Military Contribution to Cooperative Security (CS) Joint Operating Concept

Version 1.0

19 September 2008

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APPROVAL

As the lead authors, U.S. Joint Forces Command and U.S. European Command matured this concept through extensive research and a range of development activities including a series of dedicated limited objective experiments, co-sponsored joint wargames, seminars, writing workshops and other concept development venues. The intellectual direction of the concept was guided by a senior mentor cadre comprised of active and retired senior national security leaders from the defense, diplomatic and development communities. The product benefited from frequent collaboration with the community of interest.

During the development of this concept the Services, combatant commands, selected members from the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense, selected non-DOD agencies as well as multinational partners, academics, foreign policy experts and national security professionals made significant contributions.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the future, the role of the U.S. military will remain protecting and advancing the security interests of the United States. This is a broader and more holistic notion than 'fighting and winning the Nation's wars.' Contributing to Cooperative Security (CS) is a large part of what the U.S. military does, and will continue to do, when it is not engaged in open combat. Supporting CS is an essential element of the combatant commander's (CCDRs) day-to-day work to enhance regional security and thereby advance the national interest.

CS is defined as *the set of continuous, long-term integrated, comprehensive actions among a broad spectrum of U.S. and international governmental and nongovernmental partners that maintains or enhances stability, prevents or mitigates crises, and enables other operations when crises occur*. This term and its definition reflect an expanded view of actions that are described as "shaping" in the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) and current joint doctrine.

Scope and Problem

The focus herein is on those CS activities undertaken well in advance of any crisis-precipitating event, rather than those taking place immediately prior to the conduct of a significant joint military campaign or in response to a developing crisis. The concept provides a basis for future (circa 2015-2027) capability development, but much of its solution can be implemented in the near term for more effective operation in today's security environment.

This concept attempts to answer the challenging question, "How does a joint force commander (JFC) contribute to fostering a security environment favorable to U.S. interests as well as establish a solid base for effective crisis response given: (1) it is difficult to anticipate where and in what types of situations the United States will be involved, (2) the willingness and ability of others to cooperate is not always readily apparent; and, (3) the lack of definition in what will constitute success in a given situation?"

Solution

The solution advocated in this joint operating concept (JOC) involves a significant cultural change that places greater emphasis on pursuing cooperative security that is balanced with the need to maintain critical core military competencies. The concept considers a *CS mission* centered on *mobilizing and sustaining cooperation* of interested parties on a range of regional security initiatives. The following set of *five objectives* provides

a blueprint for the military contribution to CS, forming the basis for required effects and capabilities that will support mission accomplishment:

Objective One - Strengthen U.S. security posture in the region.

This objective addresses legitimacy, image, influence, and popular support of the command and the United States as a whole as well as relationships, presence, access, and arrangements. It highlights the challenges of understanding the region and building consensus through unified action before concluding with comments on capabilities, budgets, and authorities that provide the commander the agility needed to take action when it still matters.

Objective Two - Advance constructive security initiatives and build transnational and partner nation capacity and capabilities in the region.

This objective encompasses constructive initiatives at two levels: first, partner nation-related efforts; and then, regional cooperative security to positively change the security situation for the betterment of all. These efforts heavily emphasize capacity building, whether through partner nation initiatives, such as *Security Sector Reform*, or through regional and global initiatives. Such partner capacity is essential to the promotion of sustainable security in the region.

Objective Three - Thwart the emergence of specific security threats (transnational and host nation (HN)) in the region.

This objective focuses on several persistent regional dimensions of instability and conflict that grow under permissive conditions and enable security threats to emerge and exert unwelcome influence. Sanctuaries and support bases across borders, for example, permit powerful networks that include non-state actors to operate beyond the reach of HN security forces. The objective describes how geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) contribute to unified action by leveraging their regional perspectives of security concerns and mobilizing cooperative efforts to diminish the permissive conditions in which security threats take root.

Objective Four - Contribute to U.S. and international initiatives to alleviate the underlying conditions, motivators and enablers of violent extremism and destabilizing militancy.

This objective is related to the preceding discussion of thwarting the emergence of security threats. Violent extremism and destabilizing

militancy are given separate treatment because of their special nature and the dimensions of the problem they present.

Objective Five - Enable and improve cooperative security arrangements for improved multinational operating performance.

This objective describes how a JFC promotes a number of military initiatives that improve the ability to conduct CS in collaboration with contributing allies, friends, and multilateral entities.

Capabilities and Implications

To achieve these objectives, a JFC requires a complete set of broad capabilities. These capabilities are listed in Appendix C of the document. Capabilities are mapped therein to the operational effects they support.

Section 6 of the concept discusses concept implications in the following areas:

- The need for forward presence of certain capabilities and forces in order to support the requirements for regional experience and to enable the persistent relationships described in the concept;
- Other security posture-related implications such as those pertaining to authorities and organizational preparedness for CS;
- Transformation of the military personnel system that must begin in the near term due to the long lead time required to fully realize its benefits;
- Implications for joint experimentation that are being acted upon now in the ongoing plan development for CS implementation beginning in FY 08;
- Implications for joint concept development and experimentation in the areas of combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD), strategic communication, maritime domain awareness, security sector reform, and operational access;
- Implications for the joint experimentation environment infrastructure; and,
- Larger implications in the area of strategy and policy that are outside the purview of the Department of Defense but important to a unified U.S. government (USG) effort.

Summary

Figure 1 below summarizes the CS JOC concept logic. The concept risks and their mitigation are discussed in Section 5 of the document.



Figure 1 - Concept Logic

CONCEPT

1. Purpose

The **Military Contribution to Cooperative Security**[1] (CS) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) describes how future geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) and other JFCs are expected to contribute to CS[2] in support of strategic objectives.

> **Cooperative Security -** The set of continuous, long-term, integrated, comprehensive actions among a broad spectrum of U.S. and international governmental and nongovernmental partners[3] that maintains or enhances stability, prevents or mitigates crises, and enables other operations when crises occur. The military contribution to these efforts focuses on mobilizing cooperation and building relationships to enhance regional security.

Figure 2 - Definition of Cooperative Security

This concept places primary emphasis on the actions of GCCs and their senior staffs. However, the concept narrative will generally refer to the JFC so as not to exclude the important CS role played by functional CCDRs, subordinate unified commanders and, to a lesser extent, the commanders of certain joint task forces.

The intent is to help these future commanders better understand their contribution to efforts in which other instruments of national power are often more important and effective in application. Many such efforts will be led by other agencies. Upon implementation, the aim is to better enable commanders as they coordinate and integrate their CS activities with those of other agencies of the U.S. government (USG).

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[1] This title reflects the reality that this military contribution is provided to a much larger cooperative security effort orchestrated by the U.S. government. The primary defense role is to favorably impact the future security environment. For the sake of brevity within the document, the term CS may be used except when referring to the name of the concept itself.

[2] This term (see Figure 2 for definition) corresponds to what the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) describes as “shaping.”

[3] For the purposes of CS, nongovernmental partners might include nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the private business sector as well as other societal groupings (e.g., religious, political, academic, patriotic, and other cultural affiliations such as tribes, clans, social strata, etc.) that are not part of constituted governments.

The JOC helps guide the development and integration of future military concepts and joint force capabilities for conducting CS activities. The JOC provides a basis for further discussion, debate, and experimentation to evaluate elements of the concept's proposed solution. It also influences joint and Service operational development processes by providing a better understanding of the important role of the defense community in CS. Interagency and multinational partners may use this concept to assess potential integration requirements and opportunities.

2. Scope

This JOC describes the actions a JFC might take in the context of *unified action*[4] to advance U.S. interests by building partnership capacity, mitigating the underlying causes of conflict and extremism, and setting the conditions that enable rapid action when military intervention is required. This concept *focuses on steady-state*[5] *activities designed to promote an acceptable state of peace and security in a region and preclude or mitigate crises* rather than those taken concurrent with the conduct of a significant joint campaign of the nature described in Appendix D of the CCJO.

Figure 3 - Scoping Statement

This concept provides a description of how future JFCs are expected to conduct CS activities[6] in combination with other available instruments of national power and in concert with partners to achieve strategic objectives in the 2015 to 2027 timeframe. While this concept is intended to provide a basis for future capability development, much of its solution

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[4] See glossary for the definition of unified action.

[5] The term "steady state" refers to those activities the Department conducts continuously in contrast to surge activities (see the 2006 QDR Report's Force Planning Construct). It is not meant to describe the goal of these activities, which is to change the state of the security environment for the better.

[6] A representative listing of military activities undertaken in support of CS might include:

- Providing security assistance in the form of training, education and equipment to build the capacity and capability of partner states and organizations;
- Conducting security cooperation activities with partner nations to confront threats and challenges before they mature into a crisis;
- Conducting military-to-military senior leader and staff talks and exchanges;
- Promoting regional cooperation to meet shared challenges as well as decrease tension and rivalries;
- Conducting bilateral and multilateral exercises; and,
- Concluding formal arrangements for the use of facilities, basing or transit of military forces.

can be implemented in the near term for more effective operation in today's security environment.

a. Relationships to Other Joint Operations Concepts Family Concepts

This JOC is nested under and consistent with the **CCJO** that describes the importance of conflict/crisis prevention as well as anticipatory and preparatory actions to establish the conditions for rapid response to crises that occur.[7]

Future military activities are expected to focus more and more on the skillful execution of complementary CS and deterrence operations. The Military Contribution to CS and **Deterrence Operations** JOCs[8] are distinct but mutually supporting, with the Deterrence Operations JOC focused on adversaries, and the Military Contribution to CS JOC primarily focused on partners.

The CS concept is foundational and complementary to the **Major Combat Operations (MCO)**, **Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations** and **Irregular Warfare (IW)** JOCs, which derive strength from and contribute to global and regional CS. CS activities provide pre-crisis situational awareness, set the foundation for operational access and develop the relationships and organizational precursors that enable effective partnerships in times of crisis.

CS further supports irregular warfare by helping gain knowledge of the operational environment, enabling operational access, and preparing the operational environment for potential irregular warfare operations. Several CS capabilities directly support the central idea of the **Irregular Warfare** JOC stating in part, "IW focuses on winning the support of the relevant populations, promoting friendly political authority, and eroding adversary control, influence, and support." The CS JOC addresses primarily overt activities, acknowledging that other more irregular

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[7] The emphasis on such activities reflects the recognition that constructive security programs and the development of partner capability are far more cost effective in the long term than crisis intervention. Fiscal realities of the USG suggest that defense and other security-related programs will comprise a declining share of future Federal budgets.

[8] Both JOCs have a heavy focus on conflict prevention. CS supports deterrence by showing resolve, strengthening partnerships and fostering regional security. Deterrence supports CS by helping to reassure states that partnership with the United States will not incur unacceptable risk.

methods may be used in countries that are neither partners nor adversaries.

CS supports the **Homeland Defense and Civil Support** JOC through operations in both the forward regions and approaches as described in the active, layered defense of the homeland. These operations seek to mitigate extremism, deny sanctuary to terrorists, enhance situational awareness, and improve security by stemming the proliferation of WMD.

The **Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Planning and Direction** Joint Integrating Concept (JIC) provides a detailed description of required capabilities that are supportive of the situational awareness requirements of the CS JOC.

Two other concepts that expand on specific aspects of the CS JOC are the (under development) **Strategic Communication** JIC and the **Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)** JIC. The CS JOC provides the combating WMD JIC with principles for influencing the decision making of WMD actors, partners, and allies.

b. Assumptions

The conduct of CS is governed by legislative and national policy direction, and certain key assumptions must be made regarding its future. Supplementing the critical assumptions of the CCJO, this JOC assumes the following:

- Legislative authorities permitting the United States to provide foreign assistance in the form of training and equipping partners will continue;
- U.S. policy will support the allocation of U.S. military forces to CS activities led by partner states or multinational organizations; and,
- The military will serve in a supporting role in the USG development of a coordinated foreign assistance strategy.

An important assumption of the CCJO is that fundamental objectives of current national strategy will remain applicable in 2012-2025. This implies that an approach emphasizing conflict prevention and resolution to address regional conflict will continue to be a key component of U.S. national security strategy. It also implies a continued intention to conduct operations with partners when practical, often in the context of ad hoc coalitions.

3. Military Problem

a. Essence of the Problem

Given that:

- The United States must be able to protect its interests in a world which is dynamic and, in many places, unstable;
- Future state and non-state adversaries, to include extremist ideologues, may use a variety of means to exploit instability in order to undermine partnerships and further destabilize weak governments, deny or disrupt U.S. influence or access, and gain sanctuary in ungoverned, unstable and remote areas;
- The United States must be able to act but cannot be everywhere at once;
- Operations by, with and through partners are generally preferred to unilateral U.S. action;
- Globalization and an increasingly multipolar geopolitical world will increase the likelihood of having to operate with uncertain influence in the context of shifting, often fragile, issue-oriented coalitions with partners of varying sophistication and capacity;
- The ability to act effectively in pursuit of security goals, whether or not a crisis exists, is contingent on setting certain preconditions both physical (e.g., basing, passage and overflight, support, interoperability) and sociopolitical (e.g., legitimacy, credibility, cooperation) in nature;
- The military operates in a CS environment that is complicated, often imprecise, fraught with ambiguity and laden with obstacles;
- Military effectiveness within the world of diplomacy and development will often require commanders and their staffs to employ different approaches from those used for more traditional military operations; and,
- The commander's role in CS must be balanced with his/her enduring role as a warfighter:

How does a joint force commander contribute to fostering a security environment favorable to U.S. interests as well as establish a solid base for effective crisis response given: 1) it is difficult to anticipate where and in what types of situations the United States will be involved; 2) the willingness and ability of others to cooperate s not always readily apparent; and, 3) the lack of definition in what constitutes success in a given situation?

Figure 4 - Military Problem

b. Trends and Uncertainties in the Global Landscape

Figure 55 on the next page provides a contrasting view of many relative certainties and uncertainties in projections of the global landscape in the 2020 timeframe.

The CS priorities of the USG will be shaped by several fundamental characteristics of the future global operating environment[9] that directly affect America's ability to influence world affairs, honor its security commitments, and project and sustain military capabilities. For a detailed description of these stressors and other concerns that will challenge CS efforts, **see Appendix E**:

- Economic, demographic, and societal stressors;
- An ongoing global insurgency using sophisticated information operations (IO), terrorism, and criminal activities as tools;
- A greater impact of transnational networks (regional conflict complexes) on civil conflict;
- A continuing information revolution and a more level playing field in the availability and use of information;
- Proliferation of conventional weapons and WMD;
- Chronic and pandemic health issues;
- The emergence of powers with economic, political, or military capabilities rivaling those of the United States;
- Competition for energy and its effect on geopolitical relations; and,
- Climate change and other issues of the natural environment.

In contributing to CS efforts of the USG, GCCs, and other JFCs must collaborate with colleagues of relevant U.S. civilian agencies to nurture relationships among HNs, regional entities, and other influential actors from the international community.

[9] This concept's view of the future operational environment is shaped by a number of sources including the trends, implications and emerging adversary operational design as described in the "Joint Operational Environment - The World Through 2030 and Beyond" Living Draft, USJFCOM, 4 Sep 06. Refer to this document for more extensive discussion of these environmental factors. The Nature of the Long War Seminar held in Dec 06 as part of the Unified Quest 07 sequence reinforced many of these viewpoints.

The 2020 Global Landscape	
Relative Certainties	**Key Uncertainties**
Globalization largely irreversible, likely to become less Westernized.	Whether globalization will pull in lagging economies; degree to which Asian countries set new "rules of the game."
World economy substantially larger.	Extent of gaps between "haves" and "have-nots"; backsliding by fragile democracies; managing or containing financial crises.
Increasing number of global firms facilitate spread of new technologies.	Extent to which connectivity challenges governments.
Rise of Asia and advent of possible new economic middle-weights.	Whether rise of China/India occurs smoothly.
Aging populations in established powers.	Ability of EU and Japan to adapt work forces, welfare systems, and integrate migrant populations; whether EU becomes a superpower.
Energy supplies "in the ground" sufficient to meet global demand.	Political instability in producer countries; supply disruptions.
Growing power of nonstate actors.	Willingness and ability of states and international institutions to accommodate these actors.
Political Islam remains a potent force.	Impact of religiosity on unity of states and potential for conflict; growth of jihadist ideology.
Improved WMD capabilities of some states.	More or fewer nuclear powers; ability of terrorists to acquire biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear weapons.
Arc of instability spanning Middle East, Asia, Africa.	Precipitating events leading to overthrow of regimes.
Great power conflict escalating into total war unlikely.	Ability to manage flashpoints and competition for resources.
Environmental and ethical issues even more to the fore.	Extent to which new technologies create or resolve ethical dilemmas.
US will remain single most powerful actor economically, technologically, militarily.	Whether other countries will more openly challenge Washington; whether US loses S&T edge.

Figure 5 – National Intelligence Council (NIC) 2020 View[10]

[10] "Mapping the Global Future, Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project," National Intelligence Council, Dec 04

4. Solution

Many of the previously described security-related characteristics of the operating environment, either threatening or constructive, call for early engagement to bring about expanded regional cooperation in which the United States may play either a central or supporting role.

Through cooperative security, the United States seeks to mobilize and sustain cooperation across a region. The desired ends of this cooperation include improved security, nonproliferation, political stability, good governance, sustainable development, legitimate competition and trade, and economic prosperity.

Given the increasing interdependence among states in a globalizing world, the contribution of the GCCs and other JFCs to cooperative security will likely expand in the future. A solution approach answering the aforementioned military problem advocates a significant cultural change[11] placing greater emphasis on cooperative security. That emphasis must be balanced with the need to maintain critical core military competencies. The concept considers a *CS mission* centered on *mobilizing and sustaining cooperation* of interested parties on a range of regional security initiatives. A set of *five objectives* derived from that mission provides a blueprint for the military contribution to CS, forming the basis for required effects and capabilities that will support mission accomplishment.

This concept envisions that, by 2016, extensive systematic improvements will have been made to the national security structure and processes of the United States. Such reform is essential to the unified planning and execution of effective cooperative security activities.

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[11] Commanders and their staffs have to operate in a world of ambiguity and complex relationships with a wide range of partners and where progress toward goals is very difficult to measure. Classic military terms like “endstate”; a predisposition for accomplishing missions within a set period of time; and the detailed definitions of command relationships that are highly effective for most campaigns and operational planning do not translate well to CS. This concept emphasizes what good commanders know instinctively about a CS effort: it is all about relationships and its implementation requires negotiation and compromise both within the U.S. government and among our partners in the region. Cooperative security demands flexibility and a willingness to adapt to circumstances which will often be uncomfortable and is not a necessary evil, but a valuable endeavor to be embraced.

a. Description of How Operations May Be Conducted

The intent of a JFC's CS efforts is to build trust and habits of cooperation—among other nations' security forces and, in due course, among their governments—by working together to achieve common security goals.

The heart of this operating concept is *mobilizing and sustaining the cooperation* of interested parties on a range of security initiatives in and across regions.

Mobilizing and sustaining cooperation among sovereign states is a two-way street. It involves negotiating working partnerships among governments and leveraging those partnerships to achieve cooperative security objectives. U.S. ambassadors and their embassies work in these countries on a permanent basis and are critical to navigating this complicated world that often involves ambitious leaders facing challenges to their political power. Progress usually requires time, persistence, tradeoffs, pressure, compromise, and sometimes dealing with unsavory leaders. In some cases a JFC may need to employ even stronger methods of persuasion including working with partner nations when dealing with third party countries of concern. In all cases, the military contribution to CS must be integrated into the country team's broader CS efforts.

With cooperation at the core, the commander's mission for CS is as stated in Figure 6:

> Enabled by U.S. security posture, a JFC mobilizes and sustains cooperation as part of a wider U.S. effort by working in partnership with interested parties to achieve common security goals that prevent the rise of security threats and promote a constructive security environment in the region.

Figure 6 – Cooperative Security Mission

The JFC seeks to build working partnerships that enable like-minded states and organizations to prevent the rise of particular threats and promote regional peace and security. Working in partnership involves not simply pursuing a favorable outcome, but also involving those who have a stake in the result, bringing them into decision-making processes, and sustaining their participation throughout implementation.

U.S. security posture is both the primary enabler for partnerships and an index of CS success. Building relationships, cultivating

understanding, generating influence, gaining access, and bolstering several other capacities within a geographic command all contribute to a strengthened U.S. security posture that enables mobilizing and sustaining cooperation, the heart of this concept.

The JFC contributes to cooperative efforts to thwart the emergence of a range of security threats. Some of these threats can be viewed as HN challenges, such as internal conflict or the rise of a terrorist sanctuary. Other security threats, such as a militant narcotics cartel or terrorist operations conducted from a sanctuary, can be viewed as transnational because they affect many states in a region.

Concurrently, the JFC pursues a range of constructive initiatives that in the long run positively changes the security equation in the region. The promotion of some constructive efforts, such as security sector[12] reform, can be viewed as HN initiatives. Other constructive initiatives, such as proliferation security efforts, can be viewed as transnational initiatives.

Pragmatically, the JFC pursues **five objectives** as a matter of regular active engagement on a range of security initiatives, well before a crisis looms on the horizon, with the ultimate goal[13] of a global security environment favorable to United States and partner interests.

1. **Strengthen U.S. security posture in the region.**

2. **Advance constructive security initiatives and build transnational and partner nation capacity and capabilities in the region.**

3. **Thwart the emergence of security threats (transnational and HN) in the region.**

4. **Contribute to U.S. and international initiatives to alleviate the underlying conditions, motivators, and enablers of violent extremism and destabilizing militancy.**

5. **Enable and improve cooperative security arrangements for improved multinational operating performance.**

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[12] See glossary for definition of security sector.
[13] Recognizing that CS is a never-ending mission for the commander, this is a goal rather than an "endstate," the military definition of which is listed in the glossary.

These objectives serve as the blueprint for the JOC. They are expected to apply in a *timeless* fashion to current and future security challenges facing the United States. They are also crafted to be *universally applicable*[14] across the unified and subordinate unified commands of the Department of Defense. Finally, they are intended to be *inclusive* in their consideration of and nesting within the broader context of U.S. policy and strategy for a region; that is, fully integrated within a triad of diplomacy, defense, and development. These considerations are elaborated in the discussions below.

Objective One - Strengthen U.S. security posture[15] in the region.

This objective addresses legitimacy, image, influence, and popular support of the command and the United States as a whole as well as relationships, presence, access, and arrangements. As used within this concept, "security posture" refers to this broader U.S. disposition – the term should not be misconstrued to simply mean the presence of military capabilities. The objective also deals with the challenges of understanding the region and building consensus before concluding with comments on capabilities, budgets, and authorities. Specifically, the effects associated with this objective are:

- Bilateral military relationships with heads of state and senior security officials from selected states in the region are active and reliable;
- Multilateral relationships are active and reliable;
- Access agreements and arrangements support potential U.S. and multinational operations;
- U.S. security assistance, security cooperation, and other CS efforts are aligned, mutually supporting, and advancing U.S. security interests in the region;
- U.S. legitimacy is strengthened in the region;
- Regional stability is enhanced by U.S. military presence and support for constructive security initiatives, actions to thwart emerging threats and the timely conduct of other operations when required;
- The joint force's cultural understanding of and ability to interact with local society is deep and helpful; and,

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[14] In pursuit of these generic objectives, the JFC's specific activities and initiatives will be tailored to the particular regional conditions as part of a theater or functional strategy.

[15] See the glossary for a definition of security posture as it used in the context of this concept. This use of the term should not be construed as synonymous with the use of the term "posture" in the context of the DOD Global Defense Posture initiative.

- U.S. situational awareness in the region adequately supports constructive security initiatives, actions to thwart emerging threats, and the timely conduct of other operations when required.

Opportunities and Challenges

During CS activities, there are opportunities to enhance U.S. security posture that are unavailable during crises. Peacetime affords a JFC the opportunity to understand partners' interests and purposefully accommodate them in promoting our own. USCENTCOM's responses to the regional security challenges of the 1980s, including the reflagging of Kuwaiti oil tankers, helped foster a favorable response by the Gulf Cooperation Council that facilitated the conduct of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Rapid and effective U.S. support in response to disasters in the region can enhance the legitimacy, image and influence of the JFC and the United States. These enhancements can help open doors in the affected countries, but sustained CS in the aftermath of such events is required to keep those doors open. Finally, the JFC can give personal priority to the complex challenges of CS where he/she has a comparative advantage in perspective and influence unrivaled in the U.S. military while confidently delegating many military tasks to his/her staff.

The emergence of new players with global ambitions such as China, India, and perhaps others like Brazil and Indonesia could lead to a significant shift in geopolitical alignments to the detriment of U.S. interests. A strengthened U.S. security posture in peacetime, deliberately pursued, will help counter the attempts of such global competitors to exclude or supplant U.S. influence and access. Enduring relationships must be built and sustained to assure that all forms of access (human, political, economic, geographic, and operational) remain a reality.

In some regions, U.S. military effectiveness is currently hampered by a perceived lack of legitimacy and poor image. Al-Qaida (AQ) portrays the United States as occupier of Islamic lands in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and other areas of the Arabian Gulf and indirectly in Palestine. This facilitates recruitment of terrorists and constrains governments in Islamic countries in security cooperation partnerships with the United States. In South America, radicals gain political traction by portraying the United States as neo-imperialist, a charge made credible to Latin populations because of past U.S. military interventions and perceived support of dictators. The JFC should vigorously seek to enhance the image of the U.S. military in the region through innovative and appropriate strategic communication, which will reflexively enhance freedom of action in the region.

Legitimacy, Image, Influence, and Popular Support

The JFC must take the initiative to define him/herself and his/her command or they may be defined by others. Given different political environments, one size cannot fit all. For example, in areas where the U.S. military is perceived as an occupier, interventionist or largely absent, the JFC must consciously define himself in partnership with relevant U.S. agencies, HNs, and the international community:

As a force *protector* in self-defense of U.S. interests based on the principles enshrined in the United Nations (UN) charter;

As an *advocate* for international cooperation and the prevention of instability in the exercise of UN mandates or through participation in broad coalitions; and,

As a *preserver* of the human condition, assisting in relief efforts associated with the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property.

