



# The Quiet Enemy: Defeating Corruption and Organized Crime

Brock Dahl

**C**ORRUPTION AND ORGANIZED crime undermine counterinsurgency and stabilization efforts by delegitimizing state institutions in the eyes of host nationals. To some in the U.S. military, however, these dynamics may seem to be beyond the military's resources and solely the responsibility of civilian and host country agencies. This article offers a framework through which every level of the military can better understand illicit behavior and develop a plan to attack it. The framework uses military resources efficiently, but recognizes that only the military may have the strength and reach to influence some of the factors that give rise to illicit behavior in post-conflict environments. It breaks down the factors influencing illicit behavior into three targets that can serve as focal points for military operations—opportunities, risks, and rewards. These are the primary areas of consideration of those deciding to pursue illicit behavior. The military must seek to reduce opportunities for illicit behavior, increase the risks of partaking in it, and minimize its potential rewards. In so doing, it can more effectively deal with the various illicit activities that plague stabilization environments and undermine broader counterinsurgency efforts.

## A Framework for Fighting Corruption and Organized Crime

Targeting opportunities, risks, and rewards allows policymakers to develop a comprehensive strategy to fight corruption and organized crime. It also enables provincial commanders to formulate localized plans to address illicit behavior in their areas of responsibility.

**Defining the problem of illicit behavior.** The literature on corruption is rife with prolonged definitional debates.<sup>1</sup> The only useful understanding of corruption, however, is one that helps efficiently direct limited military resources towards achieving clear objectives in combating it. Corruption and organized crime, which I will refer to together as “illicit behavior,” threaten to undermine key governing institutions, and therefore the entire counterinsurgency effort. Consequently, the military must focus its resources on attacking illicit behavior that undermines security organizations, key public service agencies, and economically essential industries. This understanding requires further elaboration.

Civil conflict often leads to the breakdown of state and social institutions. Entities that individuals might rely on to provide basic services such as security, water, electricity, or education often disintegrate as violence

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PHOTO: A Texas National Guard Soldier participates in checking a tractor-trailer truck for indications of drugs or concealed people at the U.S. Border Patrol's Interstate 35 checkpoint north of Laredo, Texas, in mid-July 2009. (U.S. Army, SGT Jim Greenhill)

escalates. The process of stabilization involves rebuilding institutions around which society can shape its activities and upon which individuals can rely to enable their well-being. However, vacuums created during conflict and rebuilding often empower groups that undermine the success of new institutions by pursuing their own illicit activities and alternative power structures.

Frequently, during conflict, as established institutions break down, individuals form alliances capable of delivering both licit and illicit products and services. While some are concerned with importing food, water, clothes, or other necessities, many exploit the situation by dealing in guns, drugs, human trafficking, and other improprieties. Not infrequently, the same organizations that control transportation conduits also control regional relationships. In such an environment, organized criminal groups focused on profiteering build strong power bases, allowing them to exert control after the peace.<sup>2</sup> To maintain this power, organized criminal groups must develop “hand-in-glove” relationships with corrupt politicians.<sup>3</sup> Such relationships ensure immunity from government aggression, enrich compromised officials, and provide access to additional public resources. In the words of one commentator on post-conflict Bosnia, “Key players in the covert acquisition and distribution of supplies during wartime have emerged as nouveau riche ‘criminal elite’ with close ties to the government . . .”<sup>4</sup> These actors have an interest in perpetuating a parasitic relationship with government institutions. In other words, such actors have *incentives* to behave the way they do. Understanding those incentives is critical to attacking them.

The parasitic relationships that develop often prevent government institutions from sufficiently performing their intended functions. For example, compromised police forces may fail to fully investigate crimes, or officials in key government-run industries may sell or divert products for their own gain. The public, watching this process and experiencing the lack of services that they need and expect, lose faith in the government. The government, in turn, loses its legitimacy, while insurgents gain support by providing institutional moorings, perverse though

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they may be, for the populace. In this way, illicit behavior undermines all efforts to stabilize a society.

