



British soldier takes part in civil affairs patrol in Helmand Province

## Leaving the Civilians Behind

# The “Soldier-diplomat” in Afghanistan and Iraq

BY EDWARD BURKE

The militarization of aid in conflict zones is now a reality and is likely to increase exponentially in the future. Stability operations are critical to the success of any viable counterinsurgency strategy.<sup>1</sup> Yet in much of Afghanistan and Iraq, civilian officials working alone have proven incapable of successfully distributing and monitoring stabilization funds or implementing associated operations; thus, they have required close cooperation with the military. Many

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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries have not adequately addressed deficiencies in models of civil-military cooperation, with severe repercussions for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and some government development agencies complain that the delivery of aid by the military can exacerbate the targeting of civilian aid workers.<sup>2</sup> Highlighting the failure of civilian agencies to cooperate effectively with the military may provide temporary vindication to skeptics within the NGO community, but such criticism does not solve the critical dilemma of how to deliver reconstruction and humanitarian assistance to the most violent parts of Afghanistan and Iraq or other nonpermissive environments.

Where the targeting of civilian officials and aid workers is a key insurgent tactic, there is

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often no alternative to delivering aid through the military. Consequently, the military has found itself forced to blur conventional distinctions by taking the place of civilian aid agencies. This is to the detriment of humanitarian concepts of neutrality, but vital to the successful prosecution of a counterinsurgency strategy. It presents an uncomfortable choice between permitting the military to intrude upon “humanitarian space,” or upholding the concept of neutrality and risking total failure. Stuart Bowen, the outspoken Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, in a nod to Carl von Clausewitz, has aptly summarized the

highly political nature of humanitarian and development assistance during a counterinsurgency campaign: “If war . . . is an extension of politics by other means, so too is relief and reconstruction an extension of political, economic and military strategy.”<sup>3</sup>

In highly insecure areas, the protection of civilian officials is overly burdensome and inefficient. Due to restrictions on their movements, civilian officials cannot adequately monitor local dynamics and ensure that the delivery of aid is not counterproductive to long-term political objectives. The military is therefore better equipped to provide reconstruction and humanitarian assistance, being able to assume a number of different roles as required. The U.S. Army has observed that “even though stability operations emphasize non-lethal actions, the ability to engage potential enemies with decisive lethal force remains a sound deterrent and is often a key to success.”<sup>4</sup> In the United Kingdom (UK), the cross-departmental Stabilisation Unit has conceded that the military’s “greater mobility enables them greater access to manage projects implemented by local partners in highly insecure areas.”<sup>5</sup> During Operation *Panchai Palang* in Afghanistan last summer, the U.S. military reiterated old complaints about the “near total absence” of civilian experts, but then assembled the largest ever Civil Affairs (CA) or civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) contingent attached to a combat brigade—mostly Reservists with backgrounds in local government, business management, and policing.<sup>6</sup> Soldiers occasionally grumble about either the absence or ineffectiveness of diplomats and humanitarian assistance/development officials. They have essentially moved on, now willing to take on tasks conventionally seen as the remit of civilian agencies.

The influential French counterinsurgency expert David Galula astutely observed that

during a counterinsurgency campaign, “tasks and responsibilities cannot be neatly divided between the civilian and the soldier, for their operations overlap too much with each other.”<sup>7</sup> The insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq require such a “comprehensive approach,” utilizing the full range of civilian and military capabilities to stabilize both countries. Today, however, we risk overlooking one of the most important tenets of counterinsurgency strategy: maintaining a firm civilian lead. This was emphasized by Galula, who warned that “giving the soldier authority over the civilian would thus contradict one of the major characteristics of this type of war.”<sup>8</sup>

The need for a civilian lead on setting policy for stability operations does not mean that the military cannot undertake political/humanitarian tasks where civilian officials are unable to do so. However, civilian supervision is required to monitor such activities to ensure that policy is not set by the military. Crucially, civilian leadership helps to dispel the perception of the host population being under military occupation. It is important, however, that civilian officials should not be a rigid, bureaucratic obstacle to a more flexible military approach. They must adapt according to the evolving situation on the ground, listening and responding to military advice, while ensuring that government policies are not compromised by the military for the sake of expediency. To undertake this complex task requires a *civilian* doctrine and an unconventional diplomat.

## The Political Military

The U.S. military has undergone a radical shift in how it prepares for war. This shift can be traced back to 2005 when the Department of Defense (DOD) implemented a landmark new directive that unambiguously referred to

stability operations as a “core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations.”<sup>9</sup> More recently, Secretary Robert Gates has set about reorienting the defense budget toward counterinsurgency and stability operations.<sup>10</sup> DOD spending of U.S. Official Development Assistance (ODA) has rapidly proliferated, rising from 3.5 percent before 2003 to almost 26 percent in 2008.<sup>11</sup>

In response to its experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, in 2008 the U.S. Army produced Field Manual (FM) 3–07, *Stability Operations*, which effectively offers a coherent set of guidelines on how the military can assume responsibility for defense, diplomacy, and development. The introduction to FM 3–07 observes that “expeditionary civilians exist neither in the numbers, nor with the skill sets, required for today’s operations,” and even if these were to exist, “there will still be many instances in which it is too dangerous for these civilians to deploy.”<sup>12</sup> The manual goes on to describe potential U.S. military involvement in not only the emergency provision of essential services but also in how to assume a full range of political responsibilities—essentially the functions of government—until these can be transitioned to a civil authority. It offers a careful set of guidelines on various governance tasks that the military may be expected to assume, including the preparation and supervision of elections. It seeks to learn the lessons of Iraq by foreseeing “military forces quickly seizing the initiative to improve the civil situation while preventing the situation from deteriorating further.”<sup>13</sup>

FM 3–07 is a natural extension of counterinsurgency doctrine within the U.S. military. The manual does not offer guidance, however, on the division of political labor between the

military in theater and the diplomats whose task it is to lead on bilateral relations. It also assumes a capacity within the U.S. military that does not exist. CA officers (predominantly Reservists from administrative or construction professional backgrounds) lack training in political and linguistic skills, as well as an advanced knowledge

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of their local environment upon deploying to Afghanistan and Iraq.<sup>14</sup> The U.S. military is quickly adapting, however, and has substantially increased funding for language and cultural training since 2007.<sup>15</sup>

The U.S. military has developed a tendency to design and make policy in Iraq without sufficient civilian oversight. The local agreement reached in 2006 and 2007 by the U.S. military to “turn” significant parts of the Sunni insurgency was initially the brainchild of a U.S. Army officer, Colonel Sean MacFarland, who transformed former insurgent militia into U.S. allies without the consent of the Iraqi government. This decision “took the United States into the dangerous and complex new territory of supporting an armed group that was opposed to the government in Baghdad that the United States also supported.”<sup>16</sup> The “surge” strategy bypassed the Department of State and military chain of command. The fact that this policy has been vindicated in part does not lessen the worrisome implications that such actions have for civil-military relations. More recently, the appointment of General Karl Eikenberry as Ambassador to Kabul in early 2009 gives the impression that senior U.S. military officers are

better at making policy in Afghanistan than their civilian counterparts.

