

Change No. 5

FM 7-15, C5
Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 9 December 2010

The Army Universal Task List

1. Change 5 to FM 7-15, 27 February 2009, updates the tasks with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) collective tasks, several updates, additions, and reorganization of CBRN tasks, and the recent publication of updated CBRN Field Manuals, including FM 3-11.
2. Completely replaces Chapter 6, ART 6.0: The Protection Warfighting Function.
3. A not-equal-to symbol (\neq) marks new material.
4. FM 7-15, 27 February 2009, is changed as follows:

Remove Old Pages

pages i through viii

pages 6-1 through 6-118

pages References-1 through References-5

Insert New Pages

pages i through viii

pages 6-1 through 6-108

pages References-1 through References-5

5. File this transmittal sheet in front of the publication for reference purposes.

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FM 7-15, C5
9 December 2010

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The Army Universal Task List

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
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
Chapter 6

#ART 6.0: The Protection Warfighting Function



The *protection warfighting function* is the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power. Preserving the force includes protecting personnel (combatants and noncombatants), physical assets, and information of the United States and multinational military and civilian partners. The protection warfighting function facilitates the commander's ability to maintain the force's integrity and combat power. Protection determines the degree to which potential threats can disrupt operations and counters or mitigates those threats. Emphasis on protection increases during preparation and continues throughout execution. Protection is a continuing activity; it integrates all protection capabilities to safeguard bases, secure routes, and protect forces. (FM 3-0) (USACAC)

SECTION I – ART 6.1: EMPLOY AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE



6-1. The air defense system protects the force from missile attack, air attack, and aerial surveillance by any of the following: interceptor missiles, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, conventional fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, and unmanned aircraft systems. It prevents enemies from interdicting friendly forces, while freeing commanders to synchronize movement and firepower. All members of the combined arms team perform air defense tasks; however, ground-based air defense artillery units execute most Army air defense operations. ART 6.1 includes fires at aerial platforms by both dedicated air defense systems and nondedicated weapon systems. (FM 3-27.10) (USASMD)

ART 6.1.1 PROCESS TACTICAL AERIAL PLATFORMS

6-2. Provide advanced warning for all aerial platforms, select targets, and match the appropriate response to tactical aerial platforms including tactical ballistic missile, taking into account operational requirements and capabilities of systems and units. (FM 44-100) (USAADASCH)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit detected, located, and identified all tactical aerial platforms in area of operations (AO).
02	Yes/No	Unit developed and refined early warning plan.
03	Yes/No	Unit employed all available means to detect tactical aerial platforms.
04	Yes/No	Unit received advanced warning of aerial platforms.

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No.	Scale	Measure
05	Yes/No	Unit processed advanced warning of aerial platforms.
06	Yes/No	Unit transmitted advanced warning of aerial platforms.
07	Time	In advance of air attack that advanced warning was provided in AO.
08	Percent	Of enemy offensive air sorties against which friendly air defense assets are assigned.
09	Percent	Of enemy air attacks in AO for which early warning provided.
10	Percent	Of force in AO provided early warning of incoming air threat in time to allow them to initiate passive air defense.
11	Percent	Of time that early warning system is operational.
12	Percent	Of air threat warning estimates concerning attack timing and numbers considered accurate by maneuver units.
13	Percent	Of losses caused by hostile air attack and surveillance.
14	Percent	Of AO covered by early warning system.

ART 6.1.1.1 SEARCH FOR AERIAL PLATFORMS

6-3. Systematically conduct surveillance of a defined area so that all parts of a designated airspace are visually inspected or searched by sensors. (FM 44-100) (USAADASCH)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Sensor system used to conduct surveillance detected aerial platforms in its current mode of operations from its current location.
02	Time	To refine air defense plan.
03	Time	To revisit each part of the airspace over the area of operations (AO)—how long does it take the sensor to conduct a 6400-mil sweep.
04	Percent	Of AO covered by air defense sensors that can detect projected enemy aerial platforms.
05	Percent	Of air defense sensors functioning in AO.
06	Percent	Of air threat warning estimates concerning attack timing and numbers considered accurate by maneuver units.
07	Percent	Of effectiveness of the system conducting the aerial surveillance given current environmental conditions, such as weather and characteristics of the surrounding terrain to include interference or restrictions placed on its operations resulting from its proximity to other military or civilian equipment.
08	Number	Of air defense sensors functioning in AO.

ART 6.1.1.2 DETECT AERIAL PLATFORMS

6-4. Determine or detect an aerial platform of possible military significance but cannot confirm it by recognition. (FM 44-100) (USAADASCH)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit detected all aerial platforms in the area of operations (AO).
02	Time	To refine air defense plan.
03	Time	To report the direction of movement, altitude, and rate of movement, and to estimate if platform is a possible enemy aerial platform and target.
04	Percent	Of potential aerial platforms determined to be friendly aircraft by an identification, friend or foe (IFF) system.
05	Percent	Of potential aerial platforms determined to be friendly aircraft by other than an IFF system.
06	Percent	Of potential aerial platforms in AO detected by air defense sensors.
07	Percent	Of enemy aircraft in AO that are not detected by friendly air defense sensors.

No.	Scale	Measure
08	Percent	Of air threat warning estimates concerning attack timing and numbers considered accurate by maneuver units.
09	Number	Of potential aerial platforms in AO detected by air defense sensors.
10	Number	Of potential aerial platforms in AO detected by ground observers.
11	Number	Of enemy aircraft in AO that are not detected by air defense sensors.

ART 6.1.1.3 LOCATE AERIAL PLATFORMS

6-5. Confirm the track of an aircraft or missile platform in flight. (FM 44-100) (USAADASCH)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit located all detected aerial platforms in the area of operations (AO).
02	Time	To refine air defense plan.
03	Percent	Of aerial platforms in AO correctly located with targetable accuracy by air defense sensors.
04	Percent	Of aerial platforms in AO not located with targetable accuracy by air defense sensors.
05	Percent	Of air defense sensors mission capable in the AO.
06	Percent	Of AO covered by air defense sensors.
07	Percent	Of air threat warning estimates concerning attack timing and numbers considered accurate by maneuver units.
08	Number	Of aerial platforms in AO correctly located with targetable accuracy by air defense sensors.
09	Number	Of aerial platforms in AO not located with targetable accuracy by air defense sensors.
10	Number	Of air defense sensors available in the AO.

ART 6.1.1.4 CHARACTERIZE AERIAL PLATFORMS

6-6. Classifies, types, and identifies tracks and evaluates engageable tracks to determine the threat they pose to friendly assets and areas. (FM 44-100) (USAADASCH)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit identified all detected and located tactical aerial platforms in the area of operations (AO).
02	Time	To refine air defense plan.
03	Time	To identify aerial platform as friendly, hostile, or unknown once it has been detected and located.
04	Percent	Of aerial platforms in AO correctly identified.
05	Percent	Of enemy aircraft in AO that penetrate the air defense sensor network undetected.
06	Percent	Of air threat warning estimates concerning attack timing and numbers considered accurate by maneuver units.
07	Number	Of aerial platforms in AO correctly identified.
08	Number	Of enemy aerial platforms in AO that penetrate the air defense sensor network undetected.

≠ART 6.1.1.5 DISSEMINATE TACTICAL AERIAL PLATFORMS WARNING

6-7. The air defense system protects the force and civilian population from aerial platforms by disseminating early warning information to friendly units and civilian populations. (FM 3-01) (USAADASCH)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit detected, located, and identified all tactical aerial platforms.
02	Yes/No	Unit developed and refined aerial platforms threat to civilian populations.

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No.	Scale	Measure
03	Yes/No	Soldiers notified deployed formation commanders of warning of aerial platform.
04	Yes/No	Unit provided early warning in the area of operations before the air attack.
05	Yes/No	Unit transmitted advanced warning of aerial platforms.
06	Yes/No	Unit notified civilian population of warning of aerial platforms.

ART 6.1.2 DESTROY AERIAL PLATFORMS

6-8. Destroy all types of enemy aerial platforms in flight in the area of operations. (FM 44-100) (USAADASCH)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit changed its objectives, plan, or operational timetable due to enemy air attack.
02	Yes/No	Destruction of an aerial platform was done per established rules of engagement.
03	Time	To assign a specific air defense weapon system to a specific target.
04	Time	For air defense weapon system to acquire, track, and engage as necessary a specific aerial target once assigned responsibility for engaging that specific aerial platform.
05	Time	For air defense weapon system to recycle or reload so that it is capable of engaging another aerial platform.
06	Time	To determine weapons control status.
07	Percent	Of losses caused by hostile air attack and surveillance.
08	Percent	Of available systems directed against declared hostile aerial platforms.
09	Percent	Of enemy aerial platforms destroyed.
10	Percent	Of detected enemy aerial platforms against which air defense weapons are assigned.
11	Percent	Of target cueing information received by air defense weapon systems.
12	Number	Of enemy aerial platforms destroyed.
13	Number	Of different enemy aerial platforms that can be engaged simultaneously.

ART 6.1.2.1 SELECT AERIAL PLATFORMS TO ENGAGE AND DESTROY

6-9. Analyze each aerial platform to determine if and when it should be destroyed or engaged according to the threat posed, the tactical benefit, and the commander's guidance. ART 6.1.2.1 requires building and maintaining a complete, accurate, and relevant integrated air picture and having current control information. (FM 44-100) (USAADASCH)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit selected aerial platforms that met the commander's guidance for engagement and destruction.
02	Time	To select aerial platforms to engage and destroy.
03	Time	To determine targeting solution after making decision to engage selected aerial platform.
04	Percent	Of enemy aerial platforms in the area of operations (AO) correctly identified and attacked by air defense systems.
05	Percent	Of mission capable air defense systems in AO.
06	Percent	Of available systems directed against declared hostile aerial platforms.
07	Percent	Of aerial targets in the AO that meet the commander's guidance for engagement and destruction.
08	Number	Of enemy aircraft in AO correctly identified and attacked by air defense systems.
09	Number	Of air defense systems in AO.
10	Number	Of fratricide incidents.

ART 6.1.2.2 SELECT APPROPRIATE AIR OR MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS

6-10. Determine the appropriate air or missile defense systems for engaging a particular aerial platform.
(FM 44-100) (USAADASCH)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit selected system capable of engaging and destroying targeted aerial platform.
02	Time	To select and assign attack system once an enemy aerial platform is identified and located with targeting accuracy.
03	Percent	Of probability of selected air defense system hitting targeted aerial platform.
04	Percent	Of enemy aerial platforms selected for attack by dedicated air defense systems.
05	Percent	Of enemy aerial platforms engaged by unit small-arms air defense.
06	Percent	Of enemy aerial platforms not selected for attack by dedicated air defense systems.
07	Percent	Of enemy aerial platforms engaged by more than one air defense system.
08	Percent	Of available dedicated air defense systems directed against declared hostile aerial platforms.
09	Number	Of available dedicated air defense systems directed against declared hostile aerial platforms.

ART 6.1.2.3 CONDUCT ENGAGEMENTS USING AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE WEAPON SYSTEMS

6-11. Use air and missile defense weapon systems to destroy aerial platforms and protect the force.
(FM 44-100) (USAADASCH)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Friendly course of action changed as a result of enemy air attack.
02	Yes/No	Air and missile defense weapons were used per established rules of engagement.
03	Time	To warn dedicated air defense units after identifying inbound enemy aerial platforms.
04	Time	For air and missile defense weapon system to acquire, track, and engage as necessary a specific aerial platform once assigned responsibility for the engagement of that specific aerial platform.
05	Time	To determine weapons control status.
06	Time	For air defense weapon system to recycle or reload so that it is capable of engaging another aerial platform.
07	Percent	Of enemy aerial platforms able to penetrate air defense network to deliver ordnance or accomplish mission.
08	Percent	Of all air defense systems positioned to engage the enemy aerial platforms.
09	Percent	Of friendly courses of action that must be changed because of enemy air attack.
10	Percent	Of enemy aerial platforms engaged that are destroyed by each air defense weapon system.
11	Percent	Of friendly casualties attributed to enemy aerial platforms.
12	Percent	Of enemy engaged aerial platforms deterred from delivering their ordnance on target.
13	Percent	Of available air defense systems directed against declared hostile aerial platforms.
14	Number	Of destroyed enemy aerial platforms by air defense weapon system.

ART 6.1.2.3.1 Determine Air and Missile Defense Weapon System Capability for Engagement of Aerial Platforms

6-12. Determine the air and missile defense weapon system that can provide the required results. Includes consideration of weapons engagement zones and system characteristics and capability to defeat target.
(FM 44-100) (USAADASCH)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Available air and missile defense weapons engaged their intended targets.
02	Time	To determine system capability for engaging an identified enemy aerial platform.
03	Percent	Of enemy aerial platforms allocated to each air defense weapon system.
04	Percent	Of aerial platforms engaged within the effective range of the selected weapon system.
05	Number	Of enemy aerial platforms allocated to each weapon system.

ART 6.1.2.3.2 Determine Air and Missile Defense Weapon System Availability for Aerial Engagement

6-13. Determine the air and missile defense weapon system available for executing operation. ART 6.1.2.3.2 includes consideration of weapons control status and determination of physical environment restrictions and engagement criticality. (FM 44-100) (USAADASCH)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Selected air and missile defense weapon system was mission capable. Rules of engagement allowed it to be used, and it could be brought to a position where it could engage the intended target.
02	Yes/No	Enemy aerial platform was engaged to accomplish mission.
03	Time	To determine weapons control status.
04	Time	To analyze any restriction caused by physical environment.
05	Time	To determine engagement criticality—the enemy aerial platform must be engaged to accomplish mission.
06	Percent	Of available air defense systems in the area of operations that have the capability to engage a specific hostile aerial platform.
07	Percent	Of targets not attacked in a timely manner due to nonavailability of appropriate air defense weapon system.

ART 6.1.2.3.3 Designate Air and Missile Defense Weapon System for Aerial Engagement

6-14. Designate air and missile defense weapon system to perform an engagement. (FM 44-100) (USAADASCH)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Selected system accomplished the desired task.
02	Time	To determine available systems for engaging target on identification of enemy aerial platform.
03	Time	To select appropriate weapon system.
04	Time	For air defense weapon system to acquire, track, and engage as necessary a specific aerial target once assigned responsibility for the engagement of that specific aerial target.
05	Time	For air defense weapon system to recycle or reload so that it is capable of engaging another aerial platform.
06	Percent	Of available air defense weapon systems.
07	Percent	Of aerial targets not attacked in a timely manner due to nonavailability of appropriate air defense weapon systems.
08	Percent	Of reliability of air defense weapon system.
09	Percent	Of enemy aerial platforms able to penetrate air defense network to deliver ordnance or accomplish mission.
10	Percent	Of all air defense systems positioned to engage the enemy aerial platforms that engage the enemy aerial platforms.
11	Percent	Of friendly courses of action that must be changed because of enemy air attack.
12	Number	Of air defense weapon systems used in engagement of aerial platform.

