

THE AMERICAN MILITARY AND THE FAR EAST

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Edited by
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THE NINTH MILITARY HISTORY SYMPOSIUM

1-3 October 1980
United States Air Force Academy

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CONTENTS

	Page
Dedication	xi
Preface	xiii
Introduction	1
<i>Harry R. Borowski and Joe C. Dixon</i>	
AMERICAN OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY IN ASIA	7
Western Perceptions and Asian Realities	9
<i>Akira Iriye</i>	
American Policy and Strategy in East Asia, 1898-1950: The Creation of a Commitment	20
<i>Roger Dingman</i>	
The United States and East Asia, 1945-1960: The Evolution of a Commitment	46
<i>Norman A. Graebner</i>	
Commentary: A Soldier's Viewpoint	65
<i>Richard G. Stilwell</i>	
Commentary: Some Questions About American Policy in East Asia	69
<i>Frank E. Vandiver</i>	
Discussion and Comments	72
<i>Frank E. Vandiver (Moderator)</i>	
AMERICAN PACIFICATION AND OCCUPATION IN ASIA	77
The Pacification of the Philippines, 1898-1902	79
<i>John M. Gates</i>	
The Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952	92
<i>Ikuhiko Hata</i>	

	Page
The First Vietnamization: U.S. Advisors in Vietnam, 1956-1960	109
<i>Ronald H. Spector</i>	
Commentary: The MacArthur Viewpoint	116
<i>D. Clayton James</i>	
Discussion and Comments	121
<i>Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (Moderator)</i>	
IMPACT OF THE ASIAN EXPERIENCE ON THE AMERICAN MILITARY	125
The Orient and U.S. Naval Strategy	127
<i>Paul R. Schratz</i>	
The United States Army on the Pacific Frontier, 1899-1939	139
<i>Roy K. Flint</i>	
The Impact of the Orient on Airpower	160
<i>John Schlight</i>	
Commentary: Marines in East Asia	172
<i>Edwin H. Simmons</i>	
Commentary: Reflections on the Asian Experience	176
<i>Allan R. Millett</i>	
IMPACT OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY ON ASIAN SOCIETIES	181
Ironies of the Chinese-American Military Contact	183
<i>Frank A. Kierman, Jr.</i>	
Japanese Perceptions of the A-Bomb Decision	199
<i>Sadao Asada</i>	
The Impact of U.S. Military Presence on the Republic of Korea	220
<i>C.I. Eugene Kim</i>	
Commentary: Perceptions of Power	237
<i>William W. Whitson</i>	

Discussion and Comments 240
Joyce C. Lebra (Moderator)

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 243

Summary Remarks 245
Theodore Ropp

Concluding Remarks 247
Alvin D. Coox

Notes 251

Participants 281

Index 295

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
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DEDICATION

to
Alfred F. Hurley
Brigadier General, USAF, Retired

On behalf of past and present members of the Department of History, this volume is dedicated to Brigadier General Alfred F. Hurley.

Brigadier General Alfred F. Hurley organized the First Military History Symposium in 1967 and developed the Military History Symposia series which has since become a biennial event at the Air Force Academy. This series stands as a monument to his vision and to his special qualities of leadership.

Alfred F. Hurley was born in Brooklyn, New York, on 16 October 1928. He graduated from St. John's University in 1950 and joined the U.S. Air Force during the Korean War. He earned his Ph.D. degree from Princeton University in 1961. In addition to time in graduate school, Brigadier General Hurley's Air Force assignments included duty at the Air Force Academy as a member of the faculty, in Air Training Command as a navigation instructor, and in Europe and Washington, D.C., as a group executive and an operations staff officer. He was named a Guggenheim Fellow in 1971-1972 and a Smithsonian Fellow in 1976-1977. He is author of *Billy Mitchell, Crusader for Air Power* (1975), and co-editor of *Air Power and Warfare* (1979).

Brigadier General Hurley was appointed a Permanent Professor at the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1966, and named Head of the Department of History in 1967. He served in that capacity until his retirement from the Air Force in 1980 after thirty years of service. He thereupon assumed responsibilities as Vice President for Administrative Affairs at North Texas State University in Denton, Texas.

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PREFACE

Every symposium in this series has broken new ground and accumulated new debts. The ninth symposium, however, perhaps more conspicuously than past symposia, has struck off boldly in new directions. The two men most responsible for this symposium, (then) Colonel Alfred F. Hurley and Major Harry R. Borowski, were not constrained in their planning by a narrow definition of "military" history. Their willingness to include questions of foreign policy, cross-cultural interaction, and national perceptions and misperceptions, within the context of military history, has helped us all to expand our vision and understanding.

Debts of gratitude are owed to many people, but to none more than the outstanding group of scholars and military officers who delivered papers and served as moderators and commentators in the various sessions. Whatever success the symposium enjoyed, and whatever use the proceedings may have, are certainly a credit to the superb collection of experts on East Asia who gathered at the Air Force Academy last October.

The Department of History is once again most thankful to the Association of Graduates of the United States Air Force Academy for generous financial assistance in support of the symposium. Support came from other quarters as well. The organizers of the symposium received constant and enthusiastic cooperation from Lieutenant General Kenneth L. Tallman, Superintendent of the Air Force Academy, and from Brigadier General William A. Orth, Dean of the Faculty. The Department of History could not successfully host the symposia series without the backing of the entire Academy. Neither could the symposia be held without the hard work and sacrifice offered by the individual members of the Department of History. A standing joke among members of the department is that someday there may be enough time available during a symposium to actually attend the sessions.

Special thanks go to Lieutenant Colonel Carl W. Reddel, presently Head of the Department of History, for his assistance and encouragement in the editing of these proceedings. The proceedings would not have appeared, of course, without the patience and expertise of Mrs. Dode Jones and Ms. Rae Hellen, who typed the manuscript. The manuscript was deftly transformed into a printed volume under the watchful eye of Mr. Lawrence J. Paszek, Office of Air Force History.

None of these people is responsible for the curiosities of nomenclature, capitalization, punctuation, and footnote form in these proceedings; the editor bears full responsibility. The question of nomenclature has plagued Americans for a long time whenever they have turned their eyes to the land washed by the western Pacific. A recent Royal Air Force exchange officer at the Academy expressed surprise that Americans often call this area the "Far East," for he presumed that from the perspective of North America the label would be "Far West." The term "East Asia" seems to be currently in favor, but it does leave Southeast Asia in an anomalous position. As used in this volume, "East Asia" should be understood not to exclude Indochina and the Philippines.

Last, and perhaps most importantly, an accolade is due to the Executive Director of the Ninth Military History Symposium, Harry R. Borowski. Major Borowski's careful planning and skillful direction made this year's symposium an exceptionally valuable and enjoyable experience.

USAF Academy
March 1981

INTRODUCTION

Harry R. Borowski and Joe C. Dixon

The choice of topic for the Ninth Military History Symposium was based on the observation that comparatively little serious historical research has been done on America's military involvement in East and Southeast Asia. This seems surprising, since the U.S. has fought four major conflicts in this area since the turn of the century, and has been continuously and deeply involved with Asian affairs since 1941. More often than not, the experience has been frustrating for both Americans and Asians. Consequently, lessons of the American involvement in Asian affairs have seldom been considered relevant or important, at least when compared to American preoccupation with European concerns. American scholars and military professionals have failed to develop a comprehensive understanding of the lessons that might be learned from the experience in Asia. This dearth of scholarly interest and paucity of understanding led naturally to the conclusion that American military involvement in the "Far East" would be a timely and useful symposium topic.

One suspects that cultural differences and misunderstanding may partially explain the ambivalence and unwillingness of many Westerners to examine thoroughly the American experience in East Asia. Misperceptions on both sides of the Pacific have played an important role in war and peacetime relationships, and may have discouraged attempts at objective examination of many events. In order to address this problem, and to stimulate further research, a number of scholars were asked to present papers on topics normally outside the scope of the military history symposia series. It is the firm belief of those who organized this symposium that military history transcends matters of guns, battles, and commanders; sociological and cultural considerations can offer valuable aid to the military historian.

The American preoccupation and concern with Europe proved to be an unexpectedly pervasive theme running through almost every one of the papers in this volume. American strategy in Asia, when not devised in a fit of absence of mind—to use Professor Ropp's phrase—appears to have been largely derivative of America's European orientation. Specific American policy in Asia, too, has been frequently defined by European developments; Dr. Hata suggests that U.S. policy regarding the occupation of Japan changed largely as a result of larger concerns which had

reoriented American policy in occupied Germany. Following its every war in Asia, the U.S. has quickly turned its attention back to Europe, with an apparent collective sigh of relief. War in Europe, for America, has been less frequent and less common than war in Asia, but nonetheless, war in Europe has been considered the norm. Colonel Flint perhaps makes this point most vividly when he portrays the curious juxtaposition between the U.S. Army's operations, over a fairly long time, against American Indians and Filipinos, and the Army's continual insistence on planning and training for a European-style war. The U.S. Navy represented the major exception to this fascination with Europe, according to Captain Schratz. Whether or not this argument may constitute "naval metaphysics," to borrow Professor Millett's words, is left to the judgment of the reader. In any case, most American policies affecting Asia reflected a perspective oriented toward Europe.

The organization of this volume follows the order of presentation in the symposium. The structure of the symposium was designed to group papers around topics which became progressively more specific.

Professor Iriye's keynote Harmon Memorial Lecture on "Western Perceptions and Asian Realities" opened the symposium in the evening preceding the first formal session. His analysis of broad themes of cultural misunderstanding and of military power relationships in East Asia fits well into the first part of this volume (American Objectives and Strategy in Asia). Professor Iriye challenges the reader to think more precisely about "cultural misperceptions." He suggests that, in terms of power relationships within the context of classical balance-of-power considerations, the very real Western misperceptions of Asia may have played a less significant role than often presumed.

Professors Dingman and Graebner highlight part one with a couplet of major papers on the creation and evolution of an American commitment in East Asia from 1898 to 1960. Professor Dingman argues that the initial phase of American involvement, 1898-1907, did not lead to a U.S. commitment in the area. On the other hand, in the period 1941-1950, the American presence in the lands of the western Pacific did lead to a continuing commitment, as defined by Professor Dingman. Professor Graebner focuses on the period after 1945, and carefully delineates the factors and forces which compelled the U.S. toward an ever-increasing commitment in East Asia (including Vietnam). His analysis demonstrates the importance of American perceptions of the Communist threat, originating in a European context, in the shaping of policy in Asia. General Stilwell's brief comments bring the discussion full circle; he demonstrates poignantly, by his own perspective and his assertion of the reality of a Communist threat, the thrust of Professor Iriye's discussion: in the military power equation, cross-cultural considerations frequently play a relatively minor role.

The second collection of papers provides a look at American pacification and occupation activities in three important areas: the Philippines, 1898-1902; Japan, 1945-1952; and Vietnam, 1956-1960. Professor Gates offers a stimulating analysis of American successes in the Philippine-American War, and argues, in contrast to Samuel P. Huntington (*The Soldier and the State*), that the attitudes and goals of military men in the Philippines matched the progressive ideals current at home. He also reminds the reader that parallels with Vietnam must be drawn with care and based upon historical accuracy. In the course of suggesting that sophisticated weapons are easily overused, and perhaps less effective than earlier, cruder devices, Professor Gates delivers one of the memorable phrases of the symposium: "... a squad of arrogant, racist imperialists with Krag-Jorgensen rifles has less destructive potential than the pilot of a fully laden jet fighter-bomber, even if the latter is a humble, egalitarian liberator." From the relatively unknown war in the Philippines, the reader's attention is directed toward more familiar events in Japan. Dr. Hata gives a Japanese view of the occupation of Japan under MacArthur, although Professor James questions whether MacArthur wielded the influence Dr. Hata ascribes to the "American Caesar." Among other interesting and thought-provoking observations, Dr. Hata asserts that the essential course of occupation policy in Japan was set by a series of meetings between MacArthur and the Emperor of Japan. American success in Japan by 1952 provides a contrast with activities in Vietnam, which began only four years later. Dr. Spector analyzes the causes for failure of the first American effort at Vietnamization, 1956-1960. He suggests the reasons for that earlier failure may help to explain the failure of Vietnamization under the Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford administrations, and may provide a prognosis for the prospects of success for other U.S. military assistance programs in Asia. Dr. Spector's analysis concludes that, at the level of one-on-one military assistance, cross-cultural considerations, especially Western ability to speak host languages, are important factors in the determination of success or failure. Taken together the papers by Messieurs Gates, Hata, and Spector provide insights to anyone who would understand American military activities in Asia since 1898.

The third and fourth parts of this volume address two sides of the same question: What impact did the American military and Asian societies have on one another? Part three features papers by active duty and retired military officers, all trained as historians, who examine the impact of the Asian experience on the organizational structure, strategy and tactics, and doctrine of the components of the American military. Navy Captain Schratz, in a broadly-sweeping summary, provides an interpretation of events in the western Pacific since the mid-nineteenth century. He argues that the vision originating with Commodore Perry, developed by the Navy's best thinkers, and executed by naval leaders in World War II, died with the American decision to "abandon" China after the war. Colonels Flint and Schlicht concentrate more specifically on the impact of ex-

periences in Asia upon the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force. Colonel Flint describes the tension in Army thought and planning between expansionists and advocates of a "continental" strategy. He contends that the major impact of the Asian experience on the Army was growth and expansion, and development of structures and procedures for operating on a global rather than continental scale. Colonel Schlight sees the impact on airpower as almost wholly negative, especially after 1950. The experience against Japan in World War II helped bolster arguments for an independent—and strategic-minded—Air Force, but Colonel Schlight is quick to acknowledge that the Air Force is not synonymous with airpower. He maintains that Korea and Vietnam restricted airpower to tactical roles executed in ways not consistent with airpower doctrine which called for central control. Fragmentation of control and the resultant inefficiency, concludes the author, have led to widely-held public doubts about the efficacy of airpower. General Simmons' commentary on Marines in East Asia, which raises few doubts about the efficacy of the Corps, serves as a reminder that the American military consists of more than just the three major services featured in these papers. Professor Millett's incisive analysis challenges Captain Schratz's assertion that the Navy's strategy in defeating Japan could have "saved" the mainland if naval policy had prevailed with regard to China. Professor Millett also challenges the Air Force concern for unified command of the air; he argues that, except for strategic deterrence, airpower doctrine has shown only marginal relevance to American security problems.

The fourth part of this volume examines the impact of the American military on elements of three Asian societies: China, Japan, and Korea. Professor Kierman details the American military association with China since the late eighteenth century, weaving an intriguing story around the thread of irony which has characterized the curious relationship from the beginning. There is an element of irony in the case of Japan as well. Professor Asada demonstrates considerable intellectual courage and imagination in examining the sensitive question of Japanese perceptions of the American decision to drop the A-Bomb on Japan. He demonstrates convincingly that Japanese feelings of outrage and disapproval are stronger in the generations raised since 1945 than among those who experienced the war. Furthermore, Professor Asada explains how the historical problem of the A-Bomb decision plays a lively role in present-day Japanese politics. A note of irony is again struck in the case of Korea; Professor Kim addresses the problem of the preponderant influence of the Korean military upon the political life of South Korea. He suggests that the apolitical nature of the American military prevented Americans from creating a Korean military force subservient to civilian control. Dr. Whitson's commentary provides a valuable perspective on all three Asian societies. He concludes that Western and Eastern perceptions of power are very different, with the former more concerned with quantifiable "things." He

argues that when Asian societies lose their Oriental perception of power, and begin to adopt Western notions, they often find themselves in special difficulties. He cites examples which include the three societies examined in this section of the volume: Japan in the early twentieth century, Chiang Kai-shek in the Chinese civil war, and South Korea under American influence.

In the last part of this volume, Professors Ropp and Coox offer stimulating reflections upon the American military and East Asia. Professor Ropp maintains that much of the misunderstanding and misperception which lie at the base of East-West relationships might be eliminated by the comparative study of history. Professor Coox concludes the volume on an upbeat note, expressing with cautious confidence the belief that gatherings such as the Ninth Military History Symposium may help to clear away the ignorance and misconceptions by which we are so often plagued.

To expand the knowledge of the past, historians must ask the right questions. Panelists, moderators, and commentators raise many intriguing and novel points in this volume; perhaps more questions are raised than answered. The purpose of this volume will be served if readers are not only enlightened, but also stimulated to pursue further research and scholarship in this area of military history.

I

AMERICAN OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY IN ASIA

WESTERN PERCEPTIONS AND ASIAN REALITIES*

Akira Iriye

I am very honored to have been invited this evening to address this distinguished audience. I am extremely impressed with this year's Military History Symposium, which brings together many specialists to discuss aspects of United States involvement in East Asia. I only hope that my paper will do justice to the enormous amount of preparation that has gone into the planning for this symposium.

In considering the broad theme of tonight's topic, Western perceptions and Eastern realities, I think it might be useful to take a look at the last half-century, going back to the Manchurian crisis of 1931. That crisis began a fifteen-year war between China and Japan, a war that eventually involved the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and many other countries of Europe and Asia. That year may therefore be taken as a point of departure for American military involvement in East Asia. It also happened that in the same year, far away from Mukden where the Manchurian crisis began, an American sociologist, Robert E. Park, was in the Chinese city of Hangchow, delivering a paper for a meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The paper was entitled, "The Problem of Cultural Differences," and discussed the transmission and diffusion of culture. Following William Graham Sumner, Park noted that the Orient and the Occident constituted "two grand divisions of culture in the world." China represented the former, and America the latter, in the sense that each embodied certain traits that had become part of its cultural heritage. The paper contrasted the Orient's stress on permanency, stability, equilibrium, and repose with the Occident, where "life is prospective rather than retrospective. . . [the mood] is one of anticipation rather than of reflection. . . [and the] attitude toward change is embodied in the concept of progress." The United States exemplified the West's preoccupation with action and mobility. It was a society where "changes of fortune are likely to be sudden and dramatic, where every individual is more or less on his own. . . [fashion] and public opinion take the place of custom as a means and method of social control." In sum, Park said, in the West, and particularly in America, the "individual is emancipated, and society is atomized." In sharp contrast, the Orient, especially China, was more "im-

*This paper was delivered as the 23rd Harmon Memorial Lecture.

mobile" and "personal and social relations tend to assume a formal and ceremonial character." The individual in such a society lost initiative and spontaneity, preferring stability and security to adventure. Whereas Occidental and American cultures, Park said, "may be said to have had their origin and to have found their controlling ideas in the market place," it was from the family that Chinese and Oriental civilization derived "those controlling ideas that constitute their philosophy of life." Having listed all these differences between Orient and Occident, Park concluded the paper with a cryptic statement that "everything in our modern world, under the pressure of changing conditions, has begun to crumble." Even the Western world's "conviction of its own superiority" on which "its faith in its future is finally based, has also begun to crack."¹

Fifty years after these thoughts were penned, it is easy to say that many of Park's ideas were superficial observations by a generalist without the knowledge of the languages and histories of Asian countries. Even in 1931, the facile dichotomy between a fast-moving, individualist West and an immobile, tradition-bound East would have been too simplistic. If anything, it was the countries of Asia that were undergoing rapid political and social change, whereas economic production and population movements had slowed down in the United States and European countries, due to the spreading world economic crisis. Some Western observers were already beginning to be skeptical, if not cynical, about the assumption that the West's market-place orientation had been synonymous with individualism and freedom, whereas the East's family-centeredness and economic underdevelopment sustained each other. Daniel Bell has argued that after the turn of the century there developed a disjunction between productive capacity and mental habits in modern societies, so that while automated systems of production continued to generate more goods, the Protestant ethos of hard work and self-discipline were eroded.² In contrast, the Chinese had begun what Alexander Eckstein was to term a major "economic revolution" without fundamentally affecting their family and kinship structure.³ In Japan the pace of economic and cultural change was even faster, but like China, some of the people's personality traits and social habits were not seriously affected.⁴

My point is not to ridicule some old-fashioned generalizations made by a venerable sociologist. Rather I cite Park's paper because the juxtaposition, fifty years ago, of that paper and the developing crisis in Manchuria enables us to trace two levels of U.S. involvement in East Asia. One is the level of invasions, wars, armament and other factors that constitute "power realities." American military power in Asia at the time of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria was extremely limited. The second level of American-Asian relations is more existential. It is the fact that the United States, Japan, and other countries evolve their respective domestic institutions and economics, and that their people engage in their own daily pursuits. American-Asian relations at this level are simply the sum total of

all these activities and pursuits. Because this is a very complex phenomenon and difficult to come to grips with, many images and concepts are used to comprehend and represent what is happening in other societies. Park was doing this when he resorted to some familiar views about cultural differences between East and West. Unlike American power, those ideas were enormously influential.

Edward Said has argued, in his study of European attitudes toward the Middle East, that the division of the world into Orient and Occident was something that originated in Europe after the eighteenth century. According to him, "the Orient" was not so much a real world of Oriental people but a creation of Western minds which were preoccupied with Europe. Starting from the late eighteenth century, European archaeologists, anthropologists, novelists, and linguists "discovered" an Oriental world which the indigenous peoples had never discovered themselves. These people really had no consciousness of their identity or their heritage, but now the Europeans gave it to them by writing about Oriental civilization. Thus, from the very beginning, Orientalism was given its definition and character by non-Orientals, and the Orient was of necessity represented in terms of the more familiar West. The East was what the West was not, lacking the latter's vitality, spirituality, and individuality. It is easy to see how such a dichotomizing scheme affected generations of Europeans even as they broadened the scope of the Orient beyond the Middle East to include India, Southeast Asia, and East Asia.⁵

Americans inherited such conceptions of the Orient from Europeans, but added elements of their own. As Park said, the United States was often viewed as the most Western of Western societies. This view went back to the nineteenth century, when American writers and orators were fond of describing the United States as the most progressive of nations. The idea of progress, as Ernest Tuveson has pointed out, had two roots.⁶ One went back to, and modified, the Christian idea of millennium, the kingdom of heaven. Whereas in traditional Christian doctrine the millennium was by definition something that would not be realized on earth, some Protestant thinkers, notably Americans like Samuel Hopkins, converted the vision into that of a more perfect society here in this world. And, not surprisingly, these thinkers believed that America was closer to the earthly millennium than any other country. The second component of the idea of progress was more secular, derived from Enlightenment thought. Henry May has noted that most Enlightenment figures were not extremists; they combined a sense of moderation and a healthy skepticism with belief in reason.⁷ But the Enlightenment clearly had an impact; man's rational faculties to create more enlightened conditions generated optimism about human progress. Here, too, it was easy for Americans, conscious of their freedom from the past, to conceive of their society as the most advanced of all. The perception of America as the most progressive, modern, or "civilized" nation of the West became fixed by the early nine-

teenth century, and while other perceptions were periodically added to dilute some of the naive optimism, the view that the United States was in many ways at the forefront of modern societies remained strong even during the Depression.

A sub-theme of the idea of millennium was what Tuveson has termed the notion of America being a "redeemer nation." The United States, according to this perception, believes it already is, or is close to being, the most perfect of all societies and thus serves as a model to which other countries can aspire. Otherwise, America would be a singular exception in a sea of wilderness. America's self-definition contains the optimism that other societies can be transformed in its image. Indeed, Americans have a mission to ensure such transformation. Implicit in such views is the assumption that while Orient and Occident are two sharply contrasting civilizations, the latter is bound to be a more normative pattern of human development than the former, and that the Orient is more likely to be influenced by the Occident than the other way round. If indeed America is the most advanced of Occidental countries, and if the Occident is more progressive than the Orient, it follows that Oriental societies would come under its influence. They will be attracted to many of its features and tend to become Americanized. Park himself noted that in China, American movies and social dances had so permeated the country that many Chinese were influenced by the Western notion that marriage, or for that matter divorce, is based upon romantic love. Park assumed that this was a healthier institution than the Chinese system of family-arranged marriages, and that the acceptance of the new concept of marriage would liberate individuals and destroy the traditional family structure in China.

Such were some of the prevailing ideas at the beginning of the 1930s. The influence of those ideas was far out of proportion to the actual military power of the United States in East Asia, which was severely limited due to the naval disarmament agreements and to the policy of reducing marines in China. Even the Philippines, the bastion of American military power in the Pacific, were on the way to obtaining independence. Nevertheless, one could agree with Said that ultimately, Western ways of viewing the world of Asia were a reflection of, indeed necessitated by, Western economic and military supremacy in the modern world. The West's relative power position vis-à-vis the rest of the world since the sixteenth century provided the terms and vocabulary for representing the East. A key question, then, would have been whether America's relatively inconspicuous military presence in East Asia foreshadowed a declining cultural influence of the West, or whether, despite the erosion of Western power, its cultural impact would remain predominant.⁸

In actuality, one thing that drastically changed was the power position of the United States in East Asia. After 1931, the United States government and military steadily became convinced that maintenance of

the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region was crucial to the nation's security, and that steps must be taken to insert and augment American power in the area to maintain the balance. Stephen Pelz has pointed out in his study of the Japanese-American naval rivalry during the 1930s that the naval armament race fundamentally altered these two countries' relations because each side regarded the other as increasingly dangerous to stability.⁹ Toward the end of the decade, as Michael Schaller has noted, the United States government became concerned that Japanese domination over China would compromise American security, and began intensive efforts to buttress China, primarily through military aid to the Kuomintang regime.¹⁰ These two themes, naval rivalry in the Pacific and clashing policies in China, were joined when Japan entered into a military alliance with Germany and Italy in September 1940. From the American point of view, it became all the more imperative to discourage the growth of Japanese power, whether Japanese expansion was at the expense of the Soviet Union or the European colonies in Southeast Asia. More and more items were placed on America's list of goods embargoed for Japan, and the U.S. Pacific fleet was reinforced. Air power was added to the equation; volunteers were given official encouragement to train Chinese pilots in bombing Japanese bases, and the Philippines were designated as the major bastion for placing fighter planes and heavy bombers to deter Japanese advances.¹¹

From this perspective, there is little doubt that power was what determined the state of U.S.-Japanese relations. American strategists may not have had a sophisticated understanding of Japanese or Chinese culture, but what mattered was that the balance of power was being steadily eroded by Japan, and that it had to be redressed through American power. In this sense, all sides understood what was at stake. Chinese and Americans were pitted against Japanese, now allied with Germans. An uneasy equilibrium could still have been maintained if the power situation prevailing at the beginning of 1941 could have been frozen. For this reason, Japanese and American strategists were extremely sensitive to signs of any intention on the part of the other side to alter the balance. When the Japanese invaded the southern half of French Indochina in July 1941, after the German invasion of Russia, American reaction was instantaneous. The United States embargoed oil shipments to Japan and sought to strengthen strategic coordination with China, Britain, and the Dutch East Indies. The Japanese, on their part, viewed such moves as evidence of America's intention to extend its power at the expense of Japan. Just as the Americans considered Japanese action detrimental to the status quo, the Japanese resisted what they regarded as America's determination to alter the status quo by strengthening the "ABCD powers." Escalation of the crisis would have been averted only if both sides had been able to arrive at a mutually acceptable definition of the status quo, or if one of them had decided to retreat. Neither was the case, and war came. It was not entirely hypocritical for the Japanese to call it a war for national survival, just as it was not an exag-

geration for the Americans to view it as a direct threat to national security. By 1941, both sides' definition of security had become so extended that a balance of power for one of them seemed to imply a provocation to the other.

It is clear in retrospect that in their road to war, the leaders in the United States and Japan understood each other perfectly, *as far as the power equation was concerned*. There was nothing abnormal or irrational either about the Japanese decision to challenge the United States, given their perception of the type of Asian order required for their country to survive, or about the American policy of embargoes and stiff negotiating strategies, given Washington's view that further Japanese expansion was detrimental to the balance of power. The struggle was in essence between a nation that was trying to define a new regional system of power, and a country that resisted the attempt. What is also interesting is that Japanese and Americans shared the view that their relationship had been drastically altered after 1931. Such a view implied that before 1931 there had existed an older order of stability and peace based on a balance among the United States, Britain, Japan, and other countries.

During the war, numerous writers in Japan and the United States debated whether the pre-1931 balance could ever be restored. The answer was not a simple one. For one thing, the war indicated that the United States and its allies had the resources to punish Japan for its violation of the peace and to deprive it of all fruits of victory, not just those acquired after 1931, but all the territories it had obtained after the late nineteenth century. In that sense what was restored after Japan's defeat would be not so much the world of 1931 as an earlier period when Japan was weaker. At the same time, it was thought that after Japan's defeat, postwar Asian stability would to a great extent be based upon close coordination between the United States and the British empire, as it had been during the 1920s. What was uncertain at first were the roles of China and Russia in the area. Japan's wartime new order had been built on the assumption that there would be collaboration between Japan and a pro-Japanese China, and between Japan and the Soviet Union. The idea that Japan, China, and Russia would constitute a new grouping to check Anglo-American power stayed with Japanese consciousness until the very end of the war. They made a mistake to believe, rather naively, that China and Russia would opt for such an alliance rather than for an affiliation with the Anglo-American powers, but they were not wrong to anticipate the emergence of those two countries as significant factors in future power equations in Asia and the Pacific.

In any event, when the war ended, with Japan disarmed and reduced to its home islands, the United States was faced with the choice of whether to continue to emphasize cooperation with Britain as the key to security in Asia, or to invite China and Russia to join in the undertaking. By and

large Washington was inclined to choose the first alternative, the more so after 1947, when the Soviet Union emerged as the new potential adversary. The question then was whether China, now increasingly under Communist influence, should be co-opted into working with the Anglo-American powers as a check on Russia, or viewed as lost to the Soviet camp and therefore as an object of containment. Recent studies by Warren Cohen, John L. Gaddis, and others amply demonstrate that Dean Acheson and the State Department were extremely interested in splitting China from Russia by various inducements to the Chinese communists.¹² In the meantime, they also advocated ending the occupation of Japan and rearming the country as a potential ally against Russia and, should it become necessary, China. The Korean War settled the debate in Washington about policy toward the People's Republic of China. It became virtually impossible to form a de facto alliance with a country which was at war with the U.S. Instead, United States policy in Asia came to focus on the containment of China through such means as mutual security pacts with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, the encouragement of Japanese economic recovery through expanding trade ties with non-Communist areas in Asia, and, ultimately, its own military involvement in Vietnam to frustrate what was believed to be China-backed attempts by North Vietnam to unify Indochina. Some of these efforts were more successful than others, but in the end they failed to deal adequately with the question left over from the Second World War: how to incorporate China and Russia into a stable system of Asian international politics. The status quo, defined in terms of holding the line against Chinese expansion, was costing America tens of thousands of lives and billions of dollars, while the Soviet Union steadily augmented its military capabilities not only in Asia but in Europe and elsewhere. One result of this development was increasing tension between Russia and China, which came to a head after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, followed by the Chinese-Russian border clashes in 1969. The United States had sought to act as the regional stabilizer, but the situation was becoming more and more volatile.

Under the circumstances, it was not surprising that the United States should have abandoned the strategy of containing both Russia and China, and replaced it with a bold attempt at rapprochement with the People's Republic. The architects of the new policy, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, practiced the traditional art of balance of power in approaching China as an instrument to weaken the Soviet hold on world politics. The Chinese willingly obliged, for they were, as Kissinger has recorded in his memoirs, "the most unsentimental practitioners of balance-of-power politics I have encountered."¹³ Kissinger's memoirs can be read as a 1,400-page apologia for his China policy which was based, in his view, totally on realistic calculations of power, not on sentiment or economic needs. He simply felt it would be foolish for the United States not to take advantage of the rift between the two Communist giants, and to supplement America's power by the appearance, if not the reality, of an alliance with Chinese power.

The story since the Nixon-Kissinger years has, on the whole, confirmed the outlines of their strategy. The United States and China established normal diplomatic relations in January 1979, while China and the Soviet Union did not renew their thirty-year alliance which terminated in 1980. The America-China axis, rather than the Soviet-China axis, now defines the base line of Asian international politics. Not only politically, but militarily, too, Chinese and American officials have been intensifying their efforts to join forces against the increasing power of the Soviet Union. A key assumption has been that America's sophisticated weapons can be combined with Chinese manpower to deter Soviet ambitions. As the United States has had to divert its resources increasingly to such regions as the Middle East and Latin America, China is emerging as the principal military partner in Asia to maintain stability. In the meantime, Japan's role in the American security system has undergone change. Japan is no longer a junior partner of the United States in the strategy of containing China. It is rather a "fragile super-power," to use Frank Gibney's phrase, in the sense that while it is a leading economic power, its foundation is extremely fragile in the absence of indigenous natural resources, and because of the constitutional restrictions on building up its military capabilities.¹⁴ This situation has led Chinese, American, and Japanese officials to urge that Japan incorporate itself more fully into the emerging security system in Asia through increased military spending and development of more efficient systems of detecting and deterring hostile moves by the Soviet Union. A minority of Japanese have even begun calling for the country's nuclear armament.

Whatever develops in Japan, there is little doubt that the United States, China, and Japan are now on the side of regional stability and cooperate together to prevent Russian expansion. Whether a new equilibrium will in fact emerge on that basis remains to be seen. It may be noted, however, that a system which completely isolates the Soviet Union will certainly remain unstable. Russia is and will remain an Asian and Pacific power, and it will be futile to think that anything other than a temporary balance will prevail so long as the Soviet Union is shut out of regional security considerations. The Soviets may be expected to take military steps as a reaction to increases in the combined forces of America, China, and Japan. The arms race can escalate, and in the end the region will be no closer to stability than before. In this sense, the one question bequeathed by the Second World War, namely how to incorporate the new power of Russia into the international system, has not been satisfactorily solved.

This is a very hasty sketch of the vicissitudes of American power in East Asia during the last fifty years. My purpose in recounting this familiar story has been two-fold. One is to emphasize that the story can be told as military history, in terms of armaments, strategies, and wars. The

key ingredient is power, and cultural differences are of minor importance, if not irrelevant. The reversals in United States-Japanese relations—from war to peace—or in U.S.-Chinese relations—from alliance to Cold War to quasi-partnership—can be viewed as indicating, in Kissinger's phrase, "the absolute primacy of geopolitics."¹⁵ One characteristic of geopolitics is interchangeability of actors, that is, it really makes no intrinsic difference whether the United States is in alliance with China against Japan, or with Japan against China. What matters is the fact that all are playing the game of power politics. The United States became militarily involved in East Asia after the 1930s not because of some actual or perceived cultural differences between Americans and Asians, but because all the actors were oriented toward power balances, regardless of who was doing the balancing or un-balancing.

My second aim is related to this point. It is to raise the question of the impact of America's military involvement in Asia upon the cultures of the United States and of East Asia. Although culture was essentially irrelevant to the story of that involvement, the fact remains that Americans and Asians continued to develop their respective cultural values and institutions during these fifty years. Because military history can be discussed in power terms, one must not assume that power is everything. When Park described East-West relations in 1931, he assumed that the differences between Occident and Orient were fundamental. But he also sensed that the Oriental world was becoming more and more Westernized, while the Westerners' sense of superiority was beginning to be undermined. What has happened since then? Has the deepening involvement of American power in Asia and the Pacific brought about new developments in American-Asian cultural relations? These are difficult questions to examine, but let us make three observations.

First, it would seem that the kind of dichotomous generalizations that Park mentioned have continued to represent a very influential way of looking at Asian affairs. The growth of Japanese power in the 1930s, for instance, was seen by Americans as a challenge to Western civilization and its values. Chinese, whether Nationalist or Communist, were considered more "Western" in their heroic nationalism, resourcefulness, hard work, and their alleged determination to establish a more democratic form of government. After Japan's defeat, General Douglas MacArthur measured the success of his occupation policy by such Western yardsticks as the Japanese people's acceptance of democracy and Christianity. During the 1950s and the 1960s there was a vogue of modernization theory, according to which a country was considered either more or less modernized by means of certain criteria. Not surprisingly, the criteria were derived from the experiences of the United States and western European nations. Even in the 1970s and later, when post-industrial society, rather than modernized society, became a norm for Western development, non-Western

societies were analyzed in terms of the distances they had travelled in the direction of modernity and post-modernity. In the meantime, the idea that East-West differences are substantial and perhaps unbridgeable seems very influential even today. Travelers to Japan and China still come back with tales of the mysterious and exotic East, and, on the other side of the coin, Americans readily define themselves as Westerners, meaning they are not inheritors of certain characteristic traits that allegedly govern the behavior and thoughts of Easterners.

The fact that such ideas have persisted for so long is very interesting. It is as if the ups and downs of America's military involvement in Asia have had little impact on how Americans view Asians. This is surprising in view of the fact that today, far more than in 1931, there are major differences among the countries and peoples of Asia. Whatever validity there may have been fifty years ago in speaking of Orientals as a distinguishable group, the concept would seem totally inadequate as an all-embracing term to include Japanese, Koreans, Chinese, Vietnamese, Cambodians, Filipinos, Thais, Burmese, Indians, and many others. The persistence of certain stereotypes indicates that all the turmoil of wars and invasions have not really affected long-accepted categories of thought.

So long as these categories are employed in order to define one's own cultural boundaries, they may be considered harmless. But sometimes simplistic dichotomies in terms of "we" and "they" can cause serious damage, as happened during the war when the Japanese sought to justify their invasion of Asian lands in the name of pan-Asianism. They mouthed slogans about Asia's liberation from the West, and about the West's spiritual bankruptcy. They put Park's ideas upside down and called on all Oriental peoples to reject the Occident as a model. Instead, they were exhorted to return to their historic purity, and to create a moral order free from such Western vices as materialism and egoism. The Japanese vision was just as flawed as Park's generalizations, for as soon as Japanese troops landed in the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, and elsewhere, they started behaving just like the Western colonial masters. For the mass of Chinese, Indochinese, and others it made no difference whether the Japanese called themselves Asians; what did matter was that the United States and its Western allies were willing to help throw the invaders out.

This, then, is the second point I would like to make. Simplistic generalizations can sometimes cause serious damage. Cultural misconceptions and stereotypical images will undoubtedly remain, but let us hope that they will be confined to private spheres and not allowed to confuse international relations by imposing artificial boundaries between human groups.

My third and final observation is to go a step beyond this second point and say that cultural boundaries seem to have become less and less distinctive in the past fifty years. If Park's generalizations about the contrast between East and West in 1931 were not very sound, today it would make even less sense to divide the world into rigid cultural groupings. In part this has been due to the military interactions between Asia and the West. Wars and their aftermath (such as military occupation) have brought Americans and Asians into direct contact to a far greater extent than ever before. The results have not always been good, as direct encounters sometimes confirm one's prior prejudices. But certainly one by-product has been to enable more and more people of these countries to see one another as individuals, not simply as aggregate masses. Most important, the wars have provided them with a shared experience in a broad sense, so that they are all heirs to the horrors of war. If there is one thing that unites Americans, Chinese, Koreans, Japanese, and others, it would be their determination not to repeat the horrible experiences of Asian wars, which lasted more or less intermittently from 1931 through 1975.

Shared experience, after all, is what enables one to transcend national and cultural boundaries. An American today may share as much experience with an Asian thousands of miles away as with an American a hundred years ago, even fifty years ago. But do shared experiences produce shared perceptions, values, and attitudes? Forty years ago one might have said that Americans and Japanese had absolutely nothing in common. Twenty years ago the same thing might have been said of Americans and Chinese, or Americans and Koreans. But today it would be an extreme bigot who does not recognize that all these peoples are concerned with similar things and pursue similar objectives. In practical policy matters, in trade disputes, and in responding to specific questions, they may from time to time come together or drift apart. But, underneath such events, one senses growing awareness in these countries that what is good for one of them is also good for the others, and that craving for a higher and more humane standard of living, for a cleaner environment, for knowledge, for art and music and, ultimately, for mutual understanding is not a monopoly of one cultural group.

Such being the case, I believe we should confront the situation by discarding time-worn clichés about the mutually exclusive civilizations of Orient and Occident, and by considering American-Asian relations in a broader framework of interdependence. Fifty years ago, America's interactions with Asia, both in power and cultural terms, were largely superficial. The situation is vastly different today. The destinies of Americans and Asians are interwoven, and the greatest challenge facing them in the next fifty years may well be the question of whether they will succeed in making use of the growing interdependence among them to devise a regional community not only of peace and security, but also of tolerance, humaneness, and compassion.

**AMERICAN POLICY AND STRATEGY
IN EAST ASIA
1898-1950:
THE CREATION OF A COMMITMENT**

Roger Dingman

How, when, and why did the United States develop a commitment in East Asia? Such a question is easily posed but not simply answered. The word "commitment" carries many meanings. Normal geopolitical, economic, and cultural factors have not determined the American-East Asian relationship. Instead, that relationship has remained highly dependent upon context and has varied greatly over time. As a result, historians have been unable to reach a consensus.¹

This paper, by focusing on the concept of commitment, develops yet another interpretation of American policy and strategy for East Asia during the first half of this century. Commitment means pledging, engaging oneself on an issue, expressing an obligation, and even sending men into battle.² The word suggests the existence of the conviction that a nation has a stake in something of such importance as to require the use, or the threat of use, of armed force to protect or preserve it. Commitment exists in varying degree; like truth or beauty, it is something to be found in the eye of the beholder. Commitment, as defined in this paper, implies consensus. If a president is to sustain a commitment, he must have the concurrence of his civilian and military advisors. He must also believe that the people and their elected representatives have, either expressly or implicitly, consented to that commitment.

The scope of my analysis is limited to two crucial decades: 1898-1907 and 1941-1950. At first glance, the two periods might seem so separate in time, so different in values, so varied in decision-making processes, and so different in the technology of war and communication as to defy comparative analysis. But upon closer scrutiny, they can be seen to bear marked similarities. The two decades have a similar temporal structure, divided roughly equally into periods of war and peace. Both produced American intrusions into East Asia which brought the region to public attention. Each decade saw new refinements of policy and strategy which affected the nation's role in the far Pacific. In both decades, Americans confronted fundamentally similar problems: how to cope with Asian nationalism; and

what to do about European-based attempts to direct or contain it. In each period, too, the basic questions reappeared: What was the United States' commitment in East Asia? How should it be defended?

For all their similarities, the two decades produced very different answers to those questions. Between 1898 and 1907 Americans created a politico-strategic presence in East Asia, but did not sustain a commitment there. What began with a bang in Manila Bay in 1898 ended in 1907 with a whimper in Washington. President Theodore Roosevelt concluded that his fellow countrymen were not interested in the Philippine Islands; they had become America's "Achilles heel."³ But what began with the explosions at Pearl Harbor in 1941 ended in June 1950 with the thunder of more guns in Korea. President Harry S Truman concluded that the United States had a commitment in Korea and loudly proclaimed the nation's determination to defend it.

Why were the outcomes in 1907 and 1950 so very different? In developing an answer to that question, this paper attempts to elucidate the broader forces and factors which created an American commitment in East Asia and policies and strategies for its defense.

Presence Without Commitment: 1898-1907

At the beginning of 1898, the United States did not have a commitment in East Asia. The American presence was minimal. Although missionaries preached the gospel in China, Japan, and Korea, their numbers, the size of their flocks, and the value of their properties were all relatively small. Businessmen pursued trade opportunities in the region, but their numbers and the economic significance of their endeavor were slight. Two-thirds of the United States' trade crossed the Atlantic; less than 10 percent crossed the Pacific. China, Japan, and Korea were more important as sources of imports than as markets for American exports. No American troops were stationed in the region, and only a small squadron of second and third class naval vessels patrolled the East Asian coast.⁴

Americans were neither very aware of nor interested in the trans-Pacific region. The public, like the President and his senior civilian and military advisors, fixed its sights on the Caribbean. The Cuban crisis was so compelling that little interest remained for problems and opportunities in East Asia. Only three articles in mass circulation magazines in 1898 dealt with economic opportunities in China; none focused on the missionary enterprise there. A tiny portion of the articulate "foreign policy public," the New York Chamber of Commerce, worried that European powers would partition China into exclusive spheres; a few *New York Times* editorials echoed the concerns of this group. Some friends of the U.S. Navy were troubled by the fact that Japan had more ships, and more powerful ships, in the Pacific than did the United States. Running through

the thoughts of the very few interested in East Asia was the fear that events might transpire to deny the United States a role in the region's development. Those who made policy and strategy, however, readily dismissed that spectre.⁵

The dispatch of American forces to East Asia, beginning in 1898 and ending in 1902, dramatically changed this state of affairs. Such was not necessarily the intent of those who sent them. In each instance, the President and his senior advisors deployed those forces to achieve particular, negative, and limited ends. In May 1898 Commodore George Dewey destroyed a Spanish squadron in Manila Bay which might otherwise have augmented the enemy's strength in the Caribbean. Naval vessels went to Hawaii to assist American annexation and preclude Japanese annexation. President William McKinley ordered ground forces to the Philippines to deny control of Manila to both native rebels and Spanish troops. In the summer of 1900, he authorized the use of American sailors, soldiers, and marines in China to save Americans besieged in Peking. Each of these commitments of forces was made in the expectation that it would not prove lengthy, costly, or unpopular.⁶

Such was not to be the case. Initial deployments quickly proved inadequate. Dewey may have "destroyed" the Spanish fleet in May 1898, but throughout that summer Naval War Board strategists struggled to find ways to reinforce him if the enemy sent naval forces eastward. McKinley first proposed to send a mere five thousand-man army to Manila. His generals quickly rejected that number, and by late 1899 there were to be nearly ten times that many men under arms in the Philippines. The cautious initial commitment of a small legation guard, then a minor naval force, mushroomed by August 1900 into an American military presence in China of 6300 men. Washington found itself contemplating sending as many as 15,000 troops. East Asian engagements proved costly. More men died in battle there between 1898 and 1902 than in the Caribbean during the same period. No one expected the Filipino rebels, or the Boxers, to take the heavy toll of American lives that they did. Short term deployments stretched into a long military presence. It would be 1902 before Army forces sent in 1898 could claim to have achieved "victory" in the Philippines; in the interim, four times as many men served there than had been deployed to the Caribbean during the Spanish-American War. The China Relief Expedition of 1900 continued into the following year, keeping nearly two hundred American troops in China a year later. As late as 1902, the Asiatic fleet remained the largest single unit within the U.S. Navy.⁷

The use of force created, almost overnight, widespread popular interest in East Asia. As Mr. Dooley said in the summer of 1898 to Mr. Hennessy, it was "not more thin two months since ye larned whether they (the Philippines) were islands or canned goods," but Hennessy talked in-

cessantly about the need to keep the islands. Before Dewey's victory, not a single article on the islands appeared in popular journals; the *New York Times* printed only one editorial. Afterwards, a flood of reports mounted as newly dispatched war correspondents filed their stories. During the first half of 1899, editorials about the Philippines appeared almost daily in the *New York Times*; the same year the number of magazine articles on the islands more than tripled. In 1900, China became a "hot" topic. A year earlier, not a single article on the missionary enterprise appeared in popular magazines; only two focused on trade and economic development. Twenty-six on each topic came out in 1900. During the last six months of that year, the *New York Times* ran 103 editorials on China, a sharp increase over the 9 printed during the same period of 1899 when, it should be noted, John Hay's first "open door" note was issued.⁸

This upsurge of interest was accompanied, however, by the ominous appearance of serious differences of opinion on matters of East Asian policy and strategy. The McKinley cabinet divided sharply in 1898, not so much over its individual members' roles and responsibilities, nor even over the basic strategy of the war, as over ultimate war aims. It could not agree on what to do about the Philippines. Secretary of State William Day could not muster a majority for the extremely modest goal of simply taking "sufficient grounds for a naval station." That autumn, the American peace commissioners disagreed over both tactics and goals in negotiating the eventual acquisition of the entire Philippine archipelago from Spain. Force of circumstance in the summer of 1900 produced unanimous cabinet agreement on the decision to send a relief expedition to Peking. But cabinet members acrimoniously debated whether President McKinley should or should not first seek congressional authorization for dispatch of the expedition and for an increase in the size of the Army. The President tolerated such dissent, but only up to a point; by July 1902, when the Philippine Insurrection officially came to an end, McKinley's Secretaries of State, War, and Navy had all been replaced.⁹

Military engagements in East Asia also troubled civil-military relations, at all levels. In Washington, President McKinley tended to ignore his Secretary of War and to pay still less attention to the commanding general of the Army. In Manila, trouble developed between Admiral Dewey afloat and General Wesley Merritt ashore. The latter's successors quarreled with the civilian commissioners whom McKinley sent to the islands. Commanding generals in the field came to feel that they were caught between the Scylla of inadequate forces and the Charybdis of public criticism of the methods they used to subdue the Filipino rebels. Arthur MacArthur complained that he had been given the impossible task of conquering "eight millions of recalcitrant, treacherous, and sullen people." Journalists, however, reported the Philippine War in articles with lurid titles such as "Dead Sea fruit of our war of subjugation" and

“How to convert a white man into a savage.” The survival rate of commanding generals was quite low; there were four in the Philippines in as many years. The outbreak of trouble in China simply compounded the already existing tensions in civil-military relations. Philippine commanders resented Washington’s dispatching already scarce troops to a different theater of conflict. President McKinley disliked having to yield to the generals’ and admirals’ insistence that forces be kept in China over the winter of 1900-1901.¹⁰

Most importantly, the dispatch of American forces to East Asia stirred dangerous and potentially uncontrollable crosscurrents in the larger stream of public opinion. The debate over acquisition of the Philippines raised constitutional, economic, and even moral issues which would not go away. McKinley shrewdly managed to win, by a single vote, Senate ratification of the treaty providing for acquisition of the islands. Both he and his principal political foe, William Jennings Bryan, tempered their positions during the ratification debate in the expectation that the issue of “imperialism” would die down before the election of 1900. But to their surprise, it did not. Thanks to the Boxers, McKinley found himself controlled by public opinion more than he controlled it. He agreed to a relief expedition in the belief that failure to do so would be to reap a “whirlwind” of criticism. The public initially welcomed his decision but soon began to express doubts about the wisdom of cooperating with European powers, the morality of raids on Boxer villages similar to that on My Lai, and the legitimacy of accepting the indemnity payment eventually extracted from the Chinese.¹¹

The results of the American intrusion into East Asia between 1898 and 1902 could therefore be read in very different ways. Members of elites who believed the United States had or should have a commitment in the region found confirmation in events of their expansionist dreams. Alfred Thayer Mahan detected a “noticeable . . . most emphatic change” in the public temper towards the acquisition of colonies and a strong Navy. Charles Denby, a former American minister to China who had failed to persuade Peking to favor American railroad builders four years earlier, wrote glowingly in 1900 of the opportunities for enterprise in post-Boxer China. A missionary bishop unabashedly proclaimed: “It is worth any cost in money, it is worth any cost in bloodshed, if we can make millions of Chinese true and intelligent Christians.” Methodist preachers, long frustrated by Spain’s “closed door” to their endeavors, helped “prepare a national temper” favorable to acquisition of the Philippines, backed forceful suppression of the Filipino rebellion, and heralded the United States’ special duty in the islands.¹²

But political leaders were more cautious in drawing “lessons” from the events of 1898-1902. President McKinley, one suspects, was increas-

ingly unenthusiastic about what had happened. In 1898 he complained that the people wanted to keep everything but refused to provide the soldiers necessary to do so. He proclaimed a policy of "benevolent assimilation" in the Philippines, delicately balancing the demands of those who wanted to establish American authority against the qualms of those who questioned its legitimacy. The result was simply more criticism. In 1900 he advanced a quagmire thesis of sorts: once you became militarily involved in East Asia, you found it difficult or impossible to get out. That same year, the platform on which he ran for re-election was surprisingly cautious about East Asian policy. While commending the administration for its enunciation of the "open door" doctrine in China, the platform scrupulously avoided any mention of the use of armed force there or in the Philippines.¹³

McKinley's successor was even more cautious and ambivalent. In 1901 he spoke of the Philippine War as a "most regrettable but necessary international police action." At its conclusion, a year later, he claimed that Republican policy in the Philippines had been a great success: "No policy ever entered upon by the American people has vindicated itself in a more signal manner," he told Congress. The obvious contradiction in tone and substance reflected the President's reading of recent history. However much he personally might believe that the United States had a duty and a destiny in the Philippines, the war for their acquisition left clouds of moral and political uncertainty.¹⁴ America had become a military and political presence in East Asia, enhancing prospects for advancement of its commerce and expansion of its ideology. But whether or not that presence would become a commitment remained to be seen.

Over the next five years events did not favor transforming the American presence into a commitment. Four basic factors prevented it. First, the United States' tangible stake in the region did not increase in a manner sufficient to sustain a commitment. This is not to say that it did not grow. Between 1902 and 1907, the real dollar value of trade with China and Japan leaped by 24 percent and 78 percent, respectively. In all but one of the first five postwar years, the Philippines showed a favorable trade balance, their exports to nations other than the United States rising just as advocates of annexation had predicted. The number of Protestants preaching the gospel in China jumped 30 percent between 1902 and 1905 alone, offsetting the slight decline in the number of missionaries in Japan. The dollar value of missionary properties in East Asia also increased.¹⁵

But in other and more significant ways the American stake in the region did not grow. If the dollar value of its trade rose more quickly than that of other regions, Europe nonetheless remained pre-eminent, accounting for an average of six out of every ten dollars earned in American foreign commerce. Overall Philippine trade grew but trade with the United

States did not. The islands' economy did not prosper steadily, nor did American investors provide capital necessary for its development. The same was true in China, where the value and relative percentage of American investments remained abysmally low. In short, Americans simply did not establish an economic infrastructure likely to sustain a commitment in East Asia.¹⁶

The absence of a real or widely perceived threat to the American presence in East Asia was a second major factor inhibiting its maturation into a commitment. Threats did appear, to be sure. The Russians threatened to slam shut the "open door" in Manchuria and northern China even before Americans pried it open a crack. The Chinese attacked foreigners and boycotted U.S. trade in 1905. Pesky Filipino Moslems repeatedly caused trouble in the nation's new colony. And, from 1906 onward, disputes over pelagic sealing and discriminatory treatment of Japanese in the United States raised fears of difficulties with Japan.¹⁷

Those responsible for dealing with such threats disagreed over their importance and on responses to them. They perceived particular and sporadic difficulties, rather than a broad strategic challenge, across the Pacific. That they did so reflected the fact that, in spite of the establishment of the Navy's General Board, the creation of an Army General Staff, and the appointment of a Joint Board of the Army and Navy, there was no single body responsible for threat assessment. Nor were coherent joint war plans developed.¹⁸

Instead, each agency or individual interpreted threats by his own light and drew his own conclusion as to their magnitude. Admiral Mahan, for example, was not easily alarmed by East Asian developments during the postwar half-decade. He regarded the United States as roughly equal to other non-Asian powers in the region, in that all faced the same problem of having to defend holdings at a great distance from home. Before 1905, Japan did not seem to pose a threat; after her victory over Russia, she could be checked, not by battleships deployed in East Asian waters, but by the creation of a powerful battle fleet and the maintenance of Anglo-American racial and political solidarity.¹⁹

President Theodore Roosevelt, his own most important strategist, did not believe that East Asian developments threatened the nascent American commitment across the Pacific. His policies looked toward the maintenance of a balance of power which would in itself foster the growth of an American commitment in the region. He stood ready to support building a Philippine naval base which would allow the fleet to deter possible conquerors until Japan's reduction of Russian fortresses in Manchuria changed his mind. Roosevelt, moreover, did not share the fears of those who worried that Russia's defeat in the north freed Japan for adventures

in the south. He predicted that the Japanese would be constrained by the need to guard against a tsarist war of revenge and by the burdens of developing their new continental colonial holdings. Most importantly, the President did not credit stories of Japan's supposed intention to attack the American West Coast. Neither moral imperatives nor political necessity made a war over immigration likely.²⁰

The third major factor inhibiting the development of an American commitment in East Asia during the years after 1902 was organizational. Within the government there did not emerge particular bureaucratic commitments to East Asia. John Hay headed the State Department. His interests and experience were in Europe, and his influence declined with each passing year until his death in 1905. His successor, Elihu Root, had championed acquisition and development of the Philippines, but the State Department bore no responsibility for the islands. Its China service was neither large nor prestigious. When W.W. Rockhill, its leading light, became minister in Peking in 1905, no strong successor came forward in Washington to promote the development of an American commitment in China.²¹

Neither of the two armed services developed individual East Asian commitments. True, the War Department housed a Bureau of Insular Affairs. But its officials grappled with a wide variety of colonial problems, not just with those of the Philippines. Senior officers were preoccupied with making the newly created General Staff and a fresh divisional structure work. Attachés were assigned to Tokyo and Peking for the first time in 1903, but the Military Intelligence Division was in its infancy. Arthur MacArthur and "Black Jack" Pershing were exceptional, essentially ad hoc observers of the contest between tsar and emperor.²²

Army presence did not induce senior officers in the Philippines to advocate sustenance of an American commitment. The generals were subordinate to, and often at odds with, civilian officials. Their tenure was short. Their professional ethos ruled out advocacy in public. More importantly, most of these men did not see themselves as architects of empire; rather they were what they or their predecessors had been in Arizona, New Mexico, and South Dakota: frontiersmen garrisoning a territory inhabited by savages. They deployed their forces so as to be effective policemen, occasionally decent local administrators, and, if the opportunity arose, heroes. Between 1902 and 1907, however, heroism paid strange dividends. When Major General Leonard Wood in 1906 led an assault which killed six hundred Moros at the cost of only eighteen American lives, he naturally expected praise. Instead, Governor William Howard Taft and members of Congress demanded explanations. Wood found himself caricatured as a ghoulish figure holding a bloody sword over the bodies of his victims.²³

The Navy was in a better position to try to promote maintenance of a commitment in East Asia. George Dewey, its contemporary saint, won his halo at Manila Bay. Dewey presided over the General Board, which unlike the Army's General Staff, systematically examined trans-Pacific strategic problems. The Office of Naval Intelligence was weak, maintaining but one attaché to "cover" both Tokyo and Peking; but, for part of the period at least, he had family ties with the Asiatic fleet commander which provided for some functional integration of intelligence and operations. Successive Asiatic fleet reorganizations clarified its missions: patrolling Philippine waters; providing protection as needed along the China coast; and, with a battleship or two, symbolizing America's great power status. The Navy also developed rudimentary war plans and a broad strategic concept for the East Asian region. But the former were vague and incomplete, hypothesizing conflicts with a variety of foes. The latter became quite concrete: from 1900 on, the General Board insisted that construction of a major Philippine base, preferably at Subic Bay, was the *sine qua non* for maintenance of an American commitment in East Asia.²⁴

But sustaining such a commitment ranked far from first among Navy priorities. Strategy, despite Mahan, held no place of honor within the sea service. The Naval War College "course" at Newport lasted for only a few summer weeks. No one took Mahan's chair after he left the College. The General Board was much more concerned with ships than with bases. In an era of rapid technological innovation in gunnery and warship design, creating an "all big gun" large battleship fleet took precedence over everything else. In 1903 senior admirals split over whether or not to keep battleships in East Asian waters; by 1907 they unanimously favored concentrating them, but in the Atlantic. Nor did they fight to the bitter end for a Philippine base. In 1907, yielding to Army views, they agreed that Pearl Harbor should become America's bastion in the Pacific.²⁵

Non-governmental organizations were either too weak or too unpopular to generate sufficient support for an American commitment in East Asia. Universities had few experts on the region. President McKinley cornered the market on those who knew anything about the Philippines, making them officials in the islands. The level of "expert" knowledge was rudimentary. Paul S. Reinsch of the University of Wisconsin, who wrote extensively on East Asian affairs, relied on graduate student "stringers" in China and foreign students to read and clip the press data from which he derived ideas. None of the major newspapers maintained correspondents in East Asia permanently prior to the Russo-Japanese War. The missionary boards could not fill the gap because they reaped more criticism than dollars after the Boxer crisis. Clerical support for armed intervention led Mark Twain to castigate "the reverend bandits" of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. Finley Peter Dunne satirized their Chinese endeavors, publishing a schedule which

began with prayers and ended with “the burnin of Peking” and a “gran pop’lar massacree” of its inhabitants by the Christians. Missionary resources were also quite limited. In 1902 missions netted but 4 percent of contributions to Protestant churches, and seven years later only one in four American Protestant churchgoers gave anything to the missionary cause.²⁶

The low level of support for the missionary endeavor testified to the strength of a fourth—and perhaps most important—factor inhibiting the development of an American commitment in East Asia. Wartime interest melted into apathy and indifference toward the region. Once U.S. troops left the region and things quieted down in the Philippines, public interest, as measured by newspaper editorials and magazine articles, dropped precipitously. The number of magazine stories on business and missionary enterprises in China hovered at a low level, while the total number of *New York Times* editorials and popular journal articles in 1907 fell to less than half the number of each printed in 1902. East Asian questions lost their political relevance. Democrats who had given the Philippine issue first place in their platform of 1900 moved it back to a more modest location four years later. By 1908, while still calling for a declaration of intent to grant independence, they dropped the islands to twenty-eighth place on their list of issues. Republican platforms showed similar tendencies. Endorsement of the McKinley and Roosevelt Philippine policies came after twenty other major points in the 1908 platform.²⁷

The public’s lack of interest in East Asia narrowed Theodore Roosevelt’s aspirations—and policy and strategy options—dramatically. When he first came to office, T.R. preached the gospel of development and duty in the Philippines. Repeatedly he asked Congress to enact tariff and investment credit measures which would stimulate economic development in the islands. In 1903, he specifically endorsed the Navy’s plan to build a great base at Subic Bay. But in the twilight of his presidency, Roosevelt stopped preaching. He ceased, in part, because his priorities lay elsewhere, in the building of the Panama Canal and in creating a great Navy. He stopped, in part, because the results of the Russo-Japanese War forced him to reconsider the odds on defending Subic Bay or fighting a naval engagement thousands of miles from home. But most crucially, Roosevelt fell silent on the issue of an American commitment in East Asia because he realized that it was *not* one on which he was likely to change the public’s mind. “I wish,” he told William H. Taft in August 1907, “our people were prepared permanently, in a duty-loving spirit . . . to assume the control of the Philippine Islands for the good of the Filipinos. But as a matter of fact I gravely question whether this is the case. . . . The Philippines form our heel of Achilles. They are all that makes the present situation with Japan dangerous.”²⁸

What, then, should the United States do? Roosevelt evolved bitter but rational answers to that question. He had already concluded that America must scale down its presence, concentrating capital ships rather than scattering them across the Pacific. "I have," he thundered to Admiral Mahan, "no more thought of sending four battleships to the Pacific while there is the least possibility of friction with Japan than I have of going thither in a rowboat myself." Washington must prepare to grant the Philippines independence sooner rather than later, arranging en route an international guarantee of their neutrality and domestic order. His government would do everything possible to preserve friendly relations with Tokyo and Peking while, at the same time, making it clear that no nation could force the United States out of the Philippines.²⁹ In short, without a commitment, there was no real reason to pursue expansive policies or strategies in East Asia. The game was not worth the candle.

Presence and Commitment: 1941-1950

For the next thirty years the fundamental determinants of American policy and strategy which allowed the maintenance of an East Asian presence but not the establishment of a commitment remained basically unchanged. The region's economic importance, its press visibility, and the political significance of the issues it raised generally remained relatively low. Only within the Navy, worried constantly lest it prove unable to meet the demands of a war with Japan, might a sense of commitment to the region be said to have developed. There were, to be sure, moments of crisis when the possibility of war in East Asia flickered through the minds of policy makers and ordinary citizens alike. But presidents tended to follow the broad course of action which Theodore Roosevelt had outlined. Woodrow Wilson spoke of America's special friendship for China, yet did almost nothing to support his own diplomats' efforts to increase U.S. investment there. In 1919 he gave first priority in the Pacific to preserving good relations with Japan, within the framework of a League of Nations, and compromised on the Shantung issue. Warren G. Harding effectively "neutralized" the Philippines two years later by concluding a Pacific Island non-fortification agreement at the Washington Conference. In 1931-1932 President Herbert Hoover, who had been ashore to greet sailors and marines landed in China in 1900, concluded that there was nothing at stake in Manchuria for which Americans would fight. And Franklin D. Roosevelt, when he signed the 1934 act which granted commonwealth status and promised independence to the Philippines, in effect acted as his cousin had counselled.³⁰

The outbreak of war between China and Japan in 1937 began to change all of this. It hastened the reduction of an American presence in East Asia. The missionary enterprise was one of its first casualties. Driven from their stations by war, their properties destroyed or confiscated, their flocks scattered, the missionaries left China. Only a handful stayed on in

Japan. Missionary leaders were deeply divided over what to do next. Some advocated war with Japan; others tried to explain the motives and feelings underlying Japanese expansion on the Asian mainland; still others opposed anything that might risk American involvement in war. The combination of war in China and embargo against Japan ravaged American-East Asian trade. Only a sudden demand for Southeast Asian rubber, oil, and raw materials occasioned by shortages created by war in Europe made that region temporarily of economic significance to the United States. The American military presence shrank, too, as marines were withdrawn from mainland China and the Asiatic fleet was reduced to a bare minimum. In 1941, Admiral James Richardson, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, wanted to do precisely what Theodore Roosevelt suggested: get his major combatant vessels away from Pearl Harbor and out of harm's way.³¹

Reductions in the American presence concealed, however, the fact that U.S. involvement in the East Asian region was growing. While China in 1937 was nothing more than "an abstract concept. . . a largely disorganized and unimportant foreign state," by 1941 it loomed as "something of a symbol of American-sponsored resistance to Japanese aggression." Newspapers daily ran stories of how Japan inflicted death and destruction upon the Chinese people. Pressure groups, such as the Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression and United China Relief, kept East Asian issues prominent in the public eye. Within the Roosevelt administration, Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau and a variety of special presidential emissaries to China lobbied successfully to provide 215 million dollars in credits and arms assistance to Chiang Kai-shek's government prior to Pearl Harbor.³²

Even more importantly, Americans in 1941 looked at East Asia quite differently than had their predecessors of 1898. What was happening there did not appear as a series of isolated incidents but loomed as part of a broader strategic challenge to American security. Military professionals began to revise war plans to take account of the possibility of a two-front war in 1938, and in 1940 Chief of Naval Operations Harold Stark produced Plan Dog, which gave Atlantic needs priority over those in the Pacific. This decision forced mobilization planners to think of the Japanese and German threats simultaneously. In the summer of 1940, France's collapse and the German conquest of the Low Countries created a power vacuum in Southeast Asia, linking the European war even more directly with conflict in East Asia. When in September of that year Japan joined Italy and Germany in a tripartite pact, State Department officials and editorial writers quickly concluded that a world-wide alliance of aggressors had come into being. That belief emboldened those within the Roosevelt administration who pushed for imposition of sanctions against Japan. It underlay the public's expressed belief that their government should do *something* to help the British and Dutch hold onto their East

Asian colonies, and should act to check the growth of Japanese power, even if action risked war. It was F.D.R.'s view that developments in East Asia and Europe were inextricably linked which prompted his promise in the late summer of 1941 to Winston Churchill to warn Tokyo against further aggressive actions and assured his refusal of Prince Konoye's peace overtures.³³

These changed perceptions of East Asia, together with the shock and outrage which Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor generated, made America's second major military intrusion into the region different from the first. Virtually no one questioned its legitimacy. Its purpose seemed clear and morally indisputable from the beginning, even to the most politically naive citizen: Americans had to defeat a treacherous foe, reclaiming the territory which Japan had seized from them. The size and duration of troop deployments far exceeded those of 1898-1902. Until late 1943, official strategic priorities notwithstanding, more Americans fought in the Pacific than in the Atlantic or the Mediterranean. Like their turn-of-the-century predecessors, they went principally to East Asian and Pacific islands rather than to the mainland. But unlike the volunteers of 1898, 1899, and 1900, the draftees of the 1940s remained for years rather than months.³⁴

What these men and their leaders said, did, and suffered drew public attention to East Asia as never before. Only 12 percent of World War II battle deaths occurred in the Pacific theater, yet in three out of four years of combat, the volume of *New York Times* reportage on the war there exceeded that for any of the European fronts. By 1944 it surpassed that for all of them put together, and in 1945 nearly six of every ten *Times* war articles focused on its East Asian phase. Field commanders in this war loomed larger than their turn-of-the-century counterparts. It was Douglas MacArthur who, after all, encapsulated war aims with phrases like "I shall return" to the Philippines and "On to Tokyo." Admiral "Bull" Halsey's proclaimed determination to ride Hirohito's white ceremonial horse prompted the citizens of Elko, Nevada, to give him a silver-studded saddle on which to do so. President Franklin D. Roosevelt treated senior field commanders much more charily than William McKinley, who shuffled them. MacArthur, Admiral Chester Nimitz, Admiral William Halsey, and even General Joseph Stilwell, who received command of an army after his departure from China, fought through the whole war. The administration harnessed its commanders' popularity to promote the sale of war bonds. In 1944, during an unprecedented fourth term campaign, Roosevelt travelled all the way to Pearl Harbor to discuss strategy and be photographed with Admiral Nimitz and the general, recently a candidate in Republican primaries, whom F.D.R. had once called "one of the two most dangerous men in America."³⁵

Finally, war in East Asia between 1941 and 1945 differed from that nearly fifty years earlier in the depth and direction of the passions it stirred.

No one could mistake their strength. A Europe-first strategy may have been more rational in some abstract sense, but 53 percent of those polled in February 1943 considered Japan the major enemy. A year later, nearly 70 percent subscribed to Admiral William D. Leahy's maxim: what had been purchased in blood should be held in perpetuity; the United States should keep the islands west of Hawaii for which its soldiers, sailors, and marines died. Anti-Japanese feelings spiraled to alarming levels. Even an idealist such as Senator Lister Hill, one of the legislative fathers of the United Nations, favored a strategy which would "gut the heart of Japan with fire." A Kentucky businessman had a simpler solution for the problem of Japan: sterilize every living Japanese. Passions such as these portended changes in American attitudes toward a commitment in East Asia. In October 1943, polls indicated that most Americans favored conclusion of a permanent defensive alliance with China. By April 1945, when Chiang Kai-shek appeared a much less desirable partner, Americans felt that they had to maintain strength sufficient to deal single-handedly with any future threat to the peace in the Pacific and East Asia.³⁶

Rising passions and changing attitudes forced President Franklin D. Roosevelt to think about the postwar future long before the fighting stopped. Like McKinley, he hoped to defer concrete decisions on peace aims as long as possible. In an effort to avoid Woodrow Wilson's supposed errors of two decades earlier, he hoped to preserve a broad consensus on postwar foreign policy. To that end he gave his blessing to intensive postwar planning, within and outside of government. That effort was, by any standard of measurement, extraordinary. Outside official Washington, it brought together academic experts of varying sorts, businessmen, and journalists who worked to identify national objectives in the Pacific and East Asia and to educate the public to their importance. Three major organizations were of particular importance in this endeavor. The Institute of Pacific Relations commissioned special studies of peace needs and sponsored international conferences which brought unofficial representatives of the nations warring against Japan together to consider postwar problems. The Council on Foreign Relations, based in New York City, arranged dialogues between governmental officials and various kinds of experts. The results of their discussions were digested and then circulated to study groups across the country. The Foreign Policy Association worked principally to educate ordinary citizens, and citizen-soldiers, to the issues that loomed on the postwar horizon in East Asia.³⁷

Within the government, the postwar planning effort created an impressive and important bureaucratic structure. Within each of the major agencies concerned with foreign policy and defense there emerged important planning committees. The Department of State spawned a number of committees and subcommittees, the most important of which focused on security, territorial and international organizational issues. A surprisingly high proportion of their meetings and papers dealt with East Asian mat-

ters. The Navy began a program to train civil affairs officers for Pacific islands as they were snatched from the Japanese. It gave added impetus to War Department officials to move from that stage of planning to the establishment of a Civil Affairs Division. That move gave added importance to the Navy's Office of Occupied Areas. The Joint Chiefs of Staff created one subcommittee after another, one of which evolved into the Joint Postwar Plans Committee. By late 1944, all of the sub-organizations formed a pyramid, topped by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC). That group's Far East Subcommittee by war's end became the single most important official postwar planning agency concerned with East Asia.³⁸

None of these groups had any direct contact with or influence on the President. Members of the State Department's Territorial Subcommittee, for example, first heard of the possibility of the Cairo Declaration, which outlined the dismemberment of the Japanese Empire, while they themselves were discussing that very issue. While the President knew of some of the ideas and aims emerging from the planning effort, he did not read, prior to Yalta, specific recommendations which found their way into briefing books. But the postwar planning effort did yield three results of the highest importance to the establishment and maintenance of an American commitment in East Asia. First, the planning effort transformed civil-military and elite-mass relationships. Diplomats, soldiers, and naval officers worked together daily in a manner unimaginable four decades earlier. They became familiar with one another's problems and modes of thinking; they learned how to fashion acceptable bureaucratic compromises. Officials acted, too, with a much clearer sense of what the public was thinking. Thanks to the Council on Foreign Relations and the Foreign Policy Association, they could exchange ideas with academic and journalistic opinion leaders. The establishment in 1943 of a special unit within the Department of State to monitor and report on current trends in public opinion precluded departing too far from what the people wanted.³⁹

Secondly, the postwar planning effort identified both broad conceptual and particular practical points of disagreement about America's future role in East Asia. Some among the planners looked forward to the reestablishment of an American-East Asian relationship akin to that which had existed before 1905. The United States would be a presence and a player, but not the directing power, in the game of trans-Pacific international politics. Others espoused more expansive, essentially Wilsonian goals. Washington must, in their view, use its power to transform East Asian societies, politics, and economies in order to preserve peace throughout the region. More particular disagreements related to mainland, as opposed to insular, East Asia. Neither official nor unofficial planning groups succeeded in spelling out whether, or to what extent,

Washington might intervene in the relations between former colonial overlords and their Southeast Asian subjects striving for independence. They could not agree on whether to rely upon, reform, or reject the government of Chiang Kai-shek as a partner in remaking postwar East Asia. Nor did any of these groups divine just how the United States was to establish a presence on the Korean peninsula without, at the same time, being burdened with full responsibility for it or becoming embroiled in conflict with others over it.⁴⁰

The wartime planning effort did, however, yield what Franklin D. Roosevelt wanted and his predecessors lacked: consensus that the United States had acquired, and must sustain, a commitment in East Asia. That commitment grew logically out of the determination to defeat Imperial Japan. Having seized her mandate islands in war, the United States must retain mastery of the sea and air lines of communication across the Pacific. In the words of the Navy's most active postwar planner, "Either from a security or a commercial angle, the Pacific is definitely our pond for some time." The United States would also have to dismantle permanently Japan's military and naval power, and simultaneously reform her government. A series of position papers, which by 1945 emerged as "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan," laid out with remarkable clarity the steps necessary to achieve that end. Not least, planners and ordinary Americans agreed with the underlying logic, even if not with the politics and journalistic methods of Henry Luce, when while aboard an aircraft carrier in the Western Pacific he wrote: "The American frontier is no longer Malibu Beach; the American frontier is a line [from] Okinawa [to] Manila and it will never be moved back from there."⁴¹

Words of that sort, spoken or written at or near the moment of victory in war, have a hollow ring of finality about them. All too frequently, as the events of 1902-1907 demonstrated, a military presence and political commitments born in war do not survive in the harsh policy and strategy-making environments of postwar periods. But in the first half-decade after World War II, the United States' war-born commitment in East Asia did endure and grow. To explain in detail why this was so would be to write another essay. This essay, however, highlights those historical forces which, in combination, made the result in 1950 so very different from that in 1907.

