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Bookmark and Share 2011 Rostov Lecture Series on International Affairs

As Delivered by Adm. Mike Mullen , Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C. Thursday, March 31, 2011

JESSICA EINHORN: Well, good afternoon. I am Jessica Einhorn, dean of SAIS, and I thank you all for joining us today. 
 
It is my pleasure to welcome you – the students, the alumni and the friends – to the 2011 Rostov Lecture on International Affairs with Admiral Mike Mullen, chief – chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
 
Before I turn the podium over to Professor Cohen, who will introduce our very distinguished speaker Admiral Mullen, I want to give you a little bit of history on the Rostov Lecture Series.
 
The Charles I. Rostov Lecture on International Affairs was established in 1990 by his wife Dorothy as a tribute to his life and to his abiding interest in international affairs. A Hopkins alumnus himself, Charles Rostov was a dedicated supporter of the university’s efforts to improve our understandings of countries around the world and to build stronger relationships within those nations. And how fitting it is to have Admiral Mullen speaking with that brief.
 
Unfortunately, Dorothy Rostov could not join us today but I’d like to recognize Charles’s son Gene, a great friend of the school, and other members of the family, including daughter Terry (sp), who are here in support of this wonderful tradition. And we’ll just applaud Gene – (inaudible, applause).
 
Past Rostov Lectures have included New York Times columnist Tom Friedman, national security advisors – both Steve Hadley and Condi Rice, Justice Stephen Breyer, SAIS anchor – SAIS alumnus and CNN anchor Wolf Blitzer. We have the great honor to add Admiral Mullen to this distinguished list in no small part due to his relationship with Professor Eliot Cohen. 
 
Professor Cohen is, of course, the Robert Osgood professor of strategic studies, and director of the Merrill Center for Strategic and – Studies. And I have to say that if I don’t get off the podium now, Professor Cohen would be cross with me and a fair share of this audience knows that you don’t want that to happen. (Laughter.)
 
(Applause.)
 
ELIOT COHEN: Well, thank you, Dean Einhorn.  Admiral Mike Mullen is the 17th chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the highest-ranking officer in the United States armed forces.
 
He came to that position after a long and distinguished career in the United States Navy, to include command of the George Washington Battle Group, command of the United States Navy’s 2nd Fleet and, immediately before assuming the chairmanship 3 ½ years ago, service as chief of naval operations.
 
As chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen serves as the president’s principal military advisor. But he has many other roles as well, two of which, I think deserve particular mention.
 
He and his wife Deborah have made a point of speaking out on behalf of the welfare of American men and women in uniform, and their families, particularly in the areas of mental health, care of the wounded and veteran support.
 
He has also spoken eloquently about the changing nature of the military profession and sound civil-military relations in an age in which war has been transformed and a healthy relationship between soldier and civilian is more critical than ever.
 
The job of chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is, at any time, a difficult and demanding one. But in 2011, when this country is engaged in multiple conflicts – some a decade old, others initiated only a few weeks ago – this role is of vital importance. And as those of us who have had the privilege of observing him up close in government know, Admiral Mullen has filled that position with dignity and humanity as well as with great ability.
 
For all these reasons and more, Admiral Mullen, I am very glad indeed to introduce you as this year’s Rostov lecturer and to welcome you to SAIS.
 
(Applause.)
 
ADMIRAL MICHAEL MULLEN: Well, it really is an honor to be here. This is actually my third speaking engagement of the day. The first two were on the Hill – (laughter) – and I’m – I’m hopeful that this will be much more pleasant – (laughter) – than those two.
 
I can’t quite remember the exact moment that I committed to Eliot that I would come here and give this speech but I do remember committing to giving it at some point. And I really did that not because I know that much about SAIS, although I certainly am aware, but I just have great regard for him. 
 
And it truly is part of the privilege of serving in our government and being able to run into and work with individuals like Dr. Cohen, who care every bit about – every bit as much about our nation and its prosperity and security as anyone in uniform. So, Eliot, thank you for your service and for your continued leadership and commitment to our country.
 
Some time ago, Eliot and I enjoyed a terrific conversation related to his book “Supreme Command,” and I have to admit, his wit and insight almost made me want to start wearing a bow tie. (Laughter.) And I must admit, as soon as I got out of the vehicle today and looked through the glass, the first thing I saw was the bow tie. (Laughter.) Not quite though. 
 