U.S. ambassadors and political advisors with credible regional experience are well placed to point out pitfalls and suggest tailored approaches. The JFC will support the implementation of a U.S. strategy for communicating policy goals, priorities, and reasons for specific activities. Skeptical populations are conditioned to default to historical stereotypes so the JFC's *image will be shaped primarily by his actions or inaction*, not statements. Once established, the JFC's reputation must be protected from tarnish. From such behaviors, influence can flow via relationships, presence, access, and arrangements.

Relationships and Presence

The JFC's primary CS mission is to establish and maintain productive and enduring bilateral and multilateral security partnerships. These relationships may appropriately *originate* with U.S. interests, but if they *only serve* U.S. interests they will not endure. Ideally, State Department diplomacy would provide a regional policy framework and generate the political support in Congress so that resources flow in support of these relationships. More often, the JFC will be working with U.S. ambassadors to construct ad hoc partnerships.

Relationships will vary considerably from region to region and by type of partner. As with present-day U.S. relations in Europe and much of Asia, many future relationships will have already been effectively institutionalized. However, in much of the developing world, a requirement will remain to build strong personal relationships with foreign military and civilian leaders. Such relationships can only be built by investing in *persistent, personal, and purposeful* contacts that yield results.

The JFC staff's engagements with their partner nation counterparts are also important and should be carefully aligned with the JFC's CS strategy and supportive of country team objectives. The U.S. military's limited tours of duty are serious impediments to establishing these important relationships. For most of the world, 2 years is time for an acquaintanceship, not a relationship. This handicap can be mitigated by:

- Eliciting the support of U.S. ambassadors and country teams, particularly security assistance chiefs and defense attaches, in relationship-building efforts;
- Recruiting a staff with relevant languages, positive area experience, and particularly, the type of *interagency and cross-cultural experience* that is found in most country teams and, where consistent with equal opportunity policy, relevant ethnic or cultural background;
- Committing to frequent engagements with partner nation leaders to accelerate the development of relationships and indicate the sincerity of U.S. interest; and,
- Leveraging existing enduring relationships developed through programs such as the *National Guard State Partnership Program*[16]and *Global Maritime Partnerships.*[17]

A constructive American military *presence* will depend upon the region's history and politics. In many areas – e.g., Eastern Europe, East

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[16] The *National Guard State Partnership Program* is a bilateral military-to-military program that pairs the National Guard from the individual U.S. States with 50 partner nations around the world. The SPP is first and foremost a military-to-military program, but partnerships can evolve to conduct military-to-civilian and civilian-to-civilian activities between the partners.

[17] The *Global Maritime Partnerships* (GMP) is an overarching approach to cooperation among maritime nations who share a stake in international commerce, safety, security and freedom of the seas. Developed in conjunction with the State Department, the GMP initiative unites mariners, port operators, commercial shippers, USG and international entities in an effort to foster and develop capabilities and relationships world wide that improve maritime security and aid in the free flow of commerce.

Asia, and Sinai – the American military will likely continue to be a stabilizing factor. In other places, American military presence may destabilize the region's political environment. As a rule, in-country military personnel working with U.S. country teams or the persistent presence of integrated forward-deployed small units such as those engaged in Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) will be the most effective military contributions to CS. Maritime security forces operating from a sea base can also provide a persistent and constructive presence with minimal footprint. In permissive environments, the command presence can become substantial and Department of Defense and other USG agencies can provide significant benefits by extending U.S. tours and building relationships with HN's influential figures.

Military personnel so deployed will be at risk. Force protection will increasingly assume the form of locally informed and adapted force protection measures taken by units that are more integrated with the HN population rather than garrisoned forces divorced from the population at large. While U.S. military personnel assigned as technical and administrative staff of the diplomatic mission enjoy limited[18] diplomatic immunities, most U.S. military personnel deployed to HNs for cooperative security activities are not accorded such status. The USG, as a matter of policy, seeks to conclude with HNs enduring, broad status-of-forces agreements that cover DOD personnel performing the full range of DOD activities, from deliberately planned CS exercises to humanitarian and disaster relief operations. The negotiation of such agreements will continue to be constructive and stimulate diplomatic engagement. In permissive environments, the command presence can become substantial. The Department of Defense and other USG agencies will be encouraged to extend tours of duty to increase the depth of relationships built with HN's influential figures.

Access Agreements and Arrangements

Lasting access, particularly in terms of its political element, is a primary objective of CS. Formal arrangements can be negotiated within a framework of shared interests among sovereign states. The JFC, however, can and must often rely on informal arrangements which can provide a functional equivalent if based on solid political relationships. For example, despite high-level diplomatic efforts, the USG never arrived at a formal understanding allowing transits of the Suez Canal by nuclear-powered warships. Instead, a political understanding at the highest levels has provided a reliable basis for critical carrier transits.

[18] Limited in not extending to immunity from criminal prosecution.

Security assistance programs play an important role. The overbuilding of Saudi air bases in the 1980s and the basing of a U.S.-supported Egyptian F-16 squadron at Cairo West later afforded the United States with access critical to Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Obviously, the access to key HN security officials required in joint planning and exercises transfers directly to real-world contingencies. With climate change and urbanization, JFCs may be increasingly called upon to assist nations stricken by disasters. Only rapid response during such events, and sustained CS in their aftermath, will help foster relationships that lead to lasting access agreements and arrangements. JFCs must plan, posture, and resource accordingly.

Access is essential for force projection. The GCC must assess his/her area of responsibility (AOR), in concert with USTRANSCOM, to determine its capacity to satisfy geographic access needs for crisis response. He/she must work with the country teams to make arrangements with selected HNs to satisfy a number of operational requirements.[19]

Understanding and Consensus

A JFC confronts the daunting task of understanding the array of histories, cultures, perceptions, and goals of the countries within his/her AOR. Yet, successful contributions to CS depend upon a sophisticated understanding of each local situation. In the future, seasoned staffs will be needed with staff officers trained in relevant languages and the cultures of HNs, and serving the extended or multiple tours necessary to establish lasting relationships. In the meantime, JFCs can leverage the resident expertise of the military representatives on embassy country teams.

Heads of state and governments are usually accessible only to the U.S. Ambassador and CCDR. Understanding the minds of these HN leaders on military matters will rest largely with the CCDR. The CCDR will be equally challenged to understand the complexity of U.S. civilian agency initiatives – disaster response, security sector reform, counterterrorism (CT), good governance, and numerous other programs. Accordingly, civilian experts from USG departments and other agencies

[19] These requirements include overflight rights; the use of port facilities, staging areas, and transportation infrastructure; and host nation-furnished provisions such as food, fuel, and water that support crisis response operations. A JFC must augment the military's afloat pre-positioning capabilities using arrangements with selected HNs for the placement of military equipment or supplies at or near points of planned use to support initial stages of crisis response operations.

must be made available to CCDRs in order to provide them reachback capability to Washington for policy coordination and support.

The JFC must understand, integrate, and synchronize diverse and disparate defense combat support agency and field activity programs as well as Service-related security assistance programs that support CS initiatives in theater. Some examples of such assistance:

- Intelligence Sharing. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency (NSA) often have existing intelligence sharing agreements with many of the nations comprising a Theater of Operations. These agreements may be leveraged by the JFC in support of CS initiatives;
- Threat Reduction. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) brings an important capability to the JFC through its threat reduction efforts in theater; and
- Logistics and Communication Interoperability. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) possess unique logistics and communications capabilities, respectively, that promote interoperability in support of the JFC's CS mission.

There will be a premium on the JFC's understanding and ability to work with multilateral partners such as the UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union and the African Union, among others. A broader international consensus will make mobilizing cooperation easier. As demonstrated by the *Proliferation Security Initiative* (PSI)[20] and various NATO partnership programs such as the *Partnership for Peace,*[21] success attracts support. Sound cooperative initiatives can start small and grow. To facilitate such support, the JFC should, to the extent possible, engage in cooperative activity with partners and keep military planning and operational activities in the unclassified realm. Transparency in working unclassified may also help mitigate perceptions of ulterior motives among partners.

A shared situational awareness based on persistent and pervasive observation of the region, in all operational domains (including the maritime domain), is foundational to the understanding needed for

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[20] See glossary for description.

[21] *Partnership for Peace* is a program of practical bilateral cooperation between (currently 23) individual partner countries and NATO. Its purpose is to increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened security relationships between individual partner countries and NATO, as well as among partner countries.

strong security posture. A solid understanding of the operational environment's characteristics and conditions; of friendly, adversary, and noncombatant disposition; and of other natural and man-made effects enables the conduct of assessments useful in the pursuit of national and military objectives.

Capabilities, Authorities, Budgets – Providing the Agility to Act When it Still Matters

The JFC will need to function as soldier-statesman in the grand American tradition. He will have to be savvy in all the instruments of national power and should have cross-agency and multinational experience. Combatant command and other joint staffs should undergo profound changes to support the diverse responsibilities of CS.[22] The military's personnel system needs to reward extended or repeated tours in specific regions. It must value CS activity on a par with more traditional armed activity and value language, cross-cultural and training skills on a par with technical skills.

JFCs are currently constrained in the conduct of CS. While their authorities to conduct major operations are extensive, they do not have authority to fund CS activities with alacrity or flexibility. For example, a JFC may be able to deploy special forces to train HN counterterrorist forces, but the security assistance process essential for equipping them might take years to deliver. The delivery of training and equipment together as a package would have a far greater impact than the current system of delivering them separately. Moreover, security assistance budgets are typically under funded and are often not well aligned with CS strategy. Among the most significant challenges in CS will be convincing Congress to support and fully fund the CS strategy. Increasing the security assistance budgets and enacting specific changes to relevant authorities would permit the creation of necessary capabilities and significantly increase the effectiveness of U.S. CS efforts.

[22] Further experimentation aimed at organizational improvements for planning and execution of CS is part of the initial focus of the CS Experimentation Project discussed in Appendix D.

Assessing Progress Toward Strategic Goals

The JFC will conduct regular assessments of progress toward the strategic goals of cooperative security efforts. Such assessments will inform future priorities, planning, and resource allocation. Mechanisms must exist for the participation of supporting commands, the Military Departments, National Guard Bureau, and Defense agencies in assessment focused on the issues and implications associated with the execution of their specific cooperative security programs and supporting plans.

Objective Two - Advance constructive security initiatives and build transnational and partner nation capacity and capabilities in the region.

This objective encompasses constructive initiatives at two levels: first, partner nation-related efforts; and second, regional cooperative security initiatives. The GCC pursues a number of region-specific initiatives that in the long run positively change the security situation to the benefit of all partners. These efforts heavily emphasize capacity building, whether through partner nation initiatives, such as *Security Sector Reform*, or through regional and global initiatives, such as the *Global Peace Operations Initiative*,[23] *Proliferation Security Initiative,* and the *Regional Strategic Initiative*.[24] This combination of bilateral and regional initiatives is intended to increase the ability of partner nations to effectively and peacefully govern without external assistance. Such partner capacity is essential to the promotion of sustainable security in the region. Specifically, the effects associated with this objective are:

- Regional security agreements are strengthened and provide a credible framework for security cooperation;
- Legitimate international trade flows freely throughout the region;
- Partner nations' capacity to meet their internal and external security challenges are strengthened;
- Partner nations' capacity to govern and manage their security institutions are enhanced;

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[23] The *Global Peace Operations Initiative* (GPOI) is a multilateral program with the primary purpose of training and equipping 75,000 military troops, a majority of them African, for peacekeeping operations. GPOI also provides support for the training of constabulatory police units as well as promoting the development of an international transportation and logistics support system for peacekeepers.

[24] The *Regional Strategic Initiative* is a series of regionally-based, interagency, strategy planning activities, hosted by U.S. embassies, intended to create a flexible network of coordinated country teams, to deny terrorists safe haven.

- HN military organizations are fully prepared to work with international relief organizations in responding to disasters and other humanitarian crises;
- HNs are able to provide essential services and perform other activities required to manage and mitigate damage resulting from the employment of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) devices or from release other than attack of toxic industrial materials or contaminants;
- The United States and its partners are able to better manage the security threats arising from pandemic, epidemic, and endemic disease; and,
- The United States and its partners are able to support international initiatives to combat the proliferation of WMD.

The Challenge

Capacity building is a complex endeavor. It involves a diverse group of HN, regional, and international actors, who use a wide range of tools and processes to assess partner needs, clarify priorities, allocate resources, and attain credible operating performance. This is more complicated than simply providing assistance to fill shortfalls. In practice, capacity building presents a GCC with five recurring challenges: vexing policy voids, murky political tensions, jurisdictional issues, daunting interagency management disconnects, and issues of risk associated with technology transfer.

Policy Voids: In some cases, relevant and useful U.S. policy guidance for capacity-building efforts may not exist. Absence of policy can occur on issues requiring a broad interagency consensus, such as on the matter of security for foreign energy production facilities and distribution pipelines. The absence of a clear and coherent policy position on regional energy security imperatives makes it difficult to address the military requirements for securing such resources, if needed.

Political Tensions: Capacity building often changes the delicate balance of power within a HN. Change within the security sector inevitably creates winners and losers, with reforms challenging some vested interests and existing power relationships. Neighbors may become anxious and potent non-state networks will often be threatened. These tensions are complex and troublesome. Therefore, any sustainable capacity-building effort needs to pay attention to the internal political dynamics within the HN and among actors across the region. In addition, military improvements must be closely intertwined with parallel civilian reform efforts in good governance and the rule of law which seek to improve a HN's institutions, laws, incentives, transparency, and

leadership. All of this requires compromise by HN leaders and a far-reaching commitment by all contributors.

Jurisdictional Issues: A critical tension arises when implementation of security agreements is perceived to run counter to the purpose behind related capacity-building measures, particularly those designed to strengthen governance and the rule of law. Many cooperative security agreements and arrangements call for active measures on the part of the GCC that are likely to be condemned as illegitimate by those opposed to the U.S. goals being advanced. This is true for actions associated with CT and counterproliferation, but in many instances it may also be true with respect to pandemic response, ensuring the flow of natural resources, consequence management, and disaster response. Thus, while there may be an assumption that the combatant command will bring its resources to bear, direct action may be impossible to execute with any assurance that it will be seen as legal or legitimate across the board. The GCC must be aware of this and be prepared to address challenges to the legality and legitimacy of its action.

Management Disconnects: These emerge every day. Fragmented management of the capacity-building activities of the United States and other contributors is often the result of the lack of consensus and a likely consequence of the aforementioned policy voids. Even when a common regional approach exists, the absence of interagency mechanisms leads to confused implementation. In the worst case, such efforts may create a capacity for a partner's armed forces that has a destabilizing effect on the long-term governance of a nation. A collaborative approach, therefore, weaving together both civilian and military contributions to capacity building enables a stable and enduring transformation. It starts with the HN's assessment of its security needs, both long- and short-term. Gaining a working consensus within the host government and among international contributors is critical to local ownership of the capacity-building efforts.

Technology Transfer: The Department of Defense enters into foreign military sales and cooperative arrangements with allies and other friendly countries relating to the fielding or development of military systems for many valid reasons, including cost savings, interoperability, and the support of coalition operations. However, there are risks involved in these capacity-building arrangements because the Department of Defense is entrusting the partner countries with the responsibility to protect valuable U.S. assets. Security planning, therefore, must be factored into the requirements for foreign military sales and cooperative programs at the earliest possible time to protect U.S. national defense and foreign policy equities. The basic principles of access and protection are based on the requirements of the Arms Export Control Act, Executive

Order 12958, and National Security Decision Memorandum 119. GCC failure to plan for security and adhere to security requirements could effectively delay technology disclosure decisions and ultimately capacity building.

The imperative for the military contribution to an overall U.S. capacity-building effort is collaboration with the U.S. Ambassador and country team in the HN. Such collaboration throughout program planning and implementation will help identify policy gaps, appreciate the political tensions and jurisdictional issues that impede cooperation, coordinate management efforts, and properly plan for technology transfer. Furthermore, institutional reforms within the national security system of United States by 2016 should mitigate the overall magnitude of gaps and disconnects.

HN Security Sector Transformation and Governance

An emerging central component of international development efforts to overcome fragility and conflict in a number of countries is known as *Security Sector Reform* (SSR).[25] Acknowledging the intensely political nature of capacity building, a comprehensive SSR approach shifts the implementation focus from *reform* to *governance*, fostering better integration of defense, development, and diplomatic tools and resources. The objective is to assist partner governments to provide effective, legitimate, and democratically accountable security for their citizens. In so doing, SSR helps these governments respond appropriately to threats within and outside their borders as part of the community of nations.

SSR views a nation's security sector as a system of systems.[26] In addition to building professional security forces, SSR programs must support the establishment of relevant legal frameworks; build civilian management, leadership, oversight, planning, and budgeting capacities; enhance coordination and cooperation among services and institutions; and manage the legacies of past conflict or insecurity. Experience suggests that integrating these different lines of operation into a comprehensive package – in support of partner nation priorities – ultimately proves more successful and sustainable.

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[25] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR) – Supporting Security and Justice, 2007 Edition

[26] The system includes many sectors such as police, military forces, border management, intelligence services, justice, prisons, private security companies, and government oversight.

Effective SSR requires unity of effort and vision across all agencies, organizations, institutions, and forces contributing to the reform process. SSR is a cooperative activity, conducted with other agencies of the USG, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), multinational partners, and the HN. Holistic programs that consider connections among organizations, sectors, and actors will increase the chances of success, minimize unforeseen developments, and give value for money. The desired outcome of SSR programs is an effective security sector that is firmly ensconced within the rule of law.

In order to effect meaningful and lasting change, SSR must include a solid effort to promote the Rule of Law (ROL).[27] Respect for the ROL, specifically concepts such as supremacy of the law, predictability, transparency, equal application and enforcement of the laws, is essential for endowing any government with legitimacy and thus stability for that nation's institutions and processes. HN stakeholders have to appreciate the need for SSR activities designed to strengthen the institutions and processes through which policy on security and justice issues is made and associated financial and human resources are managed. Otherwise, capacity-building activities within any of the main sectors of their nation's security system will be undermined. The Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have the overall USG lead for SSR and ROL activities. The U.S. military role is normally limited to the defense sector. The chief of mission (normally the ambassador) is responsible for all USG SSR and ROL activities in a given country. The JFC must integrate his/her SSR assessment, planning, and implementation efforts with other USG agencies and coordinate closely with the HN, international donor community, and NGO or IGO implementers when applicable.

Constructive Regional Arrangements

Regional cooperation is critical in a globalized world. Given the rise of ever-evolving transnational threats to security, stability, and sovereignty, many countries recognize that most threats no longer come from aggressive neighboring states, but rather from new non-state networks that pose military, political, economic, and social challenges, which can overwhelm the capacity of individual nations. Governments are recognizing the immediate need for the collective application of national resources for the common good of the sub-region. In many sub-regions, a new "cooperative security" approach is replacing the traditional mindset of "national defense." This budding vision covers a whole spectrum of relations among countries across a region. In this

[27] See glossary for a definition of Rule of Law.

context, a GCC appreciates that security is not independent from political, economic, and social developments.

A region is less prone to instability and conflict when effective regional security arrangements are functioning. A critical CS effort of a GCC, therefore, is to nurture multilateral cooperation and help build regional capacities that can deal with emerging security concerns. Consistent with U.S. foreign policy guidance, the GCC should be prepared to engage with counterparts from those emerging global powers active in the region in order to foster their constructive participation in these regional venues. The intent is to promote mutual understanding and healthy competition that are beneficial to regional stability.

Innovative approaches are essential to gaining cooperation in an informed world, especially when locals question U.S. intentions. By building upon established bilateral relationships and multilateral frameworks, a GCC can support the establishment of effective regional security arrangements. In acknowledgement of political realities, HN governments may desire a GCC to participate in security cooperation initiatives through creative approaches, which may be subtle or dynamic based on the situation. In some multilateral approaches, success in mobilizing cooperation might even hinge on the agreement that the United States not actively participate in a particular initiative.

A Framework for Engagement

A five-step approach can be used as a flexible engagement planning tool in nurturing regional cooperation for specific outcomes. This approach applies in many cases, including difficult occasions when potential participants view themselves as bitter rivals. At risk of vast oversimplification, it can be said that most successful engagement activities run through five steps:[28]

1. Establish Contact. Initial communications are often indirect, via a third party. They need not be substantive—it is often better if they are not. It is important that prospective partners start talking.

2. Build Confidence via Limited Action. The first gesture is often one-sided. But it is not a random act of kindness. And it does not

[28] This five-step process has been adapted from an incremental mediation approach advocated by Jock Covey, former State Department and NSC official, in "Making Viable Peace: Moderating Political Conflict" (pp. 107-110) in the *Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation*, edited by Jock Covey, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Leonard R. Hawley, U.S. Institute for Peace Press, May 2005.

commit an actor to anything further, can be easily broken off or reversed and does not, in itself, require any party to change position or conviction. If reciprocated, it can stimulate imagination, but gestures may be exchanged a number of times before any actor is comfortable doing anything more.

3. View Interests in a Different Light. Partners of an agreement can only act in what they believe to be their interests. Parties enter this process with the same interests they pursued before initial contact. A party can act differently only if it begins to see its interests differently. With confidence enhanced by reciprocated gestures, each party is encouraged to take a fresh look at their interests. Often, a single influential actor in one party begins to respond to a drumbeat not heard before. It does not necessarily matter much what interest is served—political ambition, party interests, security for the next generation, or personal prosperity. It only matters that a leader begins to wonder if that interest might be advanced by working cooperatively with others.

4. Control Risks. A potential participating nation to an agreement rarely goes toward compromise intact. Some of its internal factions are always more intransigent than others. Often, a hardliner feels that perpetuating the status quo is essential to security, influence, or personal prosperity. A nation's leader who reaches out to rival nations suddenly discovers that he has put himself at risk and may now have less to fear from a regional rival than from the hard-line friends he/she lives with at home.

5. Consolidate Agreement. If leaders on all sides feel they can manage the new risks they are creating, they are free to advance their recently reassessed interests. Agreements are somehow solidified—whether by shaking hands, working through diplomatic channels to pursue formal agreements, exchanging memos, or perhaps just meeting again, but in public.

A GCC may at this point face a backlash. The effort in reaching agreement will often exhaust the goodwill of the new partners. Leaders of the parties must now convince their respective constituents that they got the better deal, even as they angrily fret that they have given too much to get too little. A GCC may be the only one feeling good about events—and not for long, because the engagement cycle must start all over again to advance the process incrementally toward the command's long-term security goals.

Planning a future engagement effort requires a GCC to reverse the process. Having determined what arrangement is needed next, a GCC

can walk backward along the five steps, working out what risks have to be taken by whom, and how the United States and others might minimize and mitigate those risks. By then, it would be clear who would need to see their interests in a fresh light, who would need to be encouraged by confidence-building gestures, and who would need to be brought into contact in order to kick off the engagement effort.

This incremental approach reduces the need for a grand master plan for transforming the political-military environment. A GCC has to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of detailed road maps, which can be labor intensive and not always permit the flexibility of a more iterative approach. A GCC's willingness and ability to work incrementally and opportunistically, conducting multiple step-by-step engagement processes in many different places in the region, at many different levels, concurrently, help the GCC take advantage of opportunities as they arise—and avoid being weighed down for very long by any one disappointment.

This approach to building regional cooperation gives a GCC enormous strategic flexibility. Once the larger goal is clear, the smaller challenges are easier to assess and address. Anything that will advance the larger goal, even a little, is probably worth doing. The five-step approach makes it relatively simple to craft a viable "next-step engagement" process.

Unified Action

The pursuit of regional security cooperation requires organizational integration. The earlier initiative of the joint interagency coordination group (JIACG)[29] was just the beginning of what was needed at the regional level across the interagency. Specific follow-on steps might have included the conduct of one-day "Regional Roundtables" to review implementation efforts in CS every 6 months. Such roundtables would include the GCC along with senior regional officials at the NSC, State,

[29] JIACG's were established at each GCC to serve as an advisory element to improve coordination and synchronization with other USG agencies, multinational and international organizations and NGOs. The effectiveness of these JIACG's was impacted by shortages of appropriate personnel and limited authorities. According to the 2007 posture statement of one GCC, security cooperation initiatives identified in the field still often required 3 years to move through the interagency approval and resource allocation processes. As a result, some nations were compelled to look elsewhere for their security assistance needs. To be an effective tool for planning and coordination, such an organization needed to be staffed with personnel who were able to act not merely as advisors but rather in authoritative decision-making roles with respect to resources.

Defense, USAID, Justice, Energy, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, and the NIC, among others. The agenda and U.S. positions at such a roundtable would be closely coordinated with policy officials in Washington. This group would share assessments, discuss priorities, integrate implementation efforts, and open doors to further collaboration.

Unified action also requires a more collaborative planning process across the interagency, supported by relevant authorities, organizations, integrating mechanisms, cultural awareness, effective practices, and sufficient resources. Collaborative planning may be enabled not by an elaborate master plan, but rather with a brief CS concept for U.S. engagement in the near term across a particular region.

The engagement framework outlined above facilitates a collaborative process among a GCC and his colleagues from civilian agencies that is inclusive. It also leverages comparative advantage. A GCC is in a unique position to assist regional actors and U.S. country teams by promoting a regional view on security issues. Because a GCC operates throughout the region, as opposed to one country, he/she has the ability to facilitate interaction among diverse parties and stakeholders together in venues that cross functional and factional lines. On their part, civilian agency officials give the GCC a realistic political perspective and functional expertise so necessary to a comprehensive approach in advancing constructive security initiatives and building capacity in a region.

Objective Three - Thwart the emergence of specific security threats (transnational and HN) in the region.

This objective focuses on several persistent regional dimensions of instability and conflict that grow under permissive conditions and enable security threats to emerge and exert unwelcome influence. In pursuing this objective, the JFC will emphasize promoting HN and regional capabilities. Specifically, the effects associated with this objective are:

- The destabilizing influence of state and non-state actors is reduced;
- Trafficking activities no longer pose a security threat to the stability of partner states;
- HN and other partners have the capacity to detect, deter, and mitigate other destabilizing criminality; and,
- Sanctuary is denied to destabilizing armed groups.

Permissive Conditions

Conflict is more likely to arise from regional struggles involving a variety of actors than from trouble isolated to a single state or between states. Instability is fomented by powerful transnational military, political, social, and economic networks operating across a region. These networks are interwoven and therefore, are referred to as *regional conflict complexes*. Regions like South and Central Asia, the Balkans, Southeast Asia, the Andean Ridge and much of sub-Saharan Africa experience instability emerging from cross-border ethnic ties, military connections among armed groups, secretive political alliances, and economic cartels involved in gray and black market smuggling. These cross-border interactions link instabilities and rivalries within different states into interdependent formations of regional instability. (See Appendix E for a further discussion of regional conflict complexes.)