Understanding how illicit behavior causes systemic damage is essential to defeating it.<sup>5</sup> As the behavior corrodes the system of governing institutions, it also undermines the expectations of the populace.<sup>6</sup> This dynamic suggests that the target of military activities should be areas where such illicit activities impact standards of living and trust in public institutions. Focus should center on those institutions that bear directly on the most basic public needs: security organizations, key public service agencies, and economically essential industries. Yet, in a foreign environment, identifying threats to these core institutions is a complex challenge requiring properly focused analysis.

**Defining the target of illicit behavior.** The key to identifying threats lies in understanding the expectations of the populace. Security assistance forces must understand how the local populace expects these core institutions to provide security and services in a fair manner.<sup>7</sup> In states in conflict, it may be difficult to develop a unified picture of such expectations. Yet, Soldiers can attempt to bring key leaders together to develop the standards that will dictate the behavior of relevant officials and guide the military’s awareness for when action is necessary. In Baghdad and Kabul, the commanding general and ambassador will have to meet with leaders of key political or sectarian groups, and expectations may best be represented by the passage of legislation prohibiting certain actions. In provincial Afghanistan, the commander may work with a tribal *shura*, or council, to identify expectations such as the types and quantity of services the local population expects. Because they provide clear benchmarks against which government performance can be measured, these expectations help expose the individuals and groups subverting those expectations.<sup>8</sup>



Sgt. Jean-Marc Schaible

**A soldier frisks a suspect during an investigation into illicit activity.**

When security forces have succeeded in understanding local expectations, they can then pursue a range of activities to attack illicit behavior in areas most relevant to the public. The definition of illicit behavior, thus, depends on the regional and cultural variables in which the Soldier finds himself. Comprehending the populations' concerns regarding standards of living and public trust will help security forces focus on the proper "red lines" when public officials and private actors have violated social expectations. Focusing on security agencies, key public service entities, and revenue-generating industries will

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ensure that the military's resources go to those areas where efforts will be most positively felt by the populace.

Given these dynamics, then, how does the military begin to build the actual framework used to attack illicit behavior?

**Focus on the incentive structure.** Because it is dealing with limited resources while fighting insurgents and terrorists, there are limits to the military's policing potential. Yet, it would be imprudent to confront illicit behavior, but achieve no lasting effect beyond what the military's provisional presence in the area would permit. Military power must work in a way that tips the balance of power in favor of those who are willing to work honestly, according to established standards, and through governing institutions. In short, security forces must construct an approach that changes the incentive structure. They must support honest behavior that reinforces legitimate government institutions and provides those institutions the space to develop.<sup>9</sup>

The following framework is intended to complement the military's focus on primary counter-insurgency activities, while providing flexibility to commanders to adapt to the environments in which they find themselves. Treating the three key aspects of the incentive structure as critical operational objectives can also permit commanders to frame activities in a way more familiar to Soldiers' traditional training.

## Understand Opportunities, Risks, And Rewards

Any individual—government official or civilian—will consider the available opportunities, and their risks and rewards when deciding whether to pursue illicit behavior.<sup>10</sup> The military must develop intelligence requirements that help it understand the essential aspects of such decisions:

- Where do the key opportunities for profit exist?
- What are the most significant risks if those opportunities are pursued?
- What rewards are possible if attempts to profit are successful?

The goal should be to shape an environment that affects the way individuals weigh those factors, encourages choices that support established social expectations, and reinforces strong government institutions. The three sections below describe opportunities, risks, and rewards in greater detail.

**Opportunities.** Illicit behavior occurs where opportunities for it exist. Weakly institutionalized states offer just such opportunities, but only opportunities that can be converted into cash or some item of value are normally worth pursuing. Therefore, security forces must look to those activities in the region that present the greatest potential to produce value.