            It really is an honor to be here at an institution so widely hailed as one of the top foreign affairs institutions not just in our nation but, indeed, the world. I’m amazed actually so many of you are here tonight during what I understand has been a very busy time. Frankly, I’m just grateful they didn’t schedule me during SAIS’s happy hour. (Laughter.)
 
            In fact, just this week alone, you’ve hosted events ranging from public diplomacy in Latin America to U.S.-Korean relationships to Ambassador Mark Sidwell’s observations on the future of Afghanistan. This apparently was topped off with Francis Fukuyama and other – others analyzing the theory and practice of state-building in the Democratic Republic of Congo. SAIS may be the only school in the world that could pull off a slate of events like this. But if you’re feeling tired, as someone who has also had what I – what you – what I’d call a busy week, I know how you feel. 
 
I also understand that for most of you spring break was anything but restful. I can just imagine it – the rigor of Eliot’s battlefield staff rides, service trips to Panama and to Honduras, even an energy-and-environmental trek in New York City. Frankly, you all deserve credit for looking beyond the ordinary and beyond yourselves even during your time off.
 
But I have to say my favorite SAIS spring break program description was the one that invited participants to arduously explore what was termed “Costa Rican Exceptionalism” – (laughter) – where participants enjoyed, among other things, zip-lining and whitewater rafting. (Laughter.) That’s probably the one I would have gone on – (laughter) – as a student. After reading this artfully composed description, I’m convinced that I need to find whoever wrote that and hire them to write my next congressional testimony. (Laughter.) 
 
Having just appeared before Congress today twice, I have already done a good deal – a good bit of speaking and listening. But what I hope to do tonight is share a few perspectives on the global security environment we find ourselves in. More specifically, after touching on a few trends I have discussed lately, I’d like to highlight some strategic constraints we’re facing and then briefly speak on the way ahead for our military as we prepare for this new era. Finally, I most look forward to learning from you as we continue our conversation after my prepared remarks.
 
We gather here during a time of breathtaking challenge and change. The Arab Spring, the unprecedented and tragic occurrences in Japan and our continued efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq present an extraordinary confluence of challenges for all of us. At this very moment, more than 200,000 of our young men and women in uniform are answering our nation’s call, responding to these challenges around the globe.
 
One of the places our military is making a difference is in Japan and I would like to particularly remember this extraordinary ally and friend with whom we share an enduring alliance. I know the SAIS community has also been touched by this tragedy and I salute the students here – several from Japan – who have led efforts here to support relief, aid on behalf of your great nation. Our thoughts, prayers and support go out to the Japanese people as they face an incredibly difficult tragedy and challenge.
 
Tonight, our young men and women are also serving off the shores of Libya. They are part of a coalition that includes nations like the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Italy, Spain, Greece and Turkey as well as Arab partners like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. They are flying and fighting to protect innocent people from a brutal regime and they are doing a magnificent job. 
 
To be sure, these challenges pose immediate demands. But as leaders, we must also scan the horizon as well. So despite the tyranny or (the urgent ?) – and there’s a lot of that in this town, believe me – and a pretty full inbox, I still try to dedicate time to think about the trends that I believe will shape the way we use our military forces in the future
 
These are concepts I have shared at institutions across our nation, including the Kennedy School at Harvard, the Bush School of Foreign Policy at Texas A&M, and now, here, as I engage people who I believe are our future leaders.
 
In past conversations, I have observed that we live in a geopolitical environment where the challenges we face often demand a whole-of-nation effort. And while military power may prove to be the best first tool of the state, it should never be the only one. Further, I believe military power will, far more often than not, need to be applied in a precise and principled manner, even against enemies that may not demonstrate similar restraint. And finally, our efforts to match policy and strategy in this dynamic and uncertain world will be quite necessarily iterative, informed by events on the ground, adapting as necessary to defeat a thinking enemy and achieve our ends.
 
Taken together, I believe these observations reflect the world as it is rather than what we would wish it to be. These realities are all the more daunting in that they occur during a time of strategic constraints both fiscal and otherwise.
 
For example, over the last year, I’ve noted that our national debt represents our greatest threat to our national security. Michael Mandelbaum, a member of your faculty and someone with whom I share a mutual friendship with columnist Tom Friedman, explores the impact of economic constraints in his most recent and well-received book, “The Frugal Superpower.”
 
He posits that after seven decades of global leadership without facing economic constraints, America now must lead in a cash-strapped era following the financial crisis of 2008, growing deficits and mounting domestic obligations.
 