Although the UK military has been quick to blame the Labour government for not deploying enough personnel or materiel in either Afghanistan or Iraq, the passing of blame has obscured what one former officer at the British army’s Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) has described as an “insular, conformist culture” that has sapped a “capacity for international reflection and rapid change.”<sup>17</sup> Despite such criticism, it is obvious that some senior UK officers do wish to learn from the mistakes in Afghanistan and Iraq. UK officers have spoken enviously of the U.S. Foreign Area Officer (FAO) concept and training, which allow U.S. officers to acquire a wide range of skills, whether in international development or languages.

The evolution of the UK military has been much less ambitious than that of the United States since the beginning of the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Labour government has not undertaken a Strategic Defence Review in more than a decade. Despite a reduction in defense spending from 4.1 percent of gross domestic product in 1990 to under 3 percent today, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) proposes to spend a large part of this limited budget on a new nuclear deterrent and two new aircraft carriers that many UK defense experts believe to be surplus to requirements. Given the shortage of specialist skills and vital equipment for British troops deployed in Afghanistan, one serving officer bluntly observed, “The choice we face is ‘Fortress Britain’ versus ‘intervention’. . . . What we really need is to develop armies that can get out into the world, helping to stabilise conflict situations, conducting ‘war among the people.’ We’re not preparing for that at all.”<sup>18</sup>

The UK military in Helmand Province has learned from the experience of Iraq by moving to improve civil-military relations. Military personnel are both willing and well placed to gather knowledge on local contractors and monitor projects. They have also worked to ensure that training and monitoring teams, while maintaining “the necessary force protection capabilities,” operate in a deliberately less overt manner. The British army has established a unit of CIMIC officers, the Military Stabilisation Support Group, with a range of stabilization skills and has also acknowledged a need to improve training in linguistic and cultural skills, including knowledge of local political structures. In September 2009, the MoD moved to address this knowledge deficit by creating a Defence Cultural Specialist Unit to advise commanders on operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

Although the UK military has faced the same dilemmas as its U.S. counterpart, it has reacted differently, in part due to a lack of funds with which to undertake stability operations unilaterally. Senior UK officers have been reluctant to change the political game in the areas under their command in Afghanistan and Iraq. Such an enduring preference to “leave politics to the civilians” has allowed civilian agencies to improve performance in Afghanistan and reassert political primacy at every level of operations. It has also enabled the emergence of a unique model of civil-military cooperation in Helmand Province. The DCDC at Shrivenham drew upon these experiences to produce a long-awaited stability operations doctrine at the end of 2009.

Unlike the U.S. military, the hesitancy of the UK military to adopt a unilaterally political approach should not be taken as indicating a general satisfaction with the policy set for

Afghanistan and Iraq by the UK government. This is far from the case. The UK military primarily sees its role in Afghanistan as one of “buying space” for the civilians to provide political solutions, but it is deeply frustrated at the lack of a coherent narrative and realistic strategy for success.<sup>19</sup> This has led to a worrying trend of the military launching political broadsides at their civilian masters. Prior to his retirement from the British army in November 2009, General Sir Richard Dannatt joined the opposition Conservative Party as an advisor and robustly criticized the Labour government’s strategy in Afghanistan. This followed a number of public speeches criticizing UK policies prior to the end of his term as chief of staff of the army.<sup>20</sup> Such political activity by a serving British officer is without precedent in recent times and reflects a strain on civil-military relations at both the highest levels in London and in Afghanistan.

The evolution of the U.S. and UK forces toward an increasing role in stability operations contrasts with the relative inertia of many of their NATO Allies, who continue to deploy insufficient CIMIC capacity to Afghanistan. The role of Spain in Badghis Province in northwest Afghanistan is a case in point. Despite the Spanish government’s insistence on terming the mission of Spanish troops in Afghanistan as “reconstruction, stabilization and democratization,” the Ministry of Defence has repeatedly chosen to deploy elite troops to Afghanistan, including members of the Parachute Regiment.<sup>21</sup> These soldiers have the combat skills to undertake an offensive counter-insurgency capacity, which their government is unwilling to utilize, but they are neither trained nor equipped to undertake CIMIC tasks, for which Spain only allocated 10 to 15 military personnel in 2009. Consequently, insurgents

have extended their control over large parts, if not most, of the province. There is an obvious contradiction in structuring ISAF policy around a “reconstruction mission” in Badghis if Spanish and Afghan troops do not hold territory on which to reconstruct. Meanwhile, the Spanish government development agency (*Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo*), although unable to monitor projects in most of the province due to the escalating insurgency, has refused to allow the military to do so on its behalf, claiming that this would blur lines between Spain’s civilian and military commitments to Afghanistan.<sup>22</sup> These contradictions lie at the heart of the problem with many of the European contingents in Afghanistan; soldiers are equipped to fight but cannot do so robustly due to domestic political considerations. They ultimately run the risk of being (grudgingly) replaced by the United States on both counts.

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At the NATO level, the Alliance does not have a clearly defined set of guiding principles to inform a more coherent civil-military relationship in Afghanistan. In 2006, member states agreed in principle to the concept of a NATO comprehensive approach but subsequently took 2 years to negotiate an Action Plan to put this into effect. A highly variable approach to CIMIC and civil-military cooperation among NATO member states means that the implementation of a unified framework is still some

way off. This delay has serious repercussions for the ISAF campaign in Afghanistan, where there is a chaotic divergence of approaches to stability operations. Nominally, the ISAF Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) is responsible for building a civil-military strategy for Afghanistan; in practice, however, he struggles to be effective due to his ill-defined role and powers.<sup>23</sup> Tellingly, it is the ISAF commander and not the SCR who, together with the Afghan Minister for the Interior, co-chairs the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Executive Steering Committee.

