State Department's Role in Missile Defense

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I'd like to thank my friend Peter Huessy, the National Defense University Foundation, and the National Defense Industrial Association for the opportunity to speak with you today about the State Department's role in Missile Defense and our highly successful international cooperative efforts with U.S. allies and friends. And, I would like to thank all of you for being here today.

State Department Role

First, you might be asking yourself why the Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation is here talking to you about missile defense. The reason is that – as a result of a re-organization within the "T" family of Bureaus – Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Under Secretary Robert Joseph recently transferred the Missile Defense portfolio to my Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, hereafter "VCI" for short, in October 2005. I find this to be a rather easy fit, since much of my job and the work of my Bureau is seeking to strengthen deterrence and to enforce commitments. Missile defense is a natural fit, in my opinion, because it not only enables us to strengthen deterrence, but also, should deterrence fail, to assertively strengthen it.

Having satisfied THAT question, you may be asking yourself, what's the Department of State's role in Missile Defense? After all, we don't build or fire defensive missiles (or offensive, for that matter), and in Washington terms, we're poor as church mice. But we do have an important role to play in this field – about which I'd like to say a few words.

Since the U.S. almost never fights alone, cooperation with allies and coalition partners to develop and deploy missile defenses allow us to make effective use of the technological marvels produced by MDA. The most advanced of our allies will bring missile defense-related sensors and interceptors to future combined operations. The use of overseas locations for sensors, ship basing, and – potentially – interceptors is already important to plans for the defense of the U.S. homeland, and will be important for protecting

our allies and friends.

Such missile defense cooperation is vital in its own right, for the defensive benefits it provides in protecting our populations and territory from attack by rogue states armed with ballistic missiles. But missile defense is also an important nonproliferation tool, because the more defenses spread, the more unrewarding and unattractive it will be for would-be missile proliferators to invest in delivery systems which are unlikely to hit their targets. Missile defenses, in other words, deter missile proliferation. Should deterrence of these programs and their use fail, and if a rogue state launched ballistic missiles – perhaps tipped with chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons – we would view missile defense as the "terminal phase counterproliferation."

Let me give you an idea of some of the work the Department of State is doing:

- The President has directed the State Department, along with the Department of Defense, to promote international Missile Defense cooperation and to negotiate appropriate arrangements for such Missile Defense cooperation.
- My Office of Missile Defense & Space Policy represents the Department of State on U.S. interagency delegations to discuss Missile Defense cooperation with foreign governments worldwide. The Department of State also works closely with the Pentagon on all major international MD cooperation efforts. State supports the full range of work within NATO on bringing missile defense capabilities into the Alliance. We have worked with our DoD counterparts over the last two years to establish a formal military requirement for missile defense, and supported the creation of a program office for creating the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Defense System.
- In NATO Missile Defense-related efforts, the State Department represented the U.S. in the NATO working group that established, for the first time, an assessment of the risk to NATO from the evolving ballistic missile capabilities of rogue states. That assessment will be a key element of NATO decisions on any military requirement for missile defense to protect NATO populations and territory.
- The State Department also engages in public diplomacy overseas to build support for missile defense, delivering speeches on the subject throughout Europe, Asia, and Australia.
- The State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs is charged with controlling the export of defense articles and services covered by the United States Munitions List. The Political-Military Bureau’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls carries out this mission through the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, also known as the ITAR. These regulations are the means by which the State Department implements the Arms Export Control Act.
- The International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau, and in particular its Office of Missile Threat Reduction, reviews export licenses and foreign military sales, including those for missile defense purposes, for nonproliferation concerns and to ensure that any approved exports of equipment and technology are undertaken in keeping with U.S. nonproliferation policy and international commitments – including those under the Missile Technology Control Regime.
- The regional bureaus in the Department of State support U.S. interagency working groups and delegations with critical insights about foreign government positions and the domestic conditions potentially influencing its cooperative Missile Defense efforts with the U.S., and, of course, they provide representatives to U.S. Delegations as necessary.
- My Bureau has an industry outreach effort that periodically talks to industry about Missile Defense programs and activities, including international Missile Defense cooperation. We are planning to establish an industry roundtable forum to meet on a quarterly basis with the key Missile Defense-related companies to exchange thoughts and ideas on, for example, industry problems and obstacles related to international cooperation that the Department of State might be helpful in resolving. At a minimum, we can help in explaining U.S. policy. For those in the audience that are interested in participating, you can contact my office for additional details.

