Charlie Rose
Tell me exactly what the strategy is that has come out of this review that was announced by the president last night.
Adm. Mike Mullen
Well, it is a strategy that's focused on stabilizing Afghanistan so that we are able to pursue the major goal, which is defeat -- deny and defeat al-Qaeda, and prevent their return from Pakistan to Afghanistan and prevent their continued presence there. And fundamentally it gets at the insurgency, which is very focused on overturning the government in Afghanistan, as well as a very strong support for Pakistan. It's a regional strategy focused on these kinds of objectives and it's done so to focus on a partnership literally with Afghanistan, and I think to take advantage of a situation that has evolved greatly over the last year. First of all, the insurgency's gotten much worse, we've got a new Karzai government with you know with a mandate, and certainly he's been engaged by President Obama, as well as Secretary Clinton and others, in terms of expectations. We've got new leadership, military leadership on the ground in the last couple months, we've got a new ambassador there, new leadership in the Embassy, and now a decision by the president to add these troops, to also put additional civilians in, and I really think we can succeed in turning the insurgency around. And it focuses in great part on security for the people, and then development of the Afghan security forces, the Army and the police, and more than anything else it's designed to turn it over to the Afghans, their security and their ability to run that country. It's not focused on nation building, it's not focused on bringing them to a 21st century democracy. It's focused to stabilize that country so the Taliban can't take it over again, and then host al-Qaeda as they did before.
Charlie Rose:
So you have a huge bet on President Karzai.
Mike Mullen:
Absolutely, yeah, I've said in my testimony today, I've actually said it over a long period of time, no amount of troops, no amount of time is going to make any difference if we don't get support from and leadership out of the Karzi government. And it's not just at the national level, and not just in Kabul, it's down in the provinces, down in the districts, down in the sub-districts, and so General McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry [spelled phonetically] are engaging the totality of that structure in terms of providing goods and services for the people, and without some level of governance and support. And obviously security must lead this, that we will not be successful there. And so there's very clearly a big bet on President Karzai.
Charlie Rose:
Is it because you believe that he can change? Is it because you have some influence with him so that he will adopt a different attitude and position and passion?
Mike Mullen:
Well I think it's -- we have a very clear understanding of I think where we are with respect to that. He actually and we'll look over the next year at who he appoints in his cabinet, who he appoints as ministers, who he appoints as governors, and we know, we have a pretty good idea of who the good ones are. And in fact they've got a good minister of defense right now in Minister Wardak [spelled phonetically], we've got a good minister of interior in Minister Atmire [spelled phonetically], individuals like this who really can make a difference. But it's also got a flow. It's not just good individuals, it's got to execute and again develop capabilities [unintelligible] country, work on the development, work on the economy, work on the security, all those things have to happen. That's been laid out very clearly. He said in his inauguration speech he certainly committed to this, so we'll see. We recognize that's a challenge. But to your point, an awful lot depends on him and his government, and we realize that.
Charlie Rose:
It is said by some reports we've been receiving over the last several months that the ambassador and General McChrystal have a different point of view about him and about the possibility of that government being able to rise to the occasion.
Mike Mullen:
One of the things -- you talked about the number of meetings we've had, and there have been extensive meetings --
Charlie Rose:
22 or 23, some say.
Mike Mullen:
-- throughout, I mean I think we've had nine or 10 meetings with the president and probably two or three times that with the principals. And all of that was to ring out the assumptions, ring out the debate. And we received a diversity of opinions. And actually I thought it was a pretty healthy process. Where we are right now, I understand where we are, I understand what the assumptions are, I understand what the goals are. So does General McChrystal, so does General Petraeus, and I think so does Ambassador Eikenberry. And there may have been differences, some of which were you know published with Ambassador Eikenberry's tables, but at the same time now that the decision is made, you know, Eikenberry and McChrystal are together, as we all are, we know what he's decided and we're going to march off and execute it.
Charlie Rose:
In fact you serve the president by offering your opinion, and then once he makes his decision you offer your execution to the best you know how [inaudible].
Mike Mullen:
Absolutely, absolutely, and my voice and the other military voices have been heard throughout this debate, it's been very deliberate, very thorough in breadth and depth and I’ve been very comfortable with that. And now it’s time to go execute.
Charlie Rose:
Some are asking this question though in terms of the options the president had.
Mike Mullen:
Well I think, I think broadly, and I’m not going to go into the details of the debate, but broadly, there was an option that said--and I think the president has said this as well, it’s sort of, we leave, and none of us believe that was the right option. We keep doing what we’re doing, sort of status quo.
Charlie Rose:
Was that presented, though, as a military option?
Mike Mullen:
No, I think--it [unintelligible] you can do what--
Charlie Rose:
nothing, we will do what was called a Biden option, you know, make a hard effort to kill the al-Qaeda [unintelligible].
Mike Mullen:
Well I think that’s different from leaving. And then there was option of sort of the status quo. But the status quo, where we are right now is in a deteriorating situation, we’ve seen it deteriorate from 2006, more and more significantly each year. The violence level this year was 60 percent worse than it was last year in Afghanistan. So the insurgency’s getting tougher and tougher. And General McChrystal said, he’s got to turn this thing around in the next year or two or we can’t turn it around. So fundamentally, that’s why this decision was so important. And in the end, the president, I think, made the best decision he could make to reverse the momentum, to get at these objectives, which are narrower, even than the objectives we had in March, the last time we reviewed this.