ART 6.1.2.4 EMPLOY COMBINED ARMS FOR AIR DEFENSE

6-15. Use weapon systems other than dedicated ground based air defense systems—such as small arms, tank cannons, and antiarmor missiles—to destroy aerial targets. (FM 44-8) (USAADASCH)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Commander modified course of action because of enemy air attack.
02	Yes/No	Employment of combined arms for air defense was done per established rules of engagement.
03	Time	To warn nonair defense units after identifying inbound enemy aerial platforms.
04	Time	To determine weapons control status.
05	Time	For unit weapon systems to acquire, track, and engage as necessary a specific aerial target once assigned responsibility for engaging that specific aerial target.
06	Time	For unit weapon systems conducting self-defense against air attack to recycle or reload so that they are capable of engaging another aerial target.
07	Percent	Of enemy aerial platforms able to penetrate air defense network to deliver ordnance or accomplish mission.
08	Percent	Of all unit weapon systems positioned to engage enemy aerial platforms that engage the enemy aerial platforms.
09	Percent	Of friendly courses of action that must be changed because of enemy air attack.
10	Percent	Of enemy aerial platforms engaged destroyed by each weapon system.
11	Percent	Of friendly casualties attributed to enemy aerial platforms.
12	Percent	Of enemy engaged aerial platforms deterred from delivering their ordnance on target.
13	Percent	Of weapon system operators using correct aerial engagement aiming techniques.
14	Percent	Of reduced the effectiveness of the enemy's attack as a result of the unit conducting self defense against air attack.
15	Number	Of destroyed enemy aerial platforms by unit weapon system.
16	Number	Of friendly casualties attributed to enemy aerial attack.

ART 6.1.2.5 EMPLOY AIR-TO-AIR WEAPONS

6-16. Use weapon systems carried on aircraft to destroy aerial targets. Army aircraft normally do this in self-defense. (FM 3-04.126) (USAAWC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Air-to-air weapons destroyed intended targets.
02	Yes/No	Friendly aircraft maintained mutual support throughout engagement.
03	Yes/No	Use of air-to-air weapons was accomplished per established rules of engagement.
04	Time	To warn friendly aerial platforms of inbound enemy aircraft after identification as hostile.
05	Time	Available to friendly aerial platforms to prepare to engage inbound enemy aircraft.
06	Time	To designate and initiate selected air-to-air combat drill.
07	Time	To get ordnance on target after initiation of task.
08	Time	To complete air-to-air combat after target identification.
09	Percent	Of total number of air-to-air combat engagements within a given time where friendly system remains undetected while maneuvering into position where it can effectively engage the enemy aerial platform.
10	Percent	Probability of a hit.
11	Percent	Probability of a kill given a hit.
12	Percent	Of enemy air attacks detected early enough to allow engagement.
13	Percent	Of casualties of friendly aerial platforms conducting air-to-air combat.
14	Percent	Of engaged enemy aerial platforms destroyed by friendly aerial platforms.

No.	Scale	Measure
15	Percent	Of enemy aerial platforms not engaged by available friendly aerial platforms.
16	Percent	Of available systems directed against declared hostile aerial platforms.
17	Number	Of enemy aerial platforms destroyed by friendly aerial platforms.

ART 6.1.3 DENY ENEMY USE OF AIRSPACE

6-17. Take passive air defense measures to prevent aircraft from effectively engaging the unit. Passive air defense measures, when the unit is not in the path or target of the enemy aircraft, include moving to cover and concealment and preparing to engage the attacking or any follow-on aircraft. (FM 44-100) (USAADASCH)

Note: ART 6.1.2.4 (Employ Combined Arms for Air Defense) addresses active self-defense measures taken against aerial attack by combined arms units.

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Commander modified course of action because of enemy air attack.
02	Time	To warn combined arms units after identifying inbound enemy aerial platforms.
03	Time	To move to covered and concealed positions.
04	Percent	Of enemy aerial platforms able to penetrate the air defense network to deliver ordnance or accomplish mission.
05	Percent	Of friendly courses of action that must be changed due to enemy air attack.
06	Percent	Of enemy aerial platforms unable to acquire friendly personnel and equipment to attack.
07	Percent	Of friendly casualties attributed to enemy aerial platforms.
08	Number	Of friendly casualties attributed to enemy aerial attack.

ART 6.1.4 REACT TO ENEMY AERIAL ATTACK

6-18. Prevent or degrade enemy use of airspace through fire potential or other means, such as smoke, not involving directly attacking aerial platforms. (FM 44-100) (USAADASCH)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	The enemy did not attempt to use designated portions of the airspace.
02	Yes/No	The denial of enemy use of airspace was done per established rules of engagement.
03	Time	To refine air defense plan.
04	Time	Since last enemy aerial attack.
05	Time	To warn all units in the area of operations after identification of inbound enemy aerial platforms.
06	Time	To report the direction of movement, altitude, rate of movement, and estimated target of enemy aerial platforms.
07	Percent	Of enemy aerial platforms attempting to penetrate into friendly airspace deterred from doing so by friendly fire potential.
08	Percent	Of potential target areas obscured by smoke.
09	Percent	Of losses caused by hostile air attack and surveillance.
10	Percent	Of low level flight corridors rendered unusable by the friendly fire potential.
11	Number	Of errors in the performance of the air defense sensor network in a given time.
12	Number	Of enemy aerial platforms attempting to penetrate into the airspace over friendly ground forces.

ART 6.1.5 PLAN BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

6-19. Plan and coordinate protection of the homeland and operational forces from ballistic missile attack by direct defense and by destroying the enemy's missile capacity. Determine essential requirements to achieve mission accomplishment using ballistic missile defense weapons in a defensive role to defend, detect, defeat, deter, and protect. Centralized planning for missile defense includes the protection of operational forces in the combatant commander's area of responsibility and destroying ballistic missile platforms in flight. Missile defense operations include all forces and activities that support active defense, passive defense, and attack operations. (FM 3-27.10) (USASMDC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit planned ballistic missile defense.
02	Yes/No	Unit determined command and control for ground based missile defense.
03	Yes/No	Unit defined rules of engagement according to threat capability parameters and national security objectives.
04	Yes/No	Missile defense support was available to assist the staff elements.
05	Yes/No	Unit conducted detailed planning that maximizes Service capabilities.
06	Yes/No	Unit linked with the planning of other air and missile defense capabilities.
07	Yes/No	Defended assets list affected configuration of the ground missile defense system and its defensive task plans.
08	Time	To develop and coordinate combatant command's defended assets list.
09	Time	To allocate interceptors in a timely manner to defend the homeland and operational forces.
10	Time	To respond to reports of outages and degradation.
11	Percent	In degrees in which ongoing or planned operations adversely affected by threat defenses.
12	Number	Of available systems directed against declared threatening missile platforms.

ART 6.1.6 CONDUCT BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

6-20. Defend an assigned area of interest, friendly forces, and infrastructure from ballistic missile attack. Conduct active ballistic missile defense operations to negate significant enemy missile attack. Missile defense activities are designed to destroy attacking enemy missiles exo- or endo-atmosphere, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack. Conduct destruction of hostile missiles per rules of engagement. Provide ballistic missile warning support to the Soldier using contributing sensors. (FM 3-27.10) (USASMDC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit employed combined arms for ballistic missile defense.
02	Yes/No	Unit conducted ballistic missile warning.
03	Yes/No	Space-based sensors maintained constant surveillance of potential adversary launch activities.
04	Yes/No	Unit used space-based sensors to continue tracking missile until booster burnout.
05	Yes/No	Unit evaluated a threat launch of a ballistic missile capable of striking the defenses assets.
06	Yes/No	Unit selected battle plan to match the decisions for missile's trajectory.
07	Yes/No	Unit determined the state vectors, predicted an impact point, assessed whether the defended area was threatened, and alerted missile defense systems.
08	Yes/No	Unit verified rules of engagement were met.
09	Yes/No	Unit processed ballistic missile targets.
10	Yes/No	Unit conducted effective decentralized engagements.
11	Yes/No	Unit launched interceptors singly or in multiples (ripple fire) according to established firing doctrine.

No.	Scale	Measure
12	Yes/No	Unit intercepted, engaged, and neutralized threat missiles.
13	Yes/No	Unit conducted kill assessment for engagements and made recommendations for additional firings.
14	Time	To assign a specific system to a specific target.
15	Percent	Of threat warning estimates concerning attack timing and numbers considered accurate.
16	Percent	Of hostile missiles engaged and destroyed.
17	Percent	Of errors in performance of surveillance, identification, and track monitor procedures.

ART 6.1.7 MANAGE SYSTEM CONFIGURATION

6-21. Maintain optimal system configuration to support ballistic missile defense operations necessary to respond operationally and tactically. Identify and minimize degrading effects on readiness and maintain directed readiness condition. Be familiar with system element's (to include supporting sensor's) capabilities and limitations so the system configuration can be adjusted to ensure the optimal defense. Assess preplanned maintenance, test, and exercise requests to modify system configuration. Determine impact on the ballistic missile defense mission. Approve or disapprove requested modification. Ensure approved preplanned configuration changes are executed on time. Assess real-time (unplanned) system element outage impact on the ballistic missile defense mission. Decide or direct relevant information to the right person, at the right time, in a usable format, to facilitate situational understanding and decisionmaking. (FM 3-27.10) (USASMDC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit maintained optimal system configuration necessary to respond operationally and tactically without negative effects on the defense.
02	Yes/No	Unit maintained optimal system configuration necessary to maintain readiness and readiness condition.
03	Yes/No	Unit was familiar with system element's capabilities and limitations.
04	Yes/No	Unit assessed preplanned maintenance, test, and exercise requests to modify system configuration, determined impact on the mission, and made decision.
05	Yes/No	Unit ensured approved preplanned configuration changes were executed on time.
06	Yes/No	Unit assessed real-time (unplanned) system element outages impact on the mission, determined impact on the mission, and made or recommended decision.
07	Yes/No	For recommendations, relevant readiness information was disseminated to the right person, at the right time, in a usable format, to facilitate situational understanding and decisionmaking.
08	Time	Of lag between approved real-time system reconfiguration and commencement of system reconfiguration.
09	Number	Of maintenance, test, and exercise operations adversely affected by disapprovals.
10	Number	Of incidents of critical information not reaching person responsible for decision in a timely manner.

ART 6.1.7.1 PERFORM ASSET MANAGEMENT

6-22. Units manage assets that support the Ballistic Missile Defense System. Soldiers monitor and manage changes to assets to support ballistic missile defense operations necessary to respond operationally and tactically. Soldiers identify and minimize to the commander any degrading effects of changes on readiness and maintain directed readiness condition. Soldiers are familiar with the system element's (to include supporting sensors) capabilities and limitations so they can adjust the system configuration to ensure the optimal defense. They assess preplanned maintenance, test, and exercise requests to modify the system configuration. Unit commanders recommend approval or disapproval of requested modification through proper channels for combatant commander. Soldiers assess real-time (unplanned) system element outage

impact on the ballistic missile defense mission. Units make appropriate changes to the Ballistic Missile Defense System health and status or operational capability as required. They advise the combatant commander in determining the Ballistic Missile Defense System capability. Decide or direct relevant information to the right person, at the right time, in a usable format to facilitate situational understanding and decision making. (FM 3-27.10) (USASMDC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit assessed preplanned maintenance, test, and exercise requests to modify system configuration (assets), determined impact on the mission, and made decision.
02	Yes/No	Unit assessed real-time (unplanned) system asset outages impact on the mission, determined impact on the mission, and made or recommended decision.
03	Yes/No	Unit was familiar with system asset capabilities and limitations.
04	Yes/No	For recommendations, relevant readiness information was disseminated to the right person, at the right time, in a usable format, to facilitate situational understanding and decisionmaking.
05	Time	To respond to reports of outages and degradation.
06	Time	To identify asset status changes and take appropriate action to minimize degrading effects or maximize enhancement of that change on the overall system capabilities.
07	Time	Change in asset status for which it was not accounted.
08	Number	Of maintenance, test, and exercise operations adversely affected by disapprovals.
09	Number	Of incidents of critical asset information not reaching the person responsible for a decision in a timely manner.

ART 6.1.8 PLAN ROCKET, ARTILLERY, AND MORTAR DEFENSE

6-23. Plan and coordinate to protect operational forces, forward operating bases, and aerial ports and seaports of debarkation from rocket, artillery, and mortar (RAM) attack by direct defense and by destroying the enemy’s RAM capability. Determine essential requirements to achieve mission accomplishment using RAM defense weapons in a defensive role to deny, sense, warn, intercept, shape & respond and protect. RAM defense operations include all forces and activities that support active defense, passive defense, and counterfire operations. (FMI 3-01.60) (USAADASCH)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit planned RAM defense.
02	Yes/No	Unit conducted RAM attack warning.
03	Yes/No	Unit defined rules of engagement according to threat capability parameters.
04	Yes/No	RAM attack support was available.
05	Yes/No	Unit conducted detailed planning that maximizes Service capabilities.
06	Yes/No	Defended asset list affected defense configuration.
07	Time	To develop and coordinate the commander’s defended asset list.
08	Time	To allocate assets in support of the defended asset list.
09	Percent	In degrees in which ongoing or planned operations adversely affected by threat defenses.
10	Number	Of available systems directed against threatening RAM targets.

ART 6.1.9 CONDUCT ROCKET, ARTILLERY, AND MORTAR DEFENSE


6-24. Defend an assigned asset, friendly forces, and infrastructure against rocket, artillery, and mortar (RAM) attack. Conduct RAM defense to negate RAM attacks. RAM defenses are designed to destroy attacking enemy RAM or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack. Conduct destruction of hostile RAM targets per rules of engagement. Minimize collateral damage and reduce probability of

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casualties within adjacent populated areas. This task includes detection, discrimination, and tracking of in-flight RAM to support cueing and handoff of targets for engagements. Provide RAM attack warning support to the Soldier using available sensors. (FMI 3-01.60) (USAADASCH)

No	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit conducted timely RAM attack warning, providing time for protected forces and assets to prepare for impending attack.
02	Yes/No	Unit evaluated threat launch of RAM capable of striking the defended assets.
03	Yes/No	Unit predicted an impact point and assessed whether defended assets were threatened.
04	Yes/No	Unit verified rules of engagement were met.
05	Yes/No	Unit launched interceptors according to established firing doctrine.
06	Yes/No	Unit engaged, intercepted, and neutralized RAM targets beyond ranges or altitudes at which damage or destruction of forces, materiel, or infrastructure could occur.
07	Time	To assign a specific system to a specific target.
08	Percent	Of hostile targets engaged and destroyed.
09	Percent	Of errors in performance of surveillance and tracking procedures.

SECTION II – ART 6.2: CONDUCT PERSONNEL RECOVERY OPERATIONS



6-25. Conduct personnel recovery (PR) operations to recover and return own personnel, whether Soldier, Army civilian, selected Department of Defense (DOD) contractors, or other personnel as determined by the Secretary of Defense who are isolated, missing, detained, or captured (IMDC) in an operational environment. IMDC personnel consist of U.S. forces, Army civilians, and DOD contractors who deploy with the force, or other personnel as designated by the President who are beyond the Army positive or procedural control of their unit, in an operational environment requiring them to survive, evade, resist, or

escape. It is every unit's task to have procedures in place to be ready to recover personnel, whether Soldier, civilian, or contractor. (FM 3-50.1) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	The commander, staff, units, and individuals reviewed and developed PR guidance.
02	Yes/No	The commander, staff, and units acquired PR equipment.
03	Yes/No	The commander, staff, units, and individuals conducted PR-focused education and training.
04	Yes/No	Subordinate commands and units integrated PR into internal standing operating procedures consistent with guidance from higher headquarters.