Missile Defense Cooperation: The Rationale For Cooperation

The rationale for Missile Defense cooperation arises naturally from the dramatically changing international security environment. Today, roughly two dozen countries, including some of the world’s least responsible states, possess ballistic missiles

and many are attempting to obtain missiles of longer range. Many of these states also have nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs. The contemporary and emerging missile threat from hostile states is fundamentally different from Cold War era threats, and consequently necessitates a different approach to deterrence and additional tools for defending ourselves. The strategic logic used in deterring the Soviet Union may not be applicable to deterring these post-Cold War threats, and thus the United States cannot stay solely dependent upon our capability to deter. Potentially, WMD and ballistic means for their delivery could allow such hostile states to pursue their objectives through force, coercion, and intimidation. Missile defenses are not a replacement for an offensive capability, they constitute an additional and critical dimension of contemporary deterrence, but if deterrence fails, Missile Defenses function as an insurance policy to defend the United States against ballistic missiles launched against us.

Missile defenses will also help to assure allies and friends about the credibility and reliability of America's commitments, and to dissuade countries from pursuing either the indigenous development, or foreign acquisition, of ballistic missile technologies or full-up ballistic missiles, by undermining their military utility. If Allies and friends were vulnerable to a hostile state's threatened use of WMD delivered by ballistic missiles, Allies and friends might not join coalitions. It is critically important to U.S. foreign policy to assure allies and friends that ballistic missile threats will not deter the U.S. from fulfilling its security commitments, nor allow aggressors the means to undermine the cohesiveness and political stability of a coalition or alliance. History teaches us that, despite our best efforts, there will be military surprises, failures in diplomacy, intelligence, and deterrence. Missile Defenses help provide protection against such possible failures.

As permitted by the ABM Treaty, the U.S. gave notice in December 2001 of its intention to legally withdraw from that Treaty in order to begin developing and deploying capabilities to protect the population and territory of our fifty states. The Treaty terminated on June 13, 2002. As a result, the U.S. was criticized heavily by some in the international community including by some allies and friends. Gradually, quite a number of our allies and friends have recognized the threat that, for example, North Korea and Iran pose to international peace and security and are modifying their positions, bringing them closer in line to ours, notwithstanding their earlier criticism.

An Example Of Changing Perceptions Among Allies And Friends

On January 19th of this year in Brest, France, French President Jacques Chirac delivered a major speech on French nuclear strategy. The speech noted that missile defense "cannot … be a substitute for deterrence. But it can supplement it by reducing our vulnerabilities." This adjustment in France’s position is significant, since previously the threat of nuclear retaliation to aggression had been judged sufficient to deter the full range of threats.

Types Of Missile Defense Cooperation

In the May 20, 2002, "National Missile Defense Policy," President Bush directed that the U.S. "structure the missile defense program in a manner that encourages industrial participation by friends and allies, consistent with overall U.S. national security" and that "we will also promote international missile defense cooperation." Regarding the interrelationship between Missile Defense cooperation and U.S. export control laws, regulations, and Missile Technology Control Regime obligations, it is U.S. policy to implement our export control laws and regimes in such a manner so as not to impede our cooperation on missile defense with other nations.

The U.S. has a wide range of Missile Defense-related efforts underway with foreign governments, involving,

- conducting joint Missile Defense requirements and architecture analyses on a country-by-country basis;
- joint modeling and simulation exercises;

- joint research & development projects;
- co-production;
- joint testing;
- joint training and/or interoperability exercises; and
- foreign military sales as well as commercial sales to friends and allies.

These types of Missile Defense cooperation are being conducted, or discussed with Japan, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Australia, Israel, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and Russia, to name just a few. Cooperation can also take the form of "in-kind" contributions such as offering targets for Missile Defense testing, as well as offering to provide facilities and/or territory for Missile Defense purposes. It's been less than 4 years since the U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty in June 2002, but the magnitude of MD cooperation with friends and allies has been, in my opinion, spectacular.

