be made, and we are not going to go somewhere we are not wanted. I mean, that is a fundamental precept we have in our global force posture.

The process is one where a number of factors were put together to come up with a short list of where we might look, and it is all the issues you are talking about, military issues, and it was a spectrum of issues.

There was a weighting system given to those, and there was an analytical process to come up with a short list. At that point in time, then a team goes out and does a site survey, looking at the capacity and capability of that site to be able to support the type of staff that we are talking about.

It also works with the embassy team and the country to get their inputs. That is brought back, and then the evaluation criteria are re-looked at with more detailed information.

There are a number of people besides the analysis team that are involved in the process at that point in time, in making recommendations to the Secretary. The combatant commander would be one. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be one. Those who work in international policy would be one.

And at that point in time, then he will be briefed on what the recommendations are, and I would imagine at that point in time he would consult with the Secretary of State on this also.

As part of the evaluation effort—and the teams have put it together—it is an integrated DOD-State Department team—and bringing in other parts of the U.S. Government where appropriate, and they have expertise to add.

The decision is taken to the Secretary, though, in consultations with his peers and that—he is given the decision, and then he would inform the President and make sure that the President is comfortable with that decision.

Now, normally when we make decisions about what we are doing with our U.S. forces, we consult with other countries who are stakeholders in the process, but we make the decision, and this would be done similarly.

But you can be confident that we will do significant consultation prior to making a final decision outside of the U.S. Government with our African partners and also perhaps with key European partners.

Mr. MEEK. You know, Mr. Secretary, one of the problems of how we got off to a rocky start is that we told them what we were going to do.

And that is what I am hearing back, not necessarily what I heard from you all. This is what I am hearing from the folks that are in country, some of the countries.

You know, you talk about African Command—they came in and told us, you know, how the show is going to go.

And I am just saying that I just want to make sure that on the State side that there is some massaging going on, and there is a

discussion that is going on, and making people feel that they are a part of this, because without them, we are dead in the water.

I mean, to be honest with you, as it relates to communications, I think some of the best lessons learned have been in the Middle East where we have consulted with other countries and worked with them in a way and made them feel—I am not saying that someone down in, I don't know, wherever, what have you—or Tunis—is going to make a decision on what the U.S. military and the State Department of the Federal Government is going to do.

But I just want to make sure, as we move—especially as we look at some of the issues that are in the continent, especially as it relates to some of the issues that are in Somalia and others, and the missions that have to be carried out—humanitarian, militarily—that this relationship is so very, very important.

I just wanted to say that, Madam Chair, quickly. I don't know if they called us over, but I just need—

Ms. CASTOR. They did, but you have such a keen interest in this. I want you to take all the time you need—

Mr. MEEK. Okay. Well, thank you—

Ms. CASTOR [continuing]. To make sure we have—

Mr. MEEK [continuing]. So very much. We won't miss the vote. My interest won't go that far.

But I just want to make sure—thank you, though. I just want to make sure that I don't pick up the *Post* and all of a sudden a decision has been made. Where are we in that process right now, that long process you just laid out?

Secretary HENRY. We are in the process where teams have gone out to gather information. That aspect of it has not completed.

Mr. MEEK. Okay.

Secretary HENRY. So we don't have the detailed information in order to do a second round of evaluation yet.

Mr. MEEK. Okay. Well, that is the million-dollar question right now, where it is going to be and where will it end up.

I guess the second end of things—and I am going to be in Africa over the break and have an opportunity to see some of the operations that we do have ongoing there, and also heavily on the State side, understanding how we are doing things over there and how we are going to approach it.

We start looking at the whole budget issue—I was in Tunis, Tunisia a couple of years—no, I don't know, about three months ago, three or four months ago—I was in Tunis, and I was—I know that we have our advanced Arabic school there, and I know that we have a great mission that is there.

And I took the opportunity to go visit the mission and talk to not only the Defense attaché but also the folks on the State side.

One of their concerns is the fact that we really don't have a good public affairs budget to be able to work with young people that are being influenced by other forces that are out there that are getting their attention, to put a positive image on the United States of America.

And I just wanted to ask, what level are we going—and this is the Armed Services Committee, but there has to be some—a human side to this, or it is not going to work.

And I just want to make sure that we don't get too excited about helicopters and things of that nature, and that we are—that someone or some folks on this committee—because forcing it through a square hole is not going to—you know, a square peg through a round hole is just not going to happen.