Certain permissive conditions give rise to and create opportunities for these complexes to threaten stability and peace in a region. These enabling conditions are:

- Weak governments and corrupt, illegitimate state institutions;
- Marginalization of border areas creating sanctuaries;
- Profitable illegal economic incentives;
- Ethnic- or religious-based hostility;
- Large population displacements;
- Autonomous armed groups and criminalized entities;
- Regional networks for arms trade and smuggling;
- Covert political alliances and intrigue among neighboring states;
- Ineffective or absent regional security arrangements; and,
- International pursuit of ill-considered reforms.

The implication for CS is that a diverse array of USG activities in a region is necessary to diminish these permissive conditions in which security threats take root. The aim of CS is to achieve greater orchestration of a number of U.S. activities, including those of the military, through time in partnership with HNs and regional entities.

U.S. Initiatives

CS initiatives to address the aforementioned permissive conditions require a solid foundation: gaining interagency as well as international consensus on the nature and severity of the threat; mobilizing cooperation among partners in a region; overcoming perceptions that U.S. involvement infringes upon HN sovereignty; building regional

acceptance of U.S. efforts; and orchestrating interagency implementation at the sub-regional level.

Any U.S. initiative begins with an *appreciation of the compelling necessity to act*. This requires a shared USG conception of conflict for a particular subregion including a common understanding of the permissive conditions that foster instability. Improved interagency mechanisms will enable this consensus and provide a basis for comprehensive national and international action to reduce the permissive conditions of instability.

A JFC can leverage his/her comparative advantage of having a regional view of security concerns. During the emergence of a regional conflict complex across a subregion, a JFC can better interpret unwelcome developments and the rise of permissive conditions that spur instability. Once this shared appreciation of instability and conflict is understood among his/her colleagues, particularly those at the regional offices within the Defense and State departments, a long-term, comprehensive U.S. initiative for CS can be crafted for consideration.

A combatant command also has more personnel, greater resources, and better communication assets than any other U.S. agency in a region. Thus, a GCC is in a key position to assist the country team in identifying and mending the seams among the U.S. mission, the U.S. regional bureaucracy, HNs, NGOs, and regional or international organizations.

Working in Partnership

Effective security partnerships are built upon shared interests. Each sub-region has a unique history and strong leaders who have complex motivations for rivalry or cooperation. With the growth of regional conflict complexes, powerful incentives influence the decisions of HN officials as well as other regional authorities. Moreover, due to the economic frailty of many HNs and the prevalence of corruption among state authorities, many officials are complicit with illegal networks at work in the region.

Working closely with U.S. ambassadors in the region, a JFC can propose and prioritize cooperative programs. He/she will tap into a collective political, cultural, and situational awareness of regional actors and leverage relationships (see Objective One) to find common ground on

a number of opportunities for cooperation.[30] The JFC recognizes that partners must benefit from these cooperative initiatives in order to gain the HN support necessary for their long-term viability. Even in cases where U.S. security priorities differ from those of partners, the same capability solution sets will often serve collective interests. For example, border security controls that support the War on Terrorism will also support a HN in dealing with illegal immigration or arms trafficking. Similarly, maritime domain awareness (MDA) measures that serve U.S. and international interests in stemming proliferation of WMD may also help a HN deal with piracy, smuggling, or fisheries violations.

Improvements in police, border control, and intelligence operations, developed through SSR (see Objective Two), are of particular importance in diminishing the permissive conditions enabling instability. A well-coordinated U.S. effort is essential to demonstrate to HN counterparts the role effective coordination plays in improving both internal security and regional stability. In particular, the United States must emphasize close, trusting relationships among military, police, and intelligence agencies.

Tradeoffs and Risks in U.S. Military Involvement

Building host government and regional acceptance of CS initiatives are critical. However, in most regions, political rivalries and intrigue vastly complicate HN cooperation with U.S. efforts.

When undertaking CS, if a HN lacks capacity, U.S. resources must be applied judiciously to avoid damaging HN legitimacy. Both internal and regional spoilers[31] may attempt to portray the host government as a puppet of the United States. Thus, even if slower and less effective, the best U.S. approach is generally to work through HN and regional authorities.

If a HN has any significant natural resources, spoiler propaganda will likely charge the United States with being present only to steal those resources. What makes this particularly dangerous is the fact that in resource-rich nations, the ruling elite may be enriching itself at the

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[30] This cooperative approach is consistent with the 2006 QDR report which describes the critical importance of "having the authorities and resources to build partnership capacity, achieve unity of effort, and adopt indirect approaches to act with and through others to defeat common enemies – shifting from conducting activities ourselves to enabling partners to do more for themselves."

[31] Spoiler groups consist of groups who are generally very hostile to the presence and activities of foreign forces and will likely employ political, economic, informational, and violent means to achieve their objectives.

expense of the people. In other cases, necessary and well-meaning free market reforms may be interpreted as efforts by the ruling elite to enrich themselves. In these cases, the United States must strongly pressure the ruling government to improve its legitimacy.

If a host government lacks legitimacy and the corresponding support of its people, then U.S. efforts are unlikely to meet expectations. Even in those instances where efforts do make progress, the successes may highlight the reasons for the host government's illegitimacy. In either case, charges of U.S. interference are likely to emerge.

A constant factor in any U.S. military involvement is the increased international interest it creates. A U.S. military presence may encourage armed groups to appeal for help from neighboring states or some transnational actors, such as AQ. They may also seek sympathy of certain NGOs, including human rights groups. The JFC must collaborate with the appropriate U.S. ambassador when working with HN and regional actors to minimize the impact of such support.

Objective Four - Contribute to U.S. and international initiatives to alleviate the underlying conditions, motivators, and enablers of violent extremism and destabilizing militancy.

This objective is related to the preceding discussion of thwarting the emergence of security threats. Violent extremism and destabilizing militancy are given separate treatment because of their special nature and the dimensions of the problem they present.

A significant national security threat to the United States comes from transnational networks of violent extremists such as AQ. Such networks may include a core organization and numerous affiliated groups functioning locally in various regions and subregions around the globe. Working in partnership with allies and friends worldwide, U.S. efforts have created a less permissive environment for these extremists, but major challenges will continue because these organizations have adapted to create several new dangers.

Nested within the broader U.S. CT effort, a JFC's primary objective during CS is to help alleviate the underlying conditions, motivators, and enablers of violent extremism and destabilizing militancy. Hence, some key effects that a combatant command should seek to generate as part of the effort emphasizing favorable *political, social,* and *economic* outcomes are:

- The influence of extremist groups on local populations is reduced; and,
- Local governments and populations appreciate a U.S. respect for local history, customs, and traditions.

The Challenge

The underlying factors fueling the spread of violent extremism and destabilizing militancy include:[32]

- Entrenched grievances, such as corruption, injustice, and fear of Western domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness;
- Foreign military presence;
- The slow pace of real and sustained economic, social, and political reforms in many nations; and,
- Widespread anti-U.S. sentiment in regions such as the Middle East and Latin America.

The ever-changing extremist networks feature a number of worrisome new political, social, religious, and security adaptations. Politically, trends in misinformation and anti-Western propaganda have accelerated with these networks exploiting grievances of local groups and attempting to portray themselves as the vanguard of a global movement. Socially, the radicalization of immigrant populations and alienated minorities, especially boys and young men, is increasingly being manipulated to create a "conveyer belt" through which recruits are easily found and future terrorists nurtured. Terrorist attacks have transitioned from being largely "expeditionary" or imported from far away to being "homegrown" or perpetrated by local affiliates—yet both can work in collaboration. The evolving threat presents a new form of transnational non-state warfare that resembles a form of global insurgency, especially threatening when its members believe their religion sanctions their actions.

U.S. Initiatives

In countering this complex political–social–security challenge, the U.S. approach is comprehensive in nature. At the strategic level, the National Counterterrorism Center is responsible for plans specifying objectives, department, and agency roles and responsibilities, tasks, and activities for CT. Overseas, the Office of the Coordinator for

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[32] Derived from Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate "Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States," dated April 2006

Counterterrorism at the State Department has a leading role in developing coordinated strategies to defeat terrorists abroad and in securing the cooperation of international partners. This approach is structured at multiple levels—global, regional, and local—and its central thrust is to *disaggregate the complex threat* by simultaneously countering extremist propaganda, disrupting terrorist networks, denying safe havens, building institutional capacity, supporting the rule of law, and alleviating underlying conditions that terrorists exploit. As the local threat diminishes, the aim is to build "trusted networks" of government officials, influential figures, local communities, civil society entities, private organizations, and others that work collaboratively to wean at-risk populations away from violent extremism.

Progress depends on nurturing strong relationships with HNs and favorable attitudes among influential figures and local populations. U.S. embassies are on the front line in this long term campaign. A JFC should view U.S. embassies as "command posts" in this struggle. This U.S. campaign is led by ambassadors and implemented through several country-specific plans in which the U.S. military's role in pursuing the tasks outlined above is governed by nuanced political considerations and carefully tailored to local religious and societal concerns.

The *Regional Strategic Initiative* is an important interagency mechanism for implementing the CS campaign. Its aim is to construct a unified action approach through a coherent interagency strategy, leveraging regionally-based, field-driven collaboration among embassies. Under this initiative, a flexible subregional network of interconnected U.S. country teams assesses the local violent extremist threat and devises collaborative strategies, actionable initiatives and policy recommendations. There is no question that a JFC can make valuable contributions to these deliberations, especially by conceiving multinational approaches across affected sub-regions.

Tradeoffs and Risks

The role of the U.S. military in any country has to be guided by local political considerations. A well-intentioned but imprudent military activity usually backfires. Even if a U.S. military activity is seen as prudent, the extremist propaganda machine will paint it as a "foreign occupation" and characterize HN officials as "pawns of the U.S. imperialists."

The essence of a JFC's challenge during CS is to conduct U.S. military activities in host countries without being perceived as "foreign occupiers." A low-profile, indirect approach may steer clear of this trap, primarily by working with and through multilateral venues or relying on

other militaries, especially from Muslim countries, to achieve in-country goals.

A JFC should be vigilant about tensions within host governments arising from an increased U.S. military profile in-country. Some foreign officials will question what appears to them as a new emphasis by the United States on military approaches to problems that do not lend themselves to military solutions. Moreover, a JFC should not be misled to believe that the warm welcome shown by his HN military contacts represents similar congenial views held by civilian officials or the general public. Finally, on the sub-regional level, although a host government may have good relationships with its neighbors, some of them might resist having the U.S. military operating next door.

Ultimately, a bilateral relationship could be at stake. A JFC has to be ever mindful that HN officials may perceive that their bilateral relationship with the United States is dominated by the military.

Unified Action In-Country

A U.S. Ambassador is the President's personal representative and the U.S. Chief of Mission. The ambassador maintains oversight (and in most cases coordinates and supervises) on all USG activities and operations in country. As such, it is critical that a JFC ensure that U.S. military activities complement and support the ambassador's mission plans. This arrangement enables unified action in U.S. CT efforts pursued by all agencies, including the military.

Each ambassador coordinates U.S. interagency efforts in-country, and is responsible for in-country execution of U.S. foreign policy. The JFC should coordinate with the ambassador and the U.S. Embassy in supporting CS efforts. U.S. ambassadors view the War on Terrorism as a top priority and, for the most part, welcome the additional resources the U.S. military brings, since strong military-to-military ties are integral to a strong bilateral relationship and because establishing security is often a prerequisite to development. Ambassadors will likely ask for a JFC's private assessment regarding the purpose, nature and breadth of U.S. military activities in-country.

During CS, the U.S. country team is the hub for coherent implementation. Key actors include the deputy chief of mission, USAID director, Political and Economic Section chiefs, Public Diplomacy officer, Defense Attaché, and Security Cooperation officer. U.S. military efforts advancing the CS mission need to be coordinated with these actors. Generally, a Foreign Service officer in the Political Section is the primary staff coordinator of U.S. CT efforts within a U.S. Embassy.

Misunderstandings regarding clarity of authority can be a problem nonetheless, especially with the increasing array of DOD programs being implemented abroad under the CT umbrella. Authority over U.S. military activities and program spending is best addressed by a memorandum of understanding between the ambassador and the JFC at the outset of a specific set of CS activities.

Working in Partnership

Campaign success hinges on the commitment of host governments to counter the violent extremist threat collaboratively. Through effective CS, a JFC can help ambassadors and country teams in mobilizing and sustaining cooperation. Here are some cautions and worthy avenues to pursue with HN partners:

- Do no harm. Any U.S. military activity could provoke allergic reactions, especially if seen as an "imperialist invasion" or a "foreign occupation."
- Help resolve local conflicts. Instability and conflict are exploited by extremist network affiliates and are fertile ground for generating support to their movements.
- Assist at-risk host governments. Governments who have not historically received U.S. support may require outside assistance in preventing the rise of such threats and promoting reforms to address underlying conditions spurring violent extremism.
- Align with well-liked HN actors. Avoid being associated with government entities that are feared or disrespected when promoting security initiatives in partnership with host governments. Align with those having broad popular support for the work they do.
- Pay particular attention to local populations. Convey interest and respect for the local heritage and honored traditions. Extract advantage out of adversity— beyond the fundamental human imperative, a responsive U.S. relief effort to alleviate human suffering in a natural disaster can help in countering the widespread anti-U.S. sentiment in regions such as the Middle East and Latin America.

Objective Five - Enable and improve cooperative security arrangements for improved multinational operating performance.

A key component of an effective CS program is enabling and improving cooperative security arrangements for improved multinational operating performance. In pursuit of this objective, JFCs should promote a number of military initiatives with HNs in their regions as well as contributing allies, friends, and multilateral entities. These initiatives should be aimed at generating the following operational-level effects:

- Interoperability protocols are developed and integrated into engagement activities and exercises (within and across regions);
- Information sharing arrangements and other commonalities enable synergy in multinational responses to a range of potential crises;
- Capabilities of the United States and its partners are enhanced through collaborative research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) projects;
- Multinational logistics arrangements allow burden sharing among nations, increased operational efficiency and interoperability, a reduced multinational footprint and stronger regional engagement;
- Multinational partnerships implement complementary strategic messages, cultivate shared understanding and build and maintain popular support through comprehensive, multidimensional information, and communication strategies; and,
- Multinational partners have trust and confidence in U.S. military leadership.

The Challenge

History has repeatedly underscored the need for multinational approaches in order to achieve a safe and secure regional environment. The twin phenomena of the information age and globalization have reinforced the lessons of history and convincingly demonstrated that what was important in the past will be even more relevant in the future. While pursuing military and other initiatives, and engendering a spirit of cooperation, JFCs must work in partnership with host and other nations possessing widely varying capabilities, goals and aspirations, prejudices and potentials. They must simultaneously provide the motivation and the incentives to knit these differing nations into an effective regional security partnership.

U.S. Initiatives

Just as the JFC must deal with sovereign HNs with different capabilities and goals, so too must he/she deal with other U.S. agencies

and organizations performing specialized and frequently overlapping functions. These activities may not be adequately coordinated at the national level. Because the CCDR is regionally empowered and usually enjoys a comparative advantage in resources, it often falls to him, working in close collaboration with multiple U.S. ambassadors and their country teams, to play a guiding role in bringing all U.S. national assets and resources to bear across the region. Interagency teamwork is best accomplished through cultivation of personal relationships based on mutual trust and confidence. In this way, multiple programs such as Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Financing, Excess Defense Articles, and International Military Education and Training,[33] to mention but a few, can be used to solidify an effective regional security partnership and achieve improved multinational operating performance in pursuit of common regional security goals.

Working in Partnership

Partnership implies trust. A JFC often finds it far easier to develop mutual trust with his HN partners than among the partners themselves. Cultural differences, disparities in wealth, historic grievances, rivalries, and many other factors may contribute to an atmosphere of distrust among neighbors. JFCs have realized there is frequently little they can do to resolve differences and animosities whose roots may be centuries old. Consequently, efforts to build successful regional cooperative security programs have emphasized present needs over past problems. The question most frequently asked by partners is, “what’s in it for me?” There is a range of responses: (1) better training for you and your forces; (2) the advantage of improved technical capabilities; (3) the opportunity to compensate for deficiencies in national capabilities by sharing resources with others; and, (4) access to materiel support available through U.S. assistance programs.

The JFC must ensure that all participants are treated as equals; there cannot be a hierarchy among partners. Successful partnerships stand on a foundation of mutual respect, equality, and respect for sovereignty. The first step in forging cooperative security arrangements is assessing the capabilities of partner nations. Based on that assessment, and within the framework of the partnership, each should be permitted and encouraged to do what he/she does best, with due consideration of the national caveats that partners inevitably bring with them.

The assessment having been made and missions having been assigned, the challenge then becomes achieving levels of operational

[33] See the glossary for definitions of these various programs.

proficiency necessary to meet the purposes of the coalition or partnership. This challenge can be met by selectively applying three enablers that underpin this objective:

- *A Shared View*: A common perception of the threats and conditions existing in the operational environment is indispensable. A mindset is cultivated in which the "need to share" figures prominently in the determination of the "need to know."

- *Interoperability*: Resource limitations are ever-present. Interoperability is key to attaining the most efficient use of scarce resources. Interoperability should be considered in three contexts—technical, procedural, and moral-ethical. Frequently, creative procedural workarounds can be devised to overcome technical differences in systems.

  The JFC can greatly impact the maturation of technical interoperability with international partners. Coalition Warfare Projects and Joint Concept Technology Demonstrations with international participation provide venues to promote and develop technical interoperability in a resource-constrained environment. JFC-sponsored research and development projects that support technical interoperability with foreign partners serve to promote partnership capacity, and through international coordination and collaboration can reduce duplicative technical research and development efforts.

  Security cooperation efforts undertaken with partner nations may include cooperative RDT&E activities that build capability, establish interoperability, provide access to innovative technology, and share the burden of investments.

  Moral and ethical interoperability is more complex. What is morally and ethically acceptable will be influenced by factors such as laws, customs, traditions, and culture. Ultimately, a consensus must be reached on what is and what is not morally and ethically acceptable. This consensus will shape the activities and composition of the partnership or coalition.

- *Training*: In the pursuit of operational proficiency, training is the single most important enterprise. Exercises provide the litmus test for training programs. Designing and conducting training events and exercises for security partners is part art and part science. The U.S. military has been relatively successful at planning, executing, assessing, and correcting deficiencies identified through training

and exercises. Therefore, the United States should share this experience as much as possible with interested partners.

In dealing with partners in security the U.S. military must also be artful. Events must meet the needs and challenge the capacities of the most and least capable members of the partnership without distinguishing which is which. Venues for training and exercise events present unique opportunities to enhance regional access. Moreover, these events provide a convenient and frequently compelling forum for the development and institution of common operating procedures and command relationships.

Risks and Tradeoffs in U.S. Military Involvement

Some risks appear regularly. There is always the risk that information not intended for release to foreign nationals will be inadvertently disclosed. In demonstrating U.S. technical capabilities, there is the risk they may be compromised. On occasion we may choose the wrong partner and suffer international disapprobation for the association. Then there is the risk that a partner may choose to change sides or pursue an independent course misusing the capabilities he has attained. The degree of risk will vary with each prospective partner, with no partnership being entirely risk free. Where the risk is outweighed by the potential for security gains realized through improved multilateral operating performance, the U.S. military should accept the risk and move forward with the partnership. Such will be the case for most countries with whom we are considering partnerships.

Interagency Mechanisms and Processes

The principles of inclusiveness and comparative advantage should guide a JFC's collaboration with colleagues of U.S. civilian agencies. Each agency has special expertise, authorities, access, and resources that can be brought to bear to support JFC activities. The reciprocal also applies. The contributions of U.S. military forces can reinforce the initiatives undertaken through diplomatic, development, law enforcement, and public diplomacy activities. The challenge lies in leveraging comparative advantages and then integrating efforts under a coherent strategy. A proven model is the complementary character of embassy mission strategic plans and country operational plans and CCDR theater security cooperation plans. This is a model of interagency synchronization which should be expanded, replicated or both.

Conclusion

Absent cooperative security arrangements with partners, the anticipated future environment will place unmanageable demands on our Armed Forces and generate situations and conditions that will damage the international image and prestige of the United States. To efficiently and effectively meet these challenges, JFCs must shoulder a heavy load. On one hand, they must overcome the tyranny of the present in the form of daily disruptions to peace and harmony within their areas of responsibility created by an extraordinary array of agents of violence. On the other hand, they must set conditions for a more orderly and manageable future. While holding adversaries at bay with their right hand, they must simultaneously promote sensible and productive security relationships with like-minded partners and coalition members with the left.

JFCs can play a useful role in helping leverage the specialized capabilities and authorities of U.S. civilian agencies, increase the capacity and capability of our partners in regional security, maintain harmony among the participants in the regional security partnership and argue persuasively for the policy and resources required to create and sustain the programs and initiatives that underpin these efforts. To accomplish this, JFCs must use creative approaches in organizing their commands to mobilize cooperation, develop leaders who can both fight and train others to fight and develop analytic capabilities enabling them to choose partners wisely.

b. Illustrative Vignette

The preceding objectives and associated operational-level effects inform and guide the JFC when planning, preparing for and conducting CS activities. The following vignette illustrates many of the ideas conveyed in this concept about how a future JFC might conduct CS. The events of this vignette are purely hypothetical and are introduced to serve as a basis for informed discussion.

Ananaya - A Combatant Commander Blueprint for Engagement & Security (2015-17)

Background

Since early 2009, when vast oil reserves were found in the region, southeastern Africa (see Figure 7 on the next page) experienced an increase in world attention. The Kingdom of Lokeria, a large Muslim nation with a monarchial ruling family from which the U.S. imports 20 percent of its oil, dominated U.S. engagement in the region.

Concurrently, the bordering Republic of Ananaya, a predominantly secular Muslim parliamentary republic with vast areas of unattended spaces, drew little attention with sporadic and uneven engagement activities and progress.



Figure 7 - Map of Southeastern Africa

This changed significantly after a large-scale coordinated attack in 2015 by Islamic extremists on the port of Charleston and London's financial district. The USG swiftly reinvigorated its post-9/11 national security focus on denying extremists sanctuaries from which to recruit, plan, and support attacks against the United States and its interests abroad. While other countries explicitly supporting the terror attacks and extremist organizations, such as AQ, became the center of a coordinated U.S./UK/NATO military response, at-risk countries such as Ananaya figured prominently as well. The President explicitly defined the stakes: "In Ananaya, we're partnering to avert the possibility of another extremist-supporting country." The reasons for his focus were many:

- Coastal migration and Ananaya's geography of hard-to-secure mountains and remote areas left substantial regions only loosely controlled and largely ungoverned by the central government.
- A 2010 attack on U.S.-flagged oil tankers in international waters off the coast of Ananaya had threatened energy security in the region and soured relations between Ananaya and the international business community.
- Several members of AQ's leadership had ancestral family ties in

Ananaya's western and central regions. As a result, Ananaya had emerged as a potential alternative AQ sanctuary as allied operations forced relocations from other areas.

- Large numbers of Ananayans fought as insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq, and AQ reasonably expected to recruit and enjoy sympathy from the Ananayan population.
- Ananaya's western tribes were fiercely independent and well armed. They provided critical support to the government in defeating secessionists in the mid-90s, and hence had strong ties in security and intelligence circles.

Because of its location, Ananaya held regional significance as a potential bridge between AQ operations in the Arabian Gulf and central Africa. An extremist safe haven established in Ananaya's central or western territory could readily serve as a base for operations aimed at the soft underbelly of the Kingdom of Lokeria. Such infiltration of fighters and arms across the porous frontier with Lokeria could destabilize the region.

In addition to significant cultural differences, the United States was confronted with a history of strained political relations. In 1990, Ananaya, serving a rotation on the UN Security Council, voted against the UN mandate for Operation DESERT STORM to expel Iraq from Kuwait. The U.S. Secretary of State famously commented "this will be the most expensive *no* vote they'll ever cast." U.S. economic assistance programs were drawn down, and the USAID mission closed. Security cooperation was minimized and a two-decade-long freeze ensued. Later, in 2002-2005, public rhetoric condemning U.S. intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan exacerbated the icy relationship of disengagement.

The 2010 attack on U.S. oil tankers further worsened relations as FBI and Naval Criminal Investigative Service investigators realized little cooperation. Complicating matters, Ananaya's leading opposition party espoused an extremist agenda and was well positioned to profit politically from perceptions the government was compromising Ananayan sovereignty.

During this time period, humanitarian conditions also continued to deteriorate. Disruptions in trade, migration, inflation, and continued insecurity reduced household food access and increased projected humanitarian needs. The UN's Children's Fund issued a statement reporting child malnutrition in Ananaya had reached critical levels due to violence and restricted humanitarian aid access. Persistent lack of rainfall led to pasture shortages and failed crop seasons throughout Ananaya's central region - a region not yet recovered from past years of

flooding, drought, and insecurity. The continuation of poor growing seasons forecast potential famine conditions while insecurity continued to hinder the delivery of essential relief items and services throughout Ananaya.

Within the USG, the fledgling USAFRICOM efforts championing improved U.S.-Ananayan relations met with little support. The USAFRICOM Deputy Commander for Civil-Military Affairs, a U.S. State Department senior official, supported the increased use of Ananayan ports to extend foreign investment in the region despite the ill-fated oil tanker attacks of 2010. The USAFRICOM Commander, General Mann, the first GCC to fulfill the DOD's newly-mandated flag and general officer interagency assignment requirement, wanted to shift Ananaya from the opposing camp to the supportive one. For example, he agreed in principle to the Ananayan president's request to support the establishment of an Ananayan Coast Guard primarily through transfer of surplus U.S. Coast Guard boats. General Mann touted his initiative as a critical cross-functional USG show of support for improving Ananayan security capacity. Mindful of the successful Jordanian precedent of the 1990s, General Mann also wanted to train Ananayan Special Operating Forces (ASOF) commanded by the Ananayan president's son to assure HN commitment at the highest level. Still, despite USAFRICOM's efforts, the USG lacked a comprehensive engagement strategy for Ananaya resulting in a less than successful outcome.

U.S. Security Posture vis-à-vis Ananaya: Partner or Target?