Selected Areas of Missile Defense Cooperation

I'd like to highlight a few selected areas of international cooperation in the field of Missile Defense.

Japan

Japan formally reached a decision to deploy a multi-layered defensive system in December 2003, which will involve the purchase of the U.S. AEGIS BMD system and the Patriot PAC-3, as a "purely defensive measure to protect the lives and property of citizens of Japan" against ballistic missile attacks by rogue states. In addition to deploying PAC-3 interceptors, the Japanese Defense Agency also plans to equip Maritime Self-Defense Forces destroyers with SM-3 interceptors.

In the December 2004 Japanese National Defense Program Outline, which is a QDR-type of defense policy statement, missile defense was specifically identified as a necessary capability. The statement explicitly identified equipment and technology cooperation with the U.S. as a means of developing a Missile Defense capability. In December 2004, Japan and the U.S. signed a Framework Memorandum of Understanding on Missile Defense cooperation.

In October 2005, Secretaries Rice and Rumsfeld and their Japanese counterparts released a major report on defense transformation and realignment. The report calls for the deployment of a U.S. Forward-Deployed X-band transportable radar to Japan. This deployment will complement – not replace – our Aegis Long-Range Surveillance & Tracking destroyers already stationed in the Sea of Japan and will provide benefits to both the U.S. and Japan. In addition, we are currently exploring other areas for Missile Defense cooperation, including cooperative development of next generation interceptors. Recently, on March 8, the U.S. and Japan successfully completed a cooperative flight-test of the SM-3 with a modified, Japanese-designed, advanced nosecone.

Australia

In December 2003, Australia announced its decision to participate in the U.S. Missile Defense program. Subsequently, the U.S. and Australia signed in July 2004, a Framework Memorandum of Understanding on Missile Defense Cooperation, and a Research & Development MoU was signed in October 2005. Three specific cooperative projects -- involving the Over-the-Horizon Radar, modeling and simulation, and fusion and tracking technologies -- are currently under discussion. On August 16, 2005, Canberra announced it had chosen the U.S. firm Gibbs and Cox as the preferred designer for their navy's air warfare destroyers worth up to $6Billion Australian Dollars. Three vessels are currently funded, with the first scheduled to be operational in 2013. Each

will be equipped with AEGIS sensors and will be interoperable with the military forces of the United States and with those of other future coalition partners. Although Australia may not currently see a ballistic missile threat to its territory, its purpose for pursuing bilateral U.S.-Australia Missile Defense cooperation is based on maintaining a close alliance relationship with the United States and providing Australian industry with an opportunity for industrial cooperation and technology transfer.

NATO

Contractor feasibility studies on Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense were completed early in 2003 and a Missile Defense technical blueprint was established that NATO Defense Ministers approved in June 2004. Since then NATO has committed financial resources to developing and acquiring an operational command and control, planning, and execution capability for the protection of deployed military forces. By 2010, the Alliance expects to have the capability to protect deployed military forces against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.

NATO country Heads of State and Government at the 2002 Prague Summit agreed to study options for protecting Alliance territory and population against ballistic missile threats of all ranges. NATO will be examining these missile defense options based on a multinational contractor study.

NATO-Russia

NATO's cooperative efforts with Russia are being conducted in the Theater Missile Defense Ad Hoc Working Group (AHWG) of the NATO-Russia Council, or NRC. Work to enable potential joint missile defense operations has included a glossary of missile defense-related terminology in English, French and Russian, and the development of an Experimental Concept of Operations for use in joint crisis response operations.

This Experimental CONOPs was used in a NRC missile defense-related Command Post Exercise/Simulation held in March 2004 at the Joint National Integration Center in Colorado Springs. A second NATO-Russia Command Post Exercise was completed in The Netherlands in March 2005.

Additionally, the Ad Hoc Working Group is currently working on an "Interoperability Study". Interoperability of NATO and Russian MD systems in the event our forces are deployed together as part of a coalition -- in an out-of-area, non-Article V -- operation is a useful goal.

