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NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan: Building a Sustainable, Legitimate, Effective Afghanistan Security Force: A Holistic Perspective

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Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to provide our observations and preliminary thoughts concerning the way ahead for NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) based on our work as part of the Quick-Look Assessment team from 3-19 December 2009. We both had the pleasure to work closely with members of the command whose professionalism and enthusiasm were deeply inspiring. The command confronts great challenges as it pursues a mission vital to coalition success. We are qualified optimists about the potential success of the mission. The most important source of our optimism for eventual mission success comes from our observations of the tremendous talent and dedication of the individuals assigned to this command. We were also heartened by our interaction with individuals from other commands and with many impressive Afghan partners.

COL Jebb primarily worked with the Afghan National Army (ANA) Development office while COL Lacquement primarily worked with the CJ5. Both offices are comprised of selfless, dedicated, and smart professionals. Of particular note, COL Jebb had the terrific experience to interact with senior advisors to the Ministers/General Staff (COLs Mike Barbee, Jim Campbell, Fred Manzo, Tom Donovan, and Kevin Cotten, as well as the senior advisor for ANA development, COL David Henley); COL Lacquement benefitted immensely from the support and collaboration of many CJ5 officers, particularly, COL Don Bigger, COL E.G. Clayburn, LtCol Steve Tilbrook and LTC Norm Fuss and from JAG, COL Tom Umberg.

While here, we both sought to understand the needs of NTM-A/CSTC-A on behalf of our home institutions, the U.S. Military Academy and U.S. Army War College (USMA and USAWC), so that we can best match faculty skill sets, interest, and availability to provide future support if requested. At the very least, this experience will facilitate reach-back efforts for the future. We were able to learn a great deal due to the open command climate and everyone's generosity with his/her thoughts and time. Finally, we offer our sincere gratitude to LTG Caldwell, Dr. Kem, and CAPT Mark Hagerott for enabling this fascinating experience and to MAJ Jon Klug for coordinating the visit and support.

Although we provided input to teams working on specific quick-look tasks, this trip report reflects a more holistic perspective of NTM-A/CSTC-A drawing on input from many people across several organizations. This report begins with an overview and a brief summary of key issues. Subsequent sections address the political, economic, and social landscape; corruption; ANA recruitment, training, retention, employment; ministerial development; NTM-A/CSTC-A organization; and critical uncertainties that may drive success or failure. We describe a way ahead for future collaborative work with NTM-A/CSTC-A. We also provide a list of interviewees and a brief summary of selected trips and meetings.

Overview

Interestingly, this trip began on the same day that President Obama gave his speech at West Point. In that speech, he called Afghanistan and Pakistan “the epicenter of the violent extremism practiced by Al Qaeda.” He stated the following overarching goal: “to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.” To meet this goal, the President stated the following objectives: “deny Al Qaeda safe haven...reverse the Taliban’s momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government...*strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and government so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan’s future.*” [emphasis added]

NTM-A/CSTC-A’s mission statement is: “...*in coordination with key stakeholders, generates the [Afghan National Security Forces] ANSF, develops capable ministerial systems and institutions; and resources the fielded force to build sustainable capacity and capability in order to enhance the GIRoA’s ability to achieve stability and security in Afghanistan.*” (October 2009)

NTM-A/CSTC-A’s challenges are immense. First and foremost is the challenge of growing a sustainable, legitimate, and effective force in a short time period (increase ANA to 134,000 and the Afghan National Police (ANP) to 96,800 personnel by Oct 2010). The requirements of the ongoing war create tremendous pressure to grow the ANSF and get new units into the fight as quickly as possible. This immediate pressure often creates tension with the long-term strategic goal of building an ANSF that can lead the fight effectively with minimal reliance on external support. Quality and quantity need not be in competition but often are. Second, NTM-A/CSTC-A must assist Afghanistan to stand up these security forces so that they are linked to the central government and valued by the local population throughout the country. Afghanistan is the epitome of the phrase, ‘all politics are local,’ and the country has never been controlled entirely from the center. Third, the country is extremely diverse across several dimensions: geographic, ethnic, tribal, religious, political, economic, and cultural. Hence, a cookie-cutter approach is not appropriate. Instead, each locale requires a depth of focused understanding to best address its specific issues and its connectivity to the central government. Fourth, the country has been in the throes of at least some kind of war since 1978. This has wreaked havoc on the people in all ways imaginable, devastated the social fabric of Afghan society, and caused an estimated \$250 billion in damage to infrastructure (according to the IMF and World Bank). Fifth, NTM-A/CSTC-A has just emerged from CSTC-A. The organization has restructured and reorganized with new leadership in a very short time. The organizational change has been all the more challenging in light of the concurrent, manifest increase in the organization’s mission.