U.S. policy had stipulated it would not differentiate between terrorists and the states sheltering them. While this doctrine was easily applied as early as 1999 to the Taliban in Afghanistan, its application in countries such as Ananaya was more problematic. Many within the USG questioned the need for increased engagement and, instead, that Ananaya should be targeted more aggressively. The debate swirled in the Washington media. Responding, the U.S. Ambassador publicly stated that Ananaya was indeed a partner and would become a country of increased interest. While this statement was consistent with USAFRICOM's desire to draw in Ananaya diplomatically, it was far from a consensus position.

Responding to overtures from the U.S. Ambassador to Ananaya, the Ananayan president's visit to Washington in early 2016 brought the issue to the highest level. In an Oval Office meeting, the two leaders agreed to a strategic relationship and established a theoretical basis for CT partnership. Words rapidly became deeds later that month when Ananayan military forces mounted a large conventional military operation against the compound of Abu Lin H'Ali, AQ's leader in

Ananaya, and the suspected location of another key AQ operative in the west. Unfortunately, the large number of forces involved telegraphed the operation and key targets escaped. Still, while a tactical failure, the blood in the sand demonstrated Ananayan commitment and cemented the U.S. partnership as the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the State Department provided USAFRICOM specific direction on Ananyan engagement.

While the Washington bureaucracy gained momentum in producing a formal policy to achieve unified action in CS, USAFRICOM's SOF commander seized the opportunity and flew to Ananaya to explore initiatives for cooperation and lead military elements of the Ananayan CS plan. Ananaya's president saw the opportunity and put forward wish lists that included aircraft and heavy armor. However, the lesson of the unsuccessful operation in western Ananaya was that light and agile special forces were the proper tool for CT. Thus, increasing ASOF capacity was the logical solution. USAFRICOM offered advisors, but equipment had to come from other sources since Ananaya had no foreign military financing (FMF), and USAFRICOM itself had no budget for equipping the Ananayan forces. Fortunately, the United States was not alone as USAFRICOM leveraged its ties with regional security organizations. African Union SOF had been working with ASOF and provided interpreters and valuable cultural perspectives. They were quickly augmented with U.S. advisors with specialized language and cultural training as the military realized the benefits of its officer and noncommissioned officer cultural awareness initiatives. The UK also provided trainers and agreed to direct its efforts towards the Minister of Interior's Central Security Forces (CSF). The UK and NATO provided Ananaya small-scale tactical equipment, optimized for SOF operations, from their excess inventory. Ananaya's president publicly welcomed the training programs and justified them to the Ananayan political elite and public as serving Ananaya national interests. In early 2017, Ananaya finally appeared on the DOD list of global CT forces.

Capacity Building: Development and Democracy

USAFRICOM's security initiatives were embedded in a larger operational strategy developed by the U.S. Embassy country team and regional experts. U.S. economic assistance, largely local currency derived from the sale of excess U.S. agricultural products under the 416(b)[34] program, was reoriented away from projects in the capital city and concentrated on the "deprived areas" in the west where AQ derived most

[34] 416(b) refers to the section of the Agricultural Act of 1949 that allows the furnishing of eligible excess commodities to assist developing and friendly countries.

of its tribal support. USAID's assistant administrator, formerly an Ambassador to Pakistan, championed the reestablishment of a mission in Ananaya's capital to provide professional management of this critical program. The State Department, seeing Ananayan operations as an important seam between Africa and the Middle East, supported assistance from State's Middle East Partnership Initiative and the Partnership for Southeast Africa Development to achieve a cross-regional CS solution. This assistance was augmented by a large allotment from P.L. 480 commodities, also coordinated by the Department of State. Eventually, the Bureau of African Affairs provided a small amount of economic support funds.

These projects represented a comprehensive operational strategy developed by General Mann and cross-functional regional experts to engage tribal leaders throughout the country with an emphasis on building trust in the west. While modest in size, the initiatives were well targeted at the health, economic, and educational needs of the tribes. The rapid cooperative construction of a health clinic by Navy SEABEES and a local contractor in western Ananaya had a powerful demonstration effect while the Ambassador's repeated travels to projects throughout the country demonstrated U.S. interest in security and development. The engagement program's motto – "No development without security and no security without development" – became a strategic message picked up by Ananaya officials and media and disseminated to the populace. While Americans provided leadership, both unilaterally and through NATO, the vast majority of the work in program implementation was done by Ananayans themselves either on the Embassy staff or as part of the extraordinarily well-managed Social Fund and Public Works Program.

The aim of this humanitarian reconstruction and security assistance was to strengthen Ananaya's representative government and help the Ananaya people build their own sustainable capacity. To meet the most urgent needs, USAFRICOM, in conjunction with USAID, determined priorities and humanitarian needs at local and regional levels. Next, the United States committed over $10 million, seeded by $1.2M from the USAFRICOM Commander's HA budget and discretionary funds, for the high priority items of food, water, sanitation, emergency relief supplies, and shelter. It also shared critical assessments and information with the World Food Program initially USAFRICOM played a more direct role in providing medical, dental and veterinary care to specific areas in support of regional objectives. However, once security was established, stability operations were transitioned to a DOS-led endeavor with USAFRICOM in a supporting role.

To spur economic recovery in the western conflict-affected region, American Near East Refugee Aid (ANERA) provided more than 2,000 local

residents with cash grants and supported vocational training workshops in business management, construction, soil fertility, growing and processing, food processing and safety, and product marketing and labeling. ANERA also implemented 34 small infrastructure projects, including repairing irrigation channels, bracing retaining walls, and renovating small business structures. USAID continued to monitor the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the nearly 300 schools damaged or destroyed due to the direct and indirect effects of the conflict. USAFRICOM and other USG agencies worked closely with the U.S. Embassy to transition short-term humanitarian programs into longer-term reconstruction and recovery activities.

Ananaya's multiparty political system and its parliamentary election of 2017 afforded opportunities for political development. The National Democratic Institute (NDI) directly assisted the Ananaya Supreme Council on Elections and Referendum and ran campaign workshops in which all major parties, including the Islamists, participated. The UN Development Program and the EU aligned resources and the resulting broad international effort was welcomed by the Ananayan government, political elite, and people. In 2017, despite political turbulence, the Ananayan president courageously decided to proceed with parliamentary elections. The elections were monitored by NDI's international observer team and a large Embassy observer effort, including USAFRICOM's temporary military assistance. NDI documented many shortcomings, but overall, the State Department judged the elections free and fair, and the vote confirmed a multiparty parliament.

Security Threats and Sanctuary

In light of the evolving situation, AQ reoriented its targets. In the spring of 2016, responding to government pressure and in retaliation for cooperation with American CT efforts, AQ launched a bombing campaign against Ananaya's burgeoning oil sector. Most notably, in fall 2016, suicide bombers detonated a suicide boat bomb against a French oil tanker, but with limited effect. In response, in November 2016, AQ's leader Abu Lin H'Ali was eliminated as he was traveling from a meeting with confederates as Ananaya intelligence elements successfully integrated with USAFRICOM intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and kinetic forces. The Ananayan government reasonably feared a strong reaction from Abu Lin H'Ali's tribe in the west, but in claiming his body the tribe's representative said only, "Abu Lin H'Ali chose his path and it led to his death." This success served as the catalyst for expanded U.S.-supported development and security efforts in Ananaya's western region.

AQ subsequently reoriented its campaign to target American

Embassy personnel. However, the plotters found themselves actively pursued by Ananayan security forces and unable to mount an operation. Significantly, the Ministry of Interior's CSF took the lead in the CT campaign under the vigorous leadership of the Interior Minister, a nephew of the president. In contrast, the ASOF absorbed training and equipment and exercised impressively, but operationally acted as a Praetorian Guard. Thus, the American effort was quickly reoriented to the CSF where the United States and UK shared training efforts, bringing the CSF up to a high standard. These efforts were rewarded by aggressive CSF operations against AQ agents throughout the previously unattended western area and the capital, including effective operations against the Islamic Army of Ibn O'Zlek. The black market supply of funds and flow of arms across the border diminished significantly due to the activities of the Ananayan CSF and their U.S. Army SOF and counterintelligence advisors. In the spring of 2017, Ananaya, displaying newly developed networked capabilities and synergies between organic intelligence and security forces, captured the mastermind of past bombing campaigns and the plot against the Ambassador, after which AQ operations in Ananaya became increasingly amateurish and ineffective.

Capacity Building and Cooperative Security

The broad effort to stabilize Ananaya and displace AQ was based on security. AQ's targeting of Ananaya's oil sector struck at its most important source of foreign currency, and terrorist attacks threatened the budding tourism sector while discouraging foreign investment. Therefore, "no development without security," rang true to ordinary Ananyans and the Ananayan government's sophisticated and sustained information campaign kept public opinion supportive of CT cooperation with the United States and its international partners. After months of USAFRICOM naval vessels patrolling the waters off Ananaya, the coastal region showed signs of improved stability. In turn, the tourism industry initiated a marketing campaign highlighting improved stability along the eastern beaches, and tourism steadily rebounded

USAFRICOM representatives and trainers did confront sensitivities as they worked with Ananayan counterparts. The 17th Air Force airlift which brought trainers and equipment into Ananaya's international airport was illustrative. American trainers assumed their equipment would not be subject to inspection, but Ananayan authorities – particularly the Ananayan intelligence services –insisted on inspections. This potential "showstopper" was managed successfully, as General Mann directed a "look but not touch" attitude allowing Ananayans to allay concerns and defend sovereignty. Still, cultural attitudes sometimes cushioned and facilitated cooperation in other areas. As an example, potentially disruptive training casualties and even fatalities were

accepted by the Ananayans as “written” – Allah’s will.

Given the constant rotation of USAFRICOM trainers, with none staying more than a few months, longer-term USAFRICOM staff attached to the Embassy country team played an essential role in bridging potential cultural divides. Initiatives increasing the language skills of combatant command staffs began to show productive results as Americans were able to communicate with the Ananayans (who knew only rudimentary English) in their native language. Partnerships also assisted dialogue as local interpreters and language-trained UK personnel were essential to containing misunderstandings. Even without language proficiency, culturally-sensitive officers schooled in African affairs at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies succeeded in establishing relationships of trust with their Ananayan counterparts. These actions were essential to keeping cooperation on track. In the Ananayan case, these individuals were not interchangeable; the personal relationships developed through sustained engagement could not be quickly replicated by replacements no matter how formally qualified.

USAFRICOM’s trainers demonstrated admirable resourcefulness. While the prestigious ASOF enjoyed excellent training sites, the CSF, which was actually working more closely with USAFRICOM personnel, lacked sufficient training facilities. However, as barren terrain was easy to find, USAFRICOM advisors contracted Ananaya construction companies to fashion ranges, targets, and tire houses into respectable training areas. These became sources of local satisfaction and regular destinations for U.S. and Ananayan VIPs wanting to see the CSF in action.

While USAFRICOM staff and trainers addressed military capacity building, the Embassy’s Office of Defense Cooperation spearheaded broader efforts including building an English language lab and creating an Ananayan Coast Guard. U.S. Coast Guard representatives performed brilliantly in planning and building an institution from scratch - not merely arranging the transfer of boats but creating a sustainable organization. Recognizing the new Coast Guard as a symbol of national sovereignty and pride, the Ananayan Interior Minister provided unusually effective leadership on the Ananayan side. The new force, commissioned in May 2017, not only provided a measure of protection for the Ananayan coast and Ananayan ports critical to the oil industry, but also served as a dramatic and highly visible symbol of the Ananayan-American partnership as Coast Guard boats took over USAFRICOM’s coastal patrols. Further, the Coast Guard provided the government a measure of maritime domain awareness over Ananayan sovereign waters and facilitated Ananayan inclusion into the global maritime security network. Meanwhile, the DOS Terrorism Interdiction Program gave

Ananaya effective control of its air, sea, and land entry and exit points for the first time in its history.

The Regional Piece: Combined Joint Interagency Task Force for the Horn of Africa (CJIATF-HOA)

While the Embassy focused almost exclusively on Ananaya proper, General Mann adopted a broader regional perspective. Recognizing the important linkages between the HOA region to the north and the activities surrounding Ananaya and the Kingdom of Lokeria, USAFRICOM and USCENTCOM broadened the geographic area of the existing CJIATF-HOA to include the two countries (see Figure 8 on the next page). The CJIATF commander and his staff became frequent and welcomed visitors to Ananaya's capital and, at General Mann's urging, Ananaya agreed to deploy liaison officers to both USAFRICOM and HQ CJIATF-HOA.

CJIATF-HOA performed a straightforward role in supporting bilateral cooperation. Limited civilian-military engagement, such as the refurbishment of schools and hospitals, was readily welcomed. However, Ananayan and American security objectives did not always match. For example, Ananaya set a high priority on interdicting the growing flow of economic refugees from the HOA through Ananaya towards southern Africa. CJIATF-HOA never adopted this mission. On the contrary, the international community and the United States were more interested in stopping the destabilizing small arms flows to and from Ananaya and the HOA. On one occasion, CJIATF-HOA, acting on information from 17th Air Force ISR assets, interdicted a private arms shipment of undeclared North Korean Scud missiles and turned over the cargo to Ananaya authorities. Only prompt diplomacy at the highest levels, enabled and buttressed by General Mann and the CJIATF-HOA commander's regular visits to Ananaya, avoided a serious problem in U.S.-Ananaya relations. Finally, sensing an enhanced degree of security for their development and assistance activities, NGOs (including Muslim organizations) re-initiated activities in the region, specifically leveraging CJIATF-HOA as an important coordinating partner.



Figure 8 – Expanded CJIATF Horn of Africa

CT efforts in Ananaya were also well served by CJIATF-HOA's engagement with the Kingdom of Lokeria. The diminished flow of arms and explosives into Lokeria and the diminished flow of terrorist funds from Lokeria into Ananaya suggest the more formal, multilateral approach of CJIATF-HOA was successful in addressing the security relationship between the two nations. In promoting subsequent regional strategic initiatives, the DOS Office of Counterterrorism recognized and validated the value of USAFRICOM's regional approach.

Vignette Conclusions

The Ananaya-U.S. partnership was not foreordained. Given the powerful effects and public outcry of the Charleston and London attacks, the United States might well have taken a more aggressive stance toward Ananaya. Indeed, direct unilateral U.S. action might have alienated Ananaya's government and people and created common ground among AQ and Ananaya's government, tribes, and people.

Instead, a strengthened U.S. security posture of cooperation served as the catalyst for a broad U.S.-Ananaya partnership. This partnership served to stabilize Ananaya itself and achieved the critical security goals

of preventing an extremist sanctuary and denying extremists operating space while promoting a constructive security environment in the region.

Important choices were made:

First, the United States treated Ananaya as a partner, both in its public statements and private negotiations.

Second, the United States engaged in a broad and supportive security posture based on, but not limited to, security cooperation with economic and political development serving as key enablers.

Third, Ananayan forces were empowered to disestablish AQ in the tribal areas themselves while strengthening governmental presence and relations with the tribes.

Fourth, the United States promoted other instruments of national power, including the Ananayan Coast Guard, and enhanced Ananayan sovereign border security, serving to bring Ananaya into a global security environment.

Fifth, Ananaya was included in CJIATF-HOA's joint operations area, and Ananayan representatives were invited into the CJIATF and GCC staffs. Further, the establishment of a CJIATF spanning two AORs and two DOS bureaus helped facilitate a comprehensive strategy regarding Ananaya and the region.

The favorable consequence of cooperative security done right was clearly demonstrated. As Ananaya moved into the fold of responsible governance, extremist elements were forced to look elsewhere for support and haven. U.S. engagement enabled Ananaya to evolve into a strategic partner in the War on Terror and into an anchor of regional stability.

c. Essential Capabilities

The operational-level effects considered essential to this concept and associated broad capabilities required for its implementation are presented in tabular form in Appendix C. Table C-2 compares these capabilities to the baseline of joint capability areas (JCAs) as revised during the recently-completed baseline reassessment.

5. Risks and Mitigation

Risks are hypothetical events that could render this concept invalid. They help frame the context in which this JOC applies.

Risk: The American public and its elected representatives will not permit the distribution of foreign assistance spending to be adjusted according to the priorities contained in USG foreign assistance strategic plans. Or, even worse, domestic fiscal realities will lead to political decisions that eliminate foreign assistance funding altogether.

Mitigation: This risk can be mitigated by using this concept as a cornerstone document in the interagency effort to build legislative support and funding for robust and prioritized foreign assistance programs as the sensible, preventive alternative to more costly crisis response actions.

Risk: DOD force structure and force management policies will not facilitate the recruitment, development, rotation, and promotion of sufficient numbers of military personnel with appropriate regional expertise (based on repeated area tours) and the language, cross-cultural, and training skills suited to CS activities.

Mitigation: This risk can be mitigated by giving priority in the implementation of this concept to the personnel-related capabilities described herein. Transforming force structure and management policies is a challenging but critical prerequisite to building the cultural familiarity, interagency experience, and personal relationships that will underpin an improved U.S. regional security posture.

Risk: The Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) Execution Roadmap details specific near-term actions to implement the BPC-related decisions of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). These initiatives to bring all instruments of national power to bear in order to enhance the capabilities of and our cooperation with allies and other partners could be curtailed or abandoned by future administrations.

Mitigation: This risk can be mitigated by using this concept as well as other joint concepts (such as the stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction operations (SSTRO) and Homeland Defense and Civil Support JOCs) to champion a priority within the USG for developing and exercising interagency integration mechanisms.

Risk: The existence of strong partners does not relieve the CCDR of the responsibility to respond militarily in defense of U.S. vital interests (such as the protection of American citizens) in his AOR. There is a risk that interdependencies with or overreliance on partners could hamper his ability to fulfill that responsibility.

Mitigation: This risk can be mitigated by taking a holistic approach to force development that gives due consideration to each member of the

family of joint concepts and its attendant capability requirements. The joint community should strive to develop a collective set of capabilities that will best enable future JFCs to support national security goals. An increased emphasis on CS must be balanced with the CCDRs enduring role as a warfighter.

Risk: Partner institutions and forces developed through our capacity building efforts could ultimately be used in a manner counter to U.S. interests.

Mitigation: This risk can be mitigated by the continuation of the approach described in Objective 4.5 of the 2006 QDR BPC Execution Roadmap which states, in part, that "Effective stewardship of America's tax dollars requires the United States to target its foreign assistance on those partners and programs that are critical to achieving U.S. foreign and security policy goals and have a track record of good management. The Millennium Challenge Account is an example of how to use incentives to reward recipients for their good policies and to validate U.S. returns on investments abroad. The Department needs to work closely with Congress, the State Department, USAID, and interagency partners to reform the laws, bureaucratic structures, and culture that govern foreign aid."

6. Implications

The Military Contribution to CS JOC uses a logical, top down approach to concept development including defining the future operating environment, developing broad problem and solution statements, identifying supporting ideas and broad operational capabilities. This problem-solution-capability-based approach has implications for operations and force development; concept development and experimentation; and policy matters that extend beyond the control of the Department of Defense. Broad military capabilities required to support this concept are presented in Appendix C.

a. Operational and Force Development

(1) The GCCs require the forward presence of certain capabilities and forces in order to support the requirements for regional experience and to enable the persistent relationships described in the concept.

(2) The presence of forces located within an AOR, either forward based or rotational, and the military capabilities they possess are powerful instruments of national influence. Forward presence is imperative to promoting USG interests, fostering partner relations, enhancing defensive capabilities, and maintaining regional stability.

Without forward presence, some critical consequence management-related capabilities may not be available when needed most. Presence and positioning provides the United States a platform to incorporate USG and international interagency and nonmilitary contributions to improved collective security.

(3) The preceding implication notwithstanding, U.S. security posture entails more than just this physical military presence; it also includes the authorities, legal requirements, relationships and the organizational and mental preparedness the military needs to operate within a dynamic operational and strategic environment. These elements position the United States to increase its strategic and operational acumen, reach, and effectiveness, ultimately leading to an advantage for U.S. forces, not only during combat operations, but in all cooperative security actions and missions across the full range of operations. Through this prism of engagement in the future security environment, a transformed and optimally-positioned military's greatest contribution lays as much in preventing conflict as it does in prevailing on the battlefield.

(4) The current military personnel system is in many ways an impediment to the development, assignment, promotion, and retention of commanders and staff with the background of area and cultural immersion, relevant language skills, and military-civilian teamwork experience suited to CS. This area of transformation deserves particular focus in the near term because it will take years for the benefits of personnel policy changes to be fully realized.

b. Concept Development and Experimentation

(1) Key challenges, capabilities, and proposed solution sets of this concept should be tested through focused experimentation. Several of the more difficult CS-related challenges deserving of experimental focus are identified in Appendix D.

(2) The Military Contribution to CS JOC should serve as a primary contextual lens through which Service title 10 and combatant command wargames and other focused experimentation venues examine the ideas and specific solutions proposed in related or subordinate concepts and determine capability gaps.

(3) The Military Contribution to CS JOC serves as a catalyst for more specific joint concepts:

- USJFCOM was tasked by the 2006 QDR Strategic Communication Execution Roadmap as well as an 18 August 2007 Director, Joint Staff Memorandum to develop a JIC on strategic communication, an important contributor to a strong U.S. security posture. This concept is in the early stages of development.
- Many security concerns for CS involve the maritime domain – such as attacks on economic assets, piracy, movement of terrorists or WMD, and illicit trafficking of humans, arms, drugs, or other commodities. The U.S. Navy is implementing a plan to field, in spiral fashion, an enduring, operational MDA networked information-sharing capability. USJFCOM is currently pursuing a software development initiative to improve the ability to share MDA information in the unclassified network. Additional joint concept development and experimentation should be conducted as appropriate to identify gaps and solutions to MDA requirements. USPACOM submitted a proposal to develop a JIC on MDA that was endorsed at the January 2008 Joint Concept Steering Group (JCSG). As of the date of this concept, development of the proposed JIC is pending a final decision by the Director, Joint Staff.
- A JIC may be required to develop in detail the specific capabilities required for effective military contribution to SSR described in objective two of this JOC.
- A JIC may be required to develop in detail the specific capabilities required to assure operational access. USTRANSCOM submitted a concept proposal on Joint Assured Access to the January 2008 JCSG. This proposal was deferred pending better clarity on scope and type of joint concept most appropriate.

(4) A realistic experimentation environment infrastructure should be created that effectively emulates the projected future security environment to adequately examine ideas of this JOC and other related peer and subordinate joint concepts. This infrastructure should include current and future force capabilities; integrate a range of cultural, political and economic issues; provide for operational level decision tools; incorporate selected processes and tools of interagency partners (such as USAID assessment models for predicting instability and conflict); and feature expanded modeling and simulation capabilities to replicate the CS environment.

c. Larger Implications

(1) An overall national CS strategy setting the stage for a comprehensive approach to CS is needed. This national CS strategy will then allow creation of a regional CS strategy that a CCDR can plan for

and implement. The process to develop national and regional CS strategies also needs to be formalized.

(2) A U.S. energy and natural resources security policy and associated objectives are needed to guide USG efforts including enforcement activities. Proper authorities for the JFC to execute a resources security policy need to be developed since JFCs facilitate and play a supporting role to other USG agencies in policy implementation.

(3) A unified action campaign planning process for activities aimed at diminishing the extremist threat is a prerequisite for a JFC's military campaign planning to be properly nested within a larger unified effort.

(4) Consideration should be given to implementing periodic regionally-focused venues, such as the "Regional Roundtable" described in objective two of this concept, aimed at fostering an integrated USG approach to CS.