Russia

The U.S. and Russia are continuing to talk about concrete cooperative projects in the field of Missile Defense such as cooperation on targets for testing the U.S. BMD System and radar data sharing. The U.S. and Russia conducted a fourth missile defense-related Command Post Exercise simulation in Moscow in April 2005; the U.S. has proposed a fifth exercise later this month. The U. S. and Russia are negotiating a Defense Technical Cooperation Agreement, or DTCA, which would facilitate government-to-government, as well as industry-to-industry, Missile Defense cooperation. The USG is keeping Moscow informed about U.S. Missile Defense plans and programs in State-MFA and DoD-MoD channels.

Israel

Through the jointly funded U.S.-Israel ARROW II System Improvement Program, the U.S. is currently assisting Israel in upgrading the performance of its operational Arrow system to give the system greater capability against longer-range threats of

greater sophistication. Also, this program is aimed at facilitating interoperability with U.S. systems, and will provide for periodic testing of the Arrow II system at a U.S. test range. For example, in July and August 2004, the Israeli Arrow system and its Arrow II interceptors were tested from the Pt. Magu Sea Range in California. Finally, Boeing is co-producing components of the Arrow II interceptor for Israel.

Germany, Italy, and the U.S.

Germany, Italy, and the U.S. are jointly pursuing the Medium Extended Air Defense System, or MEADS. This R&D project is intended to develop a highly mobile MD system for defending against short- to medium-range threats. MEADS is scheduled to be fielded in 2014 and would be a replacement for Patriot.

Denmark

In August 2004, the United States and Denmark, including the Home Rule Government of Greenland, signed agreements that permit upgrades to the U.S. early warning radar at Thule Air Base, Greenland. These upgrades will enhance our capability to detect and defend against ballistic missile attacks launched from the Middle East. A bilateral Framework Memorandum of Understanding to facilitate missile defense cooperation between the United States and Denmark was signed in October 2005. This agreement will allow Danish access to U.S. missile defense technologies and give Danish companies better access to partnerships with U.S. companies in the development of missile defense technologies.

The United Kingdom

In February 2003, the U.K. agreed to the U.S. request to upgrade the early warning radar at Fylingdales, U.K., for Missile Defense purposes. Defense Minister Hoon and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld signed a Framework MoU on June 12, 2003, which establishes the basis of the U.S.-U.K. industrial relationship in the field of missile defense. An Annex to the Framework MoU regarding the Fylingdales radar was signed in December 2003, which delineates the roles and responsibilities of the U.S. and U.K. for the upgrades. A 2nd Annex on bilateral Missile Defense-related RDT&E was signed in October 2004. The U.S. has provided Missile Defense-related "situational awareness" displays to the U.K., which obviously reflects the closeness of our relationship.

European Missile Defense Site

Consistent with the President's direction, the U.S. has been examining options for enhancing both the defenses of the United States and of our allies and friends by deploying additional missile defense interceptors, sensors, and forward-based radars.One of those options involves fielding a U.S. missile defense interceptor site in Europe. The U.S. has conducted ***exploratory*** consultations with a number of NATO Allies regarding their interest in hosting the deployment of U.S. Missile Defense assets. No U. S. decision has been reached yet. We believe that the deployment of limited numbers of Missile Defense interceptors in Europe would make a significant contribution to the protection of the U.S. and European NATO Allies from a Middle Eastern ballistic missile threat.

Conclusion

In short, because of the continued proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their ballistic missile means of delivery, it has become clear that the United States cannot rely solely on diplomacy, deterrence, arms control and non-proliferation regimes; we can’t continue to use 20th century tools to meet 21st century challenges. Given the growing list of bilateral and multilateral Missile Defense cooperative efforts that are being pursued, it is also clear that our allies and friends are also jettisoning the Cold War logic that vulnerability is stabilizing. Because Cold War-style deterrence is not sufficient, missile defense is a reasonable

insurance policy to purchase in today's international security environment. We must work together to defend not only against today's threats but against increasingly more sophisticated and dangerous future threats.

Thank you.

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