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SPECIAL REPORT

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Institutionalizing Security Sector Reform

Options for the U.S. Government

Summary

- International donor assistance can make a decisive difference in a partner country's security sector reform (SSR) efforts. To be successful, donors must be able to organize SSR activities among disparate ministries and departments in their national capital.
- Successful "whole-of-government" SSR efforts are based on a common framework for organizing SSR activities that includes interagency policy guidance; interagency assessment, planning and programming, and evaluation; flexible funding mechanisms; interagency structures; and human capital.
- The U.S. government should apply this institutional framework to better organize its provision of security-related assistance. Institutionalizing SSR in Washington will enable more effective support for U.S. country teams and more effective implementation of programs in the field.
- Realizing such an institutional framework will make the U.S. government a more effective partner and secure a better return on its investments in the security of partner countries. The United States has made major strides toward making SSR an institutional priority, but much more needs to be done to mainstream SSR in Washington.

Security Sector Reform: An Institutional Framework

Over the past two decades, policymakers and practitioners have come to recognize that security and development are fundamentally linked. Development can foster stability and help prevent crises and conflicts. At the same time, the single largest obstacle to development is the lack of security: development cannot take place without a safe and secure environment for states and their citizens. The security sector reform (SSR) concept is rooted in this linkage between security and development and applies a long-term development

About the Report

This report offers a framework for institutionalizing security sector reform (SSR) within the U.S. government. It is informed by the work of the Institute's Initiative for Security Sector Governance and presentations at its June 29–30, 2010, conference, "International Policy on Security Sector Governance: Opportunities and Gaps." Since its inception in 2007, the Initiative for Security Sector Governance has facilitated the exchange of ideas between U.S. officials and their counterparts in other donor capitals and among multilateral organizations, nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, and local owners of SSR processes. This initiative has helped stakeholders in the U.S. government advance the SSR agenda.

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The views expressed in this report are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Deloitte Consulting LLP or the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate policy positions.

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perspective, with an emphasis on people-centered approaches, local ownership, effective governance, and institution building, to traditional security challenges.

SSR has evolved as a discipline since the 1990s, when academic specialists, development practitioners, and local actors began to apply principles of democratic governance and people-centered approaches to security and justice delivery. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) offered the first common guidance for SSR with the adoption of guidelines for international donors in 2004 and publication of a detailed handbook for practitioners in 2006. This guidance remains the basis of whole-of-government approaches to SSR today.[1]

The resulting SSR agenda is constructed using an integrating framework that recognizes the security sector as a complex system of systems encompassing security and justice delivery, governance, legal and regulatory frameworks, management systems and processes, and civil society oversight. It focuses on building the capacity of the security sector to deliver safety, security, and justice for individuals; reduce corruption; and counter illicit criminal and terrorist networks. SSR recognizes that increased security capacity must be matched by changes in attitudes and behaviors, including greater respect for human rights and the rule of law, among security providers. SSR offers a process whereby national leaders can build a more effective, sustainable security sector embedded in the rule of law and legitimate in the eyes of local populations. Thus, SSR is ultimately a process of change management that any country, including the United States and other donor countries, can undertake for itself.[2]

A fundamental principle of SSR is local ownership. Successful reform requires political will for change among governing elites. The national government and local population must embrace and lead the reform process for it to succeed. However, donor governments as well as international organizations, regional security organizations, and nongovernmental organizations can each play a significant supporting role in a partner's reform programs, especially in fragile or postconflict states. International donor assistance can sometimes make a decisive difference. One critical element of a successful assistance program is the donor's ability to organize SSR efforts among disparate ministries and departments.

The track record of donor governments in the SSR area has been mixed at the headquarters level, however. Common policy and strategy are often lacking or incomplete in donor nation capitals. Analytical tools for assessment and evaluation are largely underdeveloped when they exist at all. Assistance plans, programs, and activities in the security sector are frequently ad hoc and conducted in isolation from one another. Funding is seldom sufficient or flexible enough to promote comprehensive programs or approaches. Organizations, systems, and processes are sometimes structured in ways that hamper rather than promote interagency coordination. Finally, headquarters organizations lack adequate numbers of trained and experienced SSR experts.

Nevertheless, donor governments have accrued a growing reservoir of knowledge and experience in organizing comprehensive approaches to SSR. This accumulated experience suggests five common elements that together form a framework for organizing donor government support for SSR[3]:

- interagency policy guidance;
- interagency assessment, planning and programming, and evaluation;
- flexible funding mechanisms;
- interagency structures; and
- human capital.

This report offers an institutional framework based on these five elements for the U.S. government to use in providing security sector assistance to its partners. The report assumes that the security of the United States depends in part on how well it helps partner

countries meet their basic security needs and how effectively those states provide their populations with safety, security, and justice. The report examines progress made to date in each of the five areas and identifies gaps remaining within the U.S. government. It also offers recommendations for institutionalizing a whole-of-government framework for SSR within the U.S. system.