Since SAIS has selected for its annual theme “the year of demography,” you are likely all too familiar that one large demographic cohort – mine, in fact – is nearing retirement age with a smaller proportional workforce remaining to pay for the rest of us.
 
In my house, this dilemma is no longer theoretical. In fact, I’ll be receiving my Medicare card later this year. But with two sons working to raise their own families, this demographic effect hits home for me in a very personal way. Many of our European friends are already seeing the impact of an increasingly gray population, with progressively smaller labor and tax bases to pay for increasingly advanced and expensive medical care for seniors who now live for decades after retirement. These nations are having to work harder to keep pace financially, much less stay engaged internationally.
 
China, and most especially Russia, whose population is actually shrinking by 700,000 people a year, will not be immune either as they reconcile their own shrinking labor bases in the face of mounting costs related to aging populations.
 
Similarly, our military budget must pay a progressively higher proportional cost on personnel-related expenditures – nearly 70 percent of our budget – to include keeping pace with the burgeoning medical costs our retirees are encountering.
 
This dilemma was somewhat obscured for us in a decade that saw steadily rising defense budgets augmented by war supplementals in an environment where money, while not unlimited, was relatively plentiful. Those days are over.
 
This January, my boss Secretary Gates said that we “simply cannot risk continuing down the same path where our investment priorities, bureaucratic habits and lax attitudes toward costs are increasingly divorced from the real threats of today, the growing perils of tomorrow and the nation’s grim financial outlook.” I could not agree more.
 
Aggressively challenging the status quo, the secretary has led a comprehensive efficiency effort: cancelling costly programs, improving business practices and even eliminating more than a hundred flag and general officer jobs and more than 200 senior executive service jobs from our roles. All told, we believe this will result in a total reduction of $78 billion from the five-year defense plan submitted last year.
 
As we look for even more ways to tighten our budgetary belt, yet another constraint casts a shadow over our ability to secure and represent our interests: energy costs. Long before this most recent round of turmoil in the Middle East, it became clear to me that energy security presents an enduring challenge for our military and our nation. And I’m not alone, and in my travels across the country, I’ve had audience members raise the connection between energy, security and our global future. 
 
Tom Friedman, who previously served as a speaker at this very lecture series, has also spoken eloquently of the growing need to rethink our views on energy and minimize our dependence on overseas energy sources that fuel regimes that do not always share our interests. In my profession, this is not just about money, for the cost of fossil fuel manifests itself far more profoundly than just a heftier bill at the gas pump. I’m acutely aware of the costs in both blood and treasure of providing energy to our forces in Afghanistan today and past headlines of fuel convoys being attacked attest to those vulnerabilities.
 
I’m proud to share that the military is responding to this challenge from sailing to the great – the “Great Green Fleet” in 2016 to deploying solar power in the field with the Marines to simply insulating roofs of the Army’s overseas deployment structures, which will save millions of dollars per month in air conditioning costs.
 
When you consider that some estimates of a fully burdened cost of diesel fuel approached $400 a gallon and require 1.3 gallons of fuel used per gallon at our most remote forward operating locations in Afghanistan, these savings start to add up. 
 
Our collective efforts may even help stem the inherent security issues related to climate change. Regardless of the root cause, climate change’s potential impacts are sobering and far-reaching. Glaciers are melting at a faster rate, causing water supplies to diminish in Asia. Rising sea levels could lead to a mass migration and displacement similar to what we saw in Pakistan’s floods last year. And other shifts could reduce the arable land needed to feed a growing population in Africa, for example.
 
Scarcity of water, food and space could not only create a humanitarian crisis but create conditions that could lead to failed states, instability and potentially radicalization. In combination, these strategic constraints related to the economy and energy consumption, combined with the panoply of emerging challenges we see in the headlines to place our nation at what I believe is at a strategic turning point.
 
Hereto, business as usual won’t cut it, for we live in a faster, flatter, more interconnected world where the United States and our allies will likely find ourselves operating in an environment where persistent tension, if not conflict, will be the norm. 
 
It is with this new reality in mind that I recently released the 2011 national military strategy. Guided by the president’s national security strategy, this strategy advances three broad themes. First, how we lead will often be as important as the military capabilities we provide. Second, the emerging security environment demands that we pursue wider and more constructive partnerships within our own government, between public and private enterprise and, most of all, internationally. 
 
Third, we must ensure that our military is capable of operating across the full spectrum of its capabilities – from counterinsurgency capabilities to humanitarian and stability operations and, of course, the more traditional missions as well. Underpinning this strategy is the firm belief that there is a place and a need in this world for America’s leadership. But in leading, our military must be prepared to play a number of roles: facilitator, enabler, convener and guarantor, sometimes simultaneously.
 