ART 6.2.1 ENSURE PERSONNEL RECOVERY READINESS DURING PREMOBILIZATION

6-26. Ensure personnel recovery (PR) readiness during premobilization by including PR in all efforts during peacetime to organize, train, and equip to accomplish missions. Premobilization preparation actions are necessary for commanders and their staffs, units, and individuals and consist of reviewing and developing PR guidance, acquiring PR equipment, ensuring PR administrative requirements are met, and conducting PR-focused education and training. (FM 3-50.1) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	The commander, staff, units, and individuals reviewed and developed PR guidance.
02	Yes/No	The commander, staff, and units acquired PR equipment.
03	Yes/No	The commander, staff, units, and individuals conducted PR-focused education and training.
04	Yes/No	Subordinate commands and units integrated PR into internal standing operating procedures consistent with guidance from higher headquarters.

ART 6.2.1.1 CONDUCT PERSONNEL RECOVERY EDUCATION AND TRAINING

6-27. Ensure all required personnel recovery (PR) individual education and training requirements are conducted per established policies and directives. Coordinate code of conduct; survival, evasion, resistance, and escape; and PR education and training related to the country (theater). Department of Defense; Headquarters, Department of the Army; and combatant commanders establish education and training requirements. (FM 3-50.1) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit reviewed policy, doctrine, regulations, and operation plans to develop guidance and intent for training.
02	Yes/No	Individual PR education and training requirements were included in individual training plans.
03	Yes/No	Units established training management systems to ensure all required training was accomplished.
04	Yes/No	Unit developed processes and procedures to ensure all incoming Soldiers, civilians, and contractors received required PR training.
05	Yes/No	All leaders and Soldiers received required PR training.
06	Yes/No	All Army civilians and Department of Defense contractors receive required training.

ART 6.2.1.2 PLAN PERSONNEL RECOVERY COORDINATION CELL AND PERSONNEL RECOVERY OFFICERS CAPABILITY

6-28. While the staff members collect personnel recovery (PR)-related information in their specialty areas, a central point for gathering the information from all the staff members is required to establish a usable common operational picture. The PR coordination cells at the division level and personnel recovery officers at brigade and below are the fusion points for the staffs' collaborative efforts to gather PR-related information for their respective units. PR coordination cells and officers coordinate with the individual

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staff members to collect, process, store, display, and disseminate this information. Personnel recovery coordination cells and officers are collectively referred to as PR cells. (FM 3-50.1) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit ensured reliable communications with subordinate unit PR officers, other personnel recovery coordination cells, and the joint personnel recovery center.
02	Yes/No	Unit coordinated deliberate recoveries for the component.
03	Yes/No	Unit reviewed accountability and movement reporting procedures of subordinate units.
04	Yes/No	Unit assisted in immediate recoveries when requested by subordinate units.
05	Yes/No	Unit coordinated for component fire support to the operation.
06	Yes/No	Unit ensured subordinate units have access to standing operating procedures developed by the joint personnel recovery center.
07	Yes/No	Unit ensured subordinate units have sufficient evasion aids.
08	Yes/No	Unit coordinated for air and ground transportation and medical support.
09	Yes/No	Unit gathered PR-specific information developed by joint personnel recovery center and personnel recovery coordination cells and disseminated to subordinate units.
10	Yes/No	Unit identified subordinate unit PR equipment shortfalls to the personnel recovery coordination cell.

*ART 6.2.2 PERFORM PERSONNEL RECOVERY-RELATED FORCE PROTECTION TASKS

6-29. Perform personnel recovery (PR)-related tasks in planning and preparing for deployment. Unit PR personnel update and obtain equipment and materials necessary to perform assigned mission. Commanders and staffs ensure adequate PR capability is programmed into personnel and equipment flow to assure ability to support the force. PR personnel must be included in the time-phased force and deployment list and equipment included in the updated deployment equipment list. PR organizations should ensure that all unit personnel complete all necessary PR deployment requirements. (FM 3-50.1) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Guidance and intent synchronized with the theater plan.
02	Yes/No	Processes, plans, and procedures integrated into the theater plan.
03	Yes/No	Maps and charts were standardized.
04	Yes/No	Special and personal staff integrated into family support plan.
05	Yes/No	Interoperability of location methods ensured.
06	Yes/No	Personnel and equipment were programmed into deployment plans per commander's intent.
07	Yes/No	Location techniques and systems synchronized.
08	Yes/No	All unit personnel completed PR-related training prior to deployment.
09	Yes/No	Personnel recovery coordination cells and personnel recovery officers received all necessary training.

ART 6.2.2.1 CONDUCT PERSONNEL RECOVERY-RELATED MOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES

6-30. Conduct personnel recovery (PR)-related mobilization activities by obtaining specific PR guidance from the supported combatant commander. Focus previous training and tailor existing guidance to the specific requirements of the supported combatant command. Examples of combatant command guidance include theater PR regulations, appendix 5 to annex C of joint operation plans and orders, theater PR standing operating procedures (SOPs), PR special instructions, and isolated personnel guidance. (FM 3-50.1) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	PR coordination cells and personnel recovery officers reviewed operation specific command and control procedures provided by theater specific guidance.
02	Yes/No	Training and rehearsals were scheduled against identified shortfalls in organization, equipment, and procedures.
03	Yes/No	Unit conducted integrated rehearsals for PR operations such as joint, combined arms, and warfighting function.
04	Yes/No	Unit operation plans and orders included PR guidance as PR appendix to annex C as required.
05	Yes/No	Unit updated all PR SOPs and other guidance to synchronize with theater PR guidance as necessary.

ART 6.2.2.2 DEPLOY PERSONNEL RECOVERY CAPABILITY AND BUILD COMBAT POWER

6-31. During deployment, commanders must determine who will be providing personnel recovery (PR) coverage for their arriving forces. Until commanders can build sufficient combat power to provide PR for their forces, other forces in theater must provide PR support. Build combat power through reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI). Early and continuous connectivity with the theater PR architecture enables commanders to report isolated, missing, detained, or captured (IMDC) incidents during deployment. This also allows commanders to report unit status when ready to assume responsibility for assigned PR missions. (FM 3-50.1) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	PR capability transitioned through the RSOI process.
02	Yes/No	Early deployment of PR capability was planned for in the time-phased force and deployment data.
03	Yes/No	Procedures for relief in place of the PR capability were developed.
04	Yes/No	PR capabilities were available until all forces, including contractors deploying with the force and Army civilians, redeployed.
05	Yes/No	Integrated rehearsals were planned and conducted.
06	Yes/No	PR cells capabilities to monitor PR asset status were established and maintained.
07	Yes/No	Unit implemented accountability procedures to identify actual IMDC events and preclude false reports.
08	Yes/No	Unit developed plans to identify personnel and equipment to maintain accountability and communications with movement serials.
09	Yes/No	Requirements to support command were implemented as required.
10	Yes/No	Unit built combat power and PR capability as planned.
11	Yes/No	Unit established training and rehearsal areas and ranges as planned.
12	Yes/No	Unit identified capabilities and shortfalls to provide recovery en route and during RSOI to supported command.

ART 6.2.2.3 SUSTAIN PERSONNEL RECOVERY CAPABILITIES

6-32. Sustain personnel recovery (PR) capabilities during the conduct of operations by having commander, staffs, units, and individuals refine their skills. Conduct rehearsals to exercise battle drills to ensure proficiency. New and replacement personnel will require training and equipment. Personnel recovery coordinating messages are prepared and disseminated per unit standing operating procedures. Commanders establish and maintain personnel accountability procedures. Communications architectures are established and maintained to ensure operational capabilities. (FM 3-50.1) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit conducted rehearsals to exercise battle drills.
02	Yes/No	Battle drills were refined as changing battlefield conditions changed.

No.	Scale	Measure
03	Yes/No	Unit established and maintained PR cell capability to monitor PR asset status.
04	Yes/No	Unit enforced accountability procedures.
05	Yes/No	Unit exercised reporting procedures within theater communications architecture.
06	Yes/No	Unit PR cells prepared and disseminated PR coordinating messages as required.
07	Yes/No	New personnel were trained in the PR procedures and provided equipment as necessary.

ART 6.2.2.4 REDEPLOY PERSONNEL RECOVERY CAPABILITIES

6-33. As units redeploy, either back to continental United States (CONUS) or to another area of operations (AO), actions accomplished for personnel recovery (PR) are similar to those undertaken during deployment. An important task is the transfer of PR responsibility, including the key task of transferring lessons learned gathered during after action reviews. When units redeploy to CONUS, PR responsibility for the AO transfers to incoming forces. If redeploying to another AO, units integrate into that AO's established PR architecture or build one if it does not exist. (FM 3-50.1) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit ensured PR capabilities were available until all forces, including contractors and Army civilians, have redeployed.
02	Yes/No	Unit ensured counterintelligence debriefing of recovered personnel.

ART 6.2.3 PLAN PERSONNEL RECOVERY OPERATIONS

6-34. Preparation does not stop when employment begins. Rehearsals and battle drills continue and should become more demanding as skills increase. Unit plans are refined as after action reviews from personnel recovery (PR) operations identify changes required in task organization, command relationships, and recovery doctrine. New and replacement personnel will require training and equipment. Commanders and staffs, units, and individuals continue to refine their skills throughout the employment phase of operations. (FM 3-50.1) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit enforced planning system to provide timely reporting; accurately reported validation and determined location; and rapidly disseminated the information to the entire PR architecture for coordinated response.
02	Yes/No	The system provided for accurate record keeping without degrading the PR effort.
03	Yes/No	The primary mission continued parallel to the recovery effort.
04	Yes/No	The goal was recovery of the isolated, missing, detained, or captured person.
05	Yes/No	Unit planned counterintelligence support to identify intelligence and security threats to PR in the area of operations.

ART 6.2.3.1 CONDUCT UNASSISTED PERSONNEL RECOVERY

6-35. Conduct unassisted personnel recovery (PR) to achieve own recovery without outside assistance. An unassisted recovery typically involves an evasion effort by isolated, missing, detained, or captured (IMDC) personnel to get back to friendly forces, or to a point where they can be recovered via another method. While the code of conduct requires IMDC personnel to make every effort to evade or escape, commanders must strive to recover these personnel via one or a combination of the other methods. (FM 3-50.1) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit enforced planning system to provide timely reporting; accurately reported validation and determined location; and rapidly disseminated the information to the entire PR architecture for coordinated response.
02	Yes/No	The system provided for accurate record keeping without degrading the PR effort.
03	Yes/No	The primary mission continued parallel to the recovery effort.

ART 6.2.3.2 CONDUCT IMMEDIATE PERSONNEL RECOVERY

6-36. Conduct immediate personnel recovery (PR) operations to locate and recover isolated, missing, detained, or captured (IMDC) personnel by forces directly observing the isolating event or through the reporting process it is determined that IMDC personnel are close enough for forces to conduct a rapid recovery. Immediate recovery assumes that the tactical situation permits a recovery with the forces at hand without detailed planning or coordination. (FM 3-50.1) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit enforced planning system to provide timely reporting; accurately reported validation and determined location; and rapidly disseminated the information to the entire PR architecture for coordinated response.
02	Yes/No	The system provided for accurate record keeping without degrading the PR effort.
03	Yes/No	The primary mission continued parallel to the recovery effort.

ART 6.2.3.3 CONDUCT DELIBERATE PERSONNEL RECOVERY

6-37. Conduct deliberate personnel recovery (PR) when an incident is reported and an immediate recovery is not feasible or was not successful. Weather, enemy actions, location of isolated, missing, detained, or captured personnel, and recovery force capabilities are examples of factors that may require the detailed planning and coordination of a deliberate recovery. (FM 3-50.1) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit enforced planning system to provide timely reporting; accurately reported validation and determined location; and rapidly disseminated the information to the entire PR architecture for coordinated response.
02	Yes/No	The system provided for accurate record keeping without degrading the PR effort.
03	Yes/No	The primary mission continued parallel to the recovery effort.

ART 6.2.3.4 CONDUCT EXTERNAL SUPPORTED PERSONNEL RECOVERY

6-38. Conduct external supported personnel recovery (PR) when immediate or deliberate recovery is not feasible or was not successful. External supported personnel recovery is either the support provided by the Army to other joint task force components, interagency organizations, or multinational forces or the support provided by these entities to the Army. Close air support; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and airborne command and control are examples of capabilities that may be required from different components to execute an external supported recovery. (FM 3-50.1) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit enforced planning system to provide timely reporting; accurately reported validation and determined location; and rapidly disseminated the information to the entire PR architecture for coordinated response.
02	Yes/No	The system provided for accurate record keeping without degrading the PR effort.
03	Yes/No	The primary mission continued parallel to the recovery effort.
04	Yes/No	Unit provided the support required to support an external support requirement.
05	Yes/No	Unit transmitted a request for external support as necessary.

ART 6.2.3.5 CONDUCT ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES PERSONNEL RECOVERY

6-39. Conduct Army special operations force (ARSOF) personnel recovery (PR) missions to achieve specific, well-defined, and often sensitive results of strategic or operational significance. ARSOF PR missions are conducted in support of their own operations, when directed by the joint task force commander to support a PR operation, when the threat to the recovery force is high enough to warrant the conduct of a special operation, and when ARSOF is the only force available. Detailed planning, rehearsals, and in-depth intelligence analysis characterize ARSOF PR missions. This ART includes unassisted evasion and nonconventional assisted recovery. (FM 3-05.231) (USAJFKSWCS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit enforced planning system to provide timely reporting; accurately reported validation and determined location; and rapidly disseminated the information to the entire PR architecture for coordinated response.
02	Yes/No	The primary mission continued parallel to the recovery effort.
03	Yes/No	The isolated, missing, detained, or captured person was recovered.

ART 6.2.4 PROVIDE PERSONNEL RECOVERY SUPPORT TO CIVIL SEARCH AND RESCUE AUTHORITIES ON A NONINTERFERENCE BASIS

6-40. Department of the Army (DA) provides support to civil search and rescue (SAR), only when directed. The National Search and Rescue Plan, International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue manual, various international agreements, and Department of Defense and DA policies all provide the authoritative basis for military participation in civil SAR efforts. Military commanders, regardless of Service, may be requested to support civil SAR operations when they have the capability to do so. (FM 3-50.1) (USACAC)


No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit identified critical command, control, and communications requirements with appropriate civil authorities and agencies.
02	Yes/No	Unit coordinated procedures to report, locate, support, and recover with appropriate civil authorities and agencies.
03	Yes/No	Unit coordinated equipment requirements with appropriate civil authorities and agencies.

ART 6.2.5 SUPPORT HOMELAND SECURITY PERSONNEL RECOVERY OPERATIONS

6-41. In cases where the President declares a “major disaster or emergency,” a number of possible mechanisms are activated to support homeland security personnel recovery operations resulting from a major disaster or emergency. The Federal Emergency Management Agency of the Department of Homeland Security becomes the lead response agency in such cases as provided in the National Response Plan. The Department of Defense is signatory to the National Response Framework. The circumstances that exist before and after a disaster declaration may involve civil search and rescue operations carried out under the National Search and Rescue Plan, and may even involve mass rescue operations as discussed below. (FM 3-50.1) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit identified critical command, control, and communications support requirements with appropriate civil authorities and agencies.
02	Yes/No	Unit coordinated procedures to report, locate, support, and recover with appropriate civil authorities and agencies.
03	Yes/No	Unit coordinated equipment requirements with appropriate civil authorities and agencies.