And I think that is lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan and some other areas, and where we are making great leaps and bounds is when we incorporate this kind of—so talk to me a little bit about what is happening on that side of the ball.

How is that going to, General, feed into the command that you have now? And who will be outside of State?

Because I am just telling you, I feel like a child that has been in the middle of a domestic violence fight, and I know who usually kinds of wins these fights when it comes down to these issues, especially trying to do something in a joint way.

Who is going to be the advocate within DOD and the State pushing, because, really, to get anything through this process here, it has to be DOD. You know, on the State side folks are like oh, you know, maybe, maybe I feel—I don't know.

But if the Department of Defense say that this is important to our mission in that command, then it will be prioritized, and we will have countries that will be able to receive—or missions that—U.S. missions that will be able to receive the dollars, that can work with African Command, to make sure that that image that we want of the United States of America is the best image that we can put forth, and have the resources to do that.

And that is so very, very important.

Secretary HENRY. Yes. I will let General Ward speak to specifically what they are doing in the command. But I mean, this is an example of the way that we do things interagency.

The President has designated the State Department for the lead in public diplomacy and strategic communications, headed by former Under Secretary Hughes. And we align ourselves with those processes.

And I mean, on one hand, people are very concerned about the militarization of foreign policy, and other times we get urged to step forward and take charge.

And this is a case where State Department is in the lead. They lay out the program and we support it, and we put resources against it.

But until the President directs us otherwise, which we would not recommend that he do, we are going to be in the supporting role to the State Department on this.

Now, that doesn't mean that within the command there is not certain aspects that go on, but setting the policy for it and the overall program is the State Department's lead.

General WARD. Congressman Meek, one of the things that the command will do by design—and we talked about this unique structure. We have typically stumbled into these sorts of things because we had not gotten it correct.

This command will have a director for outreach who is a very senior and at this point in time nonmilitary member of the team to ensure that following, as the under secretary pointed out, you know, the lead of the Department of State in our strategic commu-

nications activities, that we are aligned with the Department of State, that we are, in fact, going out and understanding from the perspective of our intended audience what sorts of things will make a difference for them, and then putting the programs in place to address their need for understanding, information and perspective, again, from their perspective.

And so this director of outreach—and again, not there yet because, again, we are a command under construction, and those elements are being built, but we are building those elements with a very determined appreciation for the point that you have just made there with respect to outreach and messaging and strategic communications.

At the current time, you know, I am doing a lot of it personally, quite candidly. As I have gone around the continent, most recently, in central Africa last week at the African Union headquarters, engaging with heads of state and others—also with the media, but again—as well as at the request of our ambassadors who are there on the continent.

As I attended one of their sessions here in Washington where the Secretary of State brought in the—

Ms. CASTOR. Excuse me, General. We have five minutes left to vote, so if you could just wrap it up, that would be appreciated.

General WARD [continuing]. Brought in the sub-Saharan ambassadors, messaging with them so that as they are talking about the command, it is, again, speaking with one voice.

So we will remain sensitive to that, and structurally the director of outreach will have that as a very specific part of their portfolio.

Mr. MEEK. And thank you, gentlemen.

And thank you, Madam Chair.

And I look forward to working with the three of you, all of you in DOD and State, making sure that we have a smooth approach in standing up this command. Thank you.

Ms. CASTOR. And thank you, Congressman Meek, for your leadership on this issue.

Gentlemen, thank you very much.

And to everyone else in attendance, thank you for being here.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:08 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

NOVEMBER 14, 2007

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

NOVEMBER 14, 2007

**STATEMENT OF
MR. RYAN HENRY
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
14 NOVEMBER 2007**

Introduction

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak to you about the creation of the newest U.S. regional command – U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).

The increasing importance of Africa to the United States is undeniable. Linked to the U.S. historically, economically, culturally, and politically, security and stability on the continent are of critical interest to the United States. The reorganization of the Defense Department's approach to the continent through the creation of AFRICOM is simply a recognition of this fact.

Commonly associated with intractable conflicts and humanitarian disasters, Africa is increasingly a place of opportunity and hope. The last decade has seen advances in conflict prevention and institution-building on the continent. Africans have begun to demonstrate the initiative and limited ability to stabilize volatile situations. The African Union is energized and through its plans for an African Standby Force seeks to be able to provide security to troubled corners of the continent.