Like SAIS, the United States military is an institution with profound convening power. From the halls of our war colleges to the largest multinational exercises in the world, our relationships and capabilities are bringing others together to deepen security relationships and address challenges. We saw these connections pay very real dividends most recently in Egypt, a nation whom we’ve shared a strong military-to-military relationship for decades.
 
While this situation is still evolving, Egypt’s military – their professionalism and their restraint – helped lend stability to an incredibly dynamic situation and our relationships provided mutual benefit during this challenging time.  It is precisely for these reasons that I spend so much time visiting my counterparts all over the world – visiting General Kayani in Pakistan, for example, more than 20 times – and why we continue to seek stronger military-to-military relationships with nations like China. Because when a crisis or misunderstanding occurs, it’s too late to build a relationship. It must be cultivated beforehand, over time, one conversation and one friendship at a time. 
 
By broadening our view of American military leadership, expanding and reinvesting in our partnerships and ensuring our capabilities span the full spectrum, we can best be ready for an uncertain future. But we can never be complacent. If our past is prologue to the future, we will see challenges in this century that we have yet to even imagine. 
 
And although recent events in Libya occurred well after our strategy was published, they reflect some of the realities and approaches we identified in this document. After calls for action by the Arab League and some of our allies, we now operate as a partner in a broader coalition under NATO command, working hard to prevent Colonel Gadhafi and his troops from killing their own people. Indeed, in this case, the military was the first and best tool to respond to a rapidly degrading and life-threatening situation.
 
We are also conducting this mission in a precise and principled way, limiting the regime’s ability to inflict harm while dedicating exceptional care to avoid putting the Libyan people at unnecessary risk. Throughout it all, our military effort has been accompanied by an equally robust diplomatic one. 
 
In a speech to the nation this Monday, the president touched on our broader governmental efforts to work with the international community to provide food and medical assistance to the people of Libya and safeguard $33 billion in frozen assets so that it’s available to rebuild this country when the time comes.
 
This Tuesday, Secretary Clinton traveled to London where she met with the Libyan opposition and more than 30 nations to discuss additional political efforts to support a transition to the future that the Libyan people deserve. The president put it this way: “While our military mission is narrowly focused on saving lives, we continue to pursue the broader goal of a Libya that belongs not to a dictator but to its people.”
 
Yet nobody is underestimating the scope of the challenge before us. Gadhafi still poses superior military capability to those of the forces arrayed against him. He still shows every desire of retaking lost ground and, in fact, did so yesterday. And he’s made no secret of the fact that he will kill as many of them as he must to crush this rebellion. 
 
As I told Congress earlier today, I will leave it to our political leaders the task of debating the character of the mission we have been assigned. But I can assure you that our men and women in uniform will execute that mission now in support of NATO with the same professionalism with which they have led that mission until today. 
 
As we all contemplate these recent events and ponder their broader implications, however, let’s remember that these dilemmas aren’t just theoretical. They have real consequences – consequences that I see every day. The brutal truth is that – is that this decade at war has included some very tough fights and tragically we have lost some tremendous young men and women. 
 
For those who do – that do come home, their lives are forever changed. Their dreams, however, have not. So at this school that produces the leaders who help determine our nation’s course, I ask you to never forget war’s consequences and the brave young men and women who fight for us as we work together to create a better future for you, your children and my grandchildren. Thank you for your hospitality and attention tonight and, most of all, thank you for what you will do when you leave this incredible institution – leading and serving others in these dangerous and trying times. Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
 
(Applause.)
 
MODERATOR: The floor is open for questions if you want to just raise your hand.
 
ADM. MULLEN: Or not. I’ve had a few today. (Laughter.)
 
MODERATOR: If you could just stand and state – (inaudible, cross talk).
 
Q: Yes. Hello, I’m Leonore Blitz and I was of the generation of Vietnam and covered it at ABC News and we, of course, had a draft then. I have two questions: one about the size of our military forces and are they adequate enough? And number two, could you tell us more what can be done to help the vets that come home? Those that are slightly injured, those that aren’t injured at all, those that need to get back into the mainstream of American life here.
 