SECTION III – ART 6.3: CONDUCT INFORMATION PROTECTION



6-42. *Information protection* is active or passive measures that protect and defend friendly information and information systems to ensure timely, accurate, and relevant friendly information. It denies enemies, adversaries, and others the opportunity to exploit friendly information and information systems for their own purposes. Information protection comprises information assurance, computer network defense, and electronic protection. (FM 3-0) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit course of action was not compromised by enemy information operations (IO).
02	Time	To develop and refine IO annex to operation order.
03	Time	To identify, determine appropriate response, and implement changes in response to a possible threat to friendly information systems.
04	Time	For friendly information and intelligence collection sensor system managers, operators, and emergency response teams and contact teams to respond, identify, and correct system failures attributed to enemy IO.
05	Percent	Of time units in area of operations (AO) are in restrictive information operations condition.
06	Percent	Of friendly emitters in AO known to have been exploited by an enemy.
07	Percent	Of information systems hardware, software components, and databases backed up by replacement components or backup files in case of failure or compromise.
08	Percent	Of information system software components and databases protected by firewalls and virus detection software.
09	Number	Of times to reprogram information system software in response to identified threats.
10	Number	Of instances of enemy IO disabling, corrupting, or compromising friendly information systems and intelligence collection sensors.
11	Number	Of instances of electronic fratricide in the AO.

ART 6.3.1 PROVIDE INFORMATION ASSURANCE

6-43. Plan, establish, and conduct programs and procedures to protect information and information systems. Implement safeguards and controls on data networks and computer systems. Ensure availability, integrity, authenticity, and security of information networks, systems, and data. Detect and react to compromises. Restore networks, systems, and data. (FM 3-13) (USACAC)

ART 6.0: The Protection Warfighting Function

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Systems administrators and operators performed risk assessment of potential threats to friendly information systems and took appropriate action to respond to those risks.
02	Time	For information system emergency response teams to identify, respond, and correct information system failures attributed to adversary information operations or criminal mischief.
03	Percent	Of information systems not protected by firewalls, virus detection software, and other appropriate information protection measures.
04	Percent	Of information systems hardware components, software programs, and databases that have backups to replace or duplicate them in case of failure or corruption.
05	Percent	Of enemy or criminal attempts to disable, corrupt, or compromise friendly information system components, software, and databases that are successful.
06	Percent	Of enemy or criminal attempts to disable, corrupt, or compromise friendly information system components, software, and databases detected by system administrators and operators and automated protective systems, such as firewalls.
07	Percent	Of friendly information systems linked to the Internet.
08	Number	Of redundant communications paths available to connect information systems.
09	Number	Of attempts to disable, corrupt, or compromise friendly information system components, software, and databases.
10	Number	And types of friendly information systems linked to unsecured and secured Internet.

ART 6.3.1.1 ENSURE INFORMATION SECURITY

6-44. Deny the enemy access to electronic information (both communications and noncommunications) that could be used to identify friendly capabilities and intentions. (FM 3-13) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Signal security compromises degraded, delayed, or modified unit operations.
02	Yes/No	Firewalls, virus protection software, or other information protection measures protected unit information systems.
03	Time	To refine and synchronize signal and information operations (IO) annexes to operation order.
04	Time	To complete operations security (OPSEC) assessment in the area of operations (AO).
05	Time	To identify improper occurrence of signal security.
06	Time	For appropriate information response teams to respond, identify, and correct information system failures attributed to enemy offensive IO or criminal activity.
07	Percent	Of increased or decreased number of security violations on combat net radios in the AO within a given time.
08	Percent	Of successful enemy attempted penetration of friendly information systems.
09	Percent	Of emitter system administrators and operators who have current OPSEC training.
10	Percent	Of enemy sensor coverage in AO known to friendly force.
11	Percent	Of identified friendly vulnerabilities in AO exploited by enemy actions.
12	Percent	Of electronic communications in AO encrypted or secured.
13	Percent	Of message traffic in AO exploited by enemy.
14	Percent	Of friendly emitters in AO exploited by enemy.
15	Percent	Of signal security measures previously assessed unsatisfactory that have improved based on assessment.
16	Percent	Of friendly operations conducted in a restrictive emission control environment.
17	Percent	Of units, installations, and agencies in AO operating from a common signal operation instruction.
18	Percent	Of unit communications systems required to maintain more than one encryption system.
19	Number	Of security violations on combat net radios in the AO.

No.	Scale	Measure
20	Number	Of teams fielded to monitor friendly emitters.
21	Number	Of interceptions of friendly communications during planning and execution.
22	Number	Of instances when frequency allocation or frequency management fails to prevent signal fratricide.

ART 6.3.1.2 EMPLOY COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY

6-45. Deny the enemy information of value that might be derived from the possession and study of telecommunications. (FM 6-02.72) (USASC&FG)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Communications security compromises degraded, delayed, or modified unit operations.
02	Yes/No	Unit executed controlling authority functions.
03	Time	To refine and synchronize signal annex to operation order.
04	Time	To complete communications security assessment in the area of operations (AO).
05	Time	To identify improper occurrences of communications security.
06	Percent	Of increased or decreased number of security violations on combat net radios in the AO within a given time.
07	Percent	Of enemy sensor coverage in AO known to friendly force.
08	Percent	Of successful enemy attempted penetration of friendly information systems.
09	Percent	Of information system administrators and operators who have current operations security training.
10	Percent	Of identified friendly communications vulnerabilities in AO exploited by enemy actions.
11	Percent	Of electronic communications in AO encrypted or secured.
12	Percent	Of message traffic in AO exploited by enemy.
13	Percent	Of friendly information systems in AO exploited by enemy.
14	Percent	Of communications security measures previously assessed unsatisfactory that have improved based on assessment.
15	Percent	Of friendly operations conducted in a restrictive emission control environment.
16	Percent	Of units, installations, and agencies in AO operating from a common signal operation instructions.
17	Percent	Of unit communications systems requiring more than one encryption system.
18	Percent	Of communications systems using encryption.
19	Percent	Of systems that include communications security in communications network planning.
20	Number	Of communications security incidents reported.
21	Number	Of security violations on combat net radios in the AO.
22	Number	Of teams fielded to monitor friendly communications systems.
23	Number	Of interceptions of friendly communications during planning and execution.
24	Number	Of redundant communications paths available to connect operational information systems.

ART 6.3.1.3 MAINTAIN EMISSION SECURITY

6-46. Plan and implement measures to deny unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived from their interception and study of electromagnetic radiation. Select and control the use of electromagnetic, acoustic, or other emitters to optimize friendly operations and capabilities while minimizing detection by enemy sensors and mutual interference among friendly systems. (FM 6-02.72) (USASC&FG)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Signal emission security compromises degraded, delayed, or modified unit operations.
02	Time	To refine and synchronize signal and IO annexes to operation order.

No.	Scale	Measure
03	Time	To complete operations security (OPSEC) assessment in the area of operations (AO).
04	Time	To identify improper maintenance of emission security.
05	Percent	Of emitter system administrators and operators who have current OPSEC training.
06	Percent	Of enemy sensor coverage in AO known to friendly force.
07	Percent	Of identified friendly vulnerabilities in AO exploited by enemy actions.
08	Percent	Of electronic communications in AO encrypted or secured.
09	Percent	Of friendly emitters in AO exploited by enemy.
10	Percent	Of emission security measures previously assessed unsatisfactory that have improved based on new assessment.
11	Percent	Of friendly operations conducted in a restrictive emission control environment.
12	Percent	Of friendly courses of action that the enemy can determine by observing friendly emitters.
13	Number	Of emission security violations in the AO in a given time.
14	Number	Of teams fielded to monitor friendly emitters.
15	Number	Of interceptions of friendly emitters during planning and execution.
16	Number	Of instances when frequency allocation or frequency management fails to prevent signal fratricide.

ART 6.3.2 PERFORM COMPUTER NETWORK DEFENSE

6-47. Computer network defense is actions to defend against unauthorized activity within computer networks. Computer network defense includes monitoring, detection, analysis, response, and restoration activities. These activities are performed by multiple disciplines, such as operations, network administrators, intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement. (FM 3-13) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Enemy offensive information operations (IO) compromised unit course of action.
02	Time	To develop and refine IO annex to operation order.
03	Time	To identify, determine appropriate response, and implement changes in response to a possible threat to information systems.
04	Time	For friendly information and intelligence collection sensor system managers, operators, and emergency response teams or contact teams to respond, identify, and correct system failures attributed to enemy offensive IO.
05	Percent	Of time units in the area of operations (AO) are in restrictive emission control condition.
06	Percent	Of friendly emitters in the AO known to have been exploited by an enemy.
07	Percent	Of information systems hardware, software components, and databases backed up by replacement components or backup files in case of failure or compromise.
08	Number	Of times to reprogram information system software in response to identified threats.
09	Number	Of instances of enemy offensive IO disabling, corrupting, or compromising friendly information systems and intelligence collection sensors.
10	Number	Of instances of electronic fratricide in the AO.

ART 6.3.3 PERFORM ELECTRONIC PROTECTION ACTIONS

6-48. Plan and implement active and passive means to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare (EW) that may degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. Electronic protection includes the hardening of equipment and facilities from the effects of EW; emission control procedures and measures as outlined in ART 6.3.1.3 (Maintain Emission Security); and the efficient management of the electromagnetic spectrum as outlined in ART 5.3.6 (Conduct Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations). (JP 6-0) (USJFCOM JWFC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	EW mission spectrum requirements were de-conflicted with the unit spectrum manager.
02	Yes/No	All EW systems operated without interference.
03	Yes/No	EW system emission security compromises degraded, delayed, or modified unit operations.
04	Time	To evaluate EW-related frequency interference issues.
05	Time	To coordinate EW-related frequency interference issues.
06	Time	To resolve EW-related frequency interference issues.
07	Time	To identify improper maintenance of emission security.
08	Time	To respond to new threats through reprogramming of systems.
09	Time	To take appropriate measure against friendly or enemy EW system interference.
10	Percent	Of identified friendly vulnerabilities in the area of operations (AO) exploited by enemy actions.
11	Percent	Of friendly emitters in the AO exploited by enemy.
12	Percent	Of friendly operations conducted in a restrictive emission control environment.
13	Percent	Of emission control procedures that have improved from previous assessments
14	Percent	Of successful EW system reprogramming events.
15	Percent	Of friendly systems affected by friendly EW systems.
16	Percent	Of friendly systems affected by enemy EW systems.
17	Number	Of frequency interference issues.
18	Number	Of EW systems operating on assigned frequencies.
19	Number	Of EW systems detected by enemy sensors.
20	Number	Of emission security violations in the AO in a given time.
21	Number	Of instances when frequency allocation or frequency management fails to prevent signal fratricide.
22	Number	Of EW system reprogramming events.
23	Number	Of instances when EW system reprogramming is unsuccessful.
24	Number	Of friendly systems affected by friendly or enemy EW systems.


ART 6.3.4 CONDUCT ELECTRONIC PROTECTION

6-49. Plan and implement actions such as communications avoidance or communications antijamming measures to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from friendly and enemy employment of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. (FM 3-13) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit course of action was not compromised by enemy offensive information operations (IO).
02	Time	To develop and refine IO annex to operation order.
03	Time	For friendly information and intelligence collection sensor system managers, operators, and emergency response teams or contact teams to respond, identify, and correct system failures attributed to enemy offensive IO.
04	Time	To identify, determine appropriate response, and implement changes in response to a possible threat to information systems.
05	Percent	Of time units in the area of operations (AO) are in restrictive information operations condition.
06	Percent	Of friendly emitters in the AO known to have been exploited by an enemy.
07	Percent	Of information systems hardware, software components, and databases backed up by replacement components or backup files in case of failure or compromise.
08	Number	Of times to reprogram information system software in response to identified threats.

No.	Scale	Measure
09	Number	Of instances of enemy offensive IO disabling, corrupting, or compromising friendly information systems and intelligence collection sensors.
10	Number	Of instances of electronic fratricide in the AO.

SECTION IV – ART 6.4: PERFORM FRATRICIDE AVOIDANCE



6-50. Fratricide is the unintentional killing of friendly personnel by friendly firepower. Responsibility for preventing fratricide is the responsibility of the commander, yet all Soldiers must avoid the reluctance to employ, integrate, and synchronize all the combat power at the critical time and place. (FM 3-20.15) (USAARMC)

ART 6.4.1 DETECT AND ESTABLISH POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF FRIEND, FOE, AND NONCOMBATANTS

6-51. Discretely and positively determine, by any means, the identity of tactical units, their equipment, and personnel, or of phenomena, such as communications-electronic patterns. Distinguish these forces from hostile or unknown forces and means, one from the other. (FM 5-19) (CRC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit was able to correctly identify other forces, equipment, and personnel in the area of operations (AO).
02	Time	To refine the force protection plan.
03	Time	Elapsed before enemy begins to mimic identification or recognition procedures.
04	Time	To confirm the identified or unidentified friendly unit or system.
05	Time	To confirm the identity of an unidentified target.
06	Time	To pass a target identity to the decision maker.
07	Time	To change codes in identification, friend or foe (IFF) systems.
08	Percent	Of force in the AO that has passive identification interrogation capability.
09	Percent	Of IFF systems operating correctly.
10	Percent	Of force in AO using their IFF systems.
11	Percent	Of friendly systems in the AO destroyed by friendly fire.
12	Percent	Of casualties in the AO from friendly fire.
13	Percent	Of positive identification false negatives (friendly identified as enemy) in the AO.
14	Percent	Of positive identification false positives (enemy identified as friendly) in the AO.

No.	Scale	Measure
15	Percent	Of units accurately reporting their locations.
16	Number	Of penetrations in the AO by unknown targets.
17	Number	Of IFF systems operating correctly in the AO.

ART 6.4.1.1 PERFORM TARGET DETECTION

6-52. Characterize detected objects as friend, enemy, or neutral. In combat operations, discriminate between recognizable objects as being friendly, neutral, or enemy, or the name that belongs to the object as a member of a class. Identify a recognized object and the specific designation of that object to determine to the extent that firing or other tactical decisions concerning it could be made. This aspect of combat identification is time sensitive and directly supports a combatant's shoot or don't-shoot decision for detected objects on the battlefield. (FM 3-20.15) (USAARMC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit classified detected object as friend, foe, or neutral.
02	Yes/No	Unit determined threat level of object.
03	Percent	Of objects detected.
04	Percent	Of objects not detected.

ART 6.4.1.2 DECIDE TARGET ENGAGEMENT

6-53. Determine the appropriate application of military options and weapons resources on identified objects. Identify the process used to execute a course of action developed to engage a target determined by situational awareness and available weapons or resources. Select a course of action as the one most favorable to accomplish the mission. In an estimate of the situation, a clear and concise statement of the line of action intended to be followed by the commander as the one most favorable to successfully accomplishing the mission. (FM 3-20.15) (USAARMC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit determined target displays hostile intent.
02	Yes/No	Unit determined if target can be engaged within rules of engagement.
03	Yes/No	Unit determined if available resources can destroy the target.
04	Yes/No	Unit determined the most favorable course of action.

ART 6.4.1.3 ENGAGE HOSTILE TARGET

6-54. Use military options or resources to engage a target with appropriate lethal or nonlethal weapons. Dominate targets and protect friendly and neutral personnel. (FM 3-20.15) (USAARMC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit used appropriate weapon to engage target.
02	Yes/No	Unit protected friendly and neutral personnel.
03	Time	To engage targets.
04	Percent	Of targets suppressed.
05	Percent	Of targets destroyed.
06	Percent	Of targets not engaged.
07	Percent	Of risk to friendly forces to engage targets.
08	Percent	Of risk to neutral personnel to engage targets.