Despite such progress, serious challenges persist. Poverty, lack of economic opportunity, deficiencies in military and government capacity, conflict, terrorism, and disease continue to jeopardize the future for all Africans. Currently, the United States is in a unique position to enhance our assistance to African nations in developing the capacity to address these challenges. As such, the creation of AFRICOM will strengthen that position by creating an economy and unity of effort in the execution of the U.S. government's security programs and policies.

Defense Policy and Security Cooperation in Africa

The stand-up of AFRICOM is just part of our government's overall strategy to develop, in partnership with and in support of Africans, a more democratic, peaceful,

stable, and economically strong Africa. In pursuit of this strategic goal, the U.S. government presently spends approximately \$9 billion annually on programs that promote health, development, trade, and good governance across the continent. Such programs form the fundamental building blocks of U.S. foreign policy towards Africa and are administered primarily through the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development. U.S. defense policy supports our national strategy outlined in National Security Policy Directive 50 (NSPD-50, "U.S. Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa"), by emphasizing three objectives: civilian control of the military and defense reform, military professionalism, and security capacity building. By contrast, U.S. programs in support of security objectives amount to about \$250 million annually, less than three percent of the total U.S. investment. Roughly half of this goes to support the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), meaning that a little more than one percent is spent on discretionary security activities – clearly not a militarization of foreign policy as it is a comparatively small investment. Our current security cooperation programs support national and regional African capacity to participate in sub-regional peacekeeping operations. We work with African partners to improve counter-terrorism capabilities and cooperation. We work to ensure African militaries adhere to democratic principles of civilian control of the military, respect for human rights and the laws of war. We alert leaders and soldiers to the dangers of HIV/AIDS and actively work to slow and stop its spread. All of these efforts are undertaken in partnership with the host African governments, institutions, and organizations. By providing a more focused and sustained Department of Defense (DoD) effort in the area of security capacity building and ensuring we are fully integrated with the broader programs, AFRICOM will take these efforts one step further.

Why AFRICOM?

First and foremost, AFRICOM is the result of a realignment of the unified command structure to match the priorities and realities of the twenty-first century. Prior to President Bush's initiative to create AFRICOM, Central Command handled countries in the Horn of Africa; European Command was responsible for northern and sub-Saharan Africa; and the handful of island nations off Africa's eastern shore fell to Pacific

Command. This splintered approach created inefficiencies and often stymied our ability to understand emerging Continental issues. A single command, headed by a four-star general, will harmonize our efforts, sharpen our coordination, and improve our ability to effectively influence change in Africa. Additionally, AFRICOM re-configures DoD's approach to addressing African security problems as Africans do – from a continental perspective.

Although the creation of AFRICOM is a logical step forward, its establishment is a bold departure from how the U.S. has traditionally established commands. Historically, national crises or disasters have been the catalysts for change. The Iranian hostage crisis, for example, drove the U.S. to create Central Command. Most recently Northern Command was established after the tragedies of September 11, 2001. AFRICOM's inception is different. We are not, and do not plan to be, at war on the continent. Rather, AFRICOM is a recognition that the approach to Africa left over from the Cold War was not only outdated, but potentially damaging to our national security interests. The unprecedented conditions of the Command's creation afforded us an extraordinary opportunity to start from scratch and tailor AFRICOM differently.

AFRICOM's Innovative Approach

AFRICOM's principal innovations are three-fold. First, unlike most unified commands, AFRICOM's focus is **not** on war fighting, but rather, as articulated in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, to "prevent problems from becoming a crisis and a crisis from becoming a catastrophe." AFRICOM endeavors to assist African nations in building the capacity to address emerging security issues on their own before they require international intervention. **U.S. security is enhanced most not when American boots are on the continent, but when Africa's indigenous governments and militaries can operate effectively and efficiently without putting our men and women in harm's way.** By and large, Africans have the drive and initiative to take charge of their own security; more often than not, they lack the means. AFRICOM endeavors to build capacity, so African nations can solve African problems before they erupt into regional or international catastrophes.