ADM. MULLEN: The – let me take the second one first. Actually – and I leave again on Sunday, and I’ve traveled fairly extensively over the course of the last year, year and a half to places throughout the country – small and big – to really make sure that I can tell the story that I see on a regular basis in terms of the sacrifices of these incredible young men and women and their families in ways that if you dialed me back to 2000 and I said, okay, this is what we’re going to do for the next 10 years, both those who have deployed, those who have come back, those who tragically have not come back. And in addition, the families who have – who have supported our men and women in ways that I couldn’t have imagined. 
 
One of the ways I look at it is if you’re a 15-year-old boy or girl and your dad has been – or mom, but mostly dads – have been in – has been in one of these heavily deployed Army units, you have – or, let’s say – let’s say you are a 20-year-old – this started when you were 10 – and you’re on – your dad’s on his fourth or fifth deployment – notionally about one year at a time – you haven’t seen much of your dad over the course of this decade. If you are 15, your whole conscience life has been at war in one of these families.
 
And it has affected us and changed us, and as terrific as we have been – and this is – I’ve been doing this for a few years now – this is the best United States military I have been associated with. It’s 2.2 men – million men and women; guard and reserve. They come from obviously all over the country and, in many cases, other countries as well. And they are extraordinary. But what I do worry about is that we’re less than 1 percent of the population in the country, we come from fewer and fewer places in the country, and I worry about the disconnect between the American military and the American people. 
 
As these veterans return home, extraordinary as each of them is, I worry about their transition and I also talk to community leaders about, I think, opportunities and potential that are there because they are so exceptional. And I think with a little boost and a little bridge in communities throughout the country, they will serve – and this is a young generation I frequently say is wired to serve. They’re in their 20s; many of them have been through life’s experiences that some of us would never want to see. But they’ve led, they’re disciplined, they’re loyal, they’re capable and I just think they’re great opportunities for communities to embrace them as they transition. And they’ll make a difference for the next five or six decades. 
 
With a very robust GI bill, many of them – tens of thousands are going back to school now. And I think not unlike it happened after World War II, that kind of investment will pay off a-thousandfold as well. So I’ve asked community leaders to customize the approach and I’ve found – I find great enthusiasm in communities throughout the country.
 
And what happened – many people in America who want to help but they don’t know how to help. And so what I’m trying to do by raising this issue is give voice to the challenges and also create an opportunity to make this connection. I know there is – I call it a sea of goodwill. I know it’s out there because the men and women in the military, and their families, are virtually universally supported by the American people. It was not thus in the war that you covered and the one that I fought in, which was when I was commissioned originally.
 
So I think there’s great potential there, but I think – I’m trying to give visibility to this. And I think they’ll make a big difference locally as well as for our nation in the future. They’re really terrific, terrific young people.
 
Q: Admiral, thank you for coming to speak to us today. What role do you see for cyberwar in both the global security environment and U.S. military strategy?
 
ADM. MULLEN: The two areas I worry about the most, actually, in the future in terms of warfare, two domains, one is cyber and another is space, because they are boundary-less. There are no rules, if you will. And they are – they’re actually being fairly widely used right now, particularly cyber.
 
And we’re at a point now where cyber, which – (audio break) – has sort of been off to the sidelines, so that we have experts that do this and we all sort of depend on them. That can no longer be the case. I think all of us have to understand a great deal more about the threats that cyber presents to us as a nation and to aggressively pursue solutions.
 
I can assure you there are other countries that understand a whole lot more about cyber than we think, and it’s a very, very dangerous threat. So I think it plays an increasingly important role in terms of warfare, both cyber and space. 
 
And it’s something I think we have to pay a lot of attention to because there are no rules, and because it is, in some cases, state-sponsored but it’s also stateless in the sense in cyber, from the standpoint of those who are hackers and in fact doing work for states, even though they would say they are stateless.
 
So there’s a tremendous amount of work that needs to go on here, and it actually will challenge us as Americans because eventually it will rub right up against our own individual freedoms. And you have to figure out, you know, what’s the right balance, to take steps to protect ourselves, to defend ourselves against this threat while certainly preserving what is so essential for us as Americans in terms of our own personal rights and freedoms.
 
But it is, more than any other warfare area, certainly an area that pushes the envelope with respect to that, and I think it needs to because of the danger that’s there.
 
MODERATOR: (Off mic) – over here.
 
Q: Thank you.
 
Admiral, thank you. My name is Thitinan Pongsudhirak. I’m a visiting professor with the Southeast Asia Studies Program here at SAIS, also a SAIS graduate from 20 years ago. Thank you for your talk, for your address, and SAIS is a great school, partly because we are able to deliver the likes of you to speak in our buildings. 
 