ART 6.4.1.4 PERFORM TARGET ENGAGEMENT ASSESSMENT

6-55. Assess the applied resources applied and whether the action generated the desired effects in support of the commander’s fires objectives. (FM 3-20.15) (USAARMC)


No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit used effective process to assess existing or new threats.
02	Yes/No	Unit achieved desired engagement results.
03	Yes/No	Unit used information to detect additional threats.
04	Yes/No	Unit used appropriate level of force to engage target.
05	Time	To complete engagement assessment.
06	Time	To send assessment to higher headquarters.

ART 6.4.2 MAINTAIN CONSTANT SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

6-56. *Situational awareness* is immediate knowledge of the conditions of the operation, constrained geographically and in time. It is the ability to maintain a constant, clear mental picture of the tactical situation. This picture includes an understanding of both the friendly and enemy situations and of relevant terrain. It also includes relating events in time to form logical conclusions and make decisions that anticipate events. (FM 3-0) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Percent	Of friendly forces following established procedures to identify themselves.
02	Percent	Of friendly forces detecting friendly objects or entities.

SECTION V – ART 6.5: CONDUCT OPERATIONAL AREA SECURITY



6-57. Operational area security is a form of security operations conducted to protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and actions within an area of operations. Although vital to the success of military

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operations, operational area security is an economy of force mission designed to ensure the continued conduct of sustainment operations and to support decisive and shaping operations. (FM 3-90) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	The operations of the area security force provided the protected force or installation with sufficient reaction time and maneuver space.
02	Yes/No	Area security forces were in place not later than time specified in operation order.
03	Yes/No	Area security force prevented enemy ground observation of protected force or installation.
04	Yes/No	Collateral damage due to the conduct of area security operations was within acceptable limits.
05	Yes/No	Area security force provided early and accurate warning of enemy approach.
06	Yes/No	Area security force oriented its operations on the protected forces and facilities.
07	Yes/No	Area security force performed continuous reconnaissance.
08	Yes/No	Area security force maintained contact with enemy forces.
09	Yes/No	Area security force protected government-sponsored civilian stabilization and reconstruction personnel.
10	Yes/No	Area security force protected contractor and nongovernmental organization stabilization personnel and resources.
11	Yes/No	Commander developed criteria for ending the area security operation.
12	Yes/No	Area commander established useful intelligence links with local authorities.
13	Time	To conduct reconnaissance of the area.
14	Time	To plan area security operation.
15	Time	To prepare for the area security operation including the conduct of troop movement.
16	Time	To execute the area security operation.
17	Time	To report enemy activities to appropriate headquarters.
18	Time	Before the secured force, installation, or route encounters enemy forces.
19	Time	To integrate host-nation or third-nation security forces and means into friendly area security operations.
20	Time	Between observation and surveillance of named areas of interest in the secured area.
21	Time	For a reaction force or tactical combat force to respond and reach an installation or facility under attack.
22	Time	Of increased required to transit an area due to enemy attacks on transportation facilities and road networks.
23	Percent	Of security force casualties during the area security operation.
24	Percent	Of casualties (secured force or installation and people using secured routes) during the area security operation.
25	Percent	Of unit combat power needed to provide desired degree of security.
26	Percent	Of decreased support capability of sustainment units due to enemy attacks.
27	Percent	Of decreased support capability of sustainment units due to the requirement to provide security forces from internal assets.
28	Percent	Of decreased transport capability of a line of communications or main supply route due to enemy attacks.
29	Percent	Of increased availability of area security forces through use of host-nation or third-nation security forces.
30	Percent	Of enemy reconnaissance and other forces destroyed or repelled by the area security force.
31	Percent	Of friendly operations judged as not compromised prior to or during execution.
32	Percent	Of operations not compromised (based on enemy prisoner of war interrogations or captured documents).

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No.	Scale	Measure
31	Percent	Of critical facilities in the area of operations hardened or protected by area security forces.
32	Percent	Of security measures completed for a given facility in the secured area.
33	Percent	Of the secured area that can be observed by visual observation or covered by sensors at any given time.
34	Percent	Of lines of communications and main supply routes in the area secured.
35	Percent	Of available military police effort in area used to provide area security, such as command post guards and reaction forces.
36	Percent	Of information system networks that have multiple paths over which to transmit data.
37	Percent	Of attempted enemy attacks—including terrorist attacks—that penetrate area security.
38	Number	And types of maneuver forces used to provide area security.
39	Number	And types of enemy forces operating in the area being secured.
40	Number	Of incidents where enemy forces affect the security of friendly units and facilities, such as terrorist attacks, snipping, and isolated mortar or rocket attacks.
41	Number	Of incidents where enemy forces compromise friendly courses of actions, level II and level III attacks, or terrorist attacks that penetrate into target area.
42	Number	Of casualties incurred by the security force during the conduct of the area security operation.
43	Number	Of casualties incurred by the secured force or installation during the conduct of the area security operation.
44	Number	Of mobility corridors or avenues of approach that the area security force can observe.
45	Number	Of observation or guard posts that the area security force can establish.
46	Number	Of enemy reconnaissance and other forces destroyed during security operation.
47	Square Kilometers	Size of area being secured.

ART 6.5.1 CONDUCT AREA AND BASE SECURITY OPERATIONS

6-58. Area and base security operations are a specialized area security operation. It protects friendly forces, installations, and actions in the support area. It includes measures taken by military units, activities, and installations to protect themselves from acts designed to impair their effectiveness. (FM 3-90) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Operations of the security forces provided the protected force or installation with sufficient reaction time and maneuver space.
02	Yes/No	Sustainment area and base security forces were in place not later than time specified in operation order.
03	Yes/No	Sustainment area and base security forces prevented enemy ground observation of protected force or installation.
04	Yes/No	Collateral damage was due to the conduct of sustainment area; base security operations were within acceptable limits.
05	Yes/No	Security force provided early and accurate warning of enemy approach toward base perimeter.
06	Yes/No	The security force oriented its operations on the protected facilities.
07	Yes/No	The security force performed continuous reconnaissance.
08	Yes/No	The security force maintained contact with enemy forces.
09	Yes/No	The area commander established useful intelligence links with local authorities.
10	Yes/No	Commander prioritized sustainment area and base security efforts to protect most critical resources.

No.	Scale	Measure
11	Time	To conduct reconnaissance of the sustainment area.
12	Time	To plan sustainment area and base security operations.
13	Time	To prepare for the sustainment area and base security operations including the conduct of troop movement.
14	Time	To execute the sustainment area and base security operations.
15	Time	To report enemy activities to appropriate headquarters.
16	Time	Of warning before the secured force, installation, or route encounters enemy forces.
17	Time	To integrate host-nation or third-nation security forces and means into friendly sustainment area and base security operations.
18	Time	Between observation and surveillance of named areas of interest in secured area.
19	Time	For a reaction force or tactical combat force to respond and reach an installation or facility under attack.
20	Percent	Of security forces casualties during the sustainment area and base security operations.
21	Percent	Of casualties (secured force or installation and people using secured routes) during the sustainment area and base security operations.
22	Percent	Of unit combat power to provide desired degree of sustainment area and base security.
23	Percent	Of decreased support capability of sustainment units due to the requirement to provide security forces from internal assets.
24	Percent	Of decreased support capability of sustainment units due to enemy attacks.
25	Percent	Of decreased transport capability of a line of communications or main supply route due to enemy attacks.
26	Percent	Of increased availability of sustainment area and base security forces through use of host-nation or third-nation security forces.
27	Percent	Of enemy reconnaissance and other forces destroyed or repelled by the base security forces.
28	Percent	Of friendly sustaining operations judged as not compromised before or during execution.
29	Percent	Of critical facilities in the area of operations hardened and protected by security forces.
30	Percent	Of security measures—such as perimeter fences, cleared fields of fire, and anti-intrusion detection devices—completed for a given facility in the sustainment area.
31	Percent	Of the sustainment area that can be observed by visual observation or covered by sensors at any given time.
32	Percent	Of lines of communications and main supply routes secured in the sustainment area.
33	Percent	Of available military police effort in area used to provide sustainment area security, such as reaction forces.
34	Percent	Of attempted enemy attacks—including terrorist attacks—that penetrate a base's perimeter security.
35	Number	And types of maneuver forces used to provide sustainment area and base security.
36	Number	And types of enemy forces operating in the echelon sustainment area.
37	Number	Of incidents where enemy forces affect the security of friendly bases, such as terrorist attacks, snipping, and isolated mortar or rocket attacks.
38	Number	Of incidents where enemy forces compromise friendly courses of action, level II and level III attacks, or terrorist attacks that penetrate into their target area.
39	Number	Of security force casualties during the sustainment area and base security operations.
40	Number	Of secured force or installation casualties during the sustainment area and base security operations.
41	Number	Of mobility corridors or avenues of approach that can be observed by the area security force.

No.	Scale	Measure
42	Number	Of observation posts, guard posts, or checkpoints that can be established by the sustainment area security force.
43	Number	Of enemy reconnaissance and other forces destroyed during the conduct of sustainment area security operations.
44	Square Kilometers	Size of the echelon sustainment area.

ART 6.5.2 CONDUCT CRITICAL INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES SECURITY

6-59. Use protective measures to prevent or reduce the effects of enemy hostile acts (such as sabotage, insurgent actions, and terrorist attack) against unit critical facilities and systems designated as Site Security Level-A or Protection Level I. Protective measures include conducting local security operations, protecting individuals and systems, preparing fighting positions, preparing protective positions, employing protective equipment, reacting to enemy direct fire, reacting to enemy indirect fire, reacting to enemy aerial attack, reacting to a terrorist incident. (FM 3-27.10) (USASMDC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Security force protected installation or facility from damage.
02	Yes/No	Unit established executable antiterrorism program
03	Yes/No	Unit established procedures to change force protection conditions.
04	Yes/No	Unit had procedures to respond to enemy use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives weapons.
05	Yes/No	Antiterrorism and physical security plan was coordinated, approved, and executable.
06	Time	To refine base and base cluster defense plan.
07	Time	For a higher headquarters to assess base and base cluster defense plans.
08	Time	To coordinate additional assets for unit lines of communications.
09	Time	For reaction forces and response forces to respond to enemy threats to critical installations or facilities.
10	Time	To review counterintelligence plans for major tactical units in the area of operations.
11	Percent	Of unit to secure critical installations and provide facility security.
12	Percent	Of successful level I, level II, and terrorist attacks in echelon sustainment area.
13	Percent	Of decreased friendly installations and facilities capabilities due to successful attacks.
14	Percent	Of critical installations, facilities, and communications hardened against attack.
15	Percent	Of alternate path communications supporting operations in the area of operations.
16	Percent	Of friendly installations and unit having current counterterrorism or antiterrorism training programs in effect.
17	Percent	Of threat assessments passed within established criteria.
18	Percent	Of tactical units in the area of operations that have counterintelligence plans.
19	Number	Of level I, level II, and terrorist attacks attempted against critical installations and facilities in the unit sustainment area.
20	Number	Of friendly force actions that disrupt enemy intelligence collection efforts.
21	Number	Of enemy acts against friendly forces near the unit.
22	Number	Of instances of operations degraded, disrupted, delayed, or modified due to successful enemy penetration of critical installations and facilities.

ART 6.5.3 ESTABLISH LOCAL SECURITY

6-60. Take measures to protect friendly forces from attack, surprise, observation, detection, interference, espionage, terrorism, and sabotage. ART 6.5.3 enhances the freedom of action of tactical units in an area of

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operations by identifying and reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. (FM 3-90) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Effective local security existed in a 360-degree arc around the unit.
02	Yes/No	Commander adjusted unit levels of alert based on the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations.
03	Time	To plan local security operations.
04	Time	To prepare for the conduct of local security operations.
05	Time	That local security will be maintained.
06	Time	To establish observation and guard posts.
07	Time	To conduct patrols of the local area.
08	Time	To emplace camouflage.
09	Time	Between observation and surveillance of dead space within direct fire range of the unit's perimeter.
10	Time	For all unit personnel to occupy fighting and survivability positions on receipt of warning of enemy attack or operation order.
11	Time	To site and emplace protective obstacles, such as concertina wire and command detonated antipersonnel mines.
12	Time	To adjust local security measures in reaction to changes in environmental conditions, such as fog, rain, and nightfall.
13	Time	For unit reaction force to respond to enemy penetration of unit perimeter.
14	Time	To establish ambushes to provide local protection under limited visibility conditions.
15	Percent	Of unit observing stand-to time and procedures as outlined in unit standing operating procedures.
16	Percent	Of unit observing movement control restrictions.
17	Percent	Of unit observing unit noise and light discipline protocols.
18	Percent	Of available ground sensors, night vision devices, and daylight sights in operating condition.
19	Percent	Of local area around the unit under continuous observation or surveillance.
20	Percent	Of unit to provide local security.
21	Percent	Of decreased sustainment unit functional capabilities due to the requirement for those units to provide their own local security.
22	Number	And types of ground sensors, night vision devices, and daylight sights in operating condition.
23	Number	Of observation and guard posts established.
24	Number	Of patrols operating at any given time.
25	Number	Of ambushes operating at any given time.
26	Number	Of instances of enemy surveillance and reconnaissance attempts disrupted by friendly local security activities.
27	Number	Of level I and terrorist attacks directed against the unit.

ART 6.5.3.1 ESTABLISH GUARD POSTS

6-61. Delineate the organization and functions of interior and exterior guards to include orders, countersigns, parole words, and responsibility of the main guard; the duties of personnel; and methods of mounting the guard. (FM 3-90) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Personnel manning guard posts took appropriate action per rules of engagement and special orders to prevent unauthorized entry or exit from protected facility.
02	Yes/No	Guard posts hardened against terrorist or level I attack.

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No.	Scale	Measure
03	Yes/No	Personnel manning guard posts allowed only authorized persons and vehicles access to the protected site.
04	Yes/No	Guard posts allowed adequate observation of mobility corridors and access routes leading into and out of the protected site.
05	Yes/No	Guard posts communicated with guardhouse, base defense operations center, and unit command post.
06	Yes/No	Method of mounting guard was per doctrine, regulations, and unit standing operating procedures.
07	Time	To assess the site—identify threat and vulnerabilities, review existing security arrangements, coordinate with facility commander, and conduct reconnaissance of the area.
08	Time	To develop guard post orders.
09	Time	To establish communication with guard house, base defense operations center, and unit command post.
10	Time	To establish barrier control measure using available materials.
11	Time	To implement access controls, such as access rosters, badge systems, and duress codes.
12	Time	To establish challenge and password system.
13	Time	To emplace perimeter control measures to include concertina wire, mines, trenches, barricades, fences, and nonlethal capabilities.
14	Time	To obtain additional resources to improve existing perimeter control measures.
15	Time	To pass personnel and vehicles through the guard post.
16	Percent	Of perimeter penetrations detected and reported.
17	Percent	Of mission-capable perimeter control measures.
18	Percent	Of unit personnel to man existing guard posts.
19	Percent	Of protected site perimeter covered by observation from existing guard posts.
20	Number	Of guard posts established.
21	Number	Of personnel to man existing guard posts.
22	Number	Of surface and subsurface (tunnels) perimeter penetrations taking place or attempted.

