Statements
IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, September 13-17, 2010
September 15, 2010
Agenda Item 7(c)
Nuclear Verification: Implementation
of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of United Nations Security Council
Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran
U.S. Statement
Ambassador Glyn Davies
Mr. Chairman,
The United States would like to express
its appreciation to the Director General for his latest report on the
implementation of the IAEA's Safeguards Agreement in Iran. The
Secretariat, in particular the safeguards inspectorate, also deserve
deep gratitude for their hard work, professionalism, and
impartiality. This report marks the eighth year since the
public learned of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran, and it
clearly notes that Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to
permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in
peaceful activities. We, too, endorse the report’s public release.
Mr. Chairman,
Since 2003, the IAEA has reported 30
times on Iran's failure to comply with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement
and, since 2006, it has reported 20 times on Iran's failure to comply
with the UN Security Council requirement to suspend its uranium
enrichment- and heavy water-related activities. In response to
these reports, the international community has repeatedly expressed
its concern that Iran's nuclear intentions are not peaceful through
multiple IAEA Board resolutions and six UN Security Council
resolutions. This concern was clearly expressed through the
adoption of UN Security Council resolution 1929 on June 9, imposing
new legally-binding sanctions on Iran to respond to its ongoing
proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. Resolution 1929 not
only added to the growing list of sanctions on Iran; it reiterated
the serious concerns, shared by the majority of UN Member States,
including Iran's neighbors, about the nature of Iran's nuclear
program.
In an
effort to address the issue through diplomatic means, the United
States has repeatedly called on Iran to restore international
confidence and has presented Iran with a number of opportunities at
confidence-building by pursuing unprecedented efforts at engagement
over the past two years.
With respect to the IAEA's Tehran
Research Reactor (TRR) refueling proposal from last year, Iran's
response letter to the IAEA does not address the concerns expressed
by the United States, Russia, and France. We view the TRR track
and the E3+3 track as related, not separate efforts. The TRR
refueling proposal is a possible confidence building measure, but it
does not address the international community's broader concerns about
Iran's nuclear program. We continue to consult with our
international partners on this issue.
Unfortunately, Iran has refused to
negotiate in good faith a diplomatic resolution to the broader
nuclear issue. We have seen this demonstrated by Iran's long history
of avoiding substantive discussion, including, among many others, its
refusal to answer many of the IAEA's most pressing questions about
its nuclear activities, especially concerning the possible military
dimensions of its nuclear program. In addition, Iran is
expanding and escalating some of its most proliferation-sensitive
nuclear activities such as uranium enrichment in blatant violation of
its UN and IAEA obligations.
The report notes that Iran continues to
produce near twenty percent enriched uranium. This activity not
only exacerbates Iran's violation of its obligation to suspend
enrichment activities, it also heightens the concerns of the
international community regarding the purpose of Iran's enrichment
program. This step was also taken without providing the IAEA
sufficient notice to put in place appropriate revisions to the
safeguards procedures before Iran began increasing the enrichment
level; Iran did not agree to these safeguards revisions until two
months after the IAEA's request was issued.
While we
understand that since then the IAEA has been implementing safeguards
according to the revised procedures, Iran has unfortunately
heightened what appears to be a long-term campaign to undercut the
effectiveness of safeguards implementation in the whole of Iran. Specifically, the
Director General's report expresses the Agency's concern with Iran's
latest objection to certain designated IAEA inspectors in Iran, an
objection the IAEA rejects and has led the Director General to report
that Iran's action "hampers the inspection process and thereby
detracts from the Agency's capability to implement effective and
efficient safeguards in Iran." It is unprecedented for a
state to reject inspectors because they report accurately to the
Director General what they see and what they hear. The United
States deems the de-designation of inspectors as being synonymous to
the INFCIRC 153, paragraph 9 language that indicates that the Board
should consider "appropriate action" when inspections are
being impeded by a States' rejection of inspectors. To that
end, the United States fully supports the IAEA's denunciation of
Iran's treatment of certain inspectors, which we consider a clear
effort to intimidate inspectors and thereby influence the conclusions
of inspectors in Iran. This undermines the confidence-building
process.
With respect to the Fordow Fuel
Enrichment Plant near Qom, the Director General notes that Iran still
refuses to provide the Agency with the information it needs to fully
understand the purpose of the plant and the chronology of its
construction. Of particular concern is Iran's failure to inform
the IAEA in 2006 when it decided to construct the facility. This
was before Iran made its claim to have unilaterally abrogated its
commitments under modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to
Iran's Safeguards Agreement. Iran continues to deny access to the
original design documentation for the Fordow plant and to companies
involved in the design and construction of the plant. The IAEA needs
this information to help verify Iran's claims as to the ultimate,
supposedly peaceful purpose of this facility and to help ensure that
there are no other undeclared facilities in Iran.