In this second postwar period, the United States' perceived military, economic, and political stake in East Asia grew in importance. Massive reductions in military presence did not connote lesser interest or concern for the region. They reflected, on the contrary, political leaders' inability to resist public demands to "bring the boys back home" once the fighting stopped. They were accompanied by massive shifts in budget and manpower allocations which had far more devastating effect on the armed ser-

vices than similar changes during the 1902-1907 period. In that first postwar period, the percentage of gross national product devoted to defense remained virtually unchanged; between 1945 and 1950 it dropped nearly 5 percent. Whereas in the earlier era each of the armed services had more men and a larger budget at the end of the half-decade, the opposite was true in June 1950. Military professionals had no choice but to revise initial postwar deployment plans. Army Chief of Staff Dwight D. Eisenhower confided to his old chief, Douglas MacArthur, that American ground forces might have to be completely removed from the Philippines. The Navy scaled down and reversed its fleet deployment plans of 1945, altering the 55 to 45 percent split of major combatants to favor the Atlantic rather than the Pacific. By June 1950, the admirals actually had a smaller percentage of their major combatants deployed in East Asian waters than they had in 1907.⁴²

The smaller force that remained was much more potent than its 1907 counterpart. Behind it, in the continental United States, there existed a huge reservoir of trained men and an enormous arsenal of ships, planes, and tanks. Forces deployed across the Pacific were concentrated; 21 percent of the Army was in Japan, nearest the hypothetical Soviet enemy. The command structure, even if divided so as to protect particular service interests and Douglas MacArthur's pride, nonetheless allowed for clear allocation of command responsibilities and efficient management of a war in the region. Washington also retained what the wartime Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted: an infrastructure of bases in being. A treaty with the newly independent Philippines provided air and naval facilities on a long term, low cost basis. Victory put Okinawa in American hands, and with it the possibility of developing a major strategic base there. In Japan, the United States acquired well-developed ground, air, and naval bases at little or no cost. In 1950, for example, the commander of the Yokosuka naval base estimated that it actually saved Uncle Sam nearly six million dollars annually.⁴³

Even as senior military officials were forced to make budget and manpower cuts, they recognized that the United States had an important strategic stake in East Asia. Japan was inherently more valuable to them than the Philippines had been to their predecessors. Late in 1947, for example, Joint Chiefs of Staff planners designated Japan as a base equal in importance with the United Kingdom in a possible anti-Soviet war. Successive revisions of their designs projected pre-emptive strikes against the Russians from East Asian bases. Late in 1949, the chiefs approved a first reversal of the postwar deployment trend: Chief of Naval Operations Forrest Sherman ordered an additional carrier and more anti-submarine forces to the Western Pacific.⁴⁴

That reversal suggested that Washington's perceived economic and political stake in the region was growing between 1945 and 1950. Trade with its core sub-area, Japan-Korea-China-Hong Kong, amounted to less than 5 percent of total American foreign commerce in 1950. Thanks to the devastation and turmoil of war and revolution, that percentage was actually lower than it had been in 1907. But, in marked contrast to the earlier period, American investment in the East Asian region was enormous. Washington had poured \$1.3 billion in grants and credits into China and the Philippines during World War II; from 1945 through 1950 it provided an additional \$4.1 billion in aid in the East Asian region. While assistance to Nationalist China declined steadily, that for other nations rose precipitously. Despite their independence, the Philippines in 1950 took nearly five times as much aid as they had in 1946; assistance to Korea shot up a hundredfold. Japan and the Ryukyus took almost as many dollars as the rest of the entire East Asian region combined during these years.⁴⁵

In one sense, such aid represented a "sunk cost" which had to be protected. That thought ran through the arguments of those who insisted that the United States must come to the aid of Chiang Kai-shek in his fight against Mao Tse-tung. But in another, and perhaps more important sense, it represented an investment in the future. Aid to Japan achieved results. A poll taken in September 1947 showed that Japan was the *only* major nation which Americans believed would experience better conditions of life during the coming year. Bilateral U.S.-Japan trade shot upward, leading older financial experts sent to "crank up" the Japanese economy to believe that the basis for a sound trans-Pacific economic partnership had been laid. The promising results of aid there fed hopes that Washington could achieve similar results in Korea, on Formosa, and in Southeast Asia.⁴⁶

Washington's perceived political stake in East Asia also grew in importance during these years. Initially, most Americans and their president thought of that stake in terms of a democratic and friendly China. That, Harry Truman told Henry Wallace early in 1946, was "our only salvation for a peaceful Pacific policy." But revolution, revelations of Nationalist incompetence and greed, and the successes of Mao Tse-tung's armies contributed to a shift in the location of that stake. If China was "lost," then Japan was gained. Five years of close interaction during the Occupation transformed the Washington-Tokyo relationship from that of master and servant to potential partnership. Early in his tenure as Supreme Commander Allied Powers, Douglas MacArthur and his senior aides regarded Yoshida Shigeru with suspicion and disdain; by 1950 they regarded his continuation in office as essential to the conclusion of a peace settlement and preservation of liberal democracy in Japan. In 1907, Theodore Roosevelt concluded that the Philippines were not intrinsically important to the United States. By 1949, three years after they had gained independence, President Truman thought it essential to "do everything

possible to keep the Philippines not only friendly to the U.S. but close to the U.S." Washington withdrew its armed forces from Korea in 1949, but the American political stake there grew steadily during the post-World War II years. The United States was responsible for the establishment of the Republic of Korea, and General Douglas MacArthur went to Seoul for its inaugural ceremonies. Two years later, Secretary of State Dean Acheson proclaimed that the peoples of Asia would judge American policy toward Korea as "a measure of the seriousness of our concern with the freedom and welfare of peoples maintaining their independence in the face of great obstacles."⁴⁷

Acheson's words pointed to a second major factor which contributed to the post-World War II maintenance of an American commitment in East Asia: the persistence of a strong sense of threat emanating from the region. President Truman could not assert, as Theodore Roosevelt did, that there was not a single war cloud on the horizon. For most of the 1945-1950 half-decade, at least three such clouds were seen. The first hung over Japan. The surrender ceremonies aboard the *U.S.S. Missouri* did not kill fears of the old enemy. That fear underlay the Navy's determination to acquire and retain control of Okinawa and Iwo Jima. That fear, too, pervaded early State Department proposals for a peace settlement, which would include a twenty-five year, multi-lateral pledge to assure the continued disarmament and good behavior of the Japanese.⁴⁸

The Soviet Union hovered as a second threatening cloud on the horizon. Long before World War II ended, American strategists concluded that the Russians would be the only possible major adversary in a future war. In the closing months of the fighting, Secretaries Henry L. Stimson of War and James Forrestal of Navy worried about Soviet intentions in East Asia. By the autumn of 1945, Joint Chiefs of Staff planners concluded that those aims amounted to the spread of Communism throughout the region. Subsequent Soviet behavior—on again, off again intervention in Manchuria, protracted occupation of North Korea, and, not least, explosion of an atomic bomb—vindicated those predictions. The United States enjoyed no monopoly of power in East Asia or elsewhere.⁴⁹

By late 1949, China became yet another source of danger. Close association with Chiang Kai-shek's forces during World War II left American military observers unimpressed with the inherent fighting capacity of the Chinese. But the Chinese and the Russians—Mao and Stalin together—were quite another matter. They appeared to reconstitute the basic elements of the Imperial Japanese threat: a mass army, supported by industrial strength, and welded together by ideological messianism. Even in the narrow sense, the combination of Chinese bases and Soviet aircraft threatened to neutralize American offshore island positions in Japan and Okinawa. The conclusion, early in 1950, of a Sino-Soviet alliance further validated Washington's sense of threat.⁵⁰

That feeling, unlike the sporadic and disjointed fears of the 1902-1907 postwar era, pervaded the American body politic. The public continued to fear and distrust Japan. In September 1946, 81 percent of those polled felt the United States should keep troops there. More than three years later, 64 percent of those asked rejected the notion that the Japanese were ready for peace. Most Americans believed that Japan would either oppose the United States or remain neutral in another global war. The same polls repeatedly showed that Americans thought that the Russians, whose claims of defensive intent were not to be believed, would start it. To counter the Soviet threat, the public by wide majorities backed universal military training and more defense spending, even at the cost of higher taxes. By late 1948, a surprisingly large number of citizens knew about the Chinese civil war, looked upon it as a threat to world peace, and considered Mao's troops to be Stalin's minions.⁵¹

These fears among the masses corresponded to more educated and refined threat assessments made within the Truman administration. By September 1946, the so-called Clifford Report confirmed the existence of a strong anti-Soviet consensus among the President's senior advisors. A year later, George F. Kennan, chief of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, rejected draft proposals for a Japanese peace treaty on grounds that they did not deal properly with its security aspects. From early 1948 through the spring of 1950, senior Pentagon civilians and the Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained that a peace settlement with Japan would simply give the Russians an opportunity to intervene. And, it might be added, the China White Paper of 1949 made official the thesis of a Sino-Soviet conspiracy against democratic self-government in East Asia.⁵²

A series of National Security Council papers and Joint Chiefs of Staff war plans codified the notion of an East Asian threat to American security. The former emerged in tangled and often bitterly disputed fashion. But by December 1948, in the form of NSC 48/2, they defined American objectives in East Asia in terms of reducing Soviet power and influence so as to render the Russians incapable of "threatening from that area" either the security of the United States and its friends or the "peace, national independence, and stability . . . of Asiatic nations." War plans emerged from the Joint Chiefs of Staff bureaucracy even before NSC 48/2 was written. They made East Asia a secondary front in a possible global war and distinguished clearly between the pre-eminent importance of retaining insular positions and the expendability of continental outposts in China and Korea. They left no doubt, however, as to the growing seriousness of the Sino-Soviet threat emanating from the Asian mainland.⁵³

The evolution of organizations, both within and outside of government, also contributed to the maintenance of an American commitment to East Asia. Within the President's official family, bureaucratic sub-units born during the war survived and grew in importance. By personal taste

and inclination, Dean Acheson was no less a "Europe first" Secretary of State than John Hay. But his reorganization of the department and his personal *modus operandi* gave East Asian area experts considerable autonomy and significant policy-initiating authority. Although political controversy surrounded the "China hands," the basic tenets of expert-recommended China policy prevailed. Japan and Korea experts enjoyed extraordinarily long tenures which enabled them, in a variety of roles, to emphasize the importance of those two nations and to implement policies which they themselves, as pre-1945 postwar planners, had devised. Successive Pentagon reorganizations preserved and enhanced the power of those concerned with East Asia. Civil affairs remained an important component of the Army General Staff; the Navy's wartime Office of Occupied Areas moved up in the bureaucratic hierarchy to become the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations for Politico-Military Affairs. Two former occupants of the Assistant Secretary of the Army's chair moved up, one to become Secretary, the other an undersecretary designated by Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson to handle East Asian affairs.⁵⁴

Within the armed services, there emerged strong advocates for the preservation of an East Asian commitment. Those who went to East Asia after 1945 played much more important roles than did their counterparts in the years after 1902. General Douglas MacArthur was simply the most spectacular example of this new breed. In 1905, Theodore Roosevelt had had to remind William H. Taft of the importance of currying congressional favor for construction of a Philippine base. MacArthur needed no such guidance from Washington. The records of his appointments with distinguished visitors of every sort—prelates and politicians, businessmen and professors—might well be mistaken for those of a Japan lobbyist. Other men in uniform fought for, and spoke out in defense of, particular East Asian causes which would serve both their own particular service's, and the nation's, interests. In China, first Naval Attache James McHugh, then Seventh Fleet commanders Charles "Savvy" Cooke and Oscar Badger, argued for the retention of a base at Tsingtao and the provision of aid to Chiang Kai-shek's beleaguered government. While they were far from successful, Rear Admiral "Benny" Decker triumphed in Japan. He waged a four-year-long campaign which did convince his superiors of the value of Japanese bases in particular and Japanese friendship more generally. Air Force generals took a much lower political posture. But they, too, in arguing for such mundane things as more money for jet runways or for control of ocean area surveillance, pursued particular bureaucratic goals which served to maintain an American commitment in East Asia.⁵⁵

It would be wrong to conclude that these advocates in uniform were always successful or to surmise that their Washington superiors consistently agreed on trans-Pacific matters. But war-created coordinating

mechanisms survived and changed in ways which fostered the definition and preservation of a broad intra-governmental consensus on the importance of the American commitment in East Asia. SWNCC became SANACC (State-Army-Navy-Air Coordinating Committee) which in turn provided a foundation for the development of a National Security Council and its staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff gained permanent legal status and reorganized their various subcommittees into a reasonably effective Joint Staff. These bodies had to fight to establish their policy-developing responsibilities with particular departmental units, such as the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. They by no means functioned as sole or primary advisory groups to President Truman. But, as already noted, they did define broad policy guidelines of a sort that simply did not exist in the Theodore and Franklin D. Roosevelt administrations. Moreover, they narrowed the range of disagreement within official Washington. Certainly American policy and strategy toward post-World War II Korea, Formosa, and Indochina were characterized by sharp disagreements. But those debates focused on how, not whether, the United States should act to keep those territories free of Soviet or Communist influence. The means, and not the ends, lay at the crux of the disputes.⁵⁶

Non-governmental organizations also contributed significantly to the maintenance of an American commitment in post-1945 East Asia. War virtually created the modern East Asian expert in American universities. Many of those who became Sinologists or Japanologists were veterans of the wartime civil affairs training programs, if not of occupation and administration in Japan, Korea, and the Philippines. These men replaced the missionaries of an earlier era, and indeed many of them had experience or family links with the Christian endeavor in East Asia. Despite the difficulties encountered by their organization, the Institute of Pacific Relations, and despite the injustices suffered by them as individuals (Owen Lattimore, for example) area experts retained close ties to official Washington. They benefitted from and helped run U.S.-China and U.S.-Japan cultural exchange programs. Philip Jessup, a Columbia biographer of Elihu Root, and one of the godfathers of the Navy's wartime civil affairs training program, became a principal aide to Secretary of State Dean Acheson. In 1949, following the Nationalist debacle in China, Acheson brought in distinguished academics to identify and examine American policy alternatives. Amid the uproar over China's "fall," the State Department sponsored a three-day roundtable in which academics played an important part. While they by no means agreed in their readings of recent Chinese history, all concurred on the need to maintain a strong American commitment in East Asia in the face of Communist expansion. Scholars, in short, played a role in the post-1945 half-decade which was beyond the dreams and capabilities of their predecessors.⁵⁷

The media, too, emerged from World War II far more capable of contributing to the sustenance of an American commitment in East Asia

than they had been four decades earlier. Many of the correspondents who went to China during the war stayed on to describe the unfolding revolution there. In every year but one, what they wrote accounted for a larger percentage of *New York Times* reportage and editorial comment on East Asia than that emanating from other countries in the region. Some of them, men like Theodore White, returned home to write controversial books, such as *Thunder Out of China*, which stimulated ongoing popular interest in the trans-Pacific world. In the years after 1902, neither the Philippines nor their senior civilian or military officials merited regular press coverage. But Douglas MacArthur was a magnet, drawing both seasoned war correspondents and enterprising young reporters to Tokyo on a semi-permanent basis. They formed a Foreign Correspondents' Club which gave both Occupation officials and visiting American politicians a forum from which to make newsmaking statements about the importance of the United States' postwar commitment in East Asia.⁵⁸

One final factor which worked to sustain an American commitment in East Asia demands comment: the relationship between president, partisan opposition, and the public at large. In both the 1902-1907 and 1945-1950 half-decades, an American presence or commitment in the trans-Pacific region provoked domestic political controversy. But the direction of partisan criticism was radically different. In the earlier period, Democrats condemned Republican imperialism, at least for a time, and then the issue dropped from the political agenda. In the latter, Republicans called for a deeper and more effective United States commitment in East Asia; their criticism mounted in ferocity with the passage of time. Late in 1945, following Ambassador Patrick Hurley's resignation, they pressed in Senate hearings for clarification of the administration's intentions toward the Chinese Nationalists. In 1947, Republican John Foster Dulles, working within the administration, managed United Nations diplomacy so as to deepen the American commitment in Korea. Republicans gave their support to Marshall Plan aid to Western Europe and got in 1948 more funds for China in return. By 1950, some among them would be pressing the administration to create a Pacific NATO.⁵⁹

But President Harry Truman and his principal advisors responded to such criticism in a manner very different from the way in which Theodore Roosevelt had dealt with his opponents. In the years after 1904, T.R. paid little attention to the words of his partisan foes on the Philippines; he was constrained, rather, by what he perceived as the public's apathy and volatility on East Asian matters. Harry Truman and Dean Acheson first tried to placate their critics. The President sent General Marshall to China in the hope that the war hero's presence there would still the domestic debate over the Nationalist-Communist struggle going on there. Admitting that he knew "very little about Chinese politics," Truman stuck to F.D.R.'s nostrums on the subject. In the autumn of 1945, Acheson

became more Catholic than the Pope, taking a far tougher stand on the severity and duration of the Occupation of Japan than General MacArthur himself.⁶⁰

But the Truman administration's spectacular successes in building popular support, first for aid to Greece and Turkey, then for the Marshall Plan, and its triumph in the elections of 1948, allowed a change in its posture toward opponents. Even before that unexpected victory, the President concluded that he could divide and conquer the Republican opposition on China, and he and his aides did so. When G.O.P. senators in 1949 excoriated the administration for "losing" China, the President refused to be panicked into hasty or overly dramatic responses. He spurned, for example, House Majority Leader John McCormack's pleas for drastic action. He resisted demands for Secretary of State Acheson's resignation. Acheson himself maintained an air of imperturbable calm which infuriated his critics. By comparing himself to the shorn lamb which must adjust itself to the wind, he triumphed over critics whom he disparaged as "primitives." He met with some of the most distasteful among them in private; he defied and overcame them in obtaining restoration of aid for Korea. He persuaded President Truman to name John Foster Dulles as a special consultant even though the President loathed Dulles for his excessive partisanship. The policy of divide and conquer seemed to work, so much so that on 25 June 1950, en route back from Independence to Washington to confront the Korean crisis, Harry Truman confidently predicted that the Senate would censure Joseph McCarthy. In short, the Truman administration did not fear its critics and confidently believed that it could overcome them.⁶¹

By the end of this first post-World War II half-decade, the administration had, moreover, defined a consensus on the major outlines of East Asian policy and strategy which the public seemed to support. To be sure, a majority of those polled in September 1949 believed that Washington had bungled China policy. But the majority of those who had opinions went along with the way in which the government dealt with the new situation created by Mao's victory. More than a third—the single largest group of respondents—felt it was best to do nothing. Although 46 percent held an unfavorable opinion of Chiang Kai-shek, nearly twice as many felt Washington should do nothing to help him. Polls taken in January 1950, at a time when both the President and his Secretary of State made major addresses outlining American policy and strategy in East Asia, showed almost as much support for Acheson's desire to wait "until some of the dust and smoke of disaster clears away" as for providing direct or indirect military aid to Chiang Kai-shek in his Formosan redoubt. The policy of withholding diplomatic recognition of the new government in Peking enjoyed overwhelming popular support early in 1950.⁶²

That the President had triumphed over his partisan foes and gained the support of the public for maintenance of an American commitment in East Asia became abundantly clear during the last, crucial week of crisis decision-making in June 1950. Those who met to consider what was to be done in Korea had no doubt about the strength and importance of the American commitment there. There was no need, in their perspective, to debate what the real source of threat was. Nor did they for a moment doubt that the most vocal Republican critics on Capitol Hill or the American people at large would support them in the decision to intervene. That there was a United States commitment in East Asia which must be defended by the force of arms, even at the risk of global war, and that Americans would fight and die to sustain that commitment was axiomatic. The game was indeed worth the candle.⁶³

Conclusion

How, when, and why, did an American commitment in East Asia come into being? This paper has suggested that commitment is a relatively recent phenomenon, a product of World War II rather than of the Spanish-American War and its attendant military operations in the Philippines and China. During the first decade of this century Americans created an East Asian presence but did not sustain it; in its fifth decade they reestablished that presence and determined to preserve it.

That they did so tells us a great deal about how America's trans-Pacific commitment came into existence. If it was the product of a particular war, it was also the by-product of a particular kind of postwar period. War stirs passions, arouses interests, and creates new organizations inside and outside government. Whether or not the attitudes war engenders and the bodies it creates survive is determined very much by the intangibles of war, which may or may not linger on after its conclusion. America's first major military incursion into East Asia was suffused with political and moral uncertainties which set severe limits on what postwar statesmen and military professionals could do. The moral legitimacy of the second war was so widely accepted as to be translated in the postwar period into broad popular support for the maintenance of a commitment in East Asia.

That postwar commitment demonstrates another important point. The commitment did not result from the actions of particular leaders; nor was it hatched in the brains of those who comprised military or political elites. Between 1898 and 1907 both civilian and military leaders tried to create and sustain an American commitment in East Asia, but, recognizing that they did not have a solid core of followers, they gave up the attempt. Between 1941 and 1950, national leaders and ordinary citizens moved in the same direction, propelled across the Pacific first by fear of Japan's power, then by a determination to destroy it, and finally

by the conviction that some other power must not be allowed to pose yet another threat to American security. In both periods, those who wore uniforms were much more followers than leaders. In the first decade of the century they lacked the will and ethos to act as independent policy and strategy makers; in the fifth, their greater prominence and popularity notwithstanding, they implemented programs designed by civilians in Washington and succeeded only insofar as they appealed to and satisfied the desires of the great mass of the American people.

This observation suggests a very broad answer to the question of why Americans created a commitment in East Asia. To pose the issue in such words is to imply that the commitment was the result of purposeful action. It was. At the turn of the century, the dynamic of war and revolution pulled Americans across the Pacific. But William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt could not control that dynamic. Nor could those with particular, developmental goals such as the expansion of American trade, the reformation of Philippine economy and polity, or the Christianization of China, convince the American people that such objectives could and should be attained. At the turn of the century, Americans in East Asia, and in the world at large, were still more acted-upon than actors on the stage of international politics. But from Pearl Harbor onward things were very different. Americans were determined to control their own destiny, to create new international order, and to establish a new relationship with the peoples and nations of East Asia. Their particular policies and strategies in so doing were but aspects of global programs and plans. They and the popular will behind them established both a presence and a commitment in East Asia that survives to this very day.

THE UNITED STATES AND EAST ASIA, 1945-1960: THE EVOLUTION OF A COMMITMENT

Norman A. Graebner

During the autumn of 1945, the United States emerged from its long war against Japan as the dominant force in the western Pacific. To preserve that strategic hegemony United States officials had pressed their wartime allies for permanent rights to the captured Japanese mandated islands. In 1944 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had advocated outright annexation, arguing that the islands properly belonged to the United States. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, on 20 February 1945, requested the President to prevent countries without legitimate security interests in the Pacific from interfering with the disposition of the mandated islands; it was unthinkable, he said, that the United States would give up any of its bases in the Pacific. If the United States could not prevent the extension of Soviet power into Eastern Europe, it could at least limit Soviet power to Sakhalin and Manchuria in the Pacific. In April 1945, Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal urged the President to negotiate for permanent bases in the Philippines as well. At the San Francisco conference the United States secured control of the Japanese bases through a trusteeship arrangement.¹ Following the defeat of Japan, Washington converted Okinawa into a powerful military base off the Asian coast. Even as Americans contemplated the problems of East Asian reconstruction, they could detect no dangers to their security lurking in the ruins.

Victory, it seemed, had assured a peaceful Orient. For a half-century Japan had been the major, if not the exclusive, threat to the Asian balance of power. But already the United States had destroyed Japan's army and navy, burned out its cities and factories, and reduced its possessions to four islands that comprised its territories before its imperial days. In September 1945, Japan came under the direct control of United States post-surrender policies, designed to insure "that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world."² Under the direction of General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, occupation authorities methodically assaulted every source of nationalistic indoctrination and central authority to create a new climate of political and intellectual freedom. To eliminate Japan's military potential, MacArthur destroyed what remained of the

Japanese war machine and placed the country's industrial capacity under the severest scrutiny and control. The Japanese constitution, which became effective in May 1947, pledged Japan to international cooperation, and limited military forces to the requirements of internal order.³ By demanding primacy in the design and management of occupation policy, the United States limited the influence of its East Asian allies, including the U.S.S.R., in Japanese affairs. The Soviets maintained a large mission in Tokyo, but United States occupation strategy had converted the northern Pacific into an American sphere of influence.

Washington had hoped to liberate Korea from Japanese rule unilaterally, but Stalin's decision to dispatch Soviet forces to Korea, in answer to Russia's historic interest in that country, compelled the United States to accept a line dividing the peninsula at the 38th parallel, a line otherwise without historical or political significance.⁴ The Soviets established a predominantly Communist regime in the North; the United States returned Syngman Rhee, the famed Korean nationalist long in exile, to lead the South. At the Moscow Conference in December 1945, United States and Soviet negotiators agreed to an international trusteeship for Korea as the surest means of uniting the country under conditions satisfactory to all parties. Koreans, northern and southern, rejected the principle of trusteeship as a backward step. The Joint Soviet-American Commission on Korea, which began its deliberations in March 1946, examined the issue of Korean unification without discovering an acceptable formula for creating an independent, sovereign state. The Russians favored a united, democratic Korea with a national economy and culture, but American officials could not accept the Soviet definition of "democratic." Eventually, uncompromising questions of politics and ideology compelled the United Nations to accept the reality of a divided Korea. South Korea drafted a constitution and in April 1948 formed the Republic of Korea with Syngman Rhee as president. Shortly thereafter the Soviets created the People's Republic of North Korea under the leadership of Kim Il Sung. Before mid-century American and Soviet forces had left the peninsula.⁵

Unfortunately, the occupations of Japan and South Korea, successful as they were, did not assure East Asian stability. Japanese expansionism had not been the only threat to the West's prewar hegemony in the Orient. Asian nationalism was another. Whereas the United States possessed the power to harness Japanese ambition, it could not achieve complete military dominance in the Pacific, return East Asia to its prewar passivity, or regulate change. Asian nationalism, evolving slowly throughout the century, was fundamentally a quest for political independence and economic progress. Most nationalists found their emotional and intellectual resources in Western notions of self-determination. A significant minority, characterized by such revolutionary leaders as China's Mao Tse-tung and Indochina's Ho Chi Minh, found their intellectual authority in the anti-colonial writings of Marx and Lenin. Emerging from the Pacific

war confident and armed, Asia's new leaders, exploiting the anti-colonialist emotions generated by Japan's wartime successes, began their assault on the old order. The still-existing imperial structures began to disintegrate under the pressure. By 1947, Britain, exhausted by war, had granted independence to India, Pakistan, Burma, and Ceylon. The Dutch, capitulating at last to nationalist and United Nations' pressures, granted independence to Indonesia in 1948. Thus Japan's defeat marked the beginning of the end for the Western colonial empires in Asia, and the emergence of perceived dangers to Asian and American security which were scarcely predictable when the disintegration began.

What tormented American policy in Asia by raising the issue of security was France's decision to recapture its lost empire in Southeast Asia. To prevent France's return to Indochina, President Roosevelt had favored a trusteeship for that region. State Department officials, with their eyes on Europe, argued that the United States should promote the power, prestige, and good will of France and not meddle in European colonial affairs. At Yalta Roosevelt assured British and French leaders that the United States opposed trusteeships except those approved by the colonial powers. Paris had already made known its intentions in Southeast Asia. Charles de Gaulle warned Washington in March 1945 that if it opposed those plans for Indochina there would be "terrific disappointment and nobody knows to what it may lead. . . . We do not want to fall into the Russian orbit; but I hope that you do not push us into it."⁶ Under French, British, and State Department pressure the Truman administration gradually extended France a free hand in Indochina and gave up whatever leverage it had to control the future of Southeast Asia.⁷ At Potsdam the United States granted operational control to the British over the southern half of Indochina. During September, Paris announced its decision to send troops to Indochina to replace the British and re-establish French control over the colony.⁸

France re-entered Indochina only to face an organized and determined independence movement which it would never defeat. During the war Ho Chi Minh had captured control of the League of Vietnam Independence, known as the Vietminh, and forced all non-Communist Indochinese nationalists either to support his cause or to accept French rule. Following Japan's surrender, Ho, in September 1945, proclaimed the independence of Indochina. Having won the support of American officers in the Office of Strategic Service (OSS) in his anti-Japanese activities, Ho addressed a series of notes to Washington between October 1945 and April 1946, asking for support and recognition from the United States. Ho reminded the Truman administration that India and the Philippines were about to receive their independence; Indochina expected no less.⁹ Neither Ho, well established in the North, nor the French would accept a divided country. The long, bitter struggle for Indochina began in 1946. Ignoring Ho's appeal, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, in April, officially ap-

proved the French effort to regain control of the colony.¹⁰ What mattered in this crucial decision was less its consequences for Asia than its effect on American perceptions of Ho Chi Minh. The new Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, reminded the embassy in Paris on 3 February 1947 that the old empires were becoming a thing of the past; the French empire was no exception. "On the other hand," Marshall observed, "we do not lose sight of the fact that Ho Chi Minh has direct Communist connection and it should be obvious that we are not interested in seeing colonial administrations supplanted by philosophy and political organizations emanating from and controlled by the Kremlin."¹¹ For Marshall, the war in Indochina had become one element in the global struggle against Communism. Still, the Secretary recognized the sources of Ho's power and urged the French to satisfy legitimate interests of the Vietnamese people.

Marshall's rationalization of America's pro-French policy in Indochina defied the warning of the State Department's Division of Southeast Asian Affairs that Ho Chi Minh, as a native nationalist, did not endanger Asian or American security; moreover, they predicted, Ho would win. From Hanoi Vice Consul James L. O'Sullivan reminded Marshall in July 1947 that France faced a Communist-led rebellion simply because it had refused to announce an independence program of its own and thus had permitted Ho to monopolize the Indochinese independence movement. State Department critics complained that Washington's decision to oppose Ho as a Communist rendered it hostage to French policy in Southeast Asia. The State Department's report on Indochina of 27 September 1948 analyzed the dilemma precisely:

Our greatest difficulty in talking with the French and in stressing what should and what should not be done has been our inability to suggest any practicable solution of the Indochina problem, as we are all too well aware of the unpleasant fact that Communist Ho Chi Minh is the strongest and perhaps the ablest figure in Indochina and that any suggested solution which excluded him is an expedient of uncertain outcome.¹²

American writers and officials warned the French that they had no chance against Ho's forces unless they separated Ho from the main thrust of Indochinese nationalism, both by promising independence and by supporting a native leader capable of bidding successfully against Ho for the support of the anti-colonial revolution. Finally in the Elysee Agreements of March 1949, the French government promised eventual independence to the Associated States of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, and named Bao Dai, former King of Annam, as spokesman for the new state of Vietnam.¹³

State Department officials predicted that France's "Bao Dai" solution for Indochina would fail largely because it gave the Vietnamese people a poor choice. Actually the United States had long given up its freedom of diplomatic maneuver. In March, Theodore C. Achilles of the Office of Western European Affairs hoped that the United States would not support

a losing cause; still, he added, the only available alternative to Ho was the French puppet.¹⁴ Secretary of State Dean Acheson doubted that Bao Dai could succeed. Unfortunately, added Acheson, the United States had no power to influence those French policies which alone could keep Southeast Asia out of Russian or Chinese hands. Washington's assumption that Ho was an agent of the Kremlin had eliminated all choices except that of following the French to disaster. Acheson analyzed the critical question of Ho's special challenge to American thought in a letter to the consulate in Hanoi on 20 May 1949:

In light of Ho's known background, no other assumption is possible but that he is an outright Commie so long as (1) he fails unequivocally to repudiate Moscow connections and Commie doctrine and (2) remains personally singled out for praise by the international Commie press and receives its support Question whether Ho is as much nationalist as Commie is irrelevant. All Stalinists in colonial areas are nationalists. With the achievement of their national aims (independence) their objective necessarily becomes the subordination of the state to Commie purposes and the ruthless extermination of . . . all elements suspected of even the slightest deviation. On the basis of the examples of eastern Europe it must be assumed that such would be the goal of Ho and men of his stamp if they were included in the Baodai Government. . . . It must of course be conceded that the theoretical possibility exists of establishing a National Communist state on the pattern of Yugoslavia in any area beyond the reach of the Soviet army. However, the United States attitude could take account of such possibility only if every other possible avenue were closed to the reservation of the area from Kremlin control. Moreover, while Vietnam is out of reach of the Soviet army it will doubtless be by no means out of the reach of the Chinese Commie hatchet men and armed forces.¹⁵

State Department reviews of American policy in Southeast Asia argued that Bao Dai would make no advances until France granted Indochina full independence under the Elysee Agreements. Such judgments could not govern American behavior. What mattered was keeping Indochina out of Communist hands. French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, in September 1949, reminded Acheson that France was fighting democracy's war against world Communism; it could not continue without American aid. Acheson agreed; Western security demanded a French victory.¹⁶ How the United States could offer aid without appearing to underwrite French colonialism was not clear.

Behind this burgeoning fear of Communist expansion in Asia was the larger issue of China. Throughout the Pacific war it had become increasingly clear that the United States would find it easier to save the National government of Chiang Kai-shek from the invading Japanese than from his internal antagonists, the Chinese Communists led by Mao Tse-tung. American observers in wartime Chungking agreed generally that China's future belonged to Mao. Washington officials, however, viewed wartime China as an Eastern power, destined to contribute conspicuously to Asia's postwar stability. To assure China's essential unity, Roosevelt dispatched General Patrick Hurley to China in 1944 to negotiate a coalition between the two Chinese factions.¹⁷ Hurley soon discarded the notion of a coalition

government as unachievable and even undesirable. He argued that only those Chinese elements that recognized the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek should qualify for American aid. In February 1945, George Atcheson, American Charge d'Affaires in China, reported that Japan's rapid deterioration had made Chiang unrealistically demanding and recommended that the United States give aid to the Communists so that Chiang would come to terms with Mao.¹⁸ As late as November 1945, when Hurley resigned, the formula to achieve a unified China under Nationalist leadership had proved agonizingly elusive.

Hopeful still of creating a strong, united, and democratic China as the bulwark of Asian stability, Truman, in December 1945, dispatched recently-retired General George C. Marshall on a special mission to China. From the beginning, Marshall's power to influence either the Nationalists or the Communists was limited by the refusal of both sides to give up any strategic advantage or to settle for less than ultimate victory. As Marshall's efforts at mediation stalled in October 1946, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated open and complete support for Chiang. Chinese Communism, they warned, was merely a tool of Soviet ambition. If the United States withdrew its support from Chiang, the Soviets would take control of China, followed by Indochina, Malaya, and India.¹⁹ Should the mediation effort fail, the United States faced the simple alternative of facing disaster or underwriting the Nationalist cause with every means short of armed intervention. As one American officer in China observed:

The obvious Soviet aim in China is to exclude U.S. influence and replace it with that of Moscow. . . . Our exclusion from China would probably result, within the next generation, in an expansion of Soviet influence over the manpower, raw materials and industrial potential of Manchuria and China. The U.S. and the world might then be faced in the China Sea and southward with a Soviet power analogous to that of the Japanese in 1941, but with the difference that the Soviets could be perhaps overwhelmingly strong in Europe and the Middle East as well.²⁰

Marshall recognized the Nationalist regime as the legal government of China, but as late as 1947 his resentment of Chiang's failures in governing and Chiang's inflexible opposition to Mao far outweighed any conviction that Nationalist China was a necessary element in any East Asian defense structure.²¹ Following Marshall's return to Washington in January 1947 to assume his duties as Secretary of State, events in Europe dominated the attention of the American government and people. But this temporary indifference to China reflected as well Chiang's continuing claims of victory.

Marshall knew better, and so did Chiang. As the Nationalist armies lost ground, Chiang pressed the administration for greater support, arguing, as did the French, that he was indeed protecting all Asia from Communist aggression. To counter such demands and determine a feasible course of action, Marshall, in July 1947, dispatched General Albert C. Wedemeyer on another special mission to China. Wedemeyer, in his

report of 19 September 1947, declared that most Chinese opposed a Communist regime, whatever the failures of the Kuomintang. Wedemeyer doubted that any policy would save Chiang. Still he concluded: "A China dominated by Chinese Communists would be inimical to the interests of the United States, in view of their openly expressed hostility and active opposition to those principles which the United States regards as vital to the peace of the world."²² During 1948 State Department officials warned the administration that Communist advances were bringing China under Kremlin control. "In the struggle for world domination," declared the State Department's report of 13 October to the National Security Council (NSC 34), "... the allegiance of China's millions is worth striving for... if only to deny it to the free world. In positive terms, China is worth having because capture of it would represent an impressive political victory and, more practically, acquisition of a broad human glacis from which to mount a political offensive against the rest of East Asia."²³ Except for Soviet imperialism in China, the report concluded, the Chinese Communists would comprise no threat to Asia.

Such fears of Russia were scarcely reflected in official policy. Marshall and others rejected the assumptions regarding Russian influence in Chinese affairs; they could not, moreover, discover any formula that would assure a Nationalist victory. The Policy Planning Staff argued that Chiang's position was hopeless. To George F. Kennan, its director, this mattered little. In a lecture to the National War College in May 1947, Kennan observed that whatever the Kremlin's role in the Chinese revolution it would decline as the Communists extended their control over China. "I am not sure," Kennan concluded, "that their relations with Moscow would be much different from those of China today, because they would be much more independent, much more in a position to take an independent line vis-à-vis Moscow."²⁴ Facing, in China, no threat to its security, the United States, advised Kennan, should avoid responsibility for what occurred there. American officials shared Kennan's doubts that Chiang could hold his country together. "We find it difficult to believe," reported Ambassador John Leighton Stuart in May 1948, "that he is any longer capable of leadership necessary to instill new spirit into the people or that he has any intention of really instituting necessary reforms."²⁵ This judgment, widely shared in Washington, could not determine policy. Marshall, in an October 1948 policy review, again bound the United States diplomatically to the Nationalist cause; at the same time he advised the administration, as did Kennan, to assume no economic or military responsibility for China's future.²⁶ The United States, Marshall made clear, would neither save Chiang nor desert him.

Confronted with the need of extending or terminating American aid to China, the President called a small meeting in February 1949 at the White House to formulate some escape from the necessity of choice.

Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan opposed desertion of the Nationalists for fear that the United States would “never be able to shake the charge that we [were] the ones who gave poor China the final push into disaster.” He urged the administration to wait until the actual fall of Chiang was “settled by *China* and *in China* and not by the *American Government in Washington*.”²⁷ Vandenberg proposed no action to prevent the immediate Communist conquest of China, but he wanted the United States to avoid responsibility “for the *last push which makes it possible*.”²⁸ Truman and Acheson accepted Vandenberg’s argument; the United States would continue to support the Kuomintang officially while it waited for the dust to settle. As late as March 1949, Acheson advised Tom Connally, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, against a large military appropriation for China. Nothing that the United States could do, said the Secretary, could save the Nationalist government; greater military intervention, moreover, would defy traditional American policy in China.²⁹

In the grinding transfer of power to China’s Communist leadership in 1949 official Washington did not recognize any threat of aggression or danger to the United States. Nothing illustrated more clearly the official tendency to view the Communist victory as a legitimate expression of popular approval, and thus no real challenge to Asian stability, than did the noted China White Paper, published in August 1949. In his letter of transmittal which prefaced the White Paper, Acheson assigned responsibility for the Nationalist collapse to the failures of that regime. “The Nationalist armies,” wrote Acheson, “did not have to be defeated; they disintegrated.”³⁰ To the extent that numerous Americans and potential critics anticipated the Communist victory with deep regret, they regarded the new Chinese leaders as dangerous to Chinese traditions and to China’s historic relationship to the United States. But even for many friends of China and Chiang Kai-shek, the possible closing of the Open Door to scholars, missionaries, travelers, officials, and merchants, added to the subsequent mistreatment of American officials in China, was not necessarily evidence of Mao’s aggressive intent toward China’s neighbors.

Actually, such assumptions of an indigenous uprising in China faced the accumulated warnings of previous years that Asian Communism was monolithic and under the control of the Kremlin. Some Americans could recall Mao’s statement of June 1949 that his regime would of necessity ally China with the U.S.S.R. Washington could not ignore the fact that soon nine hundred million people on the Eurasian land mass would be living under Communist-led governments. Indeed, the fall of Chiang sent the American nation into a deep intellectual crisis. What mattered during the critical months of decision was the role which American officials, editors, and political leaders—the creators of policy and public opinion—chose to assign to the U.S.S.R. in the triumph of Communist power in China. What had appeared indigenous suddenly appeared to some in Washington

and elsewhere as possibly the initial triumph of Soviet aggression as it moved into the Asian sphere.

Even in the White Paper, Acheson called attention to the danger of Soviet imperialism in East Asia and reaffirmed American opposition "to the subjugation of China by any foreign power, to any regime acting in the interest of a foreign power, and to the dismemberment of China by any foreign policy, whether by open or clandestine means." Acheson warned that the new Communist regime might "lend itself to the aims of Soviet Russian imperialism and attempt to engage in aggression against China's neighbors. . . ."³¹ Throughout the autumn of 1949, the administration continued to search for a definition of the Asian problem, troubled by a lack of evidence. In November, Foreign Service Officer Karl Lott Rankin warned from Hong Kong that Communist China would, through subversion, attempt to expand its influence throughout South and Southeast Asia. Wrote Rankin:

Now that communist control of China proper is all but assured it may be taken for granted that efforts will be redoubled to place communist regimes in power elsewhere in Asia. . . . China may be considered weak and backward by Western standards, but . . . in Eastern terms, communist China is a great power, economically, militarily, and politically. Supported by communist dynamism, China might well be able to dominate not only Indochina, Siam, and Burma, but eventually the Philippines, Indonesia, Pakistan, and India itself.³²

Such perceptions of danger, emanating from the Executive Branch, quickly drifted into Congress. Charging logically that American policy in China had indeed endangered the nation's security, Senator Kenneth Wherry of Nebraska and other Republicans charged that the State Department's White Paper was "to a large extent a 1,054 page whitewash of a wishful, do-nothing policy which has succeeded only in placing Asia in danger of Soviet conquest with its ultimate threat to the peace of the world and our own national security."³³

Some analysts confronted this challenge to the nation's intellectual integrity by denying that the impending collapse of American-backed governments in China and Indochina comprised a danger to Asian or Western security, or that predictable Communist gains in East Asia demanded a vigorous strategic response. George Kennan warned the Truman administration in February 1948 against overcommitting the United States in the Pacific. Asia was a world apart, quite beyond the control of outside influence. "It is urgently necessary," he wrote, "that we recognize our own limitations as a moral and ideological force among the Asiatic peoples." With Japan and the Philippines serving as the cornerstones of its defense system, the United States, he believed, was prepared to meet any conceivable threats to its security.³⁴ Like Kennan, East Asian expert Owen Lattimore condemned the popular assumption

that China had fallen under Russian control. His vigorous denial appeared in *The Nation* on 3 September 1949:

China is a fact. The Chinese Communists are a fact. It is a fact that Russian strength remains concentrated and deployable, and that no detectable part of it has been diverted or committed to China. A new American policy in Asia must start with the admission that these facts cannot be conjured out of existence. . . by Secretary Acheson's statement that "the Communist leaders have forsworn their Chinese heritage and have publicly announced their subservience to a foreign power, Russia."³⁵

Amid the growing support for Bao Dai in the autumn of 1949, Raymond B. Fosdick, consultant to the Secretary of State on Far Eastern policy, advised the administration on 4 November that Ho's certain triumph would in no measure comprise a defeat for the United States. It was too late in history, argued Fosdick, to establish a cheap substitute for French colonialism in the form of the Bao Dai regime. "For the United States to support France in this attempt," wrote Fosdick, "will cost us our standing and prestige in all of Southeast Asia. A lot of that prestige went down the drain with Chiang Kai-shek; the rest of it will go down with the Bao Dai regime if we support it." To those in Washington who insisted that it was too late to do anything except support Bao Dai, Fosdick retorted: "It is never too late to change a mistaken policy, particularly when the policy involves the kind of damage that our adherence to the Generalissimo brought us. Why get our fingers burned twice?" Because Ho was independent of both Russia and China, there was nothing to be gained from supporting French policy. "Whether the French like it or not," Fosdick concluded, "independence is coming to Indochina. Why, therefore, do we tie ourselves to the tail of their battered kite?"³⁶ Such predictions of disaster had no chance against the pressures emanating from Paris and Saigon, or the convictions of Acheson and much of the State Department. For those in power disaster lay not in supporting French policy, but in permitting it to fail.

Responding to the new dangers in Asia, American policymakers searched for some formula that would define both the objectives and the strategic priorities in Asia, with some identification of means to achieve the necessary balance between them. Late in 1949, the Truman administration approved NSC 48/2 as a basic security design for East Asia. The statement defined the goals of policy as the containment, gradual reduction, and eventual elimination "of the preponderant power and influence of the USSR in Asia to such a degree that the Soviet Union will not be capable of threatening from that area the security of the United States. . . ."³⁷ The nation would achieve this grand design by encouraging the formation of regional associations of non-Communist Asian states, and by strengthening its position in Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines. The United States would deny Formosa and the Pescadores to mainland China without assuming a military commitment to protect them.

Economic policies would contribute to the political stability of friendly, independent states. The design did not advocate the recognition of the new Peking regime of China, but it favored policies toward China no more hostile than those adopted for Moscow. In Indochina the United States would encourage the French to lift all barriers to Bao Dai's success. If the document appeared utopian, it assumed that the major area of East-West conflict was Europe, that the pressures in Asia were largely political and psychological, that the Soviets did not contemplate direct military involvement in Asia, and that the United States might best prevent further Communist gains through economic and diplomatic rather than military means.³⁸

Acheson's noted National Press Club speech of 12 January 1950 was in part a plea for moderation. It emphasized the non-Soviet nature of the Chinese revolution. He said:

What has happened . . . is that the almost inexhaustible patience of the Chinese people in their misery ended. They did not bother to overthrow this government. They simply ignored it. . . . They completely withdrew their support from this government, and when that support was withdrawn, the whole military establishment disintegrated.³⁹

The Secretary argued logically that the United States should make no effort to control the affairs of Asia, especially by military means. He assured the nation that the Communist victory in China did not constitute a threat to the rest of Asia. He drew a security line in the western Pacific which included Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines; he pointedly excluded South Korea, Formosa, and Southeast Asia from the United States defense perimeter. Acheson's statement did not deny that the United States had an interest in those regions; it simply rejected the necessity and feasibility of protecting them with military force.

Again Acheson acknowledged the presence of Soviet expansionism in revolutionary China. "Communism," he said, "is the most subtle instrument of Soviet foreign policy that has ever been devised, and it is really the spearhead of Russian imperialism which would, if it could, take from these people what they have won, what we want them to keep and develop, which is their own national independence."⁴⁰ Russia's success in winning the loyalty of China's new leaders demonstrated clearly, warned the Secretary, "what the true purposes of the Soviet Union are and what the true function of communism as an agent of Russian imperialism is." Amid such accusations of Soviet domination the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, signed in Moscow in February 1950, demolished whatever doubt remained that the Chinese had indeed become puppets of the Moscow Politburo. The treaty, necessitated ostensibly to protect East Asia from the rebirth of Japanese power, committed the two countries to the development and consolidation of their economic and cultural ties. Nothing in the treaty implied Moscow's

dominance over China; it was Stalin, not Mao, who balked at the treaty's provisions. But Acheson warned the allegedly subservient Chinese that they would bring grave trouble on themselves and the rest of Asia if they were "led by their new rulers into aggressive or subversive adventures beyond their borders."⁴¹ In 1950, the Chinese revolution itself seemed sufficient to demonstrate Soviet expansionist power in Asia.

Acheson took the lead in defining the new challenge to Asia. When China appeared to be achieving true national independence, he told the Commonwealth Club of California in March, its leaders were forcing it into the Soviet orbit. "We now face the prospect," he warned, "that the Communists may attempt to apply another familiar tactic to use China as a base for probing for another weak spot which they can move into and exploit." He reminded Asians that they "must face the fact that today the major threat to their freedom and to their social and economic progress is the attempted penetration of Asia by Soviet-Communist imperialism and by the colonialism which it contains."⁴² Ambassador Loy W. Henderson informed the Indian Council of World Affairs at New Delhi on 27 March that the United States did "not pursue one set of policies with regard to the Americas or Europe and another with regard to Asia. The foreign policies of the United States by force of circumstances have become global in character." Upon his return from a long study mission to East Asia, Ambassador Philip Jessup, on 13 April, addressed the nation over ABC. There was no need, he began, to explain Asia's importance to the United States. "I think most Americans realize that Asia is important," he added, "... because Soviet communism is clearly out to capture and colonize the continent. . . ." Asians everywhere, he said, relied on the United States to defend their independence.⁴³

After mid-century, the United States resisted the collapse of the French empire in Southeast Asia under the clear assumption that Ho also was a puppet of the Kremlin. In January 1950, both Moscow and Peking recognized Ho's newly established Democratic Republic of Vietnam. United States officials denounced Ho's war against the French as a Soviet-based aggression against the people of Indochina. Acheson declared characteristically that the Soviet recognition of Ho's Democratic Republic revealed him "in his true color as the mortal enemy of national independence in Indochina."⁴⁴ On 5 February 1950 the United States recognized the Bao Dai regime of Vietnam. Thereafter the notion that the Paris-chosen native aristocrat had better claims to Vietnamese leadership and that he would ultimately triumph became official doctrine in Washington. This new allegiance to Bao Dai assigned him and his French allies responsibility for the success of Western containment policy as it confronted Russian expansionism in Southeast Asia. On 8 June Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the war in Indochina was not a civil war. "This is a civil war," he declared, "which has been in effect captured by the Polit-

buro. . . . It is part of an international war, . . . and because Ho Chi Minh is tied in with the Politburo our policy is to support Bao Dai and the French in Indochina until we have time to help them establish a going concern. . . .”⁴⁵

Even as reports from Indochina predicted the failure of the French effort, American officials in Washington agreed that a French victory alone would protect all Southeast Asia from Communist imperialism.⁴⁶ Finally, on 8 May 1950, Acheson negotiated an arrangement with Foreign Minister Robert Schuman whereby France and the governments of Indochina together would carry the responsibility for Indochinese security. The rationale for United States policy was clear. Acheson informed the press:

The United States Government, convinced that neither national independence nor democratic evolution exist in any area dominated by Soviet imperialism, considers the situation to be such as to warrant its according economic aid and military equipment to the Associated States of Indochina and to France in order to assist them in restoring stability and permitting these states to pursue their peaceful and democratic development.

Through Mao's victory in China, according to the official American analysis, Moscow had captured control of a half billion Chinese people; now through Ho the Kremlin would add Southeast Asia to the widening area under its command.

Such perceptions of danger gave Asia a special strategic importance. During the spring of 1950, few security officials cared to dispute the force of Soviet imperialism in Asia's revolutionary upheaval. In April, the National Security Council submitted its report on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, known by its serial number, NSC 68. This document concluded that the U.S.S.R., “unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world. . . . To that end Soviet efforts are now directed toward the domination of the Eurasian land mass.” NSC 68 warned that “the Communist success in China, taken with the politico-economic situation in the rest of South and South-East Asia, provided a springboard for a further incursion in this troubled area.”⁴⁸ Such burgeoning fears of Soviet expansion in East Asia had no effect on the military budget. American defense expenditures declined after the war and did not rebound with the rise of Mao in China. Both the administration and Congress, whatever their fears of Soviet expansion in Asia, still regarded the danger of direct aggression remote. Until mid-1950, the United States had avoided formal alliances or extensive troop deployments in East Asia. Still the assumption of a Kremlin-based threat to Asia rendered the avoidance of armed resistance to any Communist-led aggression difficult, if not illogical.

Containment's test came with remarkable suddenness on 25 June 1950 when the United States ambassador in Seoul, South Korea, informed Washington that North Korean forces had invaded. The assault confronted Truman and his advisers with the immediate opportunity to teach the Communists a lesson and to reinforce American defenses in the western Pacific. At the President's Blair House meeting on 25 June General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, declared that "the Korean situation offered as good an occasion for action in drawing the line as anywhere else. . . ." Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, agreed. "The present situation in Korea," he said, "offers a valuable opportunity for us to act."⁴⁹ Two days later Truman informed those gathered around his council table that "we could not let [the Korean] matter go by default." The President explained his decision to order United States air and sea forces to Korea: "The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war."⁵⁰ To protect the increasingly strategic island of Formosa from Communist occupation, the President dispatched the Seventh Fleet to the Formosa Straits. At the same time he ordered additional military assistance to the Philippine government as well as to the French and the Associated States of Indochina.⁵¹ The U.N. Security Council, with the U.S.S.R. absent, voted unanimously on 27 June to support the American effort in Korea.

United States officials, in attributing the Korean war to Soviet imperialism, placed enormous faith in China's refusal to become involved. China's disclaimer would confirm its independence. Acheson revealed his confidence in the good judgment and resistance of the Chinese in a CBS telecast of mid-September, 1950. For the Chinese to enter the war, he said, would be sheer madness. "And since there is nothing in it for them," he added, "I don't see why they should yield to what is undoubtedly pressure from the Communist movement to get into the Korean row."⁵² Chinese aggression would threaten the island of Formosa and expose Chiang's exiled Republic of China to capture. In his prepared address to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, General MacArthur emphasized the strategic importance of Formosa. Should any hostile power gain control of that island, he warned, its "military potential would again be fully exploited as the means to break and neutralize our Western Pacific defense system and mount a war of conquest against the free nations of the Pacific basin."⁵³ Either the United States would defend that bulwark in its Pacific defense structure, or it would retreat to the western shores of North America and expose Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand to the enemy. Yet at Wake Island, in October, MacArthur assured the President that Russia and China would not risk involvement in the Korean War.

Such expressions of hope, even if backed by logic, proved to be a poor prediction of Chinese action. But they explain why the Chinese ad-

vance across the Yalu in November 1950 produced a traumatic reaction in Washington. China's intervention seemed to demonstrate, at last, not only Peking's irrationality but also the absolute control which Moscow had gained over China and China's external policies. "Those who control the Soviet Union and the international Communist movement," Acheson warned the country in a nationwide radio address on 29 November, "have made clear their fundamental design." Truman declared on the following day, "We hope that the Chinese people will not continue to be forced or deceived into serving the ends of Russian colonial policy in Asia."⁵⁴ Chinese behavior seemed to prove the accuracy of Stanley K. Hornbeck's observation of October: "The conflict in Korea is not a 'civil conflict.' The conflict between China's Communists and China's Nationalists is not a 'civil conflict.' The attacking forces in both cases bear a made-from-by-and-for Moscow stamp."⁵⁵ Even *The New York Times* proclaimed on 8 December: "The Chinese Communist dictatorship will eventually go down in history as the men who sold out their country to the foreigners, in this case the Russians, rather than as those who rescued China from foreign imperialism."⁵⁶

Thus Korea perfected the notion of Chinese subservience to a Moscow-dominated international Communism. Truman reminded the American people in his State of the Union message of 8 January 1951: "Our men are fighting . . . because they know, as we do, that the aggression in Korea is part of the attempt of the Russian communist dictatorship to take over the world, step by step."⁵⁶ Now the pattern of Soviet subversion appeared equally clear elsewhere in Asia. Disturbances throughout the Pacific and Asian areas, from the war in Korea to the activities of the Communist-controlled United States maritime unions, said Dulles, were "part of a single pattern . . . of violence planned and plotted for 25 years and finally brought to a consummation of fighting and disorder in the whole vast area extending from Korea down through China into Indochina, Malaya, the Philippines, and west into Tibet and the borders of Burma, India, and Pakistan."⁵⁷ Rusk noted in February 1951 that the year 1950 marked a new phase in Russia's expansionist policy:

First it has clearly shown that it is prepared to wage war by satellites so far as that becomes desirable to further its objective—not only wars by small satellites such as the North Koreans, but full-fledged war by Communist China, a major satellite. Second, the Soviet Union has shown that it is itself prepared to risk a general war and that it is pushing its program to the brink of a general war.⁵⁸

This concept of a Kremlin-controlled monolith created the ultimate rationale for rejecting Peking from membership in the United Nations and denying it the recognition of the United States. The government of China was not Chinese; the iron discipline of the Communist party bound it to the service of Moscow.⁵⁹

It followed naturally that the Truman administration quickly extended its containment efforts to Asia. In June 1950, Congress, under Executive prodding, appropriated \$500 million for military assistance in East Asia. In December, the United States signed a special Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with France, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos for the defense of Southeast Asia.⁶⁰ The Chinese invasion of Korea, Acheson explained in February 1951, made the security of the Pacific area a constant preoccupation of the United States government. Compelled by this new sense of urgency, President Truman, in his budget message of 1951, declared that the military aid program had become an established policy of the United States. During 1952, military assistance to Asia began to exceed in importance that earmarked for Europe. The bulk of the military aid channeled into Asia went to four countries regarded especially vulnerable to Soviet-Chinese aggression: the Republic of China on Formosa, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Vietnam, and Japan. Korea and Indochina—regions where the principle of containment was under direct assault—had emerged by 1951 as the keys to the independence of all Asia. Success in these two areas would establish the credibility of American policy elsewhere.⁶¹ Much of the official American concern over defense focused on Southeast Asia where, declared Rusk, the people of Indochina were in danger of being “absorbed by force into the new colonialism of a Soviet Communist empire.”⁶² The French, increasingly hard pressed in Indochina, supported their claims to greater American financial aid by insisting that they no less than the people of the United States were engaged in fighting international Communism. Responding to the demands of Asian containment, the United States after 1951 supported in Korea one of the world’s largest non-Communist armies at a cost of almost \$1 billion per year. In Indochina the United States eventually underwrote 80 percent of the financial expenditure of the French military effort.⁶³

During 1951, the Truman administration had negotiated a series of permanent military alliances in East Asia. Japan emerged as the key to the new alliance structure. To encourage Japanese economic development, the Japanese treaty imposed no restrictions on Japanese commerce and industry. It stripped Japan of its island possessions, including Okinawa, but it acknowledged Japan’s right to self-defense and established the foundations for future Japanese rearmament.⁶⁴ At the same time the United States retained rights to land and naval bases on Japanese territory. The Japanese treaty received approval in special ceremonies at San Francisco during September 1951. Australia and New Zealand, remembering their narrow escape from Japanese invasion in 1942, demanded special security guarantees from the United States before they would sign the Japanese treaty. United States officials joined representatives of Australia and New Zealand in signing the ANZUS Pact at San Francisco in September 1951, hours before the Japanese treaty conference opened. Late in August the United States negotiated a similar bilateral defense treaty with the Philip-

pires. The Senate ratified these pacts overwhelmingly during the spring of 1952. In these treaty arrangements, Dulles assured Washington, the United States undertook no obligation except to consult in the event of aggression.⁶⁵

For Washington the American interest in opposing Asian Communism had become a "given," rarely if ever explicated internally or externally, rarely if ever questioned by those charged with the conduct of national policy. Early in 1952 the National Security Council issued a statement on "United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia." It presented the following proposition: "Communist domination, by whatever means, of all Southeast Asia would seriously endanger in the short term, and critically endanger in the longer run, United States security interests." Neither that document nor any which followed defined what those security interests were. Instead the document went on to warn:

In the absence of effective and timely counteraction, the loss of any single country would probably lead to relatively swift submission to or an alignment with communism by the remaining countries of [Southeast Asia]. Furthermore, an alignment with communism of the rest of Southeast Asia and India, and in the longer term, of the Middle East . . . would in all probability progressively follow: Such widespread alignment would endanger the stability and security of Europe.⁶⁶

That language of despair created a paranoia, shared by military and civilian officials alike, which overlooked such fundamental determinants as culture, interest, and nationalism in the affairs of Asia.

For President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles the world which they inherited from Harry S Truman was scarcely reassuring. Early in 1953 the new President declared that the nation stood in greater peril than at any time in its history. What gave this massive danger its character—and indeed comprised its only sustaining rationale—was the concept of the international Communist monolith. Ambassador Rankin in Taipei saw this clearly when he wrote Ambassador George V. Allen in India during July 1953. He reminded Allen that the United States could maintain its anti-Peking posture only by denying that Mao enjoyed any independence from Moscow. Whether or not this was true, wrote Rankin, the Chinese Nationalists feared that the United States might accept it as true and thereafter follow the course of Britain and India. "Only so long as they are persuaded that Americans continue to regard Mao simply as a Soviet tool," ran Rankin's warning, "will they feel reasonably assured as to our China policy."⁶⁷

What made the danger of expanding Sino-Soviet penetration into South and Southeast Asia appear so ominous was Dulles's theory that Marxism was antithetical to national sovereignty, and that Communism would gradually destroy all national entities in Asia and create one vast

community under Communist domination. To official Washington, Sino-Soviet imperialism was merely the Asiatic agent for the new universalism. "The Soviet leaders, in mapping their strategy for world conquest," warned Dulles in November 1953, "hit on nationalism as a device for absorbing the colonial peoples."⁶⁸ The danger, Dulles noted further, rested in the ability of Communist agitators to aggravate the nationalist aspirations of people so they would rebel violently against the existing order. Before a new stability could be created, the Communists would gain control of the nation and convey it into the Soviet orbit.

For Dulles the Communist threat to Indochina in 1954 was especially dangerous, demanding some form of "united action" to meet it. "Under the conditions of today," he told the Overseas Press Club of New York on 29 March 1954, "the imposition on Southeast Asia of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist ally, by whatever means, would be a grave threat to the whole free community." If Indochina's Communist elite, using anti-French slogans to win public support, ever gained a military and political victory, warned Dulles, it would subject the Indochinese people to a cruel dictatorship which would take its orders from Moscow and Peking. But the tragedy would not stop there. Dulles declared:

If the Communist forces won uncontested control over Indochina or any substantial part thereof they would surely resume the same pattern of aggression against other free peoples in the area. . . . Communist control of Southeast Asia would carry a grave threat to the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, with whom we have treaties of mutual assistance. The entire Western Pacific area, including the so-called "offshore island chain," would be strategically endangered.⁶⁹

Dulles made no effort to explain why any of this would occur.

Several days later President Eisenhower, in a press conference, described as *falling dominoes* this process by which country after country, as if responding to some central force, would allegedly follow one another into the Communist camp. Dulles again warned against this danger at Manila in September when he addressed the members of the new Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO): "We are united by a common danger, and the danger stems from international communism and its insatiable ambition. We know that wherever it makes gains, as in Indochina, these gains are looked on, not as final solutions, but as bridgeheads for future gains."⁷⁰ Despite such broad definitions of danger to Southeast Asia, the administration attributed to China a special role in the Indochinese upheaval. "If China were not Communist," declared Vice President Richard M. Nixon in January 1954, "there would be no war in Indochina. . . ."⁷¹ The Eisenhower administration, no less than that of Harry Truman, denied the existence of any fundamentally indigenous, nationalistic quality in Indochina's struggle for independence.

Washington predicted disaster if containment should fail at the 17th parallel, which, after the Geneva Conference of 1954, divided North Vietnam from United States-supported South Vietnam. Eisenhower explained why in April 1959:

Strategically, South Viet-Nam's capture by the Communists would bring their power several hundred miles into a hitherto free region. The remaining countries of Southeast Asia would be menaced by a great flanking movement... The loss of South Viet-Nam would set in motion a crumbling process that could, as it progressed, have grave consequences for us and for freedom.⁷²

Such dramatic phraseology never explained the process by which the collapse of South Vietnam would endanger the United States, but it left Washington powerless to question its commitments to that country. The importance of victory compelled the Eisenhower administration to assign Ngo Dinh Diem, South Vietnam's long-faltering leader, the primary responsibility for defending his own and America's interests in Southeast Asia. Diem's political and military success was seen as the only barrier to an uncertain future of chaos and war. Having rendered itself hostage to Diem, Washington was powerless to control his regime or to desert it. Conscious of the persistent decline in Diem's fortunes, the Eisenhower administration showered him with official praise and renewed commitments to the survival of his regime.

For the moment the predictable demise of American policy in Southeast Asia mattered little. As long as the proclaimed triumphs of the South Vietnamese government and the new SEATO alliance guaranteed successful containment at little cost, the Eisenhower administration faced no necessity to explain what was contained by United States policy. Still the intellectual and policy dilemmas of the future were already clear. For the ends of policy assumed a global danger of which Ho's Hanoi regime comprised only a minor segment. Yet the means of policy, as they evolved during the Eisenhower years, did not include even a defense against Hanoi, much less against Moscow and Peking (presumably included in the more abstract phrase, Communist aggression). If the latter two nations comprised the essential danger to American security interests in Asia, policies aimed at the disposal of Ho's ambitions, whatever their success, would not touch, much less resolve, the dangers posed by the two leading Communist powers. If, on the other hand, the challenge to United States security lay in Hanoi, then the rhetoric of a Soviet-based global danger—the initial and continuing rationale for opposing Ho—had no meaning. Whatever the global pressures that demanded successful containment of Communism in Asia, the United States behaved as if the danger comprised no more than North Vietnam's determination to unseat the Saigon regime. Washington never contemplated war with China or Russia to settle the question of Southeast Asia.

COMMENTARY: A SOLDIER'S VIEWPOINT

Richard G. Stilwell

I want to say just a word or two about the two very excellent papers that were read earlier this period and then a few about things military in East Asia. I draw the distinct conclusion that Dr. Graebner would have proposed that we recognize and support Ho Chi Minh from the very beginning. I think that ignores the importance of France as one of the principal actors in the postwar political and military organization of western Europe. Remember there was no Germany at that stage of the game; our two main allies in the development of the framework for economic recovery and military defense of western Europe were the French and the British. I believe that had we rebuffed the French somehow and funneled aid directly to Ho Chi Minh, we would have had also to accept, from the beginning, Ho Chi Minh's claim, by *force majeure*, to the surrounding nations of Laos and Cambodia. I believe also that, had we done so, the Indonesian nation would not look institutionally, ideologically and politically, the way it does today.

Dr. Graebner makes the very good point that in all our protestations about rising up to confront Communism in Asia in the late 1940s and early 1950, there was no corresponding increase in budget for the Department of Defense. That is absolutely correct. But it is a commentary on our magnificent country that it takes us a whale of a long time to learn, a whale of a long time to finally get into high gear.

Now a word or two about my profession. Any man's or woman's outlook, of course, is shaped by his experience. It may be of some interest that on the 25th of June 1950, I was sitting with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency when we read the first news of the aggression from North Korea. I had been assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency by General Wedemeyer as a proximate result of the National Security Council (NSC) directive 48/2 to which Dr. Graebner alluded as somewhat Utopian. The most important thing about 48/2, I would argue, was that it said the U.S. faced a multi-faceted threat from the Soviet Union, its surrogates and satellites, in all areas, from the political to the psychological, the economic, the subversive, whatever. We therefore needed to develop capabilities as a nation to deal with some of those threats below the level of conventional force: that is, by covert action. So I became a member of the

group which was designated to “dirty tricks”—somewhat maligned, and in disrepute today, but hopefully, something which will be reinstated in the not-too-distant future as an important cog, an important arrow in our quiver, contributing to our ability to survive.

I had learned enough about Korea to know that the Communist threat on that peninsula was not all north of 38th parallel; in the years 1947 - 1949 the elements from the north had seriously penetrated and had almost denigrated the efficacy of the still embryonic Constabulary and then Army in South Korea. If it had not been for the grace of God, and a couple of very fine operations that unmasked the Communist Infrastructure pervading the armed services of the Republic of Korea, in those days, their ability to fight on the field of battle even as well as they did in 1950 would have been totally eviscerated. In any event, as a CIA type, I had responsibility for the Far East, albeit with very few assets. In that first year, working to help as best we could, I thrilled as all of us did, to the brilliant strategic stroke of MacArthur—the envelopment that was Inchon—and was appalled like so many of us just shortly thereafter at the uncoordinated, all-too-rapid advance in unsupported columns north of the 38th parallel which permitted the Chinese intervention to go undetected for longer than should have been the case and greatly increased the impact of that intervention in November and December of 1950. It is for historians to examine the theme that many of us hold: that had the advance north from the 38th toward the Yalu been coordinated, then we could have, perhaps would have, fought the balance of that police action along the line of the narrow waist of North Korea, rather than immediately south or astride the 38th parallel.

Intervention of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as we all know, changed dramatically the political objectives of that conflict. The purpose had been, until the PRC intervention, the dismemberment of the North Korean armed forces and the establishment of a unified free Korea. With the massive intervention of the PRC, the United States determined to modify the original objectives. We had to adjust to our military capability, or more precisely, to the level of commitment we determined was prudent. By taking on the Chinese, we had to take action into China proper. That could very well have precipitated a Soviet attack in western Europe for which we were not ready. So we went to the strategic defensive in the spring of 1951 and for the next two years we fought a war which was difficult on the troops psychologically and difficult for the commanders in the field to manage.

In retrospect, it is amazing that we were as successful as we were in maintaining troop morale on that battlefield. Of course proximity to a real live enemy does something for morale. We were reasonably successful, with the troops that we had in those days, in convincing them, because we were convinced, that we were involved in a noble cause (as we were to be in

Southeast Asia some years later). As representatives of the United Nations we were saving something over twenty-six million people from subjugation. We were staying the expansion of an ideology totally inimical to our value system. We were able to do that. We stayed the course.

What resulted in the middle of 1953 was not a defeat; indeed it was a limited success. The real lesson of Korea is that we were on the mainland of Asia and, notwithstanding massive Communist Chinese intervention, able to bring the conflict to a conclusion compatible with the interests of the Free World. In the years that have passed, the U.S. garrison in Korea and the other forces arrayed in Northeast Asia have contributed enormously to Free World interests, most notably by creation of a climate of security and confidence that fueled the most sustained dramatic economic forward momentum of any region in the world. We have held the Soviets in check up to this point; and we have assured the defense of our principal partner in Asia, Japan. We have given to the world at large proof that where the United States makes good its commitment by the man on the ground we can assure peace and stability, as we have also done in western Europe.

The military man, universally recognizes that Korea, that little appendage on the Asian mainland, is so proximate to the two Communist super powers, that it can never be totally self-reliant in defense. Its nearest friend, Japan, with an improbably small military establishment, is incapable of helping and the United States is a long way away. The earnest of U. S. support, of course, is the 2nd Division on the ground in that area. That is why a military man had to be shocked when four years ago the Carter administration, without political or military analysis of the consequences, without consultation with allies, or without asking for any countervailing concession, decreed the withdrawal of our forces from Korea on an arbitrary time schedule. Hopefully that will not transpire.

Now let me shift quickly to Southeast Asia, and most particularly Vietnam, where another major effort had a dramatically different end result. It was a noble cause and there was no reason for the greatest power on the earth to be soundly defeated by a fourth-rate half-country. There were key strategic errors. One was the failure to understand one's opponent, normally fatal in battle. We did not understand that we were confronting an adversary who was geared for total war, whatever the cost, however long it took. We failed to define and adhere to a political objective to which the military effort could be geared. And we failed to mobilize the United States attitudinally by calling up the reserves and preparing for the long pull. Those are errors for which the military instrument of the United States must take its share of the blame. In the conduct of the war proper, there were such gross asymmetries as to make the end result almost foreordained.

Ho Chi Minh pursued a single clear objective, and that was to control and Communize all of Indochina: North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, at a minimum. Incidentally, he has done that, and the "domino theory" has yet to be disproved. It is a matter of timing. I am not sure President Eisenhower was wrong. Time will tell. Our objectives in Vietnam changed, but mainly we were looking for a quick exit. We started with resistance to aggression, but never to the source of aggression. We went from that to a counter-insurgency posture and then to Vietnamization, a tactic designed to get us out while somehow assuring the integrity of a dwindling commitment. We constrained the area of operations to the physical boundaries of South Vietnam, while our adversary had the immense strategic advantage that comes from being able to operate outside those boundaries in Laos and in Cambodia. Unity of command was his. We did not have it on our side. Most notably it was lacking between the United States forces and the Vietnamese forces. We never got together. And I suppose the major problem, when you come right down to it, was that we expended our first team against the secondary forces of the adversary—largely the guerilla forces—because we were restricted to South Vietnam. His main forces were kept in reserve for the Sunday punch. A friend of mine was in Hanoi in 1975 on an official mission, and while talking briefly to a North Vietnamese colonel, said, "You know, you never bested us on the field of battle." The North Vietnamese colonel answered: "That may be so, but it's also totally irrelevant."

I will stop with one footnote about Vietnam. I was accorded the signal accolade earlier today by our chairman who suggested that I might have been an airman. I take that as an enormous compliment. When I was in Southeast Asia, I got to eyeball with a lot of pilots and I came away with the most enormous admiration for those officers. They knew how flagrantly airpower was being misused by the high command in the Pentagon, in violation of all the rules of air warfare and application of airpower. When you are briefed by your intelligence officers, when you see the kind of targets that you should be hitting on the maps yet cannot hit, when you are told to go at great risk to hit minor targets, and you do it, that is dedication. That is professionalism. Nothing could have better proved the total reliability of the military instrument than the work of those pilots, those squadrons, those wings that I witnessed. So that is why I say: I'm proud to have had it suggested that I wore something besides jump wings and why it is such a tremendous pleasure for me to be here at the United States Air Force Academy.

COMMENTARY: SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT AMERICAN POLICY IN EAST ASIA

Frank E. Vandiver

We have talked in this session about the American commitment in East Asia beginning in 1898. It may be well to remember that Americans were in East Asia much earlier; the U.S. had economic interests decades before. Aside from this consideration, we may wish also to consider Professor Dingman's suggestion that 1907 marks the end of America's official commitment "in the Philippines." One might suggest that 1907 was not a clear date marking the end of American interest. It may have been a clear date of ended interest in the *New York Times*, but the *National Geographic* continued, issue after issue, all through 1916, to feature at least one article per issue on the Philippines.

The commander of the Philippine Department was given—very early—wide, remarkable powers, much more so than allowed to normal, geographical or theater commanders. Those powers were not curtailed after 1907. They were in fact expanded to the point that the field commander could, and sometimes did, make political as well as military decisions in the Philippines.

The most interesting continuation of American interests in the Philippines springs from the activities of the two Philippine commissions. The first commission merely set up structures of government, at least in theory. By looking at the publication of the so-called Schurman Commission, however, one can see that the commission did a great many other things. It did sociological research, historical research, geological research, and all kinds of things, which were presented to—one must concede—a vastly uninterested Congress. The second commission did a great deal more. With Taft's interest in that part of the world, the commission not only set up additional rules for government of the Philippines, but postulated eventual freedom, and not necessarily for strategic reasons. One searches in vain through the second Philippine commission's comments for anything about strategic considerations.

Why were Americans interested in the Philippines? Part of the early interest there had come from missionary work, and then the zeal of missionary work shifted to a different kind of messianism. The American people were beginning to be told by various media, and old Philippine

hands, that the people in the Philippines had great potential, but they were denied the benefits of civilization. They needed, in other words, to be uplifted, and have you ever known a nation more zealous than the United States in uplifting someone else? Once given *that* challenge, Americans are virtually unstoppable. So Americans intended to uplift the Filipinos just as fast as possible. I suggest that while strategy, naval power, economics, anti-imperialism, and all those things, had much to do with our Philippine involvement, moral uplift should be considered an important motive. Intervention in the Philippines was good, true, and almost beautiful. A great many Americans believed in the message of Kipling, that America was in effect inheriting the mantle which the British were still carrying, but a mantle which was becoming pretty tattered in the hands of the British.

One should also note that the U.S. involvement, although perhaps officially ended in 1907, continued militarily, with some of the most costly campaigns in U.S. history, right up to the First World War, and some time afterwards. The campaigns drew the U.S. Army into politics as well as military activity, and helped create a whole series of generations of politician-soldiers who did a remarkable job of carrying forward the models set forth in General Order 100 in the Civil War: military government carried on by those actually involved in conquering territory.

Professor Dingman referred to the Bureau of Customs and Insular Affairs, a bureau which perhaps deserves a great deal more attention by scholars. It was tucked into the War Department, because the State Department, with singular grasp of its own safety, did not want anything to do with it. The War Department got stuck with it; Elihu Root was very much interested in it. It was a small bureaucracy which, in the nature of all bureaucracies, refused to remain so, but in its early days, it did remarkably well in setting governmental, economic, and legal policy for the Philippines as well as for Cuba and Puerto Rico. It was setting up, really, a vision of the future, trying to sell the United States on the idea that there was much to be made in these areas in the way of money.

Two questions may be asked in connection with Professor Dingman's paper. One of the things that Theodore Roosevelt became very much interested in, which helped him change his view on Asia, was the "big gun" navy theory. One wonders if that theory helped United States policy-makers formally reject the alleged theory of Mahan that it was impossible, indeed nationally dangerous, to carry on an Asian war? Did we ever, in fact, reject that policy, or did Mahan actually ever say it?

Professor Graebner's paper talks about later events, and leaves the impression that the main American concern for East Asia sprang from war, or necessary involvement in war, and once involved, strategic as well as political attitudes demanded that the United States remain to protect U.S. security. Hence, the U.S. had, in effect, a reactive attitude toward

East Asia, and for some time, apparently, no real policy, except an ill-defined hope to save various so-called free nations. U.S. policy seems to be one of expediency more than anything else.

One suspects that the U.S. involvement was far more important to Asians than to Americans; Americans were increasingly led to fear a global Communist threat, rather than to be made aware of possible challenges and opportunities in Asia as a theater of its own.

We look forward to hearing more in later sessions about the Asian attitude toward the Anglo-American involvement in East Asia. What were the Asian perceptions of Western threats? And yet another question remains. Do the American people really *yet* recognize the difference between balance-of-power politics in Asia and the threat of global Communist oppression of American allies and American interests?

In summary, these were excellent papers, extremely well-written. And to have papers like these commented upon by General Stilwell, who was *there*, in some of the most exciting moments of the periods these people were writing about, makes this, in my estimation, a peculiarly rewarding session.

DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS

Frank E. Vandiver (Moderator)

Question (Sadao Asada): I seem to detect certain differences in viewpoint between Professor Dingman and Professor Graebner. Could you please comment?

Dingman: I think Professor Asada has a point. I think we do have a difference of opinion of sorts about what one might call the location in time and the nature of the creation of an American commitment in East Asia. I have suggested that the essence of an American commitment in East Asia developed sometime between 1941 and 1945, while Professor Graebner is suggesting that it came a little later. I hope I am not exaggerating a difference which may be less clear-cut than I am suggesting. It seems to me, at least, that the basic foundations which continued after 1945, sustained by the very events to which Professor Graebner points—the outbreak of the war in Korea and the emergence of a sense of danger in Southeast Asia—do have their origins in World War II. Organizations are created during World War II that are going to deal with these problems. Individuals, high and low, from the soldier in the field to people like Dean Acheson, at the top of the policy-making hierarchy, derive their key experiences from the years of World War II. More importantly, emerging from World War II is a sense which I would argue is really the key to the whole thing: the notion of linkage between what is going on in Asia and what is going on in the rest of the world. Before 1941, I would argue, that was not true. As a consequence of this—the sense that it is a two-front war, but a single war—a certain mindset develops which leads to the view that the Communist threat in Europe is inexplicably tied to a Communist threat in Asia, whether or not that was actually the case. The facts are beside the point; the perception is what mattered.

I would conclude that the basic elements which sustained the commitment after the war really originated back before 1945.

Graebner: I rather disagree that there is much difference between our two viewpoints. After all, I was dealing with the period since 1945; I did not comment on the war years at all. If one talks about the growth of the commitment, one must think of a variety of commitments, some of which are strategic, some are broad, some are specific. I was concerned with the development of a specific perception of a global Communist threat which

would demand certain reactions in Asia. Commitment is a gradual process; there are many moments along the way that one makes crucial decisions about a certain part of the world. I quite agree that some of those were made during the war. My paper began at the end of the war, with America having a rather dominant strategic position. I began with the assumption that America wanted to maintain that position without going into the reasons. Obviously, the reasons developed during the war itself. All I am saying is that after 1945 there was a series of events that created certain reactions; I have tried to describe those continuing reactions to specific events which built up gradually to a growth of fear, and led eventually to certain strategic concepts.