ART 6.5.3.2 ESTABLISH CHECKPOINTS

6-62. Establish checkpoints to monitor and control movement, inspect cargo, enforce rules and regulations, and provide information. (FM 3-19.4) (USAMPS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Personnel manning checkpoints took appropriate actions per rules of engagement and special orders to control movement, inspect cargo, and enforce rules and regulations.
02	Yes/No	Checkpoint hardened against terrorist or level I attack.
03	Yes/No	Personnel manning checkpoint allowed only authorized persons and vehicles to pass through the checkpoint.
04	Yes/No	Checkpoints placed at unanticipated locations and located so the checkpoint cannot be seen more than a short distance away to prevent it being avoided.
05	Yes/No	Checkpoints communicated with response forces, base defense operations center, and unit command post.
06	Yes/No	Method of operating checkpoint was per doctrine, regulations, status-of-forces agreements, and unit standing operating procedures.
07	Yes/No	Male and female search teams were available.
08	Yes/No	Units dismantled roadblocks and established checkpoints.

No.	Scale	Measure
09	Time	To assess the checkpoint site—identify threat and vulnerabilities, review existing security arrangements, coordinate with facility commander, and conduct reconnaissance of the area.
10	Time	To develop special instructions for checkpoints.
11	Time	To establish communications with response forces, base defense operations center, and unit command post.
12	Time	To emplace checkpoint control measures to include concertina wire, mines, trenches, barricades, fences, and nonlethal capabilities.
13	Time	To establish barriers around checkpoint using available materials.
14	Time	To obtain additional resources to improve existing perimeter control measures.
15	Time	To pass personnel and vehicles through the checkpoint.
16	Percent	Of contraband detected and reported.
17	Percent	Of mission-capable checkpoint control measures.
18	Percent	Of unit personnel to man existing checkpoint.
19	Percent	Of personnel and vehicles that initiate fires against the checkpoint killed, destroyed, or captured.
20	Percent	Of personnel aware of rules of engagement and limitations regarding search, arrest, and use of force.
21	Number	Of checkpoints established.
22	Number	Of personnel to man existing checkpoints.
23	Number	Of personnel or vehicles attempting to flee or breach the checkpoint.
24	Number	And types of contraband seized at checkpoints.

ART 6.5.3.3 ESTABLISH PERIMETER SECURITY

6-63. Employ defensive measures to protect a unit, facility, or location from attack, unauthorized access, theft, or sabotage. Measures may include physical barriers, clear zones, lighting, guards or sentries, reaction forces, intrusion detection devices, and defensive positions. (FM 3-90) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Effective perimeter security existed in a 360-degree arc around the unit.
02	Yes/No	Commander adjusted unit levels of alert based on the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations.
03	Yes/No	The perimeter took advantage of the natural defensive characteristics of the terrain.
04	Yes/No	The unit controlled the area surrounding the perimeter to a range beyond that of enemy mortars and rockets.
05	Yes/No	Unit used smoke and deception during the conduct of perimeter security.
06	Yes/No	Lethal and nonlethal systems and munitions were available and sufficient to support the perimeter security plan.
07	Time	To plan for perimeter security.
08	Time	To prepare for the conduct of perimeter security.
09	Time	That perimeter security will be maintained.
10	Time	To establish observation and guard posts.
11	Time	To conduct patrols of the local area.
12	Time	To emplace camouflage.
13	Time	Between observation and surveillance of dead space within direct fire range of the unit's perimeter.
14	Time	For all unit personnel to occupy fighting and survivability positions on receipt of warning of enemy attack or operation order.

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No.	Scale	Measure
15	Time	For unit reaction force to respond to enemy penetration of unit perimeter.
16	Time	To site and emplace protective obstacles, such as concertina wire and command detonated antipersonnel mines.
17	Time	To adjust local security measures in reaction to changes in environmental conditions, such as fog, rain, and nightfall.
18	Time	To establish ambushes to provide local protection under limited visibility conditions.
19	Time	To emplace security measures that are not protective obstacles, such as sally ports, guard towers, intrusion detector sensors, and exterior lights.
20	Percent	Of unit observing stand-to time and procedures as outlined in unit standing operating procedures.
21	Percent	Of unit observing movement control restrictions.
22	Percent	Of unit observing unit noise and light discipline protocols.
23	Percent	Of available ground sensors, night vision devices, and daylight sights in operating condition.
24	Percent	Of area around the unit perimeter under continuous observation or surveillance.
25	Percent	Of unit to provide perimeter security.
26	Percent	Of decreased sustainment unit functional capabilities due to the requirement for those units to provide their own perimeter security.
27	Number	And types of ground sensors, night vision devices, and daylight sights in operating condition.
28	Number	Of observation and guard posts established.
29	Number	Of patrols operating at any given time.
30	Number	Of ambushes operating at any given time.
31	Number	Of instances enemy surveillance and reconnaissance attempts disrupted by friendly security activities.
32	Number	Of level I and terrorist attacks directed against the unit perimeter.
33	Number	Of level II attacks directed against the unit perimeter.

ART 6.5.3.4 ESTABLISH OBSERVATION POSTS

6-64. Establish and maintain observation posts to prevent surprise to a protected force or to ensure observation of a designated area. (FM 3-90) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Observation post position allowed personnel to observe assigned area, such as likely enemy avenues of approach and named areas of interest.
02	Yes/No	Observation post personnel provided early warning in event of enemy activity.
03	Yes/No	Personnel manning observation post engaged and destroyed enemy reconnaissance elements within organic and available supporting capabilities.
04	Yes/No	Observation post was operational not later than the time the operation order specifies.
05	Yes/No	Observation posts communicated with higher headquarters.
06	Yes/No	Minimum of two personnel in observation post. Observation duties rotated on a given schedule.
07	Time	To plan and prepare to establish the observation post.
08	Time	To move from current position to proposed site of the observation point.
09	Time	To assess the proposed site for the observation post and move it to a more suitable location as necessary.
10	Time	To establish communications with higher headquarters.

No.	Scale	Measure
11	Time	To establish local security including the selection of fighting and hide positions for combat vehicles; preparation of range cards; emplacing chemical agent alarms; and installing camouflage, concertina wire, and protective mines.
12	Time	To orient personnel manning observation posts to terrain and mission control graphics, such as target reference points and trigger points.
13	Percent	Of enemy or civilian activity detected and reported.
14	Percent	Of serviceable, on-hand equipment (such as map with control graphics, compass, communications equipment, and observation devices) to conduct observation mission.
15	Percent	Of unit personnel to man existing observation posts.
16	Percent	Of named area of operations covered by observation from existing observation posts.
17	Number	Of observation posts established.
18	Number	Of personnel to man existing observation posts.
19	Number	Of observation posts detected by enemy reconnaissance assets.

ART 6.5.3.5 CONTROL ACCESS TO EQUIPMENT, INSTALLATIONS, MATERIEL, AND DOCUMENTS

6-65. Establish a system of complementary, overlapping security measures to control access to critical resources and information. Measures may include physical barriers, clear zones, lighting, access and key control, the use of security badges, intrusion detection devices, defensive positions, and nonlethal capabilities. (FM 3-19.30) (USAMPS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit, base, or installation physical security program protected personnel, information, and critical resources from unauthorized access.
02	Time	To review and refine unit physical security standing operating procedures per factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations.
03	Time	To refine physical security regulations for installations and major combat formation in an area of operations.
04	Time	To complete a threat analysis.
05	Time	To design, procure, emplace, and activate protective measures, such as physical barriers, clear zones, exterior lighting, access and key control, intrusion detection devices, and defensive positions.
06	Percent	Of units, bases, or installations in the area of operations that have active integrated physical security programs.
07	Percent	Of guidance in unit and base physical security programs actually followed.
08	Percent	Of planned physical barriers, clear zones, exterior lighting, access and key control, intrusion detection devices, and defensive positions operational.
09	Number	Of successful attempts to gain unauthorized access to friendly forces, installations, information, equipment, and supplies.

ART 6.5.3.6 EMPLOY INTRUSION DETECTION DEVICES

6-66. Conduct site surveys. Install and operate intrusion detection systems to protect Army installations, personnel, operations, and critical resources in both tactical and nontactical situations. (FM 3-19.30) (USAMPS)

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No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit, base, or installation intrusion detection devices protected sites from unauthorized access.
02	Yes/No	Intrusion detection device was an integrated system that encompassed interior and exterior sensors; close-circuit television systems for assessing alarm conditions; electronic entry-control systems; data-transmission media; and alarm reporting systems for monitoring, controlling, and displaying various alarm and system information.
03	Yes/No	The intrusion detection device deployed in and around barriers served as a boundary demarcation and means to keep animals and people from causing nuisance alarms by inadvertently straying into controlled area.
04	Yes/No	Voice communications linked (radio, intercom, and telephone) with the response force were located in the security center.
05	Time	To complete a threat analysis.
06	Time	To design, obtain, emplace, and activate intrusion detection device.
07	Time	For response force to respond to report of activity by the intrusion detection device.
08	Percent	Of alerts by intrusion detection device that are incorrect.
09	Number	Of intrusions into protected site that the intrusion detection device does not detect.

ART 6.5.3.7 CONDUCT COMMAND POST SECURITY

6-67. Prevent command and control (C2) disruption due to enemy forces penetrating the perimeter around a command post or the rapid forced displacement of the command post due to the presence of enemy forces. Security of command posts at all levels is essential to the continuity and successful exercise of C2. Security is achieved by using security forces, air defense, camouflage, traffic control, electronic countermeasures, and frequent displacements. (FM 3-19.4) (USAMPS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Command post secured without degradation of command post operations.
02	Yes/No	Traffic control points were near the intersection of main supply routes and access roads to the command post. They ensured traffic flowed freely, congestion was avoided, and traffic entering access roads was screened.
03	Yes/No	Unit provided personal security for the commander.
04	Yes/No	Unit established dismount point near the command post entrance.
05	Yes/No	Unit enforced noise, light, and litter discipline.
06	Yes/No	Traffic control points controlled entrance to command post by access rosters.
07	Yes/No	Security force communicated with headquarters commandant.
08	Time	To conduct reconnaissance of routes to the command post and areas around the command post.
09	Time	To conduct troop leading procedures.
10	Time	To establish a screen line around the command post.
11	Time	To conduct patrols around the command post.
12	Time	To establish defensive positions, deploy camouflage and concealment systems, deploy lethal and nonlethal measures, and protective obstacles around the command post.
13	Time	To establish a challenge and password or duress system.
14	Time	To establish communications with headquarters commandant.
15	Time	Between movements, command post displacements, or jumps.
16	Percent	Of available forces to provide command post security.
17	Percent	Of personnel who become casualties due to a level I, level II, or terrorist attack on the command post.
18	Number	Of level I, level II, and terrorist attacks against the command post.
19	Number	Of friendly force actions that disrupt enemy intelligence collection efforts.

ART 6.5.4 PROVIDE PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR SELECTED INDIVIDUALS

6-68. Protect designated high-risk individuals from assassination, kidnapping, injury, or embarrassment. ART 6.5.4 includes planning, preparing, executing, and assessing close-in protection; coordinating external security with supporting law enforcement and security agencies; and providing technical advice on protective service operations to commanders, to include conducting vulnerability assessments. (FM 3-19.12) (USAMPS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit protected principal, including key political and societal leaders, accomplished mission while receiving protective services.
02	Yes/No	Unit protected principal was not injured, killed, or captured during time in the unit or installation area of operations (AO).
03	Yes/No	Forces providing protective services received useable antiterrorism intelligence information from host-nation agencies.
04	Yes/No	Unit or installation operations security concerning measures taken to protect the principal were not deliberately or accidentally disclosed to terrorist organizations.
05	Yes/No	Local population supported principal's presence in the AO.
06	Yes/No	Effective response or reaction forces existed in the event of an attempted or successful attack on the principal.
07	Time	To refine security plans to reflect changes in protected individual's itinerary.
08	Time	For internal or external reaction and response forces to respond to an attack on the protected individual.
09	Time	To identify facilities scheduled for visit by the protected individual, inspect to determine if safeguards are adequate, and prioritize protection.
10	Time	To identify activities by the protected individual that increases vulnerability to terrorist acts.
11	Time	To collect critical personal data (medical history, likes, and dislikes) on protected individual.
12	Time	To conduct a threat assessment to include the threat level in the AO and the protected individual's history to determine previous threats targeted at the individual and conduct site visits.
13	Time	To determine and obtain any special equipment—such as military working dogs and devices—for detecting the presence of unauthorized listening devices.
14	Percent	Of friendly force and noncombatant casualties due to terrorist actions directed against the principal.
15	Percent	Of reduced unit mission capabilities or installation support capabilities due to security measures designed to protect the principal.
16	Number	And types of groups and enemy forces operating in unit AO or in the vicinity of friendly installations likely to attack the protected individual.
17	Number	And types of individuals and units needed to provide protective services in the AO.
18	Number	And types of counterterrorism and antiterrorism activities conducted to protect the principal in the AO.
19	Number	Of terrorist attacks attempted against the protected individual in the unit AO.
20	Number	Of friendly force and noncombatant casualties due to terrorist actions directed against the protected principal.
21	Cost	To provide protective services in the AO.

ART 6.5.5 CONDUCT RESPONSE FORCE OPERATIONS

6-69. Response force operations include the planning for defeat of levels I and II threats and the shaping of level III threats until the designated tactical combat force arrives for decisive operations. Response force

operations use a mobile force with appropriate fire support to deal with level II threats in the area of operations. (FM 3-19.1) (USAMPS)

ART 6.5.5.1 CONDUCT BATTLE HANDOVER FROM BASE AND BASE CLUSTER SECURITY FORCES TO RESPONSE FORCES

6-70. Transfer responsibility for fighting an enemy from the base or base cluster commander to the commander of the response force. (FM 3-90) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Battle handover occurred before the enemy penetrated base perimeter or base cluster security area.
02	Yes/No	Main bodies of units conducting battle handover were not surprised by the enemy.
03	Time	To prepare and exchange plans.
04	Time	To provide supporting fires.
05	Time	To establish conditions allowing battle handover.
06	Time	Difference between when contact at contact point was planned and when actually made.
07	Percent	Of time that participating forces are in contact with each other.
08	Percent	Of previous plans still applicable at time of battle handover.
09	Percent	Of casualties incurred by either force due to fratricide.
10	Number	Of fratricide incidents.
11	Number	Of casualties due to fratricide.
12	Kilometers	Distance between planned and actual unit contact points where linkup occurs.

ART 6.5.5.2 CONDUCT BATTLE HANDOVER FROM RESPONSE FORCES TO TACTICAL COMBAT FORCES

6-71. Transfer responsibility for fighting an enemy from the commander of the response force to the commander of a tactical combat force. A tactical combat force is a combat unit, with appropriate sustainment assets, that is assigned the mission of defeating level III threats. (FM 3-90) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Battle handover occurred before the enemy penetrated base perimeter or base cluster security area.
02	Yes/No	Main bodies of units conducting battle handover were not surprised by the enemy.
03	Yes/No	Lethal and nonlethal systems and munitions were available and sufficient to support operational requirements.
04	Time	To prepare and exchange plans.
05	Time	To provide supporting fires.
06	Time	To establish conditions allowing battle handover.
07	Time	Difference between when contact at contact point was planned and when actually made.
08	Percent	Of time that participating forces are in contact with each other.
09	Percent	Of previous plans still applicable at time of battle handover.
10	Percent	Of casualties incurred by either force due to fratricide.
11	Number	Of fratricide incidents.
12	Number	Of casualties due to fratricide.
13	Kilometers	Distance between planned and actual unit contact points where linkup occurs.