While the U.S. country team at each mission should be the focal point for assistance initiatives, and planning at the headquarters level should normally be driven by experts in the field, this analysis is conducted primarily from the vantage point of headquarters in Washington, D.C. Improving the performance of relevant federal departments and agencies in the capital will help those organizations be better prepared to support SSR efforts in the field. By getting SSR right in Washington, the U.S. government will also become a more effective partner for its local partners and secure a better return on its investments in their security.

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Interagency Policy Guidance

Donor governments have found that clear and common guidelines are needed for policymakers, planners, and programmers across multiple departments and ministries. Guidance that provides shared principles and taxonomy is crucial for creating a collective understanding of SSR among civilian and military policymakers and practitioners. It can also foster a better understanding of why improvements in the security sector demand closer coordination within and among organizations. Policy guidance can help clarify organizational roles and responsibilities as well.

The United States has provided large amounts of security-related assistance since World War II, but activities have tended to be disparate and uncoordinated, and attempts to apply the emerging SSR approach have been ad hoc. Although parts of the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of Defense (DOD) were engaged in separate SSR activities, SSR remained largely absent as an interagency policy issue prior to November 2005, when a joint U.S.–United Kingdom workshop on SSR was held in Washington. This meeting spurred the creation of an informal interagency working group, which was cochaired by State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM), USAID's Office of Democracy and Governance, and the DOD's Office of Partnership Strategy.[4] The group featured regular participation from the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and other departments and agencies, as well as numerous bureaus and components within State, USAID, and DOD.

Recognizing that the U.S. government lacked a policy framework for SSR, the first priority for the interagency SSR working group was to develop a common State, USAID, and DOD—or "3D"—statement on SSR, which was approved in January 2009 after nearly eighteen months of drafting and coordination. This document drew on the OECD DAC's *Guidelines and Handbook on Security System Reform* and attempted to translate these international standards into a U.S. context. The paper provided a common definition of SSR for the three organizations as "the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice." It also offered a common objective for U.S. assistance to a partner's security sector: to promote "an effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and responsive to the needs of the public."[5]

The 3D statement provided the three organizations with a common vocabulary and understanding of SSR. It fostered a growing understanding in Washington of why traditional train-and-equip programs must be linked horizontally to rule of law and justice sector development and vertically to security sector governance and institution building. The paper

informed the development of DOD's *Guidance for Employment of the Force,* which is the military's primary operational planning guidance document and which made SSR, particularly defense reform, a major focus area for the security cooperation activities of its geographic combatant commanders. DOD also used the paper as the foundation for the SSR chapter in the Army's Field Manual 3-07 and in draft Joint doctrine. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review section on security assistance reform applies the SSR lens to the military capabilities, processes, and organizations needed to build partner capacity.

The 3D paper helped put SSR more firmly on Washington's policy agenda, but it was only a first step toward instating a common U.S. government-wide policy framework. Although representatives from other organizations made crucial contributions to the document and used it in practice, it was solely a State, USAID, and DOD statement and did not reflect a government-wide policy position. Furthermore, the paper was adopted in the last days of the Bush administration and has not been updated to reflect the priorities and views of the Obama administration. A logical follow-up to the paper would be a presidential policy directive (PPD) that would offer the definitive Obama administration statement on SSR and apply to all federal departments and agencies.

In fact, a PPD on security sector *assistance* is currently being prepared. Security sector assistance is a term of art that has increasingly supplanted SSR in the U.S. government's vocabulary. In the draft PPD, SSR is recognized as one objective of security sector assistance, which also includes a broader set of activities such as support to U.S. allies and coalition partners for combined military operations. Current initiatives centering on security sector assistance tend to focus on the supply side of U.S. assistance and on improving the way in which assistance is delivered. Improving assistance delivery is essential, but the intended ends of that assistance are just as vital as streamlined ways and means. Reform, which involves the transformation of individual attitudes and behaviors at the most basic level, is just as important as—if not more so than—capacity. Without an emphasis on reform, U.S. assistance risks helping partners build more effective security forces that are not bound by the rule of law, legitimate in the eyes of local populations, or sustainable in the long run.

Interagency Assessment

Comprehensive needs assessments should provide the foundation for donor decisions on assistance priorities and programming in support of a partner's SSR efforts. Assessments are essential for analyzing the capacity and capabilities of both state and non-state actors in the security sector. Analysis is more than a technical matter, however. To be comprehensive, assessments should include an analysis of the political context, including the political will of those in power and their incentives for change, the attitudes of security providers, potential spoilers, and possible entry points for donors. A thorough needs assessment can establish a baseline, which is critical for future programming, monitoring, and evaluation. Assessments of security sector strengths and weaknesses can also help partners better understand the need for reform and build internal constituencies for change. Unfortunately, assessment remains a major deficiency in the international SSR community of practice. As a consequence, donor programs and activities are sometimes developed without a thorough understanding of local conditions and priorities, and often end up being driven by donor supply rather than local need.