Value can come in a variety of forms. In 2007, for example, certain influential Afghans were said to have been stealing land at the rate of 0.8 square miles a day and then illegally selling it for a profit.<sup>11</sup> People can also be valuable. Kidnapping rings, sometimes complicit with local police, became common in post-war Iraq.<sup>12</sup> Smuggling evades government tariffs and capitalizes on critical pathways used for trade and insurgent and terrorist activities. In 2004, for example, the

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Iraqi government halted the illegal movement of 2,200 tons of oil and fuel products, 23 tons of minerals, 3,350 antiquities, and—yes—even 13,039 “tasty” sheep.<sup>13</sup> Finally, reconstruction funds that are frequently handed out in a rush to achieve some development can also provide substantial opportunities for illicit activity.<sup>14</sup>

The military must focus, then, on any item that offers value, however defined, in order to identify salient opportunities for illicit behavior. To understand what opportunities are already being exploited, it must employ intelligence to identify activities for what they really are in the local context, rather than what they may seem to be in the shadow of an insurgency. For example, rather than being irrational terrorist acts, some attacks on Iraqi oil pipelines were meant to divert oil movements to trucks and increase the opportunities for “diversion, theft, and smuggling.”<sup>15</sup> Analysis has also identified attacks on UK forces as the work of criminal groups resisting the closure of smuggling routes.<sup>16</sup> Violence can also be used to beat out competitors, and government institutions can be infiltrated to give such activities a semi-legitimate gloss.<sup>17</sup> Such infiltration has been apparent in the Iraqi Interior Ministry in the past.<sup>18</sup> Simply writing such activities off as the actions of terrorists or insurgents bent on chaos misses a larger picture that can inform more effective military operations.

Different opportunities may also appeal to different actors depending on their status in the region. Intelligence analysts should, therefore, seek to develop a critical node of key economic and political actors that captures their origin, motivations, relationships, and capabilities. For example, a political official appointed to an Afghan province, but not from the province, may consider short-term opportunities for gain



differently than an individual from the province, who has risen to power there and intends to stay.<sup>19</sup>

**Risks.** Some risks apply to individuals regardless of their position or the opportunities they may be pursuing. Perhaps the greatest risk for many illicit actors is confrontation with the state. What is the likelihood, for example, of facing investigation, arrest, trial, and imprisonment? Until 2007, coalition officials in Iraq seemed unwilling to target crime, feeling that doing so was predominantly an Iraqi responsibility.<sup>20</sup> Asked about looting in 2003, a British military spokesman replied, “Do I look to you like I’m a policeman?”<sup>21</sup> Whatever the variables under consideration by coalition forces were at the time, the prevailing approach certainly did little to impede illicit actors. Arguably, the greatest tool to dissuade potential illicit behavior was taken off the table.<sup>22</sup>

Another type of risk involves the shame and disgrace that can attach to persons publicly implicated in illicit behavior. To some extent, the orientation of the individual will be more relevant here. An outsider may be less concerned with his reputation, whereas someone from the region may be very sensitive to it. The military can strengthen such concerns by encouraging the future orientation of a populace.<sup>23</sup> As one observer notes—

In war the future is cheap, the present is everything, and rules and norms are either non-existent or are treated wholly opportunistically; in peace we have to try to change that so that the future begins to matter, and alongside the future, people’s reputation, their standing, their legitimacy and hence the propriety of their conduct.<sup>24</sup>

Development of expectations can ignite this focus on the future. Where the security forces can convince the population to focus on the future by discussing its expectations, reputations will become more critical, and efforts to publicly expose illicit actors will be more effective.

Many risks depend upon the types of activities being considered. If an official or individual is embezzling money, are there regular audits? If they are smuggling oil, drugs, or even licit goods, how easy is it to get them across the border undetected? In short, what are the

practical challenges they face that could lead to capture, exposure, or the inability to realize much of a reward?

**Rewards.** If opportunities are about the ability to access money or valued items, rewards are about the practical avenues to actually maintain control and enjoy them. If it is difficult for an official or individual to realize any gain from his activities, he will more cautiously weigh whether the opportunity is worth the reward. The critical question is motivation. Are you dealing with an official who simply wants money, a larger house, or other material goods? Are you dealing with an individual who wants to distribute resources to maintain a position of authority and influence in society? What are the main motivations of the actors and what avenues will they have to pursue those motivations?