ART 6.5.6 SECURE SUPPLY ROUTES AND CONVOYS

6-72. Security and protection of supply routes and convoys in the area of operations is critical to military operations since most traffic supporting military operations moves along these routes. Plans to provide main supply route security may include designating units for convoy security, providing guidance for units to provide their own security during convoys, or establishing protection and security requirements for convoys carrying critical assets. (FM 4-01.45) (CASCOM)

ART 6.5.6.1 CONDUCT CONVOY SECURITY OPERATIONS

6-73. Convoy security operations protect convoys. Units conduct convoy security operations any time there are not enough friendly forces to continuously secure lines of communications in an area of operations, and there is a danger of enemy ground action against the convoy. Convoy security operations are defensive in nature and orient on the protected force. (FM 3-90) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Operations of the convoy security forces provided the protected convoy with sufficient reaction time and maneuver space to avoid contact with significant enemy forces.
02	Yes/No	Convoy crossed start point and release point at the times indicated in the operation order.
03	Yes/No	Fratricide did not occur.
04	Yes/No	The convoy escort oriented its operations on the movement of the protected convoy.
05	Yes/No	Collateral damage due to the convoy escort operations was within acceptable limits.
06	Yes/No	Convoy screening elements provided early and accurate warning of enemy forces located along the route used by the convoy or moving toward the convoy's route.
07	Time	To conduct coordination with escorted unit and conduct troop leading procedures.
08	Time	To obtain route information.
09	Time	To designate reconnaissance, screen, escort, and reaction force elements, and move these elements into position.
10	Time	To conduct convoy security operation.
11	Time	For reaction force elements to respond.
12	Percent	Of convoy element casualties.
13	Percent	Of convoy escort casualties.
14	Percent	Of convoys provided convoy escorts.
15	Percent	Of available combat power in area used to provide convoy escorts including reaction forces.
16	Percent	Of decreased support capability of sustainment units due to the requirement to provide convoy escort forces from internal assets.
17	Percent	Of increased supply amounts transported along a line of communications or main supply route due to the presence of convoy escorts.
18	Number	And types of forces used to provide convoy escorts.
19	Number	And types of enemy forces operating in the echelon sustainment area.
20	Number	Of convoy escort casualties during the operation.
21	Number	Of obstacles encountered, bypassed, and breached during the conduct of convoy security operations.
22	Number	And types of enemy forces destroyed during the conduct of convoy security operations.
23	Kilometers	Length of the route traveled by the escorted convoy.

ART 6.5.6.2 CONDUCT ROUTE SECURITY OPERATIONS

6-74. Route (including highway, pipeline, rail, and water) security operations protect lines of communications and friendly forces moving along them. Units conduct route security missions to prevent enemy ground forces from moving into direct fire range of the protected route. Route security operations are defensive in nature and terrain-oriented. (FM 3-90) (USACAC)

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
No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Route security elements provided early and accurate warning of enemy forces located along the route or moving toward the secured route.
02	Yes/No	Route security was established not later than the time indicated in the operation order.
03	Yes/No	Fratricide did not occur.
04	Yes/No	The route security force oriented its operations on the secured route.
05	Yes/No	Collateral damage due to providing route security was within acceptable limits.
06	Time	To plan route security operations.
07	Time	To prepare to conduct route security operations.
08	Time	To designate reconnaissance, screen, escort, and reaction force elements, and move these elements into position.
09	Time	That security force route provides route security.
10	Time	For reaction force elements to respond to incidents along the route.
11	Time	That the protected route was unavailable for use by friendly forces because of enemy activities.
12	Percent	Of enemy attacks that succeed in closing the protected route.
13	Percent	Of casualties incurred by elements using the protected route.
14	Percent	Of security force casualties.
15	Percent	Of lines of communications or main supply routes in the area of operations secured.
16	Percent	Of available combat power used to provide route security including reaction forces.
17	Percent	Of increased amount of supplies successfully transported along a line of communications or main supply route due to route security.
18	Number	And types of forces used to provide route security.
19	Number	And types of enemy forces operating near the secured route.
20	Number	Of route security force casualties during the operation.
21	Number	Of obstacles encountered, bypassed, and breached during the conduct of route security operations.
22	Number	Of attacks that succeed in closing the protected route.
23	Number	And types of enemy forces destroyed during route security operations.
24	Kilometers	Distance of the route secured.

≠ART 6.5.7 CONDUCT SUPPORT AREA OPERATIONS

6-75. Support area operations are conducted to prevent or minimize interference with command and control (C2) and support operations, provide unimpeded movement of friendly forces, to provide protection, operations to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces or defeat threats, and provide area damage control. Key functions performed in the support area include terrain management, movement, protection (security and defense), and sustainment. (FM 3-90.31) (MSCoE)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit conducted terrain management.
02	Yes/No	Unit integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
03	Yes/No	Unit conducted movement control.
04	Yes/No	Unit conducted operational area security.
05	Yes/No	Unit conducted response force operations.
06	Yes/No	Conducted base security and defense
07	Yes/No	Unit performed area damage control.
08	Yes/No	Unit conducted airspace management.
09	Yes/No	Unit performed fire support coordination.

SECTION VI – ART 6.6: APPLY ANTITERRORISM MEASURES



6-76. Antiterrorism consists of defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces. It is an element of protection. Antiterrorism is a consideration for all forces during all military operations. (FM 3-19.30) (USAMPS)

Note: This task branch only addresses antiterrorism operations. ART 7.6.4.4 (Combat Terrorism) addresses counterterrorism measures.

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit or installation continued its mission while taking actions to combat terrorism in the area of operations (AO).
02	Yes/No	Threat and vulnerability assessments for unit and installation were completed.
03	Yes/No	Unit completed antiterrorism awareness training.
04	Yes/No	Incident response plans included managing the force protection condition system.
05	Yes/No	Unit or installation received useable antiterrorism intelligence information from host-nation agencies.
06	Yes/No	Local population supported unit or installation presence in the AO.
07	Yes/No	Effective response or reaction forces existed in the event of an attempted or successful terrorist penetration of unit or installation perimeter.
08	Yes/No	Unit or installation measures designed to combat terrorism—such as operations security—were not deliberately or accidentally disclosed to terrorist organizations.
09	Time	To refine installation or unit security plans and standing operating procedures.
10	Time	For internal or external reaction and response forces to reach individual, installation, or facility under attack.
11	Time	To identify critical facilities, key terrain, and significant sites (cultural, historical, or natural) and prioritize protection.
12	Time	To identify mission essential activities vulnerable to terrorist acts and inspect to determine if safeguards are adequate.
13	Percent	Of terrorist attacks that degrade, delay, or modify friendly force operations.
14	Percent	Of units that have active counterterrorism protocols.
15	Percent	Of successful terrorist attacks.
16	Percent	Of friendly force and noncombatant casualties due to terrorist actions.
17	Percent	Of information systems in the AO hardened against unauthorized access.
18	Percent	Of information systems in the AO with multiple pathways over which to transmit data.
19	Percent	Of critical installations and facilities hardened or protected against terrorist acts.

No.	Scale	Measure
20	Percent	Of reduced unit mission capabilities or installation support capabilities due to security measures designed to combat terrorism in the AO.
21	Percent	Of reduced line of communications or main supply route through capabilities due to security measures designed to combat terrorism in the AO.
22	Number	And types of terrorists groups operating in unit AO or in the vicinity of friendly installations.
23	Number	Of counterterrorism activities unit supports in the AO.
24	Number	Of terrorist attacks attempted in unit AO.
25	Number	Of successful terrorist attacks.
26	Number	Of friendly force actions to disrupt enemy terrorist activities.
27	Number	Of friendly force and noncombatant casualties due to terrorist actions.
28	Cost	To implement protective measures against terrorism in the AO.

ART 6.6.1 IDENTIFY POTENTIAL TERRORIST THREATS AND OTHER THREAT ACTIVITIES

6-77. Enhance freedom of action by identifying and reducing friendly vulnerability to terrorist threats, acts, influence, or surprise. This includes measures to protect from surprise, observation, detection, interference, espionage, terrorism, and sabotage. (FM 3-19.30) (USAMPS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Percent	Of lines of communications secured.
02	Percent	Of total troops used to secure critical facilities and lines of communications.
03	Number	Of incidents by enemy troops or partisans affecting security of force and means in the area of operations.
04	Number	Of security plans not including smoke and obscuration.
05	Hours	To coordinate for additional assets for the area of operations.

ART 6.6.2 REDUCE VULNERABILITIES TO TERRORIST ACTS AND ATTACKS

6-78. Reduce personnel vulnerability to terrorism by understanding the nature of terrorism, knowing current threats, identifying vulnerabilities to terrorist acts, and by implementing protective measures against terrorist acts and attacks. (FM 3-19.30) (USAMPS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Actions deterred hostile actions against Soldiers, Army civilians, family members, facilities, information, and equipment; when deterrence failed, actions mitigated the consequences of terrorist attacks against these potential targets.
02	Yes/No	Commander applied judgment to every situation and combined it with available technologies to manage risk.
03	Yes/No	Commander retained freedom of action by reducing friendly force vulnerability to terrorist actions.
04	Yes/No	Unit or installation antiterrorism program included planned and integrated antiterrorism measures, counterterrorism, physical security, operations security, and personal protective services supported by counterintelligence and other security programs.
05	Yes/No	Force protection planning was a continuous process.
06	Yes/No	Force protection assets focused on protecting the most critical assets.
07	Time	To understand how potential terrorists operate.
08	Time	To prioritize unit force protection efforts based upon criticality and vulnerability assessments.

No.	Scale	Measure
09	Time	In advance that a force is warned of attack.
10	Percent	Of unit force protection activities integrated with those of other Services and nations.
11	Percent	Of reduced enemy targeting effectiveness due to the implementation of force protection measures.
12	Percent	Of reduced the effectiveness of enemy action due to friendly measures to harden units and facilities from enemy attack.
13	Percent	Of enhanced personnel, equipment, and facility survivability because of measures taken to harden them from enemy attack.
14	Number	Of friendly and noncombatant casualties due to terrorist attack.
15	Cost	Of measures to protect the unit or installation from terrorist attack.


ART 6.6.3 REACT TO A TERRORIST INCIDENT

6-79. Implement measures to treat casualties, minimize property damage, restore operations, and expedite the criminal investigation and collection of lessons learned from a terrorist incident. (FM 19-10) (USAMPS)

Note: ART 5.5.1.2.3 (Conduct Criminal Investigations) addresses the conduct of crime analysis. ART 5.3.5.2 (Collect Relevant Information) addresses the collection of lessons learned.

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Response to terrorist incident did not prevent unit or installation from accomplishing the missions.
02	Time	To conduct reconnaissance or criminal investigation of site where terrorist incident occurred.
03	Time	To establish or restore security around site where terrorist incident occurred.
04	Time	To conduct area damage control activities, such as firefighting, power restoration and production, rubble clearance, removal of downed trees, and repair of critical damaged facilities and installations.
05	Time	To report the occurrence of terrorist incident to appropriate headquarters and agencies.
06	Time	For response forces or teams to arrive at site of terrorist incident.
07	Time	To search for, collect, identify, and treat injured survivors of terrorist incident.
08	Time	To search for, collect, identify, and process the remains of individuals killed in terrorist incident.
09	Time	To restore damaged facilities to desired level of functionality.
10	Percent	Of decreased attacked facilities capabilities to perform designed function.
11	Percent	Of response forces or teams arriving at terrorist incident site within desired response times.
12	Number	Of friendly force and noncombatant casualties due to terrorist incident.
13	Cost	To provide forces and supplies to provide local security and humanitarian aid and comfort, conduct area damage control, and restore damaged facility in response to a given terrorist incident.

SECTION VII – ART 6.7: CONDUCT SURVIVABILITY OPERATIONS



6-80. ART 6.7 is a concept that includes all aspects of protecting personnel, weapons, and supplies while simultaneously deceiving the enemy. Survivability tactics include building a good defense; employing frequent movement; using concealment, deception, and camouflage; and constructing fighting and protective positions for both individuals and equipment. Included are those assessments and surveys completed as a part of focused engineer reconnaissance support that includes infrastructure reconnaissance. (See FM 3-34.170.) Survivability operations are the development and construction of protective positions, such as earth berms, dug-in positions, overhead protection, and countersurveillance means, to reduce the effectiveness of enemy weapon systems. (FM 5-103) (USAES)

Note: This task branch is supported by ART 2.2.3 (Provide Intelligence Support to Protection).

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit could continue to conduct operations.
02	Yes/No	Unit losses from hazards were at acceptable levels.
03	Yes/No	Unit could determine when contaminated area was at a level with acceptable risk.
04	Yes/No	Unit performed risk assessment of all areas in the area of operations (AO) that underwent chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons attack.
05	Time	Required to conduct an area reconnaissance.
06	Time	To determine that unit has been attacked by CBRN weapons.
07	Time	To predict downwind hazard from the use of CBRN weapons.
08	Time	To disseminate hazard information to all units in the AO and appropriate headquarters and agencies outside the AO.
09	Time	To harden unit equipment, facilities, and positions.
10	Time	To acquire equipment and supplies necessary to harden a unit or installation.
11	Percent	Of U.S. military and civilian casualties.
12	Percent	Of increased time it takes the unit to conduct its operations due to the need to protect against identified hazards.
13	Percent	Of unit that has completed risk management and safety training.
14	Percent	Of friendly casualties due to failure to report the existence of hazards.
15	Percent	Of on-hand, mission-capable equipment necessary to protect the unit against hazards.
16	Percent	Of on-hand supplies necessary to protect the unit against hazards.

No.	Scale	Measure
17	Percent	Of planned fighting positions completed.
18	Percent	Of planned protective positions completed.
19	Number	Of planned fighting positions completed.
20	Number	Of planned protective positions completed.
21	Number	And types of on-hand equipment necessary to protect the unit against hazards.
22	Number	And types of friendly equipment destroyed or damaged by enemy action.
23	Number	Of incidents of damage to units and facilities in the AO that impact the commander's concept of operations.
24	Number	Of U.S. military and civilian casualties due to enemy hazards.

ART 6.7.1 PROTECT AGAINST ENEMY HAZARDS IN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

6-81. Protect the friendly force in an area of operations (AO) by reducing or avoiding the effects of enemy weapon systems. (FM 3-0) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit could continue to conduct operations.
02	Yes/No	Unit losses from hazards were at acceptable levels.
03	Time	To conduct an area reconnaissance to identify hazards.
04	Time	To disseminate hazard data to all elements operating in the AO.
05	Time	To analyze the impact of identified hazards.
06	Time	To obtain necessary equipment and supplies to protect against hazards.
07	Time	To protect the unit and its facilities, equipment, and supplies against hazards.
08	Percent	Of increased time it takes the unit to conduct its operations because of the need to protect against identified hazards.
09	Percent	Of unit that has completed risk management and safety training.
10	Percent	Of friendly casualties due to failure to report existence of hazards.
11	Percent	Of on-hand, mission-capable equipment that is necessary to protect the unit against hazards.
12	Percent	Of U.S. military and civilian casualties.
13	Percent	Of on-hand supplies (chemoprophylaxis, pretreatments, and barrier creams) necessary to protect the unit against hazards.
14	Percent	Of planned protective positions completed.
15	Number	Of planned protective positions completed.
16	Number	And types of on-hand equipment necessary to protect against hazards.
17	Number	And types of friendly equipment destroyed or damaged by enemy action.
18	Number	Of incidents of damage to units and facilities in the AO that impact the concept of operations.
19	Number	Of U.S. military and civilian casualties due to enemy hazards.