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Nonetheless, U.S. government stakeholders have made some important contributions in this area by developing several tools to assess the assistance needs of a partner's security sector. USAID has led the development of a draft Interagency Security Sector Assessment Framework (ISSAF) with the support of the interagency SSR working group. The ISSAF provides a strategic overview of the capacity, gaps, and linkages among the various compo-

nents of the security sector and identifies entry points for programs in the different phases of a security sector's development. By providing an integrating mechanism for assessments, the ISSAF promotes better interagency coordination and encourages joint assessment and analysis. It has been piloted in several countries, beginning with Liberia in 2006, and including Albania and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The ISSAF also complements the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF), which assesses the risk of conflict in fragile states.

The ISSAF offers a framework for organizing subsector analysis as well. SSR stakeholders in the U.S. government have pioneered a number of tools that look at different components of the security sector in more detail. USAID and State PM have applied SSR concepts to maritime security through the development of a Maritime SSR assessment tool. State's Bureau of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement developed the Criminal Justice Sector Assessment Rating Tool (CJSART) to examine the assistance needs of a partner's police, courts, and corrections components. This tool has been used extensively around the world and is currently on its second iteration. The CJSART served as the model for DOD's development of a Defense Sector Assessment Rating Tool (DSART). The draft DSART was piloted in the Democratic Republic of Congo in early 2010 and should be finalized by the fall of 2010. Despite the extensive progress to date, each of the tools remains underdeveloped pending more extensive field testing and refinement. Furthermore, assessment tools are lacking for other elements of the security sector, especially the intelligence sector.

Interagency Planning and Programming

Many donors have identified the need for improved multiyear planning and programming in their national capitals to produce more coherent SSR activities in the field. Ideally, joint needs assessments should provide planners and programmers with a solid understanding of a partner's operational capabilities, institutional strengths and weaknesses, security sector governance, and political context to determine assistance needs. Informed by a comprehensive assessment, donor countries should help partners design long-term national strategies and SSR programs tailored to each unique context. Activities should then be prioritized and phased, resources aligned, and linkages made among security sector actors in an integrated plan of reform. Planning should support the experts in the field and on the country team, as well as be responsive to top-down priorities. Finally, planning should recognize that SSR is a long-term process, not a single event, and requires a planning perspective of years to decades.

The U.S. government has had some noteworthy successes in developing plans to support a partner's SSR agenda. Plan Colombia offers an example of integrated governmental support for a partner's civil-military plan of security capacity building and reform. The counterterrorism arena provides other examples of joint plans, such as the regional Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative, which has helped limit the spread of al Qaeda influence in the region. However, interagency planning initiatives tend to be reactive to crises rather than preventive. Many feature ad hoc responses that are heavily dependent on personalities for success. Finally, planning processes generally feature a year-to-year rather than a long-term, multiyear perspective. The U.S. government lacks a comprehensive interagency planning framework across the entire national security spectrum—including a plan to support country-specific and regional security sector needs.

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Existing planning frameworks in civilian departments and agencies tend to focus on budgets rather than strategies. Mission strategic plans outline goals, priorities, and performance indicators for the country team, but these plans are often influenced more by budgetary considerations than by strategy. The State Department and USAID developed pilot Country

Assistance Strategies beginning in 2007 to provide a longer-term strategic planning framework for development assistance in those countries, but they lacked significant DOD input and were limited to twelve countries. Five-year Country Development Cooperation Strategies are currently in work for three pilot countries and could offer a framework for future SSR plans and strategies. However, no existing U.S. government framework promotes planning for SSR as a generational endeavor rather than as a one- to five-year program.

On the military side, theater campaign plans offer a long-range regional planning framework for DOD contingency planning and security cooperation activities, but no regional planning framework exists that integrates military and civilian efforts. Finally, U.S. government stakeholders have developed an Interagency Management System (IMS) for planning and organizing postconflict stabilization and reconstruction missions. Despite its potential utility for SSR activities following a conflict or crisis, the IMS has never been deployed, and its future remains uncertain. These gaps leave the U.S. government without a clear process for determining whole-of-government priorities and developing comprehensive plans for supporting country SSR strategies.

Interagency Evaluation

Measuring the success and failure of SSR planning and programming is critical for making midcourse adjustments to plans and programs or evaluating whether assistance should be continued at all. Measurement is especially critical at a time of mounting resource constraints in donor countries. Unfortunately, the lack of systematic and meaningful evaluations of program impact and effectiveness may be the most glaring deficiency among SSR stakeholders. To the extent evaluation is performed, it tends to focus on outputs (e.g., amount of dollars spent, number of security forces trained) rather than outcomes. More work is needed on both quantitative measures of impact, including more accurate measures of readiness resulting from new training and equipment, and qualitative measures of effectiveness, such as improved public perceptions of safety and security and behavioral changes reflecting increased respect for human rights among security forces. Better impact evaluation will help donors and local actors determine which approaches work, which do not work, and what lessons can be gleaned for future programming.