Charlie Rose:
How are they narrow?
Mike Mullen:
They’re focused in the sense, very much on the population. They’re focused on population centers, it is clearly not nation building. We’re focused on key ministries. We’re focused on principally building out this Afghan security force and heavily for us, anyway, it’s not a country-wide counter-insurgency effort. It’s a very focused counter-insurgency effort and there will be disruptive capabilities. There will be counter-terrorism kind of capabilities that our special forces continue to execute, but it’s focused in a way that gives clear guidance to the commander on the ground, that he understands. And that’s been a big positive for this process as far as I’m concerned. There’s no doubt in General McChrystal’s mind, where he stands and what he’s supposed to do, and it’s going to get him the forces over the next year, in 2010, in order to do that. All of us believe that it’s going to give him those forces, actually a little sooner than he had asked for.
Charlie Rose:
Why did the decision, why was the decision made to give him the forces sooner than most people thought feasible?
Mike Mullen:
We are to some degree restricted, just physically and mechanically, restricted. We worked that hard, so we’re going to get those forces there as rapidly--
Charlie Rose:
But that’s the question; how are you going to do that?
Mike Mullen:
Well, we’ve got a lot of people that have worked on that and we are working to get them there as rapidly as we can and to break down the restrictions. We’ve been working this potential for months, based on the possibility that we might have to do this. And there’s some huge challenges in the region. We’re coming out of Iraq at the same time we’re adding forces into Afghanistan. There are great logistics challenges associated with this. And at the same time, we think we’re going to get additional NATO forces, coalition forces, sooner than we were under what General McChrystal was looking at in his particular plan. And the reason that’s important, is to be able to hit the insurgents with a very quick, devastating blow over the next 12 to 18 months. So getting them there and in the fight as rapidly as possible and doing it with the Afghan security forces is absolutely critical.
Charlie Rose:
you will have 30,000 American troops, additional 30,000 on the ground in Afghanistan by what date?
Mike Mullen:
We are looking to have about 25,000 of that 30,000 there in July timeframe and towards the fall, we would get--
Charlie Rose:
That’s like eight months.
Mike Mullen:
Right, right.
Charlie Rose:
I have been told by military people like you that it takes 18 months, normally, to do what you are suggesting you can do in eight months.
Mike Mullen:
Well, I mean we moved almost 30,000 troops into Iraq in the surge at about a brigade a month. So, now, Iraq is much different. It has better infrastructure, we have Kuwait to stage. We don’t have that in Afghanistan. So we’re not going to be able to do it at that pace. But we’re going to do it at a pace, as I described, to meet the goal that we’ve got right now, which is to get the vast majority of them there by this summer. And then, and this goes to the 2011 time frame; you may want to--you may bring that up, but one of the things about 2011 is the Marines have been in, in 2009, it had a big impact down in Helmand, which is one of the key areas. In fact, that's going to be the principal area for general McChrystal. So by 2011, we will have had the marines in. They'll be reinforced by additional Marines that will go, tied to this decision. So we'll have 2009, 2010, 2011, three summers' worth of marines specifically in that area. And I think we'll really know where we stand.
Charlie Rose:
But this is a hard, hard challenge to get them over there as fast as the president wants.
Some of my favorite people in my world are my logistics people. And they work miracles all the time.
Charlie Rose:
And this is a miracle.
No, it's not -- well, I mean, it is a real challenge. But I mean, they've met it time and time again. It's our people down in transportation command. It's our logistics types both in theater. And we've got the best people in the world focused on this. So I'm optimistic we can meet this. I'm not trying to understate the challenge. But we're going to get them there as rapidly as we can. And, in fact, the first forces got ordered out this morning and will be there in a couple weeks.
Charlie Rose:
There have been various arguments made for why we need the urgency of this.
The 2011 timeframe is out there, one, as a goal for us to shoot for. And two, to begin the transfer of security responsibility and the transition. And it could be a lot of forces. It could be very few forces. We just don't know. But the point is, we want them to know they've got to step up here. They've got to start to grab the baton and take control and take the lead in security. And we think they'll be able to do that in parts of the country, not all over the country. And the other thing you haven't heard is you haven't heard a withdrawal date or a "We're leaving" date. That is not part of this discussion. And the president was very specific about this will be done responsibly, and it will be done based on conditions.
Charlie Rose:
But my understanding is general McChrystal's recommendation was more open-ended than the recommendation made by the president last night as to what the policy is.
General McChrystal, General Petraeus, the joints chiefs, myself, all feel that by 2011, we're going to know, one way or the other, whether this strategy is successful or not. And in either case. I mean, clearly, we will reassess as the president said last night, in about a year, to look where we are. But we think we've got basically about 18 to 24 months to turn this thing around. And we'll know. And if it is successful, obviously, we'll adjust accordingly. And if it isn't, we will.
Charlie Rose:
Well, let's define success.