NTM-A/CTSC-A must also be viewed in the larger context as Afghanistan moves forward. Building Afghan capacity for security must accompany efforts towards good governance and job creation. There is a possible opportunity that growing the ANA and ANP will bring added energy to developing good governance and economic growth.

As such, below are our most prominent observations framed as key themes for the command as it addresses its expanded and profoundly important charter:

Key Themes (These themes are addressed in more detail in the sections that follow.)

Enable Transition. Mindful of the immediate operational requirement to provide security to the Afghan population, NTM-A/CSTC-A's efforts must nevertheless focus on the eventual transition to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) of responsibility to effectively provide for its own security as a responsible member of the international community.

Seek Local Solutions. A pervasive theme when approaching the challenges of Afghanistan, whether they be economic, political, security, and/or societal in nature, is that the dynamics at the local level are different from place-to-place. No one group -- religious or ethnic-- ought to be considered monolithic in nature. Moreover, local issues need to be addressed locally.

Be Patient. Change will not occur overnight. The main elements for success will be persistence, tenacity, and small incremental change. The Afghans must lead with NTM-A/CSTC-A assistance. Genuine change will only occur if Afghans own the problem and work to fix it across many areas. This leads to an uncomfortable space that coalition members often rush to fill. And herein lays an important tension between the desire to see continued and rapid progress and the need to let Afghans develop and lead a pace they can sustain.

Reassess progress and desired outcomes. While understanding the emphasis on developing measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs), which are essential, it is important to frequently re-assess them with respect to the desired outcome. The situation and conditions will continually change, and therefore requires periodic re-examination of progress towards desired ends.

Collaboratively develop metrics. Given the complex requirements of the mission and the many actors engaged in accomplishing it, collaboration is essential. To gauge progress usefully, metrics must be developed with the Afghans and other coalition partners.

Counter Corruption. A great risk for Afghanistan, the region, and the world is the perpetuation of corrupt governance that the Afghan people view as illegitimate. This risk may be further exacerbated as we build a strong ANA and ANP that may potentially extend the reach of corrupt governance and, hence, fuel the insurgency. Corruption is an important issue that cuts across efforts to support effective ANSF development and employment.

Develop ANSF holistically. ANA development cannot be assessed without understanding ANP development and vice versa. Moreover, there is some tension between these two institutions. The

ANA and ANP must coordinate across recruitment, retention, training, and employment so that rather than competing for resources and missions they complement and support one another.

Balance quality and quantity. Leaders must balance quality and quantity regarding ANA and ANP development. Fundamental questions include: What is the right mix of specialties in the planned growth of the ANA? What specialties or enables will be provided by coalition partners and for how long?

Develop leaders at all levels. The professionalization of the ANA and ANP is crucial to success. Developing good leaders at all levels must be a priority. Leader development will assist with many of the challenges outlined in this report, but is particularly important to developing capacity for the eventual transfer of responsibilities.

Integrate strategic communications across all activities. The center of gravity of this war is the Afghan people. As one GO mentioned, the Afghan people need to perceive the Afghan government and the ANA as the winning team vis a vis any alternative. Information operations are significant aspects of our efforts.

Broaden civilian advisory efforts. Ministerial advisors to Afghan civilian leaders should be coalition civilians of similar experience (e.g., from a comparable coalition department or ministry). Currently, military officers primarily serve as advisors to civilian ministers. Also, there is a process in place to develop the Office of National Security Council (ONSC), which is responsible for developing security policy and strategy, which needs to be more widely understood. The ONSC could be a good forcing mechanism to ensure that ministers coordinate on important issues.