The headline in the Washington Post this morning says that the CIA is operational in Libya. A headline in the Irrawaddy magazine that focuses on Burma in Mainland Southeast Asia yesterday said that, “No Fly Zone Renews Debate Over R2P,” R2P being the responsibility to protect.
 
So, my first question – I have just two short ones – how would you explain interventions in Libya to countries’ opposition movements’ dissidents the world over that have been oppressed by their regimes for many, many years?
 
The second question has to do with this murky connection between protecting civilians and changing a regime. On the R2P responsibility to protect principle, how would this be reconciled with changing an oppressive regime? Would you be able to just give us a few words on that?
 
ADM. MULLEN: Sure. Let me back up just a little bit from the Libyan situation. Not too long after the Egyptian crisis started, I actually traveled in the gulf area over the course of a week as Egypt was unfolding and Bahrain was also starting to unfold. In fact, I was there not too long after the initial crisis in Bahrain.
 
And one of my beliefs then – and it has continued – is we have to – I think we have to do two things. One is, every country is different and we have to, I think, be mindful of discriminating, if you will, by country, and the circumstances, and not paint each one with a broad brush. 
 
The other – but the other piece of that is what I would call a country’s connection to its region. And I find less and less, certainly in the course of the last decade, for me personally, that the ability to just go to one country and understand the influence of it in some isolation, it just doesn’t exist because it’s in a region – it’s obviously got neighbors, and seemingly more and more the impact of what happens in one country seems to significantly impact what’s going on in other countries.
 
So, I certainly understand the question of the repression piece, but there is some uniqueness to Libya, from my perspective, that was – that I would – believe me, at this point I’d never say never, because if I were standing here three months ago and you stood up and said, hey, in three months your main focus is going to be Japan and Libya, I would have just moved on to the next question. (Laughter.)
 
And that gets to the predictability piece of this.   So I would never say that like circumstances couldn’t get us to another decision like the one the president just made with respect to Libya. But it has been, heretofore, very – or it has not happened that the Arab League has voted for something like a no-fly zone.
 
And then, we’ve actually got out of area deployments now from the United Arab Emirates and from Qatar, who are participating in the no-fly zone, which a few months or years ago would have been unheard of.
 
It was – so I think it was a combination of circumstances and the sense of urgency that Gadhafi’s forces were on the march. And while it’s hard to prove a negative, it’s very clear to me that the speed with which this was put together and executed initially stopped his forces from a humanitarian massacre in the vicinity of Benghazi. He is still killing his people as we speak today. 
 
So I think it was that combination there, also his personal international – his personal history with respect to international terrorism, and a confluence – and I’ll talk a little bit about the region. There’s certainly been discussion about vital interests – U.S. vital interests or national interests, and sort of level of that. 
 
And I won’t spend a lot of time on that except to say I think there is merit in the discussion about an initiative which is led by our European partners initially, because we were not the first ones to move forward in a way that said, we need to establish this no-fly zone; European partners who have fought alongside us at a time of our vital national interests, whether it was Iraq or Afghanistan.
 
And this gets to the regional piece of this, in addition to – because they certainly think – and I’ve lived over there – they certainly felt it was in their vital national interests, whether it was the almost 400,000 refugees who have left Libya since this started, whether it’s the 1.6 million Egyptians who live and work in Libya, and many of whom wanted to get back home as Libya came – as its crisis was initiated there.
 
And then, I just don’t think you can deny, you know, the physical presence of Libya between two countries – Tunisia and Egypt – who are undergoing fairly significant transformation as we speak as well.
 
So there were an awful – from my perspective, there were an awful lot of important parts of what was going on in Libya to get to the decision that the president made.
 
So, back to – pick another country that has an oppressive dictator and is, in fact, someone that should be gone, and there are a dozen you could probably tick off just the top of your head, or I could as well.
 
Just because we did this, from my perspective that does not give – that does not mean, well, let’s move from one to 12 here over the course of the next year or two. I’m very mindful that, you know, I am now in combat in my third Muslim country. I’m in my 10th year of war here. 
 
I am – and I was asked this today and I’ll just restate it here. You know, it is my view that, you know, regime change could happen in Libya through boots on the ground. And I’m not one who supports boots on the ground in a third Muslim country right now, for lots of reasons, which is very near to what has happened to us in the last – what we’ve been involved in, in the last 10 years.
 