It is difficult to refer to the PRT as a structured model; these can vary enormously in size, preponderance of military or civilian personnel, and command structures.<sup>24</sup> There is a grave need for NATO member states to coordinate doctrine and best practice: scant guidance exists on when and how a PRT should transition from being more or less military or when it should cease to exist. Where humanitarian workers are able to operate, it is important that they be permitted to do so without unnecessary intrusion or duplication of effort by the military and that civil-military models such as PRTs transition to more civilian entities, such as Field Advance Civilian Teams.

Attempts to improve coordination among ISAF contributors have seen mixed results at best. In 2006, ISAF introduced training initiatives and developed a Handbook of Best Practices for incoming PRT staff. The mechanisms of the PRT Executive Steering Committee and PRT Working Group have also been updated to reflect lessons learned. However, the impact of new guidelines in the field appears negligible, as underresourced soldiers and civilians deal with competing demands, not least from their respective home capitals. Rather than carrying out a clearly



delineated, centralized plan for Afghanistan, operations are generally left to the discretion of the individual PRT's lead nation, an approach that has been labeled as the "Balkanization" of the aid effort due to the lack of any coherent centralized planning to manage PRT collective activities.<sup>25</sup> This in turn impacts local conflict dynamics and the consolidation of the Afghan state, whose officials are overwhelmed by the divergence of perspectives and practices among such a large coalition.

### **"Where Are the Civilians?"**

Although Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF–I) and ISAF officers frequently complain about the shortage of civilian experts in areas worst affected by insurgency, it is debatable whether a significant increase of civilians would deliver the results expected of them unless highly restrictive limitations on movement are reassessed.<sup>26</sup> Diplomat and civilian expert movements are greatly hindered by regulations imposed by their respective ministries—what former British diplomat Hilary Synott has called "the dead hand of senior managers." Excessive "duty of care" restrictions prevent diplomats and civilian experts from delivering accurate analysis of the political situation, developing contacts among the local population, and implementing and overseeing reconstruction projects.<sup>27</sup> However, the response to this challenge is not uniform within ISAF. For example, the United Kingdom has increasingly come to see the greater mobility of its civilian personnel in Helmand as necessary, despite obvious security concerns. Consequently, civilian personnel attached to the PRT Lashkar Gah and stabilization advisors have a much wider presence in the province than in 2007 and early 2008. A senior UK official has concluded that "we

overstated the role of the military and understated what civilians could do even in a hostile environment."<sup>28</sup> This contrasts with other ISAF PRT-lead countries that continue to take a more cautious approach.

In some provinces of Iraq, senior United Nations (UN) officials, who have spent the bulk of the European Union's (EU) almost €1 billion in aid, have never actually seen the projects they commissioned. Agencies such as the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) have even resorted to monitoring projects through aerial photography.<sup>29</sup> In Afghanistan, a 2009 report by the

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Humanitarian Policy Group observed that an escalation of attacks by insurgents on aid workers has resulted in a "general retrenchment [of aid workers] to provincial capitals and a shrinking of the overall field presence."<sup>30</sup> Despite increased restrictions on civilian movements, many ISAF contributors are reluctant to allow the military to monitor contracts.<sup>31</sup> This is understandable but overlooks the clear warning from the Taliban–Quetta shura leadership that any organization providing aid without their direct permission will be targeted.<sup>32</sup> The Humanitarian Policy Group has concluded that, regardless of whether projects are implemented by international or local staff, "aid organisations are being attacked not just because they are perceived to be *cooperating* with Western political actors, but because they are perceived as wholly part of the Western agenda."<sup>33</sup>

The “politics of aid” is at its most apparent during an insurgency where two rival systems, the incumbent regime and the shadow insurgent state, compete to secure the support of the local population. The ISAF commander, General Stanley McChrystal, has consistently stressed the importance of a profound political knowledge to inform the delivery of aid even at the most basic levels: “If you build a well in the wrong place in a village, you may have shifted the basis of power in that village. . . . Therefore, with a completely altruistic aim of building a well, you can create divisiveness or give the impression that you, from the outside, do not understand what is going on or that you have sided with one element or another, yet all you tried to do is provide water.”<sup>34</sup>

Logically, sustainable reconstruction and provision of essential services mean that such efforts must be integrated within a locally owned plan so that in the mid to long term, such activities can be undertaken by the government. However, this directly leads to the extension of the government’s writ, namely its capacity to provide for its citizens, thereby challenging the rival structures of the shadow state established by the insurgency. Because most intergovernmental aid organizations and international NGOs are unable and unwilling to work with the Taliban, the “humanitarian space” becomes loaded in the government’s favor. The targeting of NGOs and their “recipient partners,” including hospitals and schools, that do not operate with the insurgency’s consent is therefore a tactic born out of cold and brutal reasoning, aimed at increasing the dependence of the local population on the insurgents’ rival political, economic, and social infrastructure, and not simply an innate zeal or cruelty. Consequently, in areas worst affected by the insurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq, there is no humanitarian space to speak of. Instead, the

military must move to fill the vacuum until the insurgency can be contained.

Prior to the Iraq War, the conventional thinking in the U.S. Government was “to get diplomats out of war zones on the understanding that diplomats had to be protected and preserved for when the fighting was over.”<sup>35</sup> In the aftermath of the political chaos that gripped Iraq in late 2003–2004, the U.S. State Department conceded that it had insufficient resources to “plan, implement or manage stabilization and reconstruction operations.”<sup>36</sup> Exacerbating the weakness of interagency coordination in Afghanistan and Iraq is the lack of specialist skills and local knowledge of U.S. diplomats deployed there. Few have experience or sufficient training in working with the military in hostile environments. The reality that diplomacy in conflict situations requires highly specialized skills that cannot be simply learned on the job by a Foreign Service Officer (FSO) more accustomed to conventional diplomacy is an important lesson that the State Department has yet to show definitive signs of learning. The culture of the State Department is partly to blame: U.S. diplomats are generally discouraged from cross-agency assignments, as these postings are often perceived as detrimental to career prospects.<sup>37</sup> This is the opposite experience to that of the U.S. military, where an ambitious officer is now expected to work in multiple disciplines.