AFRICOM's unique mission merits a unique make-up. Its creation provides an opportunity to capitalize on some of the lessons learned from our experiences over the last decade and a half in Africa, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. We have learned that security must be defined broadly and approached holistically. We have learned that the actual lines dividing military and humanitarian missions in the field are less concrete than the bureaucratic lines in Washington. AFRICOM's staff composition reflects these lessons. By incorporating interagency personnel into the Command, AFRICOM's structure will stimulate greater coordination among U.S. government entities. The Command's leadership will include the first civilian Deputy to the Command for Civil-Military Activities, Ambassador Mary Carlin Yates. Interagency personnel detailed from State, USAID, Treasury, Commerce, Energy, and other agencies significantly enhance the command's expertise by importing knowledge that enables AFRICOM to better execute its mission in support of overall U.S. government policy. It also creates organic mechanisms for continuous cooperation and collaboration.

The integration of interagency personnel requires the support of all relevant U.S. departments and agencies. We have engaged in considerable outreach to our interagency partners and the response has been overwhelmingly positive. In order to facilitate interagency participation in the Command, Secretary Gates has authorized that AFRICOM interagency billets be offered on a reimbursable basis.

Finally, in addition to the command's mission and make-up, we are taking an entirely different approach to the organizational structure of the command. Traditional organizational frameworks are being eschewed in favor of a tiered approach that will better position the Command for theater security cooperation. As such, AFRICOM will be a staff headquarters, not a troop headquarters. The staff headquarters will be supported by substantial reach-back capabilities. Additionally, we envision a distributed presence on the continent in locations that best facilitate partnership with African nations and institutions. This structure is the result of extensive dialogue with continental experts and African governments themselves. In the last seven years DoD has engaged in major global force restructuring involving the transition to an expeditionary force vice our former assigned approach to overseas presence. The creation of AFRICOM is consistent with that process.

The location of these AFRICOM elements is still being discussed and debated within the department, within the interagency, and with our partners abroad. One thing is for sure, an AFRICOM presence on the continent is imperative for the successful implementation of its mission. However, AFRICOM will not be accomplishing its mission if the physical presence of the Command itself becomes a burden to host nations. For that reason, as well as for force protection considerations, AFRICOM's footprint in any given location will be relatively small and discrete.

AFRICOM Consistencies

Although in some respects AFRICOM represents a departure from the traditional way we approach the continent, many aspects of U.S. defense engagement with African nations will remain the same. Foremost, AFRICOM will not change U.S. defense policy toward Africa. Rather, it is an opportunity to better coordinate all the tools of security cooperation in a holistic approach that assures sustained and steady engagement. Likewise AFRICOM will not change the State Department's lead role in U.S. foreign policy. Chief of mission authorities will be preserved. Furthermore, AFRICOM will not change USAID's role as the lead USG agency responsible for development and humanitarian assistance. The creation of AFRICOM does not foreshadow a militarization of foreign policy or foreign assistance toward the continent. AFRICOM's creation is rather intended to create greater efficiency and effectiveness in DoD's approach toward the continent, thereby allowing DoD to be a better supporting partner to other agencies in furtherance of U.S. national security objectives in Africa.

Although AFRICOM will allow the Department to be better engaged in African security challenges, Africans will still lead efforts to address those challenges. The Department recognizes and applauds the leadership role that individual African nations and multi-lateral organizations are taking to promote peace, security, and stability in Africa. The U.S. military supports this initiative through myriad capacity-building programs, activities, and exercises. AFRICOM will continue to conduct these activities in support of African leadership.

Outreach and Engagement

Although AFRICOM is a U.S. government initiative, it has not been developed in a vacuum. Our outreach campaign has comprised over 150 separate engagements with officials from various U.S. departments and agencies, Congress, non-governmental organizations, the media, multi-lateral institutions, and numerous foreign governments. These include monthly roundtable discussions with Congressional staff and multiple consultation trips abroad.

Constant and continuing dialogue with our African and European partners has profoundly influenced the mission and organization of the Command. I have personally been to the continent twice to dialogue with top African government leaders and the African Union.¹ My staff's interactions with their African counterparts continue on a regular basis. Further, we recently hosted over 35 African countries and multilateral organizations at a two-day dialogue outside of Warrenton, to discuss AFRICOM and hear their concerns. Despite some public accounts to the contrary, most African nations privately express their appreciation of greater U.S. engagement with Africa, their support for our desire to work closely with the African Union, and their feeling that some small AFRICOM presence on the continent is necessary. Overwhelmingly, once people are educated about the Command, their fears subside and their interest is piqued.