I would also like to comment on an observation made by General Stilwell, that I seem to be advocating that I would have supported Ho from the very beginning, primarily in order to get on the winning side. Now, then, as a matter of fact, when you are an historian reading documents you catch the arguments of other people. It never occurred to me that I would ever have to answer the question as to where I would fit in that spectrum. Let me simply say I am in complete agreement with General Stilwell that the American State Department was badly divided after 1945 as to what its policy should be in Southeast Asia. The Far East Division of the State Department was completely in favor of the immediate acceptance of Ho Chi Minh, under the assumption that he was a genuine nationalist, that he was no threat to American or Southeast Asian security, and that he was going to win anyway. This argument maintained, in terms of our own principles of self-determination, that we ought to recognize him. I would simply say, General Stilwell, that if I would have taken that position—but I am not saying that I would have—I would have had a lot of company.

Now, the European side of the State Department took the view that the key problems facing the U.S. in 1946 and 1947 were in Europe. France was important. When France made the decision to regain its prewar position in Southeast Asia, it was embarrassing, because Americans did not want that. But nevertheless the French did it. The European section said, "In the interest of our European policies, we dare not involve ourselves in the colonial policies of France." And we did not. But that hardly means American leaders were satisfied with the French decision, because they realized in the long run the French were apt to lose, which could only damage the French prestige and power in Europe.

Question: Given the early and obvious mismanagement of the Vietnam war, why did we not see more high-ranking officers speak up as did General Singlaub in Korea a couple of years ago? Why did these officers put up with the unintelligent use of courage that General Stilwell alluded to earlier?

Stilwell: That is a very good question. The Joint Chiefs were seriously divided in the summer of 1965 on the whole issue of mobilization of the reserves; two of the chiefs were almost ready to turn in their suits at that particular time. It was determined that the collegium would serve the national interest better by staying together to see if they could not work the problem.

The terrible dilemma faced by the senior military man is that turning in his suit over an issue, where his recommendation has been overturned, is a non-recurring phenomenon: you can only do it once. The basic hope really is that working within the system you can bring reason to the policy-makers, to whom the military are collectively responsible.

Now incidentally, my good friend, General Singlaub, is *not* a good model to make your point. Jack Singlaub did not know he was speaking out. He was "mouse-trapped" by the press, and as a result of speaking out about Korea, he was not fired: he was transferred to a bigger job. The great service that he rendered was to elevate the whole question of a thoughtless, stupid, political-military decision made by the Carter administration to the national level in a way that "little guys" like myself in retirement could not possibly do.

The other thing is, of course, collectively the United States military did *not* understand in 1965 the nature of the struggle ahead of Vietnam. Some did, but for the most part, there was little understanding of the adversary: his aims, his sustaining power, and the level of pain he could sustain.

Question: What does Professor Graebner feel about the role of public opinion and the shapers of public opinion in the development of our objectives and our strategy in the Indochina era, both after World War II and into the 1960s?

Graebner: I would not deny that public opinion does play a role at certain moments in American history in the development of foreign policy. But I would take the view that one can easily overemphasize the role of public opinion. In preparing this paper I read this morning, I used the occasion to go through masses of documents that I had only glanced at before, and I would say that in preparing this paper I went through about 7,000 pages of documents. Many of those dealt with Southeast Asia and many dealt with China. But in all those 7,000 pages of documents there was not *one* reference to the public, not *one* reference to anything that anyone outside of government said about *anything*. In other words, let me simply assure you that the basic foreign policy of the United States is made on the inside.

You ask, what is the role of the public? I would simply say this: if those on the inside—intelligent people—using a great deal of care before they arrive at a decision, can arrive at a decision which satisfies most of

them, they probably have arrived at a decision that is easily salable to the American people. That is the process which makes policy and which brings in the necessary public support. I think this is born out overwhelmingly by the record.

Question: Why were the "insiders" unable to sell their policy in Vietnam to the American people?

Graebner: They certainly tried. Here was a case when an inside decision—which was a thoroughly inside decision—overlooked some realities that in the long run made that policy unsalable. When you build your policy on assumptions which are not quite provable one way or the other, your ability to sell is not based upon concrete evidence but upon people's willingness or unwillingness to accept your rationale. I think what caused the national division on Vietnam was the fact that much of the policy was based on assumptions about what would go wrong if certain policies did not succeed. But without any hard evidence, the American people chose to agree or disagree as they saw fit. Here we see one of those few incidents in American history where the government made an enormous effort to sell the policy.

Most of us assume the policy was not sold. But let us remember in a sense that it was. After all, until the very end, the majority of the American people—the silent majority—still upheld that war: a 55 percent majority held fairly strong right up to the end. This was the silent majority. It was not the people who command the networks or the major newspapers. That silent majority held firm in the Congress. Not until June and July of 1973 did Congress finally turn against the war and bring it to an abrupt end. So you see, even here, you can overestimate the inability of government to sell its policies. It sold them fairly well for eleven years, despite the opposition.

II

AMERICAN PACIFICATION AND OCCUPATION IN ASIA

THE PACIFICATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1898-1902

John M. Gates

On 1 May 1898, following the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, Commodore George Dewey won a decisive naval victory over the Spanish squadron in Manila Bay. Upon hearing of Dewey's success, President William McKinley dispatched an expeditionary force to the islands. By August the war with Spain had ended, and the American army in the Philippines was in control of Manila. At the end of the year, a treaty of peace had been concluded in which the Philippines were ceded by Spain to the United States.

A Filipino independence movement had been active in the islands since 1896, and within weeks of Dewey's victory the Philippine revolutionaries led by Emilio Aguinaldo had gained control over large portions of the archipelago. The desire of many Filipinos for independence and the determination of the United States to establish its sovereignty over the islands led to an armed clash on 4 February 1899 between Aguinaldo's revolutionary army and the American military force occupying Manila.

A bloody battle followed in which the Filipinos suffered tremendous casualties and were forced to withdraw. The Americans, hampered by a shortage of troops and the coming of the rainy season, could do little more than improve their defensive position around Manila and establish a foothold on several islands to the south. Malolos, the seat of Aguinaldo's revolutionary government, fell to the Americans in March, but major offensive operations could not begin until the end of the rainy season in November. Then, in a well coordinated attack across the central Luzon plain, American units dispersed the revolutionary army and barely missed capturing Aguinaldo.

Seeing no obstacles remaining to their occupation of the rest of the Philippines once further reinforcements arrived from the United States, the Americans wrongly concluded that the war was at an end. However, when they attempted to organize and administer the territory coming under their control, they soon realized that the Filipino revolutionaries, rather than having been defeated, had only changed strategy. A period of extremely difficult guerilla warfare followed in which the American

hope of using the good works of an enlightened colonial government to complete the process of pacification was shattered when revolutionary terror and propaganda persuaded potential collaborators to withhold their support. Although some Filipinos cast their lot with the invaders despite the dangers, most did not, and as the frustrations of the guerrilla war mounted, some Americans resorted to torture and brutal retaliatory measures in an unsuccessful attempt to bring a swift end to the conflict. The guerrillas were fighting hard to influence the forthcoming presidential election in the United States, and the Army could make little progress against them as long as the future of McKinley's Philippine policy remained in doubt.

President McKinley's reelection victory over the anti-imperialist Democrat William Jennings Bryan dealt a severe blow to the morale of the revolutionaries and provided a perfect opportunity for the implementation of a new approach to pacification. Although the Army would continue to use the carrot of a reform-oriented military government to persuade Filipinos to accept American rule, more emphasis would also be given to the stick. From December 1900 onward, revolutionaries upon capture could expect to face deportation, internment, imprisonment, or execution. Where necessary, the population would be concentrated around American garrisons to separate the guerrillas from the civilians aiding them. An increase in the number of American garrisons throughout the islands would improve the Army's ability to protect townspeople from guerrilla terror and intimidation, creating a climate in which Filipinos inclined to show support for the Americans could do so with greater confidence, and active patrolling by American units in the field would keep the guerrillas on the run. Swift action by military courts against the supporters, agents, and terrorists of the revolution would force Filipinos to choose between the Americans and their guerrilla opponents.

The success of the American pacification campaign was apparent almost immediately. Kept off balance, short of supplies, and in continuous flight by the American army, many guerrilla bands, suffering from sickness, hunger, and decreasing popular support, lost their will to fight. By the end of February 1901, as revolutionary morale sagged, a number of important leaders surrendered voluntarily, signalling that the tide had finally turned in favor of the Americans. In March a group of Filipino scouts commanded by Frederick Funston captured Aguinaldo by a wily stratagem—considered unsportsmanlike by the Army's anti-imperialist critics at home—which added momentum to the Filipino collapse and brigadier general's stars to Funston's shoulders. As in the past, however, American optimism was premature. Although a civilian commission headed by William Howard Taft took control of the colonial government from the military in July 1901, the Army's pacification operations continued. The massacre of forty-eight American soldiers on the island of Samar precipitated a harsh campaign there at the end of the year, and guerrillas

in Batangas were not brought to heel until much of that province's population had been reconcentrated and its hinterland scorched. Even after the Secretary of War declared an official end to the conflict in July 1902, Filipino guerrillas remained in the field.

The actions of guerrillas, bandits, and agrarian rebels in the years after 1902, however, never presented the colonial government with a challenge comparable to that of Aguinaldo. While units of the Army worked to bring the warlike Muslims of the southern Philippines under American control, the civil government's security force, the Philippine Constabulary, with occasional aid from the Army's Philippine Scouts and even less frequent help from its American units, maintained a fitful peace throughout the islands. The Army's campaign to secure the Philippine colony for the United States had succeeded.¹

The conflict described so briefly here is one of America's least known and least understood wars. Even the official name for the event, the Philippine Insurrection, has helped to obscure its true nature. The term "insurrection" implies a rising against constituted authority, but at the time the fighting began, American authority in the Philippines did not extend beyond the limits of the city of Manila. Spain had ceded the islands to the United States, but outside Manila, representatives of Aguinaldo's revolutionary government or local Filipino leaders were in control. There could be no Philippine insurrection against the United States for the simple reason that, with the exception of Manila, Filipinos, not Americans, were the constituted authorities. The U.S. Army, rather than engaging in the task of putting down an insurrection, was actually embarking on a war to overthrow the revolutionary government of Aguinaldo and replace it with an American colonial one. Although the reality of the situation has long been recognized by Philippine authors, only recently have Americans begun to refer to the conflict as the Filipino-American War or Philippine-American War, rejecting the older and clearly inaccurate classification of it as the Philippine Insurrection.

Often treated in most American history texts as an appendage of the Spanish-American War, although it was much longer and cost many more lives, the Philippine-American War seems to fall into the crack between the chapter focusing on the origins of American imperialism and the one introducing the Progressive period. By the time most textbooks reach the war with the Filipinos, they seem to have already said all they want to say about American expansion. At most, they usually devote no more than a few sentences to events in the Philippines, invariably stressing the brutal nature of the conflict there and making no connection at all between the development of progressivism in the United States and American activities in the islands.

The omission of the Philippine campaign from American history texts may be explained by the absence of definitive monographic studies of the war or by the long-standing antipathy demonstrated by some historians to things military. More difficult to explain is the small amount of space devoted to the Philippine campaign in the *American Military History* volume of the Army Historical Series. Almost every combat unit of the Army saw service in the Philippines at some time between 1898 and 1902, and almost all of the officer corps participated in the pacification campaign. The war against Muslim Filipinos provided important experience in command for the Army's leadership in World War I, and the successful approach to the problems of pacification developed in the Philippines provided a pattern for subsequent American interventions in the Caribbean.² In 647 pages of text, however, fewer than 3 pages in the *American Military History* volume are devoted to "The Philippine Insurrection," with the period of guerrilla warfare after 1899 covered by a scant 9 lines. The fighting in the Philippines receives no more space than "The Boxer Uprising" and less than that given to "The Monterrey Campaign" of Zachary Taylor in the Mexican War.³

The nearest thing to an official history, *The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States—A Compilation of Documents with Notes and Introduction*, written by Captain John R. M. Taylor immediately after the war, contains a two volume historical introduction and three volumes of captured Filipino documents. By 1906 Taylor's work had been set in galleys and was at the government printers awaiting the final authorization for publication from Taylor's sponsor, the Bureau of Insular Affairs. Publication was prevented by William Howard Taft, then Secretary of War, who feared that the history, filled with criticism of ex-revolutionaries working for the American colonial government and anti-imperialist Democrats such as Bryan, might have an adverse effect on the forthcoming congressional election. A second attempt to publish Taylor's work in 1908 was also stopped by Taft, who as President-elect was still concerned with its political consequences. Publication of Taylor's compilation did not come until 1971, financed by a Philippine foundation rather than the United States government which had first sponsored and then suppressed it.⁴

For more than a half century following the suppression of Taylor's compilation, American authors wrote relatively little on the Philippine campaign. The only military history, William Thaddeus Sexton's *Soldiers in the Sun*, was published in 1939, a most inauspicious year for a work dealing with guerrilla rather than conventional war.⁵ American involvement in Vietnam, however, prompted a new interest in this nation's earlier conflict in Southeast Asia, and for more than a decade now there has been a small but steady stream of theses, articles, and books dealing with the Philippines, the war, and its impact on the United States. Still, despite

such scholarly activity, the Philippine-American War remains a relatively unknown, though controversial, event.

In most commentaries the atrocities committed by American soldiers have been the focal point of sections dealing with the Army's pacification effort. During the war, anti-imperialists accused the Army of having embarked upon "a perfect orgy of looting and wanton destruction of property"⁶ and spoke of "the devastation of provinces, the shooting of captives, the torture of prisoners and of unarmed peaceful citizens."⁷ Long after the war, even highly abbreviated textbook accounts of the campaign invariably included a reference to the Army's "brutalities."⁸ Descriptions of the water cure, in which the victim is held down and forced to swallow suffocating quantities of water until the desired confession or information is forthcoming, or until the victim dies or becomes too weak for the torture to continue, can be amazingly vivid, and few authors have been able to resist the temptation to include at least a general description of the atrocity if they have the space. In articles with such titles as "Our My Lai of 1900" and "The First Vietnam," one finds a replay of earlier anti-imperialist criticism, with references to the Army's "policy of terror" or its "standard extermination policies."⁹ One author has even claimed that "in some applications" the Americans approach to pacification was "genocidal."¹⁰ Although such statements only serve to highlight the un-scholarly and polemical nature of much that has been written about the conflict, they have gained considerable acceptance. In fact, to the extent that the educated public has any view of the war at all, it is undoubtedly that of racist American soldiers marching off to "civilize 'em with a Krag," while singing "Damn, Damn, Damn the Filipinos."¹¹

Atrocious acts of war, for all their widespread publicity, were neither the major nor the most important feature of the Army's approach to pacification, as the leaders of the Philippine guerrillas recognized at the time. Fearing that the "policy of attraction," i.e. the good works of the military government, would succeed in winning Filipino acceptance of American rule, many guerrilla leaders ordered acts of terrorism against their own people in an attempt to counter it. Terror, however, did not prevent all Filipinos from collaborating with the Americans when the Army created a positive image of the benefits of colonial rule by the reforms implemented in occupied towns. That reform orientation, and not brutality, was the most significant element in the American approach to pacification.¹²

Literally from the moment they occupied Manila, American officers had begun efforts to reform the city's government and improve the lives of the people in their charge, initiating their work at a time when they assumed that the United States would not be retaining the islands. Later, as tension between the Americans and the Filipino revolutionaries mounted, General E.S. Otis, the commander of the expeditionary force, hoped that the

many reforms implemented by his military government would obtain Filipino acceptance of American rule by demonstrating the sincerity of McKinley's pronouncements stressing America's benevolent intentions in the islands. After hostilities began, Otis continued in his belief that enlightened government was a more important tool of pacification than forceful military operations. Even when condemned by some of his own men for being too cautious, Otis persisted in a policy of pacification emphasizing good works instead of more draconian measures, leading one correspondent to remark that the Americans were "humane to the point of military weakness."¹³

Many officers shared the General's views, and as units of the Army occupied territory outside of Manila, commanders organized public schools, municipal governments, public health measures, and many other projects with a reform orientation. General Arthur MacArthur, who succeeded Otis in May 1900, continued the commitment to a pacification policy relying upon the good works of the military government to bring an end to the war by convincing Filipinos that an American colonial government would have a sincere interest in their welfare and could be trusted. MacArthur consistently rejected the recommendations of those subordinates who urged him to adopt a highly repressive policy, even after he concluded that some harsher measures would be needed to break the link between the guerrillas and their noncombatant supporters. During the most frustrating period of the guerrilla war and at times when some Americans were engaging in deplorable acts of brutality, others continued the reform-oriented work of the military government.¹⁴

Many accounts of the Philippine campaign have erred in giving the civil government of William Howard Taft credit for winning Filipino acceptance of American rule.¹⁵ In reality, although MacArthur relinquished control over the insular government to Taft in July 1901, the policies followed by the Taft government after that date were in most cases little more than a continuation of efforts initiated by the Army in the previous two and a half years. The work of the civil authorities did help bring about conciliation between Americans and Filipinos, and the lure of civil government was a powerful incentive to Filipinos who wanted to be free of the restrictions of martial rule. Stories of Taft saving his "little brown brothers" from the harshness of military rule are mythical, however. In fact, Taft advocated a more repressive policy of pacification than that conceived by MacArthur. Taft, not the military, pushed for the deportation of captured revolutionary leaders to Guam, and Taft, not MacArthur, wanted Filipinos refusing to lay down their arms to be "treated as outlaws and subject to the severest penalties."¹⁶ Taft even criticized MacArthur for being "much too merciful in commuting death sentences" of convicted terrorists,¹⁷ and in his private correspondence Taft showed little respect or liking for the Philippine people.¹⁸ To the extent that Filipinos were won over to the American side by the work of enlightened or shrewd

colonial government, in the period before 1902 the officers of the U.S. Army deserve far more credit for the accomplishment than William Howard Taft.

Although the author of a recent study of American *Social Engineering in the Philippines* has stated emphatically that "there was little relationship between the progressive movement (or, more correctly, movements) in the United States and the policies introduced in the Philippines,"¹⁹ the work of the military government would seem to offer numerous examples of the "majoritarian and humanitarian reforms" that he saw as the essence of American progressivism. The basic assumption underlying the military government's emphasis on education, for example, was that Filipinos must be prepared to participate in the democratic political structure that officers assumed would be established in the islands. Furthermore, the reform orientation of the Army's officers came far too early to represent either an insincere or pragmatic response to the demands of pacification or colonial government. The urge to engage in progressive reform was something that the officers had brought with them from home, and it was also evident among officers at work in the military governments of Cuba and Puerto Rico. Reforms implemented in all three places often mirrored those of civilians calling themselves progressive at work in many American states and cities.²⁰

If one accepts the view of Samuel P. Huntington and others who claim that the Army's officers had spent the late nineteenth century in physical, social, and intellectual isolation from the civilian society they served, then the progressive actions of officers overseas in 1898 are difficult to explain. In fact the isolation of the officer corps has been greatly exaggerated. Many officers spent much of their career before the Spanish-American War on the eastern seaboard or in western cities that were often much larger and more cosmopolitan than provincial easterners might suppose. There and at their frontier posts the officers interacted socially with numerous civilians, including many people with considerable status and power. Rather than being isolated, officers in the last half of the nineteenth century were well integrated into the nation's elite, carrying with them abroad ideas that were increasingly evident among civilian leaders at home. Officers were progressives in uniform, something demonstrated time and time again by their commitment to numerous reforms similar to those implemented at the same time or later in the United States, and their progressive inclinations were frequently apparent in the Army's campaign against the Philippine revolutionaries.²¹

That the Army's pacification efforts succeeded seems beyond doubt, although there remains considerable debate over the reasons for success. As the war progressed, Filipinos in all parts of the islands changed their mind and their allegiance, until finally, as one historian has observed, "virtually every member of the resistance cooperated with the

Americans."²² Unfortunately, the Filipino side of the process that eventually led to such widespread collaboration is not yet fully understood, although it seems clear that the Filipino response varied considerably depending on time, place, and circumstance.

Many of the conservative Filipino elite, fearing that an independent government might be dominated by military opportunists or radical representatives of the masses, supported the Americans, in some cases initiating their collaboration even before the outbreak of hostilities. Stability and order seemed more important to them than independence. Other Filipinos, believing that successful resistance was impossible, resigned themselves unenthusiastically to an American victory. In places, members of the elite attempted to maintain a posture of watchful neutrality, choosing sides only when the threat of revolutionary terror or, particularly after December 1900, that of American retaliation forced them to commit themselves. Elsewhere, the desire for independence and the sense of Philippine nationalism was so strong that elite leaders continued to fight against the Americans long after most Filipinos had accepted defeat. In general, however, members of the elite recognized that the gulf between them and their less educated, impoverished countrymen was much more difficult to bridge than that between them and their American conquerors. One by one they concluded that acceptance of an American colonial government would do more to help them retain or enhance their power and position within Philippine society than the continuation of a resistance that seemed increasingly futile.²³ For dedicated revolutionaries the task of collaboration was made easier by the extremely high correlation between the reforms implemented by the Americans and those demanded of Spain by the intellectual spokesmen of the revolution. Only the Filipino desire for complete independence and the immediate expropriation of the estates of the Spanish friars had been ignored.²⁴

There was an undeniable element of opportunism in the positive response of many Filipinos to the Army's campaign. People who had sought political power or increased status in the struggle for independence and the development of Philippine nationalism found that such goals could also be achieved by cooperating with the American colonial government. Filipinos who had joined the revolution for economic reasons soon saw that collaboration with the Americans could also bring material benefits or upward mobility. As the Army's military success and the pressure of the pacification campaign increased, so did the number of opportunistic Filipinos willing to cast their lot with the Americans. Other Filipinos undoubtedly abandoned the revolution because they had grown weary of war or feared the consequences of further resistance.

The considerable friction apparent within the ranks of the revolution proved to be an important ally of the Army in its campaign of pacifica-

tion. The fragmentation within the revolution began as early as 1897, when Aguinaldo seized control of the movement from its founder, Andres Bonifacio, whose death at the hands of Aguinaldo's supporters created the first serious division among the revolutionaries. The death of General Antonio Luna under similar circumstances in 1899 added to the tensions, as did ethnic and socio-economic divisions within Philippine society. The arbitrary rule of Filipino military commanders in areas under their control demonstrated that a Philippine republic under Aguinaldo and his lieutenants, many of whom were from the Tagalog speaking region of Luzon, might prove no more democratic than an American colonial government. Peasants or other Filipinos expecting a social revolution were alienated by the tendency of Aguinaldo's government to support local elites, many of whom had joined the revolution only after its success over the Spaniards had been assured.²⁵

Although many tensions within the revolution were heightened by the American presence, one important division in Philippine society was masked by it, that between liberal revolutionaries seeking to enhance their political and economic power in a modernizing Philippine state and peasants longing for the stability and continuity of traditional village life. While many leaders of the revolution and their elite supporters saw themselves engaged in a forward-looking movement having as its goals such "modern" objectives as economic development, increased world commerce, and the creation of a unified Philippine state, the peasant guerrillas who followed them often sought a far different world, one rooted in a seemingly Utopian but probably mythical past where life was less complex and free from tensions and insecurities of an expanding commercial agriculture and money economy. At times the goals of the peasant, whether social revolutionary or reactionary, had little in common with the revolution of the elite, the western educated intellectual, or the opportunist.²⁶

As the pressures of the modern world and expanding metropolis intruded on their lives, peasants fought back, not only enlisting in the revolution against Spain and then the Americans, but also participating in highly spiritual millennial movements or engaging in social banditry, common forms of resistance where peasants under stress are finally pushed to action. In the Philippines they began long before the revolt against Spain and continued long after the revolutionary leaders of 1896 and 1898 had joined with the Americans in the administration of the colonial government. During the Philippine-American War, the clash between traditional and modernizing tendencies, as well as that between elite and mass, formed strong undercurrents that were little understood but of great significance. The Americans, with their stress on progressive reform and their tendency to support the interests of the Filipino elite in its clash with the more traditional or radical peasantry, represented a haven from the vagaries of revolutionary fortune for many Filipinos.

From the vantage point of the present, the temptation to stress the similarities between the Philippine-American War and that in Vietnam is great, and a number of authors have been unable to resist it. The existence of a vocal opposition to the war in the United States, the considerable publicity given to war crimes and atrocities, the evidence of American racism in the face of an Asian enemy, and many other parallels make the comparison a relatively easy one. This has led some people to make incredible claims on behalf of what may be termed, for want of a better name, the Philippine analogy. "Rarely do historical events resemble each other as closely," asserted one author, while another found "the similarities between the two wars...eerily striking."²⁷ Not only have all such works been guilty of exaggerating the parallels between the two conflicts, but in their attempts to show that "My Lai was not the first time," to quote from one article's title, they have also continued to distort the nature of the Army's pacification campaign by focusing only on its darker side.²⁸

The significant differences between the two wars should make one wary of such comparisons. The Philippine revolutionaries had neither a place of sanctuary, free from American attack, nor material aid from the outside. Equally important, the Philippine-American War was not fought in the shadow of nuclear arms nor in the context of an ideologically and emotionally charged cold war, in which a small conflict might well escalate into a much larger and far more devastating one. Whereas in Indochina the necessity of cooperating with indigenous governments and other allies placed constraints on American actions, American leaders in the Philippines had considerable freedom. At home, the anti-imperialists never succeeded in creating a challenge to the nation's leadership or policies comparable to that produced by the opponents of the Indochina War. Most important of all, perhaps, are the technological differences apparent in the two wars. The operations of seventy thousand American troops armed with rifles and matches in an area inhabited by seven million people are just not comparable to those of nearly a million American, Vietnamese, and allied troops, with a fantastic array of modern weapons such as helicopter gunships, napalm, and cluster bomb units, in a nation of eighteen million.

The claim that "My Lai was not the first time" is obviously correct, but the implication that that is the most significant thing to be learned from a comparison of American conduct in the Philippines and Vietnam is not. One does not need to study the Philippine-American War to find that many Americans have long been and still are racist, or imperialist, or both. One need not study the war to learn that the clean-cut American boy next door may be capable of committing the most atrocious acts if placed in the right environment, or that American leaders, both civilian and military, will do all they can to defend themselves when war crimes are alleged, or that war, even among civilized peoples, is sometimes unbelievably bar-

baric. Although the Philippine-American War provides superb examples of all these things, focusing on them and stressing the similarities between that war and the one in Vietnam has done much to obscure the nature of both conflicts.

In a reaction to the exaggerations and distortions of the Philippine analogy, Professor Richard E. Welch, Jr., has made a persuasive argument that Americans should stop looking at the Philippine-American War for what it may reveal about subsequent historical events and begin, instead, to see what it may tell us about the United States at the time. Following such a line of inquiry himself, Welch saw in the response to the war "a mirror for the social beliefs and political divisions of turn of the century America."²⁹ In that mirror he found patriotic pride, optimism, and confidence as well as racial prejudice, confusion, and uncertainty about the nation's future.

Although the results in terms of Welch's own scholarship have been excellent, the rejection of any attempt to learn from a comparison of the American war in the Philippines with that in Vietnam seems unwise. The possibility still exists that an analysis of the tremendous contrast between the two events may provide important insights for anyone interested in the way war has changed over time.

In the Philippines in 1899, war, as it was then fought, could be a useful tool for accomplishing the goals of national policy, although in retrospect one may regret the imperial policy being pursued. Nevertheless, good or bad, the policy could be furthered by military means, providing, of course, that one's military leaders went about their assigned task in an enlightened way. That was exactly what happened at the turn of the century, and the results were decisive. The Philippine revolution was crushed; the American hold over the islands was secured; and the vocal anti-imperialist minority in the United States was overwhelmed, all without the level of destruction and death evident in the Indochina conflict.³⁰

In the years between the end of the war in the Philippines and the involvement of American ground forces in Vietnam, war changed significantly, and one of the most obvious changes was in the destructive capability of weapons. Unfortunately, the ability of military forces to use their new weapons decisively did not keep pace with the growth in destructiveness. In Indochina, despite the employment of highly technological weapons systems that were beyond the imagination of the old Army's soldiers, Americans failed to achieve their goals. The modern fire and air power used there caused the death and mutilation of thousands of noncombatants and led to serious alterations in the region's ecological balance, but it did not bring success. By concentrating on certain shameful constants of American life—such things as racism, arrogance, or imperialism—authors comparing the Philippines and Vietnam failed to see how much of what

they deplored in Indochina was rooted in changes in the art of war itself and not in the nature of the American society. They overlooked the fact that, in the reality of the war zone, a squad of arrogant, racist, imperialists with Krag-Jorgensen rifles has less destructive potential than the pilot of a fully laden jet fighter-bomber, even if the latter is a humble, egalitarian liberator. To ignore such technological distinctions, however, is to overlook one of the most significant differences between the two conflicts, one that provides further evidence for an extremely important insight into the nature of modern war.

In *Arms and Men*, Walter Millis spoke of the hypertrophy of war, noting that where "Polk or McKinley could use war as an instrument of politics or policy," by the time of World War II, war had become "a naked instrument of defense, of defense alone and of defense only in an extremity of crisis." With the development of nuclear weapons, said Millis, "its utility even to this end was questionable."³¹ Since the publication of *Arms and Men* in 1956 there have been many wars, but few with truly decisive outcomes.

In a more recent look at American military history from the other side of the Vietnam watershed, Russell Weigley reached a conclusion similar to that of Millis. After noting that "at no point on the spectrum of violence does the use of combat offer much promise for the United States today," Weigley ended *The American Way of War* with the observation that "the history of usable combat may at last be reaching its end."³²

Although the conclusions of both men have yet to gain widespread acceptance, a comparison of the American military effort in the Philippines with that in Vietnam seems to support such a view. For more than two decades many strategists have recognized that nuclear war is not a valid policy option. At present, however, the destructive power of so-called conventional weapons is so great that other forms of war have become almost as disastrous, raising the question of how a nation as powerful as the United States can use the highly destructive weapons its technology provides in support of its national policy. Well before he released the Pentagon Papers to the *New York Times*, Daniel Ellsberg observed that a national leader would be engaging in "an act of treachery against his society" if he called for American aid in a conflict that he knew would be long and would entail a large American military commitment.³³ In Vietnam Ellsberg had seen clear evidence of what an American commitment meant in terms of destruction and waste of human life and resources. It was far removed from the village burning and isolated war crimes of the Philippine-American War.

Even a brief look at the Philippine-American War from the perspective of the present demonstrates that the emphasis in the twentieth century on fire power and the reliance on the gadgetry that modern technology can

produce has changed war significantly. The change has been so extensive that great powers seem no longer able to engage in such conflicts using the most sophisticated weapons available to them without destroying the very people they are seeking to aid. Unfortunately, that lesson of American military involvement in Asia is one that some world leaders may never learn.

THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN, 1945-1952

Ikuhiko Hata

In the last year, two books have appeared in Japan which are particularly relevant to a study of the American occupation of Japan. One of these is by Etō Jun, the other by Shimizu Ikutaro.¹ Etō, angered that the Japanese have completely forgotten the humiliation of the occupation, maintains that the Americans completely ignored the Hague Convention on Land Warfare and forced a spiritual revolution—under the name of reform—upon the people of an occupied nation. Shimizu, who was once a leader of anti-American progressive intellectuals, has now turned into a right-wing hawk. He argues that the Japanese, who have a foreign-made constitution, including the restrictions on armaments outlined in Article Nine of that constitution, have no right to be called a nation, and that Japan is merely a community. He appeals for the Japanese to recover their existence as a nation by nuclear armament.

For many Japanese intellectuals, an article of faith since World War II has been the belief that “postwar democracy is our fundamental and supreme principle which should be protected,” as the greatest intellectual theorist of the postwar era, Maruyama Masao, stated. In this case, “postwar democracy” means the best part of American democracy with the qualification that it does not include the “dirty America” after the “era of reverse courses.”*

Both Etō and Shimizu were most distraught because it was no doubt true that the occupation of Japan by the United States, which lasted six and one-half years from 1945 to 1952, satisfied the majority of Japanese. It was a “generous occupation” from the Japanese point of view and a “successful occupation” from the American.

When Japan surrendered in 1945, some radical young Army and Navy officers tried to stage a *coup d'état* and to demand forcefully an “imperial decision” from the Emperor to continue the war. After the coup failed, they organized several underground organizations which watched the behavior of the occupying forces. Their plan was to resist

*Ed. note: Era of “reverse courses” is discussed in the third section of this paper.

through a guerrilla war, with a young royal prince at their head, once the emperor system was abolished or harsh occupation policies were implemented. They abandoned this project within a year; the underground organization was dissolved. It was the American method of occupation under General MacArthur and his subordinates in the Far Eastern American Army which led to the melting away of feelings of revenge in the most tough and narrow-minded militarists. Friction sometimes occurred in later years, but fraternity, as the basic tone of U.S.-Japanese relations, has never been shaken. However, the return of nationalism due to Japan's attainment of the status of an economic super-power has awakened some suspicions concerning the "legacy of occupation," as represented in the arguments of Etō and Shimizu.

It is difficult to predict what influence this tendency will have in relations between Japan and the United States in the future. Before venturing into prediction, however, this paper looks back on the development of the occupation era, which has become an important historical context for the present age.²

Initial Phase of the Occupation

There is no evidence that Japanese officials gave any thought during World War II to contingency planning for the postwar period, particularly with regard to Japan's position vis-à-vis the Allied powers. In striking contrast, the planning carried out by the Allies, particularly the United States, was meticulous. Japan specialists in the U.S. State Department began research on postwar policies toward Japan and East Asia as early as August 1942, scarcely nine months after the attack on Pearl Harbor.³ This beginning coincided roughly with a U.S. counterattack on the Solomon Islands, about one year earlier than the Japanese had anticipated. In 1942, U.S. Army and Navy Japanese-language schools were also established, designed to train intelligence and military government officers.

The basic Allied policy line for the postwar period was first made public in the Cairo Declaration of 1 December 1943, according to which Japan had to renounce all colonies, grant independence to Korea, and surrender unconditionally. Once defeat of the Axis powers seemed certain, in 1944, concrete measures were drafted in preparation for the occupation of Japan and Germany. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) was set up as a central policy planning agency in December of that year, with its initial efforts concentrated on policy for Germany. In April and May 1945, however, a group of Japan specialists drafted a comprehensive occupation policy for Japan, which formed the basis of the final plan approved by President Harry Truman at the end of the war.

A central figure in the formulation of occupation policy toward Germany at this time was Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau.⁴ He

advocated a severe policy of direct Allied rule under which German industrial capacity would be dismantled. Morgenthau insisted upon a similarly stern policy toward Japan, and was supported both by a group of State Department officials known as the "China crowd" and a number of liberals associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations. The views of President Franklin Roosevelt were influenced by this kind of thinking. However, the sudden death of Roosevelt in April 1945 came as a setback for advocates of a strict occupation policy, and it temporarily enhanced the voice of the "Japan crowd," led by Undersecretary of State Joseph C. Grew, former ambassador to Japan, and Councillor Eugene H. Dooman. These men felt that "the democratization of Japan should be promoted, but the purge and dissolution of moderate, responsible forces must be minimized in order that Japan become a staunch ally of America."

An early draft of the Potsdam Declaration, which was based on recommendations from Grew and Stimson, specifically referred to retention of the emperor system in postwar Japan. This reference was eliminated from the final version announced on 26 July 1945, however, as a result of an "in-house" compromise with the hard-liners. In Japan, as well, this deletion became a subject of heated contention in the Imperial Conference, where the terms of surrender were discussed. Acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration was finally possible only after an "imperial decision" overrode efforts of the military to secure inclusion of specific guarantees that the emperor system not be abolished. Once that obstacle had been cleared, Japan accepted the terms of the declaration unconditionally.

A final decision on the Emperor's status was withheld at the time the "Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to SCAP for the Occupation and Control of Japan" (JCS 1380/15) was issued in November 1945.* This directive instructed the supreme commander "not to remove the Emperor or take any steps toward his removal without prior consultation with and advice issued you through the J.C.S." The question was finally resolved during the first phase of the occupation when the United States, recognizing the depth of national feeling surrounding the imperial institution, incorporated it in the new Japanese constitution.

The fundamental principles of occupation policy for the demilitarization and democratization of Japan were dispatched by President Truman on 6 September 1945 in the "U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy Toward Japan" (SWNCC 150/44). The wording of this document, however, was vague and open to interpretation. Therefore MacArthur and the civil administrators of SCAP retained considerable freedom in the formulation and execution of precise policy measures. Two additional bodies were es-

*Ed. note: SCAP, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, refers to MacArthur and his staff.

tablished to coordinate Allied policies: the Far Eastern Commission (F.E.C.), set up in Washington in late 1945, consisting of representatives of eleven United Nations countries and theoretically the highest policy-making organ for the Allied Occupation; and the Allied Council for Japan, set up in Tokyo in the spring of 1946 to perform an advisory function, including representatives of the U.S., the Soviet Union, China, and the British Commonwealth. Since neither of these bodies was active until early 1946 their influence was limited. As a SCAP announcement confirmed, by the time these bodies began operations, the basic orders for the democratization of Japan had been outlined.

In fact, the F.E.C. was never in a position to play more than an indirect role, at best. In the first place, intervention in occupation policy could take place only through the executive channels of the American government and SCAP. The U.S. government, furthermore, was in a position to make *ad hoc* policy by issuing "interim directives" and therefore did not need to depend upon the authority of the F.E.C. The Allied Council for Japan had only an advisory role from the beginning, and its authority was further diminished by MacArthur's tendency to ignore it. Power therefore remained largely in the hands of MacArthur himself, proud senior general of the American military establishment. John Gunther likened him to Caesar, with good reason.

The SCAP staff was composed of persons from a wide diversity of backgrounds. One group, referred to as the "Bataan Boys," consisted of close associates of MacArthur who had served on his staff since the start of the war. Others were career officers who had fought in the Pacific theater. SCAP also included technical experts, academicians, government officials, "old [prewar] Japan hands," and a number of second-generation Japanese-Americans.

Prominent "Bataan Boys" were Courtney Whitney, a lawyer from Manila who served as chief of the Government Section; William F. Marquat, once a journalist, who headed the Economic and Scientific Section; and Charles A. Willoughby, chief of the Intelligence Section. Career officers included Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger, commander of the Eighth Army, and Chief of Staff Richard Sutherland, both of whom had served in the field during the Pacific campaign. Civilians in SCAP included Hubert G. Schenck, chief of the National Resources Section, who came to SCAP from a position as professor of geology at Stanford University; Crawford F. Sams, chief of the Public Health and Welfare Section, who had been a noted neurologist in St. Louis; and Ken R. Dyke, chief of the Civil Information and Education Section, who came from the advertising industry. Governmental officials included such persons as William J. Sebald, chief of the Diplomatic Section. A foreign service officer married to a woman of mixed Japanese and British parentage, Sebald had practiced law in Japan before the war.

Those personnel of the middle echelon who were called liberal or radical "New Dealers," headed by Charles Kades, included Edward C. Welsh, chief of the Antitrust and Cartels Division; James S. Killen and Theodore Cohen, each of whom served for a time as head of the Labor Division; Sherwood M. Fine, advisor to the Economic and Scientific Section; and Harry F. Alber, chief of the Price and Rationing Division. All of these men had experience in executing reforms in the U.S. under the Roosevelt administration and had proved themselves able administrators.

It was perhaps inevitable in a bureaucracy large enough to include SCAP and all local military authorities, that some officials would be less than well qualified. Others took advantage of Japanese pliancy and receptivity to wield the powers of their office oppressively. Nevertheless, the vast majority of the Japanese people believed that the occupational reforms were beneficial. The leaders of the occupation administration must be given the credit for this success. The SCAP bureaucracy has occasionally been dismissed as a group of second-rate malcontents who could not succeed in their own country; that view is not correct. Occupation officials on the whole, including members of the special missions which frequently visited Japan, displayed a level of ability and confidence superior to that of the people they governed.

Years of Reform and Starvation

The occupation cannot be understood apart from the personality of the supreme commander, General Douglas MacArthur. John Gunther portrays MacArthur as a colorful personality who, on the one hand, was a "man of providence," an "idealist," and a "reformer." He was "hard working," a man who "exercised formidable power with moderation," yet on the other hand, was "narcissistic," "theatrical," "histrionic," "a man of nineteenth-century virtues," and "one who dictatorially imposed democracy on Japan."⁶ Gunther was obviously at a loss to sum up the various facets of this complex personality. From the standpoint of the Japanese, who were the governed, MacArthur's rule was a form of "benevolent despotism." It follows that everything American, and the entire corpus of postwar democracy passed down to the Japanese through the hands of MacArthur, may have been only an illusion.

The general outline of early occupation policy was established by directives from Washington, while concrete implementation was largely entrusted to the judgement of MacArthur and SCAP. During his flight into Japan, MacArthur discussed with Major General Whitney the main objectives of the early stages of the occupation. He listed them under eleven headings: (1) destruction of military power; (2) establishment of representative government; (3) granting women suffrage; (4) release of political prisoners; (5) liberation of farmers; (6) freedom for the labor movement; (7) encouragement of a free economy; (8) abolition of police oppression;

(9) development of a free press; (10) liberalization of education; and (11) decentralization of political power. These objectives were all elaborated in SCAP's policy directives issued shortly after MacArthur's arrival in Japan. On 11 October 1945 MacArthur instructed newly appointed Prime Minister Shidehara to proceed with five major reforms: granting women suffrage; encouragement of labor unions; liberalization of education; abolition of oppressive institutions; and democratization of the economy.⁷

During the half-year between MacArthur's landing at Atsugi Air Base and February 1946, SCAP ordered numerous democratic reforms, including the arrest of war criminals (September 1945), granting freedom of speech (September), release of political prisoners (October), dissolution of the *zaibatsu* (November), land reform (December), revision of the election law to grant suffrage to women (December), guarantees of freedom in religion and education (December), and the purge of public officials (January 1946). The reforms came to a climax with the issuance of MacArthur's draft of the new constitution in February 1946.

The Japanese government, not anticipating that SCAP's policy of "demilitarization and democratization" would be instituted so thoroughly and quickly, tried to ride through the period with only lukewarm reforms. This behavior can be attributed to two factors. On the Japanese side, old-line government leaders misjudged the climate within SCAP and in Washington by overestimating the influence on decision-making of Grew and the "Japan crowd." SCAP officials, for their part, wished to rule only indirectly and therefore sought some signs of reformist zeal on the part of Japanese leaders. It soon became evident to those in SCAP, however, that the scale and extent of the reforms it considered necessary were beyond the range of vision of the Japanese government and the old, established class. Attempts to enact land reform, to dissolve the *zaibatsu*, and to draft a new constitution brought these limitations clearly to light. While the Japanese side did not deliberately seek to resist or sabotage SCAP directives, their slowness and cursory responses were sufficient to raise doubts within SCAP about their enthusiasm for reform.

The reforms came to a climax in February 1946 with the issuance of the new Japanese constitution. On 3 February, General MacArthur summoned Courtney Whitney, Chief of the Government Section, and ordered him to develop a draft constitution which would include the following: retention of the emperor system, renunciation of war, and abolition of the peerage.⁸ Charles Kades and twenty-five members of the staff of the Government Section completed a draft to these specifications after a week's nonstop labor. It was proclaimed to the Japanese Government on 13 February. The drafting of a constitution in such a short interval is a record which remains unequaled.

Whitney explained that the document was based on American political concepts, utilizing elements of the Meiji Constitution and the Weimar and other European constitutions as well. In fact, however, it has been pointed out that several articles were borrowed almost literally from the United States Constitution, the American Declaration of Independence, the Gettysburg Address, and the Atlantic Charter.⁹ Nevertheless, the constitution was liberal and progressive, and a first-class performance for that era. For that reason the majority of the present Japanese population is satisfied with this constitution, although even the drafters of the constitution anticipated it would be replaced by the Japanese as soon as the occupation ended.

MacArthur stated that the two main features of the new constitution were "the system of the Emperor as symbol and Article Nine which regulated the abandonment of war." Even today, Article Nine remains a feature peculiar to the Japanese Constitution, not to be found in any other country, with the perhaps notable exception of Costa Rica. It is interesting to note, however, that it was not perceived to be a curiosity in the atmosphere of that time. There were rosy expectations concerning the role of the United Nations as the world police force, while the security of Japan was guaranteed, for a time, by the U.S. occupation forces. Furthermore, the drafters at SCAP expected that Article Nine would be abolished by the Japanese as a matter of course, once the occupation had come to an end.

When the United States later came to regret the inclusion of Article Nine in the Japanese Constitution, MacArthur wrote in his *Reminiscences* that the idea had been proposed by Prime Minister Shidehara. Historical opinion remains divided as to whether Shidehara or MacArthur himself was the originator. It is most likely that both the retention of the emperor system and the inclusion of Article Nine were the result of an exchange or a bargain made in meetings between the General and Shidehara. In any event, when Article Nine became a *fait accompli*, MacArthur became its ardent supporter.

It was MacArthur who, for two years, kept rejecting a limited reararmament for Japan as requested by Washington after 1948 during the intensification of the Cold War. It might be said that the original proponent of "unarmed neutrality," which remains popular and influential even today, was General MacArthur.

The fact that the general public in Japan, which had long endured a militaristic rule, looked upon the occupation force as a "liberation army," prevented nationalistic reaction to the barrage of SCAP directives. Hence, democratic reforms were enthusiastically instituted and enthusiastically received. The Japanese economy, however, because of the war, reached a nadir. Inflation was rampant and food shortages were so common that prophecies circulated of ten million people dying of starvation in the

winter of 1945-1946. Meanwhile, labor union struggles over the right to livelihood intensified. A people "liberated" spiritually was tottering on the edge of starvation. The economy was further weakened by the heavy burden of wartime reparations. Japan's external assets had been promptly confiscated and the initial policy toward domestic economic recovery, as set forth in November 1946 in the final Pauley Report, limited Japan's productive capacity to 1930 levels. The harsh recommendations of this report, furthermore, provided for the transfer of most of the factories surviving the wartime devastation to countries such as China and the Philippines. The second Strike mission, under Clifford S. Strike, which visited Japan in the summer of 1947, eased Japan's reparations burdens. It recommended that production standards be raised to the 1935 level, allowing Japan's economy to recover and become self-reliant.

Reparations provisions were subsequently modified again in accordance with changes in American policy toward Japan; indeed, except for interim deliveries to the Philippines and elsewhere, reparations were finally discontinued altogether. There was little indication that the assets already transferred were being put to use by the recipient countries. One illustration of this fact is given by George F. Kennan, who, upon visiting Shanghai in the spring of 1948, noted that various kinds of machines, still unpacked, were piled up on the wharves and were corroding with rust. For Japanese industry, on the other hand, the fact that worn and dated machinery was removed from their factories meant, ironically, that economic recovery required its replacement by the most modern equipment, paving the way for later rapid growth.

Given the needs of the Japanese economy in the immediate postwar years, one finds fanciful the ideas of Pauley and Strike. Hampered by mounting inflation, industrial recovery was slow. As late as 1948 industrial production was still limping along at about 30 percent of the prewar level. Both the first Yoshida cabinet and the Katayama cabinet attempted to break this vicious circle of inflation and low production by promoting a "Priority Production Program" whereby important industries such as coal production (with a target of thirty million tons) and iron production were fostered. Under this policy food was specially rationed to mine workers and large sums of capital were invested in both industries by the Reconstruction Finance Bank (R.F.B.). Unfortunately, however, this also stimulated the "R.F.B. inflation."

A widespread debate broke out over whether priority should be given to rapid industrial recovery or to economic stabilization through control of inflation. Views also differed as to whether stabilization could be achieved in one sweep through the implementation of drastic measures or whether a more moderate policy, aimed at gradual stabilization, would be necessary. For all the debate, the Japanese government was in no position to take any decisive action. The control of inflation and the recovery of

the economy depended on external factors and could come only with a change in American policy toward Japan.

The Cold War and the "Reverse Course"

Change in American occupation policy in 1948 came as a by-product of the Soviet-American Cold War confrontation which had begun to unfold the previous year. Conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union over the form and control of the occupation began with Japan's surrender, but strong American opposition blocked a Soviet attempt to partition Hokkaido. In sum, at least as far as the occupation of Japan was concerned, Soviet intervention was successfully prevented. In Europe, on the other hand, the circumstances were quite different. Germany had been divided into four zones, with the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France each occupying one of the zones. The struggle over occupation policy that ensued between the United States and the Soviet Union matured into the Cold War by way of the Greek civil war of 1946-1947 and the Berlin blockade of April 1948.

The United States, with its monopoly of the atomic bomb, had expected to enjoy supremacy in a postwar Pax Americana which would encompass even the Soviet Union. Forced to revise this optimistic outlook, the Truman administration adopted a new strategy, the containment policy, as set forth in the Truman Doctrine of March 1947. The United States, in the face of the Communist threat, began by the end of that year to extend military aid to Greece and to Turkey and inaugurated the Marshall Plan to provide large scale aid to the war-ravaged economies of western Europe. According to this plan, Europe's economic recovery was to be based on the resuscitation of Germany's industrial capacity. Toward this end the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in July 1947, issued to General Lucius Clay, commander of the American occupation force in Germany, a new directive (J.C.S. 1779) that fundamentally revised existing occupation policy toward Germany.

The de-Nazification policy of the U.S. occupation force during the early stages of the German occupation was implemented through direct military rule, which was much stricter and more thorough-going than was the occupation of Japan. As the influence of the New Deal officials began to wane in early 1946, however, decartelization policies were relaxed and emphasis was placed on promoting a self-reliant German economy. It is apparent, therefore, that American occupation policies toward Germany and Japan evolved in similar directions, with the change in Germany preceding that in Japan by more than a year.

In light of the global confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, it was natural that the U.S. should eventually reevaluate Japan's significance and consider Japan as a pro-Western bulwark against

Communism in Asia. In late February 1948, George Kennan consulted with MacArthur in Japan. In the wake of these talks Kennan presented a report to the National Security Council (N.S.C.) which provided the guiding principles for subsequent policy toward Japan. The main points of this report included relaxation of SCAP control, development of a self-supporting economy and a halt to reforms, discontinuation of the purge, an end to reparations payments, strengthening and reorganizing the Japanese police, and postponement of an early peace treaty.¹⁰

The question of signing an early peace treaty had already become a focal point of discussion in the United States. MacArthur was a keen advocate of an early treaty, fearing that prolongation of the occupation would invite the resistance of the Japanese people. In February 1947 he had dispatched Diplomatic Section Chief George Atcheson to Washington with a proposal that a peace treaty be concluded by July of that year. Opinion was divided among the various groups in Washington. The Army and Navy were unenthusiastic about an early peace, owing to their desire to maintain bases in Japan. In the State Department, however, Hugh Borton's group produced the first outline of a peace treaty in March 1947, and revised drafts were prepared in July and again in January 1948. These drafts included such essential points as: prohibiting the maintenance of a regular military force, with the exception of police and coast guard; prohibiting any aircraft industry; prohibiting military research; continuing the purge; rigorously collecting reparations; and establishing a supervisory committee under the F.E.C. which would oversee the execution of the above measures for twenty-five years.¹¹ The underlying tone of these objectives was, in the words of Frederick Dunn, "that of World War II and not of the cold war."¹²

The State Department's Cold War strategists, led by Kennan, believed that the SCAP "Pinkers" (as they called the New Deal group) had drastically weakened Japan under the banner of reform. To conclude a peace with Japan under such circumstances, they argued, would be tantamount to delivering Japan into the hands of the Communists. Kennan supported a continuation of the occupation until Japan achieved economic self-sufficiency and became, as in the case of Germany, the "workshop of Asia" and a bulwark against Communism. Another year passed, however, before the changes in occupation policy proposed by Kennan were made final.

Several missions were dispatched to Japan in 1948, which, in addition to having to analyze the situation, had to overcome internal SCAP resistance in order to bring about a gradual change in policy. Along with Kennan, a central figure in this policy shift was Undersecretary of the Army William Draper, a former Wall Street investment banker who had served in the German occupation. At almost the same time as Kennan's visit, Draper brought to Japan a delegation of businessmen headed by Percy H.

Johnston. The recommendations submitted by this delegation, which included drastic reduction of reparations, increased aid to Japan, and measures for the expansion of trade, set the goal of self-sufficiency for the Japanese economy.

Further recommendations for revisions in economic policy came in May 1948 from the Young Mission, headed by Ralph A. Young of the Federal Reserve Board, which urged the adoption of a single exchange rate to pave the way for Japan's reentry into the international economy. Then, in October 1948 came the epoch-making reorientation of policy toward Japan by the National Security Council paper N.S.C.-13/2.¹³ The three essential elements of this N.S.C. decision called for: reducing SCAP controls and transferring a large measure of authority and responsibility to the Japanese government; entrusting reforms to voluntary efforts by Japanese; and strengthening and reorganizing the national police.

From the standpoint of MacArthur and SCAP, the N.S.C. decision came as an "unwelcome interference" implying a cutback in their operation. Kades, leader of the "Pinkers," was dispatched to Washington by MacArthur in an attempt to reverse the new policy. Failing in this effort, the disappointed Kades resigned without returning to Tokyo.

SCAP's resistance to the change in occupation policy was manifested in several ways. MacArthur disapproved in particular of strengthening and reorganizing the national police, and he disapproved of an additional request for a limited Japanese armed force. A strong supporter of Article Nine of the Constitution, he adopted a "wait-and-see" attitude, despite constant urging from Washington. Finally, with the outbreak of the Korean War, a police reserve of seventy-five thousand men was created.

The clearest example of SCAP's recalcitrance in the face of change was the struggle that ensued over the deconcentration law (the Law for Elimination of Concentrations of Excessive Economic Power). Following the appearance of an article in *Newsweek* magazine in December 1947, criticisms were raised in the United States against the "Pinkers" in SCAP, who, it was felt, were so completely dismantling Japanese enterprises that recovery would be impossible. This protest that SCAP reforms were "going too far" was based on a document (F.E.C. 230) which had been submitted by the State Department in May to the F.E.C., but on which action had been deferred.¹⁴

Taking advantage of the American protests, the Japanese government maneuvered to block passage of the deconcentration law by aligning with SCAP conservatives. Despite this effort, the Japanese Diet was forced to adopt the bill when, on the night of 9 December 1947, under the vigilance of SCAP Antitrust and Cartels Division Chief E. C. Welsh and Legislative

Division Chief Justin Williams, the clock was set back to forestall the closing of the Diet session.¹⁵

In May 1948, Army Undersecretary Draper dispatched a five-man review board of businessmen to Japan to review conditions for implementing the deconcentration law, by virtue of which 314 of the 325 designated firms were exempted. In essence, as Robert Textor points out, this action meant the end of the deconcentration program.

Washington next ordered SCAP to implement the nine-point Economic Stabilization Plan. Joseph M. Dodge, president of the Detroit Bank and the man who had planned currency reform in Germany in 1946, was sent to Japan as financial advisor in charge of the nine-point plan. Concurrent with this appointment was the announcement that since the objectives of anti-monopoly and deconcentration policies had been achieved, these policies would be terminated. The occupation entered a new stage.

The Last Phase of the Occupation

As the occupation continued, a fraternity developed between the administrative bureaucracies of Japan and SCAP. From the Japanese standpoint, there was, during this period, no business more important than that of "liaison" with SCAP. Whenever Japanese officials alluded to "SCAP sources," Diet members could no longer question their views. Never has the Japanese bureaucracy exercised greater authority than it did during the occupation.

On the American side, MacArthur secluded himself from the Japanese people, meeting prime ministers and few others. By shrouding himself in the mystery of an imperial aura, MacArthur sought to preserve his prestige. Scrupulously cautious, he warned SCAP officials against "collusion" with the governed. Among lower SCAP officials, however, close personal relations with their Japanese counterparts grew as a natural consequence of the daily "liaison." Beyond this, there was, of course, "fraternization" between American soldiers and Japanese women. The Japanese "liaison bureaucrats" felt that their toilsome contact with SCAP officials offered the latter an opportunity to become more familiar with conditions in Japan.

This closeness at the working level explains, in part, why it took so long for changes adopted in Washington to be reflected in the occupation administration. For example, the unified exchange-rate plan (one dollar to three hundred yen, plus or minus thirty yen) as recommended by the Young Mission, and measures to combat the inflation, both met with strong resistance from the SCAP bureaucracy. The ten principles of economic stabilization passed in a directive to the Ashida cabinet in July 1948 received no more than a lukewarm response from the Economic Stabiliza-

tion Board. In light of such deliberate resistance to the guidelines offered by Washington, the nine economic principles policy was issued in December. This policy, later known as the "Dodge Line," was enforced by Dodge upon his arrival in Japan in February 1949. Dodge was supported by Washington officials, who now realized that effective action on economic problems was impossible as long as it was left in the hands of SCAP.

The two main pillars of the Dodge Line were a balanced budget for fiscal year 1949 designed to curb "R.F.B. inflation," and the establishment of a single exchange rate of 360 yen to the dollar. Saddled with these policies, the Yoshida cabinet was unable to fulfill most of its election promises. Finance Minister Ikeda-Hayato made a plea for relaxation of these policies, but made no headway against Dodge's stubborn insistence on strict enforcement. A sudden deflation was therefore anticipated, and it was feared that corporations and export industries might go bankrupt. Layoffs also intensified labor problems. The start of the Korean War in June 1950, however, produced a sudden boom that enabled the stagnant economy to recover its vitality and to sustain high growth rates in the last half of the 1950s. Rescued by happenstance, the Dodge Line brought inflation to a halt. Stopping inflation provided a basis for industrial recovery during the war boom; the "stabilization policy" should perhaps be regarded as successful.

The Korean War also prompted the revival of military power in Japan. Article Nine of the constitution may be considered to be the product of the collaboration between MacArthur and Prime Minister Shidehara. MacArthur, to be sure, was breezily optimistic about the security prospects of a demilitarized Japan. The Japanese government, however, began to examine Japan's security requirements early after independence was regained. Even within SCAP, General Willoughby, Chief of the Intelligence Section, sought to maintain the nucleus of a rehabilitated Japanese Army by carefully cultivating the group led by Colonel Hattori Takushiro and elite members of the former Japanese Army General Staff.

Until about 1947 the Shidehara and Yoshida cabinets favored making Japan a neutral state like Switzerland. The United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Great Britain would guarantee that neutrality; therefore this plan was premised on the conclusion of a peace treaty with all the former Allied powers, including those in the Socialist bloc. This was MacArthur's personal view as well. In the spring of 1947, when the Japanese government learned of the possibility of an early peace, Prime Minister Yoshida ordered the Central Liaison Office to study Japan's security. That June, Foreign Minister Ashida, representing the Socialist Katayama cabinet, put forward a plan whereby Japan's security would be entrusted

to America in exchange for military bases on Japanese soil. Acheson and Whitney, however, quickly disapproved this proposal as being inappropriate.

Ashida prepared a second memorandum in September 1947 according to which Japan, by virtue of a special agreement with the U.S., would be dependent on American military strength to prevent external aggression until the United Nations was functioning effectively. A Japanese national police force would be created to deal with the danger of civil insurrection. Ashida requested that Lieutenant General Robert Eichelberger, who was returning temporarily to the United States, hand-carry the proposal to Washington.¹⁶ Under the circumstances, however, this plan was also ignored.

Despite these early failures, Ashida's proposals concerning a peace only with the Western powers and dependence on the United States for defense were almost identical to the provisions later included in the San Francisco peace treaty and the U.S.-Japan Administrative Agreement.¹⁷ The idea of a national police force was likewise incorporated into the N.S.C. decision and realized in July 1950 in the form of the Police Reserve. The change in U.S. policy took place within the framework of further intensification of the Cold War in 1949, exacerbated in Asia by the victory of the Chinese Communist Army, leading to the establishment of the People's Republic of China, and by Soviet development of the atomic bomb. There were repeated statements, by Secretary of State Acheson and others, to the effect that the U.S. defense perimeter in Asia should run from Japan through Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Philippines.

The lack of clear reference to the Korean peninsula left the status of this area open to question, and it is frequently suggested that it was a fatal omission, helping to induce the North Korean Army to invade South Korea. MacArthur himself once remarked to William Sebald that he "considered a United States pullout sensible because Korea was militarily indefensible."¹⁸ When the Korean War actually broke out, however, the United States, under the banner of the United Nations, was quick to send reinforcements to fight against North Korean and Chinese armies. The tide of the war ebbed and flowed, but by the second half of 1951 the two sides had settled into positional warfare in the vicinity of the 38th parallel. It was during this stage of the conflict that Japan's role as a rear supply area became indispensable to the United Nations' troops. Consequently, for better or for worse, Japan's position in the Western camp was a foregone conclusion.

In July 1950, General MacArthur ordered that the Japanese create a National Police Reserve to number seventy-five thousand men. This force was to maintain domestic security in Japan to take the place of the four divisions of Americans ground forces which were to leave Japan for

Korea. Through SCAP and Dulles, the U.S. Government requested that the Japanese expand this force to 300,000-350,000 but this was rejected by Prime Minister Yoshida on the grounds that the Japanese economy, still weak from the war, could not support such numbers.

The National Police Reserve was expanded to 110,000 in 1951, and to 130,000 the year after that in response to constant pressure from the U.S. The Maritime Security Force—in reality a small navy—was founded in 1952. In 1954, these ground and maritime forces were united with a newly created air force and the current Self-Defense Forces were born.

The discordance between United States demands for large-scale rearmament and the Japanese Government's reluctance to carry it out resulted in a compromise in the Ikeda-Robertson Talks of October 1953. The strength of the Ground Self-Defense Force was fixed at 180,000, where it remains today. The setting of this limit in size of ground forces made possible the creation of three well-balanced modern conventional services, albeit compact ones, and was a result of the rejection of large-scale rearmament.¹⁹

Once the prospects had dimmed for a peace treaty that would embrace all the former combatants in World War II, the process of regaining independence for Japan accelerated. In September 1950 President Harry Truman directed the State Department to prepare a peace treaty; the following January, John Foster Dulles, an advisor to the State Department, arrived in Japan to begin framing the document. Following a joint British-American proposal drafted in July, the San Francisco Conference convened in September 1951. Forty-eight nations, excluding the Soviet Union and China, signed the peace treaty which took effect in April 1952. The American occupation of Japan, which lasted more than six years, had come to an end, and Japan was again independent.

The termination of the occupation in 1952 was hardly a dramatic moment in Japanese history. Beginning in 1950, SCAP bureaucrats had progressively reduced their own organization and had encouraged the gradual transfer of power to the Japanese government. The Japan-U.S. security treaty, which had been signed simultaneously with the peace treaty, further heightened the sense of continuity. It provided for the stationing of American troops in Japan for an unspecified period of time.

The restoration of Japan's independence in this fashion left a residue of dissatisfaction and uneasiness, not only in the Soviet Union and China, but also among members of the British Commonwealth and other Asian countries, who feared a revival of Japanese militarism. To ease these misgivings the United States entered into mutual defense treaties with the Philippines, and with Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS).

The forceful demands of Dulles, who was the embodiment of Cold War ideology, led Japan to favor the Taiwan regime, thereby precluding a restoration of diplomatic relations with the Chinese mainland. Problems such as relations with China, which were caused or at least left unsolved during that period, would return to haunt Japan in later years. Under the international circumstances of the time, however, Yoshida felt it wisest to go along with Dulles and in so doing to secure at an early date independence and a self-supporting economy.

It is unfortunate that the personal role of the Emperor, which has been overlooked to the present time, has not been touched upon in arguments concerning the occupation by such scholars as Etō and Shimizu. This writer believes that the keynote of occupation policy was formed by the eleven meetings between the Emperor and MacArthur. Other than these two persons, only a diplomatic interpreter who accompanied the Emperor participated in the talks. It is certain that memoranda of these talks were prepared by the interpreter, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Imperial Household Agency admit the existence of the memoranda. Unfortunately, these documents have yet to be released. The reason given is that it would give rise to political arguments if it were proven that a personal diplomacy had developed between MacArthur and the Emperor at a time when the Emperor had supposedly lost all political power and become merely a political symbol.

From fragmentary information it is possible to reconstruct the contents of the talks, however, and the Emperor seems to have given his positive support to occupation policies concerning demilitarization and democratization and the anti-Communist policy, while on the other hand he requested the relaxation of the purge and expressed concern over how the security of Japan would be protected under Article Nine of the Constitution. The Emperor, through his aides, offered some advice concerning the Asian policies of the United States.

There are indications that MacArthur paid serious attention to the Emperor's requests and advice, as MacArthur recognized that the Japanese people's support of the Emperor was overwhelming. It seems, however, that when the conflict between the General and Washington intensified, the Emperor and his aides opened a new channel of communication, through the Japan lobby, which led to Dulles. The court circle quietly abandoned the General more than a year prior to the dismissal of MacArthur by President Truman in April of 1951.²⁰ This led to the anticlimactic atmosphere surrounding the twelfth and final meeting between MacArthur and the Emperor. MacArthur refused the request from the Japanese side that he pay a visit to the Emperor immediately before returning to the United States after his recall. Instead, MacArthur demanded that the Emperor come to greet him. This last meeting was purely ceremonial.

The American occupation of Japan, however, was anything but ceremonial. In a profound and basic way, it set the course of Japanese history in the second half of the twentieth century.

THE FIRST VIETNAMIZATION: U.S. ADVISORS IN VIETNAM, 1956-1960

Ronald Spector

This paper addresses one of the more neglected phases of American involvement in Vietnam, the period between the end of the Geneva Conference in 1954 and the renewal of large-scale guerrilla warfare in 1960. In the same way that many people have come to regard the French Indochina War (1946-1954) as a rehearsal for the second Vietnam War (1965-1973), so the period 1955 to 1960 may be regarded as a rehearsal for the period of Vietnamization during the Nixon and Ford administrations.

True, there were important differences between the two periods. The U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), commanded successively by Lieutenant General John W. O'Daniel and Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams, labored under advantages and disadvantages unknown to its successor, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, in the 1960s and 1970s. The advantages were a period of relative peace and calm in the countryside, especially from 1956 to 1958, and a relatively strong, stable civil government under President Ngo Dinh Diem in Saigon. The disadvantages included the restrictions imposed by the Geneva settlement of 1954 on the size and activities of the military advisory effort. The Geneva Agreements limited the number of officers and men in the advisory group to 342, the number of American military personnel present in Vietnam at the time the agreement was signed, plus an additional 350 men in a Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM) who were separate from, but subordinate to, the Chief of the MAAG. The men in TERM were in Vietnam to recover, inventory and prepare for shipment, the U.S. equipment and weapons left over from the Franco-Viet Minh War, although they spent much of their time training the technical and service units of the Vietnamese Army.¹

A further handicap was imposed by the strong budgetary constraints of the Eisenhower era. Whereas support for Vietnam in the Kennedy period was more or less open-ended, the Eisenhower administration placed strict limits on the scope of the American assistance program for Vietnam. The size of the Vietnamese armed forces to be supported by the U.S., including a small Navy and Air Force, was set by Washington at 150,000 men in 1955 and for the next five years no high-level American official in Saigon

or elsewhere seriously suggested raising this ceiling or significantly increasing the size of the military aid program. Then too, Washington leaders paid scant attention to Indochina between 1956 and 1961. No governmental official above the level of assistant secretary visited Saigon during this period and, until 1960, there were only three resident American correspondents in Vietnam.²

This points up still another important difference between the two Vietnamizations. In the second Vietnamization the U.S. was phasing down its military and civilian involvement.³ During the first, the degree of U.S. involvement was relatively stable.

Yet despite the differences the two periods share a common overriding theme. In both the early advisory period and the later period of Vietnamization American leaders were attempting to help the Vietnamese armed forces attain a sufficient degree of effectiveness to hold their own against their enemies without the assistance of large numbers of U.S. or other allied group forces. In the 1950s the first Vietnamization was precipitated by the rapid withdrawal of French combat forces from Vietnam and the inability of American forces to replace them because of limitations imposed by the Geneva agreements and the basic defense policy of the Eisenhower administration known as the "New Look."

In both cases the effort ended in failure. The reasons for the failure of the second Vietnamization are still being assessed. The reasons for the failure of the first are easier to delineate and perhaps an examination of them may serve to provide us with some clues about the failure of the second effort and the prospects for other U.S. military assistance programs in Asia.

In the first place, American military aims in Vietnam during the late 1950s were never clearly defined. The training of the Vietnamese army had been undertaken only reluctantly after Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had overruled a Joint Chiefs of Staff report which advised that a U.S. military training effort would be hopeless unless a reasonably strong, civil government were established there.⁴ Secretary Dulles, to the contrary, believed that "one of the most efficient ways of enabling the South Vietnamese Government to become strong is to assist it in organizing the national army and in training that army."⁵ Dulles' views prevailed in this classic chicken-or-egg argument and the egg ultimately ended up on the faces of many Americans.

There was also disagreement as to the nature of the military threat facing South Vietnam. Although most Washington leaders in 1955 and 1956, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, believed that Communist subversion was a greater danger to the South than an overt large-scale invasion,

U.S. contingency planning tended to emphasize the latter.⁶ The Chiefs of MAAG, therefore, understandably tended to concentrate on building an army geared to resist attack from the North. In doing so the MAAG chiefs were merely following along the main line of Army thinking, for in the 1950s, in contrast to the 1960s, there was little interest in, or knowledge of, counter-insurgency warfare within the U.S. armed forces.

The term "counter-insurgency" itself was virtually unknown in the 1950s. U.S. Army training and doctrine in the area of counter-guerrilla warfare was primarily oriented toward such subjects as the prevention or defeat of enemy raids behind the battle lines, and ways of minimizing enemy infiltration. Guerrillas were usually envisioned as troops of the enemy's regular forces who had been cut off, or had infiltrated or been inserted behind friendly lines.⁷ Instruction in counter-guerrilla subjects was generally limited to four hours in most infantry training courses and few officers or enlisted men had had any practical experience in actual operations. Whereas the conduct of guerrilla operations was a specialized skill, restricted to U.S. Army Special Forces units, counter-guerrilla operations were considered to be adequately covered in the four hours of instruction provided for all troops.

General Samuel T. Williams saw a North Vietnamese invasion as no immediate threat, but still saw it as the main danger against which the armed forces had to prepare. Insurgency within South Vietnam was a problem principally because it might divert the Army from undertaking the dispositions and preparations necessary to repel an invasion. As Williams explained to President Diem:

Communist guerrilla strategy is simple. By using a small amount of arms and equipment and a few good military leaders, they force [their opponents] to utilize relatively large military forces in a campaign that is costly in money and men. In Korea in 1950, the South Koreans were using three divisions to fight less than 7,000 guerrillas in the Southeast. When the North Koreans attacked, the South Korean Army suffered from this diversion as their army was not strategically or tactically deployed to meet the North Korean attack.⁸

Despite such beliefs, General Williams and other members of the Military Assistance Advisory Group were well aware of the need for an effective internal security force in South Vietnam. The most important South Vietnamese organizations, from the point of view of internal security, were the Civil Guard and the Self-Defense Corps. Yet responsibility for the training and equipping of paramilitary forces such as the Civil Guard and the Self-Defense Forces was vested, not in MAAG, but in other agencies of the U.S. country team, agencies which differed radically in their view of the proper mission, composition and employment of these forces.

Since May 1955, groups of police and public administration specialists from Michigan State University under contract to the U.S. Operations

Mission (a predecessor of the Agency for International Development) had been working on a number of projects to improve the training and operations of the security forces. The group established a six-week basic training course, which had trained 14,000 Civil Guardsmen by mid-1957, and also set up a national police academy. The Michigan State University advisers saw the Civil Guard as primarily a civilian-type police establishment similar to the Pennsylvania State Police or the Texas Rangers.

President Diem had different ideas about the Civil Guard. Since the entire South Vietnamese Army would be needed in the event of invasion, to defend along the 17th parallel, he maintained that a strong internal security force was needed to control the rest of the country, especially the high plateau region near the Laotian border and the Mekong Delta. Therefore, the Civil Guard had to be capable of replacing the Army in rear areas in time of war.⁹ For purposes of training, discipline, and supply, the President wanted the Civil Guard transferred from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Defense, but leaving it in time of peace under the operational control of the Interior Minister.¹⁰ He also wanted it to be unusually well armed and equipped with helicopters and armored cars.

While Diem spoke in terms of internal security and military defense, his real interest in the Civil Guard was political. Most members of the Civil Guard were former Catholic militiamen from the Catholic regions of North Vietnam who had fled to the South after the Viet Minh victory in 1954 and were among Diem's most loyal supporters.¹¹ Diem wanted to develop the Civil Guard into a strong countervailing force to offset the power of a possibly disloyal army.

General Williams generally supported President Diem's proposals because an upgraded Civil Guard would release the Army from pacification and local security duties and enable it to spend more time on unit training.¹² However, Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow and most of the other members of the U.S. country team in Saigon were dubious about Diem's plans for the Civil Guard. Durbrow and the head of the U.S. Operations Mission, Leland Barrows, insisted that the Civil Guard was a civilian police force, not a paramilitary body, and thus ought to remain fully under control of the Ministry of the Interior. Its work in peacetime would normally be closely linked with other police agencies under the control of that ministry. In addition, certain American aid funds had already been appropriated for the Civil Guard under the assumption that it was part of the regular civil police establishment; it would be hard to justify use of those funds to support a large military force.¹³

These disagreements about the internal security forces were further complicated by red tape, bureaucratic in-fighting, and personality clashes within the country team. This insured that when insurgency once again be-

came a serious threat in 1959 the paramilitary forces were still unprepared, untrained and unequipped to cope with.

The unavoidable result was that the Vietnamese Army had to be committed directly to combat against the Communist insurgents, a task in which it achieved few successes. The indifferent performance of the Vietnamese Army in combat against the Viet Cong even after four years of U.S. support and training can be attributed to two sets of factors.

First, there were the weaknesses inherent in the Vietnamese Army as an institution. These included the rampant politicization in the higher ranks of the officer corps which enabled incompetent but politically reliable officers to attain and retain positions of responsibility and high command, and the lack of unifying national spirit, motivation or patriotism on the part of most Vietnamese soldiers, a reflection of the lack of any widespread popular support for the Diem regime.

Another important factor was the penetration of the South Vietnamese Army at all levels by Viet Cong agents.¹⁴ One Viet Cong spy arrested in 1959 had been serving as personal bodyguard to the Assistant Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese Army for more than three years. Another had been a captain commanding a communications company with access to all classified messages as well as cipher books and cipher equipment. Still another important weakness was the system of divided command, routine insubordination and overlapping authority, deliberately fostered by Diem within the Army's command system to ensure that no military leaders became too powerful.

Added to these institutional shortcomings was the low level of technical competence of the South Vietnamese combat soldier. Diem's troops could look very smart on the parade ground but those well turned-out soldiers were not the ones who normally did battle with the Viet Cong. After a short period of basic training, most new recruits or draftees were sent directly to tactical units while more experienced enlisted men, non-commissioned officers, and officers served in rear area headquarters or in agencies of the Ministry of Defense.¹⁵ Combat units were consequently short of experienced officers and noncommissioned officers and had as many as 50 percent new men in the ranks. Contemporary critics also pointed to the lack of specific training for guerrilla warfare. Yet the Vietnamese Army's level of proficiency in basic combat skills was often so low as to make the question of specialized training or the lack thereof irrelevant.¹⁶

While these deficiencies were inherent in the Vietnamese Army, the very organization, composition, and outlook of the Military Assistance Advisory Group ensured that the American advisors would remain either

unaware of these deficiencies or powerless to change them. The so-called short tour limited most U.S. advisors to less than eleven months in which to win the confidence of their counterparts and influence them to take needed measures to increase the effectiveness of their units. A wide gap in customs and culture separated the advisor from his Vietnamese counterpart, a gap made wider by the small number of officers able to communicate with their Vietnamese colleagues in any language other than English. A South Vietnamese officer who later became chief of the Joint General Staff, General Cao Van Vien, could recall no instance "in which a U.S. advisor effectively discussed professional matters with his counterpart in Vietnamese."¹⁷

That the language barrier could create unexpected problems was illustrated by the experience of one American instructor at a training center who was attempting to teach basic facing movements to a group of recruits.

He instructed the interpreter to tell the men "About Face!" The interpreter looked at the major rather quizzically, then spoke rapidly to one of the trainees. The man broke from the ranks, went over to a pail of water, washed his face and then returned to the formation. Each time the advisor would attempt to teach this facing movement the same act would be repeated. Finally after the third attempt the trooper broke down. He told the major that there was nothing wrong with his face, that it was clean because he had washed it three times.¹⁸

Few South Vietnamese officers shared, or even understood, the American officers' belief in coordination, team-work, loyalty to superiors and subordinates, know-how, and delegation of authority. Yet these ideas were fundamental to U.S.-style military operations. Nor did Vietnamese officers see their government or the Army as an entity; they saw each in terms of their own particular bureau, agency, or battalion, independent of, and usually in competition with, other agencies and units. As one American advisor noted:

Coordination among agencies to achieve unity of effort and effect for the common good is almost unknown: more than this, it is zealously avoided as an undesirable encroachment on individual agency prerogatives....There is much to lead one to believe that, given freedom to do so, the [South] Vietnamese would quickly scrap the military organization so carefully developed by [the advisory group] and revert quite happily to what they were familiar with in the past.¹⁹

Another U.S. advisor reported that South Vietnamese officers were uninterested in training above the battalion level because they had no notion of ever operating with larger units.²⁰

Another problem was what might be called a communication gap between American advisors and their counterparts. Not only were most American military advisors unfamiliar with the society, culture, and language of South Vietnam but the advisory role itself was unfamiliar. A

senior American advisor observed: "The role of advisor is entirely new and challenging to most American soldiers. They have spent most of their lives giving and executing orders. As advisers to South Vietnamese counterparts, they neither give nor take orders; they have a much less positive role—that of giving advice, providing guidance and exerting influence."²¹

Separated by a wide gulf of culture and language, the American advisor could have only the vaguest idea of the effect his guidance and suggestions were having on the unit he advised. Advisors found their counterparts affable, highly accessible, and always willing to listen to advice. Yet the advice seldom produced significant results, for even when South Vietnamese commanders issued new orders or directives, they were reluctant to compel their subordinates to comply with them.