The Director General also concluded
that Iran continues to move forward with its heavy water-related
activities in further violation of UN Security Council resolutions.
We note that Iran also has refused to allow the Agency access
to the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) and to the heavy water
stored at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) for taking samples.
In addition, the Agency reports that, contrary to UN Security Council
decisions, construction at the IR-40 reactor at Arak is ongoing and
that the heavy water plant seems to have resumed operation.
As I have noted previously, the United
States fully supports the IAEA's legal determination that agreed
Subsidiary Arrangements cannot be changed unilaterally and,
therefore, the modified Code 3.1, as agreed to by Iran in 2003,
remains in force. The Director General once again reminds us
that Iran remains the only state with significant nuclear activities
that refuses to acknowledge its legal obligations under the modified
Code 3.1. I note that recent press allegations about a possible
new enrichment plant in Iran come after several statements from
senior Iranian leaders over the last year trumpeting Iranian plans to
build additional plants. The United States recalls that the
Board of Governors supported modifications to Code 3.1, including the
requirement for early declaration of nuclear facilities, precisely to
avoid the kind of uncertainty and lack of confidence Iran is now so
flagrantly sowing. Iran's attempt to systematically undercut a core
element of the IAEA's strengthened safeguards system should be of
concern to all member states that put value in the peaceful-use
assurances we all rely on the IAEA to provide.
Mr. Chairman,
As many previous reports issued by the
Agency have discussed, there remain several key issues and questions
related to the possible military dimensions to Iran's program, issues
that remain unresolved by Iran. Faced with Iran's unwillingness to
engage the IAEA on core issues related to possible military
dimensions, the Director General clearly states that substantive and
proactive engagement on these issues by Iran is essential to enable
the Agency to make progress in its verification of the correctness
and completeness of Iran's declarations. The Agency, once
again, requests it be permitted to visit all relevant sites, have
access to all relevant equipment and documentation, and be allowed to
interview relevant persons, without delay. My government fully
supports the Director General's repeated requests.
Mr. Chairman,
The lengthening list of Iran's
violations of its obligations under its safeguards agreement and UN
Security Council resolutions, together with Iran's overall refusal to
address international concerns - as detailed in the DG's report -
undermines Iran's frequent claim that there is nothing left to be
worried about with Iran's nuclear program. The United States
and our international partners in this room worked hard to seek
opportunities to build mutual confidence. Iran, however, has to
date failed to engage in any continuing and meaningful way.
Mr. Chairman,
Despite 30 IAEA reports, the
fundamental question remains: Is Iran willing to meet its
international nonproliferation obligations, build international
confidence, and enable the IAEA to provide assurances as to the
peaceful nature of its nuclear program? Based on the latest
report by the Director General, we regretfully must conclude that
Iran is clearly refusing to do so, with implications that this Board
of Governors cannot ignore and will need to consider, given the
accumulating evidence that Iran is clearly failing to adhere to even
its "routine" safeguards obligations by hampering inspector
access and repeated, flagrant violations of its Modified Code 3.1
obligations.
Mr. Chairman,
My government is committed to a
diplomatic resolution of international concerns over Iran's nuclear
program and committed to the dual track approach. Yet, Iran
continues to single itself out by refusing to fully cooperate with
the IAEA, refusing to comply with its UN Security Council
responsibilities, and instead moving forward with a nuclear program
that raises clear concerns about Iran's nuclear intentions. Iran's
intransigence increasingly represents a challenge to the
nonproliferation rules of the road and a challenge to every member of
this Board. If Iran truly seeks a leadership role, it cannot
ignore international norms and ignore its obligations. Such
behavior will only lead to Iran's further isolation.
The choice remains with Iran. The
UN Security Council resolutions and the Board resolutions speak
plainly to the steps that Iran can take to address the world's
concerns about its actions. The United States and its partners
have built a broad consensus that will welcome Iran back into the
community of nations if it meets its obligations. As Secretary
of State Clinton noted in her September 8 speech to the Council on
Foreign Relations, the choice for Iran's leaders is clear, and they
have to decide whether they accept either their obligations or
increasing isolation and the costs that must come with it. We
hope that Iran will not miss this opportunity to break a nearly
eight-year-long stalemate with the international community.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.