Re-evaluate NTM-A/CSTC-A Organization. Given the multi-faceted mission of the NTM-A, it is imperative that it is organized to accomplish its mission. Good evaluation of organizational proposals must follow the new ANA and ANP sub-commands' mission analysis. Critical to mission accomplishment is facilitating the integration of its key functions: ANA, ANP, and ministerial development and training. Moreover the organization must allow for flexibility and facilitate communications vertically and across the organization, as well as with the ANA, ANP, ISAF, IJC, MOD, and MOI.

Political, Social and Economic Landscape

Afghanistan's political landscape is extremely diverse with informal and formal organizations and leaders. It varies from place-to-place, even within provinces, districts, and municipalities. Some of the key characteristics include the following: power resides in the rural areas; it has never had a central government that was meaningful outside the cities; there has never been a robust middle class; and the population is mainly illiterate (~80%). Currently, there is a lack of trust among different segments of the population; between the population and the governing elites; and between elites themselves.

With the Soviet invasion, followed by Taliban rule with Pakistani support, the fall of the Taliban, and then the reemergence of the Taliban in the wake of government corruption and anarchy, the

population has learned to shift alliances to the perceived “winning side.” Furthermore, years of war and conflict have hardened social divisions across regions, ethnicities, tribes, etc.

Several people we spoke with highlighted the independence and capability of individual Afghans. Afghans exhibit a tremendous capacity and creativity for taking care of themselves. Such an astute ‘survivor mentality’ may well flow from the incredible violence and societal disruption of the past three decades; however, there is also much historical evidence to point to local pride and adaptability of a society planted in an often hostile and unforgiving natural environment at the crossroads of many powerful neighbors.

There have been efforts to connect the central government with the sub-national governmental levels and informal leaders at the community level. The shuras or community councils serve as mechanisms to bridge the formal governing structures with the tribal and informal leadership structures. These councils help with conflict resolution, deciding on developmental projects, and with settling other local matters.

Unfortunately, in many instances self interests among elites trump national interests, thereby greatly slowing progress and contributing to corruption. It is unclear if there is a pervasive Afghan identity across regions and groups, though there has been some progress. The opening of the press, TV stations in all provinces, and slight indications of civil society may serve to facilitate a continued, though uneven, path towards a stable, legitimate, and prosperous state.

While there has been some economic progress in Afghanistan, it still is one of the poorest states in the world. According to a UK government report, the economy is characterized primarily by subsistence agriculture, corruption, and drugs. Economic development support is directed towards agriculture in rural areas, transit lines, and access to global markets. The report makes particular note of Helmand’s potential as a major agricultural center.

A pervasive theme when approaching the challenges of Afghanistan, whether they be economic, political, security, and/or societal in nature, is that the dynamics at the local level are different from place-to-place. No one group -- religious or ethnic-- ought to be considered monolithic in nature. Moreover, local issues need to be addressed locally.

Corruption

Corruption undermines effectiveness and legitimacy of Afghan institutions. How do we understand corruption in the Afghan context? A human terrain team report suggests that there is a spectrum from grand to petty corruption. Grand corruption is defined as taking bribes with greed as the motivation as opposed to feeding a family. It is interesting to note that the development of bureaucracy, including rule of law structures, tend to foster corruption. The low wages of public servants, to include prosecutors, tends to facilitate corruption. The formal rule of law structures designed to keep corruption in check have embedded disincentives: it is costly, takes a great deal of time, and some judges are corrupt. Unfortunately, the Taliban apparently often offer quick, cost-free and impartial justice.

The basis of law includes both the constitution and Islamic (or Sharia) law. The constitution states that no law should contradict Islamic law. The issue is that the law can be interpreted differently. **The keys to rooting out corruption are: make rules as clear as possible; provide ethics training to judges and lawyers as a method of professionalization; and institute proper salary levels. Throughout the government, when possible, discipline individuals. Most of all, efforts should focus on reinforcing or developing good, honest leadership at the top. The key to truly moving forward is good leadership.**

USAID is working a project to link traditional justice systems with the government. The local shuras decide most of the civil disputes and perhaps minor crimes. Most crimes are settled by money or land. **The goal is restoring tranquility versus attaining justice. Note that there are limited prisons at the very local level. It is unclear how the policing efforts partner with the Minister of Justice to link policing with detention and the courts system.**