Within the U.S. government, advances in needs assessment tools and methodologies have not been matched by progress in developing tools for monitoring and evaluating the impact of security sector assistance, especially its impact on institutional change. The U.S. government has limited capacity and expertise to measure the effectiveness of its security sector interventions. In one notable illustration of this deficiency, a recent Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) audit highlighted significant flaws in the methodology used by U.S. and international forces to assess the effectiveness of Afghan National Security Force capacity-building programs.[6] Advances in U.S. government evaluation capacity such as DOD's new Office of Security Cooperation Assessments, which will be funded starting with the president's fiscal year 2011 budget, are modest in scope and funding. No systematic evaluation of broader security sector assistance programs or SSR outcomes is currently conducted. However, the PPD on security sector assistance may represent a first step toward a remedy by including policy guidance on monitoring and evaluation.

Flexible Funding Mechanisms

Adequate funding is an important but insufficient condition for effective SSR programs; the quality and the timeliness of the available funding mechanisms are just as important as the amount of funding. To improve funding access, a growing number of governments, including those of the UK and Canada, have established flexible, cross-departmental pro-

gramming and budgetary instruments for SSR, as well as broader stabilization and conflict prevention missions. Such instruments are works in progress, and some have been criticized as overly bureaucratic. Although these mechanisms sometimes do include additional steps that are not required in single-agency programs, the purpose of such tools is to foster whole-of-government approaches in pursuit of better SSR outcomes, not to reduce transaction costs. At their best, these innovations can ultimately reduce transaction costs by aligning or integrating what would otherwise have been separate initiatives working in parallel. On balance, such flexible funding mechanisms represent a potential improvement over past practice in the view of many stakeholders and participants.

Challenges to the U.S. government in developing integrated SSR programs are compounded by the lack of such flexible instruments. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has pointed out, "The United States' interagency tool kit is still a hodgepodge of jury-rigged arrangements constrained by a dated and complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources, and unwieldy processes."[7] Current mechanisms are not designed to facilitate interagency coordination and lack incentives for collaboration. Furthermore, funds appropriated or earmarked by Congress for programs in one sector, such as health, cannot easily be shifted to other areas, such as criminal justice, even when the partner needs U.S. assistance in developing community policing but has reached the limit of its capacity to absorb more HIV/AIDS programming.

In response to the lack of sufficiently large and flexible security assistance funding, State and DOD sought through the congressional defense committees new authorities and funding that require joint formulation of capacity-building projects by both the secretary of state and the secretary of defense. The Section 1206 Global Train and Equip program provides flexible, responsive funding for urgent partner needs for training and equipment, but it is limited to counterterrorism missions and stability operations in which U.S. forces participate. The Section 1207 Security and Stabilization Assistance program allowed the secretary of defense to transfer up to $100 million in funds, services, or supplies to the secretary of state for urgent security, stabilization, and reconstruction missions. A majority of Section 1207 projects included security sector components. Section 1207 was unique in that it enhanced coordination by bringing key representatives of the State Department, DOD, and USAID together to examine gaps in current assistance and to jointly prioritize and select projects. However, Section 1207 expired on October 1, 2010, and DOD will have no legally mandated role in the Complex Contingency Fund, which is its designated successor.

To help address security assistance requirements more holistically and to provide a mechanism that creates incentives for interagency collaboration, Secretary of Defense Gates proposed a new assistance paradigm. Informed by the UK's "Conflict Pool," which allows the Department for International Development (DFID), Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and Ministry of Defence (MOD) to pool funding to implement holistic conflict prevention and stabilization programs, Secretary Gates proposed to Secretary of State Clinton the establishment of funding pools for security capacity, stabilization, and conflict prevention. An interagency working group has been formed to explore pooled funding in more depth, but to date, it remains unclear what shape the mechanism will take, or whether the proposal will be adopted by the Obama administration and enacted by Congress.

In the meantime, SSR programs must be cobbled together using the existing patchwork of stovepipe programs. While billions of dollars for training and equipment are available through current programs such as Foreign Military Financing, Peacekeeping Operations, and Section 1206, demand for these funds will always exceed availability—requiring stakeholders to be more strategic in their use. Additionally, funding for train-and-equip programs is not sufficiently balanced by investments in security sector governance and institutional capacity-building programs.

Recognizing that short-term U.S. government investments in military training and equipment at the tactical level were not being matched by sufficient attention to partner security institutions and human capital, DOD created a new, global program to build defense institutions, the Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI). DIRI and the Warsaw Initiative Fund (WIF) program for Partnership for Peace countries provide mechanisms to support defense reform efforts by partner countries. Through these programs, technical experts offer a policy and planning framework for assessing a partner's defense sector needs, developing plans and strategies to build defense institutions, and evaluating outcomes. Investments in these institutional capacity-building programs are modest, however, and SSR programming remains skewed toward traditional training and equipping programs.[8]

Interagency Structures

Donor governments face a number of competing policy priorities that make unity of effort a difficult goal to achieve.