Unless such actors feel comfortable hiding their ill-gotten gains under a mattress, they must employ some method of storing the wealth they have accumulated. This could include traditional banking services, the *hawala* dealers commonly found throughout Afghanistan and the Middle East, or the conversion of cash into other goods of value.

Many countries have financial oversight laws that require transactions of a certain magnitude to be reported to specialized units at a central bank. Such banks, if the proper relationship can be established, might provide a valuable source of information on the financial activities of illicit actors. Essentially, any area where money is forced into a formal system presents opportunities to closely audit and constrain the rewards of illicit activities. The same is true for *hawala* dealers—also referred to as money service providers. Though *hawala* dealers often operate outside formal financial systems throughout the Middle East and Asia, they are sometimes regulated. In Afghanistan, for example, *hawala* dealers are obligated to obtain government licenses.<sup>25</sup> Understanding these requirements should allow military intelligence analysts to develop a picture of who is moving money and how they are moving it.

Yet, wealth is not always accumulated or stored monetarily. Illicit actors may attempt to obtain control over other resources either to convert them into money or distribute them to maintain



**Afghan commandos and coalition forces search for weapons and other items during a joint mission to arrest a weapons dealer in a village near Jalabad, Afghanistan, 12 September 2007.**

influence. The Mahdi Army, for example, used the Iraqi Ministry of Health to divert pharmaceuticals that were intended for the general public.<sup>26</sup> As noted above, land can also provide a place to store wealth and be a source of power.<sup>27</sup>

The military must understand who controls various resources such as land, minerals, and tangible property.<sup>28</sup> How did they obtain such property? What are they doing with it? Answers to these questions can indicate the reward incentives that help shape the illicit actors' decisions and thus point to the ideal targets of military operations.

**Intelligence.** Intelligence plays a fundamental

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role in the way the military attacks opportunities, risks, and rewards. COIN luminaries like Brigadier General Kitson argued for the importance of integrated intelligence systems long ago.<sup>29</sup> Such systems are equally critical today to effectively combat illicit behavior. Essential intelligence includes relevant social structures, biographical information, leadership analysis, and "criminal association" (critical node) analysis.<sup>30</sup>

Analyzing this intelligence through the lens of opportunities, risks, and rewards will indicate actions the military can pursue to attack illicit behavior. The ideal actions will vary, depending upon the military's resources, the geographic environment, and local characteristics.

### **Tipping the Balance: Applying the Opportunities, Risks, Rewards Framework**

As mentioned earlier, reaching common ground with influential locals about their expectations for public institutions is an essential step in attacking illicit behavior.<sup>31</sup> Understanding local

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expectations will assist the military in identifying those actions that pose the greatest threat to public trust and public services. To attack illicit behavior based on well-developed intelligence, the military can pursue measures to reduce opportunities for illicit behavior, increase the risks associated with it, and minimize the gains achieved from it. Though in some cases activities targeting each incentive area may overlap (affecting opportunities and risks, for example), in practice, clean conceptual distinctions are unnecessary. Commanders have to develop some coherent system for conceiving of the opportunities, risks, and rewards, and execute a systematic approach toward reducing opportunities, increasing risks, and limiting rewards. The military need not execute all activities. It can also realize substantial gains by identifying areas where civilian or other expert assistance can be valuable. Yet, because they have a far more expansive presence throughout conflict zones, military commanders are in the best position to digest intelligence and coordinate the fight against illicit behavior.

**Reducing opportunities.** The military can reduce opportunities through a carrot and stick approach. Such an approach could focus on conditioning monetary or other support on certain behavior, enabling closer oversight of the local government and private sector, and encouraging licit opportunities for individuals who may otherwise rely on illicit ones.