As of January 2009, the Political-Military Bureau at the State Department had 26 foreign policy or political advisor (POLAD) positions attached to the military. Another 17 FSOs were assigned to military education and training institutes. In the past, however, FSOs have considered such positions career dead-ends, and the military has frequently complained that the Department of State “doesn’t exactly send its A Team.”<sup>38</sup> POLADs also do not receive the



extensive training necessary to adapt to an advisory role in a military environment, and the State Department has no mechanism in place to track officers who previously held political-military positions at home so that a pool of experienced officers could be maintained for future deployments and consultations.<sup>39</sup>

In Iraq, U.S. diplomats rarely venture out of large military bases unless accompanied by a heavy security escort, often provided by private security companies deeply resented by the local populace. In particularly dangerous areas, civilian officials will frequently not leave military compounds for weeks or even months. During this time, their only contact with Iraqis will be with local employees who work within the military zone. Many diplomats are therefore almost completely ignorant of their surroundings and rely heavily on the military or the intelligence agencies for information on local events.

The lack of training provided to U.S. diplomats and restrictions on movement have had severe consequences with regard to political dynamics in Afghanistan and Iraq. Vastly inflated contracts stir up resentment by making a few individuals extremely wealthy. In the case of Iraq, the monopoly on U.S. reconstruction contracts was compounded by the reality that many “bids” were in fact all subcontracted to just a few local construction companies, which in turn imported significant quantities of materials from individuals with close contacts with the Iranian government.<sup>40</sup> In Afghanistan, local businessmen contracted by the United States and other ISAF contributors to undertake reconstruction projects often pay bribes to the Taliban to secure the safe passage of building supplies.<sup>41</sup> The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has also recently begun subcontracting monitoring to international civilian contractors, adding another layer of bureaucracy to an already

convoluted landscape of agencies engaged in stability operations.<sup>42</sup> More pragmatically, USAID has occasionally requested that the military take over monitoring duties of contracts where the perceived threat level to U.S. civilian officials has significantly escalated.<sup>43</sup>

In the campaign to “win hearts and minds” in Afghanistan and Iraq, the military has come

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to expect too much from its civilian counterparts. The culture of the military predisposes it to expect that, where civilian agencies “have the lead,” they have the resources and know-how to deploy self-sufficiently. However, it is obvious that, in addition to bureaucratic shortcomings, the State Department and USAID do not have sufficient funding with which to recruit and train personnel. It is estimated that only 1 cent of every dollar that the U.S. Government spends on national security and foreign affairs is allocated to diplomacy and aid.<sup>44</sup> There is clearly a chronic shortage of U.S. FSOs—key diplomatic posts in the Middle East remain unfilled—with severe consequences for U.S. diplomacy abroad and civilian control of foreign policy.<sup>45</sup> In 1990, USAID’s direct hire personnel numbered 3,500, down from 15,000 during the Vietnam War. This figure has declined by another third since the first Gulf War even as USAID’s annual budget has increased from \$5 billion to \$13.2 billion today.<sup>46</sup>

The United States has finally grasped that the State Department and USAID need to prepare for conflict and not just postconflict engagement. It is envisaged that in 2010, 150 additional POLAD diplomats will be embedded



**U.S. and British civilian members of Provincial Reconstruction Team in Helmand Province talk with school headmaster**

within military commands, although it remains unclear how POLADs fit into the command structure of U.S. operations.<sup>47</sup> In 2005, USAID established an Office of Military Affairs (OMA) to facilitate coordination with the military, and is now comparatively far ahead of other NATO government development agencies in acknowledging that they have a significant role in contributing to U.S. national security.<sup>48</sup> This follows the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in 2004 as part of the U.S. Government's Civilian Stabilization Initiative. Remarkably, however, the U.S. Congress refused to pass a State Department authorization bill to fund S/CRS.<sup>49</sup> Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, intervened to plead the S/CRS case, which eventually was awarded \$200 million from the DOD budget for 2006 and 2007.<sup>50</sup>

The funding of a large share of humanitarian and reconstruction projects from the U.S. defense budget is exactly the opposite experience of other NATO countries where the budget has been controlled by a ministry of foreign affairs or a respective development agency. The Commander's Emergency Response Program stabilization fund for 2008 amounted to approximately half a billion dollars, more than the combined education and health budgets of the Afghan government for that year.<sup>51</sup> U.S. diplomats and aid officials are increasingly reliant on the goodwill of DOD to fund their projects in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In 2005, the newly constituted S/CRS developed a draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation, which it disseminated for inter-agency comments. Disputes over the wording continued until 2008 when the S/CRS was

forced to abandon the document and published a less detailed version, laying out a framework that was finally approved in May 2008.<sup>52</sup> S/CRS does not have the authority or personnel to lead a comprehensive approach; rather, it facilitates agreement among the various parties and manages a reserve of civilian experts. Its influence in Afghanistan and Iraq has been extremely limited.<sup>53</sup> The complexity of the S/CRS task has been exacerbated by a highly confused and burdensome congressional committee system, with over eight committees assuming responsibility for stabilization and reconstruction activities.

In August 2009, Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal agreed to implement an Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan for Afghanistan. This initiative is an innovative attempt by the U.S. civilian and military leadership in Kabul to develop a model for civil-military relations during counterinsurgency and stability operations, and to some extent illustrates the dearth of appropriate structures and guidance emanating from Washington. From late 2009, civilian representatives were appointed to each U.S. regional command and at the provincial/district level “to execute U.S. policy and guidance, serve as the civilian counterpart to the military commander, and integrate and coordinate [civil-military] efforts.”<sup>54</sup> Crucially, the new structure provides for a joint decisionmaking mechanism at every level of operations on issues affecting stability operations and, if properly implemented, will go a long way toward improving civilian oversight of the military and U.S. unity of effort in Afghanistan.<sup>55</sup>

In the United Kingdom, DFID officials have previously demonstrated a profound dislike of working toward UK security interests, especially if it involved close cooperation with the MoD. Such an attitude was evident during 2002

and 2003 when the Secretary for International Development, Clare Short, refused to take any measures to prepare DFID adequately for the contingency of war in Iraq.<sup>56</sup> Senior DFID officials pointed to the wording of the 2002 International Development Act as precluding the use of aid to further the United Kingdom’s immediate political and security interests, objecting to any inclusion of DFID in UK Afghanistan counterinsurgency strategy, which they claimed was a military concept that DFID could not support.<sup>57</sup> Since 2006, however, there has been a significant shift in such thinking, as

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DFID came under pressure to contribute to UK national security interests. In 2008, the DFID contribution was an integral part of the UK projected Afghanistan Strategy—essentially a blueprint for the civil-military effort to counter the Taliban-led insurgency. DFID has also made moves to prioritize spending in other developing countries in which the United Kingdom has an important national security interest, including Pakistan and Yemen.