Way Ahead

Although we have come far in the development of the Command, we do not presume to have all the answers yet. We have endeavored to take an approach that is innovative, yet humble. We are fully cognizant that the AFRICOM of today may not be the AFRICOM of the future. We aim for a command that is as dynamic as the continent itself. Issues of presence on the continent, the integration of foreign allies, and the extent of interagency involvement will all receive continued examination and consideration and be adapted to a changing security environment. Our dialogue continues – with you, here today, with our interagency partners, with our African and European allies, and with the public. Achieving results on the continent requires sustained and active engagement.

¹ Countries visited include: Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and Tunisia.

America has the will; our government and military have the capability; and now AFRICOM will help provide the means.

Thank you for your time and attention. We look forward to your continued support as we work to stand up this historic command and integrate and coordinate the efforts of our government.

Statement of Stephen D. Mull
Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs
Before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee
November 14, 2007

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Hunter and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the State Department's involvement in, and views on, the establishment of U.S. Africa Command, or AFRICOM.

My bureau, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, is the State Department's principal institutional link to the Department of Defense (DoD). In this role, we have been working closely with the Bureau of African Affairs and a host of other bureaus and offices within State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to help DoD develop and establish U.S. AFRICOM. This collaborative process began over a year ago, and I am pleased to update you today on our achievements thus far, and on the work that remains yet to be done. I will organize my remarks around three topics. First, I want to share with you the compelling reasons why the State Department supports the creation of this new military command. Second, I would like to address and dispel a few common misconceptions about AFRICOM. And finally, I will highlight some of the many details and decisions that remain to be addressed as we move forward with AFRICOM's development.

National Security Policy Directive-50, the U.S. Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, notes that the African continent is a place of promise and opportunity, linked to the United States by history, culture, economics and geo-strategic significance. In the present era of globalization, these linkages and interdependencies are growing, and will continue to do so. Juxtaposed with Africa's promise and opportunity, however, are such severe challenges as poverty, disease, conflict, and political instability. These challenges, combined with our longstanding and growing ties to Africa, bear on our values as a nation, and our national interests. The State Department and USAID are working hard to help African nations and regional organizations address these challenges. Effective and efficient U.S. Government engagement, however, requires a coherent and coordinated effort by all relevant arms of the U.S. Government, including the Department of Defense.

For over twenty-five years, the responsibility for U.S. military engagement in Africa was divided among three unified commands – the U.S. European, Central, and Pacific Commands. This division of responsibilities made sense during the Cold War period, but not today. Now, DoD will have a structure that institutionalizes regular, comprehensive consideration of the African continent's increasing strategic importance, its challenges, and the

DoD's role in supporting U.S. government efforts to address them. We also believe that placing AFRICOM under the command of a four-star officer – co-equal with the U.S. military's other combatant commands – will help bring the level of attention and focus to African security issues that our national values and interests dictate. And I would like to digress just long enough to say that we are especially encouraged by the selection of GEN Ward to be AFRICOM's first commander. We are confident that GEN Ward's longstanding experience with African security issues, and his excellent reputation in multinational and interagency settings will enable him to establish this new command on a strong foundation of professional excellence, coupled with sensitivity to the needs and concerns of our African partners.

Another reason the State Department supports and welcomes the establishment of AFRICOM is the inclusive approach that DoD has taken in the development of the command, as well as the frank and open nature of our discussions. From the initial establishment of DoD's AFRICOM Implementation Team in November 2006, State, USAID and other USG agencies were invited to temporarily assign full-time, senior representatives to that team. This allowed us to take part in the initial deliberations and conceptual development of AFRICOM. When that team completed its work

early this year, State and other civilian agencies were invited to join DoD's AFRICOM Transition Team. This team, which began its work in Stuttgart in February 2007, conducted the very practical work of taking AFRICOM from the conceptual stage to the point of initial operating capability, which was achieved last month.

Meanwhile, AFRICOM's conceptual development and implementation has also obviously required significant outreach and coordination with our international partners – a process in which we have also engaged along with DoD. Over the past five months, delegations of senior officials from DoD, State, and USAID have conducted two extensive trips to the region to discuss AFRICOM and other security cooperation issues. We also held consultations with senior African military leadership in Washington in late September. Our outreach has also included several of our European allies who have a strong interest in security cooperation with Africa, as well as various international and non-governmental organizations. These trips and engagements have demonstrated the importance of explaining our concept and intentions in establishing AFRICOM, and of listening carefully to African perspectives. We have found that in many cases, these discussions helped to clarify the mission of AFRICOM, and dispel some of the initial apprehensions about its purpose and focus. But

more needs to be done. Building on this proactive approach, the State Department has also begun taking steps through our embassies in Africa and elsewhere to better communicate AFRICOM's mission, structure and intended impact on the continent. We have also emphasized that African input will help us shape the mission and structure of a successful command.