So there’s an awful lot that goes into a decision like this. I would assure you, this was very thoroughly debated within the administration, every aspect of it. Every question that has been asked publicly or that I’ve heard today on the Hill was a question that was put out there prior to the time that the president made his decision.
 
And his decision was in support of a coalition both in Europe, and before that in the United Nations, which was relatively unprecedented as well in terms of speed. And I think that speaks to it as well.
 
So, an awful lot – and I do believe a negative is hard to prove, but I do believe that it prevented a humanitarian massacre that Gadhafi was on the march to execute.
 
Q: Bill Courtney, Computer Sciences Corporation. 
 
Almost within hours after the Libyan military operation started, there were media reports about how much a Tomahawk missile cost. Secretary Gates has led a noble effort to reduce costs in the support tail and reduce the cost of some of the major weapons acquisitions. Is it going to become more important to be cost conscious in how we conduct military operations?
 
ADM. MULLEN: We were asked today on a couple of occasions how – obviously a lot about the costs, as well as – one question was, if the government shuts down, how will that affect us? My understanding – the best of my knowledge is that even if the government shut down, it wouldn’t affect our operations in Iraq, Afghanistan or in Libya. 
 
What Secretary Gates did – and I strongly support – is to raise the level of cost consciousness in a building that had seen nothing but rapid increase in defense budgets for almost 10 years. 
 
And I actually, in my Navy life, spent a lot of time in the budget world. And when, from my perspective, as I watched this – because the resources were abundant we lost our ability to – we didn’t have to prioritize, we didn’t have to make hard decisions, we didn’t have to do tough analysis. And so, we’ve temporarily lost that skill. 
 
As early as 2003 for me, I have been preparing for the tip over. Now, I clearly did not include in that the financial crisis that we’re in, but historically defense budgets go up and down. So, my early prediction was it would go in about 2005 or ’6. I was a couple years late. But arrive, it has, and we have to do that.
 
And we have to do it – a significant part of what Secretary Gates did was incentivize the services with respect to resources in terms of if you go find this money, basically I won’t take it all; I’ll allow you to reinvest it in the warfighting end of what we do, which is – they used Tomahawk, obviously which is what the Tomahawk is.
 
However, you know, we’re also literally, right now – and this is, I think, reflective of the challenge we have in the country – we are starting to cancel deployments of Navy ships scheduled a long time ago because of the lack of a bill this year in terms of fiscal year ’11.
 
So there’s a – I think everybody – and I’ve said this many times as well – including the Department of Defense, has to recognize – we have to recognize the situation that we’re in, and we must become much more cost-conscious than we have been. That said, I haven’t seen – the overall budget level affects the warfighting – significantly affects the warfighting capability of our forces. 
 
And I didn’t answer your question about the size of the force. I actually think the size of the force is about right. And from what I can see right now, Secretary Gates has reduced the – he’s got a budget five years out.
 
It’s really interesting; it’s very rare anybody pays any attention to what happens four or five years out. Secretary Gates put in this year’s budget, in the ’12 proposal, if you will, which is currently on the Hill, a reduction in both the Marine Corps size, which was requested by the Marine Corps, of about 15(,000) or 20,000, and a reduction in the size of the Army.
 
And I would say two things. I was surprised that everybody’s focus so far out – because usually we don’t – but it’s also we do pay attention to force structure size, and that – and the response to that has been, I think, appropriate. But we also have time, based on the uncertainty that’s out there, to adjust that if circumstances drive it in that direction.
 
So I’m comfortable right now, although I do worry – and, as Secretary Gates said today, for those that want to reduce the Defense Department dramatically, the challenges that I have just spoken to this evening, we also have, for instance, 19 ships and 18,000 troops who are helping with the relief effort in Japan. And that’s not free. We have got to figure out a way to pay for that. 
 
So these seemingly increasingly challenging times and the increased national security requirements, we can’t just wish those away. We need resources to execute them on behalf, obviously, of our civilian leadership, who give us the charge to go do this. 
 
Q: Hi, Admiral. Jim Garamone with AFPS. If I could ask you about Pakistan, it’s such a crucial ally that you’ve made many trips to the country. You mentioned earlier you made at least 20 to consult with General Kayani. And the Pakistanis are extremely touchy about matters of sovereignty. 
 
I’d like to ask you, what is the effect on U.S. policy of a tax on the Taliban inside Pakistan, especially when some claim in the country that there are innocent civilians that are the victims of these attacks? Thank you.
 