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APPENDIX B – GLOSSARY
PART I – ACRONYMS

AOR	area of responsibility
AQ	al Qaida
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BPC	building partnership capacity
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CBRNE	chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives
CCDR	combatant commander
CCJO	Capstone Concept for Joint Operations
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJTF-HOA	Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa
CONUS	continental United States
CS	cooperative security
CT	counterterrorism or counterterrorist
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DISA	Defense Information Systems Agency
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOS	Department of State
DOTMLPF	doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FMF	foreign military financing
FMS	foreign military sales
GCC	geographic combatant commander
HN	host nation
IGO	intergovernmental organization
IO	information operations
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

JCA	joint capability area
JFC	joint force commander
JIACG	joint interagency coordination group
JIC	joint integrating concept
JOC	joint operating concept
JOE	joint operational environment
JP	Joint Publication
MCO	major combat operations
MDA	maritime domain awareness
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NIC	National Intelligence Council
NGO	nongovernmental organization
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PMESII	political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information
PSI	proliferation security initiative
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RDT&E	research, development, test, and evaluation
ROE	rules of engagement
ROL	Rule of Law
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SSR	security sector (or system) reform
SSTRO	stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction operations
TSC	theater security cooperation
USAFRICOM	U.S. Africa Command
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
USEUCOM	U.S. European Command
USJFCOM	U.S. Joint Forces Command
U.S.-CREST	Center for Research and Education on Strategy and Technology
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

APPENDIX B – GLOSSARY
PART II – DEFINITIONS

active security. The comprehensive set of actions driven by strategy, which are aimed at fighting and winning wars, creating stable environments, increasing partner capacity, and preventing failed states. (2007 Theater Strategy of U.S. European Command)

building partnership capacity. Targeted efforts to improve the collective capabilities and performance of the Department of Defense and its partners. (Quadrennial Defense Review Building Partnership Capacity Execution Roadmap)

capability. The ability to achieve a desired effect under specified standards and conditions through combinations of means and ways to perform a set of tasks. It is defined by an operational user and expressed in broad operational terms in the format of a joint or initial capabilities document or a joint doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) change recommendation. In the case of materiel proposals/documents, the definition will progressively evolve to DOTMLPF performance attributes identified in the capability development document and the capability production document. (CJCSI 3170.01F)

catastrophic challenges. Challenges threatening U.S. interests that involve the acquisition, possession, and use of WMD or methods producing WMD-like effects. (NDS)

chief of mission. The principal officer (the ambassador) in charge of a diplomatic facility of the United States, including any individual assigned to be temporarily in charge of such a facility. The chief of mission is the personal representative of the President to the country of accreditation. The chief of mission is responsible for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all U.S. Government executive branch employees in that country (except those under the command of a U.S. area military commander). The security of the diplomatic post is the chief of mission's direct responsibility. (JP 1-02)

climate change. Any change in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity. (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change)

coercion. An attempt to influence the behavior of another by using force, or the threat of force, to reduce the scope of an adversary's options and/or affect its assessment of the costs and benefits of its options - in

particular, the options that do not accord with the coercer's wishes. (*Deterrence, Compellence, and Prospect Theory)*

collaboration. Joint problem solving for the purpose of achieving shared understanding, making a decision, or creating a product across the Joint Force and mission partners. (Net-Centric Environment Joint Functional Concept)

combat support agency. A Department of Defense agency so designated by Congress or the Secretary of Defense that supports military combat operations. (JP 1-02)

combatant commander. A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. Also called CCDR. (JP 1-02)

combating weapons of mass destruction. The integrated and dynamic activities of the Department of Defense across the full range of counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and consequence management efforts to counter WMD, their means of delivery, and related materials. (National Military Strategy to Combat WMD)

cooperative security. The set of continuous, long-term integrated, comprehensive actions among a broad spectrum of U.S. and international governmental and nongovernmental partners that maintains or enhances stability, prevents or mitigates crises, and enables other operations when crises occur. Note - this term and its definition reflect an expanded view of actions that are described in the CCJO and current joint doctrine as shaping. (CS JOC proposed definition)

country team. The senior, in-country, U.S. coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented U.S. department or agency, as desired by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission. (JP 1-02)

culture. Culture is a system of shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviors, and artifacts that the members of society use to cope with their world and with one another. It is often the friction resulting from the interaction between different cultures that creates the potential for conflict. Understanding a culture requires examining several elements, including core values, traditions, history, myths, legends, education and literacy, religion, language, law, economic systems, kinship and social interactions, behavioral norms, and basic manners and courtesies. (Derived from the "The Joint Operational Environment – The World Through 2020 and Beyond")

developmental assistance. U.S. Agency for International Development function chartered under chapter one of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, primarily designed to promote economic growth and the equitable distribution of its benefits. (JP 1-02)

disruptive challenges. Challenges threatening U.S. interests that come from adversaries who develop and use breakthrough technologies to negate current U.S. advantages in key operational domains. (NDS)

effect. A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom. (JP 1-02 and CJCSI 3010.02B)

elimination operations. Operations (conducted) systematically to locate, characterize, secure, disable, and/or destroy a state or non-state actor's WMD programs and related capabilities. (National Military Strategy to Combat WMD)

endstate. 1. The set of conditions, behaviors, and freedoms that defines achievement of the commander's mission. (CJCSI 3010.02B) 2. The set of conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives. (JP 1-02)

excess defense articles. The quantity of defense articles (other than construction equipment, including tractors, scrapers, loaders, graders, bulldozers, dump trucks, generators, and compressors) owned by the U.S. Government, and not procured in anticipation of military assistance or sales requirements, or pursuant to a military assistance or sales order, which is in excess of the Approved Force Acquisition Objective and Approved Force Retention Stock of all Department of Defense Components at the time such articles are dropped from inventory by the supplying agency for delivery to countries or international organizations under this Act. (Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended)

extremism. A tendency or disposition to go to extremes or an instance of going to extremes, especially in political matters. Extremist political theory favors immoderate uncompromising policies. (Derived from multiple dictionary sources)

foreign assistance. Assistance to foreign nations ranging from the sale of military equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and manmade disasters. U.S. assistance takes three forms — development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance. (JP 1-02)

foreign military financing. This program provides grants and loans to help countries purchase U.S.-produced weapons, defense equipment, defense services and military training. Most FMF-funded purchases are made through the FMS program on a government-to-government basis. On a less frequent basis, FMF funds purchases through Direct Commercial Sales between foreign governments and private U.S. companies. Congress appropriates FMF funds in the State Department budget. DOS Bureau of Political-Military Affairs sets the policy for the FMF program, while the DSCA manages it on a day-to-day basis. (Derived from multiple sources)

foreign military sales. That portion of United States security assistance authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended. This assistance differs from the Military Assistance Program and the International Military Education and Training Program in that the recipient provides reimbursement for defense articles and services transferred. Also called FMS. (JP 1-02)

forward operating base. A base usually located in friendly territory or afloat that is established to extend command and control or communications or to provide support for training and tactical operations. Facilities may be established for temporary or longer duration operations and may include an airfield or an unimproved airstrip, an anchorage, or a pier. (Seabasing JIC. Modified from JP 1-02 to capture air and maritime aspects of a forward operating base)

global force management. The ability to align force apportionment, assignment, and allocation methodologies in support of the NDS and joint force availability requirements; present comprehensive visibility of the global availability and operational readiness of U.S. conventional military forces; globally source joint force requirements; and provide senior decision makers a vehicle to quickly and accurately assess the impact and risk of proposed allocation, assignment and apportionment changes. ("Global Force Management Guidance FY 2005")

inducement. An attempt to influence the behavior of another by positive motivational means that either increase the benefits and/or reduce the costs of compliance as perceived by the decision maker. (JOC proposed definition)

information environment. The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. (JP 3-13)

information operations. The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. (JP 3-13)

information superiority. The operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same. (JP 1-02)

insurgency. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02)

interagency coordination. The coordination that occurs between agencies of the U.S. Government, including the Department of Defense, for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. (JP 3-08)

intergovernmental organization. An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. Also called IGO. (JP 3-08)

international military education and training. Formal or informal instruction provided to foreign military students, units, and forces on a non-reimbursable (grant) basis by offices or employees of the United States, contract technicians, and contractors. Instruction may include correspondence courses; technical, educational, or informational publications; and media of all kinds. (JP 1-02)

interoperability. The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks. (JP 1-02)

irregular challenges. Challenges threatening U.S. interests that come from those employing "unconventional" methods to counter the *traditional* advantages of stronger opponents. (NDS)

Islamist. Adhering to an ideology emphasizing the predominance of Islamic values in politics and society. Islamist political parties hold that religion and politics can not be separated and that sharia law must be the basis for all statutory law. Islamists take strong positions in

opposition to Western and Israeli influence in the Muslim world. Most Islamist political parties seek to replace secular governments in Muslim countries with Islamic fundamentalist theocracies. On the extreme margins, Radical Islamists appeal to Islam to legitimize violence, terrorism and repression to achieve their goals. (CS JOC proposed definition)

joint capability area. JCAs are collections of like DOD activities functionally grouped to support capability analysis, strategy development, investment decision making, capability portfolio management, and capabilities-based force development and operational planning. (Terms of Reference for Conducting a Joint Capability Area Baseline Reassessment)

joint capability area lexicon. A collection of joint capability definitions that provides a common capabilities language for DOD in order to facilitate capabilities-based planning, analysis, and decision making. (Terms of Reference for Conducting a Joint Capability Area Baseline Reassessment)

joint capability area (JCA) taxonomy. The structure or framework of joint capabilities, used in conjunction with the JCA lexicon, to facilitate capabilities-based planning, analysis, and decision making. (Terms of Reference for Conducting a Joint Capability Area Baseline Reassessment)

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander. (JP 1-02)

joint interdependence. Interdependence is a Service's purposeful reliance on another Service's capabilities to maximize complementary and reinforcing effects, while minimizing relative vulnerabilities in order to achieve the mission requirements of the joint force commander. (CCJO)

link. A behavioral, physical or functional relationship between nodes. (JP 1-02)

maritime domain. All areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances. (National Security Presidential Directive-41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-13)

maritime domain awareness. 1. The effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States. (National Plan to

Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness) 2. The effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of a nation. (JP 1-02)

means. Forces, units, equipment and resources. (Terms of Reference for Conducting a Joint Capability Area Baseline Reassessment)

militant. Having a combative character; aggressive, especially in the service of a cause. (American Heritage Dictionary)

multinational. Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners. (JP 1-02)

node. An element of a system that represents a person, place or physical thing. (JP 1-02)

nongovernmental organization. A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called NGO. (JP 3-08)

objective. The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed. (JP 1-02)

operational art. The application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs — supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience — to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war. (JP 1-02)

operational reach. The distance and duration across which a unit can successfully employ military capabilities. (JP 3-0)

overt operation. An operation conducted openly, without concealment. (JP 1-02)

persuasion. An attempt to influence the behavior of another by altering the decision context in which costs and benefits of various options are weighed. The act of persuading generally involves convincing the target audience to modify certain convictions or beliefs. (JOC proposed definition)

Proliferation Security Initiative. An international cooperative effort to stop trafficking in WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials

worldwide. It uses a proactive approach to preventing the proliferation of WMD to and from state and non-state actors of proliferation concern. PSI activities are consistent with national legal authorities and existing international treaties and regimes. PSI involves all states that have a stake in nonproliferation and the ability and willingness to take steps to stop the flow of such items at sea, in the air, or on land. (Derived from multiple U.S. Government sources)

public diplomacy. Those overt international public information activities of the United States Government designed to promote United States foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad. (JP 1-02)

reachback. The process of obtaining products, services, and applications, or forces, or equipment, or material from organizations that are not forward deployed. (JP 3-30)

research. All effort directed toward increased knowledge of natural phenomena and environment and toward the solution of problems in all fields of science. This includes basic and applied research. (JP 1-02)

Rule of Law. A principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency. (Report of the UN Secretary-General on the Rule of Law in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies, 2004)

security assistance. A group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. (JP 1-02)

security cooperation. All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military

capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a HN. (JP 1-02)

security cooperation activity. Military activity that involves other nations and is intended to shape the operational environment in peacetime. Activities include programs and exercises that the U.S. military conducts with other nations to improve mutual understanding and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners. They are designed to support a combatant commander's theater strategy as articulated in the theater security cooperation plan. (JP 1-02)

security posture. The disposition of U.S. diplomatic, informational, military and economic assets to affect world affairs. Elements of security posture include legitimacy, image, influence, relationships, presence, access and arrangements. (CS JOC proposed definition)

security sector. A system that includes core security actors (e.g., armed forces, police, gendarmerie, border guards, customs and immigration, and intelligence and security services); security management and oversight bodies (e.g., ministries of defense and internal affairs, financial management bodies and public complaints commissions); justice and law enforcement institutions (e.g., the judiciary, prisons, prosecution services, traditional justice systems); and non-statutory security forces (e.g., private security companies, guerrilla armies and private militia). Referred to as Security System by OECD. (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development DAC Guidelines)

shared understanding. A shared appreciation of the situation supported by common information to enable rapid collaborative joint engagement, maneuver, and support. (C2 and Net-Centric Environment Joint Functional Concepts)

strategic communication. Focused United States Government (USG) efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. (JP 1-02)

traditional challenges. Challenges threatening U.S. interests that are posed by states employing recognized military capabilities and forces in well-understood forms of military competition and conflict. (NDS)

unified action. The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1)

ways. Doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, competencies, and concepts. (Terms of Reference for Conducting a Joint Capability Area Baseline Reassessment)

weapons of mass destruction. Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, but exclude means of delivery of weapons where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. (National Military Strategy to Combat WMD)

APPENDIX C - CAPABILITIES

PART I - TABLE OF ESSENTIAL OPERATIONAL EFFECTS AND ASSOCIATED BROAD CAPABILITIES

This part of the appendix lists broad military capabilities necessary to achieve the operational-level objectives described in section 4 of the concept. Table C-1 maps capabilities to the desired effects.

Table C-1 – JOC Objective/Effects/Capability Table

Objective One – Strengthen U.S. security posture in the region	
Number	**Effect/Broad Capability**
CS 1.0-001E	**Bilateral military relationships with heads of state and senior security officials from selected regional states are active and reliable.**
CS 1.0-001C	The ability to actively interact at all levels with HN security organizations in the region.
CS 1.0-002C	The ability to conduct visits by high-level military leaders with their counterparts and HN heads of state that are personal, persistent, and purposeful.
CS 1.0-003C	The ability to leverage DOD and other USG institutions (educational, medical, etc.) to build relationships with the HNs influential figures.
CS 1.0-004C	The ability to promote, influence, and engage military exchange programs at all levels.

CS 1.0-002E	**Multilateral relationships are active and reliable.**
CS 1.0-005C	The ability for combatant command staff to actively interact with intergovernmental (such as NATO, UN, EU, AU, ASEAN) organizations and regional security organizations (such as ECOWAS).

CS 1.0-003E	**Access agreements and arrangements support potential U.S. and multinational operations.**
CS 1.0-006C	The ability to, in concert with USTRANSCOM, assess the CCDRs AOR to determine its capacity to satisfy geographic access needs for crisis response.
CS 1.0-007C	The ability to work with the State Department to negotiate flexible arrangements with selected HNs and other partners. Arrangements may include such things as: • the placement of pre-positioned military equipment or supplies at or near the point of

Objective One – Strengthen U.S. security posture in the region	
Number	**Effect/Broad Capability**
	planned use or at a designated location to reduce reaction time, and to ensure timely support of during initial phases of crisis response operations - overflight rights - use of air- and seaport facilities, staging areas, and transportation infrastructure - HN-furnished provisions such as fuel and water that will support crisis response operations.

CS 1.0-004E	**U.S. security assistance, security cooperation, and other CS efforts are aligned, mutually supporting, and advancing U.S. security interests in the region.**
CS 1.0-008C	The ability (authority) for the CCDR to better inform the processes for alignment and prioritization of security assistance programs funding from a regional perspective.
CS 1.0-009C	The ability to deliver training and associated equipment in a timely, packaged fashion.

CS 1.0-005E	**U.S. legitimacy is strengthened in the region.**
CS 1.0-010C	The ability to provide defense support to public diplomacy efforts.
CS 1.0-011C	The ability to communicate security policy objectives, priorities, and reasons for specific activities through unambiguous and consistent (across the USG) messages to a broad range of audiences.
CS 1.0-012C	The ability to assess the results of communication efforts, providing short- and long-term feedback to policy makers and public diplomacy program leaders.
CS 1.0-013C	The ability to leverage interagency teamwork to draw on universities, NGOs, the media production industry, and other commercial experience to further the strategic communication effort.

CS 1.0-006E	**Regional stability is enhanced by U.S. military presence and support for constructive security initiatives, actions to thwart emerging threats, and the timely conduct of other operations when required.**
CS 1.0-014C	The ability to maintain the persistent, forward, integrated presence of small units or in-country military groups working with the country team for

Objective One – Strengthen U.S. security posture in the region	
Number	**Effect/Broad Capability**
	purposes of stabilization.
CS 1.0-015C	The ability to use other presence forces to support deterrence and facilitate readiness for other operations.
CS 1.0-016C	The ability to station forces or supplies for varying periods of time at overseas facilities.
CS 1.0-017C	The ability for close coordination between defense attaché and security assistance staffs.
CS 1.0-018C	The ability to train U.S. forces in locally-informed behavior during operations in which they are integrated with the local population.
CS 1.0-019C	The ability to work with the U.S. Embassy staff to develop arrangements to protect personnel.
CS 1.0-020C	The ability to develop and disseminate rules of engagement (ROE) that are adequate for the assigned tasks. This capability includes the empowerment of commands and staffs to recommend changes or modifications to ROE.
CS 1.0-021C	The ability to employ physical security measures tolerable to HNs and designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. This capability includes measures to protect against terrorist acts.

CS 1.0-007E	**The joint force's cultural understanding of and ability to interact with local society is deep and helpful.**
CS 1.0-022C	The ability to employ personnel with requisite cultural skills (language; area, interagency, and cross-cultural experience) gained from service on country teams as well as Americans of applicable region-specific ethnicities. This includes a personnel system that recognizes the value of extended and repeated area tours and rewards demonstrated CS talent on a par with warfighting talent.
CS 1.0-023C	The ability to train deployed U.S. military personnel in the observance of local law and customs.
CS 1.0-024C	The ability to coordinate on the assignment to combatant command staffs of civilian experts from important USG departments and agencies who can reach back to Washington for information or to influence policy and resource debates.

Objective One – Strengthen U.S. security posture in the region	
Number	**Effect/Broad Capability**
CS 1.0-025C	The ability to access modeling and simulation support related to societal dynamics, stability, and influences.
CS 1.0-026C	The ability to use permanent affiliations (such as the *National Guard State Partnership Program*) to institutionalize enduring relationships between military units and HNs.

CS 1.0-008E	**U.S. situational awareness in the region adequately supports constructive security initiatives, actions to thwart emerging threats and the timely conduct of other operations when required.**
CS 1.0-027C	The ability to maintain persistent theater land, air, space, and maritime surveillance.
CS 1.0-028C	The ability to obtain visibility into the supply chain and movement of cargo, crews, and passengers.
CS 1.0-029C	The ability to identify, tag, and track high-risk entities globally.
CS 1.0-030C	The ability to develop and share combating WMD global situational awareness through a combating WMD common operating picture.
CS 1.0-031C	The ability to acquire, analyze, produce, and disseminate (across the joint force as well as with interagency partners) all-source intelligence on the current situation in a particular area.
CS 1.0-032C	The ability (technical and authorities) to share information with a range of potential partners (both allies and potential ad hoc) having varying levels of technical sophistication.
CS 1.0-033C	The ability to perform systems interrelationship analysis across the political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII)[35] spectrum.

Objective Two – Advance constructive security initiatives and build transnational and partner nation capacity and capabilities in the region.	
Number	**Effect/Broad Capability**
CS 1.0-009E	**Regional security agreements are strengthened and provide a credible framework for security cooperation.**

[35] PMESII - Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information Systems

Objective Two – Advance constructive security initiatives and build transnational and partner nation capacity and capabilities in the region.	
Number	**Effect/Broad Capability**
CS 1.0-034C	The ability to build niche capabilities within the partner nations that have relevant jurisdiction and control.
CS 1.0-035C	The ability to establish, strengthen, and exercise relationships to allow rapid response within the supporting functions of intelligence, communications, logistics, transportation, and medical support.
CS 1.0-036C	The ability to conduct truly collaborative planning across interagency, regional, and HN stakeholder lines within a CS architecture, supported by organization, structure, resources, training, doctrine, and authorities.

CS 1.0-010E	**Legitimate international trade flows freely throughout the region**
CS 1.0-037C	The ability to interact with HNs to develop solutions to protect and safeguard critical resources and infrastructure.
CS 1.0-038C	The ability to secure international lines of communication.

CS 1.0-011E	**Partner nations' capacity to meet their internal and external security challenges is strengthened**
CS 1.0-039C	The ability to evaluate (with international and interagency concurrence) the severity of the internal and external security threats to a partner nation.
CS 1.0-040C	The ability to identify gaps in partner nation capacity to counter its security threats and prioritize capacity building efforts accordingly.
CS 1.0-041C	The ability to encourage and empower the military capacities of our allies and partners through training, education, assistance, diplomacy and other activities so they are prepared to protect homelands, defeat terrorists, and protect common interests while strengthening relations with friendly global and regional powers.

CS 1.0-012E	**Partner nations' capacity to govern and manage their security institutions is enhanced**
CS 1.0-042C	The ability to conduct joint assessments (with USAID) of a HN's security sector in order to identify capacity

Objective Two – Advance constructive security initiatives and build transnational and partner nation capacity and capabilities in the region.	
Number	**Effect/Broad Capability**
	gaps.
CS 1.0-043C	The ability to contribute to a comprehensive approach to security sector reform by helping design, sequence and implement programs to help HNs improve their security institutions, laws, incentives, transparency, and leadership.
CS 1.0-044C	The ability to monitor progress of a HN's security sector reforms.
CS 1.0-045C	The ability to provide a secure environment for NGOs and other multinational agencies to facilitate responsible governance.

CS 1.0-013E	**HN military organizations are fully prepared to work with international relief organizations in responding to disasters and other humanitarian crises.**
CS 1.0-046C	The ability to conduct regional disaster relief exercises in partnership with HN forces and international relief organizations.

CS 1.0-014E	**HNs are able to provide essential services and perform other activities required to manage and mitigate damage resulting from the employment of CBRN devices or from release other than attack of toxic industrial materials or contaminants.**[36]
CS 1.0-047C	The ability to share information with partners in the areas of a CBRN attack or release of toxic industrial materials or contaminants.
CS 1.0-048C	The ability to foster partner combating WMD capability through operations and exercises.
CS 1.0-049C	The ability to conduct assessments of a HN's preparedness to perform CBRN consequence management.

CS 1.0-015E	**United States and its partners are able to better manage pandemic, epidemic, and endemic disease.**
CS 1.0-050C	The ability to work with HNs as well as UN

[36] For detailed discussion of consequence management, refer to the combating WMD JIC.

Objective Two – Advance constructive security initiatives and build transnational and partner nation capacity and capabilities in the region.	
Number	**Effect/Broad Capability**
	organizations that have the charter to deal with health crises to develop HN capacity for disease management.
CS 1.0-051C	The ability to lead a multinational health response task force.
CS 1.0-052C	The ability to provide logistic support for regional disease management efforts including the movement of personnel and resources, as well as the medical prophylaxes that may be required.
CS 1.0-053C	The ability to implement a synchronized mass communication plan.

CS 1.0-016E	**United States and its partners are able to support international initiatives to combat the proliferation of WMD.**
CS 1.0-054C	The ability to support the threat reduction cooperation activities of partner states that wish to reduce, dismantle, redirect, or improve protection of existing WMD programs, stockpiles, and capabilities.
CS 1.0-055C	The ability to conduct security cooperation and partner activities (e.g. exercises, training, conferences, etc.) in order to increase HN capacity and capability to combat weapons of mass destruction.

Objective Three – Thwart the emergence of security threats (transnational and HN) in the region.	
Number	**Effect/Broad Capability**
CS 1.0-017E	**The destabilizing influence of state and non-state actors is reduced.**
CS 1.0-056C	The ability to support unified action development[37] efforts.
CS 1.0-057C	The ability to support unified action engagement efforts.
CS 1.0-058C	The ability to support unified action efforts to reduce the capabilities of adversaries to stabilize an ungoverned or under governed area.
CS 1.0-059C	The ability to support HN and regional efforts to reduce

[37] Development efforts promote peace and stability by fostering economic growth, protecting human health, providing emergency humanitarian assistance, and enhancing democracy in developing countries.

Objective Three – Thwart the emergence of security threats (transnational and HN) in the region.	
Number	**Effect/Broad Capability**
	the capabilities of adversaries to stabilize an ungoverned or under governed area.

CS 1.0-018E	**Trafficking activities no longer pose a security threat to the stability of partner states.**
CS 1.0-029C	The ability to identify, tag, and track high-risk entities globally.
CS 1.0-060C	The ability to stop WMD, delivery systems and associated technologies, materials, and expertise from transiting between states, and between state and non-state actors of proliferation concern in any environment.
CS 1.0-061C	The ability to support enforcement of arms control sanctions, international agreements, or USG policies.

CS 1.0-019E	**HN and other partners have the capacity to detect, deter and mitigate destabilizing criminality.**
CS 1.0-062C	The ability to support unified action to build the capacity within HNs and the larger multinational community to detect, deter, and mitigate destabilizing criminality.

CS 1.0-020E	**Sanctuary is denied to destabilizing armed groups.**
CS 1.0-039C	The ability to evaluate (with international and interagency concurrence) the severity of the internal and external security threats and prioritize partner nation capacity building efforts.
CS 1.0-063C	The ability for combatant command staffs to analyze and assess national, regional, and international programs related to threat groups.
CS 1.0-004C	The ability to promote, influence, and engage military exchange programs at all levels.
CS 1.0-064C	The ability to coordinate with non-military partner police and intelligence programs (Washington program managers and in-country representatives) in developing HN capacity.

Objective Four – Contribute to U.S. and international initiatives to alleviate the underlying conditions, motivators, and enablers of violent extremism and destabilizing militancy.	
Number	**Effect/Broad Capability**
CS 1.0-021E	**The influence of extremist groups on local**

Objective Four – Contribute to U.S. and international initiatives to alleviate the underlying conditions, motivators, and enablers of violent extremism and destabilizing militancy.	
Number	**Effect/Broad Capability**
	populations is reduced.
CS 1.0-065C	The ability to collaboratively participate in planning activities involving DOS CT and regional bureaus, country teams, the U.S. Intelligence Community, FBI, and other elements of the USG.
CS 1.0-066C	The ability to responsively identify, understand, and counter anti-U.S. narratives.
CS 1.0-067C	The ability to understand underlying conditions that lead to extremism including linking them to behavior (i.e., validation that assumed underlying conditions are actually causing the behavior).
CS 1.0-010C	The ability to provide defense support to public diplomacy efforts.
CS 1.0-011C	The ability to communicate security policy objectives, priorities, and reasons for specific activities through unambiguous and consistent (across the USG) messages to a broad range of audiences.
CS 1.0-068C	The ability to counter extremist recruitment efforts.

CS 1.0-022E	**Local governments and populations appreciate a U.S. respect for local history, customs, and traditions.**
CS 1.0-069C	The ability for the CCDR and other high-level military officials to participate visibly in ceremonial and other events of significance to the local community.

Objective Five – Enable and improve cooperative security arrangements for improved multinational operating performance.	
Number	**Effect/Broad Capability**
CS 1.0-023E	**Interoperability protocols are developed and integrated into engagement activities and exercises (within and across regions).**
CS 1.0-070C	The ability to design and conduct experiments and training events that effectively test and exercise interoperability protocols with security partners or coalition members.
CS 1.0-071C	The ability to function on an unclassified level in order to enhance opportunities for cooperation, access, and interoperability between various partners.
CS 1.0-072C	The ability to collaborate during the early stages of planning and devise messages and themes using

Objective Five – Enable and improve cooperative security arrangements for improved multinational operating performance.	
Number	**Effect/Broad Capability**
	inputs from various partners.

CS 1.0-024E	**Information sharing arrangements and other commonalities enable synergy in multinational responses to a range of potential crises.**
CS 1.0-032C	The ability (technical and authorities) to share information with a range of potential partners (both allies and potential ad hoc) having varying levels of technical sophistication.

CS 1.0-025E	**Capabilities of the United States and its partners are enhanced through collaborative RDT&E projects.**
CS 1.0-073C	The ability to develop interoperability standards through technical interchange, prototyping, experimentation, and demonstration activities.
CS 1.0-074C	The ability to conduct collaborative RDT&E with international partners.
CS 1.0-075C	The ability to sponsor RDT&E activities that build capability and provide for interoperability.
CS 1.0-032C	The ability (technical and authorities) to share information with a range of potential partners (both allies and potential ad hoc) having varying levels of technical sophistication.

CS 1.0-026E	**Multinational logistics arrangements allow burden sharing among nations, increased operational efficiency and interoperability, a reduced multinational footprint and stronger regional engagement.**
CS 1.0-076C	The ability to coordinate logistic activity, involving two or more nations, supporting a multinational force conducting military operations under the auspices of an alliance or coalition.