A key part of this outreach, clearly, has been the need to clarify AFRICOM's intended mission. AFRICOM will be one of six Geographic Commands. In contrast to the traditional mission of a geographic command, however, AFRICOM's primary focus will *not* be on preparation for combat. In practical terms, its focus will instead be on security cooperation – helping our African partners build the capacity to deal with African security concerns. Security cooperation is already an important component of U.S. engagement in Africa and can take several forms, including advice and training for partner nations' military forces, assistance with maritime security and border control, schooling and mentorship to help professionalize military personnel, instruction and advice on defense management, and capacity-building for peace support operations. We encourage AFRICOM's engagement in these areas, undertaken in support of our foreign policy priorities, which are being implemented each day by Chiefs of Mission and embassies in the field. When coordinated and nested

in this manner, AFRICOM's contributions can help African countries effectively address such threats as political instability, terrorism, human rights abuses, cross-border trafficking and international crime. Furthermore, by helping address the security issues that impede economic development, AFRICOM's mission will support and complement the lead role that the State Department and USAID play in promoting development and effective governance.

A final, unique attribute of AFRICOM that the State Department welcomes is the role we and other agencies have been invited to play in providing key personnel to the AFRICOM headquarters. Most visible among those positions is the Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities, or DCMA. This position is one of two deputies working directly for the AFRICOM commander. DoD has agreed that this position will always be filled by a senior civilian officer, with the candidates nominated by State. We are very pleased that this position was recently filled for the very first time by Ambassador Mary Yates, a career Foreign Service Officer with considerable African experience. The DCMA is responsible for directing command activities related to security cooperation, capacity building, and strategic communications. The other Deputy to the

Commander, a uniformed three-star officer, is in charge of AFRICOM's more traditional military tasks.

In addition to the DCMA, DoD has invited State to nominate officers for other senior- and mid-level positions, in order to provide expertise in such areas as regional political affairs, public diplomacy, and programming for security cooperation. I should also note that, in light of the valuable foreign policy expertise these individuals will contribute, DoD has kindly offered to reimburse the State Department for the salary and benefits associated with these detailees. Our Department's leadership is currently giving very serious consideration to the number of personnel State might detail to AFRICOM, and for which positions. Finally, as with all unified commands, we plan to assign a Foreign Policy Advisor (POLAD), who will perform the more traditional role of providing policy advice to the commander – a function that will be especially important in such an interagency endeavor. We are excited at the prospect that these substantive, senior- and mid-level detailees from State and other agencies will provide valuable experience and perspective to AFRICOM as it works with the rest of the USG to build the security capacity of our African partners.

In this context, I would also like to briefly address a few common misconceptions about the division of authorities and responsibilities between

State and DoD as they relate to AFRICOM. As I've already mentioned, AFRICOM is "new" and "different" from other military commands in terms of both its mission focus and because State and other agencies have been asked to detail a number of officers to its staff in positions of line responsibility within the command. These non-traditional attributes, however, do not indicate a change in the roles and responsibilities performed by the State Department in our relationship with Africa. The State Department – led by our Africa Bureau – continues to bear primary responsibility for the development and execution of U.S. foreign policy in Africa. Likewise, we and DoD have agreed that the Chiefs of Mission in Africa will continue to exercise the authorities and responsibilities that are assigned to them in the President's Letter of Instruction. This includes the responsibility to review and approve peacetime DoD-sponsored activities conducted in or with the host nation. While we have achieved this agreement in principal with DoD, however, we also believe further discussions are needed to address in detail just how these authorities will be implemented on a day-to-day basis. Resolving these complicated institutional issues will provide a solid basis for effective collaboration with AFRICOM, as well as addressing the apprehensions expressed by some that AFRICOM could lead to a "militarization" of U.S. foreign policy in Africa.