The CJ5 and JAG superbly led a week-long session with the aim of producing an overarching anti-corruption (AC) strategy. The first two meetings established the framing and scope of the problem. Dr. Kem, the Deputy to the CG of NTM-A/CSTC-A, framed the session by referring to Sarah Chayes's book, *The Punishment of Virtue* that discusses the promotion of virtues and the punishment of vice. Dr. Kem charged the group to develop structures and systems that both punishes bad behavior but also reinforces good behavior. The discussion led to the recognition that the group must develop measures of performance and effectiveness; we discussed such MOEs as the people's confidence in the government and the decline of shadow governments. There was much lively discussion concerning the definition of corruption that should include the Afghan perspective.

The scope of the project is limited to NTM-A/CSTC-A, meaning focus must be on the ANA, ANP, and ministerial development (MOD and MOI). Subsequently, the group is concerned on three levels: echelons above corps, corps and below, and ministerial. The group then identified current AC plans/strategies that NTM-A/CSTC-A must either nest with or complement. There were a lot of questions concerning the degree of AC planning/plans at the ministerial levels. An Afghan colonel from the MOD shared that the ministries were holding working groups to establish such plans/policies. The group then identified current known capacities that both reinforce good behavior and punish bad behavior.

As with each effort designed to bolster confidence and legitimacy in the government, it is important to deliver the message of transparency, effectiveness, and rule of law.

Finally, a great risk for Afghanistan, the region, and the world is the perpetuation of corrupt governance that the Afghan people view as illegitimate. This risk may be further exacerbated as we facilitate the building of a strong ANA and ANP that potentially extend the reach of corrupt governance and, hence, fuels the insurgency. That said, ministerial and GS development must be a focal point for the command, and an area that requires similar emphasis at higher levels

ANA/ANP Recruitment, Training, Retention, and Employment

COL Jebb's focus was on ANA development, but it was clear that **ANA development could not be assessed without understanding ANP development.** There are indications of some tension between these two institutions. First, the ANA received priority attention in terms of resources and focus. The ANP development is not as mature as the ANA development. Second, the ANP has been fighting insurgents, yet they are not well prepared for this type of mission--and they have suffered dearly as a result. Many people believe that the police are more corrupt than the army. However, it is important to realize that the police have more contact with people, have much more oversight, are transparent, and have had substantially less training than the army. It may be the case that police corruption is easier to detect. The ANA and ANP must coordinate across recruitment, retention, training, and employment so that rather than competing for resources and missions they complement and support one another. For example, many suggested that the ANA's mission should be 'clear and hold,' while the ANP's mission should be 'hold, build, and sustain.' **Most importantly, the ANA and ANP should not undermine each other's recruiting efforts.**

The cycles of recruitment, training, retention, and employment are interrelated and must be viewed in an integrated manner. The resources required by NTM-A/CSTC-A are listed in the paper assembled by the assessment/staff team. **We only add that if in fact NTM-A/CSTC-A is the main effort, then it is puzzling why resources have not been forthcoming, especially in the form of authorizations for personnel.** Moreover, it is important that NTM-A/CSTC-A personnel receive the right training before serving as advisors and trainers themselves. For the discussion below, we view MOPs as a process (task) that is observable and MOEs as an expression of the end state (purpose). Additionally, MOEs and MOPs must be coordinated with the Afghans especially if they are truly going to own the system.

The center of gravity of this war is the Afghan people. As one GO mentioned, the Afghan people need to perceive the Afghan government and the ANA as the winning team. **Information operations are a significant part of coalition efforts and a major interactive dynamic with our adversaries as we compete for the local population. As such, we must be attentive to the ANA's recruiting message and consider how it compares to the Taliban's recruiting message.** The country is very diverse across many dimensions: geographic, ethnic, tribal, religious, political, economic, and cultural. Subsequently, a cookie-cutter approach is not appropriate; instead, each locale requires depth of understanding to best understand recruiting incentives and messaging. Recruiting requires actively pursuing an ethnically balanced force. One Afghan Colonel suggested that the overriding factor that attracts recruits is the salary.

MOP: engagement with the media; crafting recruiting messages appropriate for each locale; holding "town hall" meetings; meetings with Afghan formal and informal leaders to determine right message and delivery; meetings between MOD and MOI to coordinate recruiting messages that complement one another.

MOE: recruitment numbers increase; ethnically diverse recruits; provincially balanced recruitment.

One paper suggests that soldiers must not only be trained, they must also be confident. In other words, they need to be able to count on enablers (combat multipliers), such as medical, fire support, intelligence, etc. They must also have confidence in their leaders. **As such, what is the right mix of specialties in the planned growth of the ANA? If it is not feasible for the Afghans to produce an effective mix of specialties, then who should provide those enablers?**

MOP: consistent and predictable salaries (equal to or greater than what the Taliban pay with better benefits); education opportunities; a mix of combat power and combat multipliers; units must train together so that soldiers and leaders train together.

MOE: attrition and desertion numbers decrease; reenlistments increase.

Training must be linked to how the Army will be employed. COIN training is different substantially from conventional warfare training. Moreover, with the importance of information operations (IO), **IO ought to be a significant portion for at least leader training. In fact, perhaps all platoon leaders ought to carry cell phones in order to contact media so that the ANA story can over-shadow the Taliban story as events unfold.** One of the Corps Commanders stated that he was very happy with the ANA's progress, commanding for 4 years; sees reconstruction, roads, people providing intelligence, schools, close coordination with coalition; came to visit minister to ensure money for barracks; training not bad, but provides training for newly assigned personnel (convoy security, night training, MDMP). **It is interesting to note that the Marines have taken on the training initiative and want to train both the police and army next year. It will be important that good coordination occurs with NTM-A/CSTC-A if they move forward.**

MOP: numbers of trainees; trained leaders who understand how to conduct IO

MOE: commanders satisfied with level of training of soldiers they receive; ANA successfully clears and holds areas; Afghan population holds the ANA in high regard; Afghan people provide intelligence.

Ministerial Development

There is a process in place to develop the Office of National Security Council (ONSC), which is responsible for developing security policy and strategy. The ONSC could be a good forcing mechanism to ensure that ministers coordinate and dialogue on key issues. The interaction among ministers is mixed, and it appears that some ministers rely on their senior advisors to serve as messengers across ministries. **It is interesting to note that primarily army officers serve as advisors to the ministers, instead of coalition civilians of similar experience (e.g., from a comparable coalition department or ministry). This arrangement does not support a western model of proper civilian-military relations.** To give one example of a possible fix, civilian officials from the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense should advise Afghan counterparts in the Ministry of Defense. **That said, we were struck by the magnificent caliber of senior advisors: smart, selfless, dedicated, culturally savvy, and personally engaging.**

Senior advisors maintain situational awareness to understand key issues affecting two principal missions; Ministerial Development and Growth and Acceleration. They develop and implement measures, such as meetings among concerned actors, to resolve or at least mitigate issues. In addition to the normal tasks of comprehending organizational structure, policy, strategy, etc senior advisors invest an inordinate amount of time in understanding interpersonal relationships within the ANA/ANP/ministries and developing personal relationships with key actors so that they can effectively work issues.

In fact, the ministers/GS rely on the advisors for myriad issues. In one case, for writing an op-ed, the advisor worked hard to ensure that the minister understood the various audiences, the potential fall-out, and other sensitivities. The advisors work hard to gain decisions and help the minister/GS implement existing processes. To ensure that the ANA's presence is felt positively at the local and unit level, the advisor encourages and facilitates the ministers/GS to travel and meet with units and be seen at the local level.

MOP: Number of meetings between ANA senior advisors and MOD; number of meetings between MOD and local leaders; number of meetings between MOD and senior military leaders.

MOE: Healthy civilian-military relations (civilian control of the military at the central level); Afghans see value of ANA.

Organization of NTM-A/ CSTC-A

As part of the operational design and planning process, the command should carefully analyze potential organizational arrangements that better support the command's mission and increased responsibilities.