CS 1.0-027E	**Multinational partnerships implement complementary strategic messages, cultivate shared understanding, and build and maintain popular support through comprehensive, multi-dimensional information and communication strategies.**
CS 1.0-077C	The ability to deliver or support the delivery of

Objective Five – Enable and improve cooperative security arrangements for improved multinational operating performance.	
Number	**Effect/Broad Capability**
	messages through broadcast, print, and interactive media.
CS 1.0-078C	The ability to communicate effectively with indigenous populations.

CS 1.0-028E	**Multinational partners have trust and confidence in U.S. military leadership.**
CS 1.0-079C	The ability to provide foreign assistance in the form of defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services (i.e., continuance of security assistance programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act and Arms Export Control Act).
CS 1.0-080C	The ability to use exercises and other security cooperation programs to improve mutual understanding and improve interoperability with treaty or potential coalition partners.
CS 1.0-081C	The ability to support and participate in multinational partnership command relationships.

APPENDIX C – CAPABILITIES
PART II – RELATIONSHIP TO JOINT CAPABILITY AREAS

This part of the appendix (see Table C-2 beginning on page C-13) compares the broad CS capabilities of Part I to the JCAs as restructured during the recent baseline reassessment. This mapping describes, where applicable, how the CS capabilities expand upon or deviate from the JCAs.

Table C-2 JOC Capability/JCA Comparison

Tier 1 JCA abbreviations: force application (FA), command and control (C2), battlespace awareness (BA), net-centric (NC), building partnerships (BP), protection (P), logistics (L), force support (FS), corporate management and support (CM&S).

CS Broad Capability (CS 1.0-xxxC)		Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
		Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3	
001	The ability to interact actively at all levels with HN security organizations in the region.	C2	Organize	Establish and maintain unity of effort with mission partners	The concept's capability for active interaction with HN security organizations in the region is largely oriented toward building partnerships. These partnerships require the establishment and cultivation of relationships built on trust.
		BP	Shape	Partner with governments and institutions	
		BP	Communicate	Influence adversary and competitor audiences	Active interaction with HN security organizations will also extend to non-partners in efforts to prompt them to react in a manner favorable to U.S. interests. This Tier 3 as worded seems limited to a strategic communication focus and may need expansion to include relationship building with these non-partners.
002	The ability to conduct visits by high-level military leaders with their counterparts and HN heads of state that are personal, persistent and purposeful.	BP	Shape	Partner with governments and institutions	The concept's capability nests well within this Tier 3 about strengthening of formal or informal relationships with foreign countries to further U.S. national security or shared global security interests.
003	The ability to leverage DOD and other USG institutions (educational, medical, etc.) to build relationships with the HN's influential figures.	BP	Shape	Partner with governments and institutions	The concept's capability involves leveraging the *provide aid to foreign partners and institutions* Tier 3 in a manner designed specifically to strengthen relationships as described in the *partner with governments and institutions* Tier 3.
		BP	Shape	Provide aid to foreign partners and institutions	

CS Broad Capability (CS 1.0-xxxC)		Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
		Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3	
004	The ability to promote, influence and engage military exchange programs at all levels.	BP	Shape	Strengthen Global Defense Posture	The *strengthen global defense posture* Tier 3 JCA speaks to developing a network of host-nation relationships but does not explicitly mention military exchange programs in that context. It could be expanded at the Tier 4 and below level to include the use of exchange programs as part of such network building.
				Build the capabilities and capacities of partners and institutions	Decomposition of this Tier 3 at Tier 4 and below should include the requirement for the JFC (primarily CCDRs) to be able to promote and influence military exchange programs involving partners.
005	The ability for combatant command staff to actively interact with intergovernmental (such as NATO, UN, EU, AU, ASEAN) organizations and regional security organizations (such as ECOWAS).	BP	Shape	Partner with governments and institutions	The organizations and agencies identified are deemed to be included within the "institutions" to which this Tier 3 JCA applies.
006	The ability to, in concert with USTRANSCOM, assess the CCDRs AOR to determine its capacity to satisfy geographic access needs for crisis response.	C2	Planning	All	Multiple aspects of planning involved such as the preparation of estimates, evaluating the environment, developing strategies, and developing, gaming and comparing courses of action for responding to various crises.
		L	Deployment and Distribution	Operate the JDDE	The JDDE concept comes from the Joint Logistics JIC. This enterprise must be capable of providing prospective JFCs with the ability to rapidly and effectively move and sustain selected joint forces in support of MCO or other joint operations. This concept directly supports the three over-arching distribution imperatives cited in the Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept, namely the requirement to: build the right capacity into the joint distribution pipeline; exercise sufficient control over the pipeline; and provide a high degree of assurance that right forces, equipment, sustainment, and support will arrive when and where needed. The CS JOC's capability for assessment of the AOR for capacity to support geographic access seems to fall within the planning aspect of the Tier 2 but is not explicitly mentioned or alluded to at the Tier 3 level.

CS Broad Capability (CS 1.0-xxxC)		Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
		Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3	
007	The ability to work with the State Department to negotiate flexible arrangements with selected HNs and other partners. Arrangements may include such things as: • the placement of pre-positioned military equipment or supplies at or near the point of planned use or at a designated location to reduce reaction time, and to ensure timely support of during initial phases of crisis response operations • overflight rights • use of air- and seaport facilities, staging areas, and transportation infrastructure • HN-furnished provisions such as fuel and water that will support crisis response operations.	L	Deployment and Distribution	Operate the JDDE	Operating the JDDE requires accomplishment of all of the bulleted items in the CS capability statement. The JDDE must be capable of operating across the strategic, operational, and tactical continuum with a set of integrated, robust, and responsive physical, information, communication, and financial networks. It must be able to rapidly establish and maintain infrastructure whenever and wherever it is needed.
		C2	Organize	Establish and maintain unity of effort with mission partners	Capability requires the establishment and maintenance of mission partnership with the State Department in the pursuit of these flexible arrangements with HNs and others.
				Foster organizational collaboration	Capability to work with the State Department requires the establishment of collaboration policies and procedures.
008	The ability (authority) for the CCDR to better inform the processes for alignment and prioritization of security assistance programs funding from a regional perspective.	BP	Shape	Provide aid to foreign partners and institutions	This Tier 3 JCA is related in that it describes the actual ability to provide assistance but does not mention anything about the ability influence the processes by which such assistance is aligned and prioritized within the region.
		C2	Organize	Establish and maintain unity of effort with mission partners	The JCAs does not explicitly convey the need for CCDRs to be able to play an advisory role in informing the USG processes for aligning and prioritizing security assistance programs.
009	The ability to deliver training and associated equipment in a timely, packaged fashion.	BP	Shape	Provide aid to foreign partners and institutions	This Tier 3 JCA covers the ability to provide assistance, material, or services to foreign partners but does not convey the need to do so in a synchronized (packaged) manner.

CS Broad Capability (CS 1.0-xxxC)		Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
		Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3	
				Build the capabilities and capacities of partners and institutions	As pertains to foreign partners, this Tier 3 is mostly redundant to the *provide aid to foreign partners and institutions* Tier 3 since the goal of the aid is to build their capabilities and capacities.
010	The ability to provide defense support to public diplomacy efforts.	BP	Communicate	Persuade partner audiences	This Tier 3 seems most applicable since public diplomacy is designed to promote U.S. foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad. In cases where the target audience is other than partners, the Tier 3 on *influence adversary and competitor audiences* would better apply. In either case, the existing JCAs seem to adequately cover the requirement.
011	The ability to communicate security policy objectives, priorities, and reasons for specific activities through unambiguous and consistent (across the USG) messages to a broad range of audiences.	BP	Communicate	All - varies with specific target audience(s)	This capability is associated with establishing and carrying out a successful strategic communication campaign. The relevant Tier 3 varies with the target audience(s) of specific messages.
012	The ability to assess the results of communication efforts, providing short- and long-term feedback to policy makers and public diplomacy program leaders.	C2	Monitor	Assess effects	Assessing the results of the communication effort is a command and control responsibility as described in this Tier 3 JCA.
			Understand	Share knowledge and situational awareness	This Tier 3 would support the requirement to share the assessment of effects with policy makers and public diplomacy program leaders.
013	The ability to leverage interagency teamwork to draw on universities, NGOs, the media production industry and other commercial experience to further the strategic communication effort.	BP	Shape	Partner with governments and institutions	This Tier 3 JCA is most applicable since the requirement is focused on partnering with domestic and foreign institutions such as universities, NGOs, and media production industry to further the strategic communication effort.
			Communicate	All	These JCAs are supportive of the general requirement to develop and present the information to particular audiences.

CS Broad Capability (CS 1.0-xxxC)		Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
		Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3	
014	The ability to maintain the persistent, forward, integrated presence of small units or in-country military groups working with the country team for purposes of stabilization.	BP	Shape	Strengthen global defense posture	This requirement amplifies this Tier 3 with specifics as to the nature of the footprint of forces and facilities (integrated small units or in-country military groups working with the country team.)
015	The ability to use other presence forces to support deterrence and facilitate readiness for other operations.	BP	Shape	Strengthen global defense posture	This Tier 3 adequately covers the requirement. Developing a network of forward deployed forces facilitates readiness and allows for a more effective approach to uncertain events, helps in the positive shaping of the strategic environment and supports deterrence operations.
016	The ability to station forces or supplies for varying periods of time at overseas facilities.	BP	Shape	Strengthen global defense posture	JCA covers the diplomatic and decision-making aspects that enable flexible forward military presence.
		FS	Installation Support	Installation services	JCA covers the installation support requirements where stationing is done at U.S. installations.
		L	Logistic Services, Operational Contract Support, Engineering	All	JCA covers instances whether stationing is at U.S. installations or more transient (expeditionary) in nature.
017	The ability for close coordination between defense attaché and security assistance staffs	C2	Organize	Foster organizational collaboration	This coordination capability involves the organizational JCA (collaborative policies and procedures) the purpose of which is more effective provision of aid to foreign partners and institutions.
		BP	Shape	Provide aid to foreign partners and institutions	
018	The ability to train U.S. forces in locally-informed behavior during operations in which they are integrated with the local population.	FS	Force Preparation	Training	This requirement is a specific aspect of training (within a very broad Tier 3 JCA) that needs to be amplified at Tier 4 and below.

CS Broad Capability (CS 1.0-xxxC)		Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
		Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3	
019	The ability to work with the U.S. embassy staff to develop arrangements to protect personnel.	C2	Organize	Establish and maintain unity of effort with mission partners	Capability requires the establishment and maintenance of mission partnership with the embassy staff in the pursuit of these arrangements with HNs.
				Foster organizational collaboration	Capability to work with the embassy staff in this area requires the establishment of collaboration policies and procedures
020	The ability to develop and disseminate ROE that are adequate for the assigned tasks. This capability includes the empowerment of commands and staffs to recommend changes or modifications to ROE.	C2	Organize, Planning and Decide	Several	The collaborative development of the rules will involve several Tier 2's within the C2 JCA.
			Direct	Establish rule sets	This is the most directly applicable JCA to the dissemination of ROE.
021	The ability to employ physical security measures tolerable to HNs and designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. This capability includes measures to protect against terrorist acts.	P	Prevent	Prevent kinetic attack, Prevent non-kinetic attack	JCAs adequately cover this requirement.
022	The ability to employ personnel with requisite cultural skills (language; area, interagency and cross-cultural experience) gained from service on country teams as well as Americans of applicable region-specific ethnicities. This includes a personnel system that recognizes the value of extended and repeated area tours and	FS	Human Capital Management	Personnel management	This requirement is a specific aspect of personnel management (within a very broad Tier 3 JCA) that needs to be amplified at Tier 4 and below.

CS Broad Capability (CS 1.0-xxxC)		Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
		Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3	
	rewards demonstrated CS talent on a par with warfighting talent.				
023	The ability to train deployed U.S. military personnel in the observance of local law and customs.	FS	Force Preparation	Training	This requirement is a specific aspect of training (within a very broad Tier 3 JCA) that needs to be amplified at Tier 4 and below.
024	The ability to coordinate on the assignment to combatant command staffs of civilian experts from important USG departments and agencies who can reach back to Washington for information or to influence policy and resource debates.	C2	Organize	Structure organization to mission	This coordination is for the purpose of effectively structuring the organization with civilian experts from important USG departments and agencies. This aspect of structuring the staff needs to be captured at the Tier 4 level.
				Foster organizational collaboration	The actual coordination on personnel assignments with other agencies would be enabled by established collaboration policies and procedures.
025	The ability to access modeling and simulation support related to societal dynamics, stability and influences.	C2	Understand	Develop knowledge and situational awareness	At the Tier 3 level, the JCA is very general and does not describe specific aspects of the knowledge and situational awareness. The capability to access M&S support in the areas of societal dynamics, stability and influences should be amplified at Tier 4 and below.
026	The ability to use permanent affiliations (such as the *National Guard State Partnership Program*) to institutionalize enduring relationships between military units and HNs.	FS	Force Management	Global posture execution	This Tier 3 most closely describes this capability. It speaks to developing a global network of HN relationships and U.S. military units.
			Human Capital Management	Personnel management	This Tier 3 would encompass the human resource policies and programs necessary for the retention of total force members involved in these permanent affiliations.
027	The ability to maintain persistent theater land, air, space and maritime surveillance.	BA	ISR	All	This capability is directly tied to this Tier 2 JCA. JCA currently does not convey the need to be able to monitor these domains persistently within theaters as a continuous posture requirement.
028	The ability to obtain visibility into the supply chain and movement of cargo, crews and passengers.	BA	ISR	All	This capability is directly tied to this Tier 2 JCA. The Tier 3's merely lay out the steps within a generic ISR cycle and do not describe specific ISR requirements. The requirement for visibility of supply chain and movement of cargo, crews, and passengers would need to conveyed in Tier 4 and below expansion of the

CS Broad Capability (CS 1.0-xxxC)		Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
		Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3	
					JCAs.
029	The ability to identify, tag and track high-risk entities globally.	BA	ISR	All (with an emphasis on Collection)	The Tier 3's merely lay out the steps within a generic ISR cycle and do not describe specific ISR requirements. The requirement for associated with the identification, tagging and tracking high-risk entities globally would be conveyed at Tier 4 and below.
030	The ability to develop and share combating WMD global situational awareness through a combating WMD common operating picture.	BA	ISR	Analysis and production	The development of a global combat WMD picture in support of situational understanding falls under the *analysis and production* Tier 3 JCA. This specific requirement would need to be included in Tier 4 and below expansion.
				ISR dissemination	Sharing the COP involves several JCAs. The *ISR dissemination* Tier 3 under BA is the ability to present information and intelligence products that enable understanding of the operational environment to military and national decision makers. *Enterprise Services* Tier 2 JCA provides all authorized users the access from an information services perspective. The *Share knowledge and situational awareness* Tier 3 describes the communication of synthesized information and context with partners. None of these explicitly describe this particular tool.
		NC	Enterprise Services	Information sharing/computing	
		C2	Understand	Share knowledge and situational awareness	
031	The ability to acquire, analyze, produce, and disseminate (across the joint force as well as with interagency partners) all-source intelligence on the current situation in a particular area.	BA	ISR	All	The current wording of the Tier 3 capabilities under the Tier 2 ISR seems to allow for ISR from non-DOD sources but is not explicit on this aspect.
032	The ability (technical and authorities) to share information with a range of potential partners (both allies and potential ad hoc) having varying levels of technical sophistication.	NC	Enterprise Services	Information sharing/ computing	The *Information sharing/computing* Tier 3 under NC *Enterprise Services* describes the basic capabilities for sharing information. The key challenge in meeting the JOC requirement is determining the "authorized users" and the "established data standards" that will satisfy information sharing with partners of varying sophistication and partnership duration. The *share knowledge and situational awareness* Tier 3 under C2 *Understand* describes the communication of synthesized
		C2	Understand	Share knowledge and situational awareness	

CS Broad Capability (CS 1.0-xxxC)		Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
		Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3	
					information and context with partners.
033	The ability to perform systems interrelationship analysis across the PMESII spectrum	BA	ISR	Analysis and production	This Tier 3 JCA describes the specific capability to "integrate, evaluate, and interpret information from available sources and develop intelligence products that enable situational awareness." In this case, the analysis is required across PMESII systems.
034	The ability to build niche capabilities within the partner nations that have relevant jurisdiction and control.	BP	Shape	Build the capabilities and capacities of partners and institutions	JCA adequately covers this requirement.
035	The ability to establish, strengthen and exercise relationships to allow rapid response within the supporting functions of intelligence, communications, logistics, transportation, and medical support.	C2	Organize	Establish and maintain unity of effort with mission partners	Three distinct capabilities must be satisfied. They are: (1) establishing organizational unity of effort between the U.S. and the partner, (2) fostering organizational collaboration in the areas of intelligence, communications, logistics, transportation, and medical support, and (3) partnering with governments and institutions to allow (1) and (2) to happen.
				Foster organizational collaboration	
		BP	Shape	Partner with governments and institutions	
036	The ability to conduct truly collaborative planning across interagency, regional and HN stakeholder lines within a CS architecture, supported by organization, structure, resources, training, doctrine, and authorities.	C2	Organize	Establish and maintain unity of effort with mission partners	These several JCAs must be satisfied. In order to be able to conduct collaborative planning across interagency, regional, and HN lines of operation, the right organizational structure and the collaboration policies and procedures must be established. The *Planning* JCA needs expansion to reflect that unified action partners are integrated into all stages of the planning effort.
				Foster organizational collaboration	
			Planning	All	
		BP	Shape	Partner with governments and institutions	
037	The ability to interact with HNs to develop solutions to protect and safeguard critical resources and infrastructure.	BP	Shape	Build the capabilities and capacities of partners and institutions	Requirement is a specific aspect of capacity building that should be expanded upon at the Tier 4 level and below.

CS Broad Capability (CS 1.0-xxxC)		Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
		Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3	
038	The ability to secure international lines of communication.	BP	Shape	Leverage capacities and capabilities of security establishments	Securing international lines of communications such as transportation and logistics nodes and routes can not be accomplished by the United States alone. U.S. capabilities must be complemented by those of foreign governments and institutions.
		P	Prevent	Prevent kinetic attack	The Protection JCAs apply to the need to actually prevent kinetic attack on the lines of communication.
039	The ability to evaluate (with international and interagency concurrence) the severity of the internal and external security threats to a partner nation.	BA	ISR	Analysis and production	The Tier 3 BA JCA provides the required intelligence support to situational understanding.
		C2	Understand	Develop knowledge and situational awareness, Share knowledge and situational awareness.	These JCAs provide the ability to give meaning to available information and the ability to share it.
		BP	Shape	Provide aid to foreign partners and institutions	Assuming that the threat assessment would be provided to the partner nation, this Tier 3 applies.
040	The ability to identify gaps in partner nation capacity to counter its security threats and prioritize capacity-building efforts accordingly.	BP	Shape	Build the capabilities and capacities of partners and institutions	The ability to do gap assessment is a pre-requisite to this Tier 3. It may need to be nested as a Tier 4 under this Tier 3 or become an additional Tier 3 in its own right under *Shape*.
041	The ability to encourage and empower the military capacities of our allies and partners through training, education, assistance, diplomacy, and other activities so they are prepared to protect homelands, defeat terrorists, and protect common interests while strengthening relations with friendly global and regional powers.	BP	Shape	Provide aid to foreign partners and institutions	The selective provision of aid to allies and partners will better prepare them to protect homelands, defeat terrorists, and protect common interests.
				Leverage capacities and capabilities of security establishments	This Tier 3 is the ability to stimulate foreign governments and institutions to employ existing complementary capabilities in these areas.
			Communicate	Persuade partner audiences	This Tier 3 is about motivational appeals that will help mobilize the support of allies and partners.

CS Broad Capability (CS 1.0-xxxC)		Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
		Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3	
042	The ability to conduct joint assessments (with USAID) of a HN's security sector in order to identify capacity gaps.	BP	Shape	Build the capabilities and capacities of partners and institutions	The ability to do gap assessment is a pre-requisite to this Tier 3. It may need to be nested as a Tier 4 under this Tier 3 or become an additional Tier 3 in its own right under *Shape*.
		C2	Organize	Establish and maintain unity of effort with mission partners	JOC capability requires the establishment and maintenance of a mission partnership with USAID for the assessment of HN security sectors.
				Foster organizational collaboration	Joint assessments will require collaborative polices and procedures for working with USAID.
043	The ability to contribute to a comprehensive approach to security sector reform by helping design, sequence, and implement programs to help HNs improve their security institutions, laws, incentives, transparency, and leadership.	BP	Shape	Build the capabilities and capacities of partners and institutions	Tier 3 will require expansion at Tier 4 and below to fully describe these particular elements of capacity building.
		C2	Organize	Establish and maintain unity of effort with mission partners	JOC capability requires the establishment and maintenance of a mission partnership with multiple USG partners and other donor institutions involved in a comprehensive approach to security sector reform.
				Foster organizational collaboration	Joint assessments will require collaborative polices and procedures for working with multiple USG partners and other donor institutions involved in a comprehensive approach to security sector reform.
044	The ability to monitor progress of a HN's security sector reforms.	C2	Monitor	Assess effects	This Tier 3 JCA describes the need to be able to analyze, track, and measure the results of actions taken.
045	The ability to provide a secure environment for NGOs and other multinational agencies to facilitate responsible governance.	BP	Shape	Provide aid to foreign partners and institutions	Providing security to NGOs and other multinational agencies would constitute a service as described in this Tier 3 JCA.
		P	Prevent	Prevent kinetic attack	Security provided will likely be in the form of protection from kinetic attack.
046	The ability to conduct regional disaster relief exercises in partnership with HN forces and international relief organizations.	BP	Shape	Build the capabilities and capacities of partners and institutions	This is a specific aspect of capacity building that should be expanded upon at Tier 4 and below.

CS Broad Capability (CS 1.0-xxxC)		Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
		Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3	
				Leverage capacities and capabilities of security establishments	This Tier 3 will apply in stimulating international relief organizations to employ existing complementary capabilities in these exercises.
		FS	Force Preparation	Exercising	Such exercises will likely rely heavily of planning, preparation, execution and evaluation expertise of the United States and the participation of U.S. forces.
047	The ability to share information with partners in the areas of a CBRN attack or release of toxic industrial materials or contaminants.	C2	Understand	Share knowledge and situational awareness	This JOC capability is largely one of the authority and ability to share existing knowledge with partners. The *share knowledge and situational awareness* Tier 3 describes the communication of synthesized information and context with partners. This particular class of information could be included in expansion of this JCA at Tier 4 and below.
048	The ability to foster partner combating WMD capability through operations and exercises.	BP	Shape	Build the capabilities and capacities of partners and institutions	This is a specific aspect of capacity building that should be expanded upon at Tier 4 and below.
		FS	Force Preparation	Exercising	Such exercises will likely rely heavily of planning, preparation, execution, and evaluation expertise of the United States and the participation of U.S. forces.
049	The ability to conduct assessments of a HN's preparedness to perform CBRN consequence management.	C2	Decide	Manage risk	This Tier 3 is the ability to recognize and balance the likelihood and consequences of undesired effects with the desired outcomes/effects. The ability to assess HN preparedness will leverage analytical tools and processes used to direct own force consequence management.
		BP	Shape	Build the capabilities and capacities of partners and institutions	This is a specific aspect of capacity building that should be expanded upon at Tier 4 and below.
050	The ability to work with HNs as well as UN organizations that have the charter to deal with health crises to develop HN	BP	Shape	Build the capabilities and capacities of partners and institutions	This is a specific aspect of capacity building that should be expanded upon at Tier 4 and below.

CS Broad Capability (CS 1.0-xxxC)		Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
		Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3	
	capacity for disease management.	C2	Organize	Establish and maintain unity of effort with mission partners	Capability requires the establishment and maintenance of mission partnership with the UN in developing HN capacity for disease management.
				Foster organizational collaboration	Capability to work with the UN in this area requires the establishment of collaboration policies and procedures.
051	The ability to lead a multinational health response task force.	FS	Health Readiness	None explicitly seem to address this requirement	The *Health Readiness* Tier 2 is described as the ability to enhance DOD and our Nation's security by providing health support for the full range of military operations and sustaining the health of all those entrusted to our care. An additional Tier 3 capability may be needed for this requirement.
		C2	All (with an emphasis on Decide and Direct)	All	The Tier 2 *Direct* is the ability to employ resources to achieve an objective.
052	The ability to provide logistic support for regional disease management efforts including the movement of personnel and resources, as well as the medical prophylaxes that may be required.	L	Deployment and Distribution	Sustain the force	This Tier 3 JCA covers the requirement to support the movement of personnel and resources. Other capabilities under the Logistics capabilities under the Tier 2's of *Supply* and *Logistics Services* would also apply to regional disease management efforts.
053	The ability to implement a synchronized mass communication plan.	BP	Communicate	None explicitly seems to address this requirement	This requirement is about mass communication as it would apply in disease management situations such as during a pandemic. The Tier 3 JCAs under communicate as written are oriented toward strategic communication rather than mass communication as would be used in this type of situation.
054	The ability to support the threat reduction cooperation activities of partner states that wish to reduce, dismantle, redirect or improve protection of existing WMD programs, stockpiles, and capabilities.	BP	Shape	Build the capabilities and capacities of partners and institutions	This is a specific aspect of capacity building that should be expanded upon at Tier 4 and below.
				Provide aid to foreign partners and institutions	Threat reduction activities such as dismantlement or improving safeguards will often require the provision of assistance, material or services.

CS Broad Capability (CS 1.0-xxxC)		Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
		Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3	
055	The ability to conduct security cooperation and partner activities (e.g. exercises, training, conferences, etc.) in order to increase HN capacity and capability to combat weapons of mass destruction.	BP	Shape	Build the capabilities and capacities of partners and institutions	This is a specific aspect of capacity building that should be expanded upon at Tier 4 and below.
056	The ability to support unified action development efforts.	BP	Shape	Partner with governments and institutions	The ability to support unified action development events is dependent upon establishing relationships with appropriate USG institutions, HNs, and multinational partners. It is also dependent upon being able to establish policies and processes that foster organizational collaboration.
		C2	Organize	Foster organizational collaboration	
057	The ability to support unified action engagement efforts.	BP	Shape	Partner with governments and institutions	The ability to support unified action engagement actions is dependent upon actual partnering efforts where partner capabilities and capacities are developed. It is also dependent upon being able to establish policies and processes that foster organizational collaboration.
		C2	Organize	Foster organizational collaboration	
058	The ability to support unified action efforts to reduce the capabilities of adversaries to stabilize an ungoverned or under governed area.	C2	Organize	Establish and maintain unity of effort with mission partners	Organizationally, it would be important to foster and maintain cooperative relations with unified action mission partners.
				Foster organizational collaboration	It is also dependent upon being able to establish policies and processes that foster organizational collaboration with unified action partners.
		FA	Maneuver	Maneuver to influence	This Tier 3 is the ability to move to a position of advantage in all environments in order to affect the behavior, capabilities, will, or perceptions of partner, competitor, or adversary leaders, military forces and relevant populations. This (and the maneuver to secure) JCAs would apply where U.S. forces are used in a more direct manner to reduce the capabilities of adversaries to stabilize these areas.