For example, any aid program aims to dispense aid quickly when necessary, but not so quickly that its expenditure cannot be overseen effectively. Military policymakers, the Commander's Emergency Response Program, and other spending authorities can incorporate requirements local officials must meet for disbursements to occur. Such requirements at the strategic level can involve the adoption of simple, but broadly applicable controls and checks on how money is

spent. Battalion level commanders can perform a similar function by requiring proof of expenditures and evidence of receipt and control by local governing institutions. While it may be tempting (and at times, necessary) to get money out the door quickly, even remedial conditions on the release of such funds may force recipients to carefully consider how they use them.

Actual controls and checks performed by a variety of different agencies, including local government agencies, contracted civilians, or (in the earliest stages of stabilization) the military itself, should be closely tied to such conditions. Local government agencies may be well intentioned but not have the resources to visit certain parts of the country. Expanding their reach may be a simple but effective way of showing the presence of a central authority. Contracted civilians can also be effective working alongside locals who they can simultaneously train in audit and oversight responsibilities. Finally, the military should keep checking on projects its funds are supporting.

Illicit behavior also occurs because conflict environments greatly diminish the opportunities available for legitimate pursuits. In the past, the U.S. government has developed programs to provide livelihood alternatives. Yet, such enterprises pose substantial difficulties. In Afghanistan, for example, many farmers grow opium because they have become indebted to powerful warlords who require it as a form of debt repayment.<sup>32</sup> In such a situation, providing sustainable job alternatives is not as simple as handing out seed or paying off debts. Variables such as irrigation, distance from markets, and other factors also determine what farmers can profitably grow.<sup>33</sup> Alternative livelihood programs often require substantial planning that integrates a profound understanding of local dynamics that can only be achieved through engagement with the local population itself. Still, one option for limiting illicit opportunities is enabling licit opportunities through properly structured alternative livelihood programs.

Reducing opportunities for illicit behavior may be the most complicated aspect of fighting such behavior. It requires the deepest understanding of the region and how numerous variables interrelate. Though such efforts should still be pursued, security forces can likely have a far

more substantial impact by increasing the risks of illicit behavior.

**Increasing risks.** The most significant risks for illicit actors are capture, imprisonment, public exposure, and shaming. The military can substantially raise such risks by aiding law enforcement operations, supporting greater public transparency efforts, and encouraging civil society involvement against and awareness of illicit behavior.

The failure to properly support law enforcement functions is the most substantial mistake any stabilization program can make. Whatever authority is established in the country, the first step in stemming the growth of a criminalized economy lies in achieving early, visible victories over illicit actors. Such victories send clear signals that authorities will not tolerate illicit behavior.<sup>34</sup> The greatest cautionary potential available to the military rests in the actual arrest, prosecution, and imprisonment of illicit actors. Operation Honest Hands, the U.S.-Iraq effort to clean up rampant corruption at the Bayji refinery, offers an excellent example of such activities.<sup>35</sup> During that operation, U.S. and Iraq officials maintained an active presence in the refineries and arrested anyone sufficiently implicated in wrongdoing.<sup>36</sup>

Since provincial prosecutorial resources may be sparse, the military can also consider ideas such as supporting a centrally located, roving prosecution team. Such a team could develop expertise in the racketeering and conspiracy operations of large criminal networks, and can act as a powerful resource to attack such organizations.

The military can also encourage public oversight of governing institutions. It should pressure officials to make public budget, public service, and project information widely available. Innocent government officials would have no reason to fear such disclosures. The U.S. can then withhold support or incite pressure by influential locals when host officials resist such disclosures.

The military can further assist public awareness and oversight of governing institutions by conducting surveys on the quality of services like sewage disposal, water, electricity, and trash removal to measure government performance.<sup>37</sup> The military can then provide public venues

where such results are displayed and wherein host officials have to answer for those results.

While raising the risks through detention, prosecution, and public exposure are likely to have the most substantial impact on illicit actors, depriving them of the fruits of their labor could also play a significant role in dissuading them from pursuing ill-gotten gains.

**Minimizing rewards.** The military can deprive illicit actors of their profits through a variety of techniques. Moreover, cooperation with civilian agencies with an expertise in the relevant areas can often enhance the effectiveness of reward-minimization techniques.

Patrols to interdict the flow of insurgent supplies also close off traditional routes for smuggling. Broadening the scope of patrol targets to include resources exploited by local illicit actors (found through the “opportunities” analysis) may prove effective. However, such disruption also poses a substantial threat to military forces. It may incite violent responses from illicit profiteers as well as insurgents and should be carefully planned.

The military can also make it difficult for illicit actors to store, move, or enjoy the hard currency they obtain by helping oversight agencies license banks and hawaladars and identify those operating without a license or not reporting information properly. It can also do the same with commodities or other alternative value stores. For example, it can facilitate NGO programs like Land Titling and Economic Restructuring in Afghanistan, which created official land registries under contract with the U.S. Agency for International Development.<sup>38</sup> It can also support similar efforts by civil society transparency organizations, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Organization, which works to improve metering and other mechanisms for keeping track of oil, gas, and mining resources.<sup>39</sup>

Military and civilian agencies may need to coordinate the participation of organizations that increase government transparency at the highest levels. However, alternatives may also exist for operating transparency initiatives on a local level by simply doing things such as making the local budget and project lists publicly available to all and holding public disclosure meetings.



## Achieving Maximum Impact

Several years of experience in Iraq and Afghanistan have made clear that sustainable reconstruction and stabilization efforts require the military to find a way to attack illicit behavior. Because attacking such behavior head-on may drain limited military resources and distract from vital elements of the counterinsurgency mission, the military needs a framework that complements its normal operations and efficiently achieves a maximum impact. The opportunities-risks-rewards framework can coexist with counterinsurgency operations in a way that shapes incentives for people to act honestly and reinforces government institutions, so that such honesty and strength can do the bulk of the work of improving the system.

Constraining potentially lucrative illegal activities will likely elicit one of two responses. The ideal response is for individuals and groups to back down and pursue licit activities that are

more profitable, simply because the costs of illicit activities have grown too high. A second response might be that illicit actors will react violently to protect their terrain, in which case they may become enemy combatants and expose themselves to the types of traditional solutions the military knows best.

While the proposed focus on reducing opportunities, increasing risks, and minimizing rewards does involve some functions beyond the normal scope of traditional military operations, commanders should remember that shaping incentives does not require substantially different tools than the military already possesses. It simply requires strategic decisions about how to employ intelligence and deploy resources in a way that can affect incentives. Put simply, you don't have to capture every bad guy to attack illicit behavior. The goal is not to clean the slate, but simply to tip the balance in favor of honesty and good government. **MR**

### NOTES

1. Laura S. Underkuffler offers a helpful review of different definitions. Laura S. Underkuffler, "Defining Corruption: Implications for Action," in *Corruption, Global Security, and World Order*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Cambridge: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), 27-46.

2. Susan Rose-Ackerman, "Corruption in the Wake of Domestic National Conflict," in *Corruption, Global Security, and World Order*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Cambridge: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), 67, 71.

3. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Law and Order: The Military Doesn't Want to Touch It. Who Will?" *The Washington Post*, 13 April 2003, B01.

4. Peter Andreas, "The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia," *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (2004): 44. See also Heiko Nitzschke and Kaysie Studdard, "The Legacies of War Economies: Challenges and Options for Peacemaking and Peacebuilding," *International Peacekeeping* 12, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 229.

5. Underkuffler and Mark Philp use this concept with respect to corruption, but I am expanding it here for our purposes. See note 1, and Mark Philp, "Peacebuilding and Corruption," *International Peacekeeping* 15, no. 3 (June 2008): 310-27.

6. Philp, 314.

7. *Ibid.*, 323.

8. More will be said on this topic in note 10.

9. Rose-Ackerman, 86.

10. Though not written for military purposes, the discussion of opportunities, risks, and rewards in Emil Bolongaita, "Controlling Corruption in Post-Conflict Countries," *Kroc Institute Occasional Paper #26: OP:2* (January 2005) served as a catalyst for thinking about a framework involving these variables.