The UK civilian response to filling the governance vacuum that emerged in Iraq’s southeast region was chaotic, reflecting a lack of knowledge, resources, and a grave incoherence, if not outright hostility, between key government departments. The Foreign Office initially proposed appointing the Governor of Bermuda, Sir John Vereker, as the Civilian Coordinator for the Coalition Provisional Authority in the south of Iraq, despite the fact that he had

never worked in a country in or emerging from conflict.<sup>58</sup> The person eventually selected for the post, Hilary Synnott, was given a mission statement just under half a page in length and was told “to play it by ear.”<sup>59</sup> The incoherent selection and training of diplomats sent to Iraq were to be a consistent feature of UK deployment through to 2009. The slow and inadequate deployment of Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and DFID personnel, delays in the release of funds, and the unwillingness of the army to fill the civilian gap meant that the United Kingdom ultimately lost the crucial postinvasion “window” in which to decisively engage in the south of Iraq.

As the insurgency increased in intensity, during 2006 and 2007 the UK-led PRT failed to transition from a primarily civilian entity into one that took a more military approach to stability operations. During this period, the Basra palace was being hit daily by up to 40 rocket and mortar attacks, often bringing the PRT’s work to

the scope and performance of the PRT’s activities increased considerably, with one UK official observing that “the key objective was to salvage our reputation.”<sup>62</sup>

The lack of capacity to deliver in conflict countries also contributed to a growing crisis in morale within the FCO.<sup>63</sup> A shortage of personnel and cultural/language training means that the FCO and DFID continue to rely heavily on local staff in key strategic countries. Only five FCO personnel have a basic level of Pashtu, particularly surprising given the UK commitment to Afghanistan since 2001 and the large number of UK citizens of Pakistani and Afghan descent.<sup>64</sup> DFID has also suffered from a shortage in political and cultural expertise, attributed to insufficient training and short deployments: postings to Afghanistan and Iraq often only last 12 months. The UK National Audit Office (NAO) has noted that there has been little guidance and no “lessons learned” approach to DFID’s work in insecure environments, observing that there is “limited research and experience on delivering effective aid in insecure environments, so the information on which DFID is able to base its decisions is weak.” Worryingly, in a survey undertaken by the NAO, 40 percent of DFID personnel found the induction period prior to deployment poor or very poor. In addition to a lack of institutional memory, training, and a high personnel turnover, DFID frequently dispatches personnel with no previous overseas development experience: over 50 percent of DFID representatives in Afghanistan during 2008 had never been posted abroad before.<sup>65</sup>

The inability to monitor projects due to a shortage of personnel and a highly adverse security situation had grave consequences for UK stability operations in Afghanistan during 2006 and 2007. A suicide attack on civilian personnel

**the establishment of a Stabilisation Unit led to various UK departments agreeing on a roadmap that has brought about significant improvements in Helmand Province**

a virtual standstill. Reconstruction efforts were also hampered by internal conflicts between senior personnel within the PRT, arising principally from “a lack of clear guidelines” as to its role and objectives.<sup>60</sup> The fact that British and Danish civil-military structures in Basra “ran along parallel tracks and were not integrated” only added to the confusion.<sup>61</sup> Following a major MNF-I/Iraqi operation against insurgents in Basra during March and April 2008,

in Helmand Province in November 2007 led to a review of DFID operations, with the effect that by early 2008, “practical reconstruction and development efforts had stalled, as had efforts to improve governance.”<sup>66</sup> The Danish civilian contribution in Helmand was also struggling: “Due to a lack of priority and personnel,” 75 percent of the planned activities of the stabilization advisor in Lashkar Gah were cancelled during 1 month in 2008.<sup>67</sup> However, unlike postinvasion Iraq, this breakdown in the civilian effort led to a review of operations and a redoubling of the civil-military effort with a coherent structure put in place to improve cooperation.

Despite improved civil-military coherence, UK civilian officials in Afghanistan are severely hampered by a lack of air transport, being completely dependent upon the goodwill of the military as their request for a suitable aircraft in Helmand “had to be cancelled, and the deposit forgone, because [Her Majesty’s] Treasury had not approved the funds.”<sup>68</sup> Due to restrictions on mobility, DFID was subsequently able to disburse only half of its allocated funding for the province. DFID has also been forced to spend large amounts of its budget on private security company contracts: one contract with Control Risks in Afghanistan in 2003–2004 cost £6.8 million, including the provision of 68 security guards, and in 2009, the same company received the majority of the £2.9 million funding allocated to a local governance project in Basra Province.<sup>69</sup> The NAO has calculated that placing a UK civilian for a year in Afghanistan has cost up to \$250,000. Subcontracting to NGOs has also proven unfeasible in much of Afghanistan and Iraq due to security concerns.<sup>70</sup> In the case of the Southern Iraq Employment Programme, lack of oversight of the local authorities who received a grant of £4 million meant that fraudulent reporting went unnoticed

for over a year, until it was eventually concluded that only £1 million could be accounted for.<sup>71</sup>

The United Kingdom, like the United States, has recognized the shortcomings of its civilian engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq and has moved to correct an obvious lack of interagency coordination of efforts. The establishment of a Stabilisation Unit led to various UK departments agreeing on a roadmap that has brought about significant improvements in Helmand Province. The original plan for the province, produced when the United Kingdom took the lead there in 2006, did not effectively deal with the integration of the civilian and military efforts.<sup>72</sup> The roadmap shifted the activities of the PRT in Lashkar Gah away from a post-conflict approach toward that of dealing with a mounting insurgency. In June 2008, London announced the creation of the Civil-Military Mission Helmand (CMMH), which has significantly improved the integration of military and civilian efforts into one coherent strategy.