CS Broad Capability (CS 1.0-xxxC)		Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
		Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3	
				Maneuver to secure	This Tier 3 is the ability to control or deny significant areas, with or without force, in the operational area whose possession or control provides either side an operational advantage.
059	The ability to support HN and regional efforts to reduce the capabilities of adversaries to stabilize an ungoverned or under governed area.	BP	Shape	Build the capabilities and capacities of partners and institutions	This is a specific aspect of capacity building that should be expanded upon at Tier 4 and below.
				Leverage capacities and capabilities of security establishments	This Tier 3 will apply in stimulating regional nations to employ existing complementary capabilities particularly when dealing with ungoverned or under governed border regions and littorals.
060	The ability to stop WMD, delivery systems and associated technologies, materials, and expertise from transiting between states, and between state and non-state actors of proliferation concern in any environment.	BP	Shape	Partner with governments and institutions	To support this JOC requirement, formal and informal relationships with domestic and foreign institutions and countries are required.
				Leverage capacities and capabilities of security establishments	This Tier 3 will apply in stimulating regional nations to employ existing complementary capabilities in dealing with WMD proliferation.
				Strengthen global defense posture	The ability to implement this CS JOC capability would be enhanced by developing a network of HNs all of whom would be energized to cooperate to reduce uncertainty as it related to reducing a WMD threat.
		FA	Maneuver	Maneuver to secure	This Tier 3 should be expanded at the Tier 4 and below to include sanctions or embargo enforcement involving WMD, delivery systems, associated technologies and materials.
061	The ability to support enforcement of arms control sanctions, international agreements, or USG policies.	BP	Shape	Partner with governments and institutions	To support this JOC requirement, formal and informal relationships with domestic and foreign institutions and countries are required.
				Leverage capacities and capabilities of security establishments	This Tier 3 will apply in stimulating regional nations to employ existing complementary capabilities in dealing with arms trafficking networks.
		FA	Maneuver	Maneuver to secure	This Tier 3 should be expanded at the Tier 4 and below to include arms sanctions or embargo enforcement.

CS Broad Capability (CS 1.0-xxxC)		Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
		Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3	
062	The ability to support unified action to build the capacity within HNs and the larger multinational community to detect, deter, and mitigate destabilizing criminality.	BP	Shape	Build the capabilities and capacities of partners and institutions	This is a specific aspect of capacity building that should be expanded upon at Tier 4 and below.
063	The ability for combatant command staffs to analyze and assess national, regional, and international programs related to threat groups.	C2	Direct	Establish metrics	This Tier 3 is the ability to establish objective criteria to assess performance and results. As such, it is a pre-requisite for the assessment of programs.
			Monitor	All but with an emphasis on Assess effects	As written, the capabilities under the *Monitor* Tier 2 might be construed as limited to monitoring the results of military actions. These JCAs may need to be expanded to include assessment of the actions taken in the context of other USG, regional, and international programs related to threat groups.
064	The ability to coordinate with non-military partner police and intelligence programs (Washington program managers and in-country representatives) in developing HN capacity.	BP	Shape	Partner with governments and institutions	This is a specific aspect within this Tier 3 ability to establish or strengthen formal or informal relationships with domestic and foreign institutions, countries or populations to further U.S. national security or shared global security interests. It may need to be expanded at Tier 4 and below.
		C2	Organize	Foster organizational collaboration	Partnership with relevant USG agencies and the international law enforcement community in such capacity-building efforts will require policies and processes that foster organizational collaboration.
065	The ability to collaboratively participate in planning activities involving DOS CT and regional bureaus, country teams, the U.S. Intelligence Community, FBI, and other elements of the USG.	Cs	Planning	Emphasis on analyze problem, apply situational understanding, and analyze courses of action	The emphasized Tier 3s seem most applicable to participating in the collaborative planning of activities that are primarily led and synchronized by other than the military.
		C2	Organize	Foster organizational collaboration	Partnership with DOS CT and regional bureaus, country teams, the U.S. Intelligence Community, FBI, and other relevant USG agencies and the international law enforcement community in such capacity-building efforts will require policies and processes that foster organizational collaboration.

CS Broad Capability (CS 1.0-xxxC)		Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
		Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3	
066	The ability to responsively identify, understand and counter anti-U.S. narratives.	BP	Communicate	Inform domestic and foreign audiences	This CS JOC capability is used to generate the desired effect of "the influence of extremist groups on local populations is reduced." Anti-U.S. narratives often take the form of manipulative disinformation efforts by the extremists. This Tier 3 is the ability to develop and present objective information and correct misinformation or disinformation to domestic and foreign audiences to improve their understanding of the strategies, policies and operations of the USG and its partners.
				Persuade partner audiences	This Tier 3 is the ability to develop and present truthful information and motivational appeals to foreign audiences for convincing them to accept or support the strategies, policies, and operations of the USG and its partners. Motivational appeals are part of the building of "trusted networks" of government officials, influential figures, local communities, civil society entities, private organizations, and others that the concept describes as working collaboratively to wean at-risk populations away from providing support to violent extremism.
		BA	ISR	All	The ability to responsively identify the nature of anti-U.S. narratives and the means by which they are communicated in the information-rich future environment is a specific aspect of ISR that requires expansion at Tier 4 and below.
		C2	Understand	Develop knowledge and situational awareness	This Tier 3 capability will be required to derive meaning and value in comprehending the nature of anti-U.S. narratives.
067	The ability to understand underlying conditions that lead to extremism including linking them to behavior (i.e., validation that assumed underlying conditions are actually causing the behavior).	C2	Understand	Develop knowledge and situational awareness	This JOC capability is a specific aspect of this Tier 3 that may require expansion at Tier 4 and below. A related capability that will be leveraged is CS 1.0-25C (the ability to access modeling and simulation support related to societal dynamics, stability, and influences.)
		BA	ISR	All	The validation (that assumed underlying conditions are actually causing the behavior) aspect of this JOC capability is a specific aspect of intelligence that would require expansion at Tier 4 and below.

CS Broad Capability (CS 1.0-xxxC)		Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
		Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3	
068	The ability to counter extremist recruitment efforts.	BP	Communicate	Persuade partner audiences	This Tier 3 is the ability to develop and present truthful information and motivational appeals to foreign audiences for convincing them to accept or support the strategies, policies, and operations of the USG and its partners. Motivational appeals are part of the building of "trusted networks" of government officials, influential figures, local communities, civil society entities, private organizations, and others that the concept describes as working collaboratively to provide alternatives to those at risk of recruitment into violent extremist networks.
069	The ability for the CCDR and other high-level military officials to participate visibly in ceremonial and other events of significance to the local community.	BP	Shape	Partner with governments and institutions	Tier 3 is the ability to establish or strengthen formal or informal relationships with domestic and foreign institutions, countries or populations to further U.S. national security or shared global security interests. This is a specific aspect within that broad description.
070	The ability to design and conduct experiments and training events that effectively test and exercise interoperability protocols with security partners or coalition members.	BP	Shape	Leverage capacities and capabilities of security establishments	The interoperability protocols being tested are for the purpose of being able to leverage the capacities and capabilities of multinational partners for improved operating performance.
		FS	Force preparation	Training	This Tier 3 would encompass the use of training to exercise interoperability protocols.
				Exercising	Such exercises will likely rely heavily of planning, preparation, execution and evaluation expertise of the United States.
				Experimentation	This Tier 3 is the ability to conduct an iterative process for developing and assessing concept-based hypotheses to identify and recommend the best value-added solutions in DOTMLPF required to achieve significant advances in future operational capabilities. This JOC capability is specifically oriented at experimentation in conjunction with multinational partners regarding interoperability. The lexicon for the Tier 3 should be revised to explicitly mention the inclusion of experimentation involving partners. At Tier 4 and below, multinational experimentation should be included in addition to joint and Service experimentation.

CS Broad Capability (CS 1.0-xxxC)		Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
		Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3	
		C2	Organize	Foster organizational collaboration	Designing and conducting these events will require external interfaces for interaction and coordination with the multinational partners.
071	The ability to function on an unclassified level in order to enhance opportunities for cooperation, access, and interoperability between various partners.	BP	Shape	Partner with governments and institutions	Tier 3 describes a general need to strengthen relationship s with domestic and foreign partners.
		C2	Organize	Foster organizational collaboration	Tier 3 is the ability to establish internal structures and processes, and external interfaces that facilitate interaction and coordination. The ability to function unclassified elaborates on a specifically desirable characteristic of such processes and interfaces.
		NC	Enterprise Services	Information sharing/computing	Tier 3 describes the ability to provide physical and virtual access to hosted information. This JOC capability calls for the technical ability to operate certain enterprise services with multi-level security.
072	The ability to collaborate during the early stages of planning and devise messages and themes using inputs from various partners.	BP	Communicate	All	The lexicon for this Tier 2 and its Tier 3's does not currently describe a capability to engage in what might be described as the multinational equivalent to what is, for USG efforts, called strategic communication. In this case, the topic is messages and themes associated with the conduct of engagement activates and exercises.
		C2	Planning	Multiple Tier 3's apply. Emphasis on develop strategy	The *Develop strategy* Tier 3 is the ability to create a framework that synchronizes and integrates the resources available to achieve a desired outcome or effect.
073	The ability to develop interoperability standards through technical interchange, prototyping, experimentation, and demonstration activities.	BP	Shape	Build the capabilities and capacities of partners and institutions	Selected because the U.S. is assisting its partners with developing "interoperability standards."
				Leverage capacities and capabilities of security establishments	This Tier 3 applies from the standpoint that it stimulates foreign governments and institutions to employ capabilities that complement or assist the United States in furthering security interests.

CS Broad Capability (CS 1.0-xxxC)		Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
		Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3	
		FS	Force Preparation	Experimentation	The lexicon for the Tier 3 should be revised to explicitly mention the inclusion of experimentation activities involving partners. Technical demonstration is a particular type of experimentation intended to familiarize people with how a particular innovation can improve efficiency, effectiveness, or speed of military activity. At Tier 4 and below, multinational experimentation should be included in addition to joint and Service experimentation.
		CM&S	Research and Development	All	This Tier 2 is the ability to conduct fundamental research, science, technology, development, experimentation, and studies important to all departmental capabilities and operations. It would apply to cases where the technical interchange is done via international cooperative R&D programs. The R&D JCA currently does not mention these international information exchange efforts.
074	The ability to conduct collaborative RDT&E with international partners.	BP	Shape	Build the capabilities and capacities of partners and institutions	Tier 3 JCA was selected because the CS JOC capability describes the capability as being conducted "with" the partner and being "collaborative" vice simply being provided by the U.S. to the partner. It is assumed that the partner will gain something from the collaborative RDT&E that will increase or build some capability or capacity.
				Leverage capacities and capabilities of security establishments	This Tier 3 applies from the standpoint that it stimulates foreign governments and institutions to employ capabilities that complement or assist the United States in furthering security interests.
		CM&S	Research and Development	All	This Tier 2 is the ability to conduct fundamental research, science, technology, development, experimentation, and studies important to all departmental capabilities and operations. It would apply to technical interchange associated with international cooperative R&D programs. The R&D JCA currently does not mention these international collaborative efforts.
075	The ability to sponsor RDT&E activities that build capability and provide for interoperability.	BP	Shape	Provide aid to foreign partners and institutions	U.S. sponsorship would constitute the provision of assistance, material or services to foreign partners or institutions for advancing U.S. national security or shared global security interests.

CS Broad Capability (CS 1.0-xxxC)		Most Relevant JCA(s)			Comparison Results and Implications
		Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3	
076	The ability to coordinate logistic activity, involving two or more nations, supporting a multinational force conducting military operations under the auspices of an alliance or coalition.	L	Deployment and Distribution	Multiple Tier 3's apply. Emphasis on sustain the force	Tier 2 lexicon includes "the ability to plan, coordinate, synchronize and execute force movement and sustainment tasks." Neither it nor the Tier 3's explicitly describe the multinational dimension of these tasks.
077	The ability to deliver or support the delivery of messages through broadcast, print, and interactive media.	BP	Communicate	All	This Tier 2 and its subordinate Tier 3s all include the ability to present the information to audiences but do not elaborate on the means for such presentation. These would need to be specified in Tier 4 and below.
078	The ability to communicate effectively with indigenous populations.	BP	Communicate	All	These JCAs are supportive of the general requirement to develop and present the information to particular audiences.
079	The ability to provide foreign assistance in the form of defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services (i.e. continuance of security assistance programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act and Arms Export Control Act.)	BP	Shape	Provide aid to foreign partners and institutions	JCA adequately covers this requirement.
080	The ability to use exercises and other security cooperation programs to improve mutual understanding and improve interoperability with treaty or potential coalition partners.	BP	Shape	Build the capabilities and capacities of partners and institutions	JCA adequately covers this requirement.
		FS	Force Preparation	Training and Exercising	These Tier 3s do not explicitly mention training and exercising in a multinational context.
081	The ability to support and participate in multinational partnership command relationships.	C2	Organize	All. Emphasis on establish and maintain unity of effort with mission partners	This JOC capability is primarily one of command and control. All of the Tier 3's under *Organize* come into play since dynamic structuring is involved as well as alignment and synchronization of processes.

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APPENDIX D - PLAN FOR ASSESSMENT

1. Results of Assessment During the Revision Effort

Three limited objective experiments were used to draw upon subject matter expertise of participants in selected thematic areas of particular interest to CS:

- **Limited Objective Experiment on Influence** provided the following insights:

  - ***Integrated Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC)/JFC Staffs.*** Traditional military JFC Staffs should be integrated in the future with key civilians from DOS, USAID, Department of Justice (DOJ), and other agencies as applicable. Required civilians should be assigned as mid-level staffers, as well as deputies or chiefs, when appropriate. This military/civilian integration will enhance the capability of JFC staffs to carry out influence in CS operations. Where necessary, these staffs should also be designed to accept multinational and HN augmentation. The civilians assigned to these integrated staffs should also have the requisite authorities to make responsive decisions or have an effective reachback capability to their counterparts in Washington.
  - ***DIME Savvy Leaders.*** DIME savvy military officers and government civilians (DOS, USAID, DOJ, etc.) must be grown over time to later effectively serve as mid-level and senior leaders on JFC and national security planning staffs. Future leaders must know their organizations as well as the capabilities and cultures of others.
  - ***Strategic Communication.*** The right message is crucial to building Influence as part of regional security activities. DOS (ambassador, country team, etc) must have a key role in determining the right message. The JFC and his staff must be supportive and stay "on message." Strategic communication promotes influence efforts.
  - ***Enduring Relationships.*** Lasting and enduring relationships with the HN and multinational partners must be built to promote influence. Achievement of positive influence allows the JFC to accomplish improvements in rule-of-law, governance, infrastructure, security, and nation building. As a result, all players will be better able to satisfy expectations of the population as well as counter adversarial threats.

- ***Regional Security.*** In order to create secure regions and allow governments and populations to pursue similar objectives and interests, security cooperation should be regionally focused to solve regional issues vice being focused solely on specific countries. Regional security will then allow the JFC, country teams, regional nations, and multinational partners more flexibility to implement plans enhancing the opportunities for success in solving common problems, leveraging capabilities, and establishing lasting security in the region. A regional approach will also allow the JFC, country teams, regional nations, and other multinational partners to develop a common, synchronized strategy to deny adversary sanctuaries.
- ***Sanctuary Denial.*** Adversary sanctuaries can be virtual, functional, or geographic. Denial of adversary sanctuaries is a long term, coordinated operation best accomplished by the military, interagency, HN, and multinational partners working closely together. To be successful in denying sanctuaries to adversaries, the JFC must positively influence the indigenous population, HN, religious and tribal leaders, and regional nations.
- ***Leveraging Unified Action and Building Partner Capacity and Capability.*** Influence is gained only when relevant agencies are involved and included in the solution. Ambassador/country teams and JFC staffs must collectively develop security plans, with widespread "buy-in." Plans must be releasable to all concerned (Military, HN, multinational partners, country teams, USAID, etc). JFC plans must be vetted with military and interagency counterparts in Washington to gain "buy-in."

- **Limited Objective Experiment on Access** provided the following insights:

  - ***Achieving Human Access.*** Human access is a continual activity and is the foundation for developing long-term personal, professional, and institutional relationships to advance national interests. Human access should be integrated, synchronized, collaborative, process-oriented, partnership-focused, and-trust based. It is part of a whole of government approach and empowers legitimate actors.
  - ***Achieving Political Access.*** Political access enhances the opportunities and chances for successfully developing and implementing plans relating to economic, geographic, and operational access. Persistent forward presence of smaller

military units integrated into the society will create opportunities for gaining access to the population. In the future, success in gaining political access will be dependent on how well the JFC and regional DOS entities can deal with regional issues such as cutoffs in oil supply, nuclear proliferation and reactions by countries in the region, transnational criminal gangs and terrorism, and cultural changes in the population caused by extremists. Political access is not guaranteed. JFCs, ambassadors, and country teams will have to continually evaluate their access strategies and adjust to achieve success.

- ***Achieving Geographic Access.*** Political access significantly improves the chances for success when developing and implementing plans for gaining geographic access. Geographic access is required for entry operations and operational access in the event of a crisis. Geographic access is not ours for the taking; instead, it is gained by negotiating within a framework of shared interests among sovereign states. The AOR must be assessed to determine its capacity to satisfy geographic access needs. Furthermore, agreements must be negotiated so that required geographic access needs for the country or region are clearly identified and approved. Achieving geographic access allows the JFC to operationalize his plans for use of ports, infrastructure (road, rail, and utilities), logistics support (fuel, water, and pre-positioned stocks), en route stops, and overflight rights in the event he must carry out MCO, SSTRO, irregular warfare (IW), or humanitarian assistance (HA) operations.
- ***Enduring Relationships Culminate in Achievement of Operational Access.*** Lasting and enduring relationships among U.S. military, USG agencies, HN, and multinational partners must be built to allow all forms of access (human, political, economic, geographic, and operational) to become reality. Ultimate success is the achievement of lasting operational access. Relationships must be enduring and the JFC must constantly cultivate them so agreements allowing access to air and sea ports and infrastructure (roads, rail, utilities, workers, etc.) are in place when needed. Enduring relations must exist with HNs so diplomatic and political access to important governmental agencies is in place when needed. Finally, the JFC must establish close relationships with USTRANSCOM to ensure it is aware of geographical access requirements. (Note: A relationships-related insight was also identified in LOE 1.)

- ***Need for a CS Strategy and a Process to Produce Such a Strategy.*** National and regional CS strategies are needed. In addition, there is a need for a process that includes the methodology to assess CS requirements as well as develop the required CS strategies. The process must include the following agencies: NSC, OSD, the Joint Staff, DOS entities in Washington (particularly the assistant secretary for the region), USAID, JFC, ambassadors/country teams, and USTRANSCOM.
- ***Alternate Futures.*** Four different scenarios were examined for their impact on CS operations and gaining access. The four scenarios were: nuclear proliferation, economic downturn in the United States, dramatic climate change and migration, and worldwide pandemic. Each scenario caused slightly different impacts on the access piece of CS operations. What the four scenarios pointed out was that the world will likely change dramatically in the next 20-50 years. For example, traditional types of alliances and security agreements will change, the force structure of the U.S. military will likely evolve to have increased capabilities and capacities to support more SSTRO and HA missions and the geographic access grid structure in the continental United States (CONUS) and outside continental United States (OCONUS) will be increasingly under stress. In the future, where the threats may differ greatly from those we have experienced in the past, the United States must have adaptive mechanisms in place to ensure its CS strategy can be modified fast enough to keep up with world changes that threaten the Nation as well as those impacting the United States regionally.
- ***Force Management.*** Military forces must be managed globally rather than regionally (see concept assumption on the resourcing of CS efforts). This allows for surging a greater percentage of the force wherever and whenever necessary based on priorities. U.S. military force management should be coordinated with other USG agencies as well as multinational partners to ensure a coordinated surge effort can be taken responsively when necessary to counter global and regional threats. SSTRO and HA skill sets will become increasingly important and needed in the future. The DOD and DOS must work together to build the requisite SSTRO and HA skill sets and other capacities in the future. An interagency equivalent to the Goldwater Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 needs to be considered to facilitate more exchanges of officers between DOD and DOS

as well as to develop the necessary DOS capacity to complement the capabilities of the DOD within combatant commands.

- ***Whole of Government Approach and Beyond***. The JFC needs to pursue a "whole-of-government" approach when conducting CS activities. Collaboration and communication with other USG agencies, multinational partners, and the HN are required to support CS activities related to access. The understanding and support of the private sector, civil society, and NGOs will also be crucial to success.
- ***Scope of CS.*** An overarching insight that evolved from LOEs 1 and 2 relates to the scope of CS. The scope of CS should be explained to account for the vast array of activities that the JFC, in conjunction with the other members of the USG, HN, and multinational partners, undertakes in pursuit of a global and regional security environment that is favorable to the interests of the United States and its multinational partners.

- **Limited Objective Experiment on Building Partnership Capacity and Cooperation Capabilities** provided the following insights:

  - ***Need for National/Regional CS Strategy and Process.*** An overall National CS Strategy setting the stage for a comprehensive approach to CS is needed. This National CS Strategy will then allow creation of a Regional CS Strategy that a CCDR can plan for and implement. The process to develop National and Regional CS Strategies also needs to be formalized.
  - ***Need for a Combatant Command Security Cooperation Planning Process.*** A process that specifies how a security cooperation plan is developed, coordinated, budgeted, implemented, and reviewed to determine its success needs to be developed so the command and its interagency partner objectives are synchronized. Part of the process should also include procedures for developing and implementing a comprehensive assessment process that synchronizes command and its interagency partner objectives.
  - ***Security Cooperation Plan Considerations.*** The JFC must be able to mobilize command support for security issues in his AOR that relate to resources as well as the capabilities and capacities to support the plan. The JFC is the honest broker to develop a plan for security in a region that will work. He has a leadership role unique to his AOR. Combatant command other interagency capability gaps and

differences must be addressed and solved. To be successful, the JFC must have adequate funding to carry out a security cooperation plan.

- ***Impact of Shifting U.S. Forces from OCONUS to CONUS.*** Consequence management-related capabilities may be negatively impacted by shifting U.S. forces from OCONUS to CONUS. Without forward presence, some critical consequence management related capabilities may not be available when needed most. Reducing forward deployed forces impacts response capacity and opportunities for engagement. (also see insight on consequence management below)
- ***Contingency Response.*** Military and interagency roles relating to responding to contingencies within an AOR need to be clarified. Supported and supporting responsibilities need to be defined as well as the circumstances that determine whether the military or other agency is the lead Federal agency. Furthermore, the JIACG should become "full spectrum" so they can support a wider range of interagency problems within an AOR.
- ***Energy/Natural Resource Security Policy***. A codified U.S. Energy/Natural Resources Security policy and objectives need to be developed in order to guide USG efforts including enforcement activities. Proper authorities for the JFC to execute a resources security policy need to be developed since JFCs facilitate and play a supporting role to other USG agencies in policy implementation. Combatant command security cooperation plans must include these roles and describe ways to interact with the HN to find solutions to protecting and safeguarding critical resources (such as oil) from the product source to final export from the country.
- ***Strengthening U.S. Posture in a Region.*** The CCDR enhances his opportunities for success by building and implementing theater security cooperation (TSC) plans that:
    - Establish enduring relationships with foreign militaries and HN governments and interagency partners
    - Cultivate a shared understanding among multinational and interagency partners
    - Promote participation in bilateral and multilateral events
    - Promote partnership and legitimacy
    - Pursue consensus with multinational partners whenever possible
    - Build and maintain popular support

    - Are supported by the proper authorities to influence decisions that affect CS operations
    - Practice a "whole-of-government approach" where the interagency and multinational partners collectively work together to prevent, mitigate, and recover from all levels and all types of crises
- ***SSR Concept.*** "Train and equip" may be an outdated concept. Interagency and international efforts can, should, and already do go beyond "train and equip." A broader framework, such as the concept of SSR, should be adopted. Approaches to SSR must be comprehensive, synchronized, and balanced. The SSR concept provides a broad framework for implementation of TSC plans as well as complementing the efforts of other USG agencies and international organizations. Also, SSR encourages a whole-of-government approach. It broadens the aperture beyond bilateral military-to-military train and equip programs. Finally, the SSR concept is not only appropriate for current conditions, but it is also better suited to the future given prevailing trends in the joint operational environment.
- ***Implementing SSR.*** Implementing SSR will require changes in DOD training, organization, activities, and capabilities. SSR implementation will require comprehensive analysis, closer coordination with interagency partners, thorough planning, establishing a program of record, and a coordinated assessment effort (e.g., the Operation ENDURING FREEDOM – Trans Sahara[38] model). SSR will require a whole-of-government approach and adopting a long-term campaign approach. A commitment to SSR is a minimum 2-year effort with a minimum 10-year time horizon. The Services must be encouraged to retain and promote personnel who develop area expertise. Opportunities for military personnel to serve longer tours in specific regions for specific functions will be required to enable them to develop the necessary SSR skill sets. A strong strategic communication campaign must be part of any SSR implementation effort. TSC is a major component of SSR, but significant improvements are needed. In this regard, TSC activities need to be prioritized, highly focused, and well coordinated.
- ***Settlement Implementation.*** There needs to be an articulation of the requirement for the JFC to seek

[38] This operation is the U.S. military component of the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI)

negotiated settlements to the maximum extent. Some of these requirements may include nontraditional roles for the military. Additionally, the JFC needs to have an understanding of the new dynamics that may have been created by the negotiated settlement and how to engage the population to support USG and multinational partner objectives. To support settlement implementation, the JFC needs to "quietly" build the credibility of the deployed force as well as engage in soft tactical engagements that build support among the population and legitimacy with the HN and multinational partners. Influencing the HN population and gaining access to required infrastructure will be keys for success. Finally, the JFC must ensure that the strategic communication message is positive and builds a pro-U.S. image within the HN and the region.