Success is, actually, very much like Iraq in a sense that we train the Afghan security forces. We partner with them, which we were not doing that before. We really started that this summer. And about 80 percent of the Afghan security forces now have coalition partners. We're going to continue to increase that. And that means out off the bases with them. We're living with them, planning with them. And learning -- teaching each other. And in particular, us, we're training them as well, and fighting with them. So that's a huge shift from where we were again. -- where we were before. So we train the Afghan security forces to take the lead and take responsibility for their own security. And achieving a stable country. That's not going to happen overnight. We know that. And it isn't going to happen instantly all across the country. That's the main focus. We move from a lead to a, if you will a side-by-side. And then they take the lead tactically. And then we go into an over-watch kind of situation, not unlike we are in Iraq right now. And then we are able to have those combat forces depart.
Charlie Rose:
Beyond Karzai, what makes you think the Afghan forces are prepared to be able to do that in the timeframe necessary?
We've had a great focus certainly -- I mean, we've had focus on developing the Afghan security forces for some time. But not unlike the combat forces, it just had not been resourced. This resources that effort. So we had, a few months ago, the first full brigade, the fourth of the 82nd go into exclusively conduct a training mission. We've got another brigade in this 30,000 that is focused exclusively on that. So we recognize we have to accelerate it. This is a high risk part of the strategy. We know that.
Charlie Rose:
The ability of the Afghan forces to be able to rise to the occasion and be equipped and trained.
To raise the force.
Charlie Rose:
And have the language abilities and everything else.
To raise the force, absolutely. And it is a much higher risk with the police as it was in Iraq than it is with the army. And so we know that. One of the questions I got today on the Hill is how do you know this is going to work? What lessons have we learned? Well, we've learned a lot of lessons from Iraq. We know what to do. We know how to do it. It's not exactly the same. I understand that.
Charlie Rose:
Okay. But what are the lessons you learned from Iraq on this particular point?
That we need good leaders in the Afghan security forces, that it really doesn't turn until we have leadership at the noncommissioned officer level, both in the police as well as the army, and that we need leaders at the mid-grade and senior officer level of the that's probably the long pole in the tent. They've got to be equipped. The armies, they are good fighters. They want to get this right. The challenge -- probably the biggest challenge we have is in the police and the corruption that has existed there. Now we've got a minister, a government and a minister very dedicated to rooting out this corruption. That, we also know is going to take some time. In addition, General McChrystal will focus on raising up, if you will, security in local villages. Now, there's a very delicate balance here, because we're not going to go back to the warlord years.
Charlie Rose:
Right.
But that's a very historically, that's a very strong part of Afghan security. So it's not just the totality of the Afghan security force.
Charlie Rose:
What is the strategy for the warlords who have had enormous influence in Afghanistan?
The message to them is, they're not coming back as warlords. Those who want to participate in a constructive way in this way forward with Afghanistan I'm sure will be able to do that. But they're going to have to do that. They're not going to be able to raise the kind of militias that they had before, nor -- because we worry a great deal, quick frankly, that then evolves to a point where the place could break out in civil war.
Charlie Rose:
Why did Karzai turn out not to be as good as we expected him to be in the beginning?
I think it's hard to judge all that. He's been in a pretty tough position for a long time. And there have been people who have been critical of him. He said to, I think it was Secretary Gates, one time when Secretary Gates was over there. He said one of my great strengths is I know my people. And I really believe that. He does know his people. And in that regard, I think that there is potential that he can lead. He also -- I've talked to individuals who have known him pretty well, who have worked with him, that says he's really been through some pretty tough times. And he's capable of doing this. What I am concerned about and others is there are those who are around him who haven't been as strong as we would like, or in fact --
Charlie Rose:
Or they're more corrupt than you would like?
They have been more corrupt.
Charlie Rose:
Including his brother?
Well, I'm not -- again, I'm not going to get into the individual identification tonight. But clearly, he has certainly been put on notice that he's got to take significant steps with respect to the corruption. But it's not just him. He's got to appoint good ministers. He's got to appoint good governors. And we've got to focus on, in fact, getting goods and services to the people at the local level. And that hasn't been happening out of Kabul, and it hasn't been happening out in the villages.
Charlie Rose:
Is the end result that you hope for that the Taliban will occupy a certain part of Afghanistan and there will be a stable Afghan government that will occupy certain other parts of Afghanistan, that's the most you can hope for?
Mike Mullen:
We don't think that we're going to have an Afghanistan that doesn't incorporate those who've been in the Taliban in some way. We expect part of the strategy to be a reconciliation and reintegration phase where those that are tired of it and are not idealistically glued to the whole Jihad, that they, in fact, would turn in their arms and become constructive, as it occurred in Iraq. Where they will reside or what part of the -- you know what part of the country, although this is principally a Pashtun issue and so certainly we would expect that probably to be in the south and in the east, and we would expect to start to see that happen under this strategy.
Charlie Rose:
This is classic counterinsurgency strategy.
Mike Mullen:
It is. It is. It is classic counterinsurgency strategy. The only thing I would say is it's very focused for us on the east and the south and the Pashtun [unintelligible], and you will see as I indicated earlier, General McChrystal's main effort, go south, main effort into Helmand and Kandahar, as I believe it should be.
Charlie Rose:
And the roads in between.
Mike Mullen:
Well, it's a strategy focused on the population, the production centers, and the lines of communication or the roads certainly in between as well.
Charlie Rose:
All right. Are you going to be able to buy the Taliban off?
Mike Mullen:
I think in some cases that would be the case. I mean I couldn't tell you what percentage or anything like that, but that certainly would be a part of it.
Charlie Rose:
Okay, because part of the Iraq strategy as you know well was the awakening --
Mike Mullen:
Yes.
Charlie Rose:
-- in which you were able to not only buy off but also take advantage of some reaction against the al-Qaeda.
Mike Mullen:
Yeah, right, and we've seen -- I mean there was an example a couple of weeks ago that -- and it was out west that where there were tens of Taliban who essentially said, "I'm done." And that's an example of the same kind of things that happened in Iraq. But key to that is I've got to be able to have a secure enough environment so that when they in fact say, "Okay, I'm coming over," they're not going to get killed by the Taliban. We've got to have enough security. We don't have that in enough places right now.
Charlie Rose:
And that's why you need 30,000 troops coming in --
Mike Mullen:
Exactly.
Charlie Rose:
-- in addition.
Mike Mullen:
The momentum for this insurgency's got to be turned. And General McChrystal feels that this 30,000, and getting them in 2010, will really do that.
Charlie Rose:
When you look at the Taliban, I think Secretary Gates has made this point, there is among a number of them a similarity to al-Qaeda, and those who look to them as simply nationalistic are wrong.
Mike Mullen:
We've spoken a lot about Afghanistan, I am -- this strategy is also about Pakistan. And over the last couple of years, and I've spent an awful lot of time both there in trying to study this and understand it and engaging people about it. Probably the biggest concern I have is the collaboration that's going on amongst the terrorists, amongst the groups, that a few years ago, they didn't even talk to each other, they didn't like each other. And I see that in that border area, I see it in Pakistan, I see associations of the LET which is the group that fostered the attack on Mumbai, in India, from Pakistan, I see their association with al-Qaeda, I see them operating out of the country, not just into India. And I see these various Taliban groups associating with al-Qaeda in ways that just had not happened before. There's the Taliban who are actually in Pakistan and threatening Pakistan, this TTP group, there's the Taliban who are also in Pakistan and threaten -- and this comes from mostly the Hakani [spelled phonetically] network -- that are focused on Afghanistan, but there's great synergy and a much more symbiotic relationship between them and amongst all of them including al-Qaeda, and that's the center, I have a senior administration official from India say, "What you don't understand is this is the epicenter of terrorism in the world."
Charlie Rose:
Pakistan?
Mike Mullen:
That border area. And it flows back and forth. And unless we stabilize the Afghanistan side, they will be free to roam. That's my belief. My other belief -- my belief is also that we cannot take the chance to get this wrong, that people who are living in Afghanistan from al-Qaeda, same group that killed 3,000 Americans, they're still planning, they're still training, there’s still financing. Those kind of potential attacks in the future. Now they’re diminished from where they were a few years ago but by no means have they gone away. So that’s at the core of this entire strategy. We can’t do it alone, we’ve got 42 other countries in Afghanistan who are supportive of this and we need to do it with Pakistan as well.
Charlie Rose:
But if the Taliban are occupying parts of Afghanistan, are you making a distinction between those Taliban and all of the terrorist groups that you just mentioned in Pakistan?
Mike Mullen:
The --
Charlie Rose:
On the border?
Mike Mullen:
I think it’s too easy to make that distinction. It’s an insurgency that wants to, whatever the Taliban in Afghanistan, it wants to turn--it wants to take over that country and to run that country again. And I think it’s very high risk if that happens in terms of their facilitating and hosting al-Qaeda again.
Charlie Rose:
This is international security issue, simply because if we don’t do something about Afghanistan it will destabilize Pakistan where there are groups of extremism that threatens the Americans.
Mike Mullen:
In March, the strategy was a regional strategy; it was Afghanistan and Pakistan and in fact the region’s bigger than that because I think India has a lot to do with stability in this part of world, as do other bordering states, bordering countries if you will to Afghanistan and Pakistan. So the ability to stabilize, I think rests on the soldiers of a lot of players, certainly not just us. And it is that stable Afghanistan, that I think, gives an opportunity for Pakistan to change its behavior because its behavior is focused on what kind of Afghanistan is this going to be? Is it going to be a Taliban-led Afghanistan? Is it going to be a stable Afghanistan that I can depend on? And those answers aren’t there yet. And I don’t think they will be for a couple more years.
Charlie Rose:
So are you saying Pakistan is almost on --is, has not made a decision as to the way it thinks its future is because it doesn’t’ know the results in Afghanistan?
Mike Mullen:
Well I don’t think, my experience is it doesn’t know whether we’re staying or going. And the only way that we’re going--because we left them before--and the only way we’re going to convince them we’re staying is to stay over time. And I don’t mean with combat forces, but in the long run, to have that kind of partnership because it’s so critical that those two countries be stable. And I think until that time, until they’re convinced that Afghanistan’s going to stabilize and in fact it’s been going in the wrong direction from my perspective, which has affected their behavior, until they’re convinced--they just won’t know.
Charlie Rose:
Why has it been going in the wrong direction, when in fact the president has said and others have said that the Taliban does not have a lot of support in Afghanistan?
Mike Mullen:
Because they have gotten a lot tougher, better; they’re better resourced. Starting about the 2006 timeframe, their insurgency just got better and better and better. And the Afghans are not equipped to turn that around. It has been--my view is, because we’ve under-resourced Afghanistan for a significant period of time. We’d all like to go back to 2001 and 2002 and say gee, wouldn’t it be great if it were like that. It’s not. And it is our ninth year of war and I understand that. I know the American people are tired of war, believe me, the men and women who are sacrificing, serving and sacrificing are tired, yet resilient and understand this vital national interest. So, and in that under-resourcing for four or five years, we under-resourced them intellectually; we under-resourced them diplomatically; we under-resourced them militarily, economically, you name it. So that’s what led to the conditions that has allowed this insurgency to bloom again, which is where we are. Just one quick figure. The level of violence, this year, 2009, up 60 percent from what it was in 2008 and we’ve just seen a steady increase--
Charlie Rose:
And who are they getting help from?
Mike Mullen:
Well they’re financed, they’re well financed by--
Charlie Rose:
By heroin trade?
Mike Mullen:
Well, yeah, but it’s not all the heroin trade. But clearly that’s a significant part. But they raise finances from out of the country, and they tax--
Charlie Rose:
From where?
Mike Mullen:
And they also--they raise it from overseas, from supporters of the jihad, from private individuals who support the jihad. And they tax like crazy in areas that they intimidate. So they’re living in Afghanistan and they’re taxing the people and that raises cash if you will, for their survival as well, or I mean for the insurgency as well. So it’s a lot of ways that they’re bringing in support. And that’s the nexus that has to be broken.
Charlie Rose:
You have developed a very close relationship and it’s been at least 11 visits that I know about with the former chief of staff, General Kayani. What does he think? What does he tell you?
Mike Mullen:
He is supportive. We share concerns. I mean, he essentially is directing the military operations on the Pakistani side of the border. He has taken some risk by moving forces off the Indian border.
Charlie Rose:
Why is that a risk?
Mike Mullen:
Because the Pakistani people and the Pakistani military feel that India is an existential threat. You and I might disagree with that. But they get their view. That has been their threat, and it continues to be their threat. So he's taken some risk because he is -- you know, he's moved some forces, and he's moved them west. He's trained them in counterinsurgency, which is what they've got. He's seen a lot of his citizens die. He's lost a lot of his soldiers in these fights. So he's taken all this very, very seriously. He has, over the last year, year and a half, and this is one of the first things he told me when I met him almost two years ago, that he needed to get the support of the Pakistani people. And I've watched the numbers go from very low to very high in the 80s recently. So the Pakistani people recognize this violent radical movement inside their own country which has killed a lot of --
Charlie Rose:
They understand the threat of the Taliban inside --
Mike Mullen:
They do.
Charlie Rose:
-- and al-Qaeda and anyone else.
Mike Mullen:
They do.
Charlie Rose:
-- who wants to overthrow to get their hands on the nuclear weapons.
Mike Mullen:
They do. Absolutely. And they are very supportive of him and the action the government has taken to get after this threat. And you've seen them go. No one -- certainly not me, I would not have predict aid year ago that they'd have 30,000-plus troops down in -- deployed through Swat and south Waziristan going after the Taliban that are there.
Charlie Rose:
Are they doing everything that you would hope they would do in Pakistan?
Mike Mullen:
Well, at this point, I mean, we -- it took us several years to figure out that we needed a counterinsurgency force. Once we figured that out, we adapted pretty quickly. He's got two fronts. He's got a conventional front that is on the Indian side as well as a counterinsurgency force he's got to train and put them into the fight. And as I said, he's losing a lot of people as well. They've done amazing things, quite frankly, in the period of time that I'm talking about. But he is also stretched. He can only do so much. And there is a patience that I think we have to have with the Pakistani people and the Pakistani country that it's not -- they're not the greatest strength of Americans is patience. We would like to see more results more quickly. And I have argued and cautioned that we're going to have to have some patience with Pakistan and watch them continue to develop.
Charlie Rose:
The president's language last night characterized Pakistan as a partner.
Mike Mullen:
Yeah.
Charlie Rose:
And took note of the fact that they had been a troubled relationship.
Mike Mullen:
It has historically. And in fact, on my staff a few months ago, one of my guys prepared a piece of paper that said preparing for the fourth rejection. So, I mean, this isn't just when we sanctioned them in 1990 for 12 years and had no relationship with them. This goes back historically. And that, I think, is fundamentally the issue is, are we going to stay with them this time. That's the question they ask.
Charlie Rose:
And how do you convince them of that?
Mike Mullen:
I don't know how else to do it, Charlie, except keep going, supporting them in their efforts, asking them to support us where our objectives overlap. And they are doing that. And they are principally, and their military and intelligence services principally focused on their own survival. And it's a tough neighborhood. And that's why the neighborhood's got to stabilize I think before they make some significant changes that would also take steps to signal that kind of stability.
Charlie Rose:
Senator McCain and others asked today, as you heard, was what happens in 2011 if the facts on the ground do not dictate and do not -- are not where you expect them to be, and yet you have said you're going to begin the process of bringing those troops home?
Mike Mullen:
Yeah, I mean, that really is the -- it's the direction from the president, first of all.
Charlie Rose:
Why is he so insistent on that, one more time?
Mike Mullen:
He's done two things here. He has shown a great sense of urgency with respect to this decision and getting troops in there to turn this thing around.
Charlie Rose:
But help me understand.
Mike Mullen:
I will, I will. Secondly, he has also showed a sense of urgency for the need for the Afghans to stand up, and sent a signal that we are not going to be there forever at these levels. And from that standpoint, he needs Karzai and his leadership to stand up and take control of their own destiny. In the end, it's not going to be about what the coalition forces do. It's going to be about what Afghans do. So he really is -- he's making a decision that shows this sense of urgency, that shows the resolve right now, commits more treasure and blood, quite frankly, to this critical undertaking, and at the same time says we're not going to be there forever. You're going to have to stand up. And I any the Karzai government and his armed forces are going to have to do that.
Charlie Rose:
But it flows from the fact that we think this is in our national security because of the threat in Pakistan you just mentioned. And we have no other place to go except Karzai. If he lets us down, it's over.
Mike Mullen:
Vital national interests. I believe that. And back to al-Qaeda, who lives there and that they're still plotting against us. They would re-do what they did. They'd kill more Americans if they had a chance. And they're plotting to do just that. So that is the vital national interest. This is the area from which the original attack occurred. But clearly, we are very much tied to what president Karzai does. And he knows that. We've told him that. And in this partnership, I think it's possible.
Charlie Rose:
There is this also: The argument was made between counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. What I don't understand is why counterterrorism is not always part of the strategy.
Mike Mullen:
It is. Counterterrorism --
Charlie Rose:
Why did we see this sort of division in the press about its either counterinsurgency as recommended by General McChrystal or counterterrorism as recommended by Vice President Biden? Was that a false choice always?
Mike Mullen:
You can have a counterterrorism approach.
Charlie Rose:
Alone.
Mike Mullen:
Just purely counterterrorism.
Charlie Rose:
Right.
Mike Mullen:
Purely go hunt down the terrorists specifically. And we do that with high-end special forces. You can't have --
Charlie Rose:
But you're always going to do that, aren't you?
Mike Mullen:
You can't -- well, you can't have a counterinsurgency -- you can't have a counterinsurgency approach without some level of counterterrorism, which is what we have. So it was the kind -- I think the debate -- and actually, I give credit to the vice president and to the president and others. I mean, one of the things that really happened in this debate and deliberation was everybody sharpened their pencils. Everybody got a lot smarter. And I mean everybody, not just me or General McChrystal or anybody else, in totality so that when the president finally made this decision, everybody was very clear-eyed on what he was deciding, what the guidance was and that counterterrorism is a part of this strategy specifically. We couldn't -- I believe we couldn't make -- we couldn't turn this insurgency around with a counterterrorism approach alone.
Charlie Rose:
Which is what General McChrystal said when he was in London.
Mike Mullen:
Right.
Charlie Rose:
It will not work, he said.
Mike Mullen:
Right, right.
Charlie Rose:
And got in trouble.
Mike Mullen:
Right. Well, we try to keep -- the whole point there is that -- we'd like that debate to be an internal --
Charlie Rose:
[unintelligible] within the internal [unintelligible]
Mike Mullen:
That's true.
Charlie Rose:
Within the military, within the military, was there a diversity of opinion about this?
Mike Mullen:
Yeah, I mean, there was some. It wasn't --
Charlie Rose:
[unintelligible]
Mike Mullen:
Well, I mean, it wasn't wide. The same process that we had at the very senior level, I had with the chiefs and our staffs, to really wring this out as well. And the chiefs were very much supportive of a counterinsurgency strategy. They're supportive of the focus. They're very -- probably the area that is of biggest concern to them is the one we've already talked about which is we've got to have a partner in this. We can't just keep sending troops if we don't have the support that we need from the Karzai government, in terms of developing the forces, but also the corruption piece. And you've got to start delivering from your people. So we certainly had a very healthy debate about that.
Charlie Rose:
What's the expectation, even though it's not nation building, there is a kind of, quote, civilian surge as well.
Mike Mullen:
Yeah.
Charlie Rose:
What's that and why isn't it nation building?
Mike Mullen:
You know, the best example I can give you of that is I was in Helmand right after the marines went in. And I met one of our civilians from the State Department who went in behind the marines the next day. And so it's that -- and was already having a huge impact, as I have seen both in Iraq and in Afghanistan. And the multiplier that these civilians from USAID and --
Charlie Rose:
Right, right.
Mike Mullen:
It's just huge. You know, the one individual who knows what they're doing can make such a difference, so this is a civilian and a military surge, and Secretary Clinton, Deputy Secretary Jack Lieu [spelled phonetically], Richard Holbrooke, have worked very hard to generate this surge, and it's gone from some 300 to almost 1,000 here in the very near future, and that will make a huge difference. So this is a civil military campaign, if you will, and it's that way, not just with us, but also our international partners.
Charlie Rose:
Again, what happens if come 2011 and you're not sure, you don't believe that the Afghans are up to the task?
Mike Mullen:
We're going to have to -- we'll have this assessment about a year from now, and that will certainly lead what happens in mid-2011, but my belief --
Charlie Rose:
In the end mid-2011 is not sacrosanct. It's almost a benchmark. It's not a sacrosanct date because if and -- you're going to make a decision.
Mike Mullen:
It's a very specific -- it's back to, we will have the Marines in Helmand, specifically, for three summers, if you will, we will have the additional forces there, and we'll know whether this is going to succeed or not, and then I think we will adjust accordingly. But there's absolutely no question right now that the direction from the president is to start thinning our forces and turning it over, transferring responsibility, not a number, not a geographic location, starting in July of 2011, and we think we can do that. We will be able to do that more easily in some areas than others. But it's not a large -- necessarily a large turnover. And there's no withdrawal date. We haven't set the right-hand side of this in any way, shape, or form. It's just the beginning of a transition.
Charlie Rose:
Is this about defeating al-Qaeda?
Mike Mullen:
It is about defeating al-Qaeda. It is to deny them and defeat them -- deny them, degrade them, defeat them.
Charlie Rose:
Those are the terms that were used, those were the words that were used.
Mike Mullen:
Right, right.
Charlie Rose:
Dismantle, deny, defeat.
Mike Mullen:
Right.
Charlie Rose:
But the point some people make is that they'll just move somewhere else.
Mike Mullen:
Well --
Charlie Rose:
This is a global phenomenon.
Mike Mullen:
It is a global phenomenon.
Charlie Rose:
So you stop them in Afghanistan and you stop them in Pakistan, they'll go somewhere else.
Mike Mullen:
I think --
Charlie Rose:
[inaudible] rogue's -- some other failed state.
Mike Mullen:
Them in Pakistan and Afghanistan, particularly Pakistan, that is the heart of al-Qaeda, that's where bin Laden is, that's where Zawahiri is, it's where Mullah Omar is, who interestingly enough -- I didn't understand this till a few months ago -- is the head of the caliphate that they all see. And that just speaks to the linkage between the two. But that is the heart of al-Qaeda there. Now, there have been a lot of their leaders that have been killed. They're diminished from where they were. I am increasingly concerned about a safe haven growing in Yemen, a safe haven growing in Somalia, but it is not the same as the group that is in Pakistan right now. And to do this, we need to, one, cut off the head which resides there, but, two, that's not going to make it go away either. We've learned in fighting these networks, you have to destroy the whole network, the top, the middle, and the bottom. And that's going to take some time.
Charlie Rose:
But they're around the world.
Mike Mullen:
Well, I understand that. And --
Charlie Rose:
They're in Indonesia and they're in a whole lot of other places.
Mike Mullen:
And it -- well, but and I think in the end it's in ways a global counterinsurgency approach, and by that I mean that in the end I think the Muslims have to throw these guys out, and in fact we have to rest on our values and our approach and to continue to focus on our relationship with the Muslim world, it's a great religion, it's a great people, and the few people who defile that religion are eventually going to have to be thrown out by the Muslims. And there's a kinetic piece of that now, but in the long run, it's going to have to be the Muslims themselves that turn these people out so that the Jihad ends. And that's going to be a long time.
Charlie Rose:
How do they feel about us now?
Mike Mullen:
How does who feel about us?
Charlie Rose:
Those -- the Islamic community.
Mike Mullen:
Well, I'll talk specifically about Afghanistan, I mean the Afghan people specifically, they're tired of war, they want this to go the right way, but they also have been under the Taliban before, they don't see General McChrystal in his tours around Afghanistan, my engagement -- they don't see us as occupiers, but they are tired of it. And so they don't -- they are supportive of the relationship, I mean we get along well with them. We've learned about their culture, we're listening to them more, we're trying to see the problems through their eyes and understand it. So I think it’s getting better, but it’s going to take some time in that regard. The relationships that we’re building there and in Pakistan need to be long-lasting. And with the lack of trust, because we’ve abandoned them before, it’s going to take a while to patch those back up.
Charlie Rose:
You’re the military advisor to the president; you’re the president’s military guy. Bob Gates runs the Pentagon. What came out of this?
Mike Mullen:
I think, I believed that there was this nexus there, but in the intensity of the debate and the review and just the number of meetings, it just really solidified that, this nexus of terrorism there. I talked about this one, a minister from another country, from India who said this is the nexus in the war. I mean, it reaffirmed that piece--for me--I became much more convinced concerning the lethality of the front. I knew it was there, there was no question about that; I know they’re plotting, but when you review this, you look at the intel from a lot of different directions and that they are very much the threat that I described. I also learned about, continue to learn about Afghanistan and Pakistan. I mean you mentioned the number of trips I’ve been to Pakistan, it’s about a dozen times and every time I go, I learn a lot more. I also learn how much I don’t know. So the focus study, the questions the president asks, the tough questions about why we were there, what we were trying to accomplish, out of which came a very clear, focused strategy with very clear objectives for all of us, was enormously helpful in terms of getting to the point, whatever his decision was, clearly gives me the guidance to march on and carry out his orders.