Donor governments face a number of competing policy priorities that make unity of effort a difficult goal to achieve. Tensions can arise among departments and ministries over short-term versus long-term objectives; the proper balance of political, security, and developmental aims; and competing operational priorities such as counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and transnational crime.[9] Many donor governments have responded to these bureaucratic challenges by creating structures to institutionalize whole-of-government approaches to SSR, conflict prevention, and stabilization. Cross-departmental structures have been used to coordinate policy, facilitate joint planning and programming, manage pooled funding mechanisms, and support operations. Standing interagency structures can better support country teams and field missions and facilitate training and education, rapid response, and unity of effort.

U.S. government stakeholders responded to the need for more interagency structure for SSR by forming an ad hoc working group in 2006. The group's primary focus initially was to craft the joint statement on SSR. Drafting and editing of the paper began in mid-2007, and a lengthy clearance process lasted until January 2009. A major impetus to final clearance was the October 2008 formalization of the SSR working group under the Development Policy Coordinating Committee structure, which was chaired by the USAID administrator and National Security Council (NSC) staff. Besides producing the paper, the working group also helped prepare and facilitate the deployment of State Department–USAID–DOD teams to Liberia and Albania to conduct an integrated needs assessment of each partner's security sector.

In 2009, the new administration launched several major policy reviews. These included a review of security assistance policy, roles, missions, and authorities, which was proposed by Secretary of Defense Gates, along with a standing Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) to conduct the review. In response to Secretary Gates's proposal, the National Security Staff launched the Security Sector Assistance IPC in August 2009. Although this IPC would seem to be the natural successor to the SSR working group or its logical sponsor, the IPC has focused more narrowly on the division of security assistance responsibilities and authorities between the State Department and DOD as it drafts the PPD on security sector assistance. Meanwhile, the SSR working group has been left without a clear mandate, and its work has largely come to a halt. Consequently, the U.S. government lacks an authoritative structure for making SSR policy.

Donor governments have established hybrid structures to manage shared funding mechanisms as well as to make policy. To highlight the UK example again, DFID, FCO, and MOD have established a common governance structure for the Conflict Pool that facilitates joint decisions on funding recommendations and priorities from the senior level to the working level. The Conflict Pool requires personnel from each agency to work together—sometimes

on a single staff—to support the work of the pool. FCO and MOD assign individuals to form part of a DFID-led virtual secretariat to centrally oversee the pool. For each region, country, and functional theme, one department then takes the lead, with officials from the other two departments fulfilling supporting roles on relevant committees and secretariats. While interagency management of Section 1207 in the United States featured an interagency technical working group and selection committee to make decisions, its governance structure was not nearly as well developed as the UK's Conflict Pool structure. Now that Section 1207 has expired, the U.S. government lacks even that basic structure for interagency program management in the security sector assistance arena.

Additionally, donor governments have developed standing interagency units that operationalize policy for SSR as well as for stabilization and conflict prevention. The UK originally established separate tridepartmental operational structures for SSR and stabilization with the Security Sector Development Advisory Team (SSDAT) and the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit, which is now the Stabilisation Unit. Owing to a natural alignment of organizational missions as well as to budgetary pressures, in January 2010 SSDAT was folded into the Stabilisation Unit as its Security and Justice Group. The Stabilisation Unit, which includes both military and civilian secondees from MOD as well as civilians from DFID, FCO, and other government departments, now supports conflict prevention and SSR missions and leads postconflict stabilization efforts. Canada's civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force, to take another country example, covers SSR programming and policy in addition to humanitarian policy, peacekeeping policy and capacity-building programs, and conflict prevention and peace-building policy and programs.

The Bush administration responded to lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq with a structure designed to coordinate the U.S. government's response to stabilization and reconstruction missions spanning the policy level in Washington to the field. The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in the State Department was given a conflict prevention mandate as well. The coordinator is chartered with orchestrating the policy response to crises and contingencies across the government. However, S/CRS has struggled to gain traction within the State Department and among interagency stakeholders. The role of S/CRS in leading the policy response to crises has led to turf battles with State's powerful regional bureaus, battles that might have been avoided with a more operationally focused mandate. S/CRS also lacks SSR capacity and the mandate to conduct the longer-term capacity building required by SSR. Finally, because it has only token DOD representation and focuses solely on civilian response, S/CRS helps perpetuate a civilian-military divide and is not a truly whole-of-government structure.[10]

The role of S/CRS in leading the policy response to crises has led to turf battles with State's powerful regional bureaus, battles that might have been avoided with a more operationally focused mandate.

Human Capital

Donor governments are recognizing the importance of human capital for SSR at every level from headquarters to the field. Effective governmental institutions require individuals with the requisite knowledge, skills, experience, and attitudes for SSR. Donors need sufficient professional cadres of SSR experts in the uniformed services as well as in their civil and foreign services. As SSR becomes more mainstreamed, greater professionalization will be required on the part of those who make donor policy and those who design programs.