CMMH has emerged as an important model for civilian supervision of stability operations that, because of extremely adverse security conditions, are monitored by the military. It is administered by the lead personnel from the military, FCO, and DFID and integrates equivalent representatives from the U.S., Danish, and Estonian contingents. Tasks such as intelligence, political analysis, planning, district level stabilization, media, and communications, which previously were carried out in parallel, are now conducted jointly. The civil-military collaborative effort at headquarters in Lashkar Gah is replicated in other districts of Helmand, each with a joint civil-military stabilization team of approximately 10 staff located within the relevant battleground. Importantly, CMMH clearly places a UK civilian official at the center of all decisionmaking in Helmand.<sup>73</sup>

The pragmatic approach offered by CMMH, where stabilization officers at the district level provide direction to military personnel, means that civilian expertise and military capabilities are pooled toward realizing the common objectives of the UK strategy in Afghanistan. The civilian component—approximately 50 experts drawn from various government agencies—leads reporting on overall progress in the province, and a regular joint civil-military report is dispatched to Whitehall by the ambassador in Kabul, who is responsible for oversight of the UK’s Afghanistan strategy.<sup>74</sup>

UK military officers have reported positively on the effectiveness of stabilization advisors in coordinating a comprehensive approach at the operational/tactical level. In addition, the deployment of FCO and Stabilisation Unit personnel throughout the province rather than just in Lashkar Gah contrasts favorably with the experience in Basra Province, where a handful of UK civilian officials were eventually restricted to operating from one location, the Contingency Operating Base at Basra international airport.<sup>75</sup> CMMH also offers a means of structuring civilian and military political contacts with a close liaison established between the civilians and the “planning” units of the military’s Task Force Helmand. Building on this experience, the UK government has the opportunity to put in place a more coherent doctrine on civil-military relations during counterinsurgency operations.<sup>76</sup>

The UK government has introduced a number of important measures to improve civilian oversight and training of the military. The Stabilisation Unit has recently taken practical steps to improve the level of guidance given to the military, and has amended a DFID guidebook aimed at improving best practices for Quick Impact Projects implemented by CIMIC

teams. The posting of a military liaison officer in DFID has also improved coherence in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The Stabilisation Unit has played an important role in facilitating the harmonization of different agencies’ views into a more coherent UK government strategy, and has accelerated the deployment of civilian personnel to conflict areas, recently placing civilian personnel on the ground in Helmand district centers “cleared” by the military within 24 to 48 hours. The unit is responsible for updating the Stabilisation Task Matrix, which describes a range of tasks germane to stability operations and models of civil-military cooperation. The matrix is currently being updated to recognize that “civilians can do more,” a testament to the improved performance of the UK civilian engagement in Helmand. The Stabilisation Unit currently operates a number of cross-departmental training courses and is participating, together with the FCO and MoD, in a DFID-led audit of “conflict skills” in order to gauge the future predeployment needs of UK personnel.<sup>77</sup> In 2007, the UK government announced the creation of a separate Stabilisation Aid Fund as an extension of the preexisting Global Conflict Prevention Pool. The fund has a budget of £243 million for 2008–2010 that is overseen jointly by the MoD, FCO, and DFID according to a “triple key” system.<sup>78</sup>

The Stabilisation Unit is an important step toward harmonizing UK government activities in working toward national objectives when at war. However, for all its innovative steps in moving closer to the holy grail of the comprehensive approach, the unit lacks a champion in the Cabinet. It is frequently seen as too closely aligned with DFID, yet it answers to three government ministries (DFID, FCO, and MoD). This is not only a consequence of the unit’s offices operating out of DFID, but also because



almost all of its operational costs have until now been channelled from the DFID budget, rather than being split three ways.<sup>79</sup>

The Stabilisation Unit's role is limited to mediating among the three departments and operating according to their consent. The task of imposing a solution upon interdepartmental disputes falls to the Cabinet Office responsible for the day-to-day coordination of all UK government business, which is perceived as lacking sufficient personnel and expertise.<sup>80</sup> One means of addressing this authority deficit could be for the Stabilisation Unit to be placed solely under the remit of a properly resourced Cabinet Office. The Conservative Party has proposed creating a new National Security Council where the Stabilisation Unit will have a "strong voice." However, it is not clear how such a body will operate vis-à-vis the Cabinet Office and how it will differ substantially from existing committee structures. The Conservatives have also vaguely proposed that Stabilisation Advisors would "report to the military chain of command," although again what exactly this means in practice remains to be seen. Alarming, it seems to imply military seniority over UK civilian officials in Helmand.<sup>81</sup>

### **Need for Civilian Doctrine**

While many critics are horrified at the idea of the military undertaking humanitarian and reconstruction tasks normally carried out by civilians, it is difficult to consider an alternative in certain circumstances. By refusing to acknowledge that civilians are frequently incapable of performing the wide range of stability tasks expected of them, and simultaneously are not training the military to fill that void where required, we are destined to fail repeatedly. Although the prospect of close cooperation with the military has the effect of blurring the

distinction between the civilian and military efforts, it is far less desirable for governments to continue to invest heavily in a country such as Afghanistan only to find that due to the level of insecurity, civilians cannot engage, and, due to lack of guidance, the military cannot deliver, or worse, that tensions may be exacerbated by a haphazard delivery of aid. Misspent aid entrenches corruption and is a useful propaganda tool as well as an occasional source of

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funding for the insurgency. This is particularly important given the U.S. "civilian surge" in Afghanistan during 2009 and 2010. Unless the Obama administration chooses to ease security restrictions on U.S. civilian officials in Iraq, the costs of the deployment will be exorbitantly high and results are likely to be unsatisfactory.

In Helmand Province, the United Kingdom is currently testing a thoughtful and pragmatic merging of the civilian and military efforts that is worthy of further study. In agreeing on mechanisms to integrate military and civilian efforts, Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal have offered a coherent U.S. vision for improving security in Afghanistan. Both countries are substantially ahead of the curve in trying to make unity of effort a working reality, and such initiatives give grounds for optimism that the civilian performance can improve. However, these initiatives can only succeed if both governments continue to reform

their civilian bureaucracies toward empowering decisionmaking by officials on the ground so that they can respond more quickly to the needs of a rapidly evolving counterinsurgency strategy.