One American advisor set himself the seemingly modest goal of discouraging the soldiers in his regiment from carrying their boots and even an occasional chicken slung from their rifles, a common practice in Vietnam. Under pressure of much preaching and expostulation the practice had practically ceased by the time of the advisor's departure. On his final day of duty he was pleased to observe not a single boot nor fowl visible upon any soldier's weapon. Delayed a few days at the airport the triumphant advisor decided to return surreptitiously to view his unit on the march. Much to his chagrin the boots and chickens had already resumed their time-honored places.²²

Yet the success of an advisor was measured by his ability to influence his Vietnamese counterpart and point him in the right direction. Few indeed were those advisors willing to forthrightly report that they had been unable to bring about needed reform and improvements in their units. Since the whole system of evaluating the performance of the Vietnamese Army was built upon the subjective non-standardized evaluations of the advisor and his superiors, Saigon and Washington were guaranteed a superficial and overly optimistic assessment—one made more inaccurate by the dogged "Can Do" attitude of most officers and noncommissioned officers who tended to see all faults in the Vietnamese Army as correctable, all failures as temporary.

The experience of the 1955-1960 period and the ultimate failure of the Vietnamese Army as an effective fighting force can only underline the warning which the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave to Mr. Dulles in 1954: that strong stable governments and societies are necessary to the creation of strong armies. This was a lesson which the United States was to learn at considerable cost in Vietnam. It is a lesson American leaders would do well to ponder as the U.S. contemplates new efforts at large-scale military assistance to Third World nations.

COMMENTARY: THE MACARTHUR VIEWPOINT

D. Clayton James

The purpose of this short piece is two-fold: to comment on the three papers given in this session and to present MacArthur's viewpoint on the American military's role in East Asia.

Dr. Gates is surely correct in pointing out that the Philippine-American War has not received the attention in military history circles that it deserves. Its relative neglect by historians is regrettable, but even more unfortunate has been the failure of the United States Army's senior schools to include that conflict in their history-related curricula. The appearance in 1973 of the first scholarly study of the war, Dr. Gates' excellent *School-books and Krags*, coincided roughly with the beginning of an alleged renaissance of official Army interest in military history.¹ But, unhappily, military history still has a low priority at both the Army War College and the Army Command and General Staff College, and there remains widespread doubt in the officer corps that developments prior to World War II have much relevance. As Dr. Gates suggests, one of the consequences of the ignorance of the Philippine-American War has been the drawing of erroneous parallels between it and the Vietnam War. The game of "if" is enticing, and often futile, yet one cannot help but suspect that if the American civilian and military decision-makers of the Vietnam conflict had studied the Philippine-American War their judgements would have been wiser on the conduct of unconventional warfare and pacification.

Dr. Gates' paper prompts some questions that he could hardly have discussed in view of the time limitation. For example, if the American military leaders in the Philippines were influenced by progressive ideals, why were not the succeeding civilian administrators under Taft? What sort of evidence could be offered to prove a link between the progressive excitement in America and the policies of Arthur MacArthur in the Philippines? Since Filipino guerrilla activity persisted long after July 1902 when the War Department officially declared the conflict terminated, what date should be accepted realistically for the ending of the war? Could Mindanao be considered "secure" by 1906 or even 1910? What should be the criteria used in dating unconventional wars? Finally, since Gates has punctured Huntington's thesis on the isolation of the late nineteenth-century officer corps, has he discovered other vulnerabilities in *The Soldier and the State*, a book regarded almost sacrosanct by some service school faculty members?²

Dr. Hata faced the most difficult task on this panel in terms of the scope of his subject and the amount of primary and secondary materials. It is always refreshing for Americans to be exposed to Japanese views of the occupation of 1945-1952. However, the effectiveness of Dr. Hata's essay may have been enhanced, if he had pursued only one aspect of that complex phenomenon, or had developed a single argument.

His interpretation of the roles played by MacArthur and the so-called "New Dealers" on the staff of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), exaggerates their importance. He assumes that MacArthur was in a position to exercise creative leadership, whereas actually the limitations on his power were many and his options were more restricted than often imagined. If and when a definitive history of the occupation is penned, MacArthur's liability for the shortcomings and credit for the achievements of that epoch will appear not nearly as crucial as many previous writings have suggested. More work needs to be done on the critical role of SWNCC (State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee) as well as on the impediments to SCAP reforms devised by the old-guard power elite in postwar Japan, led by the conservative politicians, entrenched bureaucrats, and *zaibatsu* magnates.

As for the staff of SCAP, it is an oversimplification to present the liberal, or "New Deal," element as dominant, even during the formative years of the occupation. In truth, the SCAP civil sections were staffed by a potpourri of American Army officers and civilian specialists who were divided into a number of oft-changing factions. Dr. Hata portrays Charles Kades as a leader of the "Pinks" on the staff, but, in reality, this Wall Street attorney was (and is) hardly liberal, much less radical. Had he been either, it is unlikely that Courtney Whitney, the SCAP Government Section chief, would have regarded him as his most valued lieutenant, or that MacArthur would have retained him after 1951 as his personal lawyer, or that Justin Williams, a Government Section official never mistaken for a liberal, would have praised Kades so highly in his recent book on the occupation.³

It would have been particularly enlightening if Dr. Hata had concentrated upon the Japanese interest groups that supported or opposed the SCAP programs, for as a respected Japanese scholar he undoubtedly has access to Japanese sources, manuscript and oral, that are not readily available to American researchers.

Dr. Spector's analysis of the problems of American military advisors in Vietnam, 1956-1960, meets well the standards of conciseness, clarity, and coherence. Indeed, his paper leaves the listener wishing that he had spoken more at length: a not inconsiderable compliment.

Although each had different functions, the American military missions in the Philippines, 1935-1941, in China, 1942-1945, in South Korea, 1945-1950, and in South Vietnam to 1960, all were handicapped by socio-cultural maladjustments to their respective environments. Why were not these advisors better educated in the politics, economics, society, culture, and language of the nations they were attempting to assist? Except in the case of General Joseph Stilwell's group in wartime China, there was no pressing crisis during the early stages of the American missions which prevented the replacement of the original personnel rather soon with advisors who had the benefit of concentrated programs in language and foreign-area studies. Despite the civil affairs schools set up at Monterey, Charlottesville, and elsewhere, and the more than six years' duration of the occupation of Japan, there was a conspicuous lack of SCAP personnel who had much grasp of the mores or language of the Japanese.

Another question that arises from studying various American military advisory missions is more troubling: Now that the evidence is in for most of the cases mentioned, could the United States have altered substantially the course of events in those countries? Frankly, it appears that if the American advisors had exploited reform opportunities differently, in order to press for other means and goals, it is doubtful whether they could have made much progress, in view of the internal and external forces that were aligned against reordering things differently. It is hard not to be pessimistic about American intrusions in regions where our advisors are virtually ignorant of the flow of local power, the system of values, and, again, the language of the people. Barbara Tuchman's conclusion in her study of Stilwell may be applicable to American experiences in Asian areas besides China:

In great things, wrote Erasmus, it is enough to have tried. Stilwell's mission was America's supreme try in China. . . . Yet the mission failed in its ultimate purpose because the goal was unachievable. The impulse was not Chinese. . . . China was a problem for which there was no American solution. . . . In the end China went her own way as if the Americans had never come.⁴

Without a doubt, Douglas MacArthur would have objected strongly to so gloomy an assessment of the American impact in East Asia. He was always confident that his understanding of the "Oriental mind" (whatever that is) was superior to that of any other American leader of his time and that the United States as a nation, as well as he as an individual, was divinely charged with the mission of furthering American civilization, along with Christianity, in Asian lands.

No American military officer could claim more time spent in East Asia than MacArthur. In 1903-1904 he served as a lieutenant of engineers in the Philippines, and he was an aide to his father on a special reconnaissance mission in 1905-1906 to Japan, China, Thailand, Singapore, Burma, and India. He returned to the Philippines on tours of duty in

1922-1925 and 1928-1930, during the latter as head of the Philippine Department. In 1935-1941 he was military advisor to the Philippine Commonwealth, beside holding the grandiose title, Field Marshal of the Philippine Army. Recalled to active duty in the American Army in mid-1941, he held positions of high command in East Asia for the next decade, roles too familiar to recite here. In all, over half of MacArthur's fifty-three years of military service was spent in East Asia.

To MacArthur and his adulators that lengthy experience became tantamount to a mastery of things Asian, but more objective viewers do not regard them as synonymous. In Manila, 1935-1941, and in Tokyo, 1945-1951, he lived aloof, confining his daily itinerary to trips between his residence and his office. His personal relations with Filipinos were restricted to leaders of the dominant conservative political party, such as Manuel Quezon and Sergio Osmeña. Likewise, in Japan he met few citizens outside the ruling circles of the two main parties, both staunchly conservative. It is revealing that, according to MacArthur's office diary, of the fifty-five persons who participated in twelve or more individual or group conferences with him from 2 September 1945 through 10 April 1951, only one Japanese is included, Prime Minister Yoshida.⁵ It is likely that a century hence, MacArthur's role as occupation administrator in Japan will be regarded as his most worthwhile contribution to history. But this is a far cry from claiming that he was a master of things Japanese or was the determining force in the occupation. The main directions that postwar Japan took were primarily influenced by the SWNCC-originated policies, the evolution of the Cold War, and the opportunistic adaptability of the Japanese in turning the occupation to their advantage wherever possible.

Nevertheless, MacArthur deserves credit for striving to attain a semblance of balance in the regional priorities of America's national and military strategies from 1941 to 1951. His constant admonitions to Washington leaders not to overlook the Pacific and East Asia bear reexamination today in light of the American military's virtual obsession with European and Middle Eastern contingencies since the end of the Vietnam War. For instance, in Field Manual 100-5, the United States Army's operations doctrine states that the primary tactical mission is predicated on a climactic integrated battle on the plains of Central Europe.⁶ This emphasis is so strong in current Army circles that there seems to be little thought devoted to potential confrontations in other regions, against forces organized and deployed quite differently than those of the Warsaw Pact or Arab nations.

On the other hand, from early in his career onward, MacArthur remained convinced that the United States needed to pay more heed strategically to the Pacific and Asian areas. Looking back in 1964, MacArthur said of his Asian tour with his father in 1905-1906:

[It] was without doubt the most important factor of preparation in my entire life. . . . The true historic significance and the sense of destiny that these lands of the western Pacific and Indian Ocean now assumed became part of me. They were to color and influence all the days of my life. . . . It was crystal clear to me that the future and, indeed, the very existence of America was irrevocably entwined with Asia and its island outposts.⁷

Of course, his critics have often maintained that he wanted the top priority on that region for selfish reasons. MacArthur countered that he was simply trying to redress the balance of America's global strategic interests, which were too often determined by the "Europe-firsters" to the dangerous neglect of other areas. In a speech before the Texas legislature in June 1951 he said:

By confining their concern so assiduously to one area and ignoring the global nature of the Communist threat and the need to stop its predatory advance in other areas, they have become the "isolationists" of the present time. And it is a form of isolation which offers nothing but ultimate destruction. Our first line of defense for Western Europe is not the Elbe, it is not the Rhine—it is the Yalu. Lose there and you render useless the effort to implement the North Atlantic Pact or any other plan for regional defense. . . . I am as intensely interested in saving Western Europe as any other threatened area, where the people show the will and the determination to mount their own full defensive power, but I believe the issue to be worldwide and not confined to any special privileged area.⁸

Clark Reynolds, a noted maritime historian, argues the novel thesis in a recent article in the *Naval War College Review* that MacArthur was one of the century's great *naval* leaders:

General MacArthur's consistent advocacy of a maritime strategy for the United States in the Pacific [1941-51] places him alongside the nation's leading admirals [of the time, such as King, Nimitz, and Sherman] who have similarly advocated such a strategy. Indeed, if one can excuse this bit of hyperbole (which may well cause him to turn over in his grave), history would not be far wrong in remembering him also as *Admiral* Douglas MacArthur.⁹

Reynold's argument will provoke controversy, but it does stimulate the reader to reevaluate MacArthur's thinking on the place of East Asia in America's global strategic planning. Restudying MacArthur's arguments on the relationship of the Pacific and Asia to the long-run strategic interests of the United States needs to be undertaken by those planners in Washington who now are fascinated by future European and Middle Eastern scenarios as if the days of American involvement in East Asia are forever past.

DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS

Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (Moderator)

Question: Has anybody done any work regarding a comparative study between the American experience and the British experience in Egypt before and during World War II?

Wells: There is currently a proposal pending before the Wilson Center in which the applicant proposes to make a comparative study of the British force used in the Persian Gulf and the recently created American Rapid Deployment Force.

Spector: I have not heard of any completed studies concerning a comparison of the American and British experience, but it occurred to me some time ago that perhaps there was, or might have been, some connection between the American advisory effort in China and the later one in Vietnam. I tried to determine whether anybody who had been in China had contributed expertise or experience to Vietnam; not only was nobody consulted, but there was no knowledge of or interest in the China experience by those involved in Vietnam.

I would like to add a comment on the question Professor James raised about whether U.S. advisors—civilian or military—can really make any fundamental changes in Asian societies. He seems to feel that they cannot. Let me just quote one American advisor's comments, which confirm what Professor James has said: "Probably nothing that we [the military systems group] could have done would have changed the ultimate outcome, but we had a duty to tell the people in Washington how things were actually going, and this duty we failed to perform."

Hata: The occupation of Japan is interesting in this respect. Although the occupation was based on the so-called formula of indirect rule, General MacArthur and SCAP had absolute power. MacArthur very much hated the so-called advisory function and basically disregarded the allied advisory organizations. Ultimately, basic changes in any society probably are a function of the receptivity of the local government, whether in Japan or in Vietnam, but some reforms in Japan have had lasting effect. Two of the most successful reforms were agrarian reform and educational reform.

Question: Would someone care to comment on the extent of Japanese involvement in the Philippine Insurrection?

Asada (from audience): This question dovetails nicely with the question of strategy which was discussed this morning. The Japanese definitely felt their security was being threatened by American annexation of the Philippines, even though the Japanese government did not officially protest. Some Japanese military leaders (for example, one who was to become the Chief of the General Staff) became very interested in the Philippines. Many soldiers resigned in order to join ultra-right civilian groups interested in forming some kind of Filipino-Chinese-Japanese alliance. In fact, it was Sun Yat-sen who suggested this idea, an idea which carried overtones of Pan-Asianism. Sun asked the Japanese, "Why don't you do something to help the Filipinos?" Sun was told: "Why don't you try to do something in China?" He replied, "Well, if it is not a suitable time for the Chinese Revolution, I wish to help the Philippine Revolution. If we can succeed in a Philippine Revolution, we can then use the Philippines as a base for setting up a Chinese Revolution."

Gates: There were a number of times when there was contact between the Filipinos and the Japanese. In fact, there was an agent of the Philippine Revolution permanently in Japan. But to my knowledge, most of the supplies sent from Japan did not reach the Philippines. There is some evidence of Japanese officers in the Philippines being in liaison with the revolutionaries, although from the American side, this material is not too well documented. There was a greater fear on the part of the Americans than there was a reality concerning the number of Japanese officers who were actually in the Philippines. There seemed to be a time when the Americans thought there was a flood of people helping, but in fact, as I understand it, there was only a relatively small number of Japanese in the Philippines.

Question: What significance did the use of American volunteers in the Philippines have? Were they more important than regular officers in the pacification program?

Gates: The volunteers tended to supply a rather high level of expertise in a variety of civilian tasks. People who had been, for example, the local postmaster at home, or maybe worked in some kind of administrative capacity, moved into comparable jobs in the military government in the Philippines. But in fact, some of the highest posts in the military government were held by regular military officers who had developed some interesting expertise during their military careers. I think of a fellow, for example, who was a professional military officer, a graduate of West Point, who took an M.A. at Yale and wrote a thesis on forestry, and then ended up a conservationist advocate in Montana (I think) during the time he was stationed there. Then he ended up in the Philippines with the Bureau of Forestry in the government. So, though the volunteers did add a new

dimension, in terms of helping the military government, the evidence seems to show that in fact much of what was done was the function of professional military officers. They had picked up things during their careers that enabled them to engage in a very successful effort of military government and pacification in the Philippines.

III

IMPACT OF THE ASIAN EXPERIENCE ON THE AMERICAN MILITARY

THE ORIENT AND U.S. NAVAL STRATEGY

Paul R. Schratz

The Pacific is the ocean bride of America. China, Japan and Corea, with their innumerable islands, hanging like necklaces around them, are the handmaidens. California is the bridal chamber where all the wealth of the Orient will be brought to celebrate the wedding day. Let us see to it that the "bridegroom cometh" . . . Let us determine whilst yet there is time, that no commercial rival nor hostile flag shall float with impunity over the long swell of the Pacific. (Commodore Robert W. Shufeldt, 1868)

In the infancy of the United States Government in the 1790s, a number of individuals supported a union of the Navy with the Department of State and of the Army with the Department of the Interior. Whatever the merits of the proposal, there was no question that the historic role of the Navy, particularly in the Orient, was far closer to the State Department than to the Army. The U.S. merchant marine was the world's second largest in the 1790s with as many as thirty ships a year in Chinese ports. A U.S. Fleet was stationed in Asia more or less continuously from 1835 for the protection of American military, political and economic interest.¹ Secretary of the Navy James C. Dobbin defined the Navy's mission in Asia in a letter to Captain James Armstrong, newly appointed commander of the Far East Squadron in 1855:

The primary objects of the Government...in maintaining a Naval Force in the East India and China Seas are, the protection of our valuable trade with China and the isles of India, and our whale fisheries...to protect the persons or property of American citizens by persuasive yet firm measures...to enlarge the opportunities of commercial intercourse and to increase the efficiency of our Navy by affording active service to the Officers and crews of vessels ordered to that station.²

Hence the threads of naval policy in Asia long predated the twentieth century.

The brilliantly planned and executed operation by Commodore Perry in 1853-1854 brought the Industrial Revolution to Japan.³ Perry's ships, appearing unannounced out of the fog on Yedo Bay the morning of 8 July 1853, were not sailing ships but ironbottomed, smoke-belching monsters powered by an unseen force, the first steamships even seen in Japan. Steam propulsion made maritime commerce independent of wind and sea, but these vessels did require coaling stations and refit facilities.⁴

Perry, the first American official to foresee military, commercial and political problems in East Asia as a unity, developed a magnificent strategy for American dominance of the San Francisco-Tokyo-Shanghai trade routes.⁵ On his own authority, Perry encouraged the head of the British colony in the Bonin Islands, southeast of Tokyo, to declare "independence." He "recognized" the new "state" for the U.S. and executed a treaty for base rights with the new "sovereignty."⁶ In Naha, Okinawa, Perry obtained base rights for a coaling station and recreation area for \$10 a month, and claimed a U.S. protectorate over Formosa with another base at Keelung controlling the approaches to China.⁷ Britain did not intend to move into the field; Spain was quiescent and there was no competition from Japan. Perry's strategic plan, for the only time in U.S. history before 1945, gave America undisputed control of thirty million square miles of ocean in the central and western Pacific.⁸

Unfortunately, the Secretary of State was "embarrassed." The U.S. Government was indifferent, and the American people as usual were pre-occupied with domestic problems. The Civil War was just over the horizon and a ruinous sea war by both North and South was soon to deliver blows to the American merchant marine from which it never recovered.

The problem of Asia gave momentum to the rebirth of strategic thought in the Navy in the 1880s.⁹ The pattern of ideas to which Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan was to give such persuasive expression after 1890 was the product of ten years of vigorous discussion within the Navy.¹⁰ Mahan's imperialism and the impetus of commercial rivalry in the Orient with Britain, Germany and Japan had far-reaching effects. The war with Spain in 1898 to free Cuba from Spanish influence in the Caribbean was suddenly transformed to the Philippines eight thousand miles away.

Admiral Dewey's destruction of the Spanish Pacific Fleet in Manila, glorious victory that it was, hardly supported a national strategic objective. The Philippines could not be returned to Spain. They could not be allowed to pass to France or Germany, American commercial rivals in the Orient. The islands were unfit for self-government, and a possible British protectorate was opposed by Congress, the press and the American people. The remaining alternative, acquisition, brought the U.S. into rivalry with Europeans in China and left Dewey with no force beyond the range of his guns and no hope of controlling the large and hostile Philippine population. Without both ships and bases in the western Pacific, acquisition was a clear strategic liability; in terms of national policy, whatever freedom of choice had existed was largely foreclosed by the drive to destroy the Spanish Fleet.¹¹

None of the strategic planning of that era was backed by a body of doctrine or an administrative organization to implement policy. The plan for attacking the Philippines was the brain-child of one William Warren

Kimble, U.S. Navy, then 46 years old and already a lieutenant.¹² Kimble, in the Office of Naval Intelligence, submitted his plan directly to the Secretary of the Navy. No concept of diplomacy lay behind his Philippine strategy, no consideration of the consequent American involvement in East Asian rivalries. It was a secondary, almost incidental plan to be undertaken merely to humiliate and embarrass Spain. But in the absence of any other readily available plan, it won the approval of Teddy Roosevelt and the Secretary, and Admiral Dewey became the executor.¹³

The imperialist drive for colonies was sweeping the U.S. and the other great powers. Within the eight weeks immediately preceding Admiral Dewey's victory at Manila on 1 May 1898, Germany had grabbed Kiaochow on 6 March, Russia took Port Arthur and Talienwan on 27 March, Britain seized Weihaiwei on 2 April, and France snatched Kwangshu Bay on 22 April.¹⁴ The Navy soon joined the rush, urging an advanced base in Samsah Bay on the South China coast plus a major fleet base in the Philippines.¹⁵ East Asia had suddenly become the cockpit of European rivalries; the downfall of China seemed likely. American businessmen pressed to protect potential markets in China. Secretary of State John Hay was presented with an exceptionally difficult problem, either to preserve the long-term cooperative American policy with China on the one hand or to join the rush for territory on the other.¹⁶

Secretary Hay's solution of the Open Door was the development of an East Asian policy originating from a request of the Chinese themselves in 1842 when Commodore Kearny negotiated a "most favored nation" agreement with the governor of Canton.¹⁷ The Chinese sought equal treatment with all foreign nations to prevent exploitation by any single nation. In 1900 the Open Door sustained the American respect for the territorial integrity of East Asian nations and isolation from their politics, but it made strategic defense impossible.¹⁸ Not able to afford fleets and naval bases in East Asia, the U.S. sought to win by propitiation what European nations took by force.¹⁹ Attempting to preserve American interests in China by purely diplomatic means without the force necessary to support his policy, Hay, like President Monroe in 1823, could do no more than announce to the world America's good intentions.²⁰ But in forming a new strategic policy in Asia, one cardinal truth escaped both the political and military leaders. They failed to recognize that where the growing rivalries of European nations in the Caribbean could be counterbalanced by the U.S. fleet, in the Pacific the Open Door, without the fleet, undermined U.S. security. Even if the U.S. had a two-ocean Navy, the dominant fleet would have to be stationed in the Atlantic.²¹

Japan, meanwhile, anxious over Russian and possibly French domination in East Asia, signed the first of the Anglo-Japanese alliances on 30 January 1902, formally ending her "splendid isolation." Britain, too,

could breathe a bit more easily in her alliance with Japan, but the historic U.S. no-entanglements policy left the American military in a bind.²² As a counter, therefore, the General Board sought the establishment of an Asian fleet built around a division of battleships and competitive with other fleets in the area, the construction of a war base in the Philippines, and again the acquisition of an advanced base in China.²³ President Teddy Roosevelt, however, strongly advised by Captain Mahan never to divide the fleet, moved all the battleships to the Atlantic in 1903. His judgment appeared to be vindicated in 1904-1905 when the Japanese destroyed both Russian fleets in detail. When the Anglo-Japanese alliance was renewed in 1905, Roosevelt, to impress the Japanese, made the spectacular decision to send sixteen battleships in the Great White Fleet around the world in 1907-1908. The U.S. then negotiated agreements with the Japanese, in effect recognizing Japanese preeminence in Korea, Manchuria and Formosa in exchange for a pledge of no aggressive intent against the Philippines and Hawaii.²⁴

The net effect was a mythical protection of the American Achilles heel of the Philippines behind a Maginot Line of Japanese paper pledges. American reluctance to seek alliances left imperial America adrift without a friend in a cruel, cruel world.²⁵ In reality, America's safety was founded on the balance of power, maintained in the Caribbean by counterbalancing European rivalries and in the Pacific by the rivalry of Japan and Russia. Roosevelt accepted the role of mediator following the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 in the belief that American interests required a balance in East Asia in order to guarantee the integrity and independence of the great mass of China lying between Russia and Japan.

The first strategic plan for defense of U.S. interests in Asia—the first modern war plan in U.S. history—was Plan ORANGE, completed in 1914. (Plan BLACK against Germany was completed at the same time.) As the naval strategists saw it, logistics dominated the problem. The vast distances in the Pacific set up special problems. If naval strength could not be built up in the area where the decisive battle would be fought, the national calamity would be as great as if the fleet itself were inferior to the enemy. By way of the Panama Canal, Pearl Harbor, Midway and Guam, it would take a major force sixty-eight days to reach Manila, whereas the Japanese fleet and troop transports could be in the Philippines in eight days. The Army mission, therefore, required a defense of Corregidor for at least sixty days. Guam was the vital strategic point of control; the Navy visualized that the decisive battle would be fought within a 1200-mile radius of that island.²⁶

War planning as a whole in the U.S., one must emphasize, was a forbidden subject with service secretaries, presidents and the American public. Most feared that planning for war would make war more likely. Since any war plan must be anchored in policy, plans also reflected the

weaknesses of policy. The U.S. non-alliance policy would not support planning for coalition warfare; Plan ORANGE, therefore, postulated a war between only the U.S. and Japan, a highly unrealistic assumption.²⁷

U.S. Navy requirements under Plan ORANGE were developed in the summer and autumn of 1915 in light of the war in Europe. The great Naval Act of 1916 to build a Navy second to none was approved by Congress and President Wilson, but it is of cardinal importance to recognize that neither Wilson nor the naval strategists recommended the new Navy for World War I needs. They wanted the fleet for the postwar era.²⁸ The General Board believed that:

At the close of the present war, it is not improbable that the defeated belligerents, with the connivance and perhaps participation of the victors, may seek to recoup their war losses and to expand at the expense of the new world. On the other hand, perhaps soon, the victor may challenge the United States. . . . The naval policy should therefore make the United States secure in the Western Atlantic, the Caribbean and the Pacific Oceans at the earliest possible moment.²⁹

American strategic planning from 1890 to 1917 was entirely defensive. The exception, the only offensive plan to be found, was Lieutenant Kimball's, the result of which was the acquisition of Guam and the Philippines, both strategic liabilities. The problem of defending these outposts, repeatedly proclaimed as vital by military leaders and diplomats, was never accepted as a responsibility by the Congress. At no time in U.S. history was there a serious attempt at making fortification of these Pacific outposts even minimally adequate to defend against assaults from the sea.

World War I gave Japan a strong impetus toward naval dominance in the western Pacific and reasons to see the U.S. as an enemy.³⁰ The General Board and the Secretary of the Navy, therefore, in 1921, sought the termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance as a primary goal of U.S. policy. The ambitious Navy building program of 1916 was designed to break the Anglo-Japanese alliance by building a U.S. fleet larger than both Britain and Japan. Failing this objective, disarmament became the only means of reducing forces on both sides.³¹ The termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was placed on the agenda of the Washington Arms Limitation Conference and was finally achieved in the Four Power Pact of 13 December 1921.³² The Washington Conference carried major consequences for Pacific strategy, setting up a blueprint for a whole new order of sea power.³³ The pertinent results of the treaty were the acceptance of the 5:5:3 ratios in capital ships for the U.S., Britain, and Japan, reduction in total capital ship tonnage, tonnage limits on specific classes of vessels, and a ban on further development of bases and fortifications in the western Pacific.

The U.S. Navy was deeply discouraged at the severity of the reductions, but the Washington treaty limitations were probably the best the

Navy could hope for. Sharp reductions in armaments after the war were inevitable. A negotiated agreement among all the major powers was preferable to unilateral U.S. reductions. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was replaced by an Anglo-American understanding and Japanese expansion was checked in the Pacific for a projected ten year period. But Japan became convinced that war with the U.S. was now inevitable, and began strategic planning for that contingency in 1921.³⁵

The concession to the Japanese that the U.S. would not fortify Pacific islands, combined with sharp U.S. force reductions, seemed to concede Japanese hegemony over the western Pacific. Nevertheless, the agreement was strategically sound. The concession was necessary to obtain Japanese pledges to respect the Open Door in China and to compensate for termination of her naval alliance with Britain. Congress was extremely unlikely to support U.S. fortifications in any event: Guam and the Philippines had been American possessions for twenty-three years and had no military or naval development. Norman Graebner cites the Washington treaty as the first successful use of arms control to improve national security.³⁶

Other strategic advantages accrued. Making virtue out of necessity, Navy planners were exceptionally farsighted in converting treaty-limited battle cruiser hulls into the large aircraft carriers *Lexington* and *Saratoga*, both of which were to play vital roles in World War II. The large carriers induced battleship admirals to accept and recognize the role of air power in the Navy.

Under the treaty limitations and the severe budget cuts which followed in the 1920s and 1930s, the strategic appraisals of the Army and Navy took remarkably different courses. When drastic force limitations reduced the Army so that it no longer had an overseas capability, it ceased planning overseas operations. Not so the Navy. Where the Army was defense-minded, the Navy after 1920 was offensive, planning a western Pacific war even when severe limitation on forces, facilities and funding made such planning largely wishful.

The combination of vast distances in the Orient and lack of support bases created acute technical problems. The General Board in 1922 called for superiority in armament and radius of action in all types of American fighting ships.³⁷ The ten-year holiday in capital ship construction under the Washington treaty was used for modernization, conversion from coal to oil, improved gunnery and air defense. The aircraft carrier task forces were ideally suited for Pacific needs. But fuel oil, ammunition and stores were still necessary; if the Navy was to be denied overseas bases, naval strategists would make their own. The Navy developed mobile bases, the marvelous underway replenishment groups which were able to keep the fleet at sea for months in World War II without dependence on advanced base facilities.³⁸ In amphibious warfare, the U.S. Marine Corps disproved

the lesson of Gallipoli, that a fortified land position cannot be taken by assault from the sea. Even beyond its outstanding record as a combat force in World War II, the Marine Corps' far greater contribution to victory was doctrinal; every U.S. and allied amphibious operation to this day owes a large debt to the Corps.³⁹ Of prime importance, both the Army and the Navy developed a nucleus of outstanding leaders, the finest in the nation's history, who were to dominate strategy in the war and for a decade thereafter.

Thinking in terms of broad ocean strategic needs, the Naval War College developed and war-gamed the Pacific strategy, then tested plans each year in annual fleet exercises conducted in the huge laboratory of the high seas. Naval leaders fostered development of dramatic new war-at-sea capabilities in amphibious and submarine operations, and in the unsurpassed use of integrated tactical air power to support fleet and Marine Corps units, so vital in the war then approaching.

The strategic concept of the Navy for that future war continued to diverge from that of the Army. The Army was oriented toward the Atlantic and unsure of its role; the threads of maritime policy, on the other hand, had matured over a century. The Navy knew in detail, for forty years, what was expected in the Pacific.⁴⁰ Admirals King, Nimitz, Halsey and Spruance claimed that the war was merely a replay of a strategy learned at the Naval War College.

By the mid-1930s the Navy was scarcely less influential than the Department of State in formulating East Asian policy.⁴¹ Japanese expansionism required a U.S. fleet capable of moving into the western Pacific to defeat the Japanese Navy. American national interests on both sides of the Pacific required a large Navy, and a large Navy required a trans-oceanic mission. The Plan ORANGE strategy, therefore, continued to stress a major fleet engagement in the western Pacific, and the need to retain bases in Luzon even after Philippine independence. Not at all reluctant to force the hand or even to dominate the State Department, Navy policy again illustrated the very different role from that of its sister service.

The Army favored withdrawing from East Asia in the mid-1930s, although constrained by tradition from meddling in national policy formation. The American acquisition of the Philippines, under the influence of the Navy, became increasingly a liability for the Army in the face of Japanese expansion. In 1935 the mandated islands in the Carolines and Marianas were welded into Japanese strategic plans effectively outflanking the U.S. position in Guam and the Philippines.⁴² Yet the Navy persisted in outdated and unrealistic elements of ORANGE strategy, and used its veto power in the Joint Army-Navy Board to block any withdrawal or strategic reappraisal by the Army.⁴³

Plan ORANGE also had operational deficiencies. It often visualized what the Navy would like to have, not what it actually had. As World War II approached, Admiral J. O. Richardson, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, pointed out deficiencies in Navy force levels and logistical readiness for war. His candor offended Washington, however, and caused his relief by President Roosevelt on the eve of Pearl Harbor.⁴⁴

Admiral Richardson had succeeded in getting Plan ORANGE put on the shelf in July of 1941 in favor of the RAINBOW Series, first issued on 1 April 1940. RAINBOW offered more flexibility through varied strategic possibilities, such as the defeat of Britain and France, which would leave the U.S. alone in defending the integrity of the Monroe Doctrine and U.S. interests in the Pacific.⁴⁵ But the RAINBOW plans, after the first one, and contrary to all ORANGE Plans from 1923 through 1940, failed to include the critically important assumption that war "will be precipitated without notice."⁴⁶ ORANGE had also included, after March 1937, a strong warning regarding Pearl Harbor as a likely Japanese objective. But in RAINBOW Number Five, both the warning of a surprise attack and of Pearl Harbor as a likely objective were dropped from the war plan.⁴⁷ That plan was in effect on 7 December 1941.

It is an old cliché that "when the going gets tough, the tough get going," and when war came it was the brilliant and indomitable Admiral Ernest J. King who picked up the pieces in his dual role as Chief of Naval Operations and Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.⁴⁸ King, favoring the Pacific throughout the war, never accepted fully the "Germany first" objective.⁴⁹ At the Trident conference of the Combined British-American Chiefs of Staff in Washington in May 1943, he educated the British on his Pacific strategy. He asserted that:

...the United States Navy, based on study of the strategy for a war against Japan for the past thirty or forty years by the best minds at the Naval War College and the Navy Department, saw the Philippines as the key. Given the wealth of natural resources and the proximity to the raw materials of the "Southern Resources Area," they had always been considered a prime target for Japanese aggression. The U.S. Navy expected to defend the Philippines and to recapture them if they are lost. The three possible approaches to the recovery are first, a straight line from Hawaii through the Central Pacific; the other two to the north and south of that line. For a number of reasons the Central Pacific approach was best. In any case the Japanese fleet had to be defeated and the Marianas Islands assaulted and taken. The Marianas were the key. The use of China as a base was required, with Chinese manpower to secure and maintain it, and ports in Formosa abreast or south of Formosa. Luzon was the key to opening sea routes to ports in China, hence Luzon was the general objective in the Central Pacific. The Central Pacific has priority over the advance from the Southwest Pacific to Mindanao; Mindanao will not open ports in China and is important only to aid reoccupation of the Philippines.⁵⁰

The Navy's central Pacific goals of Formosa and China, developed over a century, found no support from General Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur favored a single drive from the southwest using the total allied

resources. He saw the dual drive, central and southwest, as "two weak thrusts" which would delay victory over Japan by six months. Despite MacArthur's objections, the dual offensive was approved by the combined U.S.-British Chiefs at Cairo and planning proceeded on this basis.⁵¹

President Roosevelt was soon to demonstrate his support for Admiral King's plan, which reinforced his own view of the role of China. Roosevelt had always felt a sentimental attachment to China and spoke of it often. His ancestors had traded with China but his reasons for including China among the Great Powers were far more than sentiment. He had no illusions about Chiang Kai-shek. Many internal reforms were necessary to make China an effective and morally acceptable partner; he assumed it would take two or three generations. But a stabilizing power was needed in Asia and China's 400 million people would be a natural buffer to Japan and the Soviet Union; in any event it was better to have the 400 million as friends than enemies.⁵²

Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy in the twenties, had long been familiar with the Navy's Pacific goals. Shortly after the Pearl Harbor attack, therefore, Roosevelt approved a very unusual recommendation by Admiral King to send a naval officer to China "to find out what's going on there." He chose Commander (later Vice Admiral) Milton E. Miles, who had spent much of his career in the Orient. Miles, as special emissary of the President and leading edge of King's China plan, was given super-secret word of mouth orders from King to "go to China and set up some bases as soon as you can. The main idea is to prepare the China coast in any way you can for U.S. Navy landings in three or four years. In the meantime, do whatever you can to help the Navy and to heckle the Japanese."⁵³

Miles' Naval Group China operated within the Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO) under the notorious Chinese General Tai Li. In one of the most incredible stories in military history, SACO set up a network of weather stations and coast watchers which passed vital information to General Chennault's Flying Tigers and to American submarines and carrier air forces. They manufactured booby traps and magnetic mines and trained 25,000 river pirates to prey on Japanese shipping. In one period of little more than a year, SACO-trained guerrillas reported over a thousand engagements in which nearly 27,000 Japanese soldiers were killed, 11,000 wounded and 508 captured. SACO lost only six hundred dead. They destroyed hundreds of trains, vehicles, ships, warehouses and bridges, and rescued seventy-six allied airmen. Miles operated a camel corps in Chinese Turkestan; his Navy lieutenants led cavalry charges against Japanese tank columns and created havoc throughout Japanese and Communist-held areas from the windswept Gobi Desert to the torrid jungles of Vietnam.⁵⁴ He and Tai Li trained 100,000 guerrillas and by June 1945 they had taken control of the ports of Wenchow, Foochow and much

of Amoy from the Japanese.⁵⁵ Miles and Tai Li were both wanted men: four times Miles escaped the assassin.

Miles and the Navy's China operation soon became the focal point of a deep and far-reaching crisis in U.S.-China policy following the collapse of Japan. Miles was totally confident that U.S. policy of a "coalition government of Nationalists and Communists...seeking jointly to solve China's economic and social problems" had no chance for success.⁵⁶ Throughout the bitter factionalism and interservice disputes in China and Washington, Admiral King strongly supported Miles and the Navy strategy seeking to knock Japan out of the war *after* landings in China. The war news from the primary fronts in the Pacific was highly encouraging. The Navy-Marine Corps drive across the central Pacific was sufficiently ahead of schedule to allow a shortcut. King thought Japanese forces in the Philippines were no longer a threat to his flank and merited a new look in the strategic plan. He had consistently argued that the defeat of Japan would satisfy America's obligation to liberate the Filipinos; he urged his fellow chiefs to strike from the Marianas to Formosa, then use Formosa as a springboard to drive the Japanese out of China and complete the isolation of the Japanese home islands.⁵⁷

So thoroughly had the economic blockade of Japan by submarine and carrier-based air power cut off the life's blood of the empire that Japanese industry had collapsed. Scores of factories lay idle, lacking raw materials and energy sources to keep them operating. The fuel shortage was so acute that Japanese pilots were going into combat with as little training as an hour and a half of solo flying. With its warmaking machine effectively destroyed, King could see only limited value in the strategic air campaign against Japan.

The B-29 bomber had been designed for a European requirement where it was not needed. The high priority given the production would have been an embarrassment, therefore, unless the airplane's utility could be demonstrated in the war. General Hap Arnold approached the Navy strategists in the summer of 1943 for support on a plan to use B-29s based in the central Pacific against the Japanese home islands.⁵⁸ The Navy at the time was planning deep strikes into the Japanese defensive ring, a plan which was opposed by General MacArthur as premature. King and Arnold, therefore, mutually supported each other's plan, and obtained General Marshall's approval over MacArthur. King, however, held out for only four bomber groups based in the Marianas rather than the twelve desired by Arnold.⁵⁹

The Joint Chiefs on 4 May 1944 affirmed the intention to land in the Philippines, Formosa and the China coast. The China landing, Admiral King wrote, sought to "supply and utilize Chinese manpower as the ultimate land force in defeating the Japanese."⁶⁰ When Admiral Nimitz

then insisted the Philippines could be bypassed, MacArthur blew up. To resolve the disagreement, President Roosevelt and Admiral Leahy went to Pearl Harbor on 27 July 1944 to meet with MacArthur, Nimitz and Halsey. MacArthur gave a passionate plea not to bypass the Philippines; Roosevelt was unconvinced but accepted a modified Philippine offensive substituting Luzon for MacArthur's choice of Mindanao. With the capture of Okinawa, however, the plan for landings on Formosa was killed, and along with it went the long standing Navy plan for a China campaign.⁶¹

Thus the Navy plan for the Pacific, a fragmentary vision of Commodore Perry in 1854, developed by the Naval War College in the 1920s and 1930s, and brilliantly executed by King, Nimitz, Halsey and Spruance, finally died. But to leave untouched the two million Japanese troops in China and Manchuria raised the possibility that the Japanese might so strengthen their hold on the China mainland that their government might retreat there even if the home islands were to fall.⁶² Further, eliminating the landings in China made an invasion of Japan not only more necessary but much more difficult. Above all, it delayed for thirty years the possible resolution of the China problem and the eventual accommodation of U.S. policy with Maoism, and led to two costly and highly unpopular wars in Korea and Vietnam.

The atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki convinced the Japanese that further resistance was hopeless. The bomb also had the psychological advantage of allowing the Japanese to save face even in surrender. In China, however, the sudden end of hostilities contributed to chaos. General George C. Marshall's final effort to prevent civil war in China by negotiating a Nationalist-Maoist coalition was foredoomed to failure. Given the hopeless position of Chiang Kai-shek—too weak to rule, too strong to be overthrown—Marshall made no progress against the skilled diplomacy of Chou En-lai. His mission succeeded only in being condemned by both Nationalists and Communists. Marshall himself admitted failure; this great patriot suffered the ultimate indignity when Senators Joseph McCarthy and William Jenner publicly accused him of treason.⁶³

What course Chinese Communism might have taken if American forces had been brought to bear on the Chinese mainland is a question that lost opportunities have made forever unanswerable. The only certainty is that affairs could not have been worse. Even apart from idle speculation, however, the key role of the Navy in the Pacific was wholly vindicated. That role is no less vital in the world today. In the recent Blechman-Kaplan study *Force Without War*, 215 postwar crises are analyzed. Navy-Marine Corps forces were used in more than 80 percent of those incidents, and *only* Navy-Marine Corps forces in half the total.⁶⁴ Clearly the Navy is still the cutting edge of diplomacy. But again the U.S. is paying the price for the lagging will of America to rebuild its defenses. One wonders again if the national leadership, civilian and military—to whom strategy appears

more and more a lost art, and for whom hardware is now exalted over ideas—can rise above the mesmerization with technology to match the brilliance and foresight of the past generation of leaders now fading from memory.

THE UNITED STATES ARMY ON THE PACIFIC FRONTIER, 1899-1939

Roy K. Flint

While touring the Philippines in November 1902, Lieutenant General Nelson A. Miles reminisced with the members of his old regiment, the 5th Infantry, about joining as its commanding officer in 1869:

At that time the regiment was on the frontier, has been on the frontier ever since, and I now find it...still on the frontier; on the frontier of our island possessions; on the frontier of progress—even on the frontier of our civilization.¹

Miles should be forgiven the grandiloquence of his words, for he was simply expressing an expansionist outlook that enjoyed increasing popularity at the turn of the twentieth century. After the war with Spain, the United States seemed ready to abandon the continental strategy that had, along with the Monroe Doctrine, been the foundation of its foreign policy and territorial interests during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The American Army sent to the Caribbean and the Philippine Islands during the Spanish-American War did not return home as expected. Instead, the Army began an overseas tour which saw troops stationed in the Philippines, China, and Hawaii throughout most of the twentieth century. The purpose of this paper is to explore the Army's great leap from the American frontier to the Pacific frontier and to assess the impact upon the Army of service in the western Pacific.

Overseas expansion began long before the Spanish-American War. Acquiring Midway Island by discovery in 1859, Alaska by purchase in 1867, Pago-Pago in Samoa by treaty in 1877, and the use of Pearl Harbor as a naval base in 1884, the United States revealed an appetite for expansion overseas even before consolidating its continental possessions. Not until the Spanish-American War, however, did the United States Government make an avowed commitment to an overseas empire. In 1898 and 1899, the United States added a part of Samoa, annexed all of Hawaii, and took the Philippine Islands and Guam from Spain. It also strengthened control over the Latin American states ringing the Caribbean by annexing Puerto Rico and securing permanent access to a base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. Linking the Caribbean with the Pacific came soon thereafter with completion of the Panama Canal. Almost overnight, the United States came of age as a maritime power, fulfilling the hopes of certain influential

economic, political, colonial, and naval interests and acquiring a whole new set of international and strategic problems. President William McKinley explained the Pacific frontier as the expression of an American responsibility to provide guidance and protection to the Filipinos; others, looking beyond to China, saw that, in Richard Challener's words, "An insular empire, stretching from Hawaii to the Philippines, would ensure America's ability to tap the China market and become a Far Eastern power."²

Naval officers joined the alliance of expansionists rapidly and enthusiastically. Guided by Alfred Thayer Mahan's vision of sea power, they saw great advantage for the nation and the naval service in preserving law and order in those parts of the world touched by the Monroe Doctrine, and later, the Open Door Policy. Of the two, the Open Door Policy in China served better to enhance the American position of power and influence among the great states of Europe.³ Therefore, the Philippines and Hawaii became strategically important naval and military bases, enabling the United States to become an active enforcer of the treaty system in China and to preserve the Open Door, even if only by international cooperation.

Unlike the officers of their sister-service, Army officers were less inclined to look overseas for their challenges; their concerns were at home. After the Civil War, there were no serious external threats to the security of the United States. Concerned with reconstructing the social, political, and economic fabric of the nation, Congress felt justified in economizing on military expenditures. The government was content to rely on a relatively small, widely dispersed army to police the South, guard the sea and land frontiers, and to control the Indians in the West. Once reconstruction of the South had ended, the bulk of the Army dispersed along the western frontier in the Indian campaigns. Fighting Indians, although affording the only opportunities to gain combat experience, was unsophisticated, unconventional and sporadic. The Indian campaigns severely taxed the scattered little army. Moreover, the Indian Wars never received the wholehearted commitment of the Army. Innovative officers recognized the special conditions of Indian fighting and devised unorthodox solutions to their tactical problems on an *ad hoc* basis, but the Army devised no doctrine to guide military campaigns against the Indians.⁴ In fact, Robert M. Utley concluded that "military leaders looked upon Indian warfare as a fleeting bother. Today's conflict or tomorrow's would be the last, and to develop a special system for it seemed hardly worthwhile."⁵ Looking back from his position as Secretary of War after the turn of the century, Elihu Root criticized preceding administrations and Congress for forcing the Army to concentrate on meeting the demands of day-to-day routine. War, he concluded, had no great influence on shaping the Army; the unfortunate result was an elaborate system adapted to financial accountability and

economy of expenditure.⁶ Lacking governmental support, the Army could never really organize for war.

Yet to organize for war was precisely what many officers of the late nineteenth century Army wanted to do. They studied the theory, doctrine, and procedures of modern European armies. They prepared for a war that was the least likely to occur while ignoring the one against the Indians in which they were engaged. Emory Upton converted insights about the technology of the breech-loading rifle and rapid-firing artillery into doctrinal manuals, and he tried to cope with the quandary of maneuvering tactical units which could not be dispersed beyond the limits of effective command and control on battlefields of high lethality. In this he was only following the lead of European theorists seeking solutions to the same problem, for he was frank to admit that "it is to the armies of Europe that we ought to look for the best military models. . . ." ⁷ Fortunately, he and other reform-minded officers also thought about problems unique to the American scene, problems such as organization of the War Department, creation of a general staff, and relations between the Secretary of War, the commanding general, and the bureaus.⁸

Although their greatest achievements were yet to come, the efforts of nineteenth century Army reformers were not entirely in vain. By the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, the Army was still small, isolated, and dispersed, but tactical theory had evolved since the Civil War from the rigid, shoulder-to-shoulder regimental formations directed by field officers to reliance on smaller dispersed formations under command of junior officers and noncommissioned officers. Drill regulations emphasized realistic use of the terrain and the combined power of fire and maneuver, all carefully integrated with the latest technology, including the recently issued Krag-Jorgensen rifle.⁹ Ironically, theory, doctrine, and technology, modeled after the latest European thinking, readied the Army to fight the Spanish effectively, but failed to recognize that a greater challenge would come fighting against worthy successors to the Apache and Sioux, the Filipino soldiers of Emilio Aguinaldo.

Cuba had been the focal point of the war. Commodore George Dewey's victory over the Spanish fleet at Manila made the Philippines American for military rather than political reasons. Yet as John M. Gates said, "McKinley and the nation were faced with an opportunity for imperialistic expansion that could not be ignored."¹⁰ To bring some kind of systematic control to the new empire, President McKinley and his successor, Theodore Roosevelt, were forced by unexpected circumstances to keep the Army deployed after the end of the war with Spain. The Philippine War, an unwanted complication, for years tied down the bulk of the standing Army and a large volunteer force in the Philippines. In the summer of 1900 the Boxer Rebellion in China caused the temporary mobilization of naval forces and 15,000 American troops as part of an allied force

which sought to stabilize China's internal politics.¹¹ These developments, along with the Cuban and Puerto Rican occupations, forced the Army to establish procedures enabling it to command and support military forces deployed worldwide on a permanent basis. Clearly, the first impact of service on the Pacific frontier was the expansion and modernization of the Army.

Expansion began with the war against Spain. When Congress declared war on 25 April 1898, the Regular Army consisted of 28,183 officers and men and the supplies and ammunition needed by that force alone. In the thirty days that followed, Congress granted a temporary increase in the authorized strength of the Regular Army to almost 64,700 and created a volunteer army of more than 216,000 from state and national volunteer units. When the war ended on 12 August 1898, 274,717 officers and men were on active duty.¹²

With the administration's decision to retain its territorial gains from the war with Spain, the Army had to face the problem of governing and administering the new possessions. Almost immediately the volunteers began to depart for home and the Regular Army began to return to its authorized peacetime strength. When this process of demobilization was well underway, the Philippine War erupted in February 1899, catching the Army with only 21,000 regulars and volunteers left in the Philippines, a strength totally inadequate to cope with the new situation.¹³ From that moment on, the Philippine War became the main business of the Army. All that the Army did, except for the brief excursion into China, was aimed at building and supporting the forces engaged in pacifying the Philippines.

Before Elihu Root's appointment as Secretary of War, Congress had recognized the difficult straits of the Army in the Philippines. On 2 March 1899, Congress granted an increase in the peacetime strength of the Army to 64,000 and permitted the raising of 35,000 volunteers to serve in the Philippines for two years.¹⁴ Root assumed his responsibilities on 1 August. By November Root had met the manpower goals and the new units were in or en route to the Philippines.

When the Army sent troops to China in the summer of 1900, the gap rapidly widened between the number of troops needed to support the new empire in the Pacific and the actual number of troops available. General Miles, the Commanding General, observed that the Army had not one-quarter the men left in the United States required to man coastal fortifications and to protect life and property on the western frontier. Moreover there were insufficient troops to relieve those serving in the tropics where health problems were serious. He lectured the expansionists on the fundamental truth about expansion:

The events of the past two years and a half have resulted in a condition that the nation must be prepared to meet. The need for an efficient and well-organized force for an indefinite period in the future is most obvious, and organization of such a force cannot wisely be avoided.¹⁵

Quality was as great a problem as numbers. Miles pointed out that there was a marked distinction between permanent, or regular, and temporary organizations. The latter did not sever their connections with home, and found long overseas service burdensome. In truth, only one-half of a volunteer's two-year tour could be effectively utilized in the Philippines, and thus volunteers became a costly way to provide the needed manpower. What Miles wanted was a standing army large enough to provide a permanent rotating reserve.¹⁶

Congress did not ignore the efforts of Root and Miles to create a large Regular Army to carry out the new national policy. On 2 February 1901, it passed a new manpower act that completed the transformation of the "frontier army" of the West to the "frontier army" of the Pacific. The Act of 1901 authorized an increase in the peacetime strength of the Regular Army to 100,619 officers and men, provided for a staff to serve with troops, and permitted the raising of a force of Filipinos and a Puerto Rican regiment.¹⁷ Annual expenditure patterns during this period also reflected the permanent growth of the Army. Between 1871—the year that post-Civil War spending bottomed out at \$35 million—and 1898, spending for the Army exceeded \$50 million in only three years. After the onset of the Spanish-American War, it never again fell below \$112 million, and from 1906 on, spending jumped to half a billion and grew steadily thereafter.¹⁸

Although the demands for administration and internal security of the overseas territories were immediate and urgent, Root genuinely believed that the real purpose of the Army was to prepare for war. As his annual reports evolved, he argued persuasively that officers had to make a systematic study of plans for action under all contingencies of possible conflict. To do this effectively, they needed to study the larger problem of military science in order to understand thoroughly the state of the art. To be competitive, the Army had to modernize the materiel of war, keeping pace with technology and adapting itself to conditions anticipated in the contingency plans. And finally, to be successful in battle, the Army had to conduct realistic training of officers and men in the maneuver of large bodies of troops.¹⁹ Clearly Root was interested in preparing for war against a modern European power rather than against native guerrilla bands.

Driven by a progressive zeal for greater efficiency and stimulated by those officers who had sought reform in the late nineteenth century, Root achieved considerable progress in laying the institutional foundations for

success in modern war, although not all reforms were complete when he left office. After the Act of 1901 greatly expanded the Regular Army, Root broadened the educational base for Army officers. Timothy K. Nenninger, who has carefully studied professional education in the Army during this period, believes that this was probably Root's greatest accomplishment, and its success was central to all his other reforms.²⁰ Root recognized that the vast majority of regular officers who had entered the service since the war with Spain had considerable combat experience in the Philippines, but virtually no systematic and technical education upon which to build professional skills. He therefore created garrison schools and service schools to teach tactical and administrative duties to junior officers. In 1902 he reopened the Infantry and Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth which had been closed during the war, and then changed it to a staff college to prepare middle grade officers to attend the War College. In November 1903 he established the Army War College, the top educational institution, to train senior officers for service on the General Staff.²¹ Creation of the General Staff, as the planning, coordinating, and supervisory head of the Army under a newly conceived position of Chief of Staff was itself a major organizational and legislative accomplishment and it promised more effective management.

At the same time that the Army expanded, reinvigorated its professional school system, and restructured its top leadership and management, it also turned its attention to the last of Root's objectives, realistic training. In General Miles' report for 1900, the Army Inspector General decried the state of training as the Army's most deficient condition.²² Dispersion of the Army continued to make large-unit training difficult if not impossible. This condition lasted almost until World War I; Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson still complained about the political obstacles to concentration in 1912.²³ Nevertheless, in extension of its recognition of the need for military education, Congress began to appropriate money for maneuvers in 1902. Joint maneuvers held in New England that year were the start of large-scale exercises designed to simulate combat. Even so, it was an uneven beginning; in 1906 Congress appropriated \$700,000 for maneuvers, but since there were so few troops in the United States, none was held. By 1910, considerable progress had been made, however, and field maneuvers became more complex and involved larger formations in the European style.²⁴

While service on the Pacific frontier may have triggered the reforms of the first decade of the century, the object of those reforms was not just to establish an effective colonial army. True, the demands of colonial administration and internal security forced the United States to expand the Army to accomplish new missions. But reorganization, education, and overall modernization prepared the Army to wage war effectively against modern armies of the European mold. The Pacific frontier, in a way, simply offered the opportunity for military reformers to put into effect

ideas that had been growing since Upton's time. Nevertheless, it was in East Asia that American leaders chose to establish a new frontier. From 1900 on the Army stationed a large percentage of its forces in the western Pacific.

Long-range support of military forces radically transformed logistics. Transportation of large bodies of troops and supplies within the Caribbean, and between the West Coast of the United States and Manila—and later to China—required the creation of a large fleet of ocean transports. To support troops in China, for example, the Army had to ship the entire base from the United States. Horses, mules, wagons, oats and hay, construction materials, food, clothing, and ammunition had to be funneled into the already overburdened line of communications between the West Coast and Manila. At home, quartermaster operations expanded to manage the supply and quality of uniforms, field rations, tactical transportation, and a myriad of supply details. Medical service developed dramatically to cope with the enervating effect of tropical disease. Permanent stationing of troops overseas meant major construction and road building. Even communications with the western Pacific were revolutionized with the installation of a telegraph cable from the United States.²⁵ Logistical planners thereafter became permanently wedded to the problem of global operations, and in terms of the subsequent history of the Army, the development of logistical procedures had far greater and lasting impact than did the tactical experience.

After the initial encounter with Aguinaldo's forces in February 1899, the Americans held Manila and slowly extended their perimeter into the surrounding countryside, trying not to overtax their meager numbers. Their object was to buy time until the Army could be reinforced. In the fall, in a conventional war of maneuver, the Americans first struck south and then north of Manila into the Luzon Plain. After hard marching and tough fighting, the Army occupied Northern Luzon and dispersed the Philippine Army. Early in 1900, Aguinaldo decided to abandon the unsuccessful Western-style warfare and resort to guerrilla warfare. His new concept of operations was to avoid defeat by attacking only under conditions advantageous to the small guerrilla bands. Employing ambushes against small parties of Americans and applying terror to coerce support from the Philippine population, the insurrectionists melted into the countryside where they enjoyed superior intelligence, ample supplies, and almost airtight secrecy.²⁶

As the Filipinos changed their tactics, American commanders changed theirs as well. Like the insurgents, their principal goal was to achieve surprise. Breaking into small units—the battalion became the largest maneuver force—American units gradually spread out over the islands until one or two companies occupied most of the largest towns. From these centers, American troops learned lasting lessons about small unit combat opera-

tions as they brought pressure to bear on the insurrectionist bands.²⁷ In these actions, infantry was the main offensive arm, but patrol duty was so demanding on the foot soldiers that many regiments mounted riflemen to pursue small bands of the enemy. For similar reasons, cavalry patrolled in small units and came to be particularly valued for its mobility. So desirable were mounted units that the Americans hired trusted Filipinos to serve as mounted scouts and cavalry. As might be expected, artillery declined in importance in difficult terrain where observed fire was impossible, and that which was not horse drawn served mainly as defensive weapons.²⁸ But combat operations, important as they were to the professional development of officers and soldiers, were never the most important dimension of the effort to pacify the Filipinos.

The subtle integration of military government and pacification measures, including combat, was the greatest accomplishment of the Army in its entire East Asian experience prior to World War II.²⁹ Army commanders were forced to face the inescapable fact that unlike Indians, who could be herded onto reservations, eight million Filipinos—many of them hostile—had to be governed in place. Adopting a policy of benevolence toward the people to win their support, the Army reorganized civilian government throughout the islands. American soldiers performed police work, established public health measures, established and taught schools, built roads and telegraph lines, and then trained Filipinos to take over these civil functions. Nevertheless, Army commanders found in late 1900 that the terrorism practiced by Aguinaldo's guerrilla bands was far more effective in controlling the populace than was the benevolence of the Army. After careful study and thorough discussion with his subordinates as well as with Filipino leaders, Major General Arthur MacArthur modified the policy of benevolence by invoking the old Civil War General Order 100 of 1863, rewarding acts of loyalty to the American-sponsored government and inflicting stern punishments, to include execution, for aiding the insurrectionists. Within a year, the populace responded as hoped to MacArthur's balanced treatment; wholesale surrender of arms and soldiers, encouraged in all probability by Aguinaldo's capture and his subsequent recanting, resulted in last-ditch resistance only in the province of Batangas, south of Manila on the island of Samar, and among the Moros of the southern islands.³⁰ In spite of the success of the pacification, however, virtually nothing that was learned in the Philippines found its way into Army doctrine until years after the war officially ended.

As Utley described their comrades on the western frontier in an earlier day, Army officers thought "European" and at first seemed to view war against Aguinaldo's insurrectionists as "a fleeting bother," hardly worthy of a special system. In 1904 a new *Infantry Drill Regulations* adopted the formal style and language of its nineteenth century predecessor and contained no evidence that the Army was or had been hotly engaged with Filipino and Moro warriors. In the following year, a new *Field Service*

Regulations reflected no tactical changes resulting from combat experience in the Philippines. When Arthur Wagner's *Organization and Tactics* appeared again in 1906, nothing had been added by the revisionists to update recent experience with either the Indians or the Filipinos. *Field Service Regulations* published in 1908 and 1910 addressed changes brought about by machine guns, aeroplanes, and telecommunications, but did not mention irregular warfare.³¹

Finally in 1911, the Army produced *Infantry Drill Regulations* that broke entirely new ground. Written in a less formal style, the manual for the first time drew a clear distinction between drill and preparation for combat. It stated clearly, from the very first sentence, that success in battle was the ultimate object of all training. The authors emphasized "elastic" movements and "simplicity," discussed the purpose and nature of field exercises—clearly showing a connection with the concurrent interest in large-scale maneuvers—and even included a section on "Minor Warfare." Defined as both small unit actions against regulars and operations against irregulars, "Minor Warfare" was aptly named, for the Army allocated less than 2 pages, in a total of 528, to describe the special conditions associated with warfare against guerrilla bands.³²

The Army's failure to synthesize a doctrine for irregular and guerrilla warfare did not go completely unnoticed. First Lieutenant Louis McLane Hamilton, an infantry officer, complained in an article in 1905 that he had "hoped to find in the new drill regulations [1904] some formation prescribed which would meet the conditions encountered in our island possessions."³³ Even in the absence of official doctrine, officers communicated with each other about their service in the Philippines. Articles of technical and tactical interest based on experiences similar to Hamilton's appeared frequently in the professional journals throughout the first decade of the century. During the war years and for some considerable time thereafter, the pages of both the *Army and Navy Journal* and the *Army and Navy Register* were filled with editorials, letters, reports of commanders, and other personal accounts detailing combat operations, pacification measures, the nature of the enemy, and other matters of professional interest. Not surprisingly, considerable space was also devoted to the British experiences in the Boer War, reflecting a rather comprehensive, but unofficial, coverage of warfare against irregular and guerrilla forces.³⁴

Field operations against diehard insurrectionists and the Moros continued for years. Nevertheless, life began to ease for the Army even before combat operations ended, and the military community soon began to assume the character of a colonial army. As early as 1903, George Marshall moved to Manila and enjoyed a pleasant garrison life that afforded time for recreation.³⁵ By 1907, Sergeant Richard Johnson, a great chronicler of his travels, reported finding electric streetcars, well-stocked and modern stores, and a general increase in the tempo of business. Electric lights illu-

minated the Luneta, a waterfront walk, and the Constabulary Band played evening concerts in a new park, Burnham Green.³⁶

Soldiering in Fort McKinley at Manila was relaxed and bore striking similarities to peacetime living at any Army post in the United States. Unit training was conducted in the mornings, reserving the afternoons—and the day's worst heat—for napping. Living, at least for the officers, was comfortable; there was plenty of servants and costs were low. Riding, polo, hunting, golf, and tennis provided regular diversion. In the evening, there was the usual garrison social life revolving around dances at the club, strolling and visiting neighbors, and occasional theatrical, musical or talent programs.³⁷ Although there was no sense of imminent peril, war with Japan always seemed possible, and the Army's training program incorporated maneuvers and staff rides to test the defenses of Luzon. These exercises continued on and off until the outbreak of World War II.³⁸ For the better part of four decades, then, the Army enjoyed a colonial lifestyle in the Philippines, mirrored in many ways by life in the 15th Infantry at Tientsin, China.

United States Army troops first entered China in the summer of 1900, under command of Major General Adna Chaffee, to join naval forces already there as a part of an international contingent aiming to suppress the Boxer Rebellion. Combat operations ended quickly after the allied force captured Tientsin and advanced to Peking. By 16 August the besieged legations had been relieved and Peking captured. Soon thereafter, Chaffee withdrew all forces except a legation guard of one reinforced infantry regiment. By the spring of 1901, even the legation guard had been reduced to one rifle company, subsequently replaced by Marines. So it remained until 1911.

Tottering for some time under the pressures of revolution, the Manchu Dynasty finally fell in 1911. Taking advantage of a provision in the Protocol of 7 September 1901 permitting the powers to maintain forces in China, the United States sent the first of two battalions of the 15th Infantry Regiment to China in January 1912. The second battalion arrived in 1914. The purpose of the regiment was to protect American business interests and missionaries and, as part of the allied contingent, to keep railroad communications open between Peking and Tientsin. Moreover, some believed, it maintained American prestige and upheld the commitment of the United States government to share with other powers the burden of stabilizing China. The 15th Infantry was also expected somehow to deter the Japanese from expanding at the expense of China. In fact it could do little except to show by its presence that American interest in the area remained high.³⁹ With a political purpose and little military value, the 15th Infantry settled into its barracks at Tientsin for a tour that lasted more than a quarter of a century.

Almost immediately, life for the officers and men of the 15th Infantry copied the colonial pattern of the Philippine garrison. Perhaps because its duties were largely ceremonial, the regiment became a "spit and polish" kind of outfit. Among Army officers, China duty was considered the cream of foreign service; young officers with only the finest records joined the 15th.⁴⁰ The enlisted men were all volunteers, and they liked the life in China. For many, the prospect of early return to the United States was a punishment; some never left China, even after their discharge. By the 1920s, Matthew B. Ridgway was complaining that the soldiers enjoyed a good deal of freedom and too much luxury. Largely as a result of the high living their physical condition was below par. Only a few senior noncommissioned officers were married; many of the rest, particularly the younger soldiers, lived with Chinese women. Up to 80 percent of the enlisted men lived in the Chinese city adjacent to the barracks. Even so, Charles L. Bolte observed, the entire command could respond to an alert within ten to twenty minutes. The price of good living could be high, however. Venereal disease was common, and offending soldiers were courtmartialed, cured, and sent home.⁴¹ Aside from these arrangements, social contacts revolved around drinking beer and boxing matches, where there was often more fighting outside the ring than in.⁴²

Social life for the officers was perhaps even more gracious than in the Philippines. The regiment enjoyed informal as well as official contacts with allied officers and their families, particularly with the British. Help was inexpensive and plentiful, with six to eight servants the normal complement, allowing for a rather lavish round of dinner parties at little cost except loss of sleep. Officers were also free to travel extensively throughout China, Japan, and Hong Kong.⁴³

Because the unit was isolated and lacked an operational commitment, training suffered as the regiment adapted to the eccentricities of succeeding commanding officers. Brigadier General William D. Connor, commanding officer of the Army forces in the 1920s, made a good start by emphasizing language training; each officer studied Chinese an hour a day. Years later in the mid-1930s, Colonel Reynolds J. Burt considered the Chinese language a "fool language," but allowed that some knowledge was probably necessary to deal with peddlers. Colonel William K. Taylor and Lieutenant Colonel George C. Marshall even tried to train their men.⁴⁴ Taylor, however encouraged intense competition between battalions, and sought ways to spruce up the troops and barracks. According to Bolte, Chinese coolies would scurry about the standing formations dusting off the shoes of the men in ranks. Officers and soldiers who would normally be armed with .45-caliber pistols wore exact wooden replicas instead to prevent their belts from sagging. One battalion even put stovepipe in the blanket rolls instead of blankets. Colonel Burt, who followed Taylor to the regiment, loved that sort of thing and encouraged its contin-

uance. In fact, Burt wanted nothing to do with tactical training or the Chinese. His great loves were music and the stage, and he ordered companies of the regiment to present monthly entertainment. He also claimed to have written "Kings of the Highway" and ordered it played on every possible occasion. As a measure of his popularity, the band played it one last time as Burt's ship sailed away; then as a man, the musicians threw all copies of the music into Chinwangtao Harbor. Burt's successor in 1935 was Colonel G. A. Lynch, who had been director of the National Recovery Administration following Hugh Johnson. Lynch's principal interest seemed to be cost "overrun," and he began to investigate the cost-effectiveness of the activities under his command. Even a brothel in Chinwangtao felt the pressure; it hung out a sign reading: "NRA, we do our part."⁴⁵

Some training was possible. The regiment conducted range firing in the summer at Chinwangtao and weapons training and drill in the mornings at Tientsin during the rest of the year. But officers found it difficult to conduct any sort of realistic tactical training because the barracks were located inside the Chinese city, and the countryside, even if a unit could get out, was intensively farmed. About all that could be done were some elementary and unrealistic attempts to teach the squad in the attack and defense.⁴⁶ Occasionally the regiment deployed to its emergency defense position as part of the inter-allied plan to defend Tientsin. This was a half-hearted and uncoordinated effort, and Bolte, who served as the regimental operations officer for a time, recalled no exchange of views on tactical planning with the legation, the allies, or even within the 15th Infantry. "I don't think that the commanding officer that I served under ever gave a thought to it." To Bolte, soldiering in China was artificial, and the 15th Infantry was a little isolated garrison, unconcerned about what was going on in the rest of the world.⁴⁷

Bolte's assessment was probably accurate, for no one saw the 15th Infantry in China as other than a liability in war. Although briefly reinforced in 1932 by the 31st Infantry when the Japanese attacked Shanghai, for almost twenty years the main interest of the General Staff was the withdrawal of the China garrison because the conditions that led to its employment had changed so drastically. So too had the conditions surrounding the Philippine garrison, and as combat operations faded into history and the problems of colonial administration dominated their duties, officers on the frontier began to develop insights concerning the strategic issues of the pre-World War II period.

Until its overseas adventure, the Army was largely uninterested in Asian politics and the Open Door. After all, it had no intellectual leader such as Alfred Thayer Mahan; the best the Army had was Emory Upton, a military technician whose principal interests had been tactical and organizational problems. While a few Army officers, such as Arthur Mac-

Arthur, Tasker Bliss, and Leonard Wood wrote on global issues, the Navy was more experienced in international affairs and far ahead of the Army in developing a keen interest in the development of Pacific bases.

An element of opportunism in the Army revealed itself after the Spanish-American War. Some Army officers were well prepared to take advantage of events in the Philippines and China. They were schooled in such matters by a professional press that reflected the views of influential expansionists. For example, a 1901 editorial in the *Army and Navy Journal* contributed a typical justification for American hegemony over the Philippines:

While it is true that a people have a certain right to say what shall be done in a political way on their own soil, it is equally true that a narrow-minded race have not the right to shut out from use by other peoples vast natural resources. . . .⁴⁸

Leonard Wood was to become a leader of the expansionist element in the Army, writing extensively about America's rightful position of power in the international community. He was in company with other officers such as Major Morris Foote, Commanding Officer of the 9th Infantry Regiment, who when discussing the situation in China concluded that "...we better hustle around and get that little piece of river front at once, or otherwise our merchants will have to play second fiddle." Adna Chaffee believed that disorder would continue in China, and the United States should have a base as an "undisputed footing for its troops and stores." Chaffee concluded that China was going to disintegrate eventually; why not divide it among the powers sooner rather than later?⁴⁹

For a time, the Army's traditional concern for continental defense yielded to the nation's enthusiasm for territorial expansion. While a few Army officers shared the anti-imperialist's fears of colonialism, they followed orders to support the new imperial strategy and bear the white man's burden.⁵⁰ Soon, however, Army officers began a long and slow retreat back to the continental strategy.

Japanese ascendancy in the western Pacific after the defeat of Russia in 1904-1905 undermined the expansionist logic. Regardless of early suspicions among Army officers that the Japanese had their own expansionist inclinations, most Americans believed that the interests of Great Britain, Japan, and the United States coincided in the Pacific. The Germans and Russians were the real threats, particularly after the Boxer Rebellion.⁵¹ But following the Russo-Japanese War, relationships in the western Pacific changed; Russia no longer rivaled Japan for Asian power and Japanese relations with the United States deteriorated. Growing Japanese hostility over President Roosevelt's role in settling the recent war and discriminatory practices in some western states created unease in the United States Government. By 1906, American civil and military leaders believed that Japan was the nation most likely to threaten American interests in the

Pacific. From that moment, defense of the Philippines—particularly Manila and Manila Harbor—became the chief overseas strategic problem of the United States.⁵²

In the autumn of 1906, Roosevelt directed that planning begin for defense of the Philippines against a Japanese attack.⁵³ By the next summer, both Army and Navy were working on what came to be known as the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Plan ORANGE. Army and Navy planners agreed that the Philippines would be Japan's first objective. Retention of the Philippines depended, therefore, on a stubborn defense of Manila Harbor by the Army while the fleet sailed from the Atlantic and Caribbean to the Pacific. There it would assemble with the armored cruisers of the Asiatic Fleet. Establishing Pearl Harbor in Hawaii as its main base and securing its line of communications through Guam, the combined fleet would steam west, relieve the defending garrison in the Philippines, and seek a battle with the Japanese fleet. In implementing this plan the Army concentrated its defenses around Manila Bay, on the island of Corregidor and on the Bataan Peninsula, thus screening the proposed naval base to be built at Cavite. This general concept to defend the harbor and its entrance remained, until 1941, the basic scheme for holding the Philippines.⁵⁴

In the years preceding World War I, plans for possible American entry into the conflict took precedence over planing for defense of the Philippines. Plan BLACK against a German incursion into the Western Hemisphere shouldered Plan ORANGE aside. Army officers on the Pacific frontier warned that security of the Philippines and Hawaii was in jeopardy because of inadequate defensive garrisons and because there was no powerful fleet stationed in the western Pacific. Until the Panama Canal was completed in 1914, they were also concerned that reinforcements could not arrive in time.⁵⁵ Even so, other officers believed that the Philippine garrison was probably strong enough to provide the necessary delay. The garrison had no enemy air problem to contend with, and the fleet was sufficiently strong to make its way to the Philippines. The facilities in Hawaii and in the Philippines were adequate to support the fleet indefinitely. Moreover, the Germans held the Marshall, Caroline, and Marianas Islands (except Guam) and—presuming they were not allied with Japan—provided secure flanks as the fleet advanced.⁵⁶

Following World War I, changes in the military equation, the American domestic climate, and postwar diplomacy caused a significant shift in the relative strategic positions of the United States and Japan. Japan came out of World War I as the dominant power in the Pacific. By capturing the German islands north of the equator, Japan extended her empire some three thousand miles eastward toward Pearl Harbor, thus creating a Japanese operational zone of great depth surrounding the Philippines

which complicated enormously the American problem of reaching the islands. Japan seized the former German concessions on the Shantung Peninsula and Tsingtao in China as well, isolating the small American garrison in China. As a consequence, what had been American bastions on the Pacific frontier in the heyday of the expansionists became nothing more than weak outposts thousands of miles inside a Japanese-controlled domain.⁵⁷

Unseeing and uninterested in strategic issues, Americans, hoping to maintain peace, placed their faith in the abolition of war rather than in schemes to correct the military imbalance. In the United States, the traditional sentiment against strong standing military forces revived, exacerbating the strategic gap already evident in the Pacific. Unsympathetic to the warnings of senior military officers and succeeding service secretaries, Congress and the administration pared away the military power of the nation by reducing spending for military purposes. National leaders, supported by the electorate, rejected provisions for offensive warfare in favor of minimum defensive security, while seeking some kind of formula for permanent peace. The Army consumed surpluses from World War I as equipment deteriorated without replacement and watched its manpower strength decline to a postwar low in the mid-1930s.⁵⁸

The dream of a permanent peace through arms limitations drove diplomatic relations which unfortunately widened the strategic gap even further. By applying a 5-5-3 ratio of capital ships to the naval forces of Great Britain, the United States, and Japan, the negotiators at the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922 permitted the Japanese, at least in theory, to concentrate a superior naval force in the Pacific against the two-ocean naval powers. But of all the provisions of those treaties, the most restrictive to American forces was Article XIX of the Naval Treaty of 6 February 1922, providing that the United States, Great Britain, and Japan would maintain a status quo with regard to fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific. Accordingly, no new fortifications or naval bases, no measures to increase existing naval facilities, and no increase in coastal defenses were permitted.⁵⁹ So concerned with the effect of such restrictions was the Army Chief of Staff, General John J. Pershing, that two days after ratification he asked the Joint Planning Committee of the Joint Board to assess the impact of the treaties. Ignoring the strategic implications, the committee replied that ratification should cause no change in missions for the Army and Navy in the Philippines. An increase in mobile forces was authorized by the treaties if greater strength were needed, but such an increase, said the committee, was not advisable. The committee concluded that the treaty should be scrupulously observed.⁶⁰ Minimizing the strategic changes that had taken place, the Joint Board then reached back into the expansionist logic to assert that the Philippines must be defended. They were the best naval asset west of Hawaii, and of great strategic significance

and national interest, particularly in stabilizing East Asian affairs and supporting free trade.⁶¹

Despite growing evidence that military plans for defense of the frontier needed radical revision, such was not to be. In supporting a position contrary to military logic, the two service secretaries and the members of the Joint Board were strongly influenced by Leonard Wood, who after almost twenty years of military leadership, was the Governor General of the Philippines and still a powerful spokesman for the expansionist theme. In the summer of 1922, he attacked those who assumed that the Philippines were indefensible. To show a lack of resolve, he argued, would damage American prestige.⁶² Again in February of the following year, he castigated naval staff officers for lacking confidence in the Navy's ability. "Such a policy of abandonment spells...international dishonor and the beginning of a retrogression which God alone can see the end of."⁶³ Wood got his way. Between 1923 and 1928, Plan ORANGE was revised continuously, but each revision widened the gap between ends and means.⁶⁴ As this imbalance became apparent, a small group of officers emerged in the Army who disagreed with Wood and the Joint Board. Although he might not have seen himself as such, Stanley D. Embick, an experienced planner in Washington as well as Manila, became its most effective spokesman.