Finally, I would highlight that AFRICOM remains very much a work in progress, with several important details and key decisions yet to be worked out. These include the proposed, eventual location of AFRICOM elements on the continent, consistent with existing Unified Command and Chief of Mission authorities. As I alluded to earlier, we are also continuing to work out AFRICOM's mission statement, final structure and manning roster, including the exact number and responsibilities of civilian agency detailees. Finally, our outreach and discussions with partners both on and off the continent, including Congress, will remain a fixture of AFRICOM's day-to-day existence even long after the command has achieved full operational capability. It represents a particularly vital aspect of our efforts, and one that truly impacts our decision-making as we continue to refine our concept for AFRICOM's presence and engagement on the African continent.

In sum, the Department of State views AFRICOM as an important step forward in the coordination of U.S. *military* engagement, and in supporting the overall U.S. *government* engagement with Africa. It is the right step at the right time to help African countries address security challenges that threaten both their interests and our own. Thank you for the opportunity to provide you with this update today.

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STATEMENT OF
General William 'Kip' Ward
COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND
BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ON
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Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee - Statement for the Record
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Mr. Chairman, Congressman Hunter, distinguished Members of the Committee -- thank you for the opportunity to be here today. I am deeply honored to be appearing before you in my position as the Commander, United States Africa Command. It is rare that one gets the chance to build a new organization from the ground up, and I look forward to what I consider to be the opportunity of a lifetime for everyone who will be a part of this new command.

Now is the right time for USAFRICOM. The African continent's economic, social, political, and military importance in global affairs has grown tremendously. From my observations, the leaders of Africa and its island nations are increasingly demonstrating the will to provide a safe and secure environment for their citizens. My goal as Commander of USAFRICOM is to build an enduring organization with regular and sustained engagement that benefits both the citizens of the United States and the citizens of the nations in Africa. The establishment of USAFRICOM presents a tremendous opportunity to work closely with U.S. interagency partners. Working together as a team, the net result over time will be a more stable and more prosperous Africa with expanded horizons for growth and development.

When the President signed the directive establishing USAFRICOM in February, we entered what I call the design process. Following my confirmation by the Senate at the end of September, USAFRICOM became a **command under construction** with three key principles:

First, we are **building the team**. With the goal of achieving full operational capability as a unified command by October 2008, USAFRICOM endeavors to be innovative in its construct. We have the opportunity, vision, and determination to redefine how the U.S. military cooperates

with and complements the efforts of its U.S., international, and non-governmental partners in Africa.

We would like to realize a complementary mix of Department of Defense civilian and military staff and representatives from across the interagency departments of our government. Our intention is to move beyond the traditional concept of liaison officers and instead have our interagency partners serve alongside their DoD counterparts, working hand in hand every day on the matters most important to making a difference in Africa. As interagency representatives bring to bear the subject matter expertise of their parent organizations, USAFRICOM will complement, not compete with, the activities of other U.S. governmental organizations. The sum of our efforts as a whole will be greater than that of any of the individual parts.

Similarly, USAFRICOM's partnership activities—enhancing friendships outside the command—will strive to build strong and lasting relationships through regular and sustained engagement with our African partners, U.S. government agencies, allies and international organizations, both governmental and private. Success in my eyes is having earned our teammates' and partners' trust and confidence in who we are and what we do.

Second, **USAFRICOM will add value and do no harm** to the collective and substantial on-going efforts on the continent. USAFRICOM was created to bring value-added to America's long-standing policy of security cooperation in Africa and to deliver security assistance that enhances African stability, so that development can occur and Africans can prosper. Working together with interagency partners we will focus on building strong security structures in Africa that work for our African partners. As USAFRICOM proceeds along the path to full operational capability, it is

important that we manage the expectations for the command and defuse the potential for misunderstanding about the command's purpose.

The creation of USAFRICOM provides an opportunity to harmonize US efforts to maximize the effectiveness of our nation's resources being dedicated to Africa. However, we realize that the Department of State remains the lead in U.S. foreign policy and we fully respect U.S. Chief of Mission authority when working in African nations. USAFRICOM will conduct all our activities, engagements, and communications on the continent in full coordination with our U.S. Chiefs of Mission in each African country. We value the tremendous experience and expertise our interagency partners bring to the table from having worked in Africa for decades. USAFRICOM will do everything in our power not to disrupt or confuse current and ongoing U.S. government or international partner efforts in Africa.

Obviously, a nation's professional military is very important for its continued stability and security, but so are police, border security, customs and all the other services required to protect its citizens. I firmly believe security should be defined broadly and must be approached holistically. We will work to support on-going U.S. government efforts while finding additional ways to improve security related programs with the support of the Department of Defense. These can be military-to-military activities and exercises, or enhancing efforts led by another agency like USAID, State, Treasury, Commerce, or Justice. We will also add value by collaborating with our national and international partners to focus on assisting African nations and institutions to build strong security structures that work for Africans.

Finally, USAFRICOM will seek to promote relationships and build partnerships to **enable the work of Africans** in providing for their own security. It begins with understanding our African partners' definitions of their own environment and interests and understanding the complexities

of the diverse countries and cultures across the continent. Appreciation of their perspective will allow us to jointly identify ways and means that address both African and American interests. Our intent is to build mutual trust, respect, and confidence with our partners on the continent and our international friends through sustained engagement by a single unified command dedicated solely to Africa. Advancing US interests need not be a zero sum game. We can work with our African and international partners in a way that benefits all.

USAFRICOM will directly contribute to enabling Africans to achieve stability and security. USAFRICOM will work to be a positive force in facilitating other agencies' and departments' activities when the command's core competencies can add value. We will strive to cooperate with and complement the efforts of the African Union (AU) and its African Regional Economic Communities (REC), the nations of Africa, our European allies and other partners and friends with strong interests on the continent. Having just visited the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, and the ECOWAS, CEEAC, and SADC headquarters, I was able to gain an understanding for the work being done to establish the Standby Forces in Africa.

USAFRICOM's value added to these partnerships will be evident as we understand their needs, and within our means and stated policy decisions, help them develop their own solutions. USAFRICOM will also be a learning organization that will evolve as necessary to meet our objectives. We will strive to better understand the perspectives of the many stakeholders working for the success of Africa. Through partnership, USAFRICOM intends to assist the nations of Africa in bringing security to the continent.

Before closing, I would like to reaffirm that USAFRICOM will sustain ongoing activities as it accepts missions from the other three geographic commands - U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. Pacific

Command. The creation of USAFRICOM will allow the Department of Defense, for the first time, to view all of Africa through a single lens, and we will build upon the significant foundation that the three geographic commands and their components have built. We will continue existing capacity building efforts and create opportunities to engage with African militaries to enhance regional security.

Past activities involving small numbers of service members, such as the medical exercises MEDFLAG and MEDCAP will continue. The communications interoperability exercise called the Limited Objective Experiment in Ghana and Ethiopia, under the umbrella of our Africa Endeavor effort, and security sector reform in Liberia make visible and measurable differences on the ground. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), and its military component known as Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS), is an excellent example of preventative US interagency cooperation aimed at building regional counterterrorism capacity to enhance partner nation border security in Trans-Sahara Africa. USAFRICOM will continue to work closely with the State Department under the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. ACOTA has a well established record of success in training African militaries in vital peacekeeping missions.

There are also new U.S. initiatives such as the African Partnership Station (APS) that demonstrate the types of activities USAFRICOM will seek to promote as "forces for good." We have listened to African leaders' in the development of our Gulf of Guinea naval programs. APS establishes an at-sea training platform on board a single ship that provides persistent regional presence employing a minimal footprint ashore.

APS is currently deploying to the Gulf of Guinea region to improve maritime security and safety in West and Central Africa. Not only will it provide quality military training to sailors and leaders of the nations it

will visit, it will also carry members of NGOs such as Project HOPE, who will provide various medical services and education programs for many of those same nations. These NGOs will work in coordination with uniformed medical personnel. APS, like OEF-TS, is a critical tool to develop the critically important human relationships which serve as the basis of enduring, broader relationships between the US and our partners.

The stability and security we envision on the continent will unfold and mature as we build strong and lasting relationships with our African partners, allies and international organizations, both governmental and private. We will build these relationships using appropriate foreign military financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds for our African partners. IMET and FMF remain important tools for building capacity on the continent. IMET, in particular, remains an important program for military professionalization.

In summary, USAFRICOM represents the United States Government's long-term commitment to strengthen our security ties with Africa. The establishment of USAFRICOM also addresses America's growing interests in a very important part of the world. Strong bonds of friendship and a common vision for the future are critical to understanding the regional challenges and opportunities across the continent. We will endeavor to assist African nations in enhancing security and stability for the peoples of Africa, where growth and expanded horizons exist for future generations. We are sure to be successful as we move forward together as a team with a common vision, thus enhancing our security here in America.

Thank you.