ADM. MULLEN: Actually, one of the things he’s talking about them being sensitive about sovereignty, one of the things that I’ve actually found out is just about every country in the world is pretty sensitive about sovereignty – (laughter) – and certainly Pakistan. 
 
And I consider that to be as critical a region as there is in the world right now, and it’s something that I have invested a lot of my personal time, as you’ve indicated, to create and sustain a relationship on the military-to-military side in a country where certainly the importance of the Pakistani military is well known.
 
And while I wouldn’t talk about operations there in any way, shape or form, I certainly want to recognize or state – and I spoke to this actually in my opening remarks – that we focus heavily on making sure, to the best of our ability, there are no civilian casualties. 
 
And as has been the case in Afghanistan and in Iraq, when that has occurred, we regret, and I do – if we’ve done anything to create civilian casualties in any country, including Pakistan, I certainly regret that.
 
And this relationship does go up and down. We’ve been through a very difficult time with them recently because of the Raymond Davis case. 
 
And yet, I also have a chance to juxtaposition a 30-year continuous relationship with Egypt that somehow, when Egypt was in a crisis, because of that investment, you know, the relationship I think had a lot to do with understanding each other, as the Egyptian military did the right thing, and continues to this day to do the right thing in that country, from my perspective.
 
And yet, as I look back on Pakistan, we have at times broken that relationship, and whenever we’ve done that, we have dug ourselves into a hole that we find out is deeper than we dug it when we dug it, when we get back to look in the hole and have the need to rebuild the relationship.
 
And we just – in the role that I have lived – that we’re living in and certainly that I see, we can’t afford to do that. So, we will continue, from my perspective, to work on that relationship. It’s critical. We both – on both sides we both have challenges, we both have priorities, and I give General Kayani and others credit to continue to try to work so that that relationship is sustained over time.
 
There are those – it was broken from 1990 to 2002. So we’re back on year sort of eight or nine, and it’s going to take longer than that to create the kind of trust that has to be there, particularly when you’re in a crisis.
 
MODERATOR: The last question from one of our students here.
 
Q: Good evening, sir. Thanks for coming. I’m Major Raven (ph) Bukowski (ph). I’m a fulltime MA student, with strategic studies concentrator.
 
You’ve been very clear tonight, as well as Secretary Gates, on no boots on the ground in Libya, the third Muslim country that we’re engaged with at the moment. But I’m curious as to your thoughts on Yemen, where a combination of AQAP and a very fragile regime could constitute, arguably, the most significant long-term threat to U.S. national security.
 
Thank you, sir.
 
ADM. MULLEN: Yemen is a country that I have been concerned about for a significant period of time. I worry about it as a potential failed state.
 
And obviously it has become the home of one of the most viral, federated al-Qaida groups in al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula, led by an extraordinarily dangerous man, who I’m reminded often – or I would remind often still would kill as many Americans as he could possibly kill on any given day, if he were given the opportunity to do that. So there is great danger there. 
 
One of the things that Secretary Gates said today – and I think it – and it was about Libya but it resonates with me with all the change that’s going on – and I think that this is difficult for the United States, is how much of this we can fix; how much of it we can actually control.
 
I think it’s important to do our – to take every opportunity to influence positive outcomes for the peoples of these countries, but it is by and large – in country after country it’s about the Libyan people and what they want, or the Egyptian people and what they want, or the Tunisian people and what they want.
 
And so it goes in Yemen and in Syria and in Bahrain, you know, et cetera. And, again, I would hearken back to what I said earlier, that each country has a uniqueness to it that I think we have to be very careful about painting a broad brush that this is the solution. And also, each country has a regional impact that we have to pay attention to as we look at this dramatic, dramatic change. 
 
Someone said to me – and I’ll leave you with this thought because it’s certainly one I can’t get out of my head – someone said to me about a month ago that she thought 9/11 may have been – was the August 1914 event of our time to change the world. She’s not so sure anymore. She thinks Egypt might be. (Applause.) 
 
MR. COHEN: I have words, but I think the fact that you got a standing ovation says more than I can. Thank you for everything. 
 
Thank you all for being here. If I could ask you just to remain seated until we get Admiral Mullen headed back. I suspect –
 
ADM. MULLEN: No, no, you can get up. (Laughter.)
 
MR. COHEN: I suspect at the Pentagon – rather than sitting in an easy chair – there is a reception which we’ll be hosting immediately after he leaves, back there and in the lobby.
 
Thank you very much, Admiral Mullen. Thank you very much, sir. (Applause.) 
 
(END)

Chairman's Quote