Charlie Rose:
The impression of this review was the president did not know going into this, as to where he would come out at the other end. He had so many questions that were unanswered for him as to what the strategy ought to be, that he felt like he had to have this kind of hard, tough questioning to understand what the possibilities were, what the risks were, and what could be done.
Mike Mullen:
Well he had other considerations, just—economically, specifically and beside the security situation in that part of the world, there’s no question about that. And what I admired about this whole process was the intensity with which he addressed all these, the totality of these issues and clearly focused on the national security implications, of the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan. And forced us all to really wring out where we were across a whole host of issues, so one of the highest risk areas is in development of this Afghan security force. So yeah, he didn’t just ask one question about that. He wanted a lot of answers about that. How are we going to raise--same type of questions you’re asking--how are we going to raise this force? What are the risks? What are we doing to make sure it can succeed? All those kinds of things; we all have a much better understanding. This is another part of the mission that’s been pretty badly under-resourced over the last several years. So, and it gives a very clear charge to me, to General Petraeus and particularly to General McChrystal, of what has to happen. So that’s been a very healthy part of this and as he pointed out last night, and I think it’s important to emphasize, this process didn’t delay the arrival of any forces in Afghanistan or Pakistan. And it was an incredible--and many of us feel, and certainly it’s not my lean in terms of the political side, I stay out of it, but this an enormous decision for the President, for our country, and for the people in that region of the world. And actually I think internationally as well.
Charlie Rose:
What difference has the 22,000 that went over at the beginning of his administration, have they made?
Mike Mullen:
The--I’ll talk specifically to the 10,000 Marines that we sent south.
Charlie Rose:
22,000 in all was it?
Mike Mullen:
It was--I’ll try to add that up in a little for you. But it was the 10,000 Marines that we sent that ended up in the south that had a huge impact in Helmand. But it’s not, there’s not enough of them yet to hold and to start to build, plus we need Afghan security forces with them; we’ve got some with them, but we need more. We took almost 5,000 -- and this was this training brigade, the fourth brigade of the 82nd airborne division, that was exclusively focused on training. And so that their main mission is training. And then there is -- there is another brigade that we sent to the vicinity of Kandahar. So the vast majority of the forces focused on the South. They've gotten there over the last several months and really started to have an impact. But it's not enough at this point to connect the dots, to have the ink spots grow from Kandahar province to Helmand province to cover those lines of communications where security is good on the roads or in the production centers. But it's started to have its effect, and it's had it in some places, locally, lay in a very positive way.
Charlie Rose:
How many troops do you think will come from NATO members?
Mike Mullen:
We think it's somewhere between 5 to 7,000. And it keeps -- that addition of troops keeps the ratio about the same. It's about two to one, US forces to NATO, where it's been. And sometimes we forget, I mean, NATO's almost doubled the number of forces that it's had in there over the last year. And it's not just NATO because there are non-- there are non-NATO contributing nations like Australia who have done exceptional work here as well. And we think it will be about five to 7,000 that they will offer up here shortly. They were waiting for the president's decision. I'm excited about the temperament in NATO right now, the positive approach here, the commitment on the part of the governments. And I have talked to an awful lot of my counterparts who are much more positive about this mission now than they were a year ago.
Charlie Rose:
What changed?
Mike Mullen:
I saw a demarcation point at the NATO summit in April. And I think that --
Charlie Rose:
Because they believe in this president, because they believe that what?
Mike Mullen:
Well, I think that it has been the outreach to Europe specifically that has occurred. I mean, it was a very clear demarcation. I have seen the governments respond. I've seen obviously the militaries respond under their governments. It has -- there have been things we've moved through NATO to approve like the establishment of this three-star headquarters out there that General Dave Rodriguez now commands, as a NATO or a coalition headquarters. And it went through NATO as rapidly as anything I have ever seen NATO approve. So all the indicators I see right now are positive.
Charlie Rose:
So what do you worry about?
Mike Mullen:
I worry -- more than anything else, I worry about the partnership with Karzai and his government. That, to me, is the highest risk area.
Charlie Rose:
It seems to me that the president, after this review, looked at this and said I have decided, as you suggested, that this is in America's national security interest because --
Mike Mullen:
Absolutely.
Charlie Rose:
-- it has become the epicenter of terrorism.
Mike Mullen:
Right. he has certainly taken -- made a decision to take the risk to commit this. And this is not a politically popular decision. I think that's, certainly, he's been clear about that. But it is in the national security interests of the country to protect the American people. In that regard, I think it's a courageous decision.
Charlie Rose:
Thank you for coming.
Mike Mullen:
Charlie, it's good to be with you.
Charlie Rose:
Chairman of the joint chiefs, Admiral Mike Mullen. Thank you for joining us. See you next time.