NTM-A/CSTC-A must be organized to accomplish its mission. The TRAC officers (who are also part of the external assessment team) have done good work in this area already. Key to mission accomplishment is the integration of ANA and ANP development functions. Moreover the organization must allow for flexibility. We suggest three organizational considerations as the command revises its plans: First, perhaps there should be a second Deputy Commander who integrates mission issues. The Deputy would allow the CG to spend most of his time on key engagements. This is different from a Chief of Staff who can coordinate the CG's internal staff. Rather, this suggestion envisions an office that integrates mission efforts. Second, that the staff conduct an analysis to determine if there are key staff functions that ought to be embedded within ANP/ANA commands. For example, some staff members suggested that CJ1 personnel should be embedded as separate staffs within the ANA and ANP commands. In this way, the GOs responsible for those missions would have a dedicated staff for key functions, and those staff members will have more stream-lined and focused taskings. However, embedded staff members are also responsive to CJ1 and therefore, when necessary due to mission surges or leaves, CJ1 can realign resources. We recommend that the staff conduct an analysis to validate which key staff functions ought to be embedded if any. Third, the organization ought to facilitate communication internally and externally. It is striking that good initiatives are happening but are

not widely known across the command. Perhaps in the integration cell, whether it occurs with the Deputy or another office, such efforts can be better communicated outwardly.

Critical Uncertainties that May Drive Success or Failure:

- The Afghan population's assessment of their government's legitimacy.
- The ability or willingness of Pakistan to secure its side of the border.
- The continued withdrawal of US forces from Iraq.
- The political will of the international community/coalition.
- Afghan Parliamentary/District elections in 2010.
- The ability to develop effective leaders for both the ANA and ANP as both forces expand.
- The ability to expand enablers, if not this year, in the near term.
- The education of the Afghan people, to include women.

Way Ahead for Future Collaborative Work

The Department of Social Sciences has the political science and economics faculty; the Combating Terrorism Center, the Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis, and the Conflict in Human Security Studies Program. While here, COL Jebb was able to reach-back to the Department of Social Sciences and Department of Law as well as the Human Terrain System run by TRADOC.

The U.S. Army War College has an extensive teaching faculty for courses on national security and strategy, military operations, and strategic leadership. It also has the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), and the Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL). Furthermore, experienced USAWC military and civilian graduate students may be able to conduct research and analysis to support command items of interest.

Both institutions have the potential to support faculty deployment by matching the needs of NTM-A/CSTC-A with faculty skill-sets, availability, and interest.

Interviewees

Minister of Defense Wardak

First Deputy MOD Akram

Dr. Jack Kem, Deputy to the CG

Afghan Corps Cdr

MG Michael Ward, Deputy Commander ANP Development (briefly while on trip)

BG(P) David Hogg: Deputy Commander ANA Development
BG Anne McDonald: ACG Police Dev
BG Ibrahim, Deputy Commander of ANAREC
BG Michael Linnington: IJC (briefly at airport)
BG Paul Wynnyk, ACG ANA Development
Dr. David Kilcullen, Crumpton Group
Dr. Terrence Kelly, RAND
Mr. Christopher Rich, Interagency Provincial Affairs
Mr. Alexander Newton, USAID, Rule of Law
Mr. Amin Shafiee, GMIC
Mr. Fahim Malyar, GMIC
Mr. Mike Watson, ONSC advisor, MPRI
Mr. Sediq Sediqqi, GMIC
Mr. Tim Strabbing, OSD
Mr. Tom Niblock, Dept of State, GMIC
Ms. Cara Negrette, OSD(P) Afghanistan Desk
Ms. Jill Kelley, USAID
Ms. Kathleen, McGinnis, Crumpton Group
Ms. Melanie Anderton, US Embassy, Civ-Mil plans and assessment
Ms. Olga Oliker, RAND
Ms. Roberta Rossi, GMIC
Ms. Sarah Chayes, ISAF Special Assistant, Anti-Corruption TF
CAPT Mark Hagerott, Dir of SAG
COL Aman, Afghan XO for LTG Caldwell
COL Chris Kolenda, ISAF Strategy
COL Don Bigger, CJ5 (UK)
COL E. G. Clayburn, Deputy CJ5
COL Fred Manzo, Senior Advisor to Deputy MOD
COL David Henley, Deputy for ANA Development
COL Jim Campbell, Senior Advisor for G3
COL John King, Senior Advisor for Deputy MOI
COL John McKenzie, ISAF Deputy CJ5, Australia
COL Kevin Palgutt
COL Kim Field, IDLG
COL Lou Jordan, Senior Advisor for Deputy MOI for Counter-Narcotics
COL Mark Edmonds, TT
COL Mike Barbee, Senior Advisor for MoD
COL Neal Rappaport, TT (USAFA)
COL Pam Hoyt, CJ7
COL Rich Gross, ISAF Legal Advisor
COL Robert Hume, ISAF Director Afghan Assessments Group
COL Steve Stebbins, CJ7
COL Terrence O'Sullivan, CJ2
COL Todd Gesling, TT (TRAC, Ft Leavenworth)
COL Tom Umberg, JAG
CDR Gaghan, ANA recruiting