In advocating greater political awareness among the officer corps, military strategist Michael Howard observed that “military commanders will need exceptional political wisdom as well as military skill; but they should refrain from attempting to shape the political world to their image.”<sup>82</sup> This is still true today. Although General David Petraeus has observed that the U.S. Department of State “is never going to put an Ambassador under a general, and [DOD] is never going to put a general under an Ambassador,” on political matters, soldiers must yield to civilian guidance at all levels.<sup>83</sup> This means granting civilians unequivocal authority at every stage of the design and implementation of stability operations, even if such activities are carried out by the military. It does not matter whether the military makes the “right” political decisions; these decisions are simply not for the military to make.

Whereas the military now plans for operations according to “ink-spots” or “clear, hold, and build” through a means of combat and stability operations, civilian officials are frequently unsure how they should deploy alongside the military and lack guidance on their role within an overall counterinsurgency strategy. There are exceptions, such as the performance of UK Stabilisation Advisors in Afghanistan, who are able to deploy at a local level alongside the UK military, often within hours of a military offensive to clear an area. Comparative to the United States, the United Kingdom appears to be easing its restrictions on civilian movement.

Continued deficiencies in models for civil-military cooperation remain extremely costly. Stuart Bowen has noted that his counterpart in

Afghanistan, whose office was created in 2008, is encountering the same problems as in Iraq due to “very little oversight” of the \$32 billion that has been appropriated.<sup>84</sup> There is an obvious need for a comprehensive approach to reconstruction contracting procedures, including the possible creation of a single civil-military agency with a pooled budget to take a clear lead on humanitarian aid and reconstruction in the areas worst affected by insurgency.

The political leaders of NATO still cannot agree on what the comprehensive approach really means: some member states view it as a method of collaboration in security sector reform, while others argue that it should constitute a closely integrated counterinsurgency strategy.<sup>85</sup> This is exacerbated by continued confusion as to the structure of PRTs, and where and how they should operate. Such political weakness severely undermines the coherence of ISAF operations in Afghanistan, where the lack of a clear strategy and guidance on civil-military division of labor is exacerbated by the proliferation of actors cluttering the same space.

Ultimately, it will take a greatly strengthened political will and commitment by NATO governments to unite different agencies to operate under a single strategy with a less ambiguous command structure. Such reform needs to begin at home before it can be implemented abroad or consolidated on a NATO-wide basis. The United States and United Kingdom have come a long way from the thinking that restricted the military contribution to stability operations during the initial period following the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Such innovation and fresh thinking should not be thwarted, but rather matched by the emergence of a new type of diplomat with the requisite authority and skills to direct civil-military resources toward realistic objectives. If respective heads of government are

serious about a whole-of-government approach to conflict management, it is incumbent upon them to assume personal responsibility for its implementation, working directly with interagency organizations such as S/CRS and the Stabilisation Unit and not subsuming them beneath other government departments. Consensus is a luxury rarely achieved in war; therefore, leadership and attention to detail at the highest level of government are required to prosecute it effectively. **PRISM**

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> The U.S. military defines *stability operations* or *stabilization* as “missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the U.S. in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or re-establish a safe and secure environment, provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.” See U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3–0, *Operations*, available at <[www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new\\_pubs/jp3\\_0.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf)>.

<sup>2</sup> Stephen Cornish and Marit Glad, “Civil-military Relations: No Room for Humanitarianism in Comprehensive Approaches” (Oslo: Norwegian Atlantic Committee, May 2008), 18.

<sup>3</sup> Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, statement of Stuart Bowen, Jr., Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, February 2, 2009), 5.

<sup>4</sup> U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3–07, *Stability Operations*, University of Michigan Press edition (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009), 2–6.

<sup>5</sup> Richard Teuten, “NMCG Conference: Stabilisation and Civil-military Relations in Humanitarian Response: Mission Integration” (London: Stabilisation Unit, 2009).

<sup>6</sup> Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Marines Seek Foothold in Helmand,” *The Financial Times*, July 3, 2009.

<sup>7</sup> David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006), 61.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 63.

<sup>9</sup> FM 3–07, 1–3.

<sup>10</sup> Robert Gates, “A Balanced Strategy,” *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 1 (January-February 2009).

<sup>11</sup> Eric Edelman, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, testimony to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

<sup>12</sup> Janine Davidson, “Next Generation Doctrine,” in FM 3–07, xvii.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 2–4.

<sup>14</sup> Interview with MNF–I official, Iraq, March 2009.

<sup>15</sup> See, for example, “Building Language Skills and Cultural Competencies in the Military: DoD’s Challenge in Today’s Educational Environment,” House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Armed Services, November 2008.

<sup>16</sup> Thomas Ricks, *The Gamble: General Petraeus and the Untold Story of the American Surge in Iraq, 2006–2008* (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), 69.

<sup>17</sup> Patrick Little, “Lessons Unlearned: A Former Officer’s Perspective on the British Army at War,” *RUSI Journal* 154, no. 3 (June 2009), 10–16.

<sup>18</sup> James Blitz, “Testing Waters Ahead,” *The Financial Times*, May 20, 2009.

<sup>19</sup> Ministry of Defence, “Afghanistan Casualties,” statement of Chief of Defence Staff Sir Jock Stirrup, London, July 10, 2009.

<sup>20</sup> General Sir Richard Dannatt, “A Perspective on the Nature of Future Conflict,” transcript of meeting at Chatham House, London, May 15, 2009, 2.

<sup>21</sup> Miguel González, “Zapatero insiste en que la misión en Afganistán es de reconstrucción,” *El País*, October 10, 2009, and EFE, “270 paracaidistas españoles vuelan a Afganistán para relevar a los legionarios,” *El País*, July 4, 2008.

<sup>22</sup> Proceedings and interviews at Spanish Ministry of Defence Conference, “La Estrategia de Afganización,” Barcelona, June 16, 2009; and Colonel Rafael Roel Fernández, “La contribución del Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) español de Qala e Naw a la reconstrucción de Afganistán” (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, February 5, 2008).

<sup>23</sup> Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “NATO’s Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Response Operations,” Danish Institute for International Studies, 2008, 21.

<sup>24</sup> Finn Stepputat, “Synthesis Report: Civil-military Relations in International Operations—a Danish Perspective,” Danish Institute for International Studies, April 2009, 8.

<sup>25</sup> Barbara Stapleton, “A Means to What End? Why PRTs Are Peripheral to the Bigger Political Challenges in Afghanistan,” *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 10, no. 1 (Autumn 2007), 40.

<sup>26</sup> Stepputat, 28.

<sup>27</sup> Hilary Synnott, *Bad Days in Basra: My Turbulent Time as Britain’s Man in Southern Iraq* (London: Tauris, 2008), 261.

<sup>28</sup> Interview with UK official, September 2009.

<sup>29</sup> National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, “Department for International Development: Operating in Insecure Environments,” October 16, 2008, 25.

<sup>30</sup> Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG), “Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: 2009 Update” (New York: HPG, 2009), 6.

<sup>31</sup> Interview with Spanish official, Barcelona, June 16, 2009.

<sup>32</sup> *A Book of Rules* (Quetta: The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, September 10, 2009).

<sup>33</sup> HPG, 6.

<sup>34</sup> General Stanley McChrystal, transcript of meeting at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, October 1, 2009, 1.

<sup>35</sup> J. Anthony Holmes, “Where Are the Civilians?” *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 1 (January-February 2009).

<sup>36</sup> Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps” (Washington, DC: GAO, November 2007), 1.

<sup>37</sup> Gordon Adams, testimony to Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, July 31, 2008.

<sup>38</sup> Rusty Barber and Sam Parker, “Evaluating Iraq’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams while Drawdown Looms,” United States Institute of Peace trip report, December 2008, 1.

<sup>39</sup> John Finney and Alphonse La Porta, “Integrating National Security at the Operational Level: The Role of State Department Political Advisers,” in *Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security*, ed. Gabriel Marcella (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2009), 304–305.

<sup>40</sup> Interviews with MNF-I officials, Iraq, March and April 2009.

<sup>41</sup> Patrick Cockburn, “Return to Afghanistan,” *London Review of Books*, June 11, 2009.

<sup>42</sup> National Audit Office, 25.

<sup>43</sup> Stuart Bowen, Jr., statement to U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Washington, DC, March 11, 2008, 9.

<sup>44</sup> Holmes.

<sup>45</sup> Hillary Clinton, testimony before U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, May 20, 2009.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> John Finney and Alphonse La Porta, "FS Know-How: Maximizing the Value of the Political Adviser Function," *Foreign Service Journal* (October 2008).

<sup>48</sup> RAND National Defense Research Institute, "Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations" (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009), xxi.

<sup>49</sup> Robert Perito, statement to U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "Defining the Military's Role toward Foreign Policy," Washington, DC, July 31, 2008.

<sup>50</sup> Eric Edelman, testimony before U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

<sup>51</sup> Matt Waldman, *Caught in the Conflict: Civilians and the International Security Strategy in Afghanistan* (London: Oxfam International, 2009), 14.

<sup>52</sup> RAND National Defense Research Institute, 40.

<sup>53</sup> Stewart Patrick, "The U.S. Response to Precarious States: Tentative Progress and Remaining Obstacles to Coherence," in *Diplomacy, Development and Defense: A Paradigm for Policy Coherence*, ed. Stefani Weiss, Han-Joachim Spanger, and Wim van Meurs (Gutersloh: Bertelsmann, 2009), 66.

<sup>54</sup> McChrystal, C-I.

<sup>55</sup> "United States Government Integrated Civilian Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan," Embassy of the United States, Kabul, Afghanistan, August 2009, 28–35.

<sup>56</sup> Interview with a former advisor to former UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, Madrid, May 2009.

<sup>57</sup> House of Commons International Development Committee, *Reconstructing Afghanistan* (London: House of Commons, Fourth Report of Session 2007–2008, February 5, 2008).

<sup>58</sup> Synnott, 4.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Kasper Hoffmann, "Civil-Military Relations in Iraq 2003–7," Danish Institute for International Studies, September 2009, 58.

<sup>61</sup> Hoffmann, 56.

<sup>62</sup> Interview with UK official, Basra, March 2009.

<sup>63</sup> Eddie Barnes, "Foreign Office has 'Culture of Clones,'" *Scotland on Sunday*, March 22, 2009.

<sup>64</sup> Alex Barker, "Afghan Mission Lacks Language Skills," *The Financial Times*, August 20, 2009.

<sup>65</sup> National Audit Office, 29.

<sup>66</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Phil Sherwood, "Reconstruction and Development in Afghanistan: A Royal Engineer Regiment's Experiences," *RUSI Defence Systems* (October 2007).

<sup>67</sup> Stepputat, 41.

<sup>68</sup> House of Commons International Development Committee.

<sup>69</sup> Interview with UK official, September 14, 2009, and National Audit Office, 32.

<sup>70</sup> House of Commons International Development Committee.

<sup>71</sup> National Audit Office, 22.

<sup>72</sup> Peter Dahl Thruelsen, “Counterinsurgency and a Comprehensive Approach: Helmand Province, Afghanistan,” *Small Wars Journal* (2008).

<sup>73</sup> Memorandum submitted by the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development (London: House of Commons Defence Committee, May 15, 2009).

<sup>74</sup> Teuten, NMCG Conference, 2009.

<sup>75</sup> Interdepartmental acrimony over Iraq was never fully diffused from 2003 until the UK military withdrawal in 2009, although the Stabilisation Unit did play an important role in improving the performance of PRT Basra during 2008 and 2009. One UK official observed that “the unit came into existence too late in Basra to play the role that it is now playing in Helmand.” Interviews with UK officials in Iraq, March 2009, and London, September 2009. See also Sherwood.

<sup>76</sup> Interim Joint Warfare Publication 3–90, *Civil-Military Cooperation* (London: Ministry of Defence, November 2003).

<sup>77</sup> Richard Teuten, “Stabilisation and Post-conflict Reconstruction” (London: Stabilisation Unit, 2008).

<sup>78</sup> In 2009, the Stabilisation Aid Fund was joined to the United Kingdom’s peacekeeping budget, requiring another name change.

<sup>79</sup> According to a UK government official, this is due to be remedied in 2010 when the FCO, DFID, and the MoD will assume responsibility for an equal share of the operational costs of the Stabilisation Unit. Interview, London, September 14, 2009.

<sup>80</sup> Interviews with UK officials, London, September 2009.

<sup>81</sup> See “One World Conservatism: A Conservative Agenda for International Development,” Policy Green Paper No. 11, available at <<http://www.conservatives.com>>.

<sup>82</sup> Michael Howard, “Military Power and International Order,” *International Affairs* 40, no. 3 (July 1964), 404.

<sup>83</sup> Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, 10.

<sup>84</sup> Stuart Bowen, Jr., statement to U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC, March 25, 2009.

<sup>85</sup> Stepputat, 28.