



All Our Eggs in a Broken Basket: How the Human Terrain System is Undermining Sustainable Military Cultural Competence

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PHOTO: Task Force Tripoli Commander BG John Kelly and staff engage with local tribal leaders in Tikrit, Iraq, April 2003.

All photos courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Losack, USMC.

FIELD-EXPERIENCED WARFIGHTERS and other experts in operational art have identified a range of weaknesses in military cultural training, education, and intelligence. Each “culture gap” has been painstakingly codified in military journals and official publications, most notably in Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (COIN). Finding an effective and lasting solution to these shortcomings has framed the latest phase of an ongoing debate over how to meet operational cultural requirements.

One approach argues for comprehensive change. This method would take all the criticism of military cultural training and intelligence analysis to heart, applying recent doctrine to long-term knowledge and cultural terrain analysis programs. Forcing the services to view the cultural terrain as a co-equal element of military terrain—without abandoning core warfighting capabilities—would ensure the kind of all-inclusive focus on culture that the Army and Marine Corps applied to maneuver warfare theory in the 1990s.

The other side of the debate, represented by the advocates of the Human Terrain System (HTS), calls for an immediate solution in the form of non-organic personnel, new equipment, and the direct application of external academic support. HTS essentially adds a quick-fix layer of social science expertise and contracted reachback capability to combatant staffs. This “build a new empire” proposal is based on the assumption that staffs are generally incapable of solving complex cultural problems on their own.

The HTS approach is inconsistent with standing doctrine and ignores recent improvements in military cultural capabilities. American military staffs have proven capable of using cultural terrain to their advantage in the small wars of the early 20th century, in Viet Nam, and contrary to common wisdom,

in Afghanistan and Iraq. Whatever weaknesses in cultural capability existed had always proven most evident at the onset of low intensity conflicts but were later rectified as warfighters adapted to the environment. These first-round failures occur because a focus on cultural training and education has yet to be sustained between conflicts.

Moreover, the practice of deploying academics to a combat zone may undermine the very relationships the military is trying to build, or more accurately rebuild, with a social science community that has generally been suspicious of the U.S. military since the Viet Nam era.

Post-9/11 Joint doctrine pounds away at the solution to the systemic weaknesses identified in cultural training, education, and intelligence: Soldiers, Marines, and combatant staffs must become cultural-terrain experts. Cultural terrain considerations must be closely woven into the full spectrum of military training and operations. The excessive focus the Department of Defense (DOD) has placed on the extraordinarily expensive Human Terrain System has, and may continue to come, at the expense of precisely those long-term programs that will develop this mandated, comprehensive level of expertise.

Failure to refocus effort on sustainable cultural competency programs will eventually lead to another wave of first-round operational failures the United States can ill afford.

Addressing the Capability Gap

Initial operations in Afghanistan and Iraq revealed three interrelated shortcomings in military cultural competency. First, cultural training for troops, staffs, and commanders was utterly deficient. Second, military intelligence personnel were not prepared to read or analyze cultural terrain and lacked comprehensive data to constantly provide cultural analysis. Third, many staffs were incapable of using cultural terrain to their advantage, which resulted in an early series of wasted opportunities that fed the insurgencies and terrorist operations of the Taliban, Ba'athist insurgents, and Al-Qaeda.

In an effort to address these gaps the services and DOD provided impetus to a grass roots cultural "surge" generated in late 2003 by returning combat veterans who were frustrated with cultural training inadequacies.¹ Taking a long-term view, both the Army and Marine Corps responded to their own self-

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assessed requirements by creating cultural training centers.² The Training and Doctrine Command Culture Center and Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning were designed to meet the immediate needs of deploying combat forces while building comprehensive education curricula in support of ongoing, sustainable professional development.

Both centers have seen some limited success. The Army Culture Center has created a progressive series of short-form cultural training sessions for deploying Army troops as well as a ladder curriculum designed to be woven into existing professional military education programs. The Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning has taken a similar approach, supporting predeployment programs like Mojave Viper while embedding civilian social scientists and trainers at a range of Marine Corps professional development schools.³

In an attempt to address gaps in cultural intelligence capability, the Army and Marine Corps intelligence schools have begun to realign in order to train both enlisted and officer students in cultural analysis. Link analysis programs designed to help tear apart Al-Qaeda or Taliban networks are now also used to track tribal and sectarian relationships. The Marine Corps Intelligence Activity has further developed its existing cultural intelligence program to address the cavernous gaps in baseline-cultural data while providing reachback cultural support to deployed forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Staff training has also expanded in recent years to encompass a wide range of cultural considerations. Currently, officers with direct counterinsurgency experience who have been trained by doctorate-level social scientists at professional education programs are attending predeployment staff exercises focused on cultural terrain. Military staff planning instructors facing skeptical audiences in late 2003 now struggle to keep up with enthusiastic students of Afghan and Iraqi culture: students who understand that the success of their upcoming deployments will

most likely pivot on social rather than combat considerations. The author observed this paradigm shift in attitude while teaching predeployment cultural courses from 2003–2007 and while deployed with combat staffs in 2003, 2004, and 2006.

The framework now exists for sustained focus on culture. Given the proper institutional support, these training centers and cultural intelligence programs can be used to leverage the experience of both troops and staffs to create a long-term, organic approach to cultural competence. Soldiers, Marines, and officers educated with these programs will come to embody the warriors that General Charles Krulak envisioned fighting the “three block war.” They will be able to successfully conduct interlaced humanitarian, peacekeeping, and combat operations in support of the kind of strategic missions this Nation is likely to face in the next 50 years.⁴

The HTS Approach

Between 2005 and 2008 the officers and contractors developing HTS repeatedly briefed their fundamental assumptions. Based on urgent needs statements from the operating forces, they claim that existing training and intelligence programs in the U.S. inventory have failed to provide immediate cultural support to the field; insufficient cultural expertise exists in the military officer corps; reachback capability is lacking; and staffs have proven deficient in reading the cultural terrain. According to these pundits, an entirely new system of cultural support would have to be developed and quickly deployed. The HTS staffers also believe that military intelligence and the broader intelligence community have only a very limited and finite role to play in shaping cultural terrain.⁵ They assert that fielding civilian academics in combat zones should be the linchpin to any successful program.⁶

Centered on the Human Terrain Team (HTT), the system is both comprehensive and discrete from any organic capability found in an infantry combat brigade (the targeted level of support). It injects civilian academic and military cultural expertise into the operational staff in the form of

the five-man HTT. The terrain team brings its own computers stocked with software that has been contract-designed from the ground up to crunch cultural data. A reachback team of cultural experts resides at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, adding an additional layer of academic support.⁷

Although program managers sell the image of a holistic, multi-faceted system, the Human Terrain Team is the physical, tactical embodiment of HTS. The civilian academic, the military cultural experts, and the leader of the team serve as special advisors to the brigade commander, providing a separate stream of data and advice that in theory is not “polluted” by the intelligence cycle. This separation makes it easier for the managers to sell the terrain team to academia and to recruit social scientists. If HTS is not related to military intelligence, then the fraught concept of applied academics seems more palatable.

The progenitors of HTS took a requirement that called for a comprehensive and sustainable solution—train combat units to navigate the cultural terrain—and instead created a costly quick-fix response to an immediate need. That response relied heavily on non-organic technology and contracted support. In theory, HTS could have addressed the perceived immediate need while the services addressed the long-term programs. In effect, the fundamental flaws in the HTS concept put the system at cross-purposes with the services’ short-term goals and future needs.

Fundamental Flaws

One assumption behind HTS is accurate: the U.S. military establishment did suffer from a near-critical weakness in cultural capability between 2001 and 2003. Most of the remaining HTS program assumptions are broadly inaccurate. By doctrine, mission, and organization, the U.S. military is mandated to train and maintain organic cultural expertise. Staffs are required to conduct training in the navigation of cultural terrain. Cultural information is inextricably linked to the intelligence process. Reachback centers do exist and are actively supporting combat operations. There is no justification to support a, “we fight wars, we need

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to pay someone to do culture.” Despite the initial failures of poorly trained military personnel to “do culture” there is no valid, systemic requirement for nonorganic personnel or equipment.

Both the Army and Marine Corps train foreign area officers (FAOs) and civil affairs (CA) officers to serve as political and cultural advisors to combatant staffs. The counterinsurgency manual describes the intended roles of these officers developing the cultural terrain operating picture in section 3-17. For example, it states, “civil affairs personnel receive training in analysis of populations, cultures, and economic development. These Soldiers and Marines can contribute greatly to understanding civil considerations.” As another example, “Foreign Area Officers have linguistic, historical, and cultural knowledge about particular regions and have often lived there for extended periods.”

The Marine Corps defines the role of the FAO as follows: “Uses the language and knowledge of military forces, culture, history, sociology, economics, politics, and geography of selected areas of the world to perform duties as directed.”⁸ FAOs receive years of basic and advanced language training, earn an advanced degree in regional studies, and serve an immersion tour in their area of expertise. Because FAOs are commissioned officers with service in the

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operating forces, they can articulate cultural advice in an operational context.

The FAO community received its first real operational exposure during the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Foreign area officers served as cultural advisors to staffs and commanders. The author served as a FAO within the First Marine Division forward command post. From 2004 to 2008, FAOs continued to advise staffs down to the battalion level, coordinating tribal liaison, providing cultural input to information operations planning, and offering mitigating options during intensive combat operations. However, based on prewar tables of organization and service manning, there simply were not enough trained and experienced FAOs to support each brigade or regiment. Fewer than 20 Middle East FAOs were serving in the active Marine Corps in 2003 and approximately half of those were colonels (too senior to serve in a unit) or in nondeployable billets.⁹

To support the need for cultural expertise DOD has mandated that the services focus attention on recruiting and training of FAOs. DOD Directive 3000.5 and the *Defense Language Transformation Roadmap*, both written in response to the perceived gap in cultural capability, require the services to strengthen their FAO programs. This requirement directly supports the doctrinal requirements found in the COIN manual and is based on recent combat experience.

In response, the Marine Corps has increased the number of Middle East FAOs in the training pipeline, but it is unclear whether this step will provide the fleet operating force with a sufficient number of trained officers. The Army has a more robust and distinct



Colonel Michael W. Manske, head of Civil Affairs and Information Operations, First Marine Division, conducts the first meeting of the “Former Senior Officer” board in Ramadi, May 2004.

program.¹⁰ It typically assigns a significant portion of its FAO community to diplomatic or military assistance missions at U.S. embassies around the world. No fewer than five Army FAOs overlapped in three-year billets at the U.S. Embassy in Jordan between 2007 and 2009.¹¹ Until the Army FAO branch shifts away from diplomatic missions it will likely be unable to meet the needs of units engaged in ongoing combat operations.

FAOs work closely with the civil affairs and psychological operations (PSYOP) sections, often riding along with them as unit members conduct tactical missions. Many of these CA officers also have significant cultural training and experience and have begun to demonstrate as much in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Although training regimes have failed to adequately reflect doctrine, the Army's civil affairs FM states the role of the CA officer is to, "[advise] commanders on the political, cultural, and economic impacts of planned operations and their impact on overall objectives."¹² According to the HTS website, the CA staff is responsible for "developing, coordinating, and executing plans to positively influence target populations to support the commanders' objectives, and to minimize the negative impact of military operations on civilian populations and interference by civilians during combat operations." CA officers "provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance on FN/HN [foreign nation/host nation] social and cultural matters." This doctrinal description almost directly mirrors the claimed capabilities of an HTS human terrain team.¹³

Both CA units and PSYOP provide direct cultural data collection, collation, and analysis to the combatant staff. Often working side by side with CA units, PSYOP teams conduct social science derived field research. PSYOP Soldiers poll and interview locals to determine the effectiveness of both tactical and information operations. Data collected in the field is input into the intelligence cycle where it is merged with classified information. The FAO, CA staff, and PSYOP leaders all have an opportunity to provide further input as the staff develops courses of action.

A properly trained, manned, and supported team consisting of a FAO, a CA unit and a PSYOP unit should be able to provide the kind of cultural expertise that staffs found lacking in 2003 and 2004. If these advisors and special staff sections are deficient, as implied in various HTS publications, then it is the clear responsibility of the services and the commanders to better train and prepare their Soldiers and Marines so they can fulfill their roles.¹⁴ If there is an insufficient number of available FAOs then, as implied in DOD 1315.17, it is the responsibility of the services to create more. Further investment in the preexisting and combat-proven FAO program would show long-term commitment to military cultural competence.¹⁵

According to the 15 July 2008 HTS briefing, the HTT is staffed by at least two officers or enlisted soldiers with FAO, CA, Special Forces, or intelligence backgrounds. The team is led by an experienced combat arms officer. Why is it necessary to create a separate program, costing (at a minimum) tens of millions of dollars, to assign these personnel to the very staffs at which they were trained to serve? What do the Human Terrain Team FAO and CA officer bring to the table that organic FAO and CA officers do not? If HTS can find these qualified officers, why can't the U.S. military services?

Even without the FAO, CA officers, and PSYOP units, combatant staffs have proven capable of both reading the cultural terrain and devising culturally savvy operational plans. In the COIN manual, General Petraeus uses the predeployment plan developed by the First Marine Division as an example of successful staff-cultural planning.¹⁶ In late 2003, then-Major General Mattis held several conferences to build a campaign plan grounded in cross-cultural considerations.

Although this plan was initially thrown off the rails by events in Fallujah in early 2004, commanders across Anbar Province continued to devise intuitive tactics designed to take advantage of tribal relationships, meet local economic needs, and avoid

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cultural friction. As early as February 2004, even those Marines poorly trained in cultural awareness were actively engaging with tribal, religious, and business leaders, targeting contracting monies based on PSYOP and CA cultural and economic data, and conducting census polling. They built local information operations messages derived from cultural input pulled from patrol reports and human intelligence sources. Applied with relative consistency over a matter of years, these local programs—often devised by commanders down to the platoon level—directly contributed to the growth and success of the Awakening movement in Al-Anbar. By early September 2008, violence in Al-Anbar had plummeted to negligible levels and the province was returned to Iraqi control.

On its website, HTS provides examples of programmatic successes, or “impacts.”¹⁷ These include an HTT-designed plan to engage with local mullahs in Afghanistan, to hold a tribal congress to address grievances, and to provide a volleyball net to build rapport with local villagers. These examples demonstrate common sense in a COIN environment, not breakthroughs. Hundreds of Army and Marine staffs that accepted culture as a significant element of terrain have been doing these things on a daily basis across Afghanistan and Iraq for years without HTS support.

A range of staffs have convened tribal councils to create a forum for the redress of grievances. As early as 2004, the First Marine Division held regular tribal councils and established a “graybeard” board of disgruntled former Iraqi general officers. Provincial reconstruction teams and infantry battalions often attend and support *loya jurga* meetings in Afghanistan. Without input from the Human Terrain System reachback cells, FAOs, CA officers, and PSYOP officers have been actively engaging with local leadership and proposing culturally savvy solutions since the onset of the war.

One quote published on the HTS “impact” webpage stands out. Referring to the local populace, an Army brigade operations officer states, “We don’t ask them about their needs—paratroopers just don’t think that way.” By prominently displaying this quotation, the HTS program managers imply that this officer’s inability to understand or execute simple counterinsurgency tactics is typical.

However, the author personally observed U.S. Army paratroopers demonstrating cross-cultural competency at both the tactical and operational levels in Anbar Province in early 2004 during relief-in-place operations. With little to no prewar planning and vague orders from above, the 82d Airborne Division conducted tribal engagement on a daily basis. Many local unit commanders had

developed relationships with villagers in their areas of operations. A Florida National Guard unit made up of (mostly) police officers developed excellent rapport with the leaders and citizens of Ramadi, using cultural techniques developed on the streets of Miami to reduce local violence.¹⁸ Whatever cultural friction was generated by the 82d came not from an innate inability of paratroopers to appreciate cultural terrain but instead from a near total lack of prewar cultural training at the staff and small unit level. The absence of prewar cultural training for intelligence specialists compounded these tactical failures.

From 2001 to 2004, intelligence cells at the operational level (regiment, brigade) focused almost solely on targeting military equipment and



The author and LTC Michael Groen engage tribal leaders in Tikrit, Iraq, to determine areas of influence, April 2003.

personnel, conducting insurgent network analysis, and providing raid support. Collection assets, both human and electronic, focused intently on gathering information for strategic thought pieces, constantly providing targets to raid teams or simple low-level force protection missions. Many intelligence officers could clearly see what needed to be done—tribal network analysis, economic analysis, and collection in support of engagement—but were initially unable to dedicate manpower to these nontraditional tasks.

The HTS team's response to the cultural intelligence failures of the early war period was to argue that cultural information is generally unclassified and is best processed by academic researchers.¹⁹ This proposed solution ignores the fact that the intelligence staff is, by doctrine, specifically designated to collect and analyze cultural data. The inference that cultural information is inherently unclassified shows a clear lack of appreciation for the contemporary operating environment.

A more effective solution to the cultural intelligence gap is to retrain intelligence staffs to collect and analyze cultural data and to include this data in all-source intelligence products. Joint doctrine clearly encourages the services to build and maintain this capability. Joint Publication 2.0, *Joint Intelligence*, requires the intelligence community to study human factors, which it defines as “psychological, cultural, behavioral, and other human attributes that influence decision-making, the flow of information, and the interpretation of information by individuals or groups.”²⁰

In response to this requirement, the community has created human-factor cells within various agencies and has worked aggressively to map human terrain. It has also provided extensive reachback capability to deployed units, leveraging the power of thousands of trained and experienced analysts, fully networked computer systems, and the ability to solicit high-level academic input as required.

The HTS program has attempted to create its own contracted reachback capability in the form of an expensive cell at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This cell provides feedback to HTTs but is incapable of providing cultural support to the full range of deployed forces around the world. Despite this demonstrated limitation of capability, the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI) has seriously considered the HTS reachback cell as

the best solution to provide cultural support to combat staffs.²¹

If the Department of Defense has ascertained that the entire intelligence community has failed to provide sufficient cultural reachback support to operational units then USDI should work with the Director of National Intelligence to fix the existing system, not spend limited resources on an entirely new and unproven program.

The Army intelligence manual also clearly identifies the Army intelligence combat staff (S-2 and G-2 sections) as responsible for the collection and analysis of cultural data.²² The new Army manual on human intelligence collection, the manuals on stability and support operations, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, and perhaps most important, the counterinsurgency manual, all require intelligence staffs to become experts in cultural terrain and to provide commanders with cultural analysis.²³

Some consider doctrine the “last refuge of the unimaginative.”²⁴ That may well be, but if we are to develop an effective force, doctrine cannot be so blatantly cast aside.

Reality is that combat intelligence staffs in both Afghanistan and Iraq have received some updated training and are aggressively collecting and analyzing cultural data. Intelligence sections leverage the reachback capability of the Open Source Center to examine both open source and classified data. The Marine Tactical Fusion Center at Multinational Forces West in Iraq supports a long-standing economic and political intelligence cell that works closely with CA units and FAOs to produce daily, high-level cultural intelligence products. This cell is replicated in one form or another across Afghanistan and Iraq.

Academic Backlash

Each human terrain team fields at least one civilian social scientist. In recruiting these social scientists for active military operations, the HTS program staff has widened a long-existing schism between academics willing to work with the military and those who are not. The HTS program has provided groups like the Network of Concerned Anthropologists a legitimate target in their efforts to prevent social scientists from supporting the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan.²⁵

Members of this network and others contend that the civilians on HTTs are violating academic ethical standards. These standards are in many ways akin to the Hippocratic Oath: field researchers are restricted from disturbing or harming the subject of their studies. Academic critics of HTS see social scientists wearing military uniforms, carrying weapons, and providing direct input to combat staffs that may use the information to apply deadly force.

The HTS managers legitimately point out that academic cultural support is most often used to reduce the necessity for the use of violence. However, whether the criticisms or comparisons are legitimate is irrelevant; the controversy is real, and it degrades the ability of patriotic social scientists who help the military through less controversial means. Many cultural anthropologists working with the military have been ostracized by their academic peers as a result of HTS blowback.²⁶

The alternative to deploying academics into combat theaters is to enlist their support in training and educating our staff officers. In this role they do not risk endangering their research subjects, provide no direct input into targeting cycles, and they do not provide antimilitary elements within their own community any substantial ammunition with which to undermine the military-academic relationship. Keeping them in an academic set-

ting will help build an untarnished and sustainable relationship.

Conclusion

The 15 July version of the HTS brief proposes growing the terrain teams to 10 members and greatly expanding the reachback cells. Although the cost of the program is classified, it is not difficult to determine the expense of hiring so many contractors, equipping them with computers, deploying them to combat zones, and sustaining the inevitable bureaucratic support staff that will flourish at Fort Leavenworth.

As DOD contemplates making HTS a program of record, the Army and Marine cultural training centers remain staffed primarily with contractors and subsist on fluctuating budgets.²⁷ There has been little to no concerted effort by the undersecretary of defense for intelligence to develop cultural intelligence training programs. HTS has sapped the attention or financing from nearly every cultural program in the military and from many within the military intelligence community. The human terrain teams have given a number of staff officers an excuse to ignore a complex and challenging training requirement.

We have been at war for eight years. When do the “quick fix” solutions give way to long-term, doctrinally sound programs? It is time for HTS to give way. **MR**

NOTES

1. The Department of Defense did not respond to informal demands for joint cultural initiatives until the January 2005 publication of the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, available at <<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050330roadmap.pdf>>.

2. The Army Training and Doctrine Command created the TRADOC Culture Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, in 2004. The Marine Corps created the Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command in Quantico, Virginia, in mid-2005.

3. Mojave Viper is an exercise held at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command at 29 Palms, California, designed to immerse deploying Marines in a realistic cultural environment.

4. GEN Charles C. Krulak, “The Three Block War: Fighting in Urban Areas,” *Vital Speeches of the Day* 64, no. 5 (15 December 1997), 139-42.

5. Representatives of the HTS program repeatedly stated this assertion over the course of a year at several USDI panel sessions on social science support to military operations. The author was present at these meetings.

6. The author received each evolving version of the HTS brief between late 2003 and 2008. The 15 July version of the briefing re-states these basic assumptions.

7. Human Terrain System home page available at <<http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/>>.

8. Marine Corps Order P1200.7V, pt. I.

9. Author had access to the International Program Office manning spreadsheets that depicted FAO availability in 2003 and was familiar with all Middle East FAOs in the Marine Corps by name.

10. FAO is a secondary specialty in the Marine Corps and a primary occupation for Army officers.

11. Author served as the Marine and Naval attaché in the embassy and has direct knowledge of manning.

12. U.S. Army FM 3-04.401, *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office (GPO), December 2003), 1-31.

13. See the Human Terrain website at <<http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/>>.

14. HTS website.

15. Both the Army and the Marine Corps have recently increased the number of FAO trainees in their respective pipelines in response to this need.

16. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, chap. 4-8, 15 December 2006.

17. Impact, HTS website available at <<http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/Impact%20on%20the%20Military.htm>>.

18. Information on the deployment of the First Battalion, 124th Infantry Regiment, Florida National Guard to Ramadi is available at <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/ramadiyah.htm>>.

19. HTS briefing 15 July 2008.

20. Joint Publication 2.0, *Joint Intelligence*, available at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp2_0.pdf>.

21. The author was the USMC representative to the USDI committee addressing this issue between 2006 and 2007.

22. U.S. Army FM 2.0, *Intelligence* (Washington, DC: GPO, May 2004), specifically sections 1-22, 1-64, 1-83, 2-11, and 3-9.

23. The COIN manual (Appendix A-16) calls for a nonintelligence staff advisor to support the commander's decision-making process. This role is filled by the FAO and Civil Affairs Officer by Table of Organization.

24. Various attributed to GEN James Mattis and (then) LtCol Stephen Ferrando, USMC.

25. Network of Concerned Anthropologists available at <<http://concerned.anthropologists.googlepages.com/>>.

26. The author maintains close relationships with many military cultural anthropologists who have commented on this academic schism. A good bibliography of relevant articles is available at <<http://culturematters.wordpress.com/2008/08/21/annotated-bibliography-on-hs-minerva-and-prisp/>>.

27. The CAOCL stood up the same year HTS was first proposed, 2005. According to CAOCL staff, as of mid-2008 the center is manned by four active Marines, two federal employees, and 39 contractors.