11. Stephanie Irvine, "Powerful 'Grab Afghanistan Land,'" *BBC News*, 6 September 2007, available at <[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/6981035.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6981035.stm)> (31 October 2009).

12. Anne Barnard, "Lethal Alliance Fuels Kidnappings: Iraq's Militants, Criminals Team Up," *The Boston Globe*, 25 September, 2004, A1. See also, Phil Williams, "Organized Crime and Corruption in Iraq," *International Peacekeeping* 16, no. 1 (February 2009): 127.

13. Edward Wong, "Boats, Cows, Tasty Lamb: Iraq Battles Smuggling," *The New York Times*, 27 March 2005, 1.

14. Rose-Ackerman, 67.

15. Williams, 122.

16. Robert E. Looney, "Reconstruction and Peacebuilding Under Extreme Adversity: The Problem of Pervasive Corruption in Iraq," *International Peacekeeping* 15, no. 3 (June 2008): 427.

17. Rose-Ackerman, 68; Looney, 427.

18. Looney, 427.

19. Philp makes the distinction between roving and predatory bandits that gives rise to this idea. Philp, 320.

20. Williams, 116.

21. Smith, B01.

22. A recent RAND study, perhaps recognizing the limitations on current

forces, suggests the creation of "stability police force" that can perform the types of "high-end" policing functions being discussed here. Terrence K. Kelly et al., *A Stability Police Force for the United States: Justification and Options for Creating U.S. Capabilities* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2009), available at <[http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND\\_MG819.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG819.pdf)> (5 November 2009). Such a force is ideal and even necessary for stabilization, but in the absence of any such force (or efforts to produce one) currently, this article is focusing on what can be done within current force constraints.

23. Philp, 324.

24. *Ibid.*

25. See "Article Two: Money Service Providers" under the regulations of Da Afghanistan Bank, available at <[http://www.centralbank.gov.af/pdf/Money\\_Service\\_Providers\\_Regulation\\_FIU\\_revisions\\_DG\\_17Mar08.pdf](http://www.centralbank.gov.af/pdf/Money_Service_Providers_Regulation_FIU_revisions_DG_17Mar08.pdf)> (31 October 2009).

26. Williams, 121.

27. Brock Dahl, "The Business of War: How Criminal Organizations Perpetuate Conflict and What to Do About It," *Colloquium* 2, no. 1 (March 2009): 8. Available at <<https://coin.harmonieweb.org/Knowledge%20Center/Colloquium/Dahl.pdf>> (5 November 2009).

28. See note 13.

29. Graham Ellison and Jim Smyth, *The Crowned Harp: Policing Northern Ireland* (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 75.

30. Kelly, 28, 30.

31. Philp, 324.

32. Nitzschke, 230.

33. Those interested in these dynamics should consult the extensive work of the socio-economist David Mansfield, who has performed elaborate research in this area. See: <<http://www.davidmansfield.org/>> (7 November 2009).

34. Rose-Ackerman, 88.

35. Yochi J. Dreazen, "U.S., Iraq Launch Campaign to Cut Oil Smuggling—Main Goal is to stem Cash Flow to Insurgents; Corruption Runs Deep," *The Wall Street Journal*, 15 March 2007, A1.

36. Dreazen, A1.

37. Sewage, water, electricity, and trash (SWET) is only an example of a potential tool for gathering information, and not a sweeping solution to answer all questions. For an argument that SWET alone is insufficient, but must be utilized in conjunction with other tools, see Major Dawson A. Plummer, "Examining the Effectiveness of SWET and Sons of SWET in OIF" (Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2006-2007), available at <<http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA470921&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>> (5 November 2009).

38. For a description of the program, see <<http://www.ltera.org>> (5 November 2009). For an audit of the program, see USAID Office of the Inspector General, "Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Land Titling and Economic Restructuring in Afghanistan Project," Audit Report No. 5-306-09-004-P (Manila, 8 June 2009). Available at: <[http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PDACC0271.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACC0271.pdf)> (5 November 2009).

39. See <<http://eitrtransparency.org/>> for more information.