SSR work requires a mix of technical experts in such diverse areas as governance, community policing, and resource management, as well as generalists who are expert at integrating disparate activities coherently and skilled at navigating competing political and bureaucratic interests. Integrators of SSR strategies, programs, and activities also need grounding in concepts ranging from institution building to change management and strategic planning.[11] All who work in the SSR arena, whether technical experts or

generalists, must also have an appreciation for the political dynamics and country context of the partner nation.

Donor governments have taken a number of steps to professionalize the cadre of SSR experts through more concerted training and education programs. The OECD has developed an SSR training module, and the Association for SSR Education and Training was formed to foster a more coordinated approach to SSR training.[12] Although appreciation for the SSR concept has grown in the U.S. government, specialized training for civilians and military members remains extremely limited. Training and education are particularly important at senior levels, where they are virtually nonexistent. USAID offers training to its own staff that is open to other U.S. government personnel, but formal offerings of SSR courses for regional and functional bureau experts at State, DOD, USAID, and other interagency stakeholders are notably lacking. Training and education in SSR tend to be ad hoc and self-directed when they do take place. No standardized curriculum exists, nor have any certification standards been established for U.S. government personnel.

Formal offerings of SSR courses for regional and functional bureau experts . . . are notably lacking.

Donor governments also need the capacity to reach beyond standing units and organizations to tap specialized expertise. Some have formed reserves of experts who can respond on short notice to contingencies. The U.S. government has established the Civilian Response Corps (CRC), which is managed by S/CRS. Like S/CRS, the CRC has a mandate that includes stabilization and conflict prevention. While the CRC includes ninety rule-of-law positions at State and DOJ, plus three demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration experts with USAID, it includes only three SSR experts with USAID to provide a more broadly focused integration role. DOD has created a deployable capacity through its Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW). The CEW includes a nascent cadre of experts to help build the capacity of partner defense institutions through the Ministry of Defense Advisers (MODA) program. These advisers support SSR by facilitating the development of systems, procedures, and practices. The United States Institute of Peace has provided training in advising and mentoring skills for this program. However, MODA is relatively small, with only thirty-eight personnel who can be deployed, and the program is limited to Afghanistan.

In a time of severe resource constraints, no donor can hope to place technical experts for every conceivable requirement on the government payroll. Many have developed rosters of outside experts or leveraged contracts, grants, or other mechanisms to tap the external capacity found in the nonprofit and for-profit sectors. Clear boundaries are needed between governmental and external support of SSR programming, however. External SSR actors are best leveraged for their technical expertise, with policy direction reserved for government officials. To ensure effective oversight, officials responsible for designing and managing contracts need the training necessary to provide policy direction and ensure that programs support the partner's overall SSR strategy. In the U.S. government, however, the lack of capacity among civilian departments and agencies has resulted in an insufficient number of project overseers with these requisite skills as well as the background to craft contracts that reflect SSR best practices and priorities.

Recommendations

The U.S. government has made major strides toward making SSR an institutional priority, but much more needs to be done to mainstream SSR at the headquarters level in Washington. Following are several concrete recommendations that, if implemented, would further elevate SSR within the U.S. government.

- **Make the Security Sector Assistance IPC a standing venue for advancing SSR policy.** The Security Sector Assistance IPC is the most authoritative policy coordinating body for issues related to SSR and should be made permanent for the duration of the Obama

administration. Once its review of security sector–related authorities, roles, and missions is complete, the IPC should reemphasize the reform objective of security sector assistance and make SSR policy a clear priority. The IPC should create sub-IPCs for SSR training and education and institution and human capacity building in addition to its new strategic planning and assessments and metrics sub-IPCs. Finally, the IPC should ensure that all key stakeholders are at the table—including, in addition to State, DOD, and USAID, all other departments and agencies with important SSR roles, such as DOJ, DHS, and intelligence community organizations, should be included.

- **Emphasize reform in the PPD on security sector assistance.** The Obama administration should promptly finish its review of security sector assistance policy and complete the PPD on security sector assistance. The directive should lay out the administration's policy, principles, and priorities for SSR, as well as define the roles and missions of relevant organizations and methods for improving the delivery mechanisms for U.S. government provision of security sector assistance. The PPD should balance capacity building with reform and ensure that train-and-equip programs are better integrated with activities that promote improved security sector governance and develop the human capacity of partner nations. An authoritative administration policy statement that emphasizes the transformational objectives of SSR as well as the need for improved delivery of security sector assistance would be a major step toward institutionalizing SSR.
- **Begin a systematic process of assessing partner SSR needs.** The Security Sector Assistance IPC should formally charter its new strategic planning and assessments sub-IPC to advance the necessary analytical work on needs assessments. These groups should facilitate continued refinement of those interagency needs assessment tools already in progress and sponsor the development of new tools in areas where gaps remain, especially in the intelligence area. Assessment tools developed by the U.S. government should be made available to the global SSR community of practice in order to promote common assessment methodologies and approaches and for the larger community to continually refine. The strategic planning and assessments sub-IPC should leverage assessment tools and methodologies to facilitate needs assessments before beginning any major program of security sector assistance. Assessments should include a frank analysis of a partner's political will to transform its security sector to assess the likelihood that U.S. assistance will have its intended impact.
- **Implement joint SSR planning and programming.** The strategic planning and assessments sub-IPC should be chartered to develop a framework, process, and procedures to jointly plan and program SSR activities. Where possible, stakeholders should leverage existing or forecasted planning frameworks, such as the Country Development Cooperation Strategies, mission strategic plans, and theater campaign plans, as platforms for coherent, coordinated, and multiyear SSR plans and strategies. To standardize multiyear planning and programming for security sector assistance, an interagency Security Sector Assistance Plans and Programs Office should be established. The State Department should host the office and serve as its secretariat to reflect the political nature of SSR and foreign assistance, and DOD and USAID—as well as DOJ, DHS, and other organizations—should provide secondees.
- **Evaluate the impact and effectiveness of security sector assistance.** Although the U.S. government has yet to develop its own tool kit for measuring the impact and effectiveness of its SSR interventions, other organizations have developed evaluation frameworks. Building on work done by Saferworld in this area, the metrics sub-IPC should sponsor pilot evaluations to measure progress toward achieving SSR objectives and should facilitate the further development of evaluation tools to assess the impact of U.S. assistance.[13] It should

also sponsor the development of new interagency metrics and evaluation frameworks where gaps remain among the international SSR community of practice.

- **Create a pilot Security Partnership Pool for funding SSR activities.** The Obama administration should seek congressional authorization for a pilot funding pool informed by Secretary Gates's proposal. The Security Partnership Pool would pool resources from State, DOD, and USAID in a way that would align train-and-equip programs with institution building and human capital development, and it would balance assistance appropriately among the elements of the security sector. The pool would also feature long-term funding arrangements to promote long-term partnerships with governments and avoid short-term shifts in programming. Governance of the pool would be shared to give each organization a voice in setting priorities, allocating funding, and directing programming. The Security Sector Assistance Plans and Programs Office would serve as the secretariat of the pool. The Security Partnership Pool would complement legacy security assistance tools and programs that will remain in place for the foreseeable future.
- **Emphasize institutional capacity, security sector governance, and human capacity development for partners.** Additional emphasis is needed on security sector governance and institution-building investments, programs, and activities such as DOD's DIRI program. Train-and-equip projects should be integrated with institution building to help the partner govern, oversee, and sustain its enhanced capabilities over time. Corresponding investments in the knowledge, skills, and abilities of partner civil servants and security officials are needed to provide them the technical skills they need to deliver security and justice effectively and run ministries efficiently. At the same time, greater investments are needed to foster the attitudinal and behavioral changes among individual officials and decision makers that are necessary for lasting reform. Building on the legacy SSR working group, a sub-IPC on institutional and human capacity should be formed to develop doctrine and best practices for building capable institutions, fostering effective governance, and developing the human capacity of partner security sectors and officials.
- **Develop deployable interagency SSR capacity within an operational unit.** SSR should be a core, cross-cutting mission for both stabilization and conflict prevention. This requires a deployable, reserve SSR capacity, which should be a key component of the CRC and a revamped, more operational S/CRS—one modeled along the lines of the UK's Stabilisation Unit. To make this organization truly whole-of-government, it should be broadened to include secondees from DOD—both active and reserve military members as well as civilians from the CEW. To reduce vertical span-of-control problems and avoid turf battles, the organization should be more operationally oriented, and country and regional policy should be left to the NSC and the regional bureaus at State. This organization should also be given the mandate to augment partners and U.S. country teams with technical expertise to conduct needs assessments and evaluate impact and effectiveness of programs. Because SSR requirements are not limited to conflict-affected or at-risk countries, this capacity should be made broadly available to U.S. partners as well as multilateral organizations.
- **Develop human capital for SSR within the U.S. government, and develop better systems and procedures for leveraging external expertise.** The Security Sector Assistance IPC should establish a training and education sub-IPC with the mandate of developing the human capital of U.S. civilian and military officials at each level—including senior decision makers—who are involved in making policy or designing programs related to a partner's security sector. The sub-IPC should also sponsor development of a specialized cadre of SSR experts who are skilled at designing and integrating programs across interagency boundaries. Some of these experts should be mainstreamed across key regional and functional bureaus, while others should be assigned to SSR-focused organizations such as a joint

planning and programming or pooled funding management cells. The deployable cadre of SSR and DDR experts within the CRC should also be expanded. Overseers of SSR contracts and grant-making vehicles should receive the training and education needed to better craft and oversee contracts. Finally, contracts, grants, and other mechanisms should be emplaced to quickly tap the technical expertise in the nonprofit and for-profit sectors.

Conclusion

The recommendations made in this report are not exhaustive. Steps should be taken to integrate a more effective U.S. framework for SSR into an international architecture that includes other donor governments, international and regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and, most important, partner governments and populations. At the same time as it organizes itself internally for SSR, the U.S. government should seek ways to improve its coordination with other donors at the policy level through UN and OECD forums and through initiatives such as the International Network for Conflict and Fragility. Ultimately, needs assessment, planning, programming, and evaluation should be better coordinated among multiple donors and with the host country.

Other donor governments and international organizations are grappling with challenges similar to those facing the United States. While not all recommendations in this report have applicability beyond Washington, D.C., the framework proposed is adaptable to other donor governments and multilateral organizations. The U.S. government should support efforts to institutionalize SSR capacities among other donors and through multilateral initiatives such as the new SSR Unit in the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Finally, the U.S. government should increase its support for institutionalizing South-South SSR capacity through regional organizations such as the African Union and mechanisms such as the African Security Sector Network.

The primary audience for this report is the U.S. government's SSR community of practice, and it is intended to offer participants a working plan for the coming months and years. Whether or not any specific recommendations in the report are adopted, it is hoped that SSR stakeholders will agree on the ultimate vision they suggest. At this future destination, structures would be in place to make policy, assess needs, allocate funding, develop plans and strategies, design programs, deploy technical experts, and evaluate results for effective, long-term SSR programs. Planning would be conducted by SSR professionals armed with the training and education, as well as the analytical assessment, planning and programming, and evaluation tools needed to manage integrated SSR programs. Programmers would enjoy sufficient funding for institutional development as well as flexible funding instruments that create incentives for, not roadblocks to, interagency coordination. They would be led by policymakers grounded in SSR theory and practice.

The security of the United States depends in part on how well it helps other states meet their basic security needs and how effectively those states provide their populations with safety, security, and justice. Getting SSR right is difficult but essential. Institutionalizing SSR in Washington will enable more effective support for U.S. country teams and more effective implementation of programs and activities in the field, which in turn will make the U.S. government a more effective partner and secure a better return on its investments in the security of states and populations around the world.

Notes

1. For a detailed background on the emergence and evolution of the SSR concept, see Nicole Ball and Dylan Hendrickson, "Trends in Security Sector Reform (SSR) Policy, Practice and Research," *CSDG Papers,* no. 20, March 2009, http://www.securityanddevelopment.org/pdf/CSDG Paper 20.pdf. See also Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance Committee, *Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice* (Paris: OECD, 2004), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf, and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance Committee, *Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice* (Paris: OECD, 2007), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/25/38406485.pdf.

2. One example of SSR in the U.S. context is the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, which responded to debilitating interservice rivalries by reforming the military command structure and empowering the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In another example, major intelligence failures prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks led to the reform of the U.S. intelligence sector under the director of national intelligence. Likewise, U.S. border control, the Coast Guard, Customs, and other critical security functions were consolidated in the new Department of Homeland Security.

3. This framework was inspired by a paper prepared for the Thematic Meeting on Whole-of-Government Approaches to Security System Reform hosted by the government of the Netherlands in 2008. See Conflict Research Unit, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, or "Clingendael Institute," "Towards a Whole-of-Government Approach to Security System Reform," conference background paper, The Hague, April 9–10, 2008. The framework was also informed by discussions at the United States Institute of Peace Initiative for Security Sector Governance conference entitled "International Policy on Security Sector Governance: Opportunities and Gaps," held June 29–30, 2010, and by the experience of the author.

4. The Office of Partnership Strategy was reorganized as the Office of Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations in March 2009.

5. U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Defense, and U.S. Agency for International Development, "Security Sector Reform," January 2009, http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/SSR_JS_Mar2009.pdf, 3.

6. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, "Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments," June 29, 2010, SIGAR Audit-10-11 Security/ANSF Capability Ratings, http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR%20Audit-10-11.pdf.

7. Robert Gates, "Helping Others Defend Themselves," *Foreign Affairs 89,* no. 3 (May/June 2010): 4.

8. For example, dedicated institution-building programs in DOD total only about $12 million ($6 million for DIRI and $6 million in WIF defense institution-building funding) in FY 2010, while the Section 1206 Global Train and Equip program is funded at a level of $350 million.

9. Conflict Research Unit, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, "Towards a Whole-of-Government Approach to Security System Reform," 5.

10. S/CRS includes staff from civilian agencies throughout the U.S. government and highlights USAID, DOJ, and DHS, as well as the Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, and Department of Health and Human Services, among its "whole-of-government" partners. However, DOD representation has typically consisted of a single army colonel serving as military adviser to the coordinator.

11. OECD, *Handbook on Security System Reform,* 4.

12. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Security System Reform: What Have We Learned?* (Paris: OECD, 2010), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/44/44391867.pdf, 12.

13. Simon Rynn with Duncan Hiscock, "Evaluating for Security and Justice: Challenges and Opportunities for Improved Monitoring and Evaluation of Security System Reform Programmes," Saferworld Research Report, October 2009, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/Evaluating%20for%20security%20and%20justice.pdf.

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