- ***Disaster Management***. Timing and response to a crisis is absolutely critical. As such, prior to a crisis, close working relationships and well understood authorities must be in place for the JFC to quickly respond with the right capabilities to minimize the impact of a natural disaster. By assessing the potential disaster risks in the AOR, the JFC will be better able to posture and develop the resources, capabilities, and capacity to respond to a crisis. The partnerships that the JFC develops with the interagency and multinational partners are crucial in disaster management as well as in the flexibility these relationships may provide. Additionally, the JFC may need to maintain specific forward presence capabilities to respond to disasters quickly. Finally, the JFC must ensure that the strategic communication message is positive and builds a pro-U.S. image within the HN and the region.
- ***Pandemic, Epidemic, and Endemic Disease Management***. Definitions for each of these are important and have differing security implications for the JFC. Pandemics, epidemics, and endemic diseases will severely strain HN capabilities, resources, and preparedness. The drain on resources, potential border and trade implications, and the potential loss of life due to a pandemic, epidemic, or endemic disease will pose a dangerous threat to the HN and regional stability. Additionally, pandemics, epidemics, and endemic disease pose a security and force protection issue for the JFC. The JFC must be prepared to work with the HN as well as UN organizations that have the charter to deal with the crisis. In fact, the JFC may be in charge of a multinational health response task force. Considerations for

the movement of personnel and resources, as well as the medical prophylaxes that may be required, impact the security and force protection of JFC personnel. It should also be noted that if the HN cannot respond to the crisis, this may provide an opportunity for a potential adversary to respond.

- ***Consequence Management***. The focus for the JFC regarding consequence management is on the mitigation and containment of the CBRN event. The response is a niche business, with the requirement for scientific and technical expertise. The development and resourcing of consequence management personnel is crucial in the ability to minimize a CBRN event. The JFC must be able to access these trained personnel if tasked to deal with a CBRN event in his AOR. Thus, consequence management provides an opportunity for the JFC to engage with the HN and multinational partners regarding combined consequence management experimentation; planning, preparing, and promoting response capacity; accomplishing gap analysis to identify specialized needs; building multinational partnerships based on common needs; promoting technology insertion and interoperability; soft tactical engagement; and quiet leadership. The primary responsibility of the JFC in consequence management is force protection, as well as building bilateral and multilateral partnerships to address potential CBRN events. Finally, the JFC must be able to use strategic communication to get out "ground truth." (also see previous insight on impact of shifting forces)
- ***Detecting, Deterring, and Mitigating Destabilizing Criminality.*** The nexus of criminality and corruption is directly linked to terrorists, criminal syndicates, and corrupt government officials. Likewise, terrorism is closely linked to criminal activities and syndicates who specialize in criminal activities. Destabilizing criminal activities include counterfeiting, government corruption, narcotics trafficking, trafficking in persons, money laundering, arms smuggling, murder for hire, cyber crime, theft of intellectual property, piracy, and extortion. These types or categories of criminal activity, if left unabated, can produce "shadow" economies that pay no taxes and cause fledgling nations to fail. USG efforts to stem the growth of organized criminality help to achieve regional and global stability. To eliminate these types of criminal activities in a HN or a region within the AOR, the JFC must support activities by the HN or larger multinational community to detect, deter, and mitigate

destabilizing criminality by groups or syndicates operating on a national, regional, or global scale.

- ***Hostile Use of the Virtual (Information and Cyber) Domain.*** Hostile use of the virtual domain is of great concern now and in the future. The JFC must expand efforts to detect, deter, and mitigate hostile actions by adversaries in the virtual domain. Both offensive and defensive capabilities (lethal and non-lethal) are necessary. The United States must be second to none in "info sphere" activity. The JFC must be able to successfully respond to adversary activities to use the virtual domain to impede the accomplishment of the combatant command's security cooperation mission. In the virtual domain, a competitor or adversary can deny our access and use his own access against the United States to win the "war of ideas." Therefore, to counter virtual domain access denial efforts, the United States must have redundant systems in place, restore access by using commercial resources, use alternative paths, level the playing field by denying competitor or adversary access, and disclose what the competitor or adversary is doing. Finally, the national policymakers need to define when a hostile virtual domain action is so damaging that it can be considered an open act of aggression or war.
- ***Strategic Communication.*** The need for an effective strategic communication program was identified in each breakout group. It was also identified as a key program in LOEs 1 and 2. Strategic communication is important because it helps the JFC to convey a positive message that supports his security cooperation plan as well as creating a favorable image of the joint force, the USG, and multinational partners. Strategic communication is a significant enabler that must be successfully harnessed by the JFC.

Several other events conducted during 2006 and 2007 provided insights that informed the development of this document. Among the events that influenced this initial version of the Military Contribution to CS JOC are:

- **Expeditionary Warrior 07** insights reinforced this concept's stated objectives and supporting ideas. Participants were tasked to design a campaign plan to (1) gain and maintain U.S. influence in the USPACOM AOR; (2) identify U.S. military posturing requirements that included integrating all instruments of national

power; and (3) position the United States as a long-term strategic partner in the Asia-Pacific region. Discourse generated several insights that resonated throughout the week:

- the consensus that there should be a holistic approach to influence, to include all instruments of national power as well as the capabilities and capacities of others;
- the value the multinational contingent provides in any AOR;
- that strategic communication is interwoven throughout any campaign;
- the necessity to "understand" the problem (much in a manner of systemic approach) in order to set the right interim objectives and apply the right activities towards those objectives;
- the need for a grand strategy when dealing in the area of influence/CS;
- the interdependence of access and influence;
- the importance for the United States to be a "good neighbor" – in order to qualify as a "neighbor," you have to be there (presence);
- that our ability to "assess" is broken – we must not only know if we are doing things right, we must know we are doing the right things;
- that economic interdependence plays a large role in any region; and
- the importance of considering available resources in any plan – we need to be able to manage scarcity and expectations.

- **Unified Quest 07 Nature of the Long War Seminar** reinforced viewpoints regarding the operational environment and underlying drivers of conflict.

- **Selected forums** helped shape the development of the Military Contribution to CS JOC:

  - **USPACOM and USEUCOM FY07 Theater Security Cooperation Working Groups** were used to gain an understanding of current TSC challenges facing the CCDRs.
  - **U.S.-CREST Phase II Working Group Meeting on Conflict Prevention** examined the military role in longer-term, active efforts to contribute to stability in a context of weak states characterized by the presence of a number of destabilizing factors, but no actual crisis situation. A fictional West Africa scenario provided the backdrop for discussion of the military's contributions to multinational conflict prevention efforts to:

- improve the security environment,
- build confidence in local governments, and
- cope with endemic poverty and unemployment.

The most significant takeaway as viewed by the concept author is the importance of regional solution approaches and the inclusion of regional organizations when considering partners on whom we should focus capacity building efforts.

- **Consultation with GCCs** was used as a means of validating that the concept addresses the real world challenges, opportunities and vision of several commanders with AORs of differing character. Specifically, the Commanders of USSOUTHCOM and USPACOM, and the Deputy Commander of USEUCOM (and prospective commander of the new USAFRICOM) were visited by the concept authors for frank discussions on the subject of CS. Reaction to the ideas contain herein were most favorable, particularly in the case of Southern Command and the soon-to-be Africa Command both in which CS is the main focus of military activity.

2. Recommendations for Further Assessment

This Joint Operating Concept identifies a high-level problem and solution for conducting future CS operations. There are a number of specific problems nested within this concept for which we must find detailed solutions. These solutions may be found in operational-level capability gaps identified through realistic, focused experimentation events, leveraging of technological advances in the public and private sectors, and through careful examination of lessons learned in recent and future "battlefield laboratories."

Identifying solution sets for the problems associated with CS operations is a continuous process. The collaborative Joint Concept Development and Experimentation community has identified several key CS challenges below as initial candidates for assessment over the next few years in focused experimentation venues. These experimentation venues must replicate the future operational environment and facilitate a competition of ideas from which solutions may be derived. Those **key CS challenge areas are**:

- Achieving unified action.
- Decision processes for prioritization of resources for CS.
- Comparative analysis on the security posture implications of likely regional contingency operations

(WMD, conventional war, irregular warfare, permissive vs. non-permissive environments). What are common security posture aspects and what are different and perhaps even at odds? How do security posture requirements change when emphasis shifts from averting crisis to preparing for an impending crisis?

- Comprehensive approach to SSR.
- Regional assessment – leveraging the GCC vantage point.
- Strategic communication (note – detailed assessment of this focus area should be covered by the strategic communication JIC recently tasked to Joint Forces Command for development.)
- CS in ungoverned or under governed areas.
- Implications for CS of working by, with and through nontraditional partners, and
- Implications for CS of influencing non-state entities (such as tribes, multinational corporations, regional security organizations, etc.)

Joint Forces Command has initiated a **CS Experimentation Project** beginning in FY 08. This project is intended to operationalize elements of the CS JOC by identifying capability gaps; informing further GCC-focused experimentation and capability demonstrations; and developing documents for submission to the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System. Early analytical work in support of the scoping of this project will involve the identification of high value, overarching capabilities that affect a significant portion of the potential customer and partner base. Draft experiment objectives will be developed through a process of comparing:

- This concept's Table C-1 capabilities;
- The aforementioned key CS challenge areas;
- The Warfighter Challenges;
- Enumerated GCC Priorities for FY 08; and
- Key interagency issues identified by Joint Forces Command's Unified Action project

The initial focus for this project is on meeting an expressed GCC requirement for improved information sharing architectures, regional assessment and decision support capabilities, and enhanced organizational structures to conduct effective CS operations. Specific requirements are:

- The ability to produce and share integrated regional assessments with other government agencies and partners;
- The information sources, networks, and processes needed to achieve regional CS goals;
- Organizations and processes to plan and execute integrated CS operations; and
- A methodology to guide planning, implementation, and evaluation of CS goals.

APPENDIX E - CHALLENGES OF THE FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

This appendix describes a view of the future security environment with a heavy emphasis on those drivers of instability and conflict that will threaten the interests of the United States and its partners.

1. Economic, Demographic, and Societal Stressors

Age and wealth distribution and western cultural influence will significantly shape the environment. Developed countries will continue to see a trend toward aging populations. Many traditional Western European allies will face mounting economic pressure as they attempt to support a growing percentage of pensioners with a declining number of workers. Immigrant population growth may tip the ethnic balance within Western Europe's shrinking population, potentially fueling domestic ethnic or sectarian violence. Such regional demographic changes are also relevant from a military perspective. Population decline and rising social welfare costs may force further reductions to NATO and European Union militaries, affecting their operational capability to partner with the United States and each other.

At the same time, high fertility rates coupled with declining infant mortality will lead to youth-bulges (15 to 29-year-olds) in many underdeveloped and developing countries where youth unemployment rates may be several times that of older adults. This will significantly strain governments' ability to provide basic goods, services, and jobs for their citizens. Such countries are far more likely to experience an outbreak of civil conflict. Youth bulges in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, and the Middle East may lead to larger military structures as a means of employment and security. Moreover, youth bulges will provide fertile ground for recruits in terrorist groups, criminal elements, and drug cartels. The clearly visible disparity between aging, developed countries and countries with young, undereducated, underemployed populations will exacerbate the frustration of the less fortunate and contribute to instability.

Failed or failing states will arise as a result of economic collapse, resource competition, mismanagement, and failed social infrastructure. Some states or regions (for example, North Korea and Central Africa) will depend on foreign aid and handouts for survival. As a result, aid-dispensing international organizations or multinational coalitions may provide de facto governance. Areas ungoverned or lacking effective government control (such as today's Northwest Frontier Province in

Pakistan, areas in the Horn of Africa, and large parts of tropical Africa and South America) may increase in number. These areas will have increasing importance to desperate or disenfranchised citizens, while providing sanctuary for terrorists, criminals, and revolutionaries.

2. Global Insurgency Using Sophisticated Information Operations, Terrorism, and Criminal Activities as Tools

The United States will confront transnational terrorism around the world for the foreseeable future with radical Islamists presenting the foremost challenge. They constitute a transnational, theologically-based insurgency that seeks to overthrow regimes in the Islamic world friendly to the United States, and to evict American presence from parts of the world vital to America's interests. Moreover, they aim at no less than to negate the past 900 years of history that have seen the rise of the West to a position of unparalleled power and influence. The radical Islamists' global network and lack of respect for the lives of innocents, combined with their apparent willingness to employ WMD, should they acquire them, makes this insurgency especially threatening.

In effect, the Islamic world confronts the need to adapt to a world of global interdependence created by the West. Often led by despotic leaders, denied political participation, shackled to commodity-based economies that offer little prospect of supporting the development of a broad middle class, and bombarded by Western media, many Islamic states have fallen behind not only the West, but South Asian and East Asian countries as well. Their rage feeds on the lies of their corrupt leaders, the rhetoric of their radical imams, the falsifications of their own media, and the images of the prosperous developed world. If the tensions between the Islamic world's past and present were not enough, the Middle East, the heartland of Islam, is riven with tribal, religious, and political divisions, creating an explosive mixture that makes continued instability and conflict all but inevitable.[39]

Global communication (described further in a later section) makes it easier for the individual Muslim to identify with and connect to the global Islamic community. Unprecedented access to communications media and a global audience allows extremists to present an image of Islam under attack. The nexus of audience and message can radicalize Muslims within predominately non-Muslim communities, driving them away from assimilation and toward more violent outlets of expression, including acts of terrorism.

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[39] Marine Corps University, U.S. Marine Corps Officer Professional Military Education 2006 Study and Findings

The belief that terror is a legitimate means to address such conditions and effect political change is a fundamental problem for the United States and its partners. The international environment defines the boundaries within which extremist strategies take shape. As a result of freer, more open borders, this environment provides access to havens, capabilities, and other support. Whether through ignorance, inability, or intent, states around the world still offer havens, both physical (e.g., safe houses and training grounds) and virtual (e.g., reliable communication and financial networks), that radical Islamists need to plan, organize, train, and conduct their operations. Once entrenched in these safe operating environments, these organizations can begin to solidify and expand.

Globalization is the primary factor facilitating the ease of legal and illegal movement across national borders. Terrorist movement and financing, illegal migration, trafficking, and smuggling tend to follow legal migration routes throughout the world. Transnational criminal organizations with global connections to money and arms will continue to form strategic alliances with states and non-state actors, including terrorists, and pose security threats to the developed world.

3. Regional Conflict Complexes

A comprehensive understanding of the interstate impacts of civil conflict reveals the importance of cross-border networks. A trouble spot cannot be treated merely as a local insurgency or an armed insurrection isolated to a single state, but likely as a regional struggle for power and wealth involving various actors. The understanding of "spill over" or "spill into" effects, economic and otherwise, on neighboring states needs to be expanded and deepened.

Conceptually, these security threats thrive in what can be referred to as *regional conflict complexes*,[40] or transnational networks involving powerful webs of authority and interconnections that occupy the space between state-centric internal rivalries and globalized alignments. These formidable complexes should be viewed as mutually supporting transnational networks—potent political-military-social-economic associations—that operate across a region igniting tensions and local disputes. Such networks often overlap and shift as incentives change and local struggles mutate. Regional conflict complexes encompass a

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[40] "War Economies in a Regional Context: Challenges to Transformation, International Peace Academy Report," Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper, with Jonathan Goodhand, 2004.

wide range of actors tied together through a fluid web of alliances and enmity: armed groups and mercenaries, criminal organizations, trading and business partners, official state actors, and civilian population groups. A brief illustration of each of these networks follows here:

Military Networks: Autonomous terrorist groups, armed military organizations, and mercenaries supported by region-wide arms trafficking syndicates and usually aided by rival political-military alliances across a region and beyond.

Economic Networks: Illegal traders in weapons and high-priced commodities such as diamonds and minerals which fuel armed groups and their neighboring state supporters. Organized smuggling networks use insecure borderlands to profit from the trafficking of drugs, prostitutes, and other contraband, which is made more acute by widespread corruption among state officials and security forces.

Social Networks: Transnational social affiliations include familial, kinship, religious, occupational, and diasporas. When basic livelihoods are at stake, informal shadow networks comprised of familial, tribal, and clan systems often fill the vacuum with subsistence, care, and work opportunities, through regional networks engaged in profitable gray or black market operations.

Political Networks: Cross-border political alliances pursue common goals and aspirations through military, economic, and social relationships in which allies and friends are rewarded for loyalty and support.

In addition to cross-border military incursions, these transnational networks are often involved somehow in ethnic strife, extremist political links, transnational solidarity with identity groups, population movements, arms smuggling, narcotics trafficking, economic predation, piracy, theft of natural resources, money laundering, and terrorism.

4. Information Environment

The future information environment will continue to provide a fruitful venue for many facets of IO, as well as assuring an almost level playing field in terms of information access.

Expanding global and regional information architectures, along with systems and organizations, public and private, will effect change in governance worldwide. The favorable impact of improved communication on transparency, education, popular participation in political processes,

and a sense of national or supranational identity, will likely result in a positive net-effect on governance. The information revolution will facilitate the identification and organization of like-minded persons around the world, allowing them to form special interest groups, unite diasporas, remain connected in real time to daily events in their homelands or communities, and share vast amounts of information quickly. Friend, foe, and neutral will attempt to exploit the information environment to create political and economic opportunities that, taken as a whole, can cascade across national and organizational boundaries with immense effect.

Critical actors, both state and non-state, will have increasingly uniform access to commercial intelligence including knowledge product research and packaging. Along with the broad availability of high-quality commercial imagery, there will be increasing growth in commercial human intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, and signals intelligence. With such parity in the availability of information, the advantage will often go to the side making the best use of information to reach faster and better decisions.

5. Weapons Proliferation

The extent of the catastrophic challenge in terms of the number of future WMD-capable actors will hinge on the outcomes of near-term initiatives to prevent, dissuade, or deny WMD proliferation or possession as well as threat reduction programs to reduce or destroy stockpiles in a secure manner. It is conceivable by the timeframe of this concept that a solid front of nuclear armed states could stretch from the Arabian Gulf to the Sea of Japan running through Iran, Pakistan, India, China, and North Korea, with Russia looming to the north. This would be a 5,000 mile "nuclear arc of instability" in a part of the world that has become increasingly important to U.S. security and economic well-being.[41]

The acquisition of nuclear weapons by hostile rogue regimes threatens to disrupt the balance of military power and restrain U.S. freedom of action to project power against such adversaries when in the national interest. The acquisition or open demonstration of nuclear capabilities by any state could also upset the current nonproliferation regime. Other countries without nuclear weapons, especially in the Middle East and Northeast Asia, may decide to seek them as it becomes clear that their neighbors and regional rivals already are doing so.

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[41] Marine Corps University, U.S. Marine Corps Officer Professional Military Education 2006 Study and Findings

Proliferation of nuclear-armed states increases the likelihood that these weapons will be used. Countries whose cultures are quite distinct from that of the United States and whose regimes are either unstable or unremittingly hostile (or both) may not view nuclear weapons in the same way that America's political leadership has over the years, as weapons of last resort. It is also not clear that acquiring regimes will take the same kinds of precautions to secure nuclear weapons that mature nuclear powers have in place. Weapons could fall into the hands of additional state or non-state entities as a result of corruption, loose controls, state failure, or conscious strategic decision making by a hostile regime.

Developments in chemical and biological warfare agents and the proliferation of related expertise will pose a substantial threat, particularly from terrorists. Biological agents in particular are becoming progressively easier to fabricate at minimal infrastructure cost using open source information and, under the right conditions, could produce mass casualties, economic disruption and terror on the scale of a nuclear strike.

Proliferation of conventional arms continues to enable armed conflict worldwide. The extent and types of weaponry currently available to terrorists, insurgents, and other criminals are enormous. These groups have exploited and developed local, regional, and global supply channels to traffic in munitions and equipment. Their access to weaponry is facilitated through covert transfers by governments and by legal and quasi-legal commercial dealers, outright black-market sales, and the theft or diversion of both state-owned and privately-owned arms and weapons stores.

Small arms[42] have a number of characteristics that contribute to their rapid and frequent movement across borders, between states, among various types of illegal organizations, and among certain entrepreneurial individuals. These types of weapons are by definition lightweight. This characteristic facilitates their cheap and easy transport, concealment, and covert movement. Arms shipments have been sent to terrorist and insurgent groups by boat, in trucks, on the backs of humans and pack animals, and even through the mail. Light weapons are also relatively cheap, which opens up a large potential buyer's

[42] As described herein, the term "small arms" refers to man-portable personal and military weapons, ranging from handguns to assault rifles to surface-to-air missiles.

market, even in the poorest parts of the world. Finally, light weapons are durable, requiring only a minimum level of field maintenance.[43]

6. Health Issues

It is expected that disparities between health services in the developed and developing world will widen. Chronic and infectious diseases will continue to have a dramatic economic and social impact in Africa and parts of Asia and South America. The dedication of resources to fighting these diseases will leave less money for other basic needs and overwhelm government support capability and capacity. Infectious diseases including HIV/AIDS, malaria, hepatitis, and tuberculosis will be present in most future operational environments. The desire to escape infectious disease may prompt mass cross-border migration, while attempts to enforce quarantine or otherwise limit the spread of infection may be perceived as rights violations, providing challenges to good governance and the exercise of sound public health practices.

It is impossible to anticipate when the next influenza pandemic might occur or how severe its consequences might be. On average, three pandemics per century have been documented since the 16th century, occurring at intervals of 10–50 years. If an influenza pandemic virus were to appear similar to the one that struck in 1918 (killing an estimated 40 million people), even taking into account advances in medicine, unparalleled tolls of illness and death could be expected. Air travel might hasten the spread of a new virus and decrease the time available for preparing interventions. Health-care systems could be rapidly overburdened, economies strained, and social order disrupted. Although it is not considered feasible to halt the spread of a pandemic virus, it should be possible to minimize its consequences through advance preparation to meet the challenge.[44]

7. Emerging Powers

Tectonic shifts in the international environment including the rise of economic power in a number of highly-populated states and the relative decline of America's share of military and economic power may give rise to new and powerful state challenges to U.S. dominance of the international system. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, overwhelming U.S. conventional military superiority has been a key feature of the international environment. However, the spread of military

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[43] Arms Trafficking and Columbia, RAND National Defense Research Institute report to the Defense Intelligence Agency, 2003

[44] World Health Organization global influenza preparedness plan, 2005

and civilian technology, growing economic power around the world, and the control of key global resources, such as petrochemicals, mean that states such as China, India, and Russia may challenge U.S. dominance of the international system and build a wide range of political, economic, and military capabilities to assert their interests regionally and globally.

> "The likely emergence of China and India as new major global players—similar to the rise of Germany in the 19th century and the United States in the early 20th century— will transform the geopolitical landscape, with impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the previous two centuries. In the same way that commentators refer to the 1900s as the American Century, the early 21st century may be seen as the time when some in the developing world led by China and India came into their own." [45]

Emerging great powers will seek to project influence farther from their borders and develop expeditionary capabilities to secure energy sources and supplies of natural resources. Emerging great powers will also rely on niche capabilities or local technologies to press geographic and societal advantages and to defeat perceived U.S. vulnerabilities in a number of areas.

Already, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) comprised of Russia, China, and the Central Asian states has executed agreements that tend to counter NATO and U.S. influence and access in the Central Asian region. Other states, such as Iran and Venezuela may be added to such SCO-like groupings and could become more actively opposed to America's influence and position around the world. Over the next 20 to 30 years, the system of international relations developed by the United States after World War II and expanded after the collapse of the Soviet Union may be challenged by the emergence of a coalition of states seeking their own place in the sun.

8. Energy

Growing demands for energy through 2020, especially by the rising powers, will have substantial impacts on geopolitical relations. The single most important factor affecting the demand for energy will be global economic growth, particularly that of China and India. The International Energy Agency assesses that with substantial investment in new capacity, overall energy supplies will be sufficient to meet growing global

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[45] National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 2004), p. 47.

demand. Continued limited access of the international oil companies to major fields could restrain this investment, and many of the areas—the Caspian Sea, Venezuela, West Africa and South China Sea—that are being counted on to provide increased output involve substantial political or economic risk. Traditional suppliers in the Middle East may also be increasingly unstable. Thus sharper demand-driven competition for resources, perhaps accompanied by a major disruption of oil supplies, is among the key uncertainties of the future environment.[46]

9. Climate Change[47] and Other Issues of the Natural Environment

There is strong consensus in the scientific community that the greenhouse effect is real and that average surface temperatures have risen over the last century, but uncertainty exists about causation and remedies. Experts at a NIC-sponsored conference judged that concerns about greenhouse gases, of which China and India are large producers, will increase steadily through 2020. There are likely to be numerous weather-related events that, correctly or not, will be linked to global warming. Such events could lead to widespread calls for the United States, as the largest producer of greenhouse gases, to take dramatic steps to reduce its consumption of fossil fuels as well as exercise a leadership role in multilateral institutions to address climatologic issues.[48]

Climate changes notwithstanding, the increasing density of the world's population as well as urbanization and development of economic infrastructure will increase the impact of natural disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and tsunamis.

Environmental decay as a byproduct of economic growth will likely outstrip environmental protection resources. While environmental health is generally improving in Western and Eastern Europe, it is declining in Africa and Asia as nations pursue short-term economic growth at the expense of environmental preservation. Degradation is especially significant in the large urban areas of less developed countries, contributing to social instability.

The combination of damage to the ecosystem and excessive commercial fishing is significantly depleting this critical natural resource

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[46] "Mapping the Global Future, Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project," National Intelligence Council, December 2004

[47] Any change in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity.

[48] Ibid.

and threatening a significant economic sector of many poorer countries. A major international scientific study released in November 2006 in the journal *Science* found that about one-third of all fishing stocks worldwide have collapsed (a collapse being defined as a decline to less than 10 percent of their maximum observed abundance), and that if current trends continue all fish stocks worldwide will collapse within 50 years.[49] A global collapse in fish stocks would result in the economic collapse of coastal populations, social instability, and widespread hunger. South and East Asia, with greater than average dependence on fish protein, would be especially affected.[50]

[49] Impacts of Biodiversity Loss on Ocean Ecosystem Services, Boris Worm, et al, *Science*, 3 November 2006

[50] The DCDC Global Strategic Trends Programme, 2007-2036, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, UK Ministry of Defense, January 2007

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