Embick and his adherents were clearly throwbacks to the continental strategy; in the mid-1920s, their time had not yet come. They were unabashedly concerned about defense of the West Coast of the United States and Panama. To achieve that security, they were prepared to give up the Philippines and China. Arguing from positions of strategic logic, rooted in the reality of domestic and international politics, they rejected the pleas of Leonard Wood which were based on American honor, prestige, and economic advantage. Despite their strategic views, however, Embick and his fellow officers in the Philippines worked loyally to make the defense of Manila Harbor more effective. They spent considerable time refining the Army's defensive plan, developing the Bataan positions, and studying the impact of Philippine independence on the defense.⁶⁵ Some were even guilty of trying to circumvent the Washington Naval Treaties. When Lieutenant Colonel Embick was Executive Officer on Corregidor, he and Colonel Guy V. Henry, Chief of Staff of the Philippine Department, conceived the bright idea that nothing in the treaties prohibited digging wells. Embick dug his wells all around the island of Corregidor—horizontally into the cliffs—so that searchlights could be run out to the opening and then dragged back under cover.⁶⁶

It was the 1928 version of Plan ORANGE that set off the reaction. Major General William Lassiter, departing commander of the Philippine Department, insisted that the mission of defending the Philippines and the force committed for that purpose were not "harmonized." While the

Army's mission was to hold Manila Bay, the defending force must also hold sufficient land to deny airfield sites to the enemy. "We cannot satisfy ourselves by saying that we will withdraw to Corregidor and wait for the fleet to come."⁶⁷ War Plans Division (WPD) of the General Staff tabled Lassiter's letter until it had time to study the legal and professional implications of using Philippine troops and to await the comments of Lassiter's replacement, Major General Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur subsequently agreed with Lassiter's assessment, but in an upbeat response, proposed a three-division maneuver force consisting of one American and two Philippine divisions to solve the problem.⁶⁸

In the early 1930s, three important international events complicated the strategic picture further and reinforced Embick's dissent. First, in 1931, the Japanese entered Manchuria and proceeded to organize a dependent state. Here was proof to those Army officers who saw danger in Japanese expansion; the ring was tightening on American forces, not only in the Philippines, but especially in China. Second, Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini threatened international stability in Europe and caused unease about the direction that American policy might take. Army planners could not afford to ignore the implications for American strategy. Finally, the drive for Philippine independence met success when the Tydings-McDuffie Act passed in March 1934. The Act promised complete independence ten years after approval of a Philippine Commonwealth Government. It reserved for the United States certain rights, but it also added responsibilities, the most important of which was to defend the Philippines until full independence.⁶⁹

Long before the Tydings-McDuffie Act passed, Army strategists were trying to assess the effect of independence on the American position in the western Pacific. In 1933, Embick, then commanding the fortress of Corregidor, wrote a far-reaching strategical analysis for his department commander, Major General E. E. Booth. Embick argued that the past twenty-five years had seen a progressive weakening of the American position in East Asia in comparison with the Japanese. Defense of the Philippines had become a military liability; to carry out Plan ORANGE "would be literally an act of madness." The likelihood of Philippine independence and the continuing economic policy curtailing military spending made the conclusion inescapable that American strategy must be reconsidered. Defending the Philippines was simply not in the vital interest of the United States; defense of the continent was far more important. The United States was, therefore, faced with two choices. The first was to greatly reinforce the Pacific frontier, which would violate the Washington Naval Treaties at high, and probably unacceptable, cost. The second alternative was to abandon the Philippines, negotiate their neutrality, and withdraw to a strategic triangle formed by Alaska-Hawaii-Panama. Along this line, Embick argued, the United States could concentrate her strength with greatest effect. Moreover, such a change promised to reduce costs, eliminate the

motives for a large naval establishment, be non-provocative to the Japanese, and permit the United States to take the offensive on her own volition rather than pushing peacetime forces into premature military operations for the relief of outposts deep in enemy territory.⁷⁰

General Booth, in his favorable endorsement of Embick's memorandum, agreed with his predecessor, Lassiter, that the United States was wasting resources in the Philippines and risking disaster. "The sole purpose for defending Corregidor," he said, "is to keep the American flag flying in Manila Bay." As a parting shot, he also recommended withdrawal of the forces in China: "If there ever was a military reason for their being stationed there, that reason has now passed."⁷¹ After summarizing the main argument in the memo and indorsement, General MacArthur, the Chief of Staff, forwarded the matter to the Joint Board for study.⁷²

Embick's memo and Booth's endorsement struck a blow from which Plan ORANGE never recovered. While the members of WPD and the General Staff did not accept Embick's arguments completely—some did not see how neutrality could be negotiated before independence or how it would be permissible under provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Act after its passage—they began to reconsider the logic in Embick's argument. Even so, the staff had to recognize that the Tydings-McDuffie Act was national policy and therefore committed the Army and Navy to defend the Philippines.⁷³ Later, after General MacArthur appointed him as Chief of WPD, Embick had to agree that there was no way to avoid defense during the life of the Commonwealth, but saw "no legal, moral, economic, political, or strategical reasons that would justify the assumption of a similar obligation after complete independence has been granted."⁷⁴ Embick never wavered from the continental strategy, and he wielded considerable influence from his position heading WPD. As he labored, he attracted more followers within WPD and the Army staff. By 1937, he spoke freely for the Army on matters of strategic policy, primarily answering Navy objections to the Army's defensive-mindedness in Pacific strategy. When he finally left WPD in 1937 to become the Deputy Chief of Staff to Malin Craig, he was replaced by Walter Krueger, a continental disciple every bit as articulate and perhaps even more worldly in his outlook.

Krueger's great contribution, undoubtedly formulated under the watchful eye of Embick, was to argue successfully for the revision of Plan ORANGE into a "readiness posture" that would permit selection of one course of action from a number of contingency options. Krueger had long doubted the efficacy of Plan ORANGE, and those doubts intensified after the Japanese attack on China in 1937 and further deterioration of the international situation in Europe. Krueger worried that Plan ORANGE offered but two courses of action to the President: he could order a prompt strategic offensive across thousands of miles of ocean via the Mandate Is-

lands, or he could do nothing. Moreover, it was unreasonable to carry out Plan ORANGE except under the precise assumptions and conditions built into the plan. Krueger, like Embick, opposed an all-out war against Japan to gain objectives that were not vital interests of the United States. He feared that the people would not support it and that such a war would strain the political fabric of the country. Krueger also saw the international situation in Europe changing so rapidly and unpredictably that its effect on Japan could not be determined. And yet Plan ORANGE disregarded such considerations. What Krueger wanted was a flexible, realistic, feasible, and rational plan that was—above all—in harmony with national ideals and policy.⁷⁵ Krueger made his point. The Chief of Staff approved his proposal for a new approach to ORANGE and forwarded it to the Joint Board where it was adopted on 10 November 1937.⁷⁶

In discussions that followed between Army and Navy planners, officers of WPD stood firmly in support of a strategic defensive in the Pacific against naval officers who found it hard to give up their plans for a naval offensive. The two interests were finally compromised in February 1938 when Embick and Rear Admiral James O. Richardson submitted a new Plan ORANGE that was little more than a broad statement calling for military and economic pressure against Japan, initial naval operations, defense of the Philippines by the peacetime garrison only, and measures to secure Alaska, Hawaii, Panama, and the West Coast of the United States.⁷⁷ The compromise notwithstanding, victory really belonged to Embick and the Army Staff. Before the end of the year, Army and Navy planners were back at work on a new series of plans, the RAINBOW plans, broadened to assume war against an alliance of Germany, Italy, and Japan and emphasizing defense of the Atlantic area and the Panama Canal. By 1939, the governing American strategy was once again continental in purpose, and strategic planning presumed the principle of “Europe First.”

Service in East Asia before World War II clearly induced growth and modernization of the Army. The shift of interest from the western frontier to the Pacific created conditions that enabled Army reformers to bring about major institutional changes that were essential for the effective operation of a modern Army. Global logistics became routine. On the tactical level, Army officers improvised solutions to their operational problems, even though the Army failed to modify the doctrine to recognize their experience. On the strategic level, the efforts of American Army officers to cope with the new international complications, particularly the rise of Japan, were an obvious product of life on the Pacific frontier.

But if one seeks a higher generalization in answer to the historical question, it appears that little that was “Far Eastern” rubbed off on the Army. The Army made no significant changes in tactics, doctrine, equipment, or organization that reflected a unique military experience. The co-

lonial life that emerged was little different than that enjoyed by the British, French, and Dutch in other parts of the world. Some soldiers married Asian women and raised mixed families, but they leaned toward Occidental lifestyles rather than Oriental. Moreover, racist and paternalistic attitudes, which might have been mitigated by forty years of close association, changed very little, judging by more recent contacts with Asian societies. In this regard there is considerable continuity in American attitudes toward Indians of the nineteenth century and Asians of the twentieth.

What really changed the Army were those interactions and demands arising from manning the distant frontier of an empire, regardless of where it was located. The American empire could have been in Africa, South Asia, or Southeast Asia just as easily as in the western Pacific. The organization of an empire, wherever it might be, required an elaborate administrative mechanism and a modern army strong enough to pacify the populace and maintain internal security. To be effective, the Army had to be centrally controlled, transported, supplied and maintained, and kept in good health. The fact that the American empire emerged in the western Pacific was, in a way, merely an accident of history and stamped that experience with a unique set of friends, enemies, and strategic problems.

Still, because those friends, enemies, and strategic problems were "Far Eastern" in nature, they had a significant impact on the Army and the nation as the twentieth century unfolded. The evolution of Plan ORANGE from its inception in 1906 until its subordination to the RAINBOW Plans in 1939 engaged Army officers in a debate that sharpened and deepened their strategic thinking. On the surface it might appear that the Army resisted change to the basic plan for war against Japan long after it should have been modified. And to the extent that defense of the Philippines was thought to be national policy, the General Staff supported Plan ORANGE, even as some Army officers began to expose its faults. But what is most important in this discussion is not the degree to which Plan ORANGE was static, but rather the degree to which Army officers with long service in the Philippines, China, and Hawaii were finally able to carry strategic thinking beyond the jingoism of the expansionist period and to employ rational analysis to bring about change. Their accomplishment was a strategic conception that identified the vital interests of the United States in the Atlantic world rather than in the Pacific. They began by trying to make a war plan more effective and ended up on the eve of World War II changing the government's whole view of the American empire and its defense.

By that date the forces that had conspired to cause the United States to establish and maintain its Pacific frontier also heightened the risk of war with Japan. After four decades of rivalry, war came; the defeat of Japan settled one conflict only to be replaced by the tensions of the Cold

War. In East Asia, the United States formed close bonds with a former enemy and fought new wars with old allies in a continuation of the "Great Pacific War." Although the cast of friends and enemies varied over the next forty years, in terms of the generalizations made in this paper, nothing much really changed.

First, the United States remained wedded to the "Europe First" strategy that emerged in the late 1930s in spite of the continuing "Great Pacific War" in Korea and Vietnam. All political-military decisions made in consequence of these two wars were the products of careful calculations about the relative power position of the United States, its allies, and the Soviet Union in Europe. One could even argue that the revival of the strategy of limited war, a major military innovation in Asia, was intended to preserve American strength in Europe. While one can agree with this to a point, the governing reason for limiting warfare had far more to do with the unacceptability of nuclear destruction and its implications and only secondarily with any impact of fighting in East Asia.

Second, the United States Army gained nothing permanent in organization, tactics, or doctrine from the later wars in the Pacific, with the possible exception of tactical air power using the helicopter. But again one can argue that since the French had already used tactical helicopters successfully in Algeria, the United States, with its penchant for exploiting technology, would have used them as well, regardless of the theater of operations. Moreover, the "lessons" of the Vietnam War suffered the same fate as those of the Indian Wars and the Philippine Insurrection, ending up in the archives rather than as a significant part of contemporary doctrine. Tactical and technological innovations, such as the armed helicopter, which might be seen as the logical legacy of American experience with irregular warfare in Vietnam, have since been "bent" to fit European battlefields and incorporated into a doctrine for highly mechanized warfare in Europe. As in the Indian and Philippine Wars that went before, the United States Army obeyed its orders, and fought the best that it could in Asia—whoever the enemy might be—while developing military technology, tactical doctrine, and organization for the Armageddon that it always believed was to come in Europe.

THE IMPACT OF THE ORIENT ON AIRPOWER

John Schlight

The United States is an offspring of Europe and, even though it has grown up, left home, and raised a family of its own, the parental pull from across the Atlantic remains, after two centuries of separation, a dominant influence on the way Americans think. There have been periods when the umbilical cord has been stretched close to snapping and today appears to be another such time of family feuding. Beneath the differences over boycotts, blockades, and Bedouins, however, runs a core of agreement which shapes the way Americans reason, the social, political and economic systems they devise, and the institutions they create to support these systems. Conversely, American military forays across the Pacific to East Asia have more often than not been viewed as unwelcome distractions from the main business, namely, Europe. When the Japanese attacked at Pearl Harbor, the United States finished the job in Europe before turning its full attention beyond Hawaii. When the North Koreans struck against American allies in the South, and the North Vietnamese did likewise farther down the Asian coastline, the drawing-power of America's European upbringing was again reflected in its conviction that it was fighting a European philosophy, Communism. That the purveyors of this philosophy were Oriental was incidental. And, not surprisingly, Americans fought these conflicts in the Orient as faithful sons of the European Enlightenment, employing technology and strategies whose roots lay in the European Age of Reason.

This is not to say that the influence from the East on the American military has been nil. Rather it is to suggest that, first, this influence has been less obvious than that which came from the opposite direction and, secondly, that it has served to drive the United States closer to its European beginnings.

As for the impact of the Orient on airpower, it is helpful at the outset to distinguish between airpower and the Air Force. To the dismay of many, the two are not always synonymous. In the ideal world, as perceived by many in the Air Force, they would match perfectly. But ideals are seldom realized in bureaucratic institutions which do well to struggle along on workable compromises. Airpower is a concept, a philosophy if you will, developed over several generations by thoughtful flyers and

seemingly validated by the conduct of the Second World War. The Air Force, on the other hand, is an institution which came into its own at the conclusion of that conflict with the initial expectation that airpower would be its ward. What follows is an attempt to examine the part played by America's East Asian exploits both in helping to create the Air Force and in frustrating the Air Force's hope of unifying airpower.

The story of this influence from the Orient on both the institution and the philosophy can begin at the end of the Second World War. The prewar campaign for a separate but equal Air Force, muted during the war, was revived in full force when hostilities ceased. The ink on the surrender documents was barely dry when the United States Senate turned its attention to reorganizing the military. To the legislators' question, "Should the Army and Navy be unified?" an illustrious parade of wartime aviators replied: "Yes, but with an Air Force equal to them!" These air generals rested their case for autonomy on two arguments: the nature of airpower and its decisiveness in the recently concluded war.

The concept of airpower propounded by these air leaders was no less detailed nor abstract than the present-day theology of deterrence which is quite capable of touching off a religious war among the various sects of defense strategists. At the core of the airpower idea was the firmly held tenet that war in the air is inherently different from war on the ground and from war at sea. Airplanes operate most efficiently when they are in their own medium following their own unique interpretation of the time-proven principles of war. An air commander needs flexibility, according to the doctrine, to move his planes hither and yon at a moment's notice in order to perform most efficiently. He can do this only if he has the resources ready at hand, that is, if the planes are unified and are his to apportion. This unity and flexibility disappears when the mass called "airpower" is permanently parceled out, and tied to the surface, to perform local, specific tasks at the behest of a ground or sea commander. When planes are scattered, airpower evaporates.

As with most else in the armed services, this philosophy-cum-doctrine of airpower emerged not so much from the contemplative atmosphere of an ivory tower as from the still-vivid wartime experiences of its apostles. One after another Generals Kenney, Arnold, Doolittle and Spaatz argued before the congressmen in late 1945 the need for a central handle on airpower, buttressing their contention with examples from the recent conflict. Significantly, a weighty proportion of these illustrations came from the war against Japan.

General Kenney, who had been MacArthur's air commander, described for the senators how the flexibility MacArthur gave him allowed him to swing his pitifully weak air resources back and forth around New Guinea to strike Japanese air bases at Rabaul, attack convoys trying to

reinforce Buna, repulse enemy invasion attempts at Milne Bay, and fight off Japanese planes attacking the American Navy in the Solomons. The General explained how, by using his airplanes against Japanese convoys rather than in support of advancing American ground forces, he achieved victory in the Bismarck Sea. Later, after the Americans reached the Philippines, MacArthur and Kenney used their still relatively limited airpower, not to support mopping-up operations in Luzon, but to strike the Japanese in their sea lanes through Southeast Asia and at their air bases which posed problems for the coming Okinawa campaign. Running through Kenney's testimony was the theme that, had his air resources been parceled out for use by ground commanders, the larger, more strategic employment of the force would not have been possible. He concluded:

Had I not had the flexibility inherent in a system which gave me control of all of my air units to use as the situation dictated, I would have been unable to accomplish adequately and efficiently the many vital missions assigned to me.¹

While such emphasis on Pacific operations was to be expected from Kenney, who at the time of his Senate appearance commanded the Far East Air Forces (FEAF), he was not alone in stressing the important lessons of the Japanese war. General Hap Arnold supported his plea for an autonomous air force with examples of victories brought about by the existence of just such an arrangement in the Southwest, South and Central Pacific arenas.² Even General Doolittle, who had commanded three Air Forces in Europe during the war pointed out that the lessons from the Pacific paralleled those from Europe. "The Navy had the transport to make the invasion of Japan possible," he said. "The ground forces had the power to make it successful; and the B-29 made it unnecessary."³

The impact of East Asia surfaced time and again in General Spaatz' statements to the lawmakers. Pearl Harbor impressed the General as one of three history-making facts of the Second World War crying out for unification of the armed services and autonomy for airpower. "Pearl Harbor," he said, "proved the consequences of disunity at the top." And again: "Pearl Harbor was the penalty we paid for self-satisfied and easy-going optimism." To him: "The Pearl Harbor of a future war might well be Chicago or Detroit, or Pittsburgh or even Washington." The war, for him, was bounded by events in East Asia. "The last war began for us," he stated, "when bombs were dropped on Pearl Harbor; it ended with a single bomb, launched from a single B-29 over Hiroshima and Nagasaki."⁴

The Senate failed in late 1945 to overcome the Navy's stolid objections to a unified defense department and an autonomous air force, despite Arnold's repeated assurances to the sailors that he had no intention of enrolling carrier aircraft in the new Air Force. It took Truman's forceful hand two years later to give birth to the Air Force, a creature many of whose labor pains were suffered in the Orient.

Amid the scramble to organize this new air institution, the imprint of the recent East Asian experience was unmistakable. Convinced of the decisiveness of strategic bombing on the war's outcome, air leaders spoke almost to a man in terms of "strategic" forces. Thoughts of limited conflict and tactical airpower were swept aside in the heady swirl of global thinking. "The [airpower] problem," theorized an Air Staff study, "has nothing to do with the insignificant number of aircraft necessary to coerce a recalcitrant minor power or chastise natives in a border dispute." The primacy of strategic thinking was reflected in the first postwar division of the nation's air resources into three commands: Strategic Air Command, Air Defense Command, and Tactical Air Command. The first was given more than 100,000 people, the second 26,000, and the third 7,000.⁶

The new Strategic Air Command was in many ways a direct descendant of East Asia, not only because its mission was inspired largely by the awesome potentiality of atomic power displayed there, but also in its organizational genesis. The Strategic Air Command was an outgrowth of an organization that had been forged several years earlier to solidify the airman's dream of centralized and autonomous airpower. Early in 1944, looking beyond the war in Europe toward the coming long-range bombing campaign against the Japanese, airmen were faced with the problem of how best to maintain control of the B-29s which were then just coming into the force. While tactical air operations, as described by General Kenney, were working well enough under theater commanders, strategic bombing could, in the opinion of General Arnold, be crippled in the Pacific if the bombers were similarly confined within artificial boundaries. He found the solution by creating the Twentieth Air Force to transcend theater air operations. A more descriptive name of this unusual organization—a name that had, in fact, been suggested for it at one point—would have been the Joint Chiefs of Staff Air Force. Based first in Washington and later moved to Guam as the Pacific war progressed, it was run by the Joint Chiefs through their agent, General Arnold. The Twentieth Air Force directed the strategic air war against Japan over the heads of Nimitz, MacArthur and Stilwell. For the first time in American aviation history the terms airpower and Air Force had become synonymous and the postwar air leaders meant to keep it that way. They used the Twentieth Air Force as a prototype for the new Strategic Air Command which, like its precursor, was placed under the Joint Chiefs and on a par with theater commanders.

Events of 1948 and 1949 strengthened the bond between airpower and strategic bombing, on the one hand, and between strategic forces and the Air Force on the other. The coup in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet blockade of Berlin in 1948, followed the next year by the Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb and the Chinese Communist victory, welded together even more firmly the concepts of airpower and strategic bombardment. The minuscule Tactical Air Force disappeared and tactical aircraft were

tolerated in the force structure only to the degree that they could contribute to strategic ambitions.

But for all the doctrinal expostulations about the deterrent value of strategic forces in 1948 and 1949, the Strategic Air Command was still a paper tiger bereft of flesh and bones by austere budgets. It took another war, again in the Orient, to give substance to the Air Force's strategic proclamations.

The irony of the air war in Korea was that here a tactical war helped to produce gigantic advances, not in tactical forces or doctrine, but in strategic preparedness, thereby linking ever more closely the term airpower with the strategic side of the equation. That it was a tactical war is clear enough. Prevented from getting at the ultimate source of the enemy's strength—Manchuria and the Soviet Union—airplanes had to be content with traditional tactical operations: controlling the air, striking the enemy's lines of communication and transportation behind the front, and killing enemy soldiers on the battle line.⁷

The June attack in 1950 from the North was so sudden that planes from the Far East Air Forces spent their first days destroying the inferior, 150-plane North Korean Air Force and striking ground invaders. Even B-29s were used in this latter role. Neither time nor resources permitted them, in this initial stage, to carry out the more important airpower function of isolating the battlefield by cutting the enemy's rear lines. Only when the Korean and U.N. forces were safely tucked into a small pocket around Pusan could the planes turn to pounding the overextended Communist supply lines. This allowed the replenished U.N. forces to push out of the pocket and drive the North Koreans to the Chinese border. The closer the allies got to the Yalu River and the border, however, the less room their planes had to provide what airmen considered their most important contribution, interdiction. By the time the U.N. armies reached the border, Far East Air Forces planes had little else to do but hunt enemy soldiers on the ground. At this point the first Korean war ended with the North Korean Air Force, Army, and industrial base in disarray.

The Chinese invasion in December opened a new war and created a wholly different situation for airpower, a situation tailor-made for strategic bombardment, were it decided to go that way. That the temptation was resisted to use what many considered true airpower was a testimony to the deep-seated conviction among Washington's decision-makers, strongly shared by the Air Force chief, General Vandenberg, that the real enemy was not in Korea and that America's strategic airpower, still a shoestring force, should not be frittered away "pecking at the periphery of Communist power."⁸

There were also factors of less than global scope influencing Vandenberg's position. He saw airplanes being used in ways that contradicted the Air Force's doctrine.⁹ For one thing, the tactical situation in Korea, particularly during the opening invasion and later as the U.N. troops approached the Yalu, led to an inordinate (in his view) proportion of strikes against enemy soldiers on the front lines. Vandenberg considered this an inefficient use of scarce and expensive weapons whose maximum utility lay elsewhere.¹⁰ This excessive use of tactical aircraft for close air support was leading many ground leaders to equate airpower solely with that function. The importance of isolating the battlefield by airpower was not clearly understood until well into the conflict.¹¹

During the Korean conflict there was concern in many Air Force circles that the war was receiving first priority at the expense of the Strategic Air Command and the air defense of the United States. The marriage between airpower and strategic thinking remained unshaken by this Oriental experience. Most Air Force leaders, adhering to a national policy which they themselves had helped to create, continued to believe that airpower still had little to do with "chastising natives in a border dispute."

Also, the command arrangements for close-support aircraft in Korea did not provide the degree of flexibility desired by air doctrinal purists. The Unified Command Plan, adopted in 1946, had enjoined each theater commander to establish a "joint staff with appropriate members from the various components of the services...in key positions of responsibility."¹² The theater commander was to be helped in his task by component commanders for air, naval and ground forces. He himself was to remain impartial and transcend the narrower perspectives of the three services. But this rule never reached East Asia. General MacArthur and his successors acted as their own army component commanders, using the Far East Command as both the unified and the Army staff. Consequently, the putative "joint" headquarters in Tokyo was peopled with Army personnel, men to whom the concepts of centralization and flexibility of airpower were alien. "The lack of air representation on the staff," remarked General Weyland, the air commander, "made it difficult to realize the most efficient and timely employment of airpower."¹³

It was not until a month before the war's end, for example, that the FEAF commander came close to getting the kind of control over close-support operations that doctrinal purists believed he should have had all along. When the war began, FEAF lacked a mechanism for coordinating air strikes with ground forces. A joint Operations Center was quickly set up at Taegu and this developed into a full tactical air control system. After some initial confusion, Fifth Air Force and the Eighth Army came to work as a close-knit unit against enemy troops. But it was not until December 1950 that the Marines, swallowing their own doctrine, joined the system

and not until the eleventh hour, in June 1953, that the Navy "agreed to assume an integral role in the work of the Joint Operations Center."¹⁴

Fortunately, circumstances permitted the United States to avoid the harsher consequences of this absence of centralized control of airpower. For one thing, the total air superiority which the U.N. forces enjoyed made centralization less critical than it would have been had the enemy possessed a strong air force. For another, General Weyland's lack of legal control over non-Air Force planes was largely offset by his good working relationships with the Navy and Marine commanders which resulted in close de facto coordination between the air arms. But coordination was a far cry from control and there was no guarantee that such favorable conditions would exist in future wars. In a post-mortem on the Korean war, the three services agreed that, in future conflicts of this type, their airpower should be integrated. This agreement was easy to achieve since few actually believed that there would be any conflicts of this type in the future. The next generation of flyers would not remember this and would have to re-learn it in Vietnam.

A host of additional lessons and warnings about the future employment of airpower flooded out of the Korean war. The implication behind most of these was that Korea was an aberration: a one-time, small-scale, diversion from the true path of a strategic future. Most of the admonitions passed on by the participants struck the theme: "Don't become too wedded to the way we did things here, because we will never see this kind of war again!" For example, FEAF warned against taking air superiority for granted, noting that in a full-scale war the United States would have to fight daily to maintain it. And again, air analysts admonished against getting the impression from Korea that practically unlimited airplanes will always be available for close support of ground forces. In a global war the United States will not have the luxury of using strategic bombers for tactical duty.¹⁵ The students of Korea furthered cautioned against letting the American military again become overly dependent on airlift, as was done in Korea. "The scale of airlift within the Far East Command," noted FEAF's final report, "has created an extravagant standard which will be impossible to maintain" in a wider conflict.¹⁶ Again, the analysts argued for learning to get along with considerably less photo reconnaissance than was available in Korea. "If we multiply the photo effort in Korea on all fronts which would be involved in a world-wide conflict," they predicted, "there is serious doubt whether the total U.N. photo industry would be able to meet the requirements."¹⁷ In one of its more indicative, yet unprophectic, statements, FEAF hypothesized:

We are moving in the direction of applying force directly against China in the event of further Chinese military aggression either in Korea, Indochina, or elsewhere. We have learned that we cannot afford resistance to aggression only in Korea or elsewhere in friendly areas on the border of China.¹⁸

While Korea affected the concept of airpower by reinforcing its strategic emphasis, it affected the Air Force by encouraging the multiplication of forces to support this strategic concept. Korea's main contribution was to the explosion of America's strategic arsenal in the 1950s. The war added fuel to the growing perception of a Soviet threat and contributed during the ensuing decade to strengthening America's nuclear preparation to counter it.¹⁹ Strings on the military purse were loosened, with the largest portion of its content flowing to the Air Force, and most of that to the Strategic Air Command. Starting the Korean war with only 48 wings, the Air Force had 106 at its conclusion and was still climbing toward a goal of 137. Most of these forces were strategic, followed a distant second by air defense aircraft. Within several years after the cease-fire, airpower was characterized by a new generation of long and medium-range jet bombers, missiles, and sophisticated early warning sites against enemy strategic intrusion.

In the face of the decision to rely primarily on nuclear weapons to deter and, if necessary, to fight both general and limited wars, tactical air proponents struggled valiantly but unsuccessfully for a revival of tactical airpower. General Weyland, now commander of the reborn Tactical Air Command, fought a rear-guard action throughout the 1950s against "continued snipping away at the tactical air force structure."²⁰ The only new tactical fighter planes to enter the inventory during the decade were the F-100 and the F-105. The former, however, was designed primarily to carry nuclear weapons, while the F-105 program was reduced piecemeal. In a final burst of frustration before retiring, the tactical air commander warned that "the Tactical Air Command forces can no longer be considered a revenue source for support of strategic forces."²¹ This caveat, however, was submerged in the wake of the 1957 Sputnik shot and the renewed American emphasis on missiles and early warning sites.

Despite the elevation to the national level of the strategy of flexible response in the early 1960s, the Air Force flew into Vietnam on the wings of strategic thinking and a force still basically structured for global competition. With a weak South Vietnam frantically attempting to increase its armed forces, a debate took place in American circles in 1964 and early 1965 over what the U.S. strategy should be until the South Vietnamese were in a position to defend themselves. The Air Force and Navy preferred a contingency plan which called for a holding action in the South with strike squadrons positioned around the periphery of China, the perceived enemy since Korea. This would provide flexibility by allowing the United States to call the shots by engaging or disengaging the enemy at times and places of its own choosing. Further, by relying on technology rather than manpower, the plan, if adopted, would avoid getting the United States bogged down on the ground in Asia.²²

But the political and military climate, neither in Washington nor in Saigon, was sympathetic to such a strategy. The decision, in April 1965, to send American ground forces to Vietnam was the first step in confining airpower to a tactical role and decentralized status. Other steps followed in rapid succession and before long the Air Force was fighting four wars (in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, northern Laos and southern Laos), each with its own command relationships, strategy, tactics and equipment.

For the bombing campaign against North Vietnam, overall control was exercised from Hawaii, but through a series of intervening commands. Air Force planes from Thailand were under the operational control of the air commander in Saigon but under the administrative control of the air commander in the Philippines. Navy carrier planes were directed from Hawaii through the commander of the 7th Fleet. The piecemeal and divided nature of the bombing campaign violated virtually every tenet of airpower from concentration of forces to mass. As in Korea, political sensitivity over sending the right diplomatic signals to the enemy determined both the quantity and quality of the campaign, both of which were inadequate in the eyes of airpower leaders.

The effect of the northern bombing campaign on airpower was largely negative. Even at the time it was going on it created confusion in the public mind. Conveniently overlooking the politically restrained nature of the campaign, many influential analysts and journalists came to look askance at airpower itself. "A shocking disappointment," wrote one commentator, when airpower "is unable to overcome a little country with fewer resources than the state of New Mexico."²³ Is there reason to wonder at Air Force euphoria over, and perhaps somewhat exaggerated claims for, Linebacker II in late 1972 when—for the first time in the war—it was permitted to use airpower to its best advantage?

Even in the area of tactics, where the American flyers learned much, it is not clear that the northern bombing campaign will yield much of lasting impact. Flying more than four years into the heaviest concentration of surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft artillery, and ground fire in aerial history, the Air Force and the Navy, through trial and error, developed successful counters to the Soviet-built ground defenses. After initially suffering high losses from low-altitude approaches early in the campaign, the planes switched to medium-altitude flights with considerable success. Air tacticians also learned that they got best results from using relatively large formations of planes in which fighter-bombers were accompanied by large numbers of support planes to suppress anti-aircraft defenses, to keep an eye out for MIGs, and to perform reconnaissance. Little of this experience, however, is being transferred to the NATO scene. European air forces are wedded to low level, two-ship flights aimed at avoiding rather than neutralizing eastern European defenses. America's air war of attri-

tion against North Vietnam appears to be giving way in Europe to a strategy of maneuver.²⁴ It is no exaggeration to say that NATO tactics are being influenced more by budgetary and force constraints, separate national military tactics and strategy, and transatlantic politics than by the American experience in Vietnam.

The second air war in Southeast Asia, the one fought in South Vietnam, was pursued simultaneously by at least six air forces (not counting the Australians), each going about its own business. The 7th Air Force commander, at least until 1968, had charge of about a thousand strike, transport, reconnaissance and liaison planes to support the ground effort. The Marines kept their 480 planes largely to themselves in the northern part of the country. Army ground commanders had control of close to four thousand aircraft (mostly helicopters). From offshore the Navy was in charge of its 210 aircraft, some of which flew in South Vietnam. The Vietnamese Air Force added about four hundred planes to the fray. Above all of these flew the fifty or so B-52s under the direction of a ground officer, oftimes a Marine, in Saigon. Despite repeated importuning by the 7th Air Force commander, these centrifugal air units were never satisfactorily tied together into a fully flexible and efficient strike force. Airpower in South Vietnam suffered from the traditional drawbacks of coalition warfare.

Unlike the situation in Korea, the Air Force brought into South Vietnam a Tactical Air Control System for supporting ground troops. Control centers on the ground mated forward air controllers with fighter-bombers and gunships for attacks on the enemy. Unlike the forward air controllers used in Korea, however, those in Vietnam operated from aloft, spotting the enemy from light, low-flying observation planes and calling in fighters and gunships. By the war's end this system had been honed to a fine edge. The Air Force, for example, perfected a method of keeping some fighters on airborne alert and calling on them for emergencies. By 1969 fighter reaction time had been reduced from more than an hour to an average of thirty minutes, and in many instances fifteen. Gunships were often used with considerable success in the system. But there was resistance even within the Air Force to their development. The commander of the Tactical Air Command at first opposed them, fearing that diversion of funds and incorporation of such vulnerable planes into the force structure would detract from his ability to support NATO.²⁵ As with other facets of airpower in South Vietnam, however, the Air Force never succeeded in unifying gunship resources. At the highest point the Air Force had thirty-seven fixed-wing gunships while the Army had over four hundred helicopter gunships which it flew to support its own soldiers.

The USAF preference for centralized control of air assets as exemplified on one level by the Tactical Air Control System, and for which

the Air Force fought dearly in South Vietnam, is seen by many Europeans as an unnecessary encumbrance. They argue that centralized control at the highest military level relies too heavily on sophisticated equipment which is too costly and too subject to equipment failure and enemy interference. Furthermore, over-centralized control strips the intermediate commander of the flexibility and initiative he needs to respond to the unexpected in warfare.²⁶ Europeans today hold grave reservations about the survivability of airborne forward air controllers in the NATO environment and display a marked preference for ground controllers.²⁷ Neither the British nor the Germans are convinced that the system of airborne alerts will work. According to them, Warsaw Pact radars, the undependability of air-to-ground radios at low level, and the need to plan ahead for transit routes render the American Vietnam experience outdated.²⁸ In the European view, airborne diverts do not gain that much time, while they cost too much, lead to mismatching of ordnance for particular targets, and can disrupt the army plan of fire.²⁹ Overall, our European allies believe that there is little that can be profitably transferred from Vietnam to the NATO environment.

The two air wars in Laos were attempts to interrupt the flow of men and supplies coming out of North Vietnam, westward toward the Plain of Jars, and along the Ho Chi Minh trail toward South Vietnam. Although the Air Force commander in Saigon owned the planes for these wars, he was frequently beset by the American ambassador in Vientiane who wanted planes set aside for close air support of Laotian troops in the North. Air Force command and control was tempered by these contradictory views of tactics and control of resources. Along the southern trails the Air Force relied on sophisticated electronic sensors to convert a moving enemy into targets for fighters and gunships. Hunter-killer teams of aircraft attempted to bottle up key passes and destroy storage points with laser-guided "smart" bombs. This was a war of attrition by technology conducted well out of sight of the battle arena. Here too, however, NATO's aversion to high technology in tactical warfare suggests that there will be little room in Europe to exercise America's knowledge of sensor interdiction. Also, the European predilection for maneuver rather than attrition indicates that interdiction in the NATO scenario will concentrate not on troops already clashing in battle, nor on distant reinforcements (as in Laos), but on second echelon troops as they move close to join the battle.³⁰

None of this is to make a value judgement concerning NATO's disregard for America's Oriental experience. The situation in Europe is in many of its key aspects very different from that encountered in Korea and Vietnam, where Americans, with little effort, controlled the air and were prohibited from attacking the enemy's manpower and materiel base. For NATO, failure to "plan for the last war" (of which the military is

often and simplistically accused) might well be the proper course. But what of the Oriental lessons for the most likely form of future war, low-level, terroristic, and unconventional? It seems almost as if the American script for its post-Vietnam strategy and force structure has been borrowed from the Korean post-mortem. Abashed at the outcome in Southeast Asia and determined to erase the experience from their minds, American decision-makers have turned their backs on serious consideration of unconventional war in the future and returned to what is more comfortable and better understood. By so doing they have left little scope for Oriental influence.

In sum, the impact of the Orient on American air strategy, tactics, force structure, command and control, and doctrine has been for the most part negative. Influence from the East was most positive after the Second World War when the lessons from the war against Japan were translated into the beginnings of the strategic buildup with airpower unified in a JCS-directed command. Interpretation of the Korean experience as atypical led to intensification of this strategic emphasis accompanied by the avowal that the United States would never have to fight that kind of war again. Future threats on the periphery of China, it was predicted, would be met by force directly against the instigators rather than the clients. Tactical forces and doctrine atrophied in the wake of global thinking. The present aftermath of Southeast Asia feels ominously familiar. Although the United States has elevated conventional war in importance to the level formerly occupied solely by strategic conflict, little remains of the vast and expensive experience with war on the lower levels of the spectrum. American tactical air forces have been strengthened and progress has been made in coordinating them with ground forces. But even this accomplishment, so hard won in Vietnam, is likely to fall prey to the legitimate demands of coalition warfare. And, finally, I would suggest that the air experience in South Vietnam, coupled with the requirements flowing from NATO, has led to a tacit acceptance among air leaders of the ancillary nature of tactical airpower relative to ground forces. By implication this suggests an abandonment of the long-held dream of the unity of airpower. power.

COMMENTARY: MARINES IN EAST ASIA

Edwin H. Simmons

Passing mention of the Marine Corps has been threaded through the remarks of all three speakers. I would like to elaborate just a bit upon these threads. A strong argument can be made that the effect upon the Marine Corps of the East Asian experience has been greater than it has been upon the three larger services. The reason is almost mathematical: the Marine Corps has consistently had a larger proportion of its total force committed to East Asia than have the other three services.

When Commodore Perry took his East India Squadron on its historic visit to Japan in 1854, he had with him a detachment of two hundred Marines and, if we can believe the evidence of contemporary Japanese prints, they attracted almost as much Japanese attention as the famous miniature steam railway.¹ Two years later in 1856, Marines were with the naval landing party that reduced the Barrier Forts protecting Canton, China. From then on Marine Corps involvement in East Asia was almost uninterrupted. There were landings "to protect American lives and property," to use that wonderful phrase, in China in 1866, 1894, and 1895; in Japan in 1867 and 1868; in Formosa in 1867; and in Korea in 1871, 1888 and 1894.²

Both Captain Schratz and Colonel Flint have mentioned Admiral Dewey's victory over the Spanish fleet at Manila and how it led to that poorly understood and almost forgotten war, the Philippine Insurrection, or as we now have retitled it, the "Philippine-American War." They might also have added that Admiral Dewey later testified to the House Naval Affairs Committee that if he had had five thousand Marines embarked with his squadron at Manila Bay he could have taken Manila that same day and the Philippine Insurrection might have been avoided.³ There was soon a regiment of Marines in the Philippines to assist in the pacification. Marines were also among the fifteen thousand Americans Colonel Flint states were involved in the Boxer Rebellion and the relief of Peking. The Corps had a particular interest in the relief of the Legation Quarter in Peking because there were some fifty-six Marines inside the Quarter.⁴ As Colonel Flint has remarked, the Army left behind a regiment which was reduced to a company in 1901; that company was replaced by a company of Marines in 1905. As time passed, the Legation Guard in Peking grew to

battalion size, including the well-known and colorful detachment of Horse Marines. The Legation Guard's experiences in garrison were not unlike those of their neighbors, the 15th Infantry in Tientsin, as described by Colonel Flint.⁵

In 1920s, as the war lords swept back and forth over China, there were periodic reinforcements of the Legation Guard and also landings at Shanghai, among other places. In 1927, when Chiang Kai-shek marched on Shanghai, a Marine battalion was hurriedly landed from the Atlantic Fleet, followed up by two regiments, the 4th and 6th Marines, and the 3d Marine Brigade headquarters under Brigadier General Smedley Butler. In his brigade Butler had a battalion of artillery, some engineers, some light tanks, and a squadron of Marine aircraft.⁶

Butler left the 4th Marines at Shanghai and took the rest of his brigade north to Tientsin, piously explaining his mission as being solely "to protect American citizens and their property."⁷ With his light tanks and his twenty biplanes, he was, and I am quoting Barbara Tuchman, "the wonder of Tientsin much to the annoyance of the 15th Infantry."⁸ The inclusion of an organic air element in the provisional Marine expeditionary brigades of that day was standard practice. Our Marine Amphibious Brigades of today, axiomatically, have included an aircraft group with both fixed-wing and helicopter types.⁹

In 1929 the 3d Brigade went back to the States but the 4th Marines stayed in Shanghai. The terms "China Marine" and "China duty" came to have a special meaning. The force was again built up to brigade size in 1937 when the Japanese and Chinese Nationalists clashed at Shanghai. In 1938 the brigade headquarters and the 6th Marines returned home. So did the 15th Infantry, after its long stay in Tientsin, leaving its barracks to a detachment of the Legation Guard from Peking.¹⁰ The 4th Marines left Shanghai in late November 1941 and went to the Philippines in time to take over the beach defenses of Corregidor. They were surrendered to the Japanese on 6 May 1942 after the island fell, the only time a U.S. Marine regiment has ever been surrendered.¹¹

In the 1920's, while the ramifications of Plan ORANGE were taking place, the Marine Corps had its own apostle who predicted how the war against Japan was going to be fought: Lieutenant Colonel Pete Ellis, who as early as 1921 had predicted Japan would strike first and that "it will be necessary for us to project our fleet and landing forces across the Pacific and wage war in Japanese waters. To effect this requires that we have sufficient bases to support the fleet, both during its projection and afterwards."¹² Captain Schratz has described the Marine Corps' development of a viable amphibious doctrine as its greatest contribution to the Allied victory in World War II. Along with doctrine, the Marine Corps also pro-

vided six divisions and five aircraft wings to the war in the Pacific. In fact, all of the Marine combat effort in World War II was devoted to the Pacific.

I should point out that a Marine aircraft wing is quite different from an Air Force wing. The former is more likely a small, independent, balanced air force, flying aircraft of varied types. In Vietnam, as Colonel Schlight has pointed out, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing operated as many as 480 aircraft.

Building up from the skeleton organization imposed by President Truman and Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, the 1st Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, virtually the entire combatant strength of the Corps, fought in the Korean War. Colonel Schlight has said, rather politely, that the "Marines, swallowing their own doctrine, joined the [Fifth Air Force] system in December 1950." Not willingly, I assure you. The Corps would not have agreed with General Vandenberg's contention that close air support was "an inefficient use of scarce and expensive weapons." In fact, General Gerald Thomas, who took command of the 1st Marine Division shortly thereafter, said flatly that the air support meted out by the Fifth Air Force was "unsatisfactory."¹³ The Air Force doctrine of a single air commander and centralized control of tactical air operations does great damage to the Marine Corps' air-ground team concept.

Colonel Schlight has identified four air wars fought by the Air Force in Vietnam. He might have named a fifth air war: that fought between the III Marine Amphibious Force and the Seventh Air Force for control of the Marines' tactical aircraft. From 1965 until 1968, the Marines held off the Air Force with a series of accommodations and compromises, but in early 1968, as a consequence of the Tet offensive and the battle for Khe Sanh, after a debate that went up to what is euphemistically called "the highest level," the Commander of the Seventh Air Force, at that time General Momyer, was made "Single Manager for Tactical Air." He did not quite get *operational control* of the Marines' tactical aircraft, but he did get *mission direction*, which amounted to the same thing.¹⁴

In Vietnam we had two and two-thirds Marine divisions, and the greatly enlarged aircraft wing that I described, once again the preponderance of Marine combat strength. Since the Vietnam War the Marines have become more involved in NATO, particularly with brigade-size exercises on the northern flanks, but still the largest overseas development is the permanent stationing of the 3d Marine Division in Okinawa and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing straddling Okinawa and the home islands of Japan.

There were two Marine brigades in France in World War I, but that was an aberration. Since the turn of the century, most of Marine fighting and a good part of Marine garrisoning has been in East Asia. As Marine Corps strategic planners sometimes put it: "We plan for the Atlantic but we fight for the Pacific."

I might conclude by commenting on the fine work of General Lucius Clay. As Commander of 7th Air Force, General Clay did much to bind up the wounds of the "war" between Air Force and Marine air forces.*

*Ed. note: In the brief time available for discussion at the end of this session, General Simmons invited General Clay to comment. General Clay responded: "I think that what has been said [in this session] is essentially correct. We did not have centralized control of air, and unfortunately part of it was within the Air Force. I did not control SAC forces, and I did not control MAC forces, so this was a problem that the Air Force itself did not really face up to. With respect to the air coordination at that time—and I use the term coordination, because the word command was an anathema, as you might well know, to the Navy as well as to the Marines—we did have a very effective system of coordinating missions, and getting an effort and a firm commitment from all parties. There was reluctance at times to commit forces completely, but in my judgement, at least, at the time I was there, all these problems had been worked out, and I think we did have—at least for in-theater operations—a centralized direction of the available air power."

COMMENTARY: REFLECTIONS ON THE ASIAN EXPERIENCE

Allan R. Millett

Instead of producing papers bound for the same graveyard reserved for Westerners who try to hustle the East, the authors in this session have practiced either the direct attack of Genghis Khan or the indirect approach of Sun Tzu in order to disarm a commentator. All the essays are thoughtful efforts to grapple with an ambiguous subject: What has been the effect of Asian service upon the institutional life of the American armed forces? The authors have implied an additional question: To what degree have Asian experiences caused the thinking of the American officer corps to go "Asiatic"? If nothing else, these papers show how different the historical impact of Asian service could be upon the individual armed forces of the same nation. Once again, the Chinese principle of *Yin Yang* prevails over Western rationalism.

In a stimulating paper noteworthy for its unabashed assertions, Captain Schratz has argued that the U.S. Navy developed a strong tie between its own institutional development and its Pacific deployments. This tie developed during the nineteenth century when one of the Navy's missions was expanding and protecting American maritime trade. Indeed, this function dominated naval policy. But function is not geography, and it is well to remember that the East India Squadron was only one of six similar units that patrolled much of the world.

Since commerce shaped most American contacts with Asia, it is hardly surprising that the Navy identified its constabulary function with national policy. However, the assertion that either American policymakers or Navy officers equated mercantile expansion with strategic interest in the nineteenth century is doubtful. To the extent that they thought about the Pacific at all, they thought of Alaska, Canada, the Oregon Territory, California, and Hawaii, and the military presence of Russia and Great Britain. Falling prey to early cases of "theateritis," only the Navy's Perrys, Shufeldts, and Rodgers succumbed to MacArthurism and saw a special American destiny in Asia. It must have been the effect of the harbor gases in Shanghai and Yokohama.

The problem with linking naval policy with overseas trade is that this union posed unsolvable strategic problems in war and peace. During the

Civil War, for example, the American merchant fleet changed registry, since most of the Navy was engaged in the blockade rather than in protecting commerce. The capture of Manila Bay in 1898 threw the United States into the affairs of Asia just as the tide of European imperialism was ebbing in the face of militant Chinese and Japanese nationalism. The Filipinos and the Americans in China became simply hostages, joined by the Yangtze River patrol, the Asiatic Fleet, and the U.S. forces in Peking, Tientsin, and Shanghai. Asiatic mercantilism became a strategic liability, as the Army-Navy Joint Board recognized even before World War I.¹

As Captain Schratz notes, the American presence in Asia was provocative, but it was no more likely a cause of war than American interventionism in Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central America. After World War I, however, the Navy, probably reflecting the Asian fixations of the State Department, clearly focused its attention on its most probable enemy, the imperial Japanese fleet. How War Plan ORANGE and the Washington agreements shaped Navy and Marine Corps force structure in the interwar years is too familiar to warrant restatement here. What *does* need further analysis, however, are the vital American interests served by War Plan ORANGE. Defense of the Pacific could be conceived as either part of American's effort to influence events in Asia, or simply the protection of the Hawaiian Islands, the Canal Zone, Alaska, and the United States itself. There was no clear answer, as the Joint Board learned.

Unhampered by a careful analysis of JCS planning and reflecting the limitations of the Navy's world view, Captain Schratz has argued that defeating Japan in World War II—a classic naval war for maritime security—was the same as exercising influence on the Asian mainland.² Somehow, according to this view, taking Formosa in 1945 would have saved the Kuomintang in 1949. Surely such naval metaphysics has outlived its usefulness. American naval power is certainly an ingredient in the continued containment of Russian influence upon the People's Republic of China, Japan, and South Korea, but its impact on land-locked events is limited and indirect. The misty glories of World War II should no more blind us to strategic realities than the fog of pre-World War II appeasement.

Colonel Flint's thoughtful and carefully researched essay has traced the impact upon the Army of service on the Pacific frontier between 1898 and 1941. One might quibble that this periodization ignores a more important era, 1941-1980, but one might argue, too that the first forty years of the century provided the Army with an important prologue for its epic international experiences of this century. Colonel Flint correctly argues that the Philippine Insurrection provided a rationale for permanent expansion of the regular Army, while making no lasting impression on the Army in terms of organization and doctrine. Nevertheless, the Insurrection had more impact than Colonel Flint suggests. Among these influences was an

enhanced appreciation of the military efficiency of citizen-soldiers, demonstrated by the federally-raised U.S. Volunteers of 1899-1901. Secondly, the Philippine experience encouraged an antipathy for civilian influence on military operations, demonstrated by the role of Governor-General William Howard Taft and the U.S. Senate in shaping and evaluating Army performance in suppressing a people's war. The creation of the General Staff helped to define the difference between civilian control and civilian interference in any type of conflict. And finally, the operations in the Philippines enhanced appreciation of the difficulties of military pacification that, despite the influence of Leonard Wood, made the Army a restraining influence on American policy toward Cuba and Mexico. Although Taft could suppress Captain John R.M. Taylor's history of the Insurrection, the War Department could not eliminate the belief of the Army officer corps that pacification operations brought little organizational profit.

At the level of international military cross-culturation, much of the U.S. Army had to go to Asia to compare itself to the European military forces and their Pacific imitator, the Imperial Japanese Army. During the Peking Relief Expedition, European and Japanese officers admired the ardor of American troops, but deplored their lack of discipline, tactical innocence, and logistical profligacy.³ Conversely, American officers had ample opportunity to assess European military methods in China and again in Manchuria in 1904-1905, and some, like John J. Pershing, even tried to apply the lessons learned in both officer education and field exercises well before 1917. Perhaps the most important legacy of the Army's early Asian operations was, however, the negative impression these operations made on a host of future allies and enemies. One may speculate on the representativeness of one French officer's assessment of American forces in 1918, but there is corroborating evidence that German and British commanders also believed that American officers were not up to Western Front command: American regular officers, "often rather limited, have a strong tendency to draw upon their experiences on the Cuban expedition, the one to Manila, or in Mexico, which they think was waging war, and tend to reject advice as an insult to their national pride."⁴

Chastened by its experiences on the Western Front, the Army, as Colonel Flint demonstrates, turned its enhanced realism in contingency planning back to the Pacific in the interwar period. Perhaps that realism owed more than we have acknowledged to the frustrations of Bud Dajo and the assault on Peking than to the cauldron of the Meuse-Argonne.

In his essay on the influence of America's Asian wars on the Air Force and airpower doctrine, Colonel Schlight has concluded that the Asian influence paid mixed dividends. In sum, World War II and the Korean War created a sense of urgency and political legitimacy that gave

the Army Air Forces independence and allowed the Air Force to expand dramatically in the 1950s. The Vietnam War's influence, however, did little for the Air Force and airpower doctrine except in many negative "lessons learned."

The critical issue posed by Colonel Schlight's essay, however, is less easily analyzed than the questions of budgets, air wings, and technology. That issue is whether a theory of *command* is the same as a theory of *utilization*. Airpower advocates have said "yes," that airpower is an instrument of decision which requires that all that flies—at least with fixed wings—be dispatched by an air officer. All three Asian wars, however, deviated from this doctrine. These experiences, airpower prophets argue, prevented a definitive judgement on airpower's efficacy, since policy confusion, excessive civilian control, and interservice rivalry prevented a true test of doctrine. The non-use of nuclear weapons remains the ultimate non-event.⁵

With Air Force autonomy inextricably linked to strategic air war since 1947, it is not difficult to link doctrine and Air Force force structure. But enemies deterred in Europe are not enemies fought in Asia. Yet there has been a linkage between doctrine and force structure, even in Asia: air power was seen as a feasible counter to superior Communist numbers. The problem for airpower advocates is that the airpower antidote has never seemed adequate or effective, as either close air support or interdiction deep and shallow. To some degree, the presence of Navy and Marine aviation and the non-joint, non-unified nature of theater commands has proven to be an easy out for airpower advocates who seek to explain their forces' lack of decisiveness. However serious, interservice problems have begged the question of air war's utility.

Of all the possible malformations produced by Korea and Vietnam on Air Force doctrine and force structure, Colonel Schlight properly focuses upon the issues of strategic air war and close air support, with a nod at interdiction. There are, however, two additional differences between a NATO-centered or even mid-Eurasian war and the Korean and Vietnam experiences. One is that air superiority over the battlefield—whatever its depth—can no longer be assumed. The other is that deterrence in peace and decision in war may depend heavily upon time-urgent airlift, both inter-theater and intra-theater. Both problems may be receiving more Air Force attention, but it is late in coming. Air superiority and strategic airlift are clearly Air Force functions; yet neither has prospered under "single management."

Colonel Schlight concludes that the Asian wars have had a negative impact on American air strategy. This judgement might be rephrased: with the exception of strategic deterrence, airpower doctrine has had only marginal relevance to American security problems. Strategic air war doc-

trine and the related issue of unified command should not dominate the thinking of Air Force roles and missions to the degree that they have in the past. *That* is the lesson of the Asian experience.

In summary, I applaud the Air Force Academy's willingness to explore a subject of significance to both the study of American military history and the current intellectual life of the American armed forces. Much to the consternation of intelligent officers of all the services, the unhappiness of the Vietnam War has made the study of the American military experience in Asia especially difficult, despite the good intentions of military educators from the precommissioning level to the senior service schools. Despite the reservations which all good practicing historians feel about drawing precise lessons from the past, the United States military has only one past, and much of it involves warfare on the Asian mainland. Like the battlefield illuminated only by the fleeting glare of a burning flare, the study may in part be illusory, but the reality it *does* reveal may be ignored only at one's peril.

IV

IMPACT OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY ON ASIAN SOCIETIES

IRONIES OF CHINESE-AMERICAN MILITARY CONTACT

Frank A. Kierman, Jr.

War is social action on a large scale and with few restraints. As such, it is peculiarly liable to irony: "incongruity between what might be expected and what actually occurs."¹ Philosophers of war will note that this idea has been packaged variously elsewhere—as "the fog of war," for example, as "movement in a resistant medium," as risk, and so on—but irony is a useful tag. Irving Kristol hits the essential point: "The unanticipated consequences of social action are always more important and usually less agreeable than the intended consequences."²

The United States and China are as different as two cultures can be: China certainly the oldest of the great nations, the U.S. certainly the youngest;³ China urbane, set in its ways even amidst chaotic change, and self-satisfied, the U.S. raw, committed to progress (however chaotic), and self-satisfied. Not surprisingly, the two nations have not understood each other very well, and yet their importance to one another is undeniable. The China trade was a vital factor in U.S. capital formation during the nineteenth century, which generated an indigenous counterbalance to European investment; during World War II the U.S. became China's first alien ally against foreign invasion in more than a millennium. Since in recent years an even more meaningful relationship seems to be developing, it may be well to survey some of the peculiarities of the past.

The man who first pointed the infant U.S. at China is himself a bundle of ironies. John Ledyard sailed as a corporal of marines on 12 July 1776 with Captain James Cook's last expedition to the South Seas. A Dartmouth dropout, Ledyard became the chronicler of the expedition. When he finally made his way back home to the fledgling, uneasily united U.S. in 1782, he published his own account of the voyage and became rather a celebrity. His experiences had taught him two things: first, he was an American, despite the uniform he wore; and second, the triangular trade across the Pacific—then being exploited by the Russians—consisting of selling furs bought from the Indians of the northwest and buying Chinese commodities, could be a bonanza for the new American nation.

Using his literary fame as a door-opener, young Ledyard began buttonholing influential and well-heeled Americans such as Robert Morris,

Benjamin Franklin, John Paul Jones, and most importantly, Thomas Jefferson. To all of them he urged the profits of Pacific trade, which began in 1784, about as soon after the Treaty of Paris as possible. By the 1790's that trade had created the first American millionaire, and by 1812 it had helped lay the foundation of John Jacob Astor's fortune, a fact memorialized in the name of Astoria, Oregon. Above all, however, Ledyard's vision seems to have influenced Jefferson toward doing two things piquantly contrary to that great man's thorny republican principles: snatching at the opportunity to buy the Louisiana Territory from France, and sending Lewis and Clark on their western expedition, thus staking the nation's claim to a transcontinental realm. Ledyard was a peculiar point-man for eighteenth century Americans (he rather admired the British, and he very much liked the Indians), but he did indeed point the way, claiming that China was the land of opportunity, and the west coast of North America was the key to that fortune's door.⁴

Two radically different nineteenth century American military men deserve at least passing mention. Frederick Townsend Ward, a freebooter rather than a trained soldier, organized the Ever-Victorious Army, composed of foreign officers and Chinese troops, to protect the Shanghai treaty port against the Taiping rebels. He fit well into an ancient and accepted Chinese status, that of the mercenary captain, often a barbarian of some sort, hired by merchants or landowners for security in times of rebellion and disorder.⁵ The other was an observer, General Emory Upton, who toured the world inspecting armies in 1875-1877 and wrote a book called *Armies of Asia and Europe*. He found the Chinese military apparatus inscrutable. He could describe elements in it but could see no comprehensible purpose in the way it functioned. In Canton he observed an arsenal that was producing the U.S.-designed Remingtons and Spencers under license, but with the barrels enlarged to one-inch caliber and a length of six feet. "On being told that the barrels were too long, the intelligent Chinese superintendent replied that he 'knew it, but that the length was added to give them a more formidable appearance.'"⁶

Such witnesses as these two military men did not establish the American pattern of military action in China. Like American trade and treaties, U.S. military action followed the British model, though Americans often tried to deny similarities to the British pattern. Since American armies were almost non-existent and since what little there was had more than enough to do at home, it was the Navy which had to assert the American presence in foreign lands. There was a United States fleet of sorts in East Asian waters from 1835 on; the Yangtze Patrol dates its beginnings to 1853.⁷ But the first real change in the pattern dates from the disorders attendant upon the "Hundred Days of Reform" and the subsequent Boxer Uprising at the end of the nineteenth century, when U.S. ground forces were sent to China (all the more easily, of course, because the U.S. enjoyed considerable troop strength in the Philippines).

Those forces were still limited in number and mission. A total of 56 Marines and sailors from the Asiatic Fleet were among the defenders of the Peking legation quarter, and some 2500 soldiers and Marines took part in the international forces that raised the siege. After the Boxer Settlement and under its provisions, a couple of battalions remained in North China to keep watch over the rail line from Tangku to Peking, but they did little except to show the flag.

After 1923 these men were elements of the 15th Regiment, based in Tientsin. A number of officers who served with the 15th were later to return as leading actors in World War II or the post-war cataclysms: George Marshall, Joseph Stilwell, Albert Wedemeyer, and Matthew Ridgway. Quite apart from its opportunities, joys, and frustrations for ambitious young officers, Tientsin was good duty for enlisted men. The work day was short, usually ending by noon; coolies did all the dirty work, including the cleaning of soldiers' rifles; and, as one commander phrased it, "Women, intoxicants, and narcotics can be obtained in their vilest forms for a few cents."⁸ Small wonder the 15th had the highest reenlistment rate in the Army.

Outside the military lotus-land, however, East Asia was undergoing changes which were radical and ultimately explosive. In 1853 Japan had been jerked unceremoniously out of her seclusion by Commodore Matthew C. Perry, tenth in the line of commanders, U.S. Asiatic Fleet. Since that time, Japan had been steadily encroaching upon China. In 1874, after invading Taiwan, Japan secured clear title to the Ryukyu Islands. After the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), Japan got Liaotung Peninsula—later retroceded under European pressure—and Taiwan, as well as acknowledgement of Korea's freedom from Chinese suzerainty. The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), all fought on land that was either Chinese or formerly under Chinese suzerainty, led to Japanese take-over in 1910 of Korea, renamed Chōsen. In 1915, after Japan had seized Germany's leasehold, Shantung Province, Japan presented its Twenty-one Demands on China. When the Versailles Conference confirmed Japan in her war-time gains, including Shantung, student rioting broke out in Peking on 4 May 1919. The Washington Conference of 1921-1922, called by the United States as an attempt to tidy up the "China Question," did succeed in retrieving Shantung but failed in the larger task of guaranteeing Chinese territorial integrity; the ponderous treaty structure which it established came to nothing in the face of steady Japanese pressure.⁹ Like the high ideals of the League of Nations, the treaty could not be enforced.

The political agitation of the early 1920s also saw the birth of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the reorganization of the Kuomintang (KMT), and their uneasy alliance in the first United Front. Like the new authoritarian political parties of Europe, this new party structure had its party army and its military academy. The Whampoa Academy was founded

in 1924 near Canton with Chiang Kai-shek as commandant and Chou En-lai (the highest Communist functionary of the staff) as deputy head of the political education department. All was under Russian tutelage and supplied by the U.S.S.R. In 1927 the party army launched the northern expeditions to the Yangtze Valley and the north, and on 12 April of that year the first KMT-CCP United Front ripped apart as the result of a right-wing coup engineered by Chiang Kai-shek and the gangs of Shanghai.¹⁰ The disorders attendant upon all this, and the threats it posed to the treaty ports, triggered military moves by the powers, including the U.S.

In February some 1700 Marines arrived in Shanghai. A month later it was decided that the force must be built up to brigade strength under that archetypical leatherneck, General Smedley D. Butler, who had been a junior lieutenant in the forces that had relieved the Boxer siege of Peking. On 24 March, however, Chinese forces at Nanking indulged in a purposeful day of terror, attacking American businessmen and missionaries and killing six of them. Almost two hundred miles away, the Marines could do nothing.¹¹

By May the Marine brigade, consisting of more than four thousand men, was at full strength, but the center of concern had shifted north. So Butler moved most of his force to Tientsin, leaving in Shanghai only the 4th Marines, who were to remain for fourteen years, becoming the legendary "China Marines" of the International Settlement.¹² Butler's men moved into Tientsin beside the 15th Regiment, to which they made a piquant contrast. There were, to start with, several times more Marines than soldiers, even though together they were a mere drop of water in the Chinese sea. But they also had twenty airplanes and some light tanks (fairly *avant-garde* items for a U.S. military unit overseas in the late 1920s) as well as plenty of mortars, howitzers, machine guns, and such standard gear. Butler's trucks could start for Peking in fourteen minutes, his planes within five.¹³ Even if it was still just showing the flag, it was something new in Tientsin.

Butler was also one of those people who could impress others without necessarily trying:

During an exhibition of stunting, . . . [one of his pilots] zoomed over the crowds, went into a spectacular roll, lost both wings off his plane and parachuted into a moat in front of the stands. "Trust Smedley," a lady spectator commented. "He always puts on a wonderful show."¹⁴

Expatriate life could still be like that in China.

But it was events among Asians, in large measure among Chinese, which set the framework within which Americans and Chinese were to interact, in a totally new way, as allies in the first truly global war. The final ten years before World War II have been called "the Nanking Decade,"

the decade 1927-1937, during which the KMT government based in Nanking seemed to promise unification and consolidation of China after the long period of warlord rule and Japanese encroachment. One reason foreign observers saw the Nanking years as hopeful was that the KMT government sought military and quasi-military aid from various foreign countries, most importantly a German military mission, which was in the country from 1928 to 1938.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the high points of the decade and the early war years demonstrated a clear, and probably irreversible, hardening of enmity between KMT and CCP. The definitive split in the first United Front occurred in 1927. The years between 1930 and 1935 saw five KMT "extermination campaigns" against the Communist Kiangsi base, the famous Long March, and the establishment of Mao Tse-tung's base in Yen-an, Shensi. In 1936 and 1937, observers witnessed the Sian Incident, the formation of the second United Front, and Japan's "China Incident." Finally, in January 1941, the New 4th Army Incident signalled the effective end of the second United Front. Thus, well before President Roosevelt commenced his efforts to have China recognized as an equal among the Allied Big Four, events had institutionalized two Chinas.

Until 1937 people in the U.S. had known almost nothing about Communist China, but in that year Edgar Snow's *Red Star over China* was published; three years later Evans F. Carlson, a Marine major and former Assistant Naval Attaché in China, had two books published: *The Chinese Army* and *Twin Stars of China*.¹⁶ All three books tended to supply a romantic, even heroic, view of the Communists, perhaps as much because the situation in Nationalist China was uncertain and messy as because of any bias in the authors. Most important, from an American viewpoint, they all supported the idea (which Ward had held, and Stilwell had and would) that Chinese troops adequately armed, motivated, cared-for, and led, are militarily formidable.

Any idea of choice between Nationalists and Communists was rapidly foreclosed, however, by Japan's lightning expansion during the first months after Pearl Harbor. By the end of April 1942 the Burma Road was lost with the fall of Lashio, and China's only supply line was air transport over the Hump. So it made little difference whether Americans were disposed to prefer Communists to Nationalists or vice versa. The Hump traffic could not go beyond Yunnan, and its capacity was far too limited to satisfy any one of the three elements which rapidly laid claim to its cargo: the Nationalists, the American Volunteer Group (AVG, later 14th Air Force) under Claire Chennault, and the Chinese forces being trained and equipped under General Joseph W. Stilwell.

Chennault had been retired from the Army as a forty-five year old captain in 1935. His age and increasing deafness were certainly against him, but the fact that he was a strong proponent of aerial combat, authoring a book entitled *The Role of Defensive Pursuit* in 1935, and this in an Army

Air Corps already largely wedded to the mystique of the bomber, probably did little to argue for retaining him. At any rate, two years after retirement he became Air Adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. Since Chennault was an imaginative enthusiast for aerial defense and since China required defense against Japan's air power, he was just what Chiang needed; he became a diehard supporter of Chiang himself and of the KMT. His initial role with the Chinese was as a contractor, recruiter and trainer of the AVG, supplying military services for money, that is to say, a mercenary. He was great at the job. For example, he devised tactics that would let the aging P-40 defeat the Japanese Zero, no small achievement. Of course he and much of his team were later reintegrated into the regular U.S. armed services, from which most of them had come. He retired as a major general in 1945. Despite many differences, he may be piquantly compared to Frederick Townsend Ward. He got along very well with the Chinese, especially Chiang Kai-shek; he married a Chinese wife; and in the end he made a fair fortune, though it was his wife who lived to enjoy it.¹⁷

Stilwell was a very different kind of soldier, a West Pointer, an infantryman, and the most broadly experienced China hand in the regular Army of his generation. He had spent more than ten years in China as visitor, as language officer studying Chinese, as officer with the 15th Regiment, and as Military Attaché. And all that was before he accepted his climactic assignment in 1942 as Chiang Kai-shek's American expediter, adviser, and (more or less) second-in-command. He had a considerable flair for language, having taught French, Spanish, and English at West Point, and he had learned useful Chinese at the North China Union Language School. Stilwell's greatest aptitude seems to have been teaching, especially devising infantry exercises. His performance as a forty-eight year old lieutenant colonel at Fort Benning led George Marshall, not an easy man to please, to call him "a genius for instruction" and to describe him on a routine efficiency report as "qualified for any command in peace or war."¹⁸ Not everybody has since agreed with that assessment. Chiang Kai-shek did not, for example. The British military writer Shelford Bidwell who uses numerous blistering adjectives on Stilwell, is probably fair in one passage: "Unfortunately the acidulous qualities...proved to be disastrous in a general who was his country's military representative with the Chinese on the one hand, and the British on the other."¹⁹ It was perhaps Stilwell's tragedy that his rather accidental China background placed him in a situation which did not suit his real gifts and for which even his apparent qualifications rather disqualified him. He had, for example, enormous admiration for the Chinese private soldier; that was, however, to put it gently, no help in dealing with anybody but Chinese private soldiers.

Chiang Kai-shek was, of course, the third leg of this badly engineered stool. A complex and ill-understood man, he is perhaps best characterized as the logical product of the warlord era. Not a warlord himself, since he

lacked a true regional base and a personal army (as opposed to a party army), he was nevertheless a creature dependent upon the warlord pattern, constantly conditioned by a shifting balance among obscure contending forces.

What Chiang, Stilwell, and Chennault competed for was the unpredictable product of the hair-raising run over the Himalaya Hump from Assam to Yunnan. At the start, borne in C-47s, the cargo delivered over the Hump was excruciatingly small, far too little for any one of the three contenders. In late 1942, for example, the total cargo came to about one thousand tons a month. Very gradually, as better equipment came into use (C-46s, C-87s—the transport modification of the B-24 Liberator—and finally C-54s), tonnage rose. By July 1943 the monthly load was three thousand tons, by that December over twelve thousand as the C-46 came into general use, and by November 1944 about thirty-five thousand tons. By then, however, Myitkyina had been retaken, and the Hump proper was no more, having been replaced by a lower-level mini-Hump.²⁰

Supply was indeed the main battle of the China War. But there were other incidents that displayed, often uncomfortably, the somewhat peculiar problems of that sector. For example, Colonel Doolittle's raid on Tokyo took place in April 1942 and inflicted a serious trauma on the Japanese psyche, even though the physical damage was negligible. But nobody had told the Chinese that the raid was coming or that Doolittle's planes, carrier-borne to takeoff, would have to land in China or near the China coast. Naturally, Chinese leaders were concerned that their citizens might be involved in aiding the crewmen after landing, and that the Japanese might take reprisals as a consequence. And that did indeed occur. Again, the Chinese performed marvels of massed manual labor in carving out airfields so that the B-29s could "raid Japan" from the Chengtu valley. But supply problems bore as heavily on the B-29 effort as on the China war itself. The B-29 raids—rather like most of the war in China—were quickly scrapped as a symbolic, marginal, low-priority effort.

So the fact remained that during the first three years of the general Pacific war, little more than a trickle of goods got into China. By the time Myitkyina had been retaken, so that the transport problem was at least potentially solved, it was all too clear that China's importance in the war was minimal. Plans did exist, in preparation for Operation Olympic (the assault on Kyushu), for a landing in South China to divert Japanese forces. These plans were never scrapped until Japan surrendered. One Chinese column managed to seize the port of Kwang-chou-wan just before V-J Day, and a convoy had actually left Manila to resupply it as the war ended.²¹ One must remember, however, that by December 1944 the Japanese fleet had had its last hurrah at Leyte Gulf, Saipan and Tinian were in U.S. hands, and B-29s were already present there, though not yet functioning effectively.²² With U.S. submarines also chopping away at the remnants of

the Japanese Navy and what was left of the merchant marine, Japan was effectively defeated, though getting the Japanese to admit that fact was still going to be painful.²³ Ironically, once supply for China was no longer a real problem, there was no longer any pressing reason for supplying China. Anything sent in was a good-will gesture, not a matter of operational necessity.

Before Stilwell was dismissed in October 1944, he had performed a minor miracle in retraining, equipping and organizing his few Chinese divisions in India and then, with essential help from the British and the Chindits and Merrill's Marauders, taking Myitkina so that the Hump trip could be flattened and Chiang Kai-shek and Chennault could have something a bit closer to the amount of supplies they asked for. By September 1944 the Japanese had responded to the increased effectiveness of the 14th Air Force by driving into southern and southwestern China and taking over many of Chennault's painfully-built bases. Stilwell had predicted the Japanese would do so if air power started to hurt them in China and offshore before there were solid American or Chinese ground forces to protect the bases. So Stilwell, very briefly and apparently in charge, had the privilege of destroying airfields to prevent the Japanese from using them. And Chiang Kai-shek, ironically, could use whatever was imported over the new low-level route to stockpile against the predictable conflict with the Chinese Communists.

During Stilwell's turbulent tour in the China-Burma-India theater, he had been infuriated constantly by the Chinese instinct for hoarding supplies and troop strength rather than using them.²⁴ This was certainly a warlord pattern: the warlord saw his troops and equipment as capital, and tended rather to bargain on the basis of what he had, or could pretend to have, rather than to expend his goods or expose his hand. By the end of World War II, however, Chiang Kai-shek was facing an old adversary with whom he could not, in the last analysis, really bargain. No deal, even if struck, would be kept between KMT and CCP. Accumulated capital had to be risked.

In theory this was no business of the U.S., even though all the military capital of the KMT (except bodies, of course) had been contributed by the U.S. Throughout the war, numerous Americans had urged that both the Communists and the Nationalist troops who watched them be used against Japan. This naive advice was a measure of how little Americans, notably including Stilwell, really understood the situation. After the war, too, despite the fact that the U.S. had no alternative to restoring "the territorial integrity of China" through its recognized government, Americans still sought to keep a considerable degree of balance between the contenders. Every major initiative taken by the U.S. in the immediate postwar years demonstrates this: establishing the Marshall mission with the U.S. as

intermediary between KMT and CCP, leaving the Embassy in Nanking when that capital fell to the Communists, and publishing the White Paper. Needless to say, this posture satisfied neither Chinese party, as the China Lobby and the "Lean-to-One Side" policy demonstrate.

For the Chinese contenders the crunch came very soon after the end of hostilities between Japan and the U.S. Geography and the Japanese position in China conspired to give the Communists a vital advantage.* The Soviets, who had overrun Manchuria in less than a week of war, helped to make this advantage insuperable, given a Nationalist strategy that was understandable but unrealistic.²⁵ Manchuria was unquestionably desirable for the Nationalists, almost overwhelmingly so, but its position made it an extremely risky gamble for the Nationalists. There was no reason whatever to assume that the Soviets would cooperate with the KMT,²⁶ and the Communist forces were in much better position to get into Manchuria, from the Shantung peninsula and through Inner Mongolia, than any Nationalist forces. Once in Manchuria, KMT forces would be at the end of a long supply line stretching through restricted entryways and the countryside of North China, which was not secured at all. CCP forces had no comparable logistical problem, since they could depend upon the guerrilla's classic supply source: capture, surrender, pilferage, or purchase from the enemy's own troops and supply depots. And the joker in the game was Russia.

General Wedemeyer, who had succeeded Stilwell as Commanding General, China Theater, judged that the Nationalists were completely unprepared to occupy Manchuria against Communist opposition. He twice advised the Generalissimo to this effect, recommending that China "south of the Great Wall and north of the Yangtze" be consolidated before any move was begun into the northeast.²⁷ Wedemeyer's assessment was that the KMT would be unable to take Manchuria "for many years" unless the Nationalist regime corrected its own abuses and weaknesses, and unless it also reached agreements with both the Chinese Communists and the Soviets.²⁸

Chiang Kai-shek's response seems to have included some gestures indicating that he at least heard Wedemeyer's advice, but his actions showed clearly that he did not or could not accept it.²⁹ The Nationalists publicly appointed personnel to administer Manchuria and decided to use their best troops to occupy it, those which had been in various measures equipped and trained by the U.S. Unfortunately, those forces were far away, in India, Burma, and Yunnan. Transporting large units over such distances would take time, even with U.S. help.

*See Map 1 following the text of this paper.

In theory the Soviets were holding Manchuria for the legitimate Chinese takeover forces, but in early October 1945, when Admiral Daniel Barbey's ships loaded with KMT troops sought to offload in Dairen (the old Russian leasehold on the Kwantung Peninsula), the Soviets would not allow them to land. When Barbey moved west to Yingkow and Hulutao he found the Soviets gone, but the Chinese Communists in control and hostile. So it was well into November, and already three months after V-J Day, before the first Nationalist troop units disembarked at Chinwangtao, which was held by U.S. Marines.³⁰

Clearly the Soviets had done nothing to impede Chinese Communist movements into Manchuria. When the Soviets withdrew from various localities the Chinese Communists usually occupied them (as they had Yingkow and Hulutao) or attacked such token KMT forces as tried to assert a presence. The Soviets had disarmed both the Japanese and their puppet "Manchukuo" forces; these arms, barring heavy weapons, were evidently used to arm CCP militia, who had raced into Manchuria empty-handed, and to rearm those former puppet troops who chose to enlist in the People's Liberation Army. Thus the Communists rapidly created a sizeable if heterogeneous army in Manchuria, under Lin Piao, which held the countryside. The KMT consistently underrated the number and usefulness of these troops.³¹

By mid-March 1946, when the KMT formally occupied Mukden, large Nationalist and Communist units confronted one another below Ssu-ping-kai, a railroad junction one hundred miles north on the line towards Changchun, former capital of Manchukuo. Extensive fighting broke out in the first week of April and lasted until 19 May, when the Communists disengaged and moved north.*

There is only one reasonably circumstantial account of this campaign, which both KMT and CCP annalists have their reasons for ignoring.³² It is worth quoting extensively, with a few comments:

The first blow from General Lin Piao fell on the Seventy-first Nationalist Army. In their advance towards Changchun, the two government armies marched abreast in two columns. The New First followed the railway axis, while the Seventy-first took the Faku-to-Pamienchieh highway, about twenty miles to the west. After being on the road for more than ten days and having encountered no substantial resistance so far, the two armies relaxed their vigilance. Reconnaissance was poorly conducted and there was little liaison between the two columns.

Meanwhile, the troops, with their recently issued American arctic clothing, including lined parkas, wind hoods, berets, field jackets, wool sweaters, mittens, mufflers, rubber snow boots, heavy socks, blankets, and sleeping bags, made an awkward picture.³³

*See Map 2.

Only those who have seen a Chinese army on the march and observed their equipment and the paucity of their support arms can begin to imagine just how much this extravagant issue of goodies (which U.S. supply officers were undoubtedly eager to write off their books at war's end) bewitched and encumbered the men, and no doubt the boys, of the 71st Army.

There was no adequate transport for them. Inevitably, when the troops were on the march, carrying coolies were hired, pack animals commandeered, and squeaking mule carts conscripted. The speed of the marching column was slowed down and its security was compromised. On April 2, the Eighty-eighth Division, advance unit of the Seventy-first Army, crossed the East Liao River at Tungkiangkow. Lin Piao, proving himself a shrewd tactician, did nothing to arouse the suspicion of the Nationalists. Only in the evening of April 3, near Kingkiatun, about forty miles southwest of Suping-kai..., Lin's 40,000-man army closed in on the Eighty-eighth Division, the latter then having a combat strength of 9,000. The government troops were not only caught by surprise, they were also denied support, as the rest of the army was delayed at the ferry behind. The three regiments tried to take defensive positions as best they could, but panic and disorder ensued. Combat troops and supply trains collided on the road. Some officers abandoned their men and ran for life. The Communists surrounded the three regiments and overran them one after another. By midnight the battle was over. No one yet knows how many were killed in action. But the Communists were supposed to have captured half of the equipment of the Eighty-eighth, and about one-third of its personnel. The Division Commander escaped capture; he wept when he reported to his superiors.³⁴

This brief account might have made suggestive reading for American officers confronting the Chinese Communists and Lin Piao in Korea, but of course it was not written until some years after the Korean War ended.

Lin then turned his attention to the New First Army, which was proceeding north along the railway. On 5 and 6 April he staged a series of daylight assaults in the style that would later, in Korea, be called "human sea" attacks. Fortunately for the Nationalists, most of the troops on the receiving end, the New 38th Division, had been well seasoned in Burma, and the Communists took heavy losses, finally pulling back towards Ssu-ping-kai. Despite this good showing, however, the KMT troops were shaken by the carnage and apparently lost some of their edge. Furthermore, the Communists proved as stubborn in defense as they had been headlong in attack. A relative stalemate was succeeded by a relative lull, during which both sides pulled fresh troops into the area. The key difference was that the KMT had one of Stilwell's units from Burma, the New 6th Army, to bring up from southern Manchuria. The CCP had nothing comparable. The New 6th was assigned to conduct an end-run around Ssu-ping-kai to the east and trap Lin Piao's forces in the city. But Nationalist security was poor. On 19 April, the day before the trap was to be sprung, the Communists were found to have withdrawn overnight. The retreating Communists tried to make a stand at Kung-chu-ling, an important pass halfway to Changchun, but the New 1st Army maneuvered them out of the pass in a single morning, and the KMT took Changchun on 23 May.³⁵

The importance of the Ssu-ping-kai/Kung-chu-ling episode is perhaps best expressed by General Chassin: "At this time Chiang Kai-shek was at Mukden, where he had arrived in General Marshall's personal plane for a tour of inspection. The capture of Changchun increased Chiang's confidence and his certainty of victory through force."³⁶

Chiang's confidence was unjustified. The Communists had strengths he could not comprehend. The U.S. tie was much less unconditional than he supposed, and the Communists learned from their mistakes, as losers tend to do. Less than two and a half years later, on 2 November 1948, Mukden surrendered to the Communists; the Nationalists had lost thirty good divisions in Manchuria, half of them American-equipped.³⁷ Less than five months later the Nationalist capital, Nanking, fell. Never has Sun-tzu's maxim been more bitterly proved: "Ignorant of your enemy and yourself, you are in peril every battle."³⁸

Furthermore, despite the China Lobby's energetic efforts, U.S. patience was at an end. In August 1949 the White Paper was published. Like the decision to leave the solid core of the U.S. embassy in Nanking, this was designed to clear the decks for giving aid to the Chinese Communists and for recognizing them. But between the fall of Nanking and the publication of the White Paper, Mao Tse-tung had lashed his flag to another masthead. On 1 July 1949 he had published his essay, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," which announced the "Lean-to-One-Side" policy, that is, leaning to the side of the Soviet Union. So the White Paper was anti-climactic, to say the least. Still, it did sever the U.S.-Nationalist tie, if only briefly.

The Communists proposed to take Taiwan, the Nationalists' final foothold on Chinese soil, by a vigorous—if largely symbolic—assault. The plan was postponed indefinitely by an epidemic of schistosomiasis which ravaged the invasion troops in late 1949 and early 1950, and then in June 1950 the Korean War started. One of President Truman's first actions was to interpose the 7th Fleet between Taiwan and the mainland, thus making the U.S. once more the Nationalists' protector, ally, and supplier, and creating the political geography of East Asia as it still is today.³⁹ Chiang Kai-shek, who had always been spiritually a warlord, now had his regional regime and his very own army, as well as a better bankroll than any warlord had ever possessed by controlling merely a city or a province. He had the key to the U.S. Treasury, a fact formalized by treaty in 1955.⁴⁰

The United States was not done with China, nor with the consequences of its military and political actions there. On 31 October 1950 Chinese troops attacked U.S. units near the Yalu River in North Korea.⁴¹ South Korean units had reported heavy contacts and had taken Chinese prisoners six days earlier, but like many warnings these had been discounted by General MacArthur and his headquarters, by the press, and by

the troops.⁴² So, too, was this U.S. Army report ignored. On 24 November MacArthur gave the order for his "Home-for-Christmas" offensive, adding, a little gratuitously, "The Chinese are not coming in." That push ended Chinese patience. Within three days of his ill-starred prediction, MacArthur's troops were retreating, when they could, all along the line.⁴³ By New Year's Day the fighting was near the 38th parallel and by 3 January Seoul had been abandoned for the second time. By February, however, U.N. counter-offensives brought the "fast-break" period of the Korean War to an end. From then on it was short-range slogging back and forth in brutal terrain until the armistice of July 1953.

The Korean War was a singularly difficult and unsettling conflict in many ways, but especially because of Chinese Communist battle techniques. Their "human sea" tactics and nocturnal noise-making were peculiarly nerve-wracking, especially to inexperienced troops. It seemed that perhaps the Communists had succeeded in engineering a new man, one so disciplined, ideologically conditioned, and selfless that he was not recognizably human. Fortunately, the postwar prisoner exchange exploded that theory. Of the more than 21,000 Chinese prisoners held by U.N. forces, almost exactly two-thirds elected not to return to the mainland, but to go to Taiwan.⁴⁴ It turned out that those mass attacks had been liberally fleshed out with former KMT and warlord troops who confronted the enthusiastic American fire-power not because their hearts had been purified but because they had guns at their backs.

The Chinese role during the Vietnam war also tended to feed U.S. sentimentalities regarding monolithic Communism. Once the Communists had secured mainland China, they gave generous supply help as well as unstinting political support to the Viet Cong. Some of the guns which battered the French into surrender at Dien-bien-phu in 1954 were originally American weapons, supplied to the Chinese Nationalists and captured in Manchuria in 1948. And despite the increasingly bitter Sino-Soviet split, China supported the Viet Cong to the end. Only after Vietnam had been reunified by force did China adopt Kampuchea and the Pol Pot regime, bringing the polarities of the Sino-Soviet dispute to Southeast Asia in visible, violent form.

The ironies of the U.S.-China relationship have certainly not diminished in 1980, now that the two are more or less friends, which is to say more rather than less enemies of the U.S.S.R. Americans do not understand China, or their own interests and attitudes towards China, much better today than in the past, nor do Americans understand China accurately or subtly enough to function effectively with her as an ally or against her as an enemy.

Early in 1980 the Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, announced in Peking that to give China "the capacity to defend itself against any Soviet


attack by conventional forces and weapons" would take something between \$41 billion and \$63 billion.⁴⁵ This is at best newspaper talk, at worst pure eyewash.

What one must face is that, for China as for all nations, the United States must have a clear comprehension of what each nation and area *really* is: each potential focus of conflict, each potential adversary, each potential ally. The U.S. cannot afford to be in a situation characterized by the descriptions of American knowledge relative to Iran and Iraq in a current crisis: "We are weak in the bazaars, on the campuses, in the streets where the life of a nation takes place...we're in the Dark Ages when it comes to knowing what makes these nations tick."⁴⁶ Attaining sufficient understanding of China, in order to make a realistic assessment of the American position against the Chinese position, is a task which is—to put it mildly—enormous.


Merely to emphasize a few of the more dramatic ironies in a "strange eventful history," consider the following. (1) The U.S. government today seems to be considering supplying China with very large and expensive amounts of military aid, while at the same time American forces and the industrial plant which would have to replace the goods are themselves in dubious condition.⁴⁷ (2) In World War II the most experienced China hand among American general officers could not understand that for the Chinese what matters most is what happens within China: "The Japanese are a disease of the skin; the Communists are a disease of the heart." (3) Most basically, the Chinese have been thinking astutely about social action and social organization for four millennia, and have developed a considerable array of administrative and technological prescriptions during that time. This paper began by stating that war is fundamentally social action. For the United States to advise China on military affairs is the height of irony.

MANCHURIA

APRIL - MAY, 1946
MAP-2



CHINA - 1945
MAP - I



JAPANESE PERCEPTIONS OF THE A-BOMB DECISION, 1945-1980

Sadao Asada

Under the impact of a spiraling nuclear arms race which has come to assume apocalyptic proportions, the historical controversy over the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki has generated considerable heat both in the United States and Japan.

From Norman Cousins' early doubts in 1946 to the recent works of Martin Sherwin and Barton Bernstein, American historians, political scientists, and journalists have debated about the motives and necessity for using this "absolute weapon."¹ Now, thirty-five years after the tragedy, "orthodox" as well as "revisionist" studies recognize that the A-bomb decision was based on *both* military and political motives: to end the war with Japan as quickly as possible, and to gain possible diplomatic advantages vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in the emerging Cold War. These two considerations reinforced and confirmed a de facto policy, already existing and never seriously questioned by President Truman and most of his advisors, to use the atomic bomb. Thus defined, the historical controversy over their motives has essentially boiled down to the relative weight to be assigned to these respective considerations.²

Instead of going over the familiar ground, this paper attempts to analyze shifting Japanese perceptions of the A-bomb decision. Not surprisingly, concerned Japanese intellectuals have closely followed the course of the historical controversy in the United States, which is reflected, albeit selectively, in their own debate. For many Japanese, however, the problem goes far deeper than a mere historical debate, because it became closely related to the question of their identity as the first and the only nation to have suffered from atomic bombings. This sense of victimization gives a unique stamp to the Japanese perspective on the A-bomb decision. The tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, far from being confined to the casualties in these two cities, have become a significant *national* experience of the Japanese people. The impression given by the mass media is that the entire nation vicariously bears the scars of the atomic exposure. It is in this broader sense that Japanese perceptions will be examined in this paper, although references will necessarily be made to Hiroshima-Nagasaki survivors when their attitudes seem relevant for our purposes.

Even today the question of the A-bomb decision is a highly delicate one in Japan—ridden by strong emotions, surrounded by myths, misunderstandings, and even “taboos.” Having instantly become *the* symbol of the anti-war feelings among the defeated Japanese, “the A-bomb problem” has remained poignantly potent as a political issue exploited by nationalistic as well as leftist elements. From July to September 1980, the problem suddenly acquired greater contemporary relevance and political significance as some Japanese opinion leaders published explosive articles on Japan’s defense policy in influential magazines and newspapers. Suffice it here to say that the historical question of the A-bomb decision became inseparably intertwined with the current debate as to whether or not Japan ought to acquire nuclear capability and whether or not Japan’s constitution should be revised to eliminate the famous Article Nine that renounced war.

Equally important are striking differences between Japanese and American perceptions of the A-bomb decision. These differences constitute a subtle psychological discordance, a persistent irritant that militates against mutual communication and understanding. The divergent perspectives—all the more insidious because they are influenced by emotional undercurrents—certainly deserve a thorough ventilation in the interest of healthier U.S.-Japanese relations. This paper, though limited in scope, is intended as a first step in this direction.

The thirty-fifth anniversary of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was an occasion in Japan for a flood of articles, books, television serials, pictorial exhibitions, and publication of photographs recently made available by the United States National Archives. In contrast American newspapers and journals virtually ignored the anniversary. The only possible exception is a *Washington Star* article by Garry Wills, an active journalist and history professor at Northwestern University. After his recent visit to Hiroshima, he proposed that the film of the A-bomb disaster should be run every year on the world’s television sets. “Forget the past?” he emphatically asked:

For survivors, for their children, for people still dying from the bomb’s effect, the past is the present. The city is still engaged in a death water Some want to close their eyes. But that course leads to a large scale death watch, one in which we could measure the way a world dies.³

Wills re-echoed the regret, often expressed by the older generation of reflective Japanese, that the A-bomb experience has become a thing of history, now that over half of the Japanese population was born after the end of the Second World War. With the passage of thirty-five years, it is perhaps inevitable that the so-called “A-bomb consciousness” should go through a “weathering” of sorts. In truth, however, an overwhelming and ever increasing majority of Hiroshima-Nagasaki survivors feel it their “duty,” their “special mission,” to keep their A-bomb memories alive,

transmit them through the generations, and to make known to the rest of the world the true nature of nuclear warfare.

In preparing this paper, I canvassed a variety of materials: survivors' diaries and memoirs, detailed interviews conducted by various voluntary organizations, visual representations, journalistic accounts, political pamphlets and polemical writings, popular histories as well as more academic studies, secondary school textbooks in social studies and history, and an ever growing literary genre called "A-bomb literature."⁴ Perhaps only the firsthand materials—with all their gruesomeness and miseries—can give us a human, therefore a truthful, picture. However, for a more objective analysis, the historian and political scientist must rely on public opinion polls periodically conducted by major newspapers, the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK), and other reliable organizations.

Of course, any statistics can be manipulated, depending on the way the questionnaire is phrased and the samples selected. I therefore used, as corroborative data, a small-scale (N = 95) but in-depth poll which an able American student of mine took on our campus, Doshisha University in Kyoto, five years ago under my supervision.⁵ (To my regret, I had to abandon my original plan to conduct a follow-up poll by myself because of the highly controversial atmosphere that suddenly came to surround the "A-bomb question" in the summer of 1980.)

Let me state some of my findings first. While the deepest resentment is no doubt harbored by many A-bomb survivors, as a group their feelings toward the United States do not seem to be much different from other Hiroshima-Nagasaki residents or average Japanese elsewhere. If anything, the atomic victims tend to be less harsh in their condemnation of the American use of the atomic bomb.

In sharp contrast, my preliminary investigation suggests that anger at and suspicion of the United States are strongest among the younger generation who never experienced war. Our college students are more prone to assert that the atomic bombing was neither necessary nor justified. On campuses a high degree of credence is given to the "revisionist" view that the A-bomb was dropped not so much to end the war quickly as to "check" or "pressure" the Soviet Union. This political motive of "Atomic Diplomacy" was chosen by our students most frequently both as the primary and secondary reasons why the American leaders used the atomic weapon.

Secondly, our students made a special point of racism as a factor that influenced the A-bomb decision. At least among the Doshisha students polled, half believed that the American leaders would not have dropped the atomic bomb on Germany, even if it had been ready in time, but it was dropped on Japan because of racial prejudice and discrimination against Asians.

There is no reason to believe that students' perceptions of the A-bomb decision have materially changed since the poll was taken five years ago, for they are given a steady diet of popular histories, journalistic writings, and tendentious treatises that harp on the two themes of "atomic blackmail" against the Soviet Union and American racism.

In order to understand the wide acceptance of these views, one must place them against the historical background of the complex love-hate relationship that has characterized the Japanese attitude toward Americans. In the space of thirty-five years, the position of the United States shifted from postwar conqueror and protector to the most important ally and "partner" and then a major economic competitor. America has registered her images among the Japanese as the model of democracy as well as epitome of "capitalistic imperialism." Given such ambivalent feelings toward the United States in general, it is not easy to isolate and measure with any accuracy the Japanese attitudes toward the U.S. on the issue of the A-bomb decision.

As a starting point of our analysis, let us review the earliest statistics available—those gathered by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey just three months after Japan's surrender.⁶ Interviewing five thousand people, the Survey found a relatively low level of hostility to the United States. Concerning the use of atomic bombs, less than one-fifth of the respondents in or near Hiroshima and Nagasaki expressed hatred of Americans for having dropped the atomic bombs. On the national scale, the Survey found only 19 percent of the Japanese people directing their resentment against Americans for this act. Like Japanese in other areas, Hiroshima-Nagasaki residents turned more of their resentment against their own leaders, especially the military. When asked where the responsibility lay for the atomic bombings, 35 percent replied that it was Japan's own fault, and another 29 percent stated that neither side was responsible, for it was the inevitable consequence of war.

As the published Survey frankly admitted, these figures probably underestimated the actual extent of hostility to the United States. Among the reasons it counted were: the fatalistic attitude best summarized in the expression "c'est la guerre"; the respondents' unwillingness to express their true feelings out of fear or "politeness"; the total discredit into which Japanese war leaders had fallen and the all-time high prestige of the Americans in Japan under the great "Shogun" General Douglas MacArthur.

These and other biases seem to have been borne out thirty years after the Strategic Bombing Survey, when a monthly magazine *Ushio* searched out and reinterviewed as many as possible of the same persons who had been interviewed in 1945.⁷ They were asked what their feelings toward the United States had been then and what they were now. Many stressed the fears they initially had about the American troops, then their great relief at

seeing the friendly behavior of the ordinary GI's, and their emerging sense of gratitude for the non-retributive occupation policies. Not surprisingly, they felt all the more reluctant to express their resentment of the atomic bombing to their American interviewers. Above all, they were simply too preoccupied with feeding themselves to give much thought to the A-bomb decision.

Even had the concerned Japanese wished to do so, the Press Code, imposed by the occupation authorities in September 1945, made it difficult for them to obtain sufficient information. But censorship restrictions during the occupation period were by no means complete or even consistent, despite the recent efforts of Professor Etō Jun to present them almost as oppressive as Japan's prewar and wartime control.⁸ If the occupation authorities sometimes required Japanese publications on A-bomb casualties to be modified or delayed, they did allow Japanese translations of some American writings on the subject. The most notable among them was John Hersey's poignant best-seller *Hiroshima*, which was published in Japanese in April 1949.⁹ Thus, I very much question the contention, often argued by Japanese writers, that the U.S. occupation imposed a "total news blackout" on the Hiroshima-Nagasaki disasters.¹⁰

Even if we concede that the Japanese had been "deprived" of their own recent history under the American occupation, they certainly "regained" it when the San Francisco Peace Treaty went into effect in 1952. The recovery of Japanese independence was an occasion for a flood of publications on the "A-bomb problem," after any remaining American censorship had been lifted.¹¹

By then, Japanese perceptions of the A-bomb decision had been affected by such complex events as the heightened Cold War, the Soviet acquisition of nuclear capability, the Korean War, and the conclusion of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Pact. On the domestic scene, the conclusion of this treaty with the United States in 1951 provoked a heated political debate between its supporters and opponents. Since the latter took the initiative in the peace movement, Japanese pacifism came to be linked with "anti-Americanism" of sorts. Then the Bikini incident of 1954 (in which a group of Japanese fisherman suffered from the fallout from American H-bomb testing in the Pacific, resulting in one death) suddenly galvanized the Japanese peace sentiment into a mass movement against nuclear weapons.

The anti-nuclear movement, with all its strong emotional potential, soon came to be exploited by political leaders for their own partisan purposes. During the 1960s it was plagued by ideological splits and bitter infighting as each faction condemned American, Soviet, or Chinese nuclear testing. (Naturally, Hiroshima survivors became disillusioned by the "double standard" adopted by a major anti-nuclear organization which

indicted “American imperialism” while equivocating on or even defending the Soviets or the Chinese.)¹²

On the international scene, meanwhile, the escalating war in Vietnam had a complex impact on retrospective Japanese feelings toward the United States regarding their A-bomb experience. To some extent, these negative feelings were reinforced by their natural reaction of siding with the apparent underdog against the intervening superpower, with helpless peasants against the overwhelming material strength of the United States. This and other factors combined to create a more critical attitude toward the A-bomb decision.

By the beginning of the 1970s the Japanese people had long since ceased to express more hostility toward their own leaders than toward Americans for the A-bomb disasters. According to a 1970 nationwide poll conducted by the *Mainichi* newspaper, 39 percent directed resentment toward the United States, while 19 percent did so toward the Japanese government. A poll taken a year later by the *Chūgoku* newspaper revealed that 21 percent of Hiroshima-area citizens blamed “the American government and military” for dropping the atomic bomb; 10 percent accused former President Harry S. Truman. As for the American people and the scientists who developed the nuclear weapon, each received about 2 percent. In contrast, only 10 percent blamed the Japanese government and military. Significantly, however, as many as half of the respondents placed the responsibility for atomic bombings on “the insanity of war itself” (26 percent) and “the failure of all mankind” (24 percent). Subsequent polls taken in 1975-1978 seem to indicate that Hiroshima-Nagasaki residents are more prone than the national average to universalize the “responsibility” involved in the A-bomb decision, thus sublimating their own personal tragedies.¹³

To reiterate: if the Japanese today blame American rather than their own leaders for the atomic holocausts, even more attribute the fault to the predicament of mankind caught in war. This, let me underscore, is the reason why most Japanese do not harbor bitter feelings toward the American people. (The United States, by all opinion polls, has remained the most popular foreign country with all age groups in Japan.)

I must hasten to qualify this generalization with a caveat. While there is no extreme bitterness toward the United States, there does not seem to be total “forgiveness” either. This is a very subtle difference, a point that is often lost on American observers. A typical example of complacent American reporting is a feature article on Hiroshima carried by the *U.S. News and World Report*, “The City That Has Forgiven but Can’t Forget—30 Years after the A-Bomb.” It is certainly misleading to say that “forgiveness is neither sought nor needed from former enemies.”¹⁴

Without going into the complicated matter of intercultural and semantic differences over the expression “forgiveness,” let me simply point out that various polls depend, to a large extent, on how the questionnaires are phrased. For example, 43 percent of those polled in 1971 (by the *Asahi* newspaper in a nationwide survey) replied that because of its “inhumanity” they could not “forgive” the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In contrast, 20 percent said, “for America it was a means that could not be helped”; and 17 percent stated that “because of war it was natural.”¹⁵

As was to be anticipated, a poll taken the same year in Hiroshima showed a higher proportion of its citizens—over 60 percent—responding that they could not “forgive the inhuman act of using the atomic weapon.” More recent statistics suggest that the percentage of those who reply “can never forgive” has remained more or less constant, if not on the increase. An extensive poll taken by NHK in 1975 found 69 percent of Hiroshima residents (and 71 percent of atomic survivors) expressing this sentiment. In the follow-up survey of June 1980 the figures were similar—67 percent for Hiroshima residents and 72 percent for survivors. On the minority side, about 30 percent of Hiroshima residents responded in both the 1975 and 1980 surveys that “the atomic bombing could not be helped.”¹⁶

Regarding the “responsibility” for the A-bomb disasters, the polls indicate an increasing tendency among the Japanese, especially among the atomic survivors, to focus their resentment on one individual, former President Truman, rather than direct it toward the American people in general. As the Yale psychologist Robert Lifton explains, this may be “a means of avoiding wider and more malignant forms of hatred.”¹⁷ However, what has baffled, irritated, and offended the Japanese was Truman’s repeated disavowal of any sense of “guilt” or “regret.” Over the years he publicly adhered to his original rationale that the use of the atomic bomb was necessary to save half a million or more casualties that would have ensued on both sides from an American invasion of the Japanese mainland, and that he never had any disturbed conscience or regrets over his decision. When Edward Murrow asked him in 1958 television interview, “Any regrets?” Truman responded, “Not the slightest—not the slightest in the world.”¹⁸

On their part, the Japanese have been offended by Truman’s statement in his *Memoirs* (available in Japanese translation) that he “never had any doubt” about the use of the atomic bomb.¹⁹ In 1964 an occasion arose for the Japanese to ascertain the former president’s “real feelings” about the subject when he agreed to meet a delegation of A-bomb survivors at the Truman Memorial Library in Independence, Missouri. The visiting Japanese representatives had hoped that Truman would come out with an open admission that the atomic bombing had been a “mistake.” Since

they had been led to believe that he was suffering from a sense of guilt and inner torments, they were all the more keenly disappointed by his simple repetition of the conventional rationale.²⁰ Truman's position continued to be that while he was "perfectly willing" to explain why he had decided to drop the atomic bombs (if necessary, by going to Japan and speaking to school children there), he would never "apologize" for it or say that he had been "wrong."²¹ Yet, it was precisely this kind of "apology" that the Japanese people—given their national psychology—hoped and waited for; they regarded such a gesture as the essential initiative if they were ever to feel completely reconciled or "forgiving."

To compound the irony, recently opened materials reveal that Truman—contrary to the confident public image he projected—had actually been full of secret doubts about his A-bomb decision and deeply concerned about likely postwar criticism. In a private letter to his sister Mary he confided, "It was a *terrible* decision."²² As the private journal he kept at the Potsdam Conference now reveals, his reaction to the successful testing of the atomic bomb was almost apocalyptic. "We have discovered the most terrible bomb in the history of the world," he wrote. "It may be the fire destruction prophesied in the Euphrates Valley Era, after Noah and his fabulous Ark." Then he scribbled: "Even if the Japs are savages, ruthless, merciless and fanatic, we as the leader of the world for the common welfare cannot drop this terrible bomb on the old Capital [Kyoto] or the new [Tokyo]."²³

This last passage seems to show that in President Truman's mind the atomic bomb partially served the emotional need of retribution against Japan as well. A few days after Nagasaki he wrote privately: "I was greatly disturbed over the unwarranted attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor. The only language they seem to understand is the one that we have been using to bombard them."²⁴ Such a sentiment is more bluntly expressed in the inscription below an aerial photograph of Hiroshima in atomic ruins that hangs in the Truman Memorial Library: "Japan started the war at Pearl Harbor; she has been repaid many times over."²⁵ This wartime mental habit of seeing a sort of moral equation between Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima has remained with many Americans.

It is widely known in Japan that some American visitors to the Hiroshima Peace Museum scribble in the register, "No more Hiroshimas, but remember Pearl Harbor!" Most Japanese find it difficult to accept this line of logic, which they interpret as another feeble American attempt to justify the atomic bombing. The Japanese today feel that for the "mistake" of starting the Pacific War they have already taken their punishment and are thus absolved, while the American side remains unrepentant for the atomic holocaust. In Japanese consciousness, moreover, Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima belong to totally different categories—in terms of

sheer numbers of casualties, the nature of human suffering, and the symbolic significance for the future of mankind. A gap between Japanese and American perceptions here, I feel, is a matter of concern that transcends academic interest.

Having discussed general Japanese attitudes on the "A-bomb question," I shall next turn to their views of the American motives, real or fancied, for using the atomic weapon against Japan. As a basis of our own poll at Doshisha University, I took into account the previous Harris surveys. The one published in August 1965 indicated that 70 percent of the American public thought the United States was "right" in dropping the atomic bomb in order to shorten the war "immeasurably" and thus to save American lives. This was essentially in line with Truman's rationalization. In contrast, only 17 percent of the samples felt "sorry" for the Hiroshima Bomb, and the remaining 13 percent said "Don't Know." Many Japanese were surprised, and even shocked, to learn that as many as 83 percent of the American people did not regret the atomic bombing.²⁶ Again in 1971 a Harris poll, commissioned by the newspaper *Asahi*, yielded a similar result: 64 percent of the American respondents felt that the atomic bombings were "necessary and proper." When questioned in a different way, 64 percent of the samples replied that "it could not be helped," while only 21 percent agreed that "it was a mistake." As in 1965, these findings again came as "a great surprise" even to the *Asahi* analysts.²⁷

In our Doshisha University poll of 1975 we asked the same general questions at the onset in order to bring out clearly the contrast between Japanese and American thinking. To summarize our findings, as many Doshisha students strongly opposed the Truman rationalization (61 percent) as American samples supported it. Only one Japanese respondent was willing to agree that the atomic bombing was "right."²⁸

The next question concerned the view that "it could not be helped" in order to avoid massive casualties that had been projected in the event of American assault on the Japanese homeland. As many as 80 percent of our respondents disagreed with this view. Admittedly our sample was small, but there are reasons to believe that the findings in 1975 among Doshisha students hold true for 1980 and for the Japanese student population in general.

Since a large majority of our students were convinced that the atomic bombing was not necessary to shorten the war and save lives, they were expected to advance non-military motives for this act. We therefore asked, "What do you think was the reason for dropping the A-bomb? What do you consider were the important reasons for the American leaders?" In the questionnaire we supplied several reasons and asked the respondent to rank them as factors which in their opinion affected the American decision.

The reason most frequently chosen as both the dominant and subordinate factors was: "To pressure the Soviet Union by a demonstration of power." Although three out of ten respondents listed "the avoidance of heavy American casualties" as the first reason, 17 percent said the reason was "to end the war against Japan before the Soviet Union could enter it," and 16 percent said it was "to test the destructive power of the A-bomb." Other secondary reasons marked by our sample in descending order were: "the need to justify to the American public the two million dollars spent on the Manhattan Project," "to pay back for Pearl Harbor," and "to avoid *both* American and Japanese casualties."* In sum, the most interesting result of our Doshisha poll was that the "Atomic Diplomacy" thesis ("to pressure the Soviet Union") found wider acceptance than the more moderate "revisionist" interpretation ("to end the war before the Soviets could enter it"). This finding is all the more intriguing because Gar Alperovitz's radical interpretation (*Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam—The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power*) has not been published in Japanese translations except for a brief summary in a weekly magazine.²⁹

How can we account for its prevalence among our students? One obvious explanation is that the main thrust of Alperovitz's arguments had already been presented by British Nobel laureate physicist P. M. S. Blackett in his book, *Fear, War and the Bomb*, which appeared in Japanese translation in May 1951.³⁰ This book had a seminal influence in shaping Japanese views of the A-bomb decision, because the Japanese public tends to hold Nobel prize scientists in such high esteem that their words are taken almost as an oracle even when they venture into the unfamiliar area of international politics and history. One index of Blackett's influence on our students is the fact that his translated book is recommended and excerpts from it included in high school teachers' manuals.³¹

The more serious-minded students who read history books and monographs can find this thesis repeated by many Japanese scholars, mostly of the leftist orientation. For example, an influential book by Tōyama Shigeki and others on contemporary Japanese history approvingly quotes from the British physicist: "The dropping of the atomic bombs was not so much the last military act of the Second World War as the first major operation of the cold war with Russia."³² In a similar vein, the multi-volume *History of the Pacific War* compiled by a leftist group of scholars, states: "500,000 citizens [of Hiroshima and Nagasaki] were *meaninglessly sacrificed* for the sake of America's political purpose."³³ Going one step further, a historian has recently asserted, in a full-length study, that these victims were not only "slaughtered uselessly but were cold-bloodedly sacrificed for the purpose of America's anti-Soviet, anti-Communist policy"

*See Table 1 following text.

to gain "hegemony in the postwar world." Although the author has been vocal in his appeal that "any anti-nuclear movement must be founded on the cognizance of this fact," the A-bomb survivors can find no solace in such an extreme interpretation.³⁴

The leftist historians, who are tightly organized and affiliated with the anti-nuclear movement as well as associations of atomic survivors, have taken it upon themselves to popularize their "Atomic Diplomacy" thesis, through mass media and school teachers' unions. The extent of their success can be measured by the *Asahi* newspaper's serialized articles on the nuclear issue in 1975. "It is now *commonly accepted*," the *Asahi* analyst stated, "that the real purpose of the United States in dropping the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was not so much to force Japan's surrender as to scare the Soviet Union."³⁵

On the secondary school level, recent polls indicate an increasing percentage of pupils who consider "Atomic Diplomacy" to be the most important reason for the A-bomb decision. In a 1977 survey, high school students in Hiroshima were asked to choose from a list of reasons the two they considered most crucial. A large majority of 70 percent felt the American motive was "to demonstrate the power of the A-bomb"; 58 percent said "to attain supremacy over the Soviet Union in postwar settlements"; 23 percent replied "to destroy the fighting morale of the Japanese"; and 22 percent said "to minimize American casualties." The percentage of high school students elsewhere who regarded America's political motive as the most important was somewhat lower: 53 percent and 65 percent of Nagasaki and Okayama students respectively listed the first reason, and 40 percent and 35 percent in each city cited the second reason. Unfortunately, a detailed nationwide poll of high school students does not exist.³⁶

Generational differences in Japanese perceptions of the A-bomb decision are quite revealing. The same team which polled high school students asked the identical questions to their parents. No significant regional differences were observed among the four cities sampled—Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Okayama, and Kanazawa. "Demonstration of nuclear power" elicited 55-59 percent; "destruction of the Japanese morale," 37-47 percent; "minimizing American casualties," 18-29 percent; but "the American policy of supremacy over the Soviets" drew only 20-25 percent of the samples. Another interesting result was obtained when the parents' opinions were broken down in terms of their party allegiances. In Hiroshima the supporters of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party emphasized the strategic reasons (48 percent replied "to hasten Japan's surrender" and 28 percent "to minimize American casualties"), while a mere 18 percent listed "the American policy of supremacy over the Soviets." In contrast, those who backed the left-wing parties gave greater weight to America's political motive—33 percent of the Communist Party supporters and 25 percent of the Socialist Party respectively listed "the American policy of supremacy over the Soviets."³⁷

At the risk of overburdening the reader with more statistics, let me cite a nationwide poll to round out our picture. According to a 1975 *Asahi* survey, 52 percent of the respondents replied "to end the war as quickly as possible"; 22 percent, "to experiment on the destructive power of the atomic bomb"; 13 percent, "to attain American supremacy over the Soviets in the postwar world"; and 4 percent, "American contempt for the Japanese." An analysis in terms of political allegiances bears out the more limited survey of Hiroshima parents. The conservatives tended to reply "to force a speedy Japanese surrender," whereas the supporters of the Communist Party were inclined to accept the "Atomic Diplomacy" thesis. Especially interesting is a breakdown by age group. The view that the A-bomb was dropped to force a prompt Japanese surrender elicited support from 63 percent of those sampled who were in their 40s, 67 percent who were in their 50s, and 71 percent from those over 71 years old. In contrast, the "Atomic Diplomacy" interpretation drew the highest percentage from young people in their 20s.³⁸

From these figures one conclusion is inescapable. The wartime generation, who had gone through combat experience, conventional as well as atomic, is rather more tolerant of the A-bomb decision than younger people who have never experienced war. The former passively accept the military rationale: they seem to feel that wartime exigencies necessitated this decision—at least in the calculation of American leaders. If such a generalization would seem paradoxical, it may be attributed to different generational outlooks. The older generation still retains memories of Japanese aggressions in Asia and wartime atrocities, the devastating defeat administered by the United States, the relatively lenient occupation, and American recovery aid. The younger people, enjoying the fruits of Japan's "economic miracle" and exposed to critical writings about American foreign policy, are more susceptible to the "Atomic Diplomacy" thesis and a retrospective feeling of victimization.

This sense of victimization is most bitterly expressed in the racist interpretation of the A-bomb decision. About half of the students sampled at Doshisha felt that the United States would not have used the atomic bomb against Germans even if it had been ready in time, but did so against Japanese because they are Asians. Only 17 percent of our respondents registered opposition to this view.³⁹

To be sure, it is not entirely surprising that the racial issue should be raised in Japan, given America's past record of discrimination against Japanese immigrants and the *nisei* which culminated in a decision to intern them in "relocation" camps during the Pacific War. But the question of racism elicited a more violent response from our students than had been anticipated. Two students compared Hiroshima and Nagasaki to Auschwitz—unfavorably. To give one example:

The United States dropped the A-bomb on Japan because of its racial prejudice. Looking down upon the yellow Japanese as having less human value, Americans used the Japanese to test their new weapon.

My reading of public opinion surveys shows that this kind of racist interpretation was suddenly reinforced by analogy with what happened in Vietnam—the My Lai case, incidents in Cambodia, and other reported expressions of the contempt in which Asian lives were held by the American military. Suddenly revived was the old image of white men against yellow men, which became superimposed on Japanese views of the A-bomb decision. Here is a familiar instance of how current reactions affect the way one interprets and makes judgement on an historical event.

The impact of Vietnam caused not only Japanese but some American and other foreign commentators to seek hidden racial motives in the atomic bombing of Japan. In this context, even such a respected Japanologist as Professor John W. Hall questioned what the relationship was between America's own racial prejudices and the Hiroshima-Nagasaki tragedies. He further doubted whether the United States could without scruple have exploded atomic bombs over two German cities.⁴⁰ Carrying this logic to extremes, some Japanese writers have approvingly quoted Bertrand Russell to the effect that both the atomic bombing of Japan and the American "atrocities" in Vietnam stemmed from the same racist attitude of treating Asians as "less than human beings," and that the ultimate aim of the American leaders in scheming the atomic holocaust had been to terrify Asian nationalists.⁴¹ On the basis of such exaggerated inferences, the *Asahi* reporter Honda Katsuichi considers it axiomatic that the United States would never have used the atomic bomb against Caucasian Germans, although it did against the Asians "as if they were mere worms."⁴²

This interpretation, overplaying racial prejudice as a factor in the A-bomb decision, hardly needs any refutation: from the very beginning the American efforts to develop the atomic bomb had been conceived as a race against German scientific and technological progress in the same field, as Martin Sherwin's recent study amply shows. However, it is difficult to "prove" beyond doubt that racial considerations were totally absent in the psychic process of American leaders as they finally followed through the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Can one not detect subtle nuances of racism in President Truman's private letter (sent a few days after Nagasaki) in which he wrote: "When you have to deal with a beast you have to treat him as a beast"?⁴³ In January 1976 a Japanese newspaper prominently reported an excerpt from the recently disclosed diary of William MacKenzie King, the wartime Prime Minister of Canada, which to many Japanese seemed to confirm their racist interpretation. King's entry of 6 August 1945 reads: "It is fortunate that the use of the A-bomb should have been upon the Japanese rather than on the white

racers of Europe.”⁴⁴ Although Canada was involved only marginally in the first stage of the atomic project, King’s initial reaction to Hiroshima could conceivably have been shared by some American leaders. However, to consider such an offhand ex post facto sentiment as an important factor in the A-bomb decision is certainly wide of the mark.

The racist interpretation is closely linked to what may be called the “human guinea-pig theory.” Some Japanese, upon reading General Leslie R. Groves’ *Now It Can Be Told* (available in Japanese translation), might come away with the feeling that experimentation of the new weapon was in itself the main purpose of using it. A similar sentiment was expressed by Dr. Matsumoto Takuo, the main spokesman of the group from the Hiroshima World Friendship Center who visited the United Nations in August 1970. In an “emotional press conference” he stated:

Japan was ready to surrender as you knew, and the American Government knew about that. But they insisted on keeping up the tension until possibly they had tested the effectiveness of this kind of weapon....It is like a child, a naughty child with a sharp knife. The child wants to test it and will try it on anybody....You have invented this kind of nuclear weapon and of course you wanted to test it during the war.⁴⁵

By way of an interesting footnote on the moral dilemma involved, I would like to mention here a minor controversy over the “saving” of my hometown, Kyoto, which had originally been slated by the Target Committee as the first priority for atomic attack. My American colleague at Doshisha, Professor Otis Cary, has been investigating this subject with “almost a sense of duty” and published an essay titled “Mr. Stimson’s ‘Pet City’—The Sparing of Kyoto, 1945.” He praises Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson as “a great humanitarian” for having “protected” this ancient capital with all its cultural and artistic treasures.⁴⁶

Regarding this point, the *Asahi* reporter Honda has taken issue with Cary. He angrily retorted that American leaders “saved” Kyoto merely for its ancient quaintness—hundreds of temples, gardens, historic buildings—and not for the *lives* of Kyoto citizens. He drew a sarcastic analogy with the American past: just as American frontiersmen had killed native Indians while “preserving” their folk handicraft and tepees in museums, so did U.S. leaders in 1945 “save” Kyoto’s cultural assets for their exotic charm.⁴⁷

Official U.S. records indicate a broader political consideration behind the decision to remove Kyoto from the list of A-bomb targets. Both President Truman and Secretary Stimson seem to have been motivated by more pragmatic than “humanitarian” reasons. “Wanton” destruction of Kyoto—the religious and cultural shrine of the Japanese—would so embitter them, both men feared, as to “make it impossible during the long postwar period to reconcile” the Japanese to Americans and would instead drive them into the arms of the Russians.⁴⁸

The present state of Japanese historiography on the A-bomb decision is highly polarized. On the one hand, there is a well-organized group of leftist historians who rigidly adhere to the monocausal thesis of "Atomic Diplomacy," asserting that the *real* American aim in the atomic bombing of Japan was to pressure the Soviet Union into making concessions in Eastern Europe, especially in Poland.⁴⁹ Their stand on this subject had become so dogmatic that when they conferred with various foreign delegates at an international (non-governmental) symposium in Hiroshima in 1977, they could hardly have any meaningful communication, except with the Soviet representatives. Totally embracing Blackett's "classical thesis," later elaborated by Alperovitz, these Japanese scholars have gone little beyond the Western "revisionists."⁵⁰

On the other hand, there are experts on the United States, fully *au courant* of contemporary American scholarship and recently released documents, who take a more balanced view. One notable example is Professor Nagai Yōnosuke, a brilliant political scientist, who published a very astute analysis of the A-bomb decision in 1978. Carefully examining the decision-making process in Washington, he places particular emphasis on the sheer organizational momentum, the "inertia" of a vast mechanism of government dedicated solely to the development and employment of the atomic bomb. In addition, he takes into account the quality and power relationship of the top echelon of American leadership, "bureaucratic politics" among the different branches of service and their preferred strategies. In short, Nagai's essay, informed by theoretical insights, is the most powerful rebuttal to the "Atomic Diplomacy" thesis yet seen in any language.⁵¹

As stated at the outset of this paper, the historical controversy over the A-bomb decision has wider ramifications that transcend academic interest. It can effect one's position on such issues as Japan's defense policy, including the nuclear option, Article Nine of the Constitution, and, more broadly, the nature of contemporary warfare.

Regarding nuclear armament, the Japanese government has often reiterated its longstanding official position, the "three non-nuclear principles," that Japan will neither manufacture nor possess nuclear weapons, nor permit their entry into the country. At the same time, however, the government has been making efforts to "desensitize" the Japanese public to what is often called a "nuclear allergy." (This term disparagingly implies an abnormality or pathology that ought to be cured.) Various polls show that the government has been successful in its efforts. In 1969 two polls showed that 62 percent and 72 percent of respective samples were opposed to Japan's acquiring nuclear weapons, while only 16 percent and 14 percent were in favor. At the same time 46 percent believed that it would never be necessary for Japan to acquire nuclear weapons.⁵²

On this delicate issue, later polls reveal an ambivalence on the part of the Japanese people faced with the uncertainties and fluidity of their international environment. Although clear majorities were still opposed to Japan going nuclear, an increasing proportion of the samples—in fact, more than half—replied that Japan would eventually possess nuclear weapons. In a 1972 poll, 51.7 percent gave this reply. The figures rose to 54 percent in 1975 and 58 percent in 1980. On this matter no significant differences could be observed between the atomic survivors and the national average. An NHK poll of 1975 found 75 percent of Hiroshima residents foreseeing that Japan would probably acquire nuclear weapons, 6 percent stating that Japan would do so “without fail.” This trend, to which these statistics eloquently testify, confirms T. J. Pempell’s observation in a 1975 article: “In short, a sense of the ‘inevitable’ seems to be growing.”⁵³

This tendency is viewed by the leaders of the Japanese peace movement as the result of the “weathering” of the “A-bomb consciousness,” failure of their anti-nuclear drive, and the bankruptcy of “peace education” in schools. They fear that fatalism regarding Japan’s nuclear option will remove a barrier to nuclear armament. Until the late 1970s, however, clear majorities of the Japanese (more than 70 percent) were opposed to such a course and overwhelmingly supported the “three non-nuclear principles.”

The nation’s mood underwent a sudden change in 1979-1980 as the result of the deteriorating international situation which saw the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Pentagon’s exaggerated statements that the nuclear balance was shifting in a direction favorable to the Soviet Union. Faced with new power realities, the “hawkish” elements in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, as well as the leaders of big business closely allied to it, activated their campaigns for arms increases.

Against this background, Professor Shimizu Ikuarō, who has exerted a considerable influence on intellectuals and students, published in the summer of 1980 an explosive article entitled “The Nuclear Option.”⁵⁴ Formerly a “pacifist” (of the “militant pacifist” variety), he suddenly reversed his position and came out dramatically in apparent support of nuclear armament of Japan. Despite his about-face, Shimizu has remained consistent at least on one point—his basic stance of anti-Americanism. Now he rejects America’s credibility regarding the “nuclear umbrella” over Japan. Commenting on Shimizu’s long article, Dr. Inoki Masamichi, former president of the National Defense Academy, wrote a devastating rebuttal nicely titled, “From Utopian Pacifism to Utopian Militarism.”⁵⁵ Another prominent intellectual, Etō Jun, whose name is not unknown in this country, has recently published a number of essays and two books denouncing the New Constitution, especially its Article Nine, which, from a strictly legal viewpoint, prohibits Japan from possessing regular military

forces.⁵⁶ Together, the writings of Shimizu and Etō have brought a hornet's nest about our ears, with countless arguments and counterarguments. We cannot dismiss this controversy as merely a storm in a Japanese teacup, for these two writers share one thing in common—an excessive nationalism that can easily be used by demagogues and agitators to determine Japan's nuclear option with all its ominous consequences, both internationally and domestically. Without going into the details of the current defense controversies, let me simply say that the nation's mood is very fluid and rapidly changing, thus making prediction for the future difficult indeed.

Even today, the Japanese outlook on contemporary warfare is strongly conditioned by memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Japanese people took the A-bomb disaster as their "Last Traumatic Experience." For them the bombed-out "Hiroshima Dome" became the symbol of war. Whenever they hear or read about any kind of war, they immediately conjure up an image of the mushroom cloud. While it is quite understandable that they are quick to see the potential nuclear holocaust in any conflict anywhere, this habit has tended to narrow their perspective and sometimes has blinded them to the realities of postwar international conflict which has been characterized by limited wars, guerrilla fighting, wars of national liberation, border clashes and ethnic conflict.

Of more concern is a certain nationalistic streak in the claim of many Japanese that they, being the first and the only nation to have suffered from the atomic bomb, have a morally superior position of world leadership in the anti-nuclear movement. If they are uniquely entitled to this task, Japan's actual contribution to arms control in such international arenas as the United Nations and Geneva has not quite measured up to their aspiration. Furthermore, in the hands of a nationalistic agitator like Professor Shimizu, the whole argument can easily be reversed in order to support Japan's nuclear armament. "If we Japanese hold a privileged position as the first nation to have been A-bombed," he rhetorically demands, "are we not by the same token privileged to be the first nation to manufacture and possess the nuclear weapon? Is this not a common sense view of the matter?"⁵⁷ Limitations of Japanese pacifism, based solely on the A-bomb experience, would seem obvious.

This is, of course, not to belittle the importance of peace education in accurately conveying to pupils the tale of the two A-bombed cities and raising the broader question of Japan's peaceful role in an interdependent world. A survey of Japanese history textbooks on the secondary school level reveals a rather surprising and discouraging fact. In 1952-1953, shortly after the American occupation was over, junior high school textbooks devoted as much as ten to twenty pages to the A-bomb question, but after 1961 the space was reduced to a few pages, and during the 1970s to only several lines.⁵⁸ A representative treatment of the subject in current text-

books (both on junior and senior high school levels) reads: "the atomic bombs *were dropped* on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, thus ending the war." From such a simple account pupils do not learn it was the United States that dropped the A-bombs. In fact, recent surveys conducted by teachers' unions in Hiroshima and Nagasaki show that 10 to 20 percent of junior high school pupils in these cities could not even identify which country dropped the atomic bomb!⁵⁹

Let us compare this with American high school textbooks. They all devote far more space than their Japanese counterparts to explain why the atomic bomb was dropped and how devastating the destruction was in terms not only of immediate deaths but "agonizing" radiation sickness. While most textbooks repeat Truman's military rationale, there are some which give an in-depth treatment. *Men and Nations: A World History* by Anatole G. Mazour and John M. Peoples (1975) poses a moral question for student discussion: "Do you think the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were justified? Defend your position." Richard Hofstadter and Clarence L. Ver Steeg, in *A People and a Nation* (1971), challenge the student: "Should this frightful instrument be used?" After describing how the Japanese government was "looking for a way out of the war" and soliciting Soviet mediation for this purpose, the authors frankly state: "Many persons have wondered whether it was really necessary to drop a first and then even a second atomic bomb on Japan." For a discussion topic, students were asked their own reaction to the message in the Franck Report. "Which would you choose, military advantage and the loss of confidence in the United States or a feeling of horror relative to the use of the bomb?" Comparison of Japanese and American textbooks suggests that, ironically enough, the latter are doing a better job of peace education, at least as far as the A-bomb question is concerned.

I greatly admire the British historian Herbert Butterfield, whose writings are permeated with "the tragic view of history" and a keen awareness of "the moral dilemma" and "the human predicament" of modern man caught up in wartime exigencies. Perhaps reflecting Butterfield's philosophy of history, Professor John W. Hall of Yale has urged a reconsideration of the Pacific War from a "tragic" viewpoint:

...one which takes no comfort in scapegoats and offers no sanctuaries for private or national claims of moral righteousness, but rather admits that as two nations are drawn into violent conflict, something very tragic in human affairs is taking place.⁶⁰

If we accept this standpoint, it is no longer necessary to take seriously the racist or ideological interpretations of the A-bomb decision. Such one-sided, arbitrary, and emotional explanations are the "scapegoats" against which Professor Hall warns, and they merely serve to cheapen the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It was war itself that dehumanized the victors and the vanquished alike. Behind the A-bomb decision was the

brutal logic of war which inexorably forced the issue as in a Greek drama that is played to the catastrophic end.

The last thirty-five years have been a period of unbroken international tension—full of crises, provocations, and local disputes—which would have exhausted the patience of great powers in the pre-atomic age. But the fact remains that another world war has not occurred. It may be that the use of the “ultimate weapon” in Japan has given awesome credibility to its destructive power, which alone can function as an essential deterrent to nuclear warfare. Future historians might well postulate that Japan’s A-bomb experience was a factor that deterred the use of nuclear bombs by the United States in Korea and Vietnam. Thus viewed, the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not “meaninglessly massacred,” as some Japanese critics have charged. On the contrary, those victims, without knowing it, may be said to have served a “noble cause” to prevent another nuclear holocaust. This, I take it, is the broader and deeper meaning of the famous inscription on the cenotaph in Hiroshima: “Please Rest in Peace; the Mistake Shall Not Be Repeated.”

Table 1

THE POLL OF DOSHISHA STUDENTS, 1975-1976

(Prepared by Mark Fitzpatrick)

The questionnaires were distributed to 100 undergraduate students in the mail and 100 upperclassmen enrolled in an international relations course. By 30 January 1976, 95 questionnaires had been returned.

<i>Age:</i>		18	19	20	21	22	23	24	27
	N =	4	13	23	29	14	4	5	3
<i>Sex</i>		Male		Female					
	N =	74		21					
<i>Majors:</i>		Law	Economics	Commerce	Literature	Engineering	Other		
	N =	48	14	12	12	6	3		
<i>Home:</i>		Kyoto	Osaka	Hyogo	Hiroshima	Nagasaki	Others		
	N =	13	22	10	2	2	46		

I. Concerning the American decision to drop the atomic bomb, please indicate your support, opposition or neutrality to the following views.

A. It was right to drop the atomic bomb in order to save the lives of a vast number of American soldiers who were expected to die in an American landing on the Japanese homeland.

	N	
Strongly support	(0)	
Support	(1)	1%
Oppose	(24)	
Strongly oppose	(59)	87%
Neither support nor oppose	(7)	
Don't know	(4)	12%
Total (95)		100%

B. For the same reason, the atomic bombing could not be helped.

	N	
Strongly support	(0)	
Support	(2)	2%
Oppose	(29)	
Strongly oppose	(49)	82%
Neither support nor oppose	(8)	
Don't know	(7)	16%
Total (95)		100%

II. The Atomic bomb was completed on July 16, 1945, after the end of the war against Germany (May 1945). It was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6. Please answer the following questions related to this matter.

A. Even if the A-bomb had been completed while the war against Germany was still continuing, the United States would not have used it in Germany. (Supposing that Germany had the same ability to persist in the war that Japan had when the A-bomb was dropped on Hiroshima.)

	N	
Strongly support	(16)	
Support	(32)	50%
Oppose	(16)	
Strongly oppose	(1)	18%
Neither support nor oppose	(11)	
Don't know	(19)	32%
<hr/>		
Total	(95)	100%

B. For the United States to have dropped the A-bomb on Japanese was an expression of American racial discrimination and prejudices against Asians.

	N	
Strongly support	(11)	
Support	(30)	43%
Oppose	(14)	
Strongly oppose	(4)	19%
Neither support nor oppose	(23)	
Don't know	(13)	38%
<hr/>		
Total	(95)	100%

III. What do you think were the reasons for dropping the A-bomb? What do you think were the important reasons to the American leaders? Please circle them and then list them in order of importance.

	Ranked as reasons					Total	
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th +	No Order		
To avoid U.S. casualties	(22)	(10)	(8)	(5)	(13)	(56)	61%
To avoid Japanese casualties also	—	—	—	(2)	(3)	(5)	5%
To end the war against Japan before Soviet entry	(13)	(15)	(3)	(3)	(7)	(41)	43%
To pressure the Soviet Union by a display of power	(26)	(12)	(8)	(2)	(14)	(62)	65%
To test the destructive power of the A-bomb	(12)	(13)	(20)	(5)	(11)	(61)	64%
To pay back for Pearl Harbor	(1)	(5)	(2)	(6)	(3)	(17)	18%
To justify to the American public the \$2 million spent on the Manhattan Project	(2)	(5)	(6)	(4)	(7)	(24)	25%

THE IMPACT OF U.S MILITARY PRESENCE ON THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

C.I. Eugene Kim*

The U.S. military has played a significant role in the development of South Korea's military as a modern force, both in its inception and subsequent growth. The United States not only built it from scratch but created the most American-oriented institution in Korean society. Its modern military organization and its professional corporate attitudes, as well as its weapons and equipment, are American. These American influences, however, have failed to impart one of the cardinal democratic virtues in civil-military relations, i.e., civilian control of the military. The central question for this study stems from this anomaly. Why did American influence over the Korean military fail to provide that organization with the attitudes which determine a military's basic subservience to civil authority?

In order to examine this question, we must take several factors into account. The factors investigated in this paper include the political history and culture of South Korea, the nature of the changing relationship between the United States and Korea, the role of U.S. forces in the development of the South Korean military organization, and the pattern of communication between the U.S. and South Korean military.

Korea's Historical and Cultural Background

The collapse of Korea's Yi dynasty in 1910 culminated a long process of administrative decay. The strategic importance of Korea's location between the rival states of Russia, China and Japan created a stiff competition among these states for control of the Korean peninsula. Japanese victories in the Sino-Japanese War (1895) and Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) enabled Japan to eliminate her rivals in the region and to make Korea a Japanese colony in 1910.¹ Japanese government in Korea provided the peninsula its first experience with a modern form of government. The rewards of Japan's development of the region were, however, tailored to meet the needs of Japan's own expanding economic development. Although the development of industry and the improvement of agriculture dramatically increased Korean productivity, the quality of life for the

*Ed. note: The author wishes to acknowledge that Brian Borlas assisted with the research for this study.

masses improved little. Japanese attempts to eradicate all vestiges of Korean culture and Japanese economic exploitation created a persistent independence movement and constant conflict between the Korean people and the Japanese overlords.²

Japan's defeat in World War II ended her colonization of Korea. It also resulted in the division of the Korean peninsula along the 38th parallel and occupation of the South by American forces.³ In 1948, South Korea's First Republic was created with Syngman Rhee as president, after which American occupation forces quickly withdrew. North Korea launched an invasion of the South in 1950. For the next three years, until the 1953 armistice, the whole Korean peninsula was war-torn. Massive American aid maintained South Korea's survival, but the inability of the First Republic to perform well and its highly suppressive control tactics lead to its overthrow by students in 1960.⁴ The short-lived Second Republic collapsed in less than nine months as a result of its inability to stabilize the highly chaotic political and economic situation.⁵ In 1961, a group of officers and their followers led by General Park Chung-hee seized control of the government and ruled the country under martial law until the election of 1963.⁶ Although General Park resigned his commission in the Army to head a "civilian" government, his ruling methods and emphasis remained essentially military.

By 1972, Park found the constitutional system of the Third Republic too confining and executed drastic constitutional revisions resulting in what was considered by most observers to be a coup in office.⁷ The Fourth Republic was maintained under the almost complete control of Park himself, and his policies of increasing control and suppression stimulated widespread objection to his government both at home and in the United States. In October 1979, Park's assassination at the hands of his own Chief of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency plunged the country into confusion.⁸ The disorganized state of the civil political structure and the fear of reduced control resulted in another take-over by the military in 1980.

American Involvement in Korea

American interest in Korea prior to 1910 was limited. Motivated by a desire for safe harbors in the late 1800s, the United States began a brief involvement with the declining Yi dynasty. The annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910 ended this tenuous contact, and the United States was content to deal with Korean questions through the Japanese. This perspective of Korea lingered long after the Japanese defeat in 1945. American interest in Korea was half-hearted, resulting more from U.S. reactions to events in the region than from a goal-oriented foreign policy.

Preoccupied with World War II, the U.S. State Department placed the question of the development of an independent Korean state low on its

priorities. Although Syngman Rhee and other Korean nationalist leaders lobbied throughout the war in Washington, their efforts stimulated little interest. International bargaining in the final days of the war, in order to gain Soviet support for the invasion of Japan, resulted in the division of Korea into North and South, reflecting the growing bipolar power struggle of the Cold War.

Although the Soviet occupation of the North was well planned and executed, the attempt at military government in the South by the United States was hampered by a crucial lack of perspective. American policy makers had long considered Korea to be part of Japan and were unprepared to deal with a volatile, highly mobilized political atmosphere. In short, the American occupation was based upon "the faulty premise that the problems of a conquered Japan would be the same as those of a liberated Korea" For three years the American occupation struggled to create a democratic structure of government which could resist becoming Communist. With Rhee's election in 1948, the United States hastened the process of extrication from the relationship which was at best distasteful. The withdrawal of most American forces left only a small body of advisors who were entrusted with developing the nascent Korean military.

President Rhee, falsely optimistic about South Korea's military capabilities, was willing to march north to unify the country. American fear of such an attempt to unify the peninsula by force, which would upset the delicate balance of American-Soviet relations in the region, contributed in large part to the development of a military with little or no offensive capacity. Keeping Korea militarily weak precluded aggressive actions on the part of Rhee's government but resulted in the sporadic, disorganized growth of an army which, at the outset, would exist at the level of a glorified police force rather than as a modern military unit.

The rapid American pull-out after 1948 and American unwillingness to equip the South Korean Army at that time further reflected the lack of serious interest in the fate of the Republic of Korea (ROK). Statements from both Secretary of State Dean Acheson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterated the premise that the defense of Korea from attack was not included in the established perimeter of U.S. defenses.¹⁰ Japan was regarded as the farthest area of primary U.S. interest. Despite continued policy statements supporting economic aid, the United States had no Korean policy. North Korean attack on the South, however, revolutionized the American perception of Korea.

On 25 June 1950, the North Korean forces, spearheaded by more than 150 Soviet-made T-34 tanks, swept across the 38th parallel. The first engagements demonstrated the inability of the ROK Army to check the Northern attack. ROK troops soon "found they had no weapons to halt

the T-34 tanks. The 2.36" rocket launchers furnished them by the U.S. Army could not be counted on to penetrate the Soviet armor. . . ."¹¹

At the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the military strength of the ROK versus that of North Korea was minimal. Not only did the ROK Army lack an armored tank force, it also lacked any significant anti-tank weaponry. An examination of the forces available to both sides in 1950 reveals a significant disparity favoring the North in all areas.*

The Truman administration was now faced with the prospect of losing Korea to the Communists. Perhaps China's "fall" to Communism the year before served to spark a greater U.S. determination to withstand further Communist aggression. The defense perimeter of the United States expanded to encompass Korea, and the United States began investing in Korean Defense. Even after the 1953 armistice agreements, the American commitment to the maintenance of a large land-based force in Korea continued.*

Following the Korean War, the major U.S. concern in East Asia was to make South Korea the farthest signpost of American presence in the area. North Korea has posed a constant threat to South Korean security. According to the Cold War "domino" psychology, South Korea, if not aided, might fall to the North. If so, the joint forces of the People's Republic of China and Communist Korea would endanger the security of Japan, the most dependable U.S. ally and the only viable democracy in the East.

Relations between the United States and the ROK after 1953 may be characterized by the pattern of U.S. attempts to control the international actions of Korea, a series of actions made possible by the interface of certain mutual goals. According to Astri Shurke, the manager state has three basic objectives in its relations with client states: (1) to control the periphery, (2) to deny control to a rival, and (3) to support the client state (Korea) in order to maintain the manager state's (U.S.'s) international prestige.¹² The threat of losing the periphery determined American involvement in the Korean War, and extension of that commitment was likewise necessary in order to create the belief that the United States is a dependable, long-term ally. The consequence of not doing so would have been costly to the United States. One need only to examine the later effects of the withdrawal from Vietnam on U.S. credibility, when widespread fear and suspicion among America's allies that a new period of isolationism was at hand seriously disrupted the U.S. role in international affairs. A perceived abandonment of Korea would have had similar deleterious effects on American prestige.

*See Table 1 at the end of this paper.

*See Table 2.

Korean goals throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s dovetailed neatly with the U.S. perspective. The overriding aim of the ROK has been to maintain U.S. support in terms of economic and military assistance. Korea's bargaining power stems from its utilization of the client state's tools for advantage. These tools include: (1) stressing the client's unreliability, (2) stressing the client's contributions, and (3) stressing the client's ultimate weakness.¹³ The problems inherent in this approach arise from the fact that stressing the client government's weakness without U.S. aid seriously limits the legitimacy of that government.

For more than three decades since 1950, U.S. investments in South Korea's security and economic development have been enormous, providing over \$7 billion in the form of grants and credits, in addition to \$18 billion spend during the Korean War. From the fiscal years 1950 to 1979, the United States also provided South Korea nearly \$6 billion security assistance in various forms: grants-in-aid, excess defense articles, foreign military sales credits, and military education and training. In addition, \$1.2 billion in military assistance service funds were allocated from 1966 through 1973 to support South Korean divisions in South Vietnam. South Korea, in short, has been the third largest recipient of U.S. foreign grants and credits, as well as military aid, and sixth largest in economic aid.*

In examining the percentages of aid to the various societal sectors of South Korea, it becomes readily apparent that the Korean military has received most developmental attention. Coincidental to American military aid was, furthermore, the massive expansion of the South Korean military. From its meager beginning in 1945, South Korean armed forces expanded quickly throughout the Korean War and after.

Growth of the ROK Military Under American Auspices

The effect of American commitment to the ROK on the Korean military was significant. In a strictly military sense, the United States preferred a strong ally in the field to a weak one. The transfer of technology, weapons, logistic support, and financial aid for the development of a strong Korean military became the primary U.S. goal. It is at this point that the greatest impact of the American military is evident. The rapid continued development of the Korean military created an organization unrivaled in the Korean political picture. Steady growth and improvement of this organization not only improved its battle effectiveness but also enabled the military to move in the direction of greatest power, i.e., the eventual takeover of the government. Although the long-term effects of military development did not result in a coup until 1961, the North Korean invasion marked the turning point of U.S. policy regarding ROK Army development.

*See Tables 3, 4, and 5.

In the first week of the Korean War, approximately four-fifths of the ROK Army was lost. To compensate for this loss and to augment troop strength, a most hurried recruitment program was undertaken by American authorities. All able-bodied men found in the streets and countryside were inducted as soldiers, and by February 1951 the ROK Army had regained its initial troop strength of 100,000 men. By that time also, Washington had authorized General MacArthur, the commander of U.S. forces in Korea, to arm and train an additional 200,000 to 300,000 Koreans.¹⁴ By the time Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected president in November 1952, the ROK Army had expanded to more than 400,000. A further increment in troop strength occurred soon after Eisenhower assumed the presidency in 1953; the ROK Army increased to some 525,000 men organized in fourteen divisions.¹⁵ Thus, in terms of absolute numbers, South Korea had one of the largest armies in the world.

To lead it, systematic officer training was accelerated under American tutelage. Korean military academies modeled after the American academies have, since 1952, been four-year institutions. War and defense colleges were established, and various military technical training institutes were created; young, promising officers were selected for further training in the United States (a program already instituted in 1948: ten field grade officers and two company grade officers received training in the U.S. in 1948 and 1949).¹⁶

Since the Korean War South Korean armed forces have maintained close contact with their counterparts from the United States. No other sector of South Korean society has had such close working relationships with Americans as the military. The Korean military has enjoyed a relatively constant growth and development with American help, and it has become the most modern and American-oriented force in the society. Contact between Korean and American military officers began under the American occupation forces, continued within the United Nations Command during and after the Korean War, and currently continues in the joint forces of the Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command, which was created in November 1978.*

Patterns of U.S.-ROK Military Communications

Contact between American and ROK forces has very often been a humbling as well as a learning experience for Koreans. The two are far apart in such elements as pay, various fringe benefits, and living styles. Cultural differences abound. Americans are friendly, sympathetic, and unceasingly extol Korean fighting capabilities. The material and cultural differences, however, are simply too great to be easily compromised. As Koreans have become more professionally capable as soldiers,

*See Table 6.

the humbling and frustrating impact of their experience has been compounded. The logic of this is simple enough: "We are as good as they are, but they are better treated than we are."¹⁷

Those Korean officers who have close ties to Americans and who speak English are not representative of their Korean peers, and quite often constitute an isolated group. These officers and their wives may be able to mix easily with American officers, but their "American-ness" is regarded as foreign by most other Korean officers. Hard-core Korean officers are of rural birth. Proud of their training and austere outlook, they are not intellectuals and internationalists. They are trained to uphold honor and to become exemplary Koreans.¹⁸ Both Generals Park and Chun, for example, were relatively unknown to Americans when they assumed power.

Significantly, the American military virtue of subservience to civilian control means that armed forces in the U.S. are politically neutral. Translated into the Korean situation, this virtue has made the American military politically inept in its dealing with the changing political scenes in Korea. Where it could have applied a positive influence in Korea's political development, it has been content to play a bystander's role. Perhaps an American sense of guilt conflicts with a more active role. The various roles played by the American policy makers in Seoul and Washington in the past have, after all, had deleterious effects on Korea.

The first American role was unilateral. The Korean provisions in the Cairo Declaration of 1 December 1943, the Potsdam Conference of July-August 1945, the 38th parallel decision of August 1945, and the Moscow Conference of December 1945 were the prime examples. The fact is that Koreans neither participated nor had a voice in these decisions which largely determined the fate of postwar Korea.

The second American role was that of patron and client. This role characterized the occupation and subsequent period when the South Korean military had to depend heavily on the United States for its build-up. During this period, American presence in Korea helped perpetuate North and South Korean division. It was also the period of the Korean War and U.S. commitment to South Korean defense and security. Ultimate U.S. emphasis on security during this period was very often at the expense of everything else. It may be interesting to note in this connection that President Kennedy's invitation of General Park to Washington on 13-23 November 1961 was synchronized with Park's successful consolidation of power following the May 1961 coup. Noteworthy also is the fact the U.S. military and economic aid was neither interrupted nor curtailed during this formative period of the Park regime. On the contrary, U.S. aid increased steadily after Park seized power. This increase was particularly dramatic at the height of the Vietnam conflict as the price of Korean support in the American adventure.

The third American role occurred during the period of transformation from the patron/client and big-power/small-power linkage to "a more equalized bondage."¹⁹ During this period, South Korea experienced a remarkable economic growth. It has become an important economic and trade partner of the United States; in 1979, it was the twelfth major U.S. trade partner with nearly \$9 billion in total trade volume. This period is characterized by "self-help" and "Asia for Asians." First enunciated by President Richard Nixon in 1969, this policy has placed the defense burden of South Korea more and more on South Koreans.²⁰ Thus in 1973, the U.S. grant-aid support for operations and maintenance costs to the South Korean military equipment (investment) ended. Since 1977, South Korea has been underwriting essentially all of its defense costs increasingly through commercial purchase.

Thus the South Korean military has become more and more "Koreanized."²¹ American troops may eventually be withdrawn from Korea. President Jimmy Carter's initial plan, against strong Korean objection, called for the phased withdrawal of all U.S. forces for Korea by 1982.²² Koreans by that time are to meet their own defense and security needs as much as possible. In the meantime, the United States is pledged to aid modernization of Korean forces.

U.S. forces in Korea have not only helped create modern Korean forces but an eventually powerful political force as well. However, not only have U.S. forces attempted to stay politically neutral in Korea, but they are also increasingly losing what leverage they have had in their dealings with Korean forces. The U.S. forces that remain in Korea at present tend to live within their secluded, well-guarded compound and have only limited contact with Korean forces. Korean forces are, at the same time, becoming more and more Korean, and their behavior is often dictated by their own perception of Korea's needs, not only for defense and security but also for national development. To the South Korean military leadership, the questions of national security and domestic political stability are closely linked. Furthermore, in Korea's cultural and developmental mold, no institutional boundaries have been clearly established to set apart military and political functions.²³

Conclusion

In examining the ramifications and impact of the U.S. military presence in the ROK, several key assertions present themselves. Perhaps the most essential factor resulting from this presence is the cause and effect of the growth of the modern Korean military. Although national security is an essential aspect of any modern state, overbalancing the civil-military equation in favor of military necessarily leads to military dominance over both sectors. A military organization is concerned with questions of power and administration. Tactical considerations determine

that positions of power are to be sought, whether on the battlefield or in the political sphere. Therefore, the ultimate usurpation of governmental functions by the military is a logical organic outgrowth of developing that military as a modern professional organization. It seems unfortunate that the United States failed to foresee more clearly this effect of its military policies.

The growth and development of the South Korean military is also the natural result of American foreign policy goals regarding Korea. American military disengagement from an expensive, difficult role after World War II determined that the inability of the ROK Army to defend the southern part of the Korean peninsula would require the reengagement of American forces should the United States hope to avoid enlargement of the Communist sphere and diminishment of American influence. The U.S. desire to minimize its costly military presence in Korea and to gain Korean support in U.S. international military ventures created the need in American eyes to expand and develop the military capacity of the ROK. The continued development of that organization in a milieu of sporadic political growth created a dangerous situation for continued democratic civil development, for the professional and administrative capacity of the military developed at a rate far greater than the civil sphere. This factor alone created a situation wherein the military expectations regarding the administrative efficiency of government would not be fulfilled.

Developing a modern military organization, while no easy task in and of itself, is a basic one in comparison with the problems involved in creating a viable democratic civil government in a political atmosphere as highly charged and explosive as South Korea's. Training officers in command, logistics, and administration is a fairly straightforward process. Military training is often bounded by the dictates of logic and pragmatic approaches to problem solving. A goal is stated, an action must be performed, and the military is geared to produce an already agreed-upon effect, whether it be destruction of the enemy or construction of a bridge. The military is almost exclusively concerned with the accomplishment of goals. The political sphere, however, is concerned with a different set of problems. Politics is a decision-making process involving not only *what* is to be done, but *why*, and the means by which to accomplish the job. No aid programs support the process of training civilian elites to function effectively within the political structure. Officer training for the military, in contrast, is highly developed and well funded. It is small surprise, therefore, that the constant growth of the professional military will have the ultimate effect of outstripping the capacity of the civil sector.

The poor performance of the political sector in Korea further exacerbates the dichotomy between the performance capacities of the military and political spheres. The pragmatic approach of the Park government

with its military character reinforced the conception of military men as efficient administrators. The cost of such an efficient administration, however, was the growing suppressive control orientation of Korean government and eventual mass opposition to such rule. The anti-Park riots in Pusan and Masan in 1979 and the Kwangju rebellion in 1980 point to the increasingly serious disaffection of the Korean people from military rule. A soldier is required to obey orders, and his very life often depends upon unquestioning obedience to his superiors. This is his role, and this is what he accepts and expects. Civilians, on the other hand, differ from the soldier significantly in this respect. They do not regard the world in the easy, clearly defined categories of dominance and submission which characterize military life. The inability of military elites to deal with this crucial difference is a natural outgrowth of good military training. The conflict between civil and military sectors is determined by this factor. When the civil sector is strong and maintains a satisfactory level of performance, the military is content to limit its functions to those within the considered purview of the military. However, when development of the military far outstrips the civil sector, the military finds it simple and desirable (from its own viewpoint) to take over those functions of government that are poorly performed. In short, the U.S. military aid and training given to the Korean military worked too well; it was too successful.

While the development of the Korean military was considered necessary in order to reduce the American burden of defense, the impact of the American military presence provided American policy makers with a powerful tool for control of the ROK. With the reality of potential American withdrawal, however, the Korean government has followed a more independent course, often disregarding the wishes of the United States, whose principle instrument of manipulation has lost its cutting edge. Indeed, the threat of U.S. military withdrawal, which would threaten the security of the state, provided the Korean government with a useful control device against its people. The threat from the North and the uncertainty regarding American commitment to South Korean defense allowed the Korean government to create a situation of emergency, using the bipolar hostility as a lever to suppress individual freedom. Therefore, the impact of the American military presence has had an additional two-fold effect: first as a tool of American control over her client state, and second as an example of the technique of the security threat used as a control tactic, which Korea could now use domestically even as Korea's patron had used it internationally.

Finally, we must reemphasize that American forces in Korea, despite the enormity of their political resources, have been unwilling to exercise what leverage they have had in helping Korea's political growth. As politically neutral professionals at home, American forces bred in the U.S. democratic tradition have consciously limited their political role. While this politically neutral and negative role is to be expected, it has, however,

**unconsciously created a most potent political force in the Korean military:
a force, which, in its eventual political projection, is without restraint.**

Table 1

**COMPARISON OF MILITARY MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT
OF NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA (1950)**

Manpower					
Classification					
Branch of Service	People's Armed Forces		ROK Armed Forces		Ratio
Army	10 Divisions (30 Regiments) 120,880 Other Special Units 61,820 Total (182,680)		8 Divisions (22 Regiments) 67,416 Other Support Units 27,558 Total (94,974)		2:1
Navy	4,700		7,715		1:1.7
Air Force	2,000		1,897		1.1:1
Marines	(Landing Forces) 9,000		1,166		7.8:1
Grand Total	198,380		105,752		2:1
Major Equipment					
Classification					
Equipment by Item	People's Armed Forces		ROK Armed Forces		Ratio
	Size	Quantity	Size	Quantity	
Mortars	120 mm	225 pieces	81 mm	384 pieces	
	82 mm	1,141	60 mm	576	
	61 mm	360			1.8:1
Howitzers	122 mm	172	105 mm	91	
	76 mm	380			6:1
Anti-Aircraft Artillery	85 mm	12			ROK: None
	37 mm	24			
Anti-Tank Artillery	45 mm	550	57 mm	140	3.9:1
Tanks	T-34	242			ROK:None
Armored Cars		54		27	2:1
Self-Propelled Artillery	Su-76	176			ROK:None
Planes	YAK-9	not	L-4 plane	8	
	IL-10	known	L-5 plane	4	
	IL-2		T-6 plane	10	9.6:1
Total		211 Total		22	
Patrol Vessels		30		28	1.1:1

Table 2

U.S. MILITARY FORCES STATIONED IN SOUTH KOREA (1977)

<i>Force</i>	<i>Manpower</i>
Total U.S. Forces Korea	40,000
8th U.S. Army	32,000
2d Division	13,500
(38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade)	
(4th Missile Command)	
19th Support Brigade	
Intelligence	
Command, Communications, and Control	
314th Air Division	7,000
Nuclear Weapons	

Sources: Charles A. Sorrels, *Planning U.S. General Purpose Forces: Forces Related to Asia* (Congressional Budget Office, June 1977), pp. 51, 62-63. Various unclassified sources.

Table 3

Ten Major Recipients of U.S. Foreign Military Aid, 1970-1978
(Unit: \$1 million)

Rank	Countries	1970-1978	percent grants
1	Vietnam	10,726	100.0
2	Israel	7,665.2	45.0
3	<i>Korea</i>	3,213.5	73.3
4	Turkey	1,584.5	61.5
5	Democratic Kampuchea	1,181.9	100.0
6	Taiwan	1,009.5	54.1
7	Laos	1,008.0	100.0
8	Greece	1,000.7	37.7
9	Jordan	716.7	58.4
10	Spain	508.2	52.8

Source: Adapted from the *Statistical Yearbook of the United States, 1979*.

Table 4
 Ten Major Recipients of U.S. Economic Aid, 1948-1978
 (Unit: \$1 million)

Year Rank	1948-1978		1962-1978		1975-1978	
	Countries	Amount	Countries	Amount	Countries	Amount
1	Vietnam	5,466	Vietnam	4,490	Israel	2,640
2	India	3,846	India	3,051	Egypt	2,498
3	United Kingdom	3,835	Israel	2,935	Portugal	435
4	Israel	3,352	Egypt	2,605	Jordan	383
5	France	3,190	Pakistan	2,032	Syria	348
6	Korea	3,042	Brazil	1,480	Pakistan	325
7	Egypt	2,766	Turkey	1,081	Bangladesh	256
8	Pakistan	2,765	Korea	1,080	Indonesia	226
9	Turkey	2,117	Colombia	990	Philippines	205
10	Italy	1,696	Indonesia	873	Vietnam	194

Source: Adapted from the *Statistical Yearbook of the United States, 1979*.

Table 5

Ten Major Recipients of U.S. Foreign Grants and Credits, 1945-1978
(Unit: \$1 million)

Rank	Post WW II Period ¹		1945-1955		1956-1965		1966-1978	
	Countries	Amount	Countries	Amount	Countries	Amount	Countries	Amount
1	India	9,236	United Kingdom	6,923	India	4,796	Israel	6,364
2	Israel	7,236	France	5,477	Korea	2,517	Vietnam	4,358
3	Korea	7,183	West Germany	3,907	Pakistan	2,416	India	4,039
4	Vietnam	6,691	Italy	2,795	Vietnam	2,088	Pakistan	2,425
5	United Kingdom	5,532	Japan	2,302	Turkey	1,418	Saudi Arabia	2,425
6	Pakistan	5,019	Korea	1,358	Brazil	1,200	Korea	2,009
7	France	4,034	Egypt	1,324	Yugoslavia	1,042	Indonesia	1,965
8	Brazil	3,276	Taiwan	1,257	Egypt	1,009	Brazil	1,606
9	Turkey	3,144	Netherlands	1,051	Taiwan	862	Turkey	1,362
10	Italy	2,975	Austria	1,019	Spain	685	Colombia	855

Source: Adapted from the *Statistical Yearbook of the United States, 1979*.

¹July 1, 1945 through December 31, 1978.

Table 6

MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF NORTH KOREA AND SOUTH KOREA
(1977-78)

<i>North Korea</i>	<i>South Korea</i>
<i>Total Armed Forces</i>	
512,000 personnel	596,000 personnel
2.5 million paramilitary militia	2.8 million reserves and local defense militia
<i>Army</i>	
440,000 personnel (includes 40,000 commandos)	520,000 personnel (includes 9,000 commandos)
25 divisions	20 divisions
—20 infantry	—19 infantry
— 3 mechanized infantry	— 1 mechanized infantry
— 2 tank	— 0 tank
10-12 independent infantry and light infantry brigades	2 independent infantry brigades
5 independent tank regiments	2 armored brigades
1,850 medium tanks	840 medium tanks
100 light amphibious tanks	0 light amphibious tanks
750 APCs	500 APCs
100 assault guns	0 assault guns
3,000 field artillery pieces	2,000 field artillery pieces
1,300 multiple rocket launchers	0 multiple rocket launchers
9,000 mortars	5,300 mortars
24 Prog-5/7 SSM	Honest John SSM
	TOW ATOM
<i>Navy</i>	
27,000 personnel	46,000 personnel (includes 20,000 marines)
18 bases	8 bases/stations
425-450 naval combatants	80-90 naval combatants
— 0 destroyers	— 7 destroyers
— 0 destroyer escorts	— 9 destroyer escorts
— 6- 7 patrol frigates	— 0 frigates
—17-19 missile attack boats	— 7 missile attack boats
—10-12 submarines	— 0 submarines
— 300 coastal patrol types	—60 coastal patrol types
— 90 landing craft	—21 landing ships
<i>Air Force</i>	
45,000 personnel	30,000 personnel
20 primary jet-capable airfields	12 primary jet-capable airfields
570 fighters/fighter bombers	300 fighters/fighter bombers
—120 MIG-21	—180 F-5
—110 MIG-19	— 40 F-4
—320 MIG-15/17	— 80 F-86
— 20 SU-7	
85 light bombers (1L-28)	0 light bombers
250 transports	40 transports
65 helicopters	100 helicopters

Air Defense

5,500 AA guns
250 SA-2 SAM

700 AA guns
80 Hawk SAM
40 Nike-Hercules SAM

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1977-1978* (London, 1977) pp. 60-61), and various unclassified sources.

COMMENTARY: PERCEPTIONS OF POWER

William W. Whitson

We all know that today there is a great debate going on, here at the Air Force Academy, in the War Colleges, in Congress, and in the Pentagon. The debate has to do with the nature and definition of power. The debate is in the context of the geopolitics of oil, the limits of growth, and the discussions over the last fifteen years of ideas like the coming of a new age, profound shifts in values, questions about who we think we are, and institutions that manifest those values. In this debate we are searching for new vision, a vision of a clear future and some notion of what is happening so rapidly to technology, to institutions, and to a world stage that long ago began to erode some traditional notions of sovereignty and of independence.

I am reminded as I listen to this debate and participate in it of a joke ascribed to former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who once went to President Lyndon Johnson, about the time of the Tet offensive, and said, "Mr. President, I regret to tell you that you are running a highly costly, inefficient, no-win policy in Vietnam. But take heart. We have devised a way to change that to a highly cost-effective, no-win policy in Vietnam." And President Johnson said, "Dammit, how about a victory?" McNamara said, "I'm sorry. That's not systems analysis. We deal in adjectives, not nouns." The noun was "containment" and McNamara was locked into it, as we all were: we believed in it. It seemed to have some meaning. Now we do not have a noun.

In the papers we have heard both this morning and this afternoon, in very many ways and at many levels we have examined an array of perceptions which we have of the East and the East has had of us, particularly in the military sphere. We have really been addressing two questions. The first has to do with the premises by which power is defined in two different cultures: two great cultures, one, if you will, Greco-Judaic, another Buddhist, or perhaps Confucian. The roots of these premises are very ancient and they are not likely to be changed very easily. The second question is this: Has either culture profoundly influenced the way those premises are applied in combat?

The central premise of Oriental thought regarding power, and more specifically military power, is the Sun Tzu aphorism that the greatest general is not the general who fights and wins a hundred battles, but the

one who wins without fighting at all. That premise is so baffling, finally, to most Western minds that we dismiss it as a notion about war that really does not deserve much of our attention. The Chinese are concerned with *strategem*, not *strategy*. Their notion is that physical power is in many cases only a minor component in the total mix of power by which you attempt to influence an adversary's mind.

The Western premise of power, on the other hand, has been expressed by Nathan Bedford Forrest in his aphorism "Getting there fustest with the mostest." Things—quantifiable things—are important to us. The Chinese philosophy, and I think this is true also of both the Korean and the Japanese, is a philosophy of poverty, a poverty of things. Ours, inevitably, has been a philosophy, perhaps, of an excess of things. I would dare say today there are no strategists in Washington: there are only logisticians. If we are going to launch something substantial, we feel we must first fill pipelines. We must lay down bases. We must do it the right way. The German General Staff at the end of the war said: "You didn't defeat us with your strategy, with your brilliance. You overwhelmed us with your things, with your industry."

Perhaps I am trying to make a distinction that is not as clear as I have suggested. And yet it is one that I think has been expressed beautifully in this array of papers. Frank Kierman's paper has portrayed, I think, very clearly, in spite of many years spent in the Orient, Vinegar Joe Stilwell's inability to really grasp just what the "peanut" (as he called Chiang Kai-shek) was up to.

Now, I must say, Chiang lost his bearings. He became unduly influenced by a Western notion of physical power at precisely the time when Chairman Mao and others were delegating, right down to the lowest unit, a kind of military and political initiative which finally overwhelmed the Nationalist preoccupation with rigid control. It was a harsh lesson for Chiang to learn. Similarly, I think, a Japanese preoccupation with physical power on the heels of their first victory against the Chinese, and then against the Russians, fostered a kind of preoccupation, an obsession, that ultimately led to Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Finally, I think that the Koreans, thanks to the Korean War and the necessity to become a garrison state, also gave enormous attention to the Western model. At the Korean Military Academy, in 1958, I learned that in the first five years of its existence, two hundred cadets had been dismissed on honor. I asked the commandant, "I don't understand this, because you have here the cream of the youth of Korean high schools. How could you dismiss these people on honor?" Very sheepishly, he said, "Frankly, we don't understand the Western idea of honor. Rather than be embarrassed by the MAAG telling us what we have done wrong, we would just rather dismiss the cadet until we can better understand what you're talking about." Many of you have

no doubt experienced a story similar to this. In this case theirs was a set of values deeply rooted in Buddhism and ours was a set of values rooted in the notion of the responsibility of the individual, and if you will, what some anthropologists have called, a guilt complex: God is always watching. From the Chinese and certainly the Confucian viewpoint, the shame value structure is much more operative. It is not that God or some metaphysical eye is watching, but rather that society is watching, and one should not be shamed into doing something wrong as society sees it.

Today, as American influence is being reduced in Korea the Koreans are being forced back upon their own earlier perceptions of what power is and how it works. I think the same thing has happened in China, and the same thing has happened in Japan. Today, the Japanese definition of Japan's defense problem is not home-island defense. Japanese leaders, political and military, face a worldwide threat to their existence, because Japan is a huge complex of production dependent on a worldwide network of both markets and raw material sources. It is not enough to be able to defend the factories. The life lines must be defended; defense and security and power go far beyond simple military formulas.

I think that our emphasis on Europe, in a way, is a reflection of a constant preoccupation with physical power, and systems, and a way of warfare which the Europeans and the Russians understand. We much prefer to deal with an adversary that speaks our language.

My point has been distilled best, most recently, by Chairman Mao. Mao said that all he needed was twenty ICBMs, and with those he could so manipulate the symbolism of an ICBM that he could easily play in this game where we feel that we need a hundred, or a thousand, or seven thousand warheads. Whether Mao was right or wrong is not the issue. The point is simply that his perception differed from ours.

My own sense is that after more than a century of interaction between East and West, we really have not changed one another's premises or perceptions of power very much.

DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS

Joyce C. Lebra (Moderator)

Lebra: Before opening this session to questions from the audience, I would like to exercise the chair's prerogative and ask Professor Kim a two-part question. First, what impact did the Japanese military have upon the Korean military? And secondly, was part of the reason for the failure of the American model in Korea perhaps due to the success of the Japanese model?

Kim: There was, of course, some impact from the Japanese military on Korea. Some Korean youth were accepted as volunteers in the Japanese military, and during the Second World War, Japan started drafting Korean college students. But the number of people involved was limited. The impact upon Korean military organization was negligible, especially as compared to the American influence after 1945. In general, I think the impact from Japan has not been a significant factor.

Comment (from the audience by Colonel So of the ROK): I would like to reinforce what Professor Kim has said about the impact of Japanese colonial rule upon the Korean educational system and upon Korean leadership after the war. Let me remind you—you Westerners—that we Koreans have experienced 493 invasions from without. We have suffered through those invasions, yet we have survived and retained our identity as Koreans. Over a period of five thousand years we have demonstrated promising potential for independent existence. But potential does not mean capability; external interference and external suppression have prevented that potential from surfacing. Japanese colonial rule, in this regard, was similar to previous occupations of Korea.

Suddenly, after World War II, we were exposed to Western civilization, which was a strange phenomenon to us. Before that, Koreans had been under colonial and authoritarian rule. The Americans, however, particularly during and after the Korean War, gave us a chance to govern ourselves.

Priority went to building up the armed forces. The Americans concentrated on the training and education of military forces. That is the reason our military officers are better leaders than our civilians. There are,

of course, many civilian Korean students and scholars who have been trained in Western countries. But leadership training is not a matter of knowledge alone. It is practice and it is a mental attitude of duty-mindedness. Our military academies are patterned after yours; Korean graduates will have a quality compatible with your cadets upon graduation. However, civilians are different: Harvard, Princeton, and other such fine schools do not specifically teach leadership training. Given these considerations, it is natural and logical that we find better leadership qualities among our military people.

Question: Professor Kim has suggested that South Korea has failed to adopt or incorporate the American model of civil-military relations, because of the overwhelming power of the Korean military in the society. My question is for Professor Asada. As the Japanese military gains power and assumes a larger role in Japanese society, how durable do you think Japanese civil-military relations will be? Will the American model be retained in Japan?

Asada: There is considerable doubt as to whether or not Japan has adopted the American model, the model within which the military is under civilian control. The Japanese Self Defense Force is in the anomalous position—an illegitimate child, almost—of not being recognized by the constitution. In this regard, civilian control has not been firmly established in Japan.

This raises another concern. Korea is certainly capable of developing nuclear weapons in the future. That development would destabilize the entire East Asian situation.

Kim: Perhaps I can add a comment or two. When one talks about civil-military relations, one talks in terms of a power equation. To what extent does a society possess a countervailing civilian power which can restrain and check the military? One must consider this in the case of Japan. In the U.S., civilian power has kept the military in check. In Korea, there has been practically a void in terms of civilian power to countervail the military-political power.

Lebra: We have another authority on this subject in the audience. I wonder if Dr. Hata would care to comment.

Hata (from the audience): Before 1945, military forces in Japan were under direct control of the emperor. There was a wide-spread belief in Japan that civilian control was a bad thing. The notion of civilian control was introduced by the American occupation forces after 1945.

Question: Professor Kierman's comment on Chiang Kai-shek's warlord attitude toward his armed forces raises an interesting question. To

what extent was Chiang simply being sensible to hang onto his troops, let someone else win the war against the Japanese, and then use his army against domestic opponents?

Kierman: That was certainly Chiang Kai-shek's intention. Barbara Tuchman makes a great deal of this point in *Stilwell and the American Experience in China*. Stilwell was continuously infuriated by Chiang's attitude. Chiang Kai-shek was not, I think, a very able soldier; consider, for example, his unrealistic strategy in Manchuria which I discussed in my paper. One must remember that Chiang did not come to power in China as the result of any real fighting, unless you wish to include his gang-land rub-out activities when he was associated with the Gangs of Shanghai. But that is hardly real military experience.

Once Chiang became the generalissimo, he was not about to risk his supreme prestige by engaging in hands-on command. He avoided going into the field to observe first-hand situations of any sort, whether they were civil or military. Many examples of this can be found in Barbara Tuchman's book, and in Theodore White's *In Search of History*. Chiang, in a sense, wanted to keep himself away from reality. From our standpoint, that is a strange way of fighting any sort of combat, even if one takes into account differences in attitude between the Chinese and the West concerning the proper way to conduct war.

V

**SUMMARY
AND
CONCLUSION**

SUMMARY REMARKS

Theodore Ropp

The first lessons of this symposium are, I think, Professor Kierman's observations concerning the unanticipated consequences of social action. Much of the American side of the story is one of ignorance, economic and missionary zeal, and military improvisation, factors which may have peaked at the turn of the century, in the age of such great generalizers as Henry Adams, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Frederick Jackson Turner, Brooks Adams, and Homer Lea. This is a group whose popularity was surely due to our own turn-of-the-century valor of ignorance. Perhaps these symposium sessions have stressed this ignorance too much. I think out of this ignorance, and also out of our previous colonial status, have come the two things that Professor Kim and others have just talked about: the very firm belief that democracy is not for export, but arms are. One of the reasons for our failures in East Asia and elsewhere is, in a sense, our fear of being called "neo-colonialists" and the belief that democracy is not for export, whereas arms are neutral and can be given free play.

Between 1815 and 1914 God looked out for political-military fools in America, who, I think, used the new century to add new misperceptions to those which were implicitly current about East Asia among the founding fathers. Adam Smith, who best reflects the ideas of the founding fathers, saw China as a traditional society which, because of its lack of interest in trade, had escaped the advantages of the division of labor and was therefore condemned to a "stationary" or "static" civilization. Now Smith did not see a stationary or traditional civilization, as we would now call it, as particularly barbarous. But by 1900, according to Roger Dingman's analysis, America's passions, interests, and social organizations had been drawn militarily into the Pacific. Dingman, Gates, and Flint all suggest how Hamilton's original formulation of the agricultural and commercial manifest destiny had developed into a linkage of three critical ideas: ideas of the savages on our frontier, barbarism, and economic backwardness. In other words, by the time we really got into contact with East Asia, economic backwardness had been equated with barbarism, and so it was perfectly easy for the U.S. Army to see the Chinese as somewhat more numerous Indians. The American definition of frontier is very different from that of the German definition of *Grenze*. The frontier is not the established line between two powers of roughly the same cultural development, but a line between civilization and barbarism.

Carrying these misconceptions with us, of course, simply means in the larger sense that nationalist definitions are a persistent problem in international politics, and certainly the nationalist definitions which we made of ourselves, the baggage which we carried with us across the Pacific, was the basic source of many of our misinterpretations. What Flint, Gates, and Dingman all show and what we have been talking about now for nearly two days is the effort to establish principles, programs, and patterns for our American military presence in East Asia. By 1853 the Navy knew that its basic interests lay in the Pacific, while the European-oriented U.S. Army was unsure of its role as late as 1940. As Schratz points out, such ideas were closely related to the slow and sporadic development of American foreign policy institutions. But what happened was that essentially in peacetime the expansion of civilization on the frontiers and the protection of trade in East Asia and other places were the only duties which our military was fitted to perform, even though every man in the military knew that in wartime he might have to do something very different from what he was doing in peacetime. But the accidents of internal and international politics forced both services in 1861, 1917, and 1941, into roles for which neither was very well prepared.

I think one can say that our East Asian empire was built by various individuals, with superior machines, in a political and strategic fit of absence of mind. Several papers suggest that enlightened peoples with too great a weapons advantage always tend to overuse these weapons, and the resulting escalation may make men and cultures actually more resistant to pounding (from better machines) than before.

Policies and procedures for dealing with East Asians, and I would say with Third World peoples of all kinds, have been the real lesson of this symposium. Cultural differences and misunderstandings have always placed Western and Eastern politics in what is essentially an adversary role. First, there is the European bias of our culture, interests, and armed forces. And then there are the anomalies of East Asian cultures. East Asians tend to see all foreign devils as alike, much as we tend to see all other cultures as alike. For these problems I think there is no real solution except perhaps the comparative study of history, over a very long time. As we move into a more active role in an extremely volatile Indian Ocean arena, it is well to remind ourselves of this: history is most useful, militarily, in expanding the soldiers' and statesmen's range of experiences, and I think their intellectual humility and circumspection. Comparative history, covering very long time periods, is especially helpful, and keeps us from focusing on what I call the besetting sin of the military: when it studies history too closely it always focuses on the last traumatic experience, whether it is judged to have been one of defeat, victory, or deterrence.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Alvin D. Coox

A symposium, like an anthology, reflects the bent and the talents of its creators and its participants. The better symposia, unlike most anthologies, not only attract luminaries but also spring from a freshness of approach that excuses unevenness and lacunae. The Ninth Military History Symposium revealed an impressive sense of originality, both in concept and execution. There was a refreshing absence of conformity, and lack of antiquarian excursions. Chronologically, the emphasis of the papers was on the period since 1898, although addressed in varying slices of time.

The panelists recognized and struggled to evade the parental pull of our European origins, as one author put it. No one here needed to be reminded that militarily the United States has fought its three most recent wars (or "police actions") in Asia. The number, we are told, should be increased to six if we incorporate Colonel Schlight's description of four air wars in Southeast Asia. But who has not heard that those wars, at least since Korea, were aberrant, or atypical?

Exactly what is a "typical" war? One of our own choosing? At a pleasant place to fight? Would Tahiti meet that definition? The Riviera? But then certainly someone would conduct a postmortem and conclude that the area was atypical, in terms—let us say—of the use of armor.

As several panelists intimated, a certain aphorism might better read: "Our combat experience in Asia was the *right* war at the *right* time in the *wrong* place." But if tourist agencies cannot be called upon to select typical locales for us, do we then turn to a theater of prime expectation? Once more we feel the tug of Europe, the plains of Germany, for example. Then, one wonders, what are forty-four Soviet infantry divisions doing on the Chinese frontier? Are the Russians in Afghanistan engaged in a "typical" or "atypical" operation? Are the American troops in South Korea no more than window dressing? Preconceptions about the identity and nature of the hypothetical enemy often feed intelligence failures or lapses. Speaker after speaker here has alluded explicitly or implicitly to the question of perception and misperception; the topic is of extreme importance.

What role did feelings of racial superiority play in the victory over Western powers by Japan in Asia in 1941 and 1942? In our handling of the North Korean invasion, in the summer of 1950? In our response to the Chinese intervention in the autumn of the same year? And our waging of the whole war in Southeast Asia after 1964? An American officer once suggested to me that the slang terms used against our Asian military enemies may have covertly revealed the intensity of our feelings and the degree of our bellicosity. Then he specifically compared the lingo for Korea with the lingo for Southeast Asia. In all fairness, I must add that our often condescending evaluations extended to friendly Asians, and to the European powers, too. We tended to denigrate the French in Indochina, the Dutch in Indonesia, and of course the Belgians and the Portuguese in Africa. Meanwhile, we sweated over the NATO connection in each case.

This suggests the crucial nature of so-called "experts" who guide the uninitiated. One recalls the British intelligence pundits in Malaya in 1941 who briefed allied pilots about the inferiority of the Japanese Zero to the Brewster Buffalo. And then there was the British naval attaché in Tokyo who advised the Admiralty that the Japanese were "naturally slow people," given their complex language and their poor vision.

What has been done or what has not been done to rectify this ignorance over the years? I shall mercifully ignore the cultural consequences on America, at least, of the recent TV series *Shogun*. An important by-product, on a more serious level, of our involvement in Asia since Pearl Harbor has been the upgrading of our language skills and our cultural awareness, at least to a certain degree. Certainly the American wartime experience against Japan, of necessity, stimulated one of the most remarkable crash programs in the history of American education. When a Japanese scholar surveyed the situation in America in 1935, four years after the outbreak of the Manchurian incident, and only six years before Pearl Harbor, he found there were only twenty persons in the whole United States who were concentrating on Japanese studies. This figure included people not even associated with universities. The best American libraries that he visited lacked such vital and easily accessible documents as the census of Japan. By the end of wartime 1944, however, fifty-seven colleges and more than fifteen thousand servicemen were engaged in Asian studies. The beneficial academic consequences are with us even today.

But emphasis has always been geared to our view of priorities. As one specialist on Asia put it, it is one of the great tragedies of American history that Vietnam was left out of East Asian studies throughout the 1930s, the 1940s, and the 1950s. A language or an area of the world has a better chance of being studied in the U.S. if there seems to be a real threat to the country.

In a cogent statement put out by the Department of Foreign Languages at this Academy, it is pointed out that, among the reasons for teaching certain languages is "a certain strategic or special international importance for the United States." (*The United States Air Force Academy's First Twenty-five Years*, USAF Academy, 1979, p. 135.) But, the statement continues:

Unfortunately, the relevancy of teaching these strategic languages is often difficult to ascertain because of the shifting and volatile climate of world politics and the uncertainty of predicting future areas of U.S. strategic or special interest. . . . after evaluating the current international situation, our language offerings in Russian, Arabic, Chinese, and Japanese accurately reflect the United States' strong concern for those areas of the world today.

One of the most useful contributions of this symposium has been the chance to learn something about Asian perceptions and American realities, if I may paraphrase and reverse the title of Professor Iriye's Harmon lecture. Professors Asada, Hata and Kim gave us some illuminating glimpses into postwar Japanese and Korean attitudes in particular on such wide-ranging themes as the U.S. occupation of Japan, a subject as vital and controversial as ever; responses to the use of the atomic weapons, a subject obviously as emotional as ever; and political consequences of the U.S. military presence in South Korea, a subject as real as ever.

Perhaps in future symposia, we can broaden the base to include more panelists who represent other friends and perhaps even enemies from abroad, for example, Vietnamese, Kampuchians, Laotians, Thais, even Chinese and Russians. In the absence of second voices our treatment may tend to be one, or one and one-half, dimensional. Certain of the panelists in this symposium would have benefited, I think, from a greater use of comparative resources and comparative analysis. But, suggestions aside, let me say that sponsors of this particular symposium deserve immense credit for devising a meaningful theme, and for amassing experts from as far away as Japan. Publication of these proceedings will also serve a very useful purpose, most particularly the stimulation of further studies, as was intended from the onset.

We all look forward to the Tenth Military History Symposium and we wish it a similar success.*

*Ed. note: The Tenth Military History Symposium, scheduled for autumn 1982, will deal with the home front in warfare.

NOTES

Akira Iriye (*Text, pages 9-19*)

1. Robert E. Park, *Race and Culture* (Glencoe, 1950).
2. Daniel Bell, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (New York, 1976).
3. Alexander Eckstein, *China's Economic Revolution* (New York, 1977).
4. Takeo Doi, *The Anatomy of Dependence* (Tokyo and New York, 1973).
5. Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York, 1978).
6. Ernest Tuveson, *Redeemer Nation: The Idea of America's Millennial Role* (Chicago, 1968).
7. Henry May, *The Enlightenment in America* (New York, 1976).
8. This latter idea inspired John Carter Vincent, consul general in Mukden at the time of the incident, who retained a strong faith in the universal applicability of certain (especially liberal) Western ideas. See Gary May, *China Scapegoat: The Diplomatic Ordeal of John Carter Vincent* (Washington, 1979).
9. Stephen Pelz, *Race to Pearl Harbor* (Cambridge, 1976).
10. Michael Schaller, *U.S. Crusade in China, 1938-1945* (New York, 1979).
11. Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945* (New York, 1979), chap. 11.
12. See the essays by Cohen, Gaddis, and others in Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs, eds., *Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations, 1947-1950* (New York, 1980).
13. Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston, 1979), p. 1087.
14. Frank Gibney, *Japan: The Fragile Superpower* (New York, 1975).
15. Kissinger, p. 1063.

Roger Dingman (*Text, pages 20-45*)

1. Compare microscopic dissections of a particular decision, such as William McKinley's decision to retain the Philippines, in Ernest R. May, *Imperial Democracy* (New York, 1961), chap. 17; Paolo Coletta, *Threshold to American Internationalism: Essays on the Foreign Policy of William McKinley* (Jericho, New York, 1970), pp. 145-146; and Walter Karp, *The Politics of War* (New York, 1979), pp. 97, 104-105. Or ponder the different macroscopic interpretations of the broad determinants of the American-East Asian relationship in George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* (Chicago, 1951); A. Whitney Griswold, *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States* (New York, 1938); William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York, 1959); and Robert A. Hart, *The Eccentric Tradition* (New York, 1976).
2. Jess Stein, ed., *The Random House Dictionary of the English Language* (New York, 1973), p. 296.
3. Elting E. Morison, et al., eds., *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt* (Cambridge, 1952), V, p. 762 (Hereafter cited as Roosevelt, *Letters*).
4. Valentin H. Rabe, *The Home Base of American China Missions, 1880-1920* (Cambridge, 1978), p. 6; Daniel Crosby Green, ed., *Tokyo Missionary Conference 1900* (Tokyo, 1901), pp. 986-987; Bureau of Statistics, Department of Commerce and Labor, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1907* (Washington, 1908), pp. 3, 9 (Hereafter cited as SA); Dept. of the Navy, *Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1897* (Washington, 1897), pp. 3, 9 (Hereafter cited as RSN); RSN, 1898, pp. 6-7; War Dept., *Annual Reports of the War Department, 1897* (Washington, 1897), p. 3 (Hereafter cited as RSW).
5. Helen I. Cushing, comp., *Nineteenth Century Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature, 1890-1899* (New York, 1944), I, pp. 496-497, and II, p. 199; *New York Times*, 1, 4, and 21 Jan 1898, and 5, 7, and 14 Feb 1898; Ernest R. May, *American Imperialism* (New York, 1968), chap. 2 develops the "foreign policy public" concept; Robert Seager, II, and Doris Maguire, eds., *The Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan* (Annapolis, 1975), II, p. 538 (Hereafter cited as Mahan, *Letters*); Roosevelt, *Letters*, I, p. 764; Marilyn B. Young, *The Rhetoric of Empire: American China Policy, 1895-1901* (Cambridge, 1968); chaps. 2-4

provide background on the activities of groups particularly interested in China; William R. Braisted, "The Open Door and the Boxer Uprising," in Paolo Coletta, ed., *Threshold to American Imperialism: Essays on the Foreign Policy of William McKinley* (Jericho, New York, 1970), pp. 184-186.

6. William R. Braisted, *The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909* (Austin, 1948), pp. 21-25; Akira Iriye, *Pacific Estrangement* (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 49-51; Graham A. Cosmas, *An Army for Empire: the United States Army in the Spanish-American War* (Columbia, Missouri, 1971), p. 119; John M. Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags* (Westport, Conn., 1973), p. 5. For contrasting interpretations of the purpose and particular forces shaping these deployments, see: John A. S. Grenville and George B. Young, *Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy* (New Haven, 1966), chap. 10, and Thomas McCormick, *China Market* (New York, 1967), pp. 105-125.

7. Mahan, *Letters*, II, pp. 563-566; Cosmas, pp. 119-120; *RSW, 1899*, Vol. I, pt. 1, p. 4; Vol. I, pt. 2, p. 6; *RSW, 1900*, I, pp. 3-4; *RSW, 1901*, I, pp. 8-9; *RSW, 1902*, I, pp. 2-3; Glenn A. May, "Filipino Resistance to American Occupation: Batangas, 1899-1902," *Pacific Historical Review* 48 (Nov 1979), p. 531; Paolo Coletta, *Bowman Hendry McCalla: A Fighting Sailor* (Washington, D.C., 1979), pp. 124-126; *RSN, 1902*, pp. 6-11, 444-445.

The total size of American forces deployed in East Asia during the 1898-1902 period is impressive. An average of 53 percent of total U.S. Army forces were in the region then, while the Navy, at its moment of peak strength in May 1901 had 51 percent of its combatant vessels in East Asian waters. *RSN, 1901*, pp. 610-611; Department of Commerce, *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970* (Washington, 1970), II, p. 1141 (Hereafter cited as *Historical Statistics*); Elihu Root, *The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States: Addresses and Reports*, comp. Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott (2nd ed., New York, 1970), pp. 248, 316-318, 346.

8. Finley Peter Dunne, *Mr. Dooley on Ivrything and Ivrybody*, ed. Robert Hutchinson (New York, 1963), p. 14; *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* (Minneapolis, 1905, 1910), I, pp. 260-263, and II, pp. 970-971; *New York Times Indexes, 1899-1900*. For a contrasting interpretation on the trend and importance of public opinion prior to war's outbreak, see Young, pp. 109-110.

9. Cosmas, pp. 102-110; Paolo Coletta, "The Peace Negotiations and the Treaty of Paris," and Braisted, "The Open Door," in Coletta, ed., *Threshold to American Imperialism*, pp. 124-125, 133-142, and 194-198.

10. Gates, pp. 102-103, 106, 192; Yates Stirling, Jr., *Sea Duty* (New York, 1939), pp. 61, 68, 72; B. O. Flower, "Dead Sea Fruit of Our Way of Subjugation," *Arean* 27 (June 1902), pp. 647-653; P. Bigelow, "How to Convert a White Man Into a Savage," *Independent* 54 (15 May 1902), pp. 1159-61; Mahan, *Letters*, II, p. 693; Braisted, "The Open Door," pp. 202-204; Young, pp. 184-187; Michael Hunt, "The Forgotten Occupation: Peking, 1900-1901," *Pacific Historical Review*, 48 (Nov 1979), p. 515.

11. May, *Imperial Democracy*, chap. 17; Robert L. Beisner, *Twelve Against Empire* (New York, 1968), pp. 15-38; David Healy, *U.S. Expansionism* (Madison, 1970), pp. 213-247; E. Berkeley Tompkins, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States* (Philadelphia, 1970), pp. 183-195; Coletta, "The Peace Negotiations," pp. 162-163; Young, pp. 153, 170-171, 184-192; Donald Bruce Johnson, comp., *National Party Platforms Volume I: 1840-1956* (Champaign, Illinois, 1978), I, pp. 112, 122-124.

12. Mahan, *Letters*, II, p. 556; Charles Denby, "What Is to Be Done in China?" *Independent*, 52 (29 Nov 1900), pp. 1837-1838; Stuart C. Miller, "Ends and Means: Missionary Justification of Force in Nineteenth Century China," in John K. Fairbank, ed., *The Missionary Enterprise in China and America* (Cambridge, 1974), p. 275; Kenton J. Clymer, "Religion and American Imperialism: Methodist Missionaries in the Philippine Islands, 1899-1913," *Pacific Historical Review*, 49 (Feb 1980), pp. 29-34.

13. Margaret Leech, *In the Days of McKinley* (New York, 1959), p. 334; Gates, pp. 112, 173; Braisted, "The Open Door," p. 202; Johnson, I, p. 112.

14. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1901* (Washington, 1902), p. vii (Hereafter cited as *FRUS*); *FRUS, 1902*, p. xxiii; Roosevelt, *Letters*, II, pp. 1054, 1403, 1415. Roosevelt began to have second thoughts about the legitimacy of the way

in which force was used against the Chinese almost immediately, for in March 1901 he wrote Admiral Mahan that "the count went against us rather than against the Chinese." Roosevelt, *Letters*, III, p. 23.

15. SA, 1908, pp. 350, 354-356, 538; Valentin Rabe, "Evangelical Logistics: Mission Support and Resources to 1920," in Fairbank, ed., *The Missionary Enterprise*, pp. 72-73; Milton T. Stauffer, ed., *The Christian Occupation of China* (Shanghai, 1922), p. 346; Greene, ed., *Tokyo Missionary Conference 1900*, pp. 986-987; Otis Cary, *A History of Christianity in Japan* (New York, 1909), II, p. 359; C.F. Remer, *Foreign Investments in China* (2nd ed., New York, 1968), pp. 260, 274.

16. SA, 1908, p. 538; SA, 1946; Remer, p. 138.

17. Michael Hunt, *Frontier Defense and the Open Door: Manchuria in Chinese-American Relations, 1895-1911* (New Haven, 1973), pp. 53-76; Raymond Esthus, *Theodore Roosevelt and Japan* (Seattle, 1966), pp. 112-127; Charles Neu, *An Uncertain Friendship: Theodore Roosevelt and Japan* (Cambridge, 1967), chaps. 3, 5.

18. Richard Challener, *Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy 1898-1914* (Princeton, 1973), pp. 43, 47-48.

19. Mahan, *Letters*, II, pp. 700, 707; III, pp. 79-80, 202, 205-206, 214, 221, 226.

20. Neu, pp. 6-12; *FRUS*, 1903, p. xxxiii. Only once, in 1903, did Roosevelt consider the Philippine base sufficiently important to mention in his State of the Union message to Congress (Roosevelt, *Letters*, IV, pp. 1140-1141, 1206, 1231, 1234; Roosevelt, *Letters*, V, pp. 353, 474-475, 527-528).

21. Roosevelt, *Letters*, IV, p. 1271; Kenton J. Clymer, *John Hay* (Ann Arbor, 1975), chaps. 4, 7, 9; Jerry Israel, *Progressivism and the Open Door: America and China, 1905-1921* (Pittsburgh, 1971), p. 40.

22. James E. Hewes, Jr., *From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963* (Washington, 1975), pp. 6-18; Challener, pp. 24-27; *RSW*, 1903, I, p. 159; Frank E. Vandiver, *Black Jack: the Life and Times of John J. Pershing* (College Station, Texas, 1977), I, pp. 332, 345, 355.

23. Gates, pp. 106, 176-177; Challener, pp. 24-25; Jack C. Lane, *Armed Progressive: General Leonard Wood* (San Rafael, California, 1978), p. 128. There were exceptions to the pattern of deployments described. Leonard Wood in January 1906 wrote President Roosevelt claiming that he had a regiment already in port ready to leave for China at a moment's notice (Lane, pp. 136-137).

24. Ronald Spector, *Admiral of the New Empire* (Baton Rouge, 1974), chap. 4; *RSN*, 1902, p. 418; *RSN*, 1903, pp. 175-178; *RSN*, 1904, p. 506; Braisted, *U.S. Navy in the Pacific*, pp. 117, 120-122, 142, 145, 149, 152; Challener, p. 29, points out that war planning was "extremely casual." Those who manned the fleet did not always perceive its larger purposes; Yates Stirling, Jr., claimed that it had "no real purpose except to give positions to superfluous admirals." See Stirling, *Sea Duty*, p. 98; Ronald Spector, *Professors of War* (Newport, Rhode Island, 1977), pp. 104-105; and Mahan, *Letters*, III, pp. 658-662.

25. Spector, *Professors of War*, p. 128; Braisted, pp. 148-149; 200-201, 218-222; Challener, pp. 38-41, 61, 237-243. For contrasting arguments as to Dewey's role and importance, see Challener, p. 234 and Spector, *Admiral of the New Empire*, p. 122. One suspects that Theodore Roosevelt would have agreed with Spector's argument that Dewey's post carried "immense prestige but little real authority," for in April 1900 Roosevelt disparaged the admiral's intelligence as well as his political acumen; see Roosevelt, *Letters*, II, p. 1252.

26. Peter W. Stanley, *A Nation in the Making* (Cambridge, 1974), pp. 55, 63; Noel H. Pugach, *Paul S. Reinsch: Open Door Diplomat in Action* (Millwood, New York, 1979), pp. 21, 25; Israel, p. 33; Young, pp. 191-196; Rabe, "Evangelical Logistics," and Miller, "Ends and Means," in Fairbank, ed., *The Missionary Enterprise*, pp. 82, 88, 275-280.

27. *New York Times Indexes, 1902-1907; Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*, I, pp. 1123-1127, II, pp. 1710-1712; Johnson, I, pp. 112, 122-123, 131, 138, 150, 161-162.

28. *FRUS*, 1901, p. xxiv; *FRUS*, 1903, pp. xxv, xxxii; *FRUS*, 1904, p. xlvi; *FRUS*, 1905, pp. lvii, lx; Roosevelt, *Letters*, V, pp. 761-762.

29. Roosevelt, *Letters*, V, pp. 501, 761-762.

30. Norman Graebner, "Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Japanese," and Waldo Heinrichs,

Jr., "The Role of the United States Navy," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, eds., *Pearl Harbor as History* (New York, 1973), pp. 28, 197-223; Pugach, chaps. 10, 12; Roger Dingman, *Power in the Pacific: the Origins of Naval Arms Limitation, 1914-1922* (Chicago, 1976), pp. 81, 203-212; Michael D. Reagan, "The Far Eastern Crisis of 1931-1932," in Harold Stein, ed., *American Civil-Military Decisions* (Birmingham, Alabama, 1963), pp. 29-37.

31. Paul A. Varg, *Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats* (Princeton, 1958), chap. 15; SA, 1946, pp. 914-915, 918-919; James O. Richardson and George C. Dyer, *On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor: the Memoirs of Admiral James O. Richardson* (Washington, 1973), chaps. 15, 16.

32. Michael Schaller, *The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938-1945* (New York, 1979), pp. 17, 27, 56, 82; Donald Friedman, *The Road from Isolationism: the Campaign of the American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression 1938-1941* (Cambridge, 1968); William M. Leary, Jr., *The Dragon's Wings* (Athens, Georgia, 1976), chap. 4.

33. Heinrichs, "Role of the U.S. Navy," in Borg and Okamoto, eds., *Pearl Harbor as History*, pp. 220-221; Paul Schroeder, *The Axis alliance and Japanese-American Relations, 1941* (Ithaca, New York, 1958), pp. 29-31; Irvine H. Anderson, Jr., *The Standard Vacuum Oil Company and United States East Asian Policy, 1933-1941* (Princeton, 1975), chaps. 5-6; George H. Gallup, *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935-1971* (New York, 1972), I, pp. 266, 268, 296, 306, 311; Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945* (New York, 1979), pp. 300-301.

34. Gallup, I, p. 359. A poll taken late in 1942 showed unmistakable determination to defeat the Axis powers but considerable vagueness on just what that meant; *Historical Statistics*, II, p. 1140. In 1898, only 29 percent of those mobilized served overseas, for an average of 1.5 months; in 1941-1945, 73 percent served abroad, remaining there for an average of 16.2 months.

35. Robert B. Morris, ed., *The Encyclopedia of American History* (New York, 1976), p. 443; *New York Times Indexes, 1941-1945*; *New York Times*, 6 and 20 Feb 1945, 13 Aug 1945; D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur* (Boston, 1975), II, pp. 403-440, 526-536; Rexford Tugwell, *The Democratic Roosevelt* (Garden City, New York, 1957), p. 349; Barbara Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China* (New York, 1971), p. 663.

36. Gallup, I, pp. 370, 411, 508-509; Reports: Controversial Trends of Opinion, Japan, numbers 3-4, 1 Dec 1943 - 29 Feb 1944; and W. Hume Logan to Anthony Eden, 4 Feb 1944, F.O. 371/F6246/4905/23-42, and /4944, Foreign Office papers, Public Records Office, London.

37. Dallek, p. 312; Ernest R. May, "*Lessons*" of the Past (New York, 1973), pp. 7, 10-12; John N. Thomas, *The Institute of Pacific Relations: Asian Scholars and American Politics* (Seattle, 1974), pp. 3-35; Council on Foreign Relations, *The War and Peace Studies of the Council on Foreign Relations, 1939-1945* (New York, 1946), pp. 6-18; Council on Foreign Relations, *The Council on Foreign Relations, 1921-1946* (New York, 1947), chap. 4; "The Foreign Policy Association in the War," Foreign Policy Bulletin 21 (26 Dec 1941), Foreign Policy Associations pamphlets collection, Hoover Institution, Stanford University; United States Congress, 83 cong., 2 sess., House Special Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations, *Hearings* (Washington, 1954), pp. 928-929.

38. Harley Notter, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945* (Washington, 1949) provides an overview of State Department postwar planning efforts; Minutes of Territorial and Security Subcommittees and of Inter-Divisional Area Committee on Far East, 1943-1945, Notter files, boxes 42, 54-55, Record Group 59, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; Okura sho zaisei shi shitsu, ed., *Showa zaisei shi: Shūsen kara kōwa made 3: Amerika no taiNichi senryo seisaku* [Financial History of the Showa Era: From War's End to Peace 3: The United States' Policy for the Occupation of Japan] (Tokyo, 1976), pp. 26-58, provides an exceptionally thorough analysis of organizational shifts pertinent to the development of Japan policy; Michael S. Sherry, *Preparing for the Next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941-1945* (New Haven, 1977), pp. 8-15; Memo concerning the history of naval military government, Box 5, Harry L. Perce papers, University of California, San Diego

Library, La Jolla, California; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, "Major Changes in the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1977," (Washington, mimeo, 1978).

39. William Roger Louis, *Imperialism at Bay* (New York, 1978), pp. 259-275, 449-450; Weekly summary of activities of Navy Office of Occupied Areas, 26 July 1943 - 15 July 1944, Box 5, Pence papers, details inter-service cooperation at the working level; Territorial subcommittee minutes 58, 3 Dec 1943, Notter files, Box 42, RG 59, National Archives. The activities of Admiral Harry S. Yarnell provide an example of both intra-service and civil-naval interaction on East Asian war aims. See Yarnell's Notes on the agenda, "The Treatment of Defeated Japan, Council on Foreign Relations, 6 January 1944," and Yarnell memo for Chief of Naval Operations on "A Study of Naval Patrol and Air Surveillance for Japan," 11 Apr 1944, Box 5, Pence papers.

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41. Dallek, pp. 428-30, 500-501, 535-537; Speech to Columbia course graduates, 5 Oct 1943, box 5, Pence papers; SWNCC 150- 150/4, 11 June - 6 Sept 1945, Office of Politico-Military Affairs, Chief of Naval Operations files, Naval History Division, Washington, D.C.; W. A. Swanberg, *Luce and His Empire* (New York, 1972), p. 235.

42. Historical Statistics, I, p. 224, II, pp. 114-115, 1141; *RSN, 1945*, pp. 6-13; Dept. of Defense, *Second Report of the Secretary of Defense and of the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy, and Secretary of the Air Force, Fiscal Year 1949* (Washington, 1950), pp. 138, 142-145, 208-210, 218. (Hereafter cited as *Second Report*); Dept. of Defense, *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense and Semiannual Reports of the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force 1 July - 31 Dec 1949* (Washington, 1950), pp. 134-135, 170-171; James A. Field, *A History of United States Navy Operations in Korea* (Washington, 1962), pp. 45-48; Eisenhower to MacArthur, 28 Jan 1946, MacArthur file, Box 66, Dwight D. Eisenhower papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.

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44. JSPG 496/2, 496/3, 15 and 18 Dec 1947, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46), sec 6, RG 218, National Archives; Dingman, "Strategic Planning," pp. 10-16; *New York Times*, 10, 30 Dec 1949.

45. *SA, 1951*, pp. 844, 848-849, 858; *Historical Statistics*, II, pp. 874-875.

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Foreign Policy Association, New York City, 9 Nov 1948; Draper, Speech to Foreign Policy Association, New York City, 7 Feb 1950; Joseph M. Dodge Statement for National Advisory Council, Fiscal Year 1951: Appropriations for Economic Aid to Japan, 19 Jan 1950; Tracy S. Voorhees to Dodge, 22 June 1950, Joseph M. Dodge papers, Detroit Public Library.

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48. *FRUS, 1902*, p. xvii; *FRUS, 1946*, VIII, pp. 150, 153-155, 348.

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50. Draft Willoughby memo for representatives of Joint Chiefs of Staff: Relation of World-Wide Political Situation to CINCFE mission, 1 Oct 1949, and GHQFE Command Briefing to Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins, 12 Oct 1949, P & O 091 Japan Top Secret file, RG 319, National Archives; *New York Times*, 15, 16 Feb 1950.

51. Gallup, I, pp. 565, 567, 599, 603, 615, 641, 664, 675, 714, 719, 737, 742, 759, 773; II, pp. 818, 826-827, 838, 865.

52. "American Relations with the Soviet Union: A Report to the President by the Special Counsel to the President, 24 Sept 1946: Conclusion," in Etzold and Gaddis, eds., *Containment*, pp. 64-71; *FRUS, 1947*, VI, pp. 36-43; *FRUS, 1950*, VI, pp. 1150-1153; Lyman Van Slyke, ed., *The China White Paper* (Stanford, 1967), p. xvi.

53. NSC 48/2, Conclusion, in *FRUS, 1949*, VII, part 2, pp. 1215-1219; Dingman, "Strategic Planning," pp. 10-15. For the full text of the document on which NSC 48/2 was based, see NSC 48/1, in Dept. of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967*, (Washington, 1971), VIII, pp. 225-264.

54. Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York, 1969), pp. 337-339; Ernest R. May, *The Truman Administration and China, 1945-1949* (Philadelphia, 1975), pp. 7, 18-19; Iriye, "Continuities," in Nagai and Iriye, eds., *The Origins of the Cold War in Asia*, pp. 380-381; Hewes, *From Root to McNamara*, pp. 158-161; Thomas H. Etzold, "American Organization for National Security, 1945-1950," in Etzold and Gaddis, eds., *Containment*, pp. 1-23.

55. Roosevelt, *Letters*, IV, p. 1198; Record of Appointments and Memoranda to Commander-in-Chief, 1945-1950, Record Group 5, Douglas MacArthur papers, MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, Virginia; Schaller, pp. 27, 51, 89, 104, 134; United States Congress, 82 Cong., 1 Sess., Senate Judiciary Committee, Sub-committee on Internal Security, *Hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations* (Washington, 1951-1952), V, pp. 1500-1506 detail Admiral Cooke's activities; Badger to Denfeld, 2 Apr 1949, box 1, Oscar C. Badger papers, Naval History Division, Washington, D.C.; Dingman, "The U.S. Navy and the Cold War: the Japan Case," pp. 6-10, 24; Tracy S. Voorhees, "After Twenty-five Years," pp. 22-26, and Tab C, 15 Oct, "Memorandum on Lengthening of Airfields in Japan," Tracy S. Voorhees papers, Rutgers University Library, New Brunswick, New Jersey; Brown to Crabb, 8 Dec 1949, CCS 388.1 Japan (9-1-47) sec. 1, RG 218.

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Norman A. Graebner (*Text*, pages 46-64)

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37. Report of the National Security Council (NSC 48/2), 30 Dec 1949, *FRUS, 1949*, VII, pp. 1215-1216.
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39. *Bulletin*, XXII (23 Jan 1950), pp. 113-114.
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42. *Bulletin*, XXII (27 Mar 1950), pp. 469-472.
43. *Bulletin*, (10 Apr 1950), p. 562; (24 Apr 1950), p. 627.
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45. Rusk's testimony of 8 June 1950, Porter, I, 266.
46. John F. Melby to Rusk, 7 Aug 1950, *FRUS, 1950*, VI, pp. 845-848.
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48. United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (NSC 68) appears in Etzold and Gaddis, *Containment*, pp. 385-442. Quotations appear on pp. 385, 387, and 409.
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50. *FRUS, 1950*, VII, pp. 200, 202.
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54. Acheson in *The New York Times*, 30 Nov 1950; Truman's statement in *Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1950* (Washington, 1965), p. 725.
55. Stanley K. Hornbeck, "The United States and China," *Vital Speeches*, 16 (1 Oct 1950), pp. 745-746.
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58. Rusk, "The Strategy of Freedom in Asia," Philadelphia, 9 Feb 1951, *Bulletin*, XX-IV (19 Feb 1951), p. 295.
59. See statements of Dulles and Rusk, 18 May 1951, *Bulletin*, XXIV (28 May 1951), pp. 844, 847.
60. *FRUS, 1950*, VI, p. 954.
61. For the development of this view see Jacques Soustelle, "Indochina and Korea: One Front," *Foreign Affairs*, 29 (Oct 1950), pp. 56-66.
62. Rusk's speech in Seattle, 6 Nov. 1951, *Bulletin*, XXV (19 Nov 1951), p. 823.
63. The French pressure for aid increased in 1951 and 1952. See Porter, I, pp. 372-374.
64. Buhite, p. 56.
65. U.S., Dept. of State, *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents* (Washington, 1957), I, pp. 873-896.
66. Policy Statement on United States Goals in Southeast Asia, 1952, in Neil Sheehan, ed., *The Pentagon Papers as Published by The New York Times* (New York, 1971), p. 28.
67. Rankin to George V. Allen, 29 July 1953, in Rankin, *China Assignment*, p. 173.
68. Dulles used this explanation of Soviet expansion repeatedly. See, for example, his speech before The Overseas Press Club, 29 Mar 1954. *Bulletin*, XXX (12 Apr 1954), p. 539.
69. *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955*, II, pp. 2375, 2376.
70. *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955*, I, pp. 917-923.
71. *Bulletin*, XXX (4 Jan 1954), p. 12.
72. Eisenhower's address at Gettysburg College, 4 Apr 1959, *Bulletin*, XL (27 Apr 1959), pp. 580-581.

John M. Gates (*Text, pages 79-91*)

1. For a fuller description of the U.S. Army's pacification campaign than that presented here see John M. Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902* (Westport, 1973). On the reaction to the war in the United States see Richard E. Welch, Jr., *Response to Imperialism: The United States and the Philippine-American War* (Chapel Hill, 1979). Peace-keeping in the islands after 1902 is described in George Yarrington Coats, "The Philippine Constabulary: 1901-1917" (Ph.D. Diss., The Ohio State University, 1968) and James Richard Woolard, "The Philippine Scouts: The Development of America's Colonial Army" (Ph.D. Diss., The Ohio State University, 1975).
2. Allan Reed Millett, *The Politics of Intervention: The Military Occupation of Cuba, 1906-1909* (Columbus, 1968), pp. 14-16.
3. Maurice Matloff, ed., *American Military History* (partially rev. ed., Washington, 1973), pp. 337-339, 339-342, and 168-171 respectively.

4. John R. M. Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States—A Compilation of Documents with Notes and Introduction*, 5 vols. (Manila, 1971). A microfilm copy of the galleys is available from the U.S. National Archives. For an interesting history of Taylor's project and its suppression see John Thomas Farrell, "An Abandoned Approach to Philippine History: John R. M. Taylor and the Philippine Insurrections Records," *Catholic Historical Review*, 39 (1954), pp. 385-407.

5. William Thaddeus Sexton, *Soldiers in the Sun* (Harrisburg, 1939). James A. LeRoy, Taft's protégé in the Philippines, had considerable encouragement from American officials while writing his history, but his untimely death in 1909 cut short his work. Published posthumously, LeRoy's two volumes included material on only the first two years of the war. See *The Americans in the Philippines*, 2 vols (Boston 1914). For over a decade the standard work on the war was Leon Wolff, *Little Brown Brother: How the United States Purchased and Pacified the Philippine Islands at the Century's Turn* (Garden City, 1961), although it lacked both the scholarship and detail of its predecessors. Wolff's lively style and the death of other, better works after World War II helped assure its preeminence.

6. Moorefield Storey and Julian Codman, *Secretary Root's Record: "Marked Severities" in Philippine Warfare* (Boston, 1902), p. 11.

7. Statement of Senator George Frisbie Hoar, quoted in Richard E. Welch, Jr., "American Atrocities in the Philippines: The Indictment and the Response," *Pacific Historical Review*, 43 (1974), p. 233 (hereafter cited as "Atrocities").

8. John M. Blum, et al., *The National Experience* (4th ed., New York, 1977), p. 505.

9. Stuart C. Miller, "Our My Lai of 1900: Americans in the Philippine Insurrection," *Transaction*, 7, (1970), p. 19, and Luzviminda Francisco, "The First Vietnam: The U.S.-Philippine War of 1899," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 5 (1973), p. 12.

10. Daniel B. Schirmer, *Republic or Empire: American Resistance to the Philippine War* (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), p. 256.

11. The text this author read as an undergraduate contained such a view. See Thomas A. Bailey, *The American Pageant: A History of the Republic* (Boston, 1956), p. 629.

12. Professor Richard E. Welch, Jr., a careful scholar who for many years has studied the response in the United States to events in the Philippines, although accepting the view that the American campaign there was brutal, has observed that "if 'atrocities' are defined as the murder of civilians and prisoners, torture of captives, systematic burning of civilian quarters, and rape, then it is possible to identify fifty-seven verifiable instances when American soliders committed atrocities." He also identified an additional sixty cases of "aggravated assault." See Welch, "Atrocities," p. 234. Although 117 verified atrocities is not a record to be proud of, the number is certainly much lower than one would expect from a pacification campaign characterized as harshly as that in the Philippines.

The response of the revolutionaries to the Army's reform oriented approach to pacification is fully documented in Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*. This author has seen many Filipino references to the problems caused by American benevolence but few to American brutality in the revolutionary documents he has read in Taylor's five-volume compilation and in rolls 1-82 and 637-643 of the Philippine Insurgent Records, 1896-1902, with Associated Records of the U.S. War Department, 1900-1906, a microfilm collection of 643 rolls available from the U.S. National Archives. Rolls 637-643 contain Spanish copies of revolutionary documents from the Visayan islands south of Luzon compiled by Capt. Robert H. Noble and bound in 34 hand-written volumes in 1902. A copy of the bound work may be found in the library of the U.S. Military History Research Collection, Carlisle, Penn.

13. Frederick Palmer, "White Man and Brown Man in the Philippines," *Scribner's Magazine*, 27 (1900), p. 85.

14. The reform activities of the American military government and Army officers in the provinces are documented in Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, esp. pp. 54-155. Attempts to demonstrate that the Army's work was not successful or oriented toward reform are sometimes undermined by their own data. See, for example, Virginia Frances Mulrooney, "No Victor, No Vanquished: United States Military Government in the Philippine Islands, 1898-1901" (Ph.D. Diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1975), chap. 5.

15. See, for example, William J. Pomeroy, "'Pacification' in the Philippines,

1898-1913," *France-Asie*, 21 (1967), p. 444, and David Joel Steinberg, "An Ambiguous Legacy: Years at War in the Philippines," *Pacific Affairs*, 45 (1972), p. 170.

16. Taft to Root, 21 Sept 1900, Elihu Root Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

17. Taft to Root, 31 Oct 1900, Root Papers.

18. Peter W. Stanley, *A Nation in the Making: The Philippines and the United States, 1899-1921* (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), pp. 64-67.

19. Glenn Anthony May, *Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims, Execution and Impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900-1913* (Westport, 1980), p. xvii.

20. The Army's work in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines is thoroughly described in the Annual Reports of the War Department for the fiscal years 1898-1902.

21. John M. Gates, "The Alleged Isolation of U.S. Army Officers in the Late 19th Century," *Parameters*, 10 (1980), pp. 32-45, makes the case against the interpretation presented in Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957).

22. Glenn A. May, "Filipino Resistance to American Occupation: Batangas, 1899-1902," *Pacific Historical Review*, 48 (1979), p. 554.

23. The variation in the elite response may be seen in a comparison of Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic* (Quezon City, 1960), pp. 636-653; John A. Larkin, *The Pampangans: Colonial Society in a Philippine Province* (Berkeley, 1972), pp. 126-127; May, "Filipino Resistance," pp. 554-556; and Norman G. Owen, "Winding Down the War in Albay, 1900-1903," *Pacific Historical Review*, 48 (1979), pp. 564-569 and 581-589. Jane Slichter Ragsdale, "Coping with the Yankees: The Filipino Elite, 1898-1903" (Ph.D. Diss., University of Wisconsin, 1974) stresses the diversity of elite participation in the Philippine revolution. For an insightful look at the long-term effects of elite collaboration with the Americans see Steinberg, "Ambiguous Legacy," pp. 165-190.

24. A summary of the demands of the opponents of Spanish colonial rule appears in Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *The Revolt of the Masses: The Story of Bonifacio and the Katipunan* (Quezon City, 1956), pp. 18-31 and LeRoy, *The Americans in the Philippines*, I, pp. 63-73.

25. On the death of Bonifacio see Agoncillo, *The Revolt of the Masses*, chaps. 14 and 15. On that of Luna see Agoncillo, *Malolos*, pp. 498-539. The split between peasant social revolutionaries and the more conservative revolutionary movement headed by Aguinaldo is covered in detail in Milagros Camayon Gferrero, "Luzon at War: Contradictions in Philippine Society, 1898-1902" (Ph.D. Diss., The University of Michigan, 1977).

26. David R. Sturtevant, *Popular Uprisings in the Philippines, 1840-1940* (Ithaca, 1975), focuses on the millennial aspects of the peasant response to the revolution. See esp. chaps. 5 and 6. Gferrero, "Luzon at War," pp. 164-168, specifically rejects Sturtevant's interpretation and argues that the peasants were social revolutionaries.

27. Miller, "Our My Lai of 1900," p. 19, and Dino J. Caterini, "Repeating Ourselves: The Philippine Insurrection and the Vietnam War," *Foreign Service Journal* (Dec 1977), p. 11.

28. D. B. Schirmer, "Mylai Was Not the First Time," *The New Republic* (24 Apr 1971), pp. 18-21. For a contrasting view see John M. Gates, "The Philippines and Vietnam: Another False Analogy," *Asian Studies*, 10 (1972), pp. 64-76.

29. Welch, *Response to Imperialism*, p. xiii.

30. The very conservative estimates of Guenter Lewy, *America in Vietnam* (New York, 1978), Appendix 1 place the number of war-related deaths during the American period of the war in Vietnam at well over a million. In the Philippine-American War the number of combatants killed was probably no more than 20-25,000 (slightly more than 4,000 being Americans). The commonly cited figure of 200,000 for civilian deaths is totally unsubstantiated and clearly out of line with the ratio of civilian to combatant deaths in such conflicts as World War II, Korea, or Vietnam. Although a number of authors apparently assume that the deaths from cholera in the 1902-1903 epidemic are war-related, the 1902 and 1903 death rates in the Philippines were comparable for those of the previous cholera epidemic in 1889-1890 and lower than estimates for the 1879 outbreak. More important, the 1902 cholera epidemic began in India, not the war-torn Philippines, and spread throughout Asia, as other epidemics had in the past. Although the Philippine-American War was long and sometimes

brutal, it may not have been as destructive of human life as some authors believe. No data exist to support estimates of 600,00 or 1,000,000 deaths, and one wonders what motivates authors to make such claims. See Renato Constantino, *The Philippines: A Past Revisited* (Quezon City, 1975), p. 245 and Francisco, "The First Vietnam," p. 14.

31. Walter Millis, *Arms and Men* (New York, 1956), p. 364.

32. Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (New York, 1973), p. 477.

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1. Etō Jun, *Wasureta koto to wasuresaserareta koto* [Things We Have Forgotten and Things We Were Made to Forget], (Tokyo, 1979), and Shimizu Ikutaro, *Sengo o Uiagau* [Doubts on the Postwar Japan], (Tokyo, 1980).

2. See *Amerika no Tainichi Senryo Seisaku* [History of the U.S. Occupation of Japan], (Tokyo, 1976). Book review by Roger Dingman, *The American Historical Review*, (April 1978).

3. Hugh Borton, *American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan* (New York, 1967).

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17. Martin E. Weinstein, *Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968* (New York, 1971).

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19. Hata, pp. 198-200.

20. See Howard Shonberger, "The Japan Lobby in American Diplomacy 1947-1952," *Pacific Historical Review* (Aug 1977).

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ities in Indochina, JCS 1992/367, 4 Aug 1954. Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Archives Record Group 218.

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10. Notes of Protocol Visit of General I. D. White, CGUSARPAC, to Pres. Diem, 16 Jan 1958, author's files, CMH.

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12. Message, Chief, MAAG to CINCPAC, 14 Mar 1957, Williams Papers, CMH.

13. Letter, Durbrow to Diem, 26 Feb 1958, Copy in folder 36, Williams Papers, CMH.

14. Viet Cong penetration of the Vietnamese government and Army is discussed in a number of Field Intelligence Reports of 1958 and 1959 made available to the Center of Military History.

15. Letter, ARMA to ACSI, Subj: Conversations Regarding Vietnamese Army Programs, 25 Apr 1960, S-14-60, OUSARMA, Records of ACSI.

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4. Barbara W. Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45* (New York, 1970), p. 531.

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6. U.S. Army, *Field Manual No. 100-5: Operations* (Washington, 1976).
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2. Kenneth J. Hagan, *American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy 1877-1889* (Westport, Conn., 1973), p. 111.
3. A similar operation by Commodore Shufeldt in 1882 opened Korea to American trade.
4. John K. Fairbank, Edwin W. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, *East Asia: Tradition and Impression* (Boston, 1979), pp. 486-488.
5. Tyler Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia* (New York, 1941), p. 220.
6. Dennett, p. 270.
7. Others had similar interests. Dr. Peter Parker formally proposed a protectorate over Formosa to the State Department on 12 Dec 1856, 12 Feb 1857 and 10 Mar 1857. See William A. Williams *The Shaping of American Diplomacy* (Chicago, 1956), pp. 241-242.
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9. Ronald Spector, *Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession* (Newport, 1977), p. 11.
10. Robert J. Love, *The Chiefs of Naval Operations* (Annapolis, 1980), p. xv.
11. Paul R. Schratz, "Mahan, Philosopher of Sea Power," *Shipmate* (Dec 1978), p. 4.
12. Admiral James O. Richardson, *On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor* (Washington, 1973), p. 251; Paul M. Kennedy, *The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914* (London, 1979), p. 25.
13. Kennedy, p. 26.
14. A. Whitney Griswold, *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States* (New York, 1938), p. 23.
15. Secretary Hay himself instructed the U.S. minister to "obtain a naval coaling station at Samsah Bay in Fukien." Secretary to U.S. Minister to Japan, 7 Dec 1900, quoted in Williams, p. 488.
16. Dennett, pp. 633-634.
17. Dennett, pp. vi, 645.
18. Ernest R. May and James C. Thomson, Jr., eds., *American-East Asian Relations: A Survey* (Cambridge, 1972), p. 45.
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20. Iriye, *Across the Pacific*, p. 119.
21. Kennedy, p. 29.
22. Kennedy, p. 213.
23. William R. Braisted, *The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922* (Austin, 1971), p. 5. The fact that Subic Bay could not be defended from the land side did not perturb the naval strategists; the probable enemy, Germany, could operate only with naval forces (Kennedy, p. 29). Under Army influence, Cavite was substituted for Subic, defensible from both Manila on the land side and Corregidor to seaward.
24. Frederick L. Schumann, *International Politics: The Western State System and the World Community*, 6th ed. (New York, 1958), p. 327.

25. Robert Seager II, *Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His Letters* (Annapolis, 1977), pp. 476, 489.
26. Kennedy, p. 33.
27. Richardson, p. 254.
28. As late as February 1917 Wilson shocked his Secretary of State Lansing by refusing to agree that an allied victory was necessarily a good thing. Navy Secretary Josephus Daniels deeply sympathized. Wilson sought to preserve neutrality by bringing the war to a close before the European balance of power was destroyed.
29. Kennedy, p. 64.
30. Harold and Margaret Sprout, *Toward a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918-1922* (Princeton, 1971), p. 285.
31. Norman A. Graebner, *An Uncertain Tradition: The American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1961), p. 138.
32. Gerald E. Wheeler, "Edwin Denby: 6 March 1921-10 March 1924" in Paolo E. Colletta, *The American Secretaries of the Navy* (Annapolis, 1980), p. 585.
33. Sprout and Sprout, p. 290.
34. Braisted, p. 647; Sprout and Sprout, pp. 295-296.
35. Akira Iriye, "From the Washington Treaties to Pearl Harbor, 1922-1931" in May and Thomson, p. 233.
36. Paul R. Schratz, "The Interwar Presidents and National Security" in *Citadel Conference on War and Diplomacy* (Charleston, S.C., 1977), p. 118.
37. Love, *The Chiefs*, p. 58. The British were not similarly motivated and as a result the shortlegged, logistically dependent British fleet units were never welcomed by the U.S. Navy in combined fleet operations in World War II.
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39. Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (New York, 1973), p. 264.
40. Samuel Eliot Morison, *The Two Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War* (Boston, 1963), p. 17.
41. Iriye, "Washington Treaties," p. 253.
42. Falk, p. 300.
43. Iriye, "Washington Treaties," p. 254.
44. Richardson, pp. 271, 295.
45. Richardson, p. 282.
46. Richardson, p. 304.
47. Richardson, p. 306.
48. King was the only Navy Chief who combined both the CNO and Commander-in-Chief roles. As Chief of Naval Operations he was subordinate to the Secretary of the Navy, hence he favored the Commander-in-Chief role which gave him direct access to the President, and the Navy Secretary became more and more isolated.
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6. U.S. War Department, *Annual Reports of the War Department*, Vol. I, pt. 1, *Report of the Secretary of War* (Washington, 1899), p. 46.
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65. Henry, pp. 61-62.
66. Henry, pp. 61-62.
67. Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—ORANGE, 17 Apr 1928, Box 182, RG 165, National Archives; letter, Maj. Gen. William Lassiter, CG, Philippine Department to Brig. Gen. George S. Simonds, WPD, 31 Aug 1928, WPD 3251, RG 165, National Archives.
68. Memo, WPD for ACSI-3, subject: "Defense of the Philippines," 1 Oct 1928, WPD 3251 and WPD memorandum for the Chief of Staff, subject: "Defense Plans, Philippine Islands," 18 Feb 1929, WPD 3251-3, both in RG 165, National Archives.

69. U.S. Cong., 73d Cong., H.R. 8573, 24 Mar 1934 (the Tydings-McDuffie Act).
70. Memo, 19 Apr 1933, WPD 3251-15.
71. Memo, 19 Apr 1933, WPD 3251-15, 1st indorsement by Maj. Gen. E. E. Booth, CG, Philippine Department.
72. Letter to Joint Board from the Chief of Staff, subject: "Military Police of the United States in the Philippine Islands," undated carbon, WPD 3251-15, RG 165, National Archives.
73. Morton, pp. 35-36; Schaffer, p. 90; draft memo, WPD to Chief of Staff, subject: "Provisions of the Philippine Independence Act affecting our future military policy in the Philippines," 28 June 1934, WPD 3251 Developmental File in Box 145; and memo, WPD to Army members of Joint Planning Committee, subject: "Military Policy in the Philippine Islands," 1 May 1934, WPD 3251-18, both in RG 165, National Archives.
74. Memo, subject: "Military Aspects of the Situation that Would Result from the Retention by the United States of a Military (Including Naval) Commitment in the Philippine Islands," 2 Dec 1935, WDR SDE [Embick's personal file] in the JPC Developmental File, Serial 573, RG 165, National Archives.
75. Memo, WPD for Chief of Staff, subject: "Joint Army and Navy Basic Plan—ORANGE," 28 Oct 1937, WPD 2720-104, RG 165, National Archives.
76. Memo, Embick, Dep. Chief of Staff, to WPD, subject: "Draft of a Directive to Planning Committee in re a New Orange Plan," 5 Nov 1937, WPD 2720-104, RG 165, National Archives. Embick penned a memorandum for record stating that the basic memo was approved by the Joint Board on 10 Nov 1937.
77. Memo, WPD to Chief of Staff, subject: "Concentration Plan of the Army Strategical Plan—Orange," 22 Dec 1937, WPD 2720-106, RG 165, National Archives; Morton, p. 39; Watson, pp. 97-99.

John Schlight (Text, pages 160-171)

1. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, *Department of Armed Forces, Hearings on S.84 and S.1842*, 79th Congress, 1st Session, 1945. Hereafter cited as Senate Hearings, 1945.
2. Senate Hearings, 1945.
3. Senate Hearings, 1945.
4. Senate Hearings, 1945.
5. Memo, Walter Todd for Maj. Gen. L. Norstad, ACAS/PL to DCAS, 26 Jul 1945.
6. AAF Statistical Digest, 1946, pp. 27, 28, 30, 31; *The Development of the Strategic Air Command, 1946-73*, Hqs, SAC, 19 Sept 1974, p. 2.
7. FEAF, *Final Report on the Korean War, 1953*, Microfilm, Office of Air Force History, K7335, Frs. 273ff, p. 135. Hereafter cited as *Final Report*.
8. Testimony, U.S. Congress, Senate, *Military Situation in the Far East*, 82d Congress, 1st Session.
9. Robert Frank Futrell, *Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1964* (Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1974), p. 151.
10. Testimony, U.S. Congress, *Military Situation*.
11. *Final Report*, p. 137.
12. *Final Report*, p. 137.
13. *Final Report*, p. 138.
14. Robert Frank Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953* (New York, 1961), p. 661.
15. *Final Report*, p. 137.
16. *Final Report*, p. 142.
17. *Final Report*, pp. 136-137.
18. *Final Report*, pp. 156-157.
19. The Soviet threat had been enshrined as the centerpiece of American foreign policy in NSC-68 in 1950. The text appears in the *Naval War College Review*, May-June, 1975.

20. Letter, Weyland to White, 12 June 1959, in White papers, Library of Congress, Box 27, TAC file.
21. Letter, Weyland to White, 12 June 1959.
22. Message, CINCPACAF to CINCPAC, Subj: Contingency Planning for SEA/Western Pacific, 20 Mar 1965.
23. Quoted in J. S. Butz, Jr., "Airpower in Vietnam: The High Price of Restraint," *Air Force Magazine*, Nov 1966, p. 41.
24. Steven L. Canby, "Tactical Air Power in Armored Warfare," *Air University Review*, May-June, 1979, p. 5; Edward N. Luttwak, "The American Style of Warfare and the Military Balance," *Air Force Magazine*, Aug 1979, pp. 86-88.
25. Message, CINCPACAF to 13AF, 9 Nov 1964.
26. Canby, p. 11.
27. Donald J. Alberts, "Tactical Air Power Within NATO: A Growing Convergence of Views," *Air University Review*, Mar-Apr 1980, p. 62.
28. Canby, p. 10.
29. Canby, p. 16.
30. Alberts, pp. 4-5.

Edwin H. Simmons (*Text, pages 172-175*)

1. Japanese fascination with both the Marines and the miniature railway is well demonstrated by the Shotuko Nakao scroll, "Picture of place of arrival of Admiral Perry, U.S. Navy," in the Historical Institute, University of Tokyo. This 40-foot scroll shows, *inter alia*, the funeral procession, burial, and headstone of a Marine private who died on board ship; Marines in ranks and drilling; and, in lighter vein, Marines testing a Sumo wrestler's muscles. In typical Japanese style, items such as band instruments, buttons, uniforms, etc., are shown in great detail.
2. Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret.), *The United States Marines, 1775-1975* (New York, 1976), pp. 52-53, 64-65.
3. Letter, Admiral George Dewey to Secretary of the Navy, 14 Jan 1909, in *Hearings on the Status of the Marine Corps*, House Naval Affairs Committee (Washington, 1909), p. 350: "If there had been 5,000 Marines under my command at Manila Bay, the city would have surrendered to me on May 1, 1898, and could have been properly garrisoned. The Filipinos would have received us with open arms, and there would have been no insurrection."
4. Simmons, pp. 79-84.
5. Simmons, pp. 89, 133.
6. Simmons, pp. 133-134.
7. Major General Smedley D. Butler, as told to Lowell Thomas, *Old Gimlet Eye* (New York, 1933), p. 288.
8. Barbara W. Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45* (New York, 1970), p. 106.
9. Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) are task-organized to suit the particular mission assigned. All MAGTFs include command, aviation combat, ground combat, and combat service support elements. The command element provides a single headquarters for command and coordination of ground, air, and combat service support forces. The ground combat element may range in size from an infantry battalion to one or more divisions. The aviation element is task-organized for the required range of tactical air operations which may include offensive air support, air reconnaissance, anti-air warfare, electronic warfare, and command and control. The smallest MAGTF is a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU), commanded by a colonel, and normally is built around a battalion landing team (BLT), a composite aircraft squadron (always helicopters and sometimes VSTOL aircraft), and a service support group. Similarly, a Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) is built around a regimental landing team, a Marine aircraft group, and a brigade service support group. The largest and most powerful of the MAGTFs is a Marine Amphibious Force (MAF). Commanded by a ma-

for general or lieutenant general, it normally combines a Marine division and a Marine aircraft wing supported by a force service support group. The Marine aircraft Wing is task-organized and will ordinarily operate from 375 to 475 aircraft, both helicopters and fixed wing.

10. Simmons, pp. 134-135.

11. Simmons, p. 143.

12. Simmons, p. 125.

13. General Gerald C. Thomas, USMC (Ret.), interview, 1966, (Oral History Section, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington), pp. 751, 868. With respect to air support provided the 1st Marine Division in Korea by the Fifth Air Force while he was division commander, General Thomas states, "It was, had been, unsatisfactory, and continued to be." Based on his experiences in World War II including his observation of the British in the desert war, as well as his Korean War experiences, General Thomas concluded that "...ground forces must not be denied their air support by reason of other air missions which they [air organizations] think they should undertake...and [with respect to his experiences in Korea] we didn't get any air support for a month...."

14. Lieutenant General Keith B. McCutcheon, USMC, "Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962-1970," *Naval Review 1971* (Annapolis, 1972), pp. 134-138.

Allan R. Millett (*Text, pages 176-180*)

1. Fred Greene, "The Military View of American National Policy, 1904-1940," *American Historical Review* 66 (Jan 1961), pp. 354-377; Richard D. Challener, *Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1914* (Princeton, 1973), pp. 179-264, 270-288, 367-379.

2. See Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942* (Washington, 1953), and Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944* (Washington, 1959) in the series *United States Army in World War II*.

3. "Reports of the Operations of the China Relief Expedition, July 29 to September 1, 1900, by Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee, U.S.V., Commanding" *Annual Reports of the War Department, 1900* (Washington, 1900), I, pt. 7; Brig. Gen. A. S. Daggett, USA, *America in the China Relief Expedition* (Kansas City, Mo., 1903); Frederick Palmer, "With the Peking Relief Column," *The Century Magazine* 61 (Dec 1900), pp. 302-307.

4. "Rapport du Lt. Colonel Sezille des Essarts, Officier de Liaison pris a la 1^o D.I.U.S.," 13 Mar 1918, File 17 N 109-2, Archives of the French Military Mission with the American Army, *Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre*, Vincennes, France.

5. See esp. Gen. William W. Momyer, USAF (Ret.), *Air Power in Three Wars* (Washington, 1978).

Frank A. Kierman, Jr. (*Text, pages 183-197*)

1. This is the fourth and most relevant definition of irony in the *American Heritage Dictionary* (New York and Boston, 1969), p. 692.

2. Irving Kristol, *On the Democratic Idea in America* (New York, 1972), p. ix.

3. Germany is of course younger as a modern nation, though much older as a linguistic and cultural "nation," but it is also presently divided.

4. On Ledyard, see Richard O'Connor, *Pacific Destiny* (Boston, 1969), chap. 1, and James Kenneth Munford, ed., *John Ledyard's Journal of Captain Cook's Last Voyage* (Corvallis, 1963).

5. Richard J. Smith, *Mercenaries and Mandarins* (Millwood, 1978), pp. ix-x, xiii-iv. Also Smith, "The 'God from the West': A Chinese Perspective," in *Essex Institute Historical Collections*, 114, No. 3 (July 1978), pp. 127, 132-136. It is worth noting that Yueh Fei, China's greatest military hero, was for a while a mercenary bravo in a landlord menage, and

that one well-known student of Chinese military history speaks of him, even in his moment of glory, as commanding "semiautonomous irregulars." (Charles O. Hucker, *China's Imperial Past*, Stanford, 1975, p. 276).

6. Emory Upton, *Armies of Asia and Europe* (1878; rpt. Westport, Conn., 1968), pp. 132-136.

7. Kemp Tolley, *Yangtze Patrol* (Annapolis, 1971), pp. 13, 303-304.

8. Barbara W. Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45* (New York, 1971), p. 99.

9. The main elements of this structure were the Four Power Pact and the Five Power Naval Limitation Treaty which emerged from the Washington Conference itself, plus the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 and the codicils of the London Naval Conference, 1930.

10. Harold R. Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*, rev. ed. (Stanford, 1961) is the classic work on this period, especially chaps. 10 and 11.

11. Tuchman, p. 103; Robert D. Heintz, *Soldiers of the Sea*, (Annapolis, 1962), p. 291.

12. Heintz, p. 291.

13. Tuchman, pp. 106-107.

14. Robert Sherrod, *History of Marine Corps Aviation* (Washington, 1952), quoted in Heintz, p. 292.

15. In addition to the Germans, headed first by Colonel Max Bauer and last by General von Falkenhausen, China had an American aviation mission under Lt. Col. John Jouett from 1932 until World War II began, at which time its functions fell to Chennault's less official group. An Italian mission was also in China from 1934 until the Japanese war broke out. See Evans F. Carlson, *The Chinese Army* (1940; rpt., Westport, Conn., 1975), pp. 16-17, 46. Herbert O. Yardley, the major individual figure in U.S. twentieth century cryptography—or at least the gaudiest—also served the Nationalist government, as he retails entertainingly in the interstices of his instructive book, *The Education of a Poker Player* (New York, 1957).

16. *Red Star over China* (London, 1937); Carlson, *The Chinese Army*, and *Twin Stars of China* (1940; rpt., Westport, Conn., 1975).

17. Robert Lee Scott, Jr., *Flying Tiger: Chennault of China* (New York, 1959) is a popular biography.

18. Tuchman, p. 125.

19. *The Chindit War* (London, 1979), p. 32. Bidwell is fairly even-handed, seeing the shortcomings of his hero Orde Wingate about as clearly as he does Stilwell's.

20. Bliss K. Thorne, *The Hump* (New York, 1965).

21. Personal communication from Frederic D. Schultheis, dated 9 Aug 1980.

22. General Curtis LeMay called the B-29 "the buggiest damn airplane that ever came down the pike." LeMay with Mackinlay Cantor, *Mission with LeMay* (New York, 1965), p. 326. See also pp. 333-334, 338.

23. Laurens van der Post, *The Prisoner and the Bomb* (New York, 1971).

24. Tuchman, pp. 192, 194, 288-289, 420, 489.

25. It is not surprising that Chiang Kai-shek was a strategist out of touch with realities. His personal military experience was very limited, and after he became Generalissimo he was naturally unwilling to risk his prestige in hands-on command. During the war he rarely went to look at actual field situations, civil or military. Furthermore, his renowned tendency to violent rages and the difficult, as well as corrupt, conditions in KMT China meant that no Chinese had the courage to tell him unpalatable facts. Examples of episodes in which Americans came to know, and sometimes broke through to him with, news which his Chinese retinue had suppressed are given in Tuchman, pp. 304-307 and 514, and Theodore H. White, *In Search of History* (New York, 1978), pp. 144-156.

26. There was indeed a basis for rationalization if Chiang Kai-shek chose to assume Soviet cooperation, since Stalin had steadfastly refused to back the CCP and had regarded the KMT as the chosen vessel for revolution in China. Until the outbreak of full-scale World War II involving Russia, the Soviets had been a major source of supply for the KMT, sending it in by way of Sinkiang. And indeed, Stalin maintained the semblance of diplomatic propriety long after KMT power had lapsed: When U.S. Minister-Counselor Lewis Clark moved

to Canton to open the Embassy Office there in 1949, only Soviet Ambassador (Gen.) Nicolai Roshchin followed along. All other chiefs of mission, including U.S. Ambassador Leighton Stuart, remained in Nanking.

27. *The China White Paper* (Stanford, 1967), p. 131, quoted in O. Edmund Clubb, "Manchuria in the Balance, 1945-1946," *Pacific Historical Review*, XXVI (1957), p. 382.

28. *China White Paper*, pp. 131-132.

29. Chiang personally accepted Wedemeyer, who was an astute observer and diplomat, but Chiang obviously regarded the advice as coming from "Washington" and not necessarily representing Wedemeyer's own views.

30. Clubb, p. 381.

31. Clubb, pp. 380-384.

32. Both sides were playing devious games with the Cessation of Hostilities Order, which was put into effect 10 January 1946 and which prohibited troop movements in North China and hostilities throughout China. The Communists were certainly losers in 1946, which would not stimulate them to instant publicity; and the victorious KMT troops were trained and equipped by the U.S., which made them suspect in some KMT circles. By 1948 the Nationalists had lost Manchuria, troops, equipment, and all, which did not encourage historians based in Taiwan to celebrate the brief victory. Lin Piao's later period of ascendancy as Mao Tse-tung's heir did not coincide with a period of free activity among historians; and his still later disgrace and death furnished an even more compelling reason not to review his exploits back in the first part of the Chinese Civil War.

The one "circumstantial account" is that of Ray Huang, "Some Observations on Manchuria in the Balance, Early 1946," *Pacific Historical Review*, 27 (1958), pp. 159-167. Dr. Huang was a captain in the KMT forces in Manchuria during the campaign. A good many other works treat the fighting around Ssu-ping-kai, or at least mention it, but their stories diverge markedly. Among them are Gen. L. M. Chassin, *La conquête de la Chine par Mao Tse-tung* (Paris, 1952), pp. 78-81; Robert B. Rigg, *Red China's Fighting Hordes* (1951; rpt., Westport, Conn., 1971), pp. 130, 190-192, 254; Jacques Guillermaz, *History of the Chinese Communist Party*, trans. Anne Destenay (New York, 1972), pp. 388-389; F. F. Liu, *A Military History of Modern China: 1924-1949* (Princeton, 1956), pp. 243-244; and a translation from a KMT publication, *Military Campaigns in China: 1924-1950* (MAAG/Taipei, 1966), pp. 103-106. The author has also had the benefit of conversations with two persons, as well as Dr. Huang, who were more distant observers of the battles: Lt. Gen. Ts'ai Wen-chih, former G-3 of the Nationalist Army, and Mr. Frederic D. Schultheis, who was in 1946 a lieutenant colonel in charge of the Intelligence Division, G-2, U.S. Forces, China.

33. Huang, p. 163.

34. Huang, p. 163.

35. Huang cites a message which underlines the strategic significance of Kung-chu-ling. During the reinforcement lull of late April, "A radio message from Chiang to Cheng Tung-kuo [deputy and stand-in for KMT commander in Manchuria Tu Yü-ming]...reads: 'It is desired that you arrive at Kungchuling by April 25.' The strategic objective was directed to the mountain pass south of Changchun rather than the capital city itself." (Huang, p. 165.)

36. Chassin, *The Communist Conquest of China*, trans. T. Osato and L. Gelas (Cambridge, 1965), p. 81.

37. Guillermaz, p. 407.

38. Another translation of the quotation is S. B. Griffith, Sun Tzu: *The Art of War* (Oxford, 1963), p. 84.

39. F. A. Kierman, *The Fluke That Saved Formosa* (Cambridge, 1954). Also published in abridged form in *Harper's* magazine in 1954.

40. The fact of the treaty arrangement should not cause one to ignore the strength of Taiwan's economy, especially the agricultural sector (where the U.S.-China Joint Committee on Rural Reconstruction played a great part), the industries (many of them involved with foreign business, much of it U.S.), and the intelligent management of the island's special resources and advantages, all of which undergird its military power.

41. This and other data on the Korean conflict are from Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, *The Korean War* (Garden City, 1967), pp. 51-74.

42. What the Chinese Communists presumably thought an absolutely unmistakable signal was conveyed through the Indian ambassador in Peking, Sardar K. M. Panikkar. See Panikkar, *In Two Chinas* (London, 1955), pp. 110-111. Unfortunately, Panikkar was well known to American diplomats and was rather a figure of fun, which may have contributed to his warning's being discounted.

43. The classic treatment of this phase is S. L. A. Marshall, *The River and the Gauntlet* (New York, 1953).

44. The figures are somewhat scattered in the *New York Times* for December 1953 and January 1954, but they are pulled together in text and table in W. C. Brandbury (edited by S. M. Myers and A. D. Biderman), *Mass Behavior in Battle and Captivity* (Chicago, 1968), pp. 215-216.

45. *New York Times*, 4 Jan 1980.

46. *New York Times*, 27 Sept 1980, p. 5, column 2.

47. See the series in the *New York Times*, seven articles each beginning on the front page, 21-27 Sept 1980. There are usually supporting stories as well, generally on the continuation pages.

Sadao Asada (*Text, pages 199-219*)

1. Norman Cousins and Thomas K. Finletter, "A Beginning for Sanity," *Saturday Review of Literature*, 15 June 1946, pp. 5-9, 38-40; Martin Sherwin, *A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance* (New York, 1975); Barton J. Bernstein, "Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb, 1941-1945: A Reinterpretation," *Political Science Quarterly*, 90 (1975), pp. 23-69; "Hiroshima and Nagasaki Reconsidered: The Atomic Bombings of Japan and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1945," *University Program Modular Studies* (Morristown, N.J., 1975). For a good survey of the debate, see Bernstein, "The Atomic Bomb and American Foreign Policy, 1941-1945: An Historiographical Survey," *Peace and Change* (Spring 1974). Bernstein has also edited a handy anthology, *The Atomic Bomb: The Critical Issues* (Boston, 1976).

2. See Succinct comments in Gregg Herkin, *The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950* (New York, 1980), pp. 4-5; and Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (Boston, 1977), pp. 116, 120-121, 433. My own observations on the debate are contained in "Reisen no kigen to shūseishugi kenkyū [The Origins of the Cold War and Revisionist Studies], *Kokusai mondai*, 170 (May 1974), pp. 2-21.

3. *Washington Star*, 25 June 1980. See also Joseph Alsop, "Was the Hiroshima Bomb Necessary?" *New York Review of Books*, 23 Oct 1980, pp. 37-40. This article is a latter-day justification of President Truman's A-bomb decision but merely goes over the same old hackneyed ground without presenting any new information.

4. For a sample of visual materials that convey the human dimension of A-bomb horrors more vividly than any written record can, see Howard Shonberger, "People's Art as History: Hiroshima Survivors and the Atomic Bomb," *The Japan Interpreter*, 12 (Winter 1978), pp. 44-53. Also valuable is a sensitive psychoanalytic work by Yale psychiatrist, Robert J. Lifton, *Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima* (New York, 1967), which has been translated into Japanese.

5. I am much indebted to Mark Fitzpatrick for allowing me to draw significant findings from his excellent essay, "How Japanese View the A-Bomb Decision" (mimeographed).

6. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale*, Report on the Pacific War, No. 14 (Washington, D.C., 1947), pp. 3, 91-97.

7. "Beikoku Senryaku Bakugeki Chōsadan kara sanjūnenme no hōmon" [A Revisit Thirty Years after the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey], *Ushio*, Sept 1975, pp. 104-156.

8. Etō Jun, *Wasureta koto to wasuresaserareta koto* [What We Have Forgotten and What We Were Forced to Forget] (Tokyo, 1979); *Senkyūhyaku shijūroku-nen kempō—sono kōsoku* [The New Japanese Constitution and Its Constraints] (Tokyo, 1980).

9. John Hersey, *Hiroshima* (New York, 1946). For the Japanese-language version (Tokyo, 1949), the co-translator (who was also one of the six characters to appear in the book) wrote a "Postscript" in which he praised "the truthfulness and accuracy" of Hersey's account as well as his "humanitarian passions." For the American public's reaction to this "minor literary bombshell," see: Michael J. Yavenditti, "John Hersey and the American Conscience: the Reaction of 'Hiroshima,'" *Pacific Historical Review*, 43 (Feb 1974), pp. 24-49.

10. Staff of the Asahi Shimbun, *The Pacific Rivals: A Japanese View of Japanese-American Relations* (New York, 1972), p. 360.

11. I find it difficult to accept the far-fetched contention, vocally expressed by Professor Etō both in the United States and Japan, that the Japanese had been so thoroughly "brain-washed" or spiritually castrated by U.S. occupation censorship that even today they cling to versions of recent history imposed by the American authorities.

12. See, for example, The New York Times, *Hiroshima Plus 20* (New York, 1965), p. 81.

13. *Mainichi* newspaper, 3 Aug 1970; *Chūgoku* newspaper, 23 July 1971.

14. *U.S. News and World Report*, 21 July 1975, pp. 26-27. This article quotes the Hiroshima mayor as saying, "In some ways people have begun to forget or have forgotten the atomic bombing. There is a sense of gratitude—not resentment—toward the U.S. because we owe so much of our postwar recovery to America." Reliable data all contradict the reporter's statement that this feeling "is common even among the *hibakusha* [atomic survivors]." See also the 11 August 1975 issue, p. 50.

15. Naikaku Sōridaijin Kambō Kōhō Shitsu [Information Service Section, the Prime Minister's Secretariat], *Zenkoku yoron chōsa no genkyō*, 1972 [1972 National Public Opinion Surveys], pp. 563-564.

16. *Chūgoku* newspaper, 23 July 1971; Report on 1975 Public Opinion Survey regarding the Atomic Bomb (NHK, Hiroshima and Nagasaki Bureaus, June 1975); Summary of Findings: 1980 Public Opinion Survey regarding the Atomic Bomb (NHK, Hiroshima Bureau, June 1980).

17. Lifton, pp. 323-324.

18. *New York Times*, 3 Feb 1958.

19. *Years of Decisions*, Vol. I of *Memoirs of Harry S. Truman* (Garden City, N.Y., 1955), p. 419.

20. *Chūgoku* newspaper, ed., *Honoo no hi kara nijū-nen: Hiroshima no kiroku* [Twenty years from the Day of the Flames: The Record of Hiroshima], Vol. 2 (Tokyo, 1966), p. 197.

21. Merle Miller, *Plain Speaking: An Oral biography of Harry S. Truman* (New York, 1974), pp. 224-228.

22. Margaret Truman, *Harry S. Truman* (New York, Pocket Book edition, 1974), p. 6. Italics added.

23. Robert H. Ferrell, ed., *Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman* (New York, 1980), p. 55. These passages and other excerpts were quickly translated into Japanese and carried by the major national newspaper *Asahi* in a serialized form, attracting considerable attention. How this new information will affect Japanese perceptions of the A-bomb decision remains to be seen.

24. Cited in Bernstein, "Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb," p. 61.

25. *The Pacific Rivals*, p. 267.

26. "Hiroshima Bomb: Right or Wrong?" *Honolulu Advertiser*, 2 Aug 1965; Kawashima Takeyoshi, "Genbaku ni tsute no Amerikajin no kangae [American views on the Dropping of the A-bomb], *Hōritsu jihō*, Vol. 37, No. 12 (Nov 1965), pp. 64-65.

27. *The Pacific Rivals*, p. 267.

28. For the interesting but painstaking poll of Doshisha students, I am indebted to Mark Fitzpatrick upon whose findings I heavily drew in this and the following paragraphs.

29. (New York, 1965); The Japanese translation of excerpts from this book appeared in *Ekonomisto* [The Economist], Vol. 43, No. 36 (24 Aug 1965), pp. 72-76.

30. P. M. S. Blackett, *Fear, War and the Bomb* (New York, 1949) was originally published as *Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy* (London, 1948). Its

Japanese translation was published by the Hōsei University Press when Japan was still under American occupation.

31. Ishida Akira, *Hibaku kyōshi* [The Record of an A-Bombed Teacher] (Tokyo, 1976), p. 219.

32. Tōyama Shigeki, Imai Seiichi, and Fujiwara Akira, *Shōwashi* [A History of the Shōwa Period] (newly revised version, 1959), p. 366.

33. Rekishigaku kenkyūkai [The Historical Science Society of Japan], compiler, *Taiheiyō Sensōshi* [History of the Pacific War], Vol. 5 (Tokyo, 1972-1973), pp. 363-366.

34. Nishijima Ariatsu, *Genbaku wa naze tōka saretaka* [Why Was the Atomic Bomb Dropped?] (Tokyo, 1968), pp. 168, 335, *passim*.

35. *Asahi Evening News*, 16 Aug 1975. Italics added.

36. Shōno Naomi, Nagai Hideaki, and Ueno Hirohisa, eds., *Kaku to heiwa: Nihonji no ishiki* [The Nuclear Weapon and Peace: An investigation into Japanese Consciousness] (Kyoto, 1978), p. 40.

37. Shōno, et al., pp. 46-47, 142-143.

38. *Asahi* newspaper, 23 July 1975.

39. This and the following paragraph are based on Mark Fitzpatrick's poll conducted under my supervision.

40. "Pearl Harbor Thirty Years After—Reflections on the Pathology of War and Nationalism," a paper presented at the Fukuoka UNESCO Conference on the U. S.-Japanese Relations, August 1971. See also Telford Taylor, *Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy* (Chicago, 1970), pp. 140-143.

41. Kuroda Hidetoshi, *Nanking, Hiroshima, Auschwitz* (Tokyo, 1974), pp. 174, 228; Honda Katsuichi, *Korosareru gawa no ronri* [The Logic from the Side of Those Being Killed] (Tokyo, 1971), pp. 17, 33, 156; Nishijima, p. 333.

42. Honda, p. 152.

43. Bernstein, "Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb," p. 61.

44. *Asahi* newspaper, 5 Jan 1976; *Mainichi* newspaper, 5 Jan 1976.

45. *Mainichi Daily News*, 5 Aug 1970; Lifton, pp. 353ff.

46. (Kyoto, 1975). See also the same author's "Atomic Bomb Targeting—Myths and Realities," *Bunka shigaku* [Proceedings of the Cultural History Department, Doshisha University], No. 35 (1979), pp. 1-20. How the Hiroshima-Nagasaki survivors would react to Cary's admiration for the "great humanitarian" Stimson defies my imagination.

47. Honda, pp. 157-158.

48. Ferrell, ed., p. 56; United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Conference of Berlin (Potsdam) 1945*, Vol. 2 (Washington, D. C., 1960), p. 1373, footnote 3; Herkin, p. 345.

49. Nishijima, *passim*. In addition to his monograph, Professor Nishijima has written numerous articles in the leftist-oriented *Journal of Historical Studies* and other journals. His earlier works emphasized the American use of the A-bomb to end the war before the Soviets could enter it, but his recent efforts are devoted to show a "linkage" between the A-bomb decision and America's attempt to "roll back" the Soviet gains in Poland. His arguments are identical with those of Alperovitz which rest on inadequate evidence.

50. *Rekishigaku kenkyū*, No. 454 (Mar 1978), p. 36.

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
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
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INDEX

- ABCD Powers: 13
 Acheson, Dean
 and Chinese intervention in
 Korea: 59, 61
 China policy: 15, 42-43, 53
 Far East policy: 40-41, 56, 105
 and France, support of: 55
 Indochina policy: 50, 55
 Korea policy: 38, 222
 and Soviet control of China: 56-57,
 60
 on Soviet threat: 54-55
 Achilles, Theodore C.: 49
Action Diplomacy (Alperovitz): 208
 Adams, Brooks: 245
 Adams, Henry: 245
 Advisors
 in China: 121
 in South Vietnam: 109-115, 118,
 121
 Afghanistan, Soviet invasion of: 214
 Agency for International Develop-
 ment (AID): 112
 Aguinaldo, Emilio: 79-81, 87, 141,
 145-146
 Air bases. *See* Bases
 Air Forces
 Far East: 164-166
 Fifth: 165, 174
 Seventh: 169, 174
 Fourteenth: 187, 190
 Twentieth: 163
 Air-ground coordination: 171
 Air operations
 command and control in: 161-163,
 165-166, 168-170, 174-175, 179
 Far East experience effect on:
 160-171
 forward air controllers in: 169-170
 against Japan: 136, 189
 in Korean War: 164-167
 in Laos: 170
 limitations on: 164, 170
 strategic employment: 163-164,
 168, 179
 supremacy, maintaining: 35, 166,
 179
 tactical employment: 161-168,
 170, 179
 in Vietnam War: 68, 167-170, 179
 Airlift operations: 166, 179
 Alaska
 acquisition of: 139
 in security system: 155, 157, 177
 Alber, Harry F.: 96
 Allen, George V.: 62
 Allied Council for Japan: 95
 Alperovitz, Gar: 208, 213
 American Board of Commissioners
 for Foreign Missions: 28
American Military History: 82
 American Volunteer Group (Flying
 Tigers): 135, 187-188
American Way of War (Weigley): 90
 Amoy: 136
 Amphibious warfare doctrine: 132-133,
 173
 ANZUS Agreement: 61, 106
 Armed forces, U.S. (*see also individu-
 ally*)
 budget and personnel reductions:
 35-36
 and Far East commitment: 40
 strength in Far East: 10, 12-13,
 22-23, 31-33, 36
Armies of Asia and Europe (Upton):
 184
 Arms-control agreements: 30, 131, 153,
 185
Arms and Men (Millis): 90
 Armstrong, James: 127
 Army Air Forces. *See* United States
 Air Force
 Army Command and General Staff
 College: 116
 Army-Navy Joint Board: 26, 133,
 153-154, 156-157, 177
Army and Navy Journal: 147, 151
Army and Navy Register: 147
 Army War College: 116, 144
 Arnold, Henry H.
 and Air Force autonomy: 161-162
 and air operations against Japan:
 136

- and strategic bombing: 163
- Asahi*: 205, 207, 209-212
- Ashida cabinet: 103-104
- Asia. *See* Far East
- Asiatic Fleet, U.S. Navy: 22, 28, 31, 127, 130, 152
- Assam: 189
- Astor, John Jacob: 184
- Atcheson, George: 51, 101
- Atlantic Fleet, U.S. Navy: 173
- Atlantic theater, stress on: 31, 36, 129, 157-158
- Atomic bomb
 - American views on decision: 207
 - introduction of: 137, 162
 - Japanese views on decision: 199-219
 - Soviet acquisition: 38, 105, 163
- Atrocities
 - by Americans: 80, 83-84, 88
 - by Filipinos: 80
- Australia
 - alliance with: 106
 - Communist threat to: 63
 - in security system: 59, 61
- Austria, economic assistance to: 234
- B-24 aircraft: 189
- B-28 aircraft: 136, 162-164, 189
- B-52 aircraft: 169
- Badger, Oscar: 40
- Bangladesh, economic assistance to: 233
- Bao Dai: 49-50, 55-58
- Barbey, Daniel E.: 191-192
- Barrows, Leland: 112
- Bases
 - in China: 39-40, 128-130, 135, 189-190
 - in Cuba: 139
 - in Far East: 38
 - in Hawaii: 140, 152
 - in Japan: 36, 38, 40, 55, 61, 101, 105
 - in Marianas: 130, 136, 163, 189
 - mobile: 132
 - in Okinawa: 36, 38, 46, 55, 128
 - in Pacific theater: 46, 55
 - in Philippines: 12, 23, 26, 28-30, 36, 40, 46, 129-130, 140-141, 152
 - in Samoa: 139
 - in South Korea: 39
- Bataan Peninsula: 152, 154
- Batangas Province: 81, 146
- Bell, Daniel: 10
- Berlin blockade (1948): 100, 163
- Bernstein, Barton J.: 199
- Bidwell, Shelford: 188
- Bikini incident (1954): 203
- Bismarck Sea, battle of: 162
- BLACK Plan: 130, 152
- Blackett, P. M. S.: 208, 213
- Blechman, Barry M.: 137
- Bliss, Tasker H.: 150
- Boer War (1899-1902): 147
- Bolté, Charles L.: 149-150
- Bomber aircraft. *See* Strategic operations; *also by designation Bombing operations. See* Strategic operations
- Bonifacio, Andres: 87
- Bonin Islands: 128
- Booth, Ewing E.: 155-156
- Borton, Hugh: 101
- Boxer Rebellion (1900): 22-24, 141-142, 148, 172, 178, 184-185
- Bradley, Omar N.: 59
- Brazil, economic assistance to: 233-234
- Brown, Harold: 195-196
- Bryan, William Jennings: 24, 80, 82
- Bud Dajo: 178
- Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department: 27, 70, 82
- Burma, independence proclaimed: 48
- Burma Road: 187
- Burt, Reynolds J.: 149-150
- Butler, Smedley D.: 173, 186
- Butterfield, Herbert: 216
- Byrnes, James F.: 49

- C-46, C-47, C-54 and C-87 aircraft: 189
- Cairo Conference (1943): 135
- Cairo Declaration (1943): 34, 93, 226
- Cambodia. *See* Kampuchea
- Canton incident (1856): 172
- Cargo aircraft. *See by designation*
- Caribbean theater
- Army garrison in: 139, 142
 - casualties in: 22
 - interests in: 130
 - U.S. policy in: 21
- Carlson, Evans F.: 187
- Caroline Islands: 133, 152
- Carter, Jimmy, and withdrawal from Korea: 67, 74, 227
- Cary, Otis: 212
- Cavite naval base: 152
- Censorship, in Japan: 203
- Central America. *See* Latin America; *also individual country*
- Central Highlands, RVN: 112
- Central Intelligence Agency, U.S.: 65-66
- Ceylon, independence proclaimed: 48
- Chaffee, Adna R.: 148, 151
- Challener, Richard: 140
- Changchun: 192-194
- Chassin, L. M.: 194
- Chengtou valley: 189
- Chennault, Claire L.: 135, 187-188
- Chiang Kai-shek
- Communists, relations with: 186, 190, 194
 - demands for support of: 50-53
 - as head of state: 33, 35, 37, 43, 53, 55, 137, 173, 238
 - military assistance to. *See* China, military assistance to
 - military assistance to military plans: 241-242
 - professional qualifications: 188-189, 242
 - Stilwell, relations with: 188, 242
 - and supplies hoarding: 190
- Chief of Staff, U.S. Army: 144
- China (*see also* Chiang Kai-shek; Far East; Mao Tse-tung)
- advisors in: 121
 - air operations in: 135
 - Americans attacked in: 186
 - aversion to war: 19
 - balance of power, role in: 14-15
 - bases in: 39-40, 128-130, 135, 189-190
 - Boxer Rebellion: 22-24, 141-142, 148, 172, 178, 184-185
 - civil war in: 42, 50-51
 - commitment in: 27, 184-186
 - Communist control established: 105, 163, 194
 - Communist-Kuomintang conflict: 185-187, 190
 - economic assistance to: 37, 42, 233-234
 - German military assistance to: 187
 - guerrilla warfare in: 135-136
 - human sea assaults: 193, 195
 - interests and influence in: 12, 15, 23, 37, 129, 140, 151, 195-196
 - investments in: 26, 30, 37
 - and Japan occupation: 95
 - Japan, relations with: 107
 - Japan as threat to: 148, 185
 - Japan, wars with: 30-31, 150, 156, 185, 220
 - Japanese demands on: 185
 - Japanese independence, reaction to: 106
 - Japanese reparations proposed: 99
 - Kampuchea supported by: 195
 - Korean War, effect on policy: 15
 - Korean War, intervention in: 59-61, 66, 164, 194-195
 - Kuomintang rule: 186-187
 - Manchuria, KMT-CCP conflict in: 191-194
 - Marine Corps commitment to: 186, 192

- Marine Corps withdrawal: 31
- Marshall mission to: 42, 51, 137, 190
- military assistance to: 13, 31, 40, 50-51, 53, 61, 194-196, 232
- missionaries in: 24-25
- North Vietnam recognized by: 57
- Open Door doctrine: 23, 25-26, 129, 132, 140
- pilots, training by U.S.: 13
- policy on: 25, 30, 33, 40-42, 50-52, 56, 129
- political and social values: 9-10, 17-18, 118, 183, 239, 245
- postwar plans for: 35, 50-51
- power, concept of use: 238-239
- as priority target: 136-137
- prisoners of war disaffection from: 195
- recognition denied by U.S.: 60
- in security system: 16, 129, 134, 136, 195-196
- Soviet alliance with: 38, 53, 56-57
- Soviet interest and influence in: 26, 53-55
- Soviet military assistance to: 186
- Soviet relations with: 15-16, 194-195
- Stilwell mission to: 118, 185, 187-188, 190
- supply to: 187, 189-191
- threat to Far East: 38-39, 41, 51-54, 56, 58, 60, 62, 64-65
- trade with: 37, 183-184
- training programs: 187, 190
- United Front failure: 185-187
- U.N. membership rejected: 60
- U.S. Army garrison in: 139, 148-150, 153, 156, 185
- Viet Cong support by: 195
- withdrawal from: 31, 150, 156, 173
- China Relief Expedition (1900): 22-24, 141-142, 148, 172, 178, 184-185
- China White Paper (1949): 39, 53-54, 191, 194
- Chindits: 190
- Chinese Army* (Carlson): 187
- Chinwangtao: 150, 192
- Chou En-lai: 137, 186
- Chugoku*: 204
- Chun, General: 226
- Churchill, Winston: 32
- Citizen-soldiers, combat effectiveness: 178
- Civic action, in Philippines: 84, 146
 - Military authority, military deference to. *See* Civil-military relations
- Civil government
 - in Far East: 34, 40-41
 - Navy role in: 34, 40
 - in Philippines: 80-81, 84, 116, 146
 - in South Korea: 228-229
 - in South Vietnam: 109-110
 - training programs: 118
- Civil Guard, RVN: 11-112
- Civil-military relations (*see also* Military government)
 - on Far East: 23-24, 32, 34, 40-41
 - in Japan: 241
 - on Philippines: 27, 84-85
 - in South Korea: 220-221, 224, 226-229, 241
 - in United States: 73-74, 178
- Clay, Lucius D.: 100
- Clay, Lucius D. Jr.: 175
- Clifford Report (1946): 39
- Close air support. *See* Tactical air support
- Cohen, Theodore: 96
- Cohen, Warren: 15
- Colombia, economic assistance to: 233-234
- Colonialism
 - end of: 47-48
 - expansion of: 129
- Combined Chiefs of Staff: 134-135
- Command and control (*see also* Unity of command)

- in air operations: 161-163, 165-166, 168-170, 174-175, 179
- in Far East: 36
- in Philippines: 69
- in South Vietnam: 112-113
- Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Agresion: 31
- Communications systems: 145
- Congress, and Vietnam War: 75
- Connally, Tom: 53
- Connor, William D.: 149
- Construction programs: 145
- Cook, James: 183
- Cooke, Charles: 40
- Corregidor Island: 130, 152, 154-156
- Costa Rica: 98
- Council on Foreign Relations: 33-34
- Counter-insurgency: 111. *See also* Guerrilla warfare
- Cousins, Norman: 199
- Cuba
 - bases in: 139
 - cession by Spain: 128
 - independence movement: 21
 - military government in: 85
 - policy on: 70, 178
 - U.S. Army garrison in: 142
- Czechoslovakia, Soviet invasion of: 15, 163

- Dairen: 191-192
- Day, William R.: 23
- Decker, Benjamin: 40
- De Gaulle, Charles: 48
- Demobilization, demands for: 35
- Democratic People's Republic of Korea. *See* North Korea
- Democratic Republic of Vietnam. *See* North Vietnam
- Denby, Charles: 24
- Deportations, from Philippines: 84
- Dewey, George: 22-23, 28, 79, 128-129, 141, 172
- Diem, Ngo Dinh
 - commanders, control of: 113
 - defense policies: 112
 - Eisenhower support of: 64
 - as head of government: 109, 111
- Dien Bien Phu: 195
- Dobbin, James C.: 127
- Dodge, Joseph M.: 103-104
- DOG Plan: 31
- Doolittle, James H.: 161-162, 189
- Dooman, Eugene H.: 94
- Doshisha University: 201, 207-208, 210, 218-219
- Draper, William H.: 101-103
- Dulles, John Foster
 - on alliances obligations: 62
 - on Communist-controlled unions: 60
 - on Communist threat: 63
 - Hirohito, relations with: 107
 - and Japan, peace treaty with: 106
 - and Japan, security of: 106
 - on nationalism as Soviet device: 63
 - and South Korea commitment: 42
 - and South Vietnam: 110, 115
 - and Taiwan regime: 107
- Dunn, Frederick: 101
- Dunne, Finley Peter: 22, 28
- Durbrow, Elbridge: 112
- Dyke, Ken R.: 95

- Early warning systems, stress on: 167, 170
- East Asia. *See* Far East; also individual nations
- East India Squadron, U.S. Navy: 176
- East Liao River: 193
- Eckstein, Alexander: 10
- Economic assistance (*see also* Military assistance)
 - to China: 37, 42
 - to Bangladesh: 233
 - to Far East: 37, 233-234
 - to India: 233-234
 - to Indochina: 58
 - to Indonesia: 233-234
 - to Japan: 37, 102, 234
 - to Latin America: 233-234
 - to Middle East: 233-234

- to Pakistan: 233-234
- to Philippines: 37, 233
- to South Korea: 37, 43, 221-222, 224, 233-234
- to South Vietnam: 233-234
- to Western Europe: 42, 100, 233-234
- Economic Stabilization Board: 103-104
- Educators, and Far East commitment: 41
- Egypt, economic assistance to: 233-234
- Eichelberger, Robert L.: 95, 105
- Eighth Army, U.S.: 165
- Eisenhower, Dwight D.
 - and armed forces reduction: 36
 - on Communist influence in Indochina: 63
 - on Communist threat: 62-63
 - defense policies: 109-110
 - Diem, support of: 64
 - on dominoes concept: 63, 68
 - on Indochina partition: 64
 - and South Korea: 225
 - and South Vietnam, 64, 109
- Elko, Nevada: 32
- Ellis, Peter: 173
- Ellsberg, Daniel: 90
- Elysee Agreements (1949): 49-50
- Embick, Stanley D.: 154-157
- Engineer operations: 145
- England. *See* United Kingdom
- Erasmus: 118
- Eto Jun: 92-93, 107, 203, 214-215
- European theater, as priority: 157, 159-160

- F-100 and F-105 aircraft: 167
- Faku-Pamienchieh highway: 192
- Far East (*see also individual country*)
 - bases in: 38
 - casualties in: 22
 - civil governments in: 34, 40-41
 - civil-military relations on: 23-24, 34, 40-41
 - commitment to: 9-10, 17, 20-40, 43, 54-55, 69-73, 177
 - Communist threat to: 72, 137-138
 - criticisms of policy in: 42-43, 73
 - interest and influence in: 12-15, 19, 21-26, 29, 32, 35-38, 151, 177
 - political and social values in: 9-11, 17-19, 62, 237-239, 245-246
 - postwar plans for: 33-36
 - power, concept of: 237-238
 - in security system: 16, 41, 55-56, 61-62, 70
 - Western concept of: 11-12, 237-239, 245-249
- Far East Squadron, U.S. Navy: 127
- Far Eastern Commission: 95, 101-102
- Fear, War and the Bomb* (Blackett): 208
- Field Service Regulations* (1905-10): 146-147
- Fighter aircraft. *See by designation*
- Fine, Sherwood M.: 96
- Flexible response doctrine: 167
- Flying Tigers (American Volunteer Group): 135, 187-188
- Foochow: 135
- Foot, Morris C.: 151
- Force Without War* (Blechman-Kaplan): 137
- Ford, Gerald R.: 109-110
- Foreign Policy Association: 33-34
- Formosa. *See* Taiwan
- Forrest, Nathan Bedford: 238
- Forrestal, James V.: 38, 46
- Fort McKinley: 148
- Forward air controllers: 169-170
- Fosdick, Raymond B.: 55
- Four Power Pact (1921): 131
- France
 - alliance with: 61
 - economic assistance to: 58, 61, 233-234
 - Far East, interests in: 128-129
 - and Indochina policy: 48-50

- military assistance to: 50, 57-59, 61, 65
 - support of in Indochina: 55, 58, 65, 73
 - withdrawal from Indochina: 110
- Franck Report: 216
- Franklin, Benjamin: 184
- Funston, Frederick: 80

- Gaddis, John L.: 15
- Gallipoli campaign (1915-16): 133
- Gates, John M.: 116, 141
- General Board, U.S. Navy: 26, 28, 130-132
- General Staff, U.S. Army: 26-27, 144, 150, 155-156, 158, 178
- Geneva Accords (1954): 64, 109-110
- Germany
 - as Axis partner: 13, 31
 - China, military assistance to: 187
 - economic recovery: 100
 - Far East, interests in: 128-129, 151
 - military government in: 100
 - occupation policies: 93-94, 100
 - Pacific bases: 152
 - plans against incursions by: 152
- Gibney, Frank: 16
- Gobi Desert: 135
- Grants. *See* Economic assistance
- Great Britain. *See* United Kingdom
- Great White Fleet, U.S. Navy: 130
- Greece
 - civil war in: 100
 - military assistance to: 43, 100, 232
- Grew, Joseph C.: 94, 97
- Gross national product, defense allotment: 36
- Groves, Leslie R.: 212
- Guam
 - bases in: 163
 - cession by Spain: 131, 139
 - defense plans: 131-132
 - deportations to: 84
 - as naval base: 130
- Guantanamo Bay naval base: 139

- Guerrilla warfare (*see also* Counter-insurgency warfare)
 - in China: 135-136
 - Japanese plans for: 93
 - in Korean War: 111
 - Navy-led: 135-136
 - in Philippines: 80-81, 84, 87, 116, 140, 145-146
 - in South Vietnam: 109, 111-113
- Gunther, John: 95-96

- Hague Convention: 92
- Hall, John W.: 211, 216
- Halsey, William F.: 32, 133, 137
- Hamilton, Alexander: 245
- Hamilton, Louis McLane: 147
- Hangchow: 9
- Harding, Warren G.: 31
- Harris surveys: 207
- Hattori Takushiro: 104
- Hawaii
 - annexed by U.S.: 22, 139
 - Army garrison in: 139
 - bases in: 140, 152
 - Japanese threat to: 130
 - in security system: 152, 155, 157, 177
- Hay, John: 23, 27, 40, 129
- Helicopters, Army use: 159, 169
- Henderson, Loy W.: 57
- Henry, Guy V.: 154
- Hersey, John: 203
- Hill, J. Lister: 33
- Himalayas Hump: 187, 189
- Hirohito, Emperor of Japan: 94, 98, 107
- Hiroshima: 137, 162, 199-219
- Hiroshima* (Hersey): 203
- Hiroshima World Friendship Center: 212
- Historians, neglect of Philippines
 - insurrection: 82, 116
- History of the Pacific War*: 208
- Hitler, Adolf: 155
- Ho Chi Minh (*see also* Indochina: North Vietnam)
 - anti-colonialism of: 47

- and independence movement:
 - 48-50
 - political objectives: 68
 - support of proposed: 65, 73
 - as threat: 55
- Ho Chi Minh Trail: 170
- Hofstadter, Richard: 216
- Hokkaido Island: 100
- Honda Katsuichi: 211-212
- Hong Kong, trade with: 37
- Hoover, Herbert: 30
- Hopkins, Samuel: 11
- Hornbeck, Stanley K.: 60
- Horse Marines: 173
- Hulutao: 192
- Human sea assaults: 193, 195
- Huntington, Samuel P.: 85, 116
- Hurley, Patrick J. : 42, 50-51
- Hydrogen bomb test (1954): 203

- Ikeda Hayato: 104
- Ikeda-Robertson talks (1953): 106
- In Search of History* (White): 242
- India
 - economic assistance to: 233-234
 - independence proclaimed: 48
- Indian Ocean, interests in: 246

- Indian wars lessons: 140, 159
- Indochina (*see also* Ho Chi Minh; North Vietnam; South Vietnam)
 - Communist control as threat: 54-55, 58, 63
 - economic assistance to: 58
 - French policy on: 48-50
 - French withdrawal from: 110
 - independence movement: 49
 - Japanese invasion of: 13
 - military assistance to: 58-59, 65
 - partition of: 64
 - policy on: 41, 56-58, 65
 - political and social values: 18
 - in security system: 61
 - studies of: 248
- Indochina War: 109. *See also* France
- Indonesia
 - economic assistance to: 233-234
 - independence proclaimed: 48
 - in security system: 59
- Infantry and Cavalry School: 144
- Infantry Drill Regulations* (1904, 1911): 146
- Inoki Masamichi: 214
- Inspector General, U.S. Army: 144
- Institute of Pacific Relations: 9, 33, 41, 94
- Interior, Department of the: 127
- Investments in Far East: 37
- Iran, lack of knowledge of: 196
- Israel, economic and military assistance to: 232-234
- Italy
 - as Axis partner: 13, 31
 - economic assistance to: 233-234
- Iwo Jima, bases in: 38

- Japan (*see also* Far East)
 - air operations against: 136, 161-163, 189
 - alliance with Britain: 129-132
 - alliance with United States: 61, 106, 159, 203
 - atomic bomb decision, views on: 199-219
 - aversion to war: 19, 98
 - as Axis partner: 13, 31
 - bases in: 36, 38, 40, 55, 61, 101, 105
 - capital ships, limitation on: 30, 131, 153
 - casualties: 135
 - censorship in: 203
 - China bases: 153
 - China, demands on: 185
 - China, relations with: 107
 - China, wars with: 30-31, 150, 156, 185, 220
 - civil-military relations in: 241
 - commitment in: 12-128, 172, 185
 - constitution, formulation of: 97-98
 - criticism of occupation policies: 102
 - demilitarization of: 35, 47, 101, 104, 107

democratic reforms in: 17, 46, 92, 95-97
 discrimination against: 26, 210
 economic assistance to: 37, 102, 234
 economic blockade against: 13, 31, 136
 economic recovery: 37, 98-104
 Emperor status: 94, 98, 107
 Far East policy of: 14, 130, 151
 guerrilla warfare plans: 93
 independence, foreign reaction to: 106
 Indochina invaded by: 13
 invasion of planned: 137, 189
 Korea as colony of: 130, 185, 220-221, 240-241
 Korean forces, influence on: 240
 Korean War, effect on: 104-105
 Liaotung Peninsula lease: 185
 and Manchuria incident: 9-10, 30, 155
 Maritime Security Force: 106
 military assistance to: 61
 missionaries in: 25, 31
 National Police Reserve, 105-106
 nationalism, return to: 93
 naval rivalry and expansion: 13-14, 17, 21, 26, 30, 131-133, 177
 Navy and merchant marine, defeat of: 189-190
 neutralist policy: 104-105
 nobility, abolition of: 97
 nuclear weapons policy: 16, 92, 200, 203-204, 213-215
 occupation period: 15, 43, 92-108, 121
 Pacific bases: 133, 136
 Pacific fortifications, moratorium on: 153
 Pacific, interests in: 128, 152-153
 peace treaty with: 101, 104, 106, 203
 Perry mission to: 127-128, 172, 185
 Philippines invaded by: 18
 political and social values: 10, 18-19, 118
 postwar plans for: 33-35, 93
 power, concept of: 238-239
 rearmament: 15, 61, 98, 102, 104-106
 relations with: 15, 17, 26, 30-33, 37-40, 151
 reparations by proposed: 99, 102
 Russia, war with: 26-27, 130, 178, 185
 Ryukyus annexation by: 185
 sanctions against: 13, 31, 136
 SCAP staff in: 95-96
 in security system: 16, 39, 56, 59, 67, 98, 100-101, 104-107, 223
 Self-Defense Forces: 106
 Shantung Peninsula seizure: 185
 Soviet demands on: 100
 studies of: 248
 surrender by: 92-94
 Taiwan annexation: 185
 Taiwan, relations with: 107
 as threat to China: 148, 185
 as threat to Far East: 46, 130-132, 151-153
 as threat to Hawaii: 130
 as threat to Philippines: 122, 130
 trade with: 25, 37, 103
 training programs: 136
 United Nations policy on: 95
 United States Army in: 36, 106
 Vietnam War, effect on: 204, 211
 war, renunciation of: 19, 98
 war criminals treatment: 97
 Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK): 201, 205, 214
 Jefferson, Thomas: 184
 Jenner, William E.: 137
 Jessup, Philip: 41, 57
 Johnson, Hugh S.: 150
 Johnson, Louis A.: 40
 Johnson, Lyndon B.: 237
 Johnson, Richard: 147
 Johnston, Percy H.: 101-102

- Joint Chiefs of Staff
 - air power use by: 163
 - and Chiang support: 51
 - on combat effectiveness essentials: 115
 - and Emperor of Japan status: 94
 - and Far East bases: 36
 - and Far East, threats to: 38
 - and Germany, occupation of: 100
 - and Japan bases: 36
 - and Japanese mandated islands: 46
 - and Japanese security: 39
 - and Korean War: 59
 - Korea policy: 222
 - and Pacific theater operations: 136-137
 - postwar planning: 34, 39
 - reorganization and legal status: 41
 - and reserves mobilization: 74
 - and South Vietnam: 110
- Joint Soviet-American Commission
 - on Korea: 47
- Jones, John Paul: 184
- Jordan, economic and military assistance to: 232-233
- Kades, Charles: 96-97, 102, 117
- Kampuchea
 - alliance with: 61
 - Chinese support of: 195
 - military assistance to: 232
 - North Vietnam threat to: 65, 68
- Kanazawa: 209
- Kaplan, Stephen S.: 137
- Katayama cabinet: 104-105
- Kearny, Lawrence: 129
- Keelung naval base: 128
- Kennan, George F.
 - and Chiang collapse: 52
 - on commitment to Far East: 54-55
 - and Communist control of China: 52
 - and Japan, occupation of: 101
 - and Japan, reparations by: 99
 - and Japan, security of: 39
- Kennedy, John F.
 - and South Korea: 226
 - and South Vietnam: 109
- Kennedy, George C.: 161-163
- Khe Sanh, battle of: 174
- Kiangsi Province: 187
- Kiaochow naval base: 129
- Killen, James S.: 96
- Kim Il Sung: 47
- Kimball, William Wirt: 131
- Kimble, William Warren: 128-129
- King, Ernest J.
 - and air operations against Japan: 136
 - and China as target: 136
 - on Navy war plans: 133
 - and Pacific theater, plans for: 134, 136-137
- King, William L. MacKenzie: 211-212
- Kingkiatun: 193
- Kipling, Rudyard: 70
- Kissinger, Henry A.: 15-17
- Konoye, Fumimaro: 32
- Korea (*see also* Korean War; North Korea; South Korea)
 - independence movement: 93, 220
 - interests in: 221-222
 - as Japanese colony: 130, 185, 220-221, 240-241
 - partition of: 47, 221-222, 226
 - in security system: 61
- Korean War
 - air operations in: 164-167
 - antecedents: 137
 - China policy, influence on: 15
 - Chinese intervention: 59-61, 66, 164, 194-195
 - cost of: 61, 225
 - Japan, effect on: 104-105
 - objectives and lessons in: 66-67
 - Soviet intervention: 59
 - United Nations action on: 59
- Kristol, Irving: 183
- Krueger, Walter: 156-157
- Kung-chu-ling: 193-194
- Kwang-chou-wan: 189
- Kwangju rebellion (1980): 229
- Kwangshu Bay naval base: 129
- Kyoto: 212

- Kyushu, planned invasion of: 189
- Language barrier in South Vietnam: 114
- Language schools: 93
- Laos
 - air operations in: 170
 - alliance with: 61
 - military assistance to: 232
 - North Vietnam threat to: 65, 68
- Lashio: 187
- Lassiter, William: 154, 156
- Latin America: 16 (*See also individual country*)
- Lattimore, Owen: 41, 55-56
- Lea, Homer: 245
- Leahy, William D.: 33, 137
- Ledyard, John: 183-184
- Lewis and Clark expedition: 184
- Lexington*, USS: 132
- Leyte Gulf, battle of: 189
- Liaotung Peninsula, lease by Japan: 185
- Lifton, Robert J.: 205
- Limited war concept: 159
- Lin Piao: 192-193
- Lines of communications, safeguarding: 35, 132
- Logistical operations
 - Army: 145, 157
 - in Pacific theater: 152-153
- Louisiana Purchase: 184
- Luce, Henry R.: 35
- Luna, Antonio: 87
- Luzon, operations in: 79, 145
- Lynch, George A.: 150
- MacArthur, Arthur: 23, 27, 84, 116, 146
- MacArthur, Douglas
 - and air operations: 136, 161-162, 165
 - and Allied Council: 95
 - on China-Soviet intervention in Korea: 59
 - and Chinese intervention: 194-195
 - and democratic reforms: 17, 46
 - and demilitarization: 104
 - dismissal by Truman: 107
 - Emperor, relations with: 94, 107
 - as Far East commander: 36, 40, 117, 121
 - Far East experience: 118-119
 - Far East, stress on: 119-120
 - Filipinos, relations with: 119
 - on Formosa security: 59
 - and Inchon operation: 66
 - and Japanese constitution: 98
 - Japanese officials, relations with: 37, 103, 119
 - in Korean War: 225
 - as naval planner: 120
 - and news media: 42
 - occupation policies: 43, 93-97, 102, 121
 - and peace treaty: 101, 104
 - personal characteristics: 95-96, 119
 - and Philippines defense: 155-156
 - and Philippines as priority target: 137
 - and rearmament: 98, 102
 - SCAP staff: 95-96, 117
 - and security forces: 105-106
 - single-thrust concept: 134-135
 - and South Korea: 38, 105
 - war aims: 32
- Mahan, Alfred Thayer: 24, 26, 28, 30, 70, 128, 130, 140, 245
- Mainichi*: 204
- Malaya campaign (1941): 248
- Malolos: 79
- Manchuria
 - Japanese interest in: 130
 - KMT-CCP conflict in: 191-194
 - Russian interest in: 26, 38, 46
 - Soviet occupation of: 191-192
- Manchuria incident (1931): 9-10, 30, 155
- Manila, 22-23, 79, 145, 152
 - battle of (1898): 22, 79, 128, 141, 172, 177
 - defense measures: 152, 154-155
- Mao Tse-tung: 37, 50

- anti-colonialism: 47
- effect on U.S. military expenditures: 58
- and Long March: 187
- as military-political leader: 238
- power, concept of: 239
- and Soviet alliance: 57, 194
- Soviet influence on: 62
- as threat to Far East: 53
- Mariana Islands
 - bases in: 130, 163, 189
 - as German base: 152
 - as Japanese base, 133, 136
- Maritime Security Force, Japan: 106
- Marquat, William F.: 95
- Marshall, George C.
 - and air operations against Japan: 136
 - on Chiang survival: 52
 - in China garrison: 149, 185
 - China policy: 52
 - Indochina policy: 49
 - mission to China: 42, 51, 137, 190
 - in Philippines: 147
 - Stilwell evaluated by: 188
 - vilification of: 137
- Marshall Islands, as German base: 152
- Marshall Plan: 42, 100
- Masan riots (1979): 229
- Masao, Maruyama: 92
- Matsumoto Takuo: 212
- May, Henry: 11
- Mazour, Anatole G.: 216
- McCarthy, Joseph R.: 43, 137
- McCormack, John W.: 43
- McHugh, James: 40
- McKinley, William
 - commanders, relations with: 32
 - on Pacific as frontier: 140
 - and Philippines: 22-25, 28-29, 79-80, 84, 141
- McNamara, Robert S.: 237
- Medical services: 145
- Men and Nations* (Mazour-Peoples): 216
- Merchant marine, U.S.: 127-128, 176-177
- Merrill's Marauders: 190
- Merritt, Wesley: 23
- Meuse-Argonne campaign (1918): 178
- Mexico, policy toward: 178
- Michigan State University: 111-112
- Middle East, commitment in: 16
- Midway Island, acquisition of: 139
- Miles, Milton E.: 135-136
- Miles, Nelson A.: 139, 142-144
- Military assistance (*see also* Economic assistance)
 - to China: 13, 31, 40, 40-51, 53, 61, 194-196, 232
 - in Far East: 61
 - to Greece: 43, 100, 232
 - to Indochina: 58-59, 65
 - to Israel: 232
 - to Japan: 61
 - to Jordan: 232
 - to Kampuchea: 232
 - to Laos: 232
 - to Philippines: 59
 - to South Korea: 61, 223-225, 229, 232
 - to South Vietnam: 61, 109-110, 112, 232
 - to Spain: 232
 - to Third World: 115
 - to Turkey: 43, 100, 232
- Military attachés: 27
- Military government
 - in Cuba: 85
 - in Germany: 100
 - in Philippines: 70, 80, 83-85, 122-123, 146
 - in Puerto Rico: 85
 - in South Korea: 22
 - in World War II: 70
- Military history, neglect of: 116
- Military Intelligence Division, WDGS: 27
- Millis, Walter: 90
- Milne Bay, air operations in: 162

- Mindanao Province: 116
 Missile systems, stress on: 167
 Missionaries: 24-25, 28, 30-31, 41
 Momyer, William W.: 174
 Monroe, James: 129
 Monroe Doctrine: 140
 Morgenthau, Henry Jr.: 31, 93-94
 Moros: 27
 Morris, Robert: 183
 Moscow conference (1945): 47, 226
 Mukden: 192-194
 Murrow, Edward R.: 205
 Mussolini, Benito: 155
 My Lai incident: 24
 Myitkyina: 189
- Nagai Yonosuke: 213
 Nagasaki: 137, 162, 199-219
 Naha, Okinawa: 128
 Nanking: 186, 194
National Geographic: 69
 National Police Reserve, Japan: 105-106
 National security. *See* Security system
 National Security Council
 and Communist China threat: 52, 65
 and Far East security: 55
 and Japan occupation: 101-102
 and Japan, security of: 105
 on Southeast Asia objectives: 62
 staff development: 41
 on Soviet threat: 58
 and threats to Far East: 39
 Nationalism movements: 47-48
 Naval Act (1916): 131
 Naval attachés: 28
 Naval bases. *See* Bases
 Naval forces in Far East: 21, 28, 30-31, 36
 Naval Group China: 135
 Naval War Board: 22
 Naval War College: 28, 133
Naval War College Review: 120
 Naylor, William K.: 149
 Nenninger, Timothy K.: 144
- Netherlands, economic assistance to: 234
 Netherlands East Indies: 18
 New England maneuvers (1902): 144
 New Guinea, air operations in: 161
 New York Chamber of Commerce: 21
New York Times
 China coverage: 21, 29, 42, 60
 Far East coverage: 32
 Philippines coverage: 23, 69
 New Zealand
 alliance with: 106
 Communist threat to: 63
 in security system: 59, 61
 News media (*see also* New York Times; News media)
 and Far East commitment: 23-24, 29, 31, 34, 41-42
 South Vietnam coverage: 110
Newsweek: 102
 Nimitz, Chester W.: 32
 and Navy war plans: 133
 Pacific theater, plans for: 136-137
 and Philippines as priority target: 136-137
 Nippon Hoso Kyokai (NHK): 201, 205, 214
 Nixon, Richard M.
 and China, relations with: 15-16
 on Communist China as threat: 63
 Far East policy: 227
 Vietnamization policy: 109-110
 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): 168-171
 North Korea
 armed forces of: 231, 235-236
 independence proclaimed: 47
 South invaded by: 59, 65, 105, 164, 221-222, 224
 Soviet commitment and withdrawal: 38, 47, 222
 threat to South: 229
 North Vietnam (*see also* Ho Chi Minh; Indochina; Vietnam War)
 air-defense weapons: 168

- China, recognition by: 57
 infiltration in South: 113
 sanctuaries use by: 68, 170
 Soviet, recognition by: 57
 as threat to security: 64, 68
 as threat to South: 68
 underestimation of: 74
 unification campaign: 15
Now It Can Be Told (Groves): 212
- Nuclear weapons
 effect on warfare: 90
 Japanese policy on: 16, 92, 200,
 203-204, 213-215
 reliance on: 167
 South Korea potential: 241
 Soviet acquisition: 38, 105, 163,
 203
- O'Daniel, John W.: 108
 Office of Naval Intelligence: 28
 Office of Occupied Areas, Navy
 Department: 34, 40
 Office of Strategic Services: 48
 Okayama: 209
 Okinawa
 bases in: 36, 38, 46, 55, 128
 in security system: 56, 105
 seizure by U.S.: 137
 separation from Japan: 61
 OLYMPIC Operation: 189
 Open Door doctrine: 23, 25-26, 129
 132, 140
 ORANGE Plan: 130-131, 133-134,
 152, 154-158, 173, 177
Organization and Tactics (Wagner):
 147
 Organizations, private: 41
 Osmeña, Sergio: 119
 O'Sullivan, James L.: 49
 Otis, Elwell S.: 83-84
- P-40 aircraft: 188
 Pacific Fleet, U.S. Navy: 13
 Pacific theater
 Army service and strength in:
 139-159
 bases in: 46, 55
 casualties in: 32
 fortifications, moratorium on:
 153-155
 interests in: 127, 245
 lines of communication in: 35
 logistical problems: 130, 153
 Navy role in: 127-138, 140, 246
 as U.S. frontier: 139-140
 war plans for. *See* ORANGE Plan;
 RAINBOW Plans
 Pago Pago naval base: 139
 Pakistan, economic assistance to:
 233-234
 Panama Canal, in security system:
 29, 139, 152, 154-155, 157
 Park Chung-hee: 221, 226, 228-229
 Park, Robert E.: 9-12, 17-19
 Pauley Report: 99
 Pearl Harbor
 attack on: 31-32, 93, 134, 162,
 206
 conference at (1944): 137
 as naval base: 28, 139, 152
 Peking, relief of: 22-23, 148, 172,
 178, 185
 Pelz, Stephen: 13
 Pempell, T. J.: 214
Pentagon Papers: 90
People and a Nation (Hofstadter-Ver
 Steeg): 216
 Peoples, John M.: 216
 Perry, Matthew C.: 127-128, 172,
 185
 Pershing, John J.: 27, 153, 178
 Persian Gulf theater: 121
 Pescadores Islands, policy on: 55
 Philippine Constabulary: 81, 148
*Philippine Insurrection Against the
 United States*: 82
 Philippine Scouts: 81
 Philippines (*see also* Far East)
 air operations in: 162
 alliance with: 61-62, 106
 Army service and strength in: 36,
 139, 142

atrocities in: 80, 83-84, 88
 bases in: 13, 23, 26, 28-30, 36,
 40, 46, 129-130, 133, 140-141,
 152
 cession by Spain: 79, 81, 128,
 131, 133, 139
 civic-action programs in: 84
 civil government in: 80-81, 84,
 116
 civil-military relations in: 27,
 84-85
 collaborationists in: 85-86
 criticism of policy on: 88-89
 defense measures: 130-133, 148,
 152, 154-158
 deportations from: 84
 economic assistance to: 37, 233
 factionalism among revolutionaries:
 86-87
 garrison life in: 147-148
 guerrilla warfare in: 80-81, 84, 87,
 116, 141, 145-146
 historians neglect of: 82, 116
 histories of: 82
 independence movement: 12,
 29-30, 37, 79, 86, 154-155
 insurrection in and pacification:
 22-24, 27, 79-91, 142, 145-146,
 172, 177
 interests in: 69-70
 investments in: 37
 Japanese invasion of: 18
 Japanese proposals for: 99
 Japanese threat to: 122, 130
 military assistance to: 59
 military government in: 70, 80,
 83-85, 122-123
 nationals in U.S. service: 143
 policy on: 21-26, 28-29, 37, 70,
 79-80, 84-85
 political and social values in: 118
 as priority target: 136-137
 propaganda campaigns in: 80
 relations with: 21-25, 27, 29, 37-38,
 42
 in security system: 56, 59, 70, 105,
 116, 130, 134, 136, 152
 terrorism campaigns in: 80, 83,
 145-146
 trade with: 25
 Vietnam War comparison: 88-91,
 116
 volunteers role in pacification:
 122-123
 Plain of Jars: 170
 Pol Pot: 195
 Port Arthur naval base: 129
 Portugal, economic assistance to:
 233
 Potsdam Declaration (1945): 48, 94,
 226
 Power, concept of: 237-238
 Press. *See* News media; Public
 opinion
 Progress, American concept of:
 11-12
 Propaganda campaigns, by
 Filipinos: 80
 Public opinion (*see also* News
 media)
 on atomic bomb decision:
 199-219
 effect on foreign policy: 74-75
 and Far East commitment: 23-24,
 29, 31, 34, 43
 on threats to Far East: 39
 on universal military training: 39
 on war planning: 130-131
 Puerto Rico
 Army garrison in: 142
 cession by Spain: 139
 military government in: 85
 natives in U.S. service: 143
 policy on: 70
 Pusan Perimeter: 164
 Pusan riots (1979): 229
 Quezon, Manuel: 119
 Rabaul, air strikes against: 161
 RAINBOW Plans: 134, 157-158
 Rankin, Karl Lott: 54, 62
 Rapid Deployment Force, U.S. Army:
 121

- Reconnaissance, photographic: 166
Red Star Over China (Snow): 187
 Reinsch, Paul S.: 28
 Republic of Korea (ROK). *See* South Korea
 Republic of Vietnam (RVN). *See* South Vietnam
 Reserve components mobilization: 74, 142
 Reynolds, Clark: 120
 Rhee, Syngman: 47, 221-222
 Richardson, James O.: 31, 134, 157
 Ridgway, Matthew B.: 149, 185
 Rockhill, William W.: 27
Role of Defensive Pursuit (Chennault): 187
 Roles and missions. *See* Command and control; Unity of command
 Roosevelt, Franklin D.
 China policy: 42, 50-51, 135, 187
 commanders, relations with: 32
 Indochina policy: 48
 Japan policy: 32, 94
 naval policy: 134
 Philippines policy: 30, 137
 policy guidelines: 41
 postwar plans: 33-34
 war plans: 35
 Roosevelt, Theodore
 and Far East: 29-31, 41, 130
 and fleet world tour: 130
 Japanese hostility toward: 151
 and naval policy: 31, 70
 and Philippines, 21, 25-26, 37, 129, 152
 Root, Elihu
 and Army modernization and education: 143-144
 and constraints on Army mission: 140-141, 143
 and military government: 70
 and Philippines: 27, 142
 Rusk, Dean: 57-58, 60-61
 Russell, Bertrand: 211
 Russia, imperial, and Far East: 26, 129-130, 151
 Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905): 26-27, 130, 178, 185
 Ryukyu Islands: 37, 185
 Said, Edward: 11-12
 Saipan Island, U.S. seizure of: 189
 Sakhalin Island: 46
 Samar Island: 80, 146
 Samoa, cession by Spain: 139
 Sams, Crawford F.: 95
 Samsah Bay naval base: 129
 Sanctions, against Japan: 13, 31
 Sanctuaries, use by North Vietnam: 68
Saratoga, USS: 132
 Saudi Arabia, economic assistance to: 234
 Schaller, Michael: 13
 Schenck, Hubert G.: 95
Schoolbooks and Krags (Gates): 116
 Schuman, Robert: 50, 58
 Sea, supremacy on: 35
 Sebald, William J.: 95
 Security system
 Alaska in: 155, 157, 177
 China in: 16, 128, 134, 136, 195-196
 Far East in: 70
 Hawaii in: 152, 155, 157, 177
 Indochina in: 61
 Indonesia in: 59
 Japan in: 16, 39, 56, 67, 100-101, 104-107, 223
 North Vietnam threat to: 64, 68
 Okinawa in: 56, 105
 Panama Canal in: 139, 152, 154-155, 157
 Philippines in: 56, 59, 70, 105, 116, 130, 134, 136, 152
 South Korea in: 56, 61, 67, 105, 223, 226, 229
 South Vietnam in: 64, 112
 Southeast Asia in: 56, 61, 64
 Taiwan in: 56, 59, 105, 134, 136
 Self-Defense Corps, RVN: 111
 Self-Defense Forces, Japan: 106

- Seoul: 195
- Seventh Fleet, U.S. Navy: 59, 168, 194
- Sexton, William Thaddeus: 82
- Shanghai incident: 150, 173, 186
- Shantung Peninsula: 31, 153, 185
- Sherman, Forrest P.: 36, 59
- Sherman Commission: 69
- Sherwin, Martin: 199, 211
- Shidehara, Kijuro: 97-98, 104
- Shigeru, Yoshida: 37
- Shimizu Ikutaro: 92-93, 107, 214-215
- Shogun* (television series): 248
- Shufeldt, Robert W.: 127
- Shurke, Astri: 223
- Sian incident (1936-37): 187
- Singlaub, John: 73-74
- Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO): 135
- Smith, Adam: 245
- Snow, Edgar: 187
- Social Engineering in the Philippines*: 85
- Soldier and the State* (Huntington): 85, 116
- Soldiers in the Sun* (Sexton): 82
- Solomon Islands campaign: 93, 162
- South Korea (*see also* Korea; Korea War)
- alliance with: 15
 - armed forces of: 220, 223-226, 228, 231, 235-236
 - aversion to war: 19
 - bases in: 39
 - casualties: 225
 - civil government in: 228-229
 - civil-military relations in: 220-221, 224, 226-229, 241
 - commitment to: 35, 38, 42, 47, 59, 105, 229
 - Communist infiltration: 66
 - economic assistance to: 37, 43, 221-222, 224, 233-234
 - economic growth: 227
 - guerrilla warfare in: 111
 - invaded by North: 59, 65, 105, 164, 221-222, 224
 - Japan, influence on armed forces: 240
 - military assistance to: 61, 223-225, 229, 232
 - military government in: 222
 - nuclear weapons potential: 241
 - political crises in: 229
 - political and social values in: 118, 226-227, 238
 - power, concept of: 238-239
 - relations with: 40-41, 223, 225-227
 - republic proclaimed: 47, 221-222
 - in security system: 56, 61, 67, 105, 223, 226, 229
 - strategic importance: 220
 - threat from North: 229
 - trade with: 37, 227
 - training programs: 225, 228-229, 240-241
 - U.S. forces in: 227, 229-230, 232
 - in Vietnam War: 226
 - withdrawals, effected and proposed: 38, 47, 67, 73-74, 105, 222-223, 227, 229
- South Vietnam
- advisors in: 109-115, 118, 121
 - alliance with: 61
 - armed forces of: 109-111
 - Civil Guard: 111-112
 - combat effectiveness: 113, 115
 - command and control in: 112-113
 - commitment in: 15, 64, 110
 - Communist threat to: 110
 - economic assistance to: 233-234
 - enemy agents infiltration by: 113
 - ground forces commitment to: 168
 - guerrilla warfare in: 109, 111-113
 - language barrier in: 114
 - military assistance to: 61, 109-110, 112, 232
 - motivation, lack of: 113
 - news coverage: 110

- North Vietnam threat to: 68
- objectives in: 68, 110
- parochialism in: 114
- political and social values in: 114-115, 118
- in security system: 64, 112
- Self-Defense Corps: 111
- Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM): 109
- training programs: 109-113
- U.S. forces commitment and withdrawal: 109-110, 168, 223
- Southeast Asia, in security system: 56, 61, 64
- Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO): 63-64
- Soviet Union (*see also* Russia, imperial)
 - Afghanistan invaded by: 214
 - armed forces expansion: 15
 - atomic bomb acquisition: 105, 163
 - and balance of power: 14-15
 - China, alliance with: 38, 53, 56-57
 - China, clashes with: 15
 - China, interest and influence in: 26, 53-55
 - China, military assistance to: 186
 - China, relations with: 15-16, 194-195
 - Czechoslovakia invaded by: 15, 163
 - Far East policy: 16
 - as global threat: 100-101
 - and Japan occupation: 95, 100
 - Japanese independence, reaction to: 106
 - Korean War, intervention in: 59
 - Manchuria occupied by: 191-192
 - North Korea, commitment and withdrawal from: 38, 47, 222
 - North Vietnam, commitment in: 38, 47
 - North Vietnam recognized by: 57
 - nuclear weapons acquisition: 38, 105, 163, 203
 - pre-emptive strikes against: 36
 - satellite launches: 167
 - threat to Far East: 38-39, 41, 51-52, 55-58, 62, 64-65, 167, 177
 - threat to Western Europe: 66, 72
- Spaatz, Carl: 161-162
- Spain
 - economic assistance to: 234
 - military assistance to: 232
 - in Pacific theater: 128
- Special Forces, U.S. Army: 111
- Spruance, Raymond A.: 133, 137
- Sputnik satellite launch: 167
- Ssuning-kai: 192-194
- Stalin, Josef: 57
- Stark, Harold R.: 31
- State, Department of
 - and China-Soviet relations: 15
 - and Communist China as threat: 51-52
 - Far East policy: 73
 - Indochina policy: 49-50
 - and Japan occupation: 94, 102
 - and Japanese peace treaty: 101, 106
 - Korea policy: 221-222
 - and military government: 70
 - Navy, proposed merger with: 127
 - Philippines policy: 27
 - postwar planning: 33-34, 93
 - and public opinion: 34
- State-Army-Navy-Air Coordinating Committee (SANACC): 41
- State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC): 34, 41, 93, 117, 119
- Stilwell, Joseph W.: 32, 118, 185, 187-188, 190, 238
- Stilwell and the American Experience in China* (Tuchman): 242
- Stimson, Henry L.
 - and atomic bomb decision: 212
 - and constraints on Army mission: 144
 - and Japan occupation: 94
 - and Japanese mandated islands: 46
 - and Soviet threat: 38

- Strategic Air Command: 163-165, 167
- Strategic air support: 163-164, 168, 179
- Strategic plans. *See* War aims and plans
- Strike, Clifford S.: 99
- Stuart, John Leighton: 52
- Subic Bay: 28-29
- Submarine warfare: 133, 135, 189-190
- Summer, William Graham: 9
- Sun Tzu: 194, 237
- Sun Yat-sen: 122
- Supply operations. *See* Logistical operations
- Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP): 95-96, 117. *See also* MacArthur, Douglas
- Sutherland, Richard K.: 95
- Syria, economic assistance to: 233
- Tactical Air Command: 163, 167, 169
- Tactical air support
 - Air Force doctrine: 161-168, 170, 179
 - by Army: 159, 169
 - by Marine Corps: 165-166, 169, 174
 - by Navy: 133, 135, 166, 169
- Tactical doctrine formulation: 140-141, 145-147, 157, 159, 176
- Taegu: 165
- Taft
 - as Philippines governor: 80, 84-85
 - and Philippines policy: 27, 29, 40, 69, 82, 178
- Tai Li: 135-136
- Taiwan
 - Chinese Communist plans for: 194
 - Japanese annexation: 185
 - Japanese interests in: 107, 130
 - policy on: 55
 - as priority target: 136-137, 177
 - in security system: 56, 59, 105, 134, 136
 - U.S. claim on: 128
- Talienwan naval base: 129
- Tangku: 185
- Taylor, John R. M.: 82, 178
- Taylor, Zachary: 82
- Technology, effect on warfare: 90-91
- Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM): 109
- Terrorism campaigns, by Filipinos: 80, 83, 145-146
- Tet offensive: 174
- Textor, Robert: 103
- Third World, military assistance to: 115
- Thomas, Gerald C.: 174
- Tientsin garrison: 148-150, 185-186
- Tinian Island, U.S. seizure of: 189
- Tokyo, air raid on: 189
- Toyama Shigeki: 208
- Trade with Far East: 37
- Training programs
 - in China: 13, 135, 149-150, 187, 190
 - in civil affairs: 118
 - in Japan: 136
 - language schools: 93
 - in South Korea: 225, 228-229, 240-241
 - in South Vietnam: 109-113
 - U.S. Army: 93, 111, 143-144, 148
 - U.S. Navy: 34, 133, 135-136
- Transport aircraft. *See by designation*
- TRIDENT Conference (1943): 134
- Truman, Harry S
 - and Air Force autonomy: 162
 - and atomic bomb decision: 199, 204-207, 212
 - China policy: 42-43, 51-53
 - and Communist containment: 100
 - criticism, response to: 42
 - Dulles, relations with: 43
 - and Far East alliances: 61
 - and Far East security: 55
 - Indochina policy: 48
 - and interests in Far East: 37
 - and Japan occupation: 93-94

- and Japanese peace treaty: 106
- and Korean War: 21, 59, 223
- MacArthur dismissed by: 107
- and Marshall Plan: 43
- on military assistance: 61
- and Philippines: 37-38, 59
- and Soviet control of China: 60
- and Soviet threat: 39
- and Taiwan: 59, 194
- Truman Doctrine (1947): 100
- Tsingtao naval base: 40, 153
- Tuchman, Barbara W.: 118, 173, 242
- Tungkiangkow: 193
- Turkey
 - economic assistance to: 233-234
 - military assistance to: 43, 100, 232
- Turner, Henry Jackson: 245
- Tuveson, Ernest: 11-12
- Twain, Mark: 28
- Twin Stars of China* (Carlson): 187
- Tydings-McDuffie Act (1934): 155-156

- Unification of armed services: 161-162
- United China Relief: 31
- United Kingdom
 - alliance with Japan: 129-132
 - alliance with United States: 132
 - capital ships, limitation on: 30, 131, 153
 - economic assistance to: 233-234
 - Far East, interests in: 128-129, 151
 - and Japan occupation: 95
 - Japanese independence, reaction to: 106
 - Persian Gulf, interests in: 121
- United Nations
 - China membership rejected: 60
 - and Japan occupation: 95
 - and Korean War: 59
- United States Air Force
 - autonomy movement: 161-163, 179
- Far East experience: 160-180
- organization and strength: 163, 167, 169
- United States Army
 - appropriations by Congress: 143
 - atrocities by: 80, 83-84, 88
 - Bureau of Insular Affairs: 27, 70, 82, 82
 - Chief of Staff instituted: 144
 - civic action programs: 84, 146
 - civil government by: 34, 40-41, 80-81, 84, 116, 146
 - combat effectiveness: 178
 - communications systems: 145
 - conflict with Navy: 23
 - constraints on mission: 140-144
 - construction projects: 145
 - engineering projects: 145
 - expansions and reductions: 132, 142-144, 153, 157
 - Far East policy and mission: 29, 133, 150-151, 157-158, 177-178
 - General Staff: 26-27, 144, 150, 155-156, 158, 178
 - global commitment concept: 142, 145, 151, 157
 - and guerrilla warfare doctrine: 141, 145-147
 - helicopters use by: 159, 169
 - and Indian wars lessons: 140, 159
 - Inspector General: 144
 - Interior Department, proposed merger with: 127
 - logistical operations: 145, 157
 - medical services: 145
 - military government by: 70, 80, 83-85, 100, 122-123, 142, 146
 - military history, neglect of: 116
 - Military Intelligence Division: 27
 - modernization program: 143-144, 157
 - officers, professionalism of: 85, 116, 122-123, 133, 178
 - post-Civil War service: 140
 - Rapid Deployment Force: 121
 - Regular Army strength: 142-143

- reserve components mobilization: 142
- school system: 144
- Special Forces: 111
- tactical doctrine formulation: 140-141, 145-147, 157, 159, 177
- training programs: 93, 111, 143-144, 148-150
- war plans: 133, 152
- United States-Japan Administrative Agreement: 105
- United States-Japan Mutual Security Pact (1951): 203
- United States Marine Corps
 - amphibious warfare doctrine: 132-133, 173
 - China, commitment to: 186, 192
 - China, withdrawal from: 31, 173
 - Far East experience: 172-175
 - Horse Marines: 173
 - in Korean War: 174
 - in NATO forces: 174
 - in Pacific theater: 174
 - in Philippines: 173
 - postwar crises, use in: 137
 - tactical air support by: 165-166, 174
 - in Vietnam War: 174
 - World War I service: 175
- United States Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam (USMAAGV): 109, 111, 113-114
- United States Navy
 - air operations against Japan: 136
 - Asiatic Fleet: 22, 28, 31, 127, 130, 152
 - Atlantic Fleet: 173
 - Atlantic theater priorities: 31, 36, 129
 - capital ships, limitation on: 30, 131, 153
 - in civil government: 34, 40
 - combat effectiveness: 134
 - conflict with Army: 23
 - East India Squadron: 176
 - expansions and reductions: 131-133, 153
 - and Far East bases: 38
 - Far East, commitment to: 22, 28, 30, 127-138, 194
 - Far East policy and mission: 127-138, 151, 176, 246
 - Far East Squadron: 127
 - fleet world tour: 130
 - General Board: 26, 28, 130-132
 - guerrilla warfare by: 135-136
 - intelligence operations: 135
 - Japanese navy, rivalry with: 13-14, 17, 21, 26, 30, 131, 177
 - lines of communication, safeguarding: 35, 132
 - Naval Group China: 135
 - Office of Naval Intelligence: 28
 - Office of Occupied Areas: 34, 40
 - officers, professionalism of: 133, 138
 - Pacific Fleet: 13
 - postwar crises, use in: 137
 - postwar plans: 36
 - Seventh Fleet: 59
 - State Department, proposed merger with: 127
 - submarine warfare: 133, 135, 189-190
 - tactical air support by: 133, 135, 166
 - training programs: 93, 133, 135-136
 - unification, opposition to: 162
 - war plans: 130-135, 152
 - warship conversions: 132
 - Yangtze Patrol: 184
- United States Operations Mission: 111-112
- United States Strategic Bombing Survey: 202
- Unity of command: 26, 68, 180
- Universal military training, public opinion on: 39
- Universities, and Far East commitment: 41
- Upton, Emory: 141, 150, 184

- U.S. News & World Report*: 204
Ushio: 202
 Utley, Robert M.: 140, 146
 Vandenberg, Arthur H.: 53
 Vandenberg, Hoyt S.: 164-165, 174
 Ver Steeg, Clarence L.: 216
 Vien, Cao Van: 114
 Viet-Cong: 113. *See also* North
 Korea
 Vietnam War
 air operations in: 68, 167-170,
 179
 antecedents: 137
 Chinese intervention in: 195
 faulty decision in: 75
 Japan, effect on: 204, 211
 objectives and lessons in: 67
 Philippines pacification compari-
 son: 88-91, 116
 public opinion on: 75
 South Korea in: 226
 Vietnamization policy: 68, 109-110
 Volunteers, U.S. *See* Citizen-soldiers
- Wagner, Arthur L.: 147
 Wake Island Conference (1950): 59
 Wallace, Henry A.: 37
 War
 aversion to: 33, 153
 as social action: 183
 War aims and plans: 26, 28, 31, 33,
 35, 130-137, 152, 154-159, 173,
 177-178
 War criminals, Japanese: 97
 War Department
 Bureau of Insular Affairs: 27, 70
 Civil Affairs Division: 34
 Ward, Frederick Townsend: 184,
 187-188
 Washington Naval Conference
 (1921-22): 30, 131, 153, 155,
 185
Washington Star: 200
 Weapons, effect on warfare: 89-90
- Wedemeyer, Albert C.: 51-52, 65,
 185, 191
 Weigley, Russell: 90
 Weihaiwei naval base: 129
 Welch, Richard E. Jr.: 89
 Welsh, Edward C.: 96, 102
 Wenchow: 135
 West Germany, economic assistance
 to: 234
 Western Europe
 Army stress on: 119
 economic assistance to: 42, 100
 economic recovery: 100
 Soviet threat to: 66, 72
 Weyland, Otto P.: 165-166
 Whampoa Academy: 185-186
 Wherry, Kenneth S.: 54
 White, Theodore H.: 42, 242
 Whitney, Courtney: 95-98, 105, 117
 Williams, Justin: 103, 117
 Williams, Samuel T.: 109, 111-112
 Willoughby, Charles A.: 95, 104
 Wills, Garry: 200
 Wilson, Woodrow: 30, 131
 Wood, Leonard: 27, 150-151, 154,
 178
 World War I plans: 152
- Yalta Conference (1945): 48
 Yalu River: 60, 66, 164-165, 194
 Yangtze Patrol, U.S. Navy: 184
 Yedo Bay: 127
 Yen-an: 187
 Yi dynasty (Korea): 220-221
 Yingkow: 192
 Yokosuka naval base: 36
 Yoshida cabinet: 104, 106-107, 119
 Young, Ralph A.: 102
 Yugoslavia, economic assistance to:
 234
 Yunnan: 187
- Zero aircraft: 188