Wing Cdr Andy Trolen, UK Deputy CJ1
LTC Bill Harmon, SAG
LTC Dave Dinger, TRAC
LTC Jon Liba, XO for BG McDonald
LTC Mike Holmes, CJ5, Strategic Communications
LTC Norm Fuss, CJ5
LTC Steve Tilbrook, Deputy CJ5, Australia
LTC Tom Tracy, advisor to GSG1
MAJ Bob Hannah, TRAC
MAJ Jennifer Munro, US Embassy, Civ-Mil plans and assessments
MAJ Jon Klug, XO of SAG
MAJ Sam Sok, CJ7
MAJ Shon McCormick, SAG
CPT Jack Morrow, TF-435
CPT Melissa La Plante, NTM-A/CSTC-A
Capt Staci Reidinger, U.S. Marine, PAO, GMIC
1LT Graf, asst CJ1
CSM Hoopii, Marine at Helmand
MSG Gross, ANA recruiting
SFC Mendelson, ANA recruiting
Various individuals at Camp Leatherneck

Summary of Selected Trips and Meetings

Meetings at US Embassy, 9 & 14 Dec 09: We had several useful engagements with personnel at the US Embassy, to include discussions with representatives from Interagency Provincial Affairs, Civil-Military Plans and Assessment, and USAID. There is strong evidence of increasing deployment and engagement of US government civilians in US efforts in Afghanistan (see also the summary of the CJTF-82 VTC). The ‘civilian uplift’ (formerly ‘surge’) continues to increase the overall number of US government civilians in Afghanistan. Distribution includes extensive coverage, along with other coalition partners, throughout the provinces of Afghanistan (particularly in provincial reconstruction teams) but also in unified action with coalition military units down to district level (often with company size military units).

Visit to MOD, 11 & 15 Dec 09: COL Fred Manzo provided a wonderful opportunity to meet with First Deputy Minister Akram. We had a conversation that lasted over three hours and over the course of an excellent lunch. He addressed the importance of developing security, good governance, and job opportunities simultaneously. It is critical to connect the central government with the provinces, districts, and villages. The key is to have good leaders and to solve local problems locally. He discussed in detail the history of Afghanistan’s woes after 1978, and discussed Pakistan’s significant influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan filled the power vacuum created when the Soviets left; Al Qaeda filled the vacuum when the Taliban fell; Afghanistan requires step by step pragmatism; ANA primarily operates outside cities; ethnic balance very important, especially among the leadership. His message to cadets...come to Afghanistan and when they leave Afghanistan will feel like a second home; hard to rotate units due to logistics issues. COL Mike Barbee provided a great opportunity to visit MOD and meet Minister Wardak.

Again, a gracious host who provided a wonderful lunch. Though the visit was shorter than the previous visit, we talked about family, aspirations, and requirements. He mentioned that the United States can improve its support by providing better equipment, enablers, and weapons.

Anti-Corruption OPT, 6-9 Dec 09: great session run by the CJ5 and JAG as discussed in a previous section. We attended several portions of the week-long discussion. We provided discussion and input to the development of the CSTC-A plan (draft currently circulating for comment prior to presentation to the CG).

Community Defense Initiative (CDI) Brief, 9 Dec 09: Great brief by Seth Jones and LTC Lechner. COL Jim Campbell was able to quickly coordinate their visit.

CJTF-82 Command Brief to LTG Caldwell, 10 Dec 09: Fascinating update from Regional Command-East (RC-E). MG Scaparotti and his staff provided an excellent overview of operations in their area. Of particular note were the very extensive integration of civilian and military efforts throughout the region. Starting at the top, Ms Dawn Liberi (USAID) as senior civilian noted the substantial cell (30 personnel) at CJTF level. This approach extends down through province level (PRTs) and to many of the districts. Militarily, CJTF-82 has developed combined action programs to partner coalition and Afghan military units throughout the battlespace.

Trip to Police graduation in Helmand, 10 Dec 09: A truly eye-opening experience! COL Jebb had the great opportunity, thanks to BG MacDonald and MG Ward, to visit Camp Leatherneck in Helmand. The Marines are inspiring and it is truly amazing to see how they have helped turn a corner in that province. The purpose of the visit was to attend the first graduation of 52 police trained by the Marines in conjunction with trainers from all over the world. Several VIPs attended to include two provincial governors, MG Ward, BG Borgio (IT Carabinieri), ANA generals, and the police chief. The visiting group was first received by the Marines (BG Nicholson welcomed us). We saw where the trainees lived, worked, and prayed. We then saw a video of the experience, which included a moving scene of the police taking an oath to serve the people of Afghanistan. We witnessed training demonstrations, many VIP speeches, and the graduates' receipt of their certificates. It is interesting to note that the Marines have taken on this initiative and want to train both police and army next year.

Trip to Afghan National Army Recruiting Command (ANAREC) 12 Dec 09: A tremendous opportunity! We drove about 30 minutes outside Camp Eggers and observed the difficult conditions in which Afghans live. We were met by BG Ibrahim, the Deputy CG for ANAREC. A very candid discussion ensued after an excellent breakfast was served. BG Ibrahim gave us a tour of the facilities. We observed all the recruits going through their in-processing. The American advisors and the Afghan leadership have an extraordinarily close bond and work very well together. Afterwards we observed a voluntary community support event at a school in the town outside the base. Marines were providing school supplies, candy and toys to the school children.

Dinner presentation by Dr. David Kilcullen, 13 Dec 09: Dr Kilcullen provided a sobering but pragmatic assessment of the challenges facing NTM-A/CSTC-A in developing effective security forces over the next 18 months (in accord with President Obama's guidance). He posited that the

timetable President Obama's articulated at West Point could suggest to the Taliban that they can wait the coalition out, and then return to claim control of the country. Conversely, Taliban withdrawal could open a window to establish local security that would thwart an attempted Taliban return. Key aspects of a plausible way forward rely on a significant overhaul of current ANSF development approaches. In particular, police forces should be significantly pruned to remove corrupt and/or ineffective individuals. The remaining effective police would then be the recipient of more focused advisory support, better training and better equipment.

Trip to GMIC, 13 & 14 Dec 09: A great initiative! Tom Niblock from Dept of State helped stand up the Afghan Government Information Center designed to facilitate an Afghan lead for media relations between the government and the independent press. This Center provides a channel between the Afghan government and the Afghan people. Note that the independent media has dramatically increased while the government communications remained weak. The center attempts to right this imbalance. The Center provides training at provincial and ministerial levels, though this occurs unevenly across ministries; some are embracing this activity, others are resisting it. The Center, with a young, smart Afghan staff is increasing the communications pipeline to include elders, mullahs, media, spokespeople, ministers, etc to get messages and news to the media. The good news is that the independent media now has reliable information provided by the government as opposed to only getting information from the adversary. The press corps is maturing, press conferences are becoming more routine and information is more accessible. In fact, during the elections, the GMIC received calls from people reporting activities at the polling station...a very good sign. The key to success is for the Afghans to own this activity, and for US/IC to back away, even when problems emerge. The Afghans must address the challenges themselves, while the US/IC offer assistance.

General Petraeus visit 16 Dec 09 (NTM-A/CSTC-A Command Brief and RAND interim report): We gained valuable perspective on the NTM-A/CSTC-A command concerns and priorities while attending the briefing to General Petraeus. Projected ANSF growth, personnel requirements for the command, strategic communications, transition issues, and the relationship among the commands in Afghanistan (among ISAF, IJC, NTM-A/CSTC-A and various Afghan headquarters) were important topics. RAND provided an interim brief to General Petraeus regarding ANA and ANP development based on observations during team member research throughout Afghanistan in recent weeks. RAND briefers were Dr Terrence Kelly and Ms Olga Olikier. The final RAND report should be available in February.

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The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

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