ART 6.7.1.1 PROTECT INDIVIDUALS AND SYSTEMS

6-82. Use protective positions (natural or artificial), measures, or equipment—such as armor, detection equipment, mission-oriented protective posture gear (MOPP), and collective protective equipment—to reduce effects of enemy weapon systems. ART 6.7.1.1 includes construction of fighting and survivability positions, conduct of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense, and responding to enemy fires. (FM 3-0) (USACAC)

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No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit losses from effects of enemy weapon systems did not keep the unit from accomplishing its mission.
02	Yes/No	Unit losses from enemy weapons systems effects were at acceptable levels.
03	Yes/No	Unit used the terrain to protect itself from effects of enemy weapons.
04	Time	To conduct an area reconnaissance to identify areas where risk of enemy attack exists.
05	Time	To analyze the impact of identified hazards in the area of operations (AO).
06	Time	To revise the plan based on results of the area reconnaissance and environmental considerations.
07	Time	To disseminate area reconnaissance data and revised execution instructions to all elements operating in the AO.
08	Time	To establish the necessary degree of local security for construction efforts.
09	Time	To obtain the equipment and supplies necessary to protect the unit from the effects of enemy weapon systems.
10	Time	To protect the unit, its facilities, equipment, and supplies from the effects of enemy weapons systems.
11	Percent	Of U.S. military and civilian casualties due to enemy hazards.
12	Percent	Of increased time it takes the unit to conduct operations because of the need to protect itself from the effects of identified enemy weapons systems.
13	Percent	Of unit personnel trained to use available detection and protection equipment.
14	Percent	Of friendly casualties due to failure to use existing protective equipment and structures.
15	Percent	Of on-hand, mission-capable equipment, such as MOPP gear, necessary to protect the unit from the effects of enemy weapon systems.
16	Percent	Of on-hand supplies necessary to protect the unit from effects of enemy weapon systems.
17	Percent	Of unit personnel who become casualties due to the faulty use of terrain to protect themselves from effects of enemy weapon systems.
18	Percent	Of unit personnel who become casualties of effects of enemy weapon systems due to the faulty use of detection equipment.
19	Percent	Of planned protective positions completed.
20	Number	Of planned protective positions completed.
21	Number	And types of on-hand equipment necessary to protect the unit against the effects of enemy weapon systems.
22	Number	And types of friendly equipment destroyed or damaged by enemy action.
23	Number	Of incidents of damage to units and facilities in the AO that impact the concept of operations.
24	Number	Of U.S. military and civilian casualties from effects of enemy weapons.

ART 6.7.1.2 PREPARE FIGHTING POSITIONS

6-83. Prepare primary, alternate, and supplementary fighting positions that provide cover, concealment, and protection from the effects of enemy fires for occupants and systems, and allow for fields of fire and maneuver space for combat systems and units engaging the enemy. (FM 5-103) (USAES)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit could accomplish its mission using its fighting positions.
02	Time	To conduct an area reconnaissance including environmental considerations.
03	Time	To design primary, alternate, and supplementary fighting positions, and decide correct placement to maximize terrain effectiveness.
04	Time	To establish the degree of local security necessary for the construction effort.
05	Time	To obtain the equipment and supplies necessary to construct fighting positions.

No.	Scale	Measure
06	Time	To construct primary, alternate, and supplementary fighting positions with engineer support.
07	Time	To construct primary, alternate, and supplementary fighting positions without engineer support.
08	Percent	Of on-hand equipment and supplies needed to construct fighting positions.
09	Percent	Of personnel trained to properly construct fighting positions.
10	Percent	Of planned fighting positions completed.
11	Percent	Of completed fighting positions constructed to standard.
12	Percent	Of friendly casualties due to improperly constructed or sited fighting positions.
13	Percent	Of planned fighting positions completed.
14	Number	And types of fighting positions completed.
15	Number	Of friendly casualties due to improperly constructed or sited fighting positions.

ART 6.7.1.2.1 Construct Vehicle Fighting Positions

6-84. Construct fighting positions that provide cover, concealment, and protection from direct and indirect fires for combat vehicles, yet allow direct or indirect engagement of enemy forces. (FM 5-103) (USAES)

Note: ART 6.7.1.3.2 (Construct Vehicle, Information Systems, Equipment, and Material Protective Positions) addresses vehicles that do not provide or conduct direct fire.

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit could accomplish its mission using its vehicle fighting positions.
02	Time	To conduct area reconnaissance including environmental considerations.
03	Time	To design primary, alternate, and supplementary vehicle fighting positions, and decide correct placement to maximize terrain effectiveness.
04	Time	To establish the local security necessary for the construction effort.
05	Time	To obtain the equipment and supplies necessary to construct vehicle fighting positions.
06	Time	To construct primary, alternate, and supplementary vehicle fighting positions with engineer support.
07	Time	To construct primary, alternate, and supplementary vehicle fighting positions without engineer support.
08	Percent	Of on-hand equipment and supplies necessary to construct vehicle fighting positions.
09	Percent	Of personnel trained to properly construct vehicle fighting positions.
10	Percent	Of planned vehicle fighting positions completed.
11	Percent	Of completed vehicle fighting positions constructed to standard.
12	Percent	Of friendly casualties due to improperly constructed or sited vehicle fighting positions.
13	Number	Of planning vehicle fighting positions completed.
14	Number	Of friendly casualties due to improperly constructed or sited vehicle fighting positions.

ART 6.7.1.2.2 Construct Crew-Served Weapon Fighting Positions

6-85. Construct fighting positions and or bunkers for crew-served weapons remaining in defensive positions for extended times. Fighting positions provide cover and concealment from direct and indirect fires while allowing coverage of primary and secondary sectors of fire. (FM 5-103) (USAES)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit could accomplish its mission using crew-served weapon fighting positions.
02	Time	To conduct area reconnaissance including environmental considerations.

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No.	Scale	Measure
03	Time	To design primary, alternate, and supplementary crew-served weapon fighting positions, and decide the correct placement to maximize terrain effectiveness.
04	Time	To establish the degree of local security necessary for the construction effort.
05	Time	To obtain the necessary equipment and supplies to construct fighting positions.
06	Time	To construct primary, alternate, and supplementary crew-served weapon fighting positions with engineer support.
07	Time	To construct primary, alternate, and supplementary crew-served weapon fighting positions without engineer support.
08	Percent	Of on-hand equipment and supplies needed to construct crew-served weapon fighting positions.
09	Percent	Of personnel trained to properly construct crew-served weapon fighting positions.
10	Percent	Of planned crew-served weapon fighting positions completed.
11	Percent	Of completed crew-served weapon fighting positions constructed to standard.
12	Percent	Of friendly casualties due to improperly constructed or sited crew-served weapon fighting positions.
13	Number	And types of planned crew-served weapon fighting positions completed.
14	Number	Of friendly casualties due to improperly constructed or sited crew-served weapon fighting positions.

ART 6.7.1.2.3 Construct Individual Fighting Positions

6-86. Construct individual fighting positions that provide cover and concealment from observation and direct and indirect fires. Properly sited individual fighting positions allow Soldiers to engage the enemy with their assigned weapons while providing observation and fields of fire that overlap those of other positions. (FM 3-21.75) (USAIS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit could accomplish its mission using individual fighting positions.
02	Time	To conduct an area reconnaissance including environmental considerations.
03	Time	To design primary, alternate, and supplementary individual fighting positions, and decide correct placement to maximize terrain effectiveness.
04	Time	To establish the degree of local security for the construction effort.
05	Time	To obtain the equipment and supplies to construct fighting positions.
06	Time	To construct primary, alternate, and supplementary individual fighting positions with engineer support.
07	Time	To construct primary, alternate, and supplementary individual fighting positions without engineer support.
08	Percent	Of on-hand equipment and supplies available to construct individual fighting positions.
09	Percent	Of personnel trained to properly construct individual fighting positions.
10	Percent	Of planned individual fighting positions completed.
11	Percent	Of completed individual fighting positions constructed to standard.
12	Percent	Of completed individual fighting positions that can support unit defensive positions, such as vehicle fighting positions and crew-served weapon fighting positions.
13	Percent	Of friendly casualties due to improperly constructed or sited individual fighting positions.
14	Number	Of planned individual fighting positions completed.
15	Number	Of friendly casualties due to improperly constructed or sited individual fighting positions.

ART 6.7.1.3 PREPARE PROTECTIVE POSITIONS

6-87. Provide cover and concealment for personnel, systems, equipment, supplies, and other materiel not directly involved in fighting. This includes medical patients. These positions reduce risks associated with all forms of enemy contact, such as direct and indirect fires, enemy observations, and employment of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. (FM 5-103) (USAES)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	The use of protective positions preserved the unit's personnel, equipment, and supplies for future missions.
02	Time	To conduct an area reconnaissance including environmental considerations.
03	Time	To design protective positions for personnel, systems, equipment, supplies, and other materiel not directly involved in fighting, and to decide correct placement to maximize terrain effectiveness.
04	Time	To establish the degree of local security for the construction effort.
05	Time	To obtain the equipment and supplies to construct protective positions.
06	Time	To construct protective positions with engineer support.
07	Time	To construct protective positions without engineer support.
08	Percent	Of on-hand equipment and supplies to construct protective positions.
09	Percent	Of personnel trained to properly construct protective positions.
10	Percent	Of planned protective positions completed.
11	Percent	Of completed protective positions constructed to standard.
12	Percent	Of unit facilities not hardened.
13	Percent	Of friendly casualties due to improperly constructed or sited protective positions.
14	Percent	Of personnel casualties or equipment and supplies lost due to the nonavailability of protective positions.
15	Number	And types of planned protective positions completed.
16	Number	Of friendly casualties due to improperly constructed or sited protective positions.
17	Number	Of personnel casualties or equipment and supplies lost due to the nonavailability of protective positions.

ART 6.7.1.3.1 Construct Protective Earth Walls, Berms, and Revetments

6-88. Provide cover, concealment, and protection against direct and indirect fires without restricting the operational capability of systems. (FM 5-103) (USAES)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	The use of protective earth walls, berms, and revetments preserved unit personnel, equipment, and supplies for future missions.
02	Time	To conduct an area reconnaissance including environmental considerations.
03	Time	To design protective earth walls, berms, and revetments for personnel, systems, equipment, supplies, and other materiel not directly involved in fighting, and to decide correct placement to maximize terrain effectiveness.
04	Time	To obtain the equipment and supplies to construct protective earth walls, berms, and revetments.
05	Time	To establish degree of local security for the construction effort.
06	Time	To construct protective earth walls, berms, and revetments with engineer support.
07	Time	To construct protective earth walls, berms, and revetments without engineer support.
08	Percent	Of on-hand equipment and supplies to construct protective earth walls, berms, and revetments.
09	Percent	Of personnel trained to construct protective earth walls, berms, and revetments.
10	Percent	Of planned protective earth walls, berms, and revetments completed.

No.	Scale	Measure
11	Percent	Of completed protective earth walls, berms, and revetments constructed to standard.
12	Percent	Of unit facilities not hardened.
13	Percent	Of friendly casualties due to improperly constructed or sited protective earth walls, berms, and revetments.
14	Percent	Of personnel casualties or equipment and supplies lost to enemy attack due to the nonavailability of protective earth walls, berms, and revetments.
15	Number	Of planned protective earth walls, berms, and revetments completed.
16	Number	Of friendly casualties due to improperly constructed or sited protective earth walls, berms, and revetments.
17	Number	Of friendly casualties or equipment and supplies lost due to the nonavailability of protective earth walls, berms, and revetments.

ART 6.7.1.3.2 Construct Vehicle, Information Systems, Equipment, and Material Protective Positions

6-89. Provide cover and concealment for vehicles, information systems nodes, equipment, supplies, and other materials that do not provide or conduct direct fire. (FM 5-103) (USAES)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	The use of vehicle, information systems, equipment, and materials protective positions preserved unit personnel, equipment, and supplies for future missions.
02	Time	To conduct an area reconnaissance including environmental considerations.
03	Time	To design protective positions for vehicle, information systems, equipment, and materiel not directly involved in fighting, and decide correct placement to maximize terrain effectiveness.
04	Time	To establish the degree of local security for the construction effort.
05	Time	To obtain the equipment and supplies to construct vehicle, information systems, equipment, and materials protective positions.
06	Time	To construct vehicle, information systems, equipment, and materials protective positions with engineer support.
07	Percent	Of on-hand equipment and supplies available to construct vehicle, information systems, equipment, and materials protective positions.
08	Percent	Of personnel trained to construct vehicle, information systems, equipment, and materials protective positions.
09	Percent	Of planned vehicle, information systems, equipment, and materials protective positions completed.
10	Percent	Of completed vehicle, information systems, equipment, and materials protective positions constructed to standard.
11	Percent	Of unit vehicles, information systems, equipment, and materials supplies not protected by protective positions.
12	Percent	Of friendly casualties due to improperly constructed or sited vehicle, information systems, equipment, and or materials protective positions.
13	Percent	Of casualties or equipment and supplies lost due to the nonavailability of vehicle, information systems, equipment, and or materials protective positions.
14	Number	Of planned vehicle, information systems, equipment, and materials protective positions completed.
15	Number	Of friendly casualties due to improperly constructed or sited vehicle, information systems, equipment, and materials protective positions.
16	Number	Of friendly casualties or equipment and supplies lost due to the nonavailability of vehicle, information systems, equipment, and materials protective positions.

ART 6.7.1.4 EMPLOY PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

6-90. Employ individual and collective equipment to protect personnel, systems, and facilities against hazards caused by enemy action. Protective equipment includes individual and collective chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) detection and protective systems. ART 6.7.1.4 includes using other items such as bullet-resistant glazing, hydraulically or manually operated vehicle crash barriers, personnel gates that limit the number of personnel passing through at one time, intrusion detection systems, security lighting, and security fences. (FM 5-103) (USAES)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Using protective equipment preserved unit personnel, equipment, and supplies for future missions.
02	Time	To conduct an area reconnaissance including environmental considerations.
03	Time	To plan or revise the plan for employing protective equipment to account for the existing factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations.
04	Time	To establish the degree of local security necessary for installing or constructing protective equipment.
05	Time	To employ protective equipment to harden individuals and facilities.
06	Time	To assume the necessary mission-oriented protective posture level in response to enemy action, given previous mission-oriented protective posture level.
07	Time	To employ protective equipment to harden supply stocks with engineer support.
08	Time	To employ protective equipment to harden supply stocks without engineer support.
09	Time	To emplace warning signs marking the edges of areas contaminated by enemy action such as the use of CBRN weapons.
10	Time	To obtain the protective equipment and systems needed to complete the hardening process.
11	Percent	Of personnel, systems, and facilities hardened by protective equipment and systems.
12	Percent	Of personnel trained to use protective equipment.
13	Percent	Of necessary protective equipment and supplies on hand.
14	Percent	Of protective equipment employed to standard.
15	Percent	Of protective equipment system that is mission capable.
16	Percent	Of friendly casualties due to improperly used protective equipment.
17	Percent	Of casualties or equipment and supplies lost due to the nonavailability of protective equipment.
18	Number	Of mission capable protective equipment systems.
19	Number	Of friendly casualties due to improperly used protective equipment.
20	Number	Of personnel casualties or equipment and supplies lost due to the nonavailability of protective equipment.

ART 6.7.1.4.1 Install Bridge Protective Devices

6-91. Provