

Editor's Comments

Welcome to the 5th Volume of the Journal of Physical Security (JPS). This issue contains articles about vulnerabilities in balanced magnetic door switches, elections, and computers.

The paper by Sharon Meroni discusses an analysis of election security in Illinois. The findings are disturbing and relevant to elections elsewhere in the country. Election integrity is a homeland security issue, and we had better start taking it seriously. Suggestions for better election security are offered both in her paper, and in the viewpoint paper that follows. Speaking of election security, we in the Vulnerability Assessment Team at Argonne National Laboratory recently demonstrated another man-in-the-middle physical attack on a different electronic voting machine. See <http://www.ne.anl.gov/capabilities/vat/election-security>.

We don't usually publish papers in JPS about cyber security, but the final paper by undergraduate student Tyler Murphy does a nice job of emphasizing the importance of physical security in cyber security, and also points out the risks of social engineering.

As usual, the views expressed by the editor and authors in *the Journal of Physical Security* are their own and should not necessarily be ascribed to Argonne National Laboratory, the United States Department of Energy, or the authors' home institutions.

Research at Harvard, Duke , and the University of Toronto indicates that people are more honest in filling out forms if they are asked to sign an honesty pledge or acknowledge an ethics policy or responsibility at the top of the form, rather than the more traditional bottom of the form. See K Weisul, "One Blindingly Simple Way to Improve Honesty", <http://www.bnet.com/blog/business-research/one-blindingly-simple-way-to-improve-honesty/1641> and N Mazar, et al., "The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance", <http://duke.edu/~dandan/Papers/dishonestyOfHonest.pdf>.

People seem to need to be reminded up front of the importance of being honest. There are significant implications for security involving such things as loss prevention, security incident reports, background checks, and security clearances.

Charles Kurzman has written an interesting book entitled, *The Missing Martyrs: Why There Are So Few Muslim Terrorists* (Oxford University Press, 2011). Kurzman points out that approximately 150,000 people have been murdered in the United States since 9/11. Islamic terrorism has taken fewer than 3 dozen lives on U.S. soil in the same time period. Fewer than 200 Muslim Americans have been caught planning or engaging in terrorist acts, out of a U.S. population of 2.5 million

Jon Ronson's new book, *The Psychopath Test: A Journey Through the Madness Industry*, claims that Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of large corporations are 4 times more likely to be psychopaths than the general public, about 1% of whom are psychopaths. It's not clear what percentage of managers below the CEO level are psychopaths, but I'm betting on a much higher number. The percentage of sociopaths is presumably even larger.

A new research study, "The Destructive Nature of Power without Status", to be published in the *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* finds that supervisors and managers with power but low organizational status or respect may be the most likely to be bully or demean their subordinates. There are important implications for mitigating the insider threat and for security managers and supervisors. More on this study can be found at http://www.cnn.com/2011/09/24/us/california-power-status-study/index.html?hpt=hp_t2.

Some interesting quotes about homeland security...

[The TSA is] moving towards risk-based security.

-- Jim Fotenos, TSA spokesman

Comment: It's been a decade since 9/11 and we're only **moving towards** risk-based security!?!

Taking my tweezers away is not going to win the war on terrorism.

-- Airline passenger Ross Ratcliff

So far, DHS seems pretty efficient at detecting losers and wackos, then entrapping them into some kind of inane terrorist plot. It would probably be better if they concentrated on serious threats.

-- Anonymous

After 9/11 it was literally like my mother running out the door with the charge card. What we really needed to be doing is saying, 'Let's identify the threat, identify the capability and capacity you already have, and say, OK, what's the shortfall now, and how do we meet it?'

-- Al Berndt, Nebraska Emergency Management Agency

So if your chance of being killed by a terrorist in the United States is 1 in 3.5 million, the question is, how much do you want to spend to get that down to 1 in 4.5 million?

-- John Mueller

The Center for Investigative Reporting has a web site that lists many questionable homeland security expenditures and initiatives: <http://centerforinvestigativereporting.org>. Some examples:

1. The Secure Border Initiative was a Boeing Co. contract to set up a network of surveillance cameras, radar, and other security measures along a 2,000-mile length of the U.S.-Mexico border. Originally intended to be up and running by 2009, the project missed deadlines, had serious performance problems, and resulted in severe cost overruns. The project ended up costing \$1 billion before it was mercifully canceled.
2. \$557,400 of rescue and communications gear was provided by Department of Homeland Security (DHS) funds to protect 1,500 residents of North Pole, Alaska.
3. In Idaho, the state's smallest county, Clark, population 910, received nearly \$600,000 in anti-terrorism grants during the years immediately following 9/11. Clark County officials spent more than \$20,000 on body bags. Another \$10,000 paid for "explosive device mitigation and remediation equipment".
4. Cherry County, Nebraska (population 6,148) got thousands of DHS dollars to buy cattle nose leads, halters, and electric prods to deal with potential bioterrorism attacks on cows.
5. West Virginia purchased \$3,000 of lapel pins with DHS funds.
6. The city of Denver used DHS grants to buy refrigerator magnets, baseball caps, pens, and other swag totaling over \$35,000 for its "Ready Colorado" campaign, even though federal guidelines didn't allow such promotional items to be purchased with federal money.
7. Denver also forgot about a \$1 million check from DHS and failed to cash it.
8. A 30-foot trailer worth \$54K purchased with DHS grants by Hinsdale County, CO was apparently not used 4 years after it was purchased. New mobile radios were held in storage for nearly a year.
9. A high school in Tennessee spent \$30,000 of DHS funds for a defibrillator to keep on site during a district basketball tournament.
10. Missouri spent several million dollars of DHS funds to buy 13,000 chem-bio warfare suits at \$400 each. This was enough personal protection "for each and every full-time law enforcement officer in the state, regardless of the type of community in which he or she works."
11. New York spent \$3 million on a custom automated public health record system to help identify bioterrorism threats. A 2008 investigation, however, learned that the employees who

used the system were completely unaware of its potential for bioterrorism detection.

12. In California, a so-called “fusion center” used by police to collect threat information bought 55 big-screen digital TVs to be used for training employees. But the training system was never purchased, and when auditors showed up, all of the televisions were tuned to a single television station.

Security often involves complex tradeoffs. This reality does not, in my view, excuse the reprehensible conduct of Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) in blocking cellphone reception in San Francisco stations on August 11 for 3 hours due to threatened protests. (See *The Oakland Tribune*, August 12, 2011 or <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/groups-see-fcc-ruling-bart-s-cell-phone-shutdown>.) The idea was that the loss of cellphone communication would make it more difficult for potential protesters to coordinate their efforts.

In undertaking this electronic censorship (also reportedly being contemplated by the United Kingdom to deal with flash mobs), BART firmly placed itself in the company of Hosni Mubarak, Bashar al-Assad, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Vladimir Putin, Wen Jiabao, Thein Sein, and other dictators, thugs, and oppressors. Interfering with the basic right of free expression—before anybody broke any laws no less!—is a violation of basic human rights. (There were also serious safety implications for BART passengers being unable to use their cell phones.)

The reality of liberty and freedom is that they are not consistent with absolute safety. They’re dangerous. They are also more important than public safety. If we have to adapt unenlightened, illegal, or morally reprehensible tactics that compromise our basic principles in the name of security, we’re no longer the good guys. As Ben Franklin said, “They who would give up an essential liberty for temporary security, deserve neither liberty or security”.

-- Roger Johnston, Argonne National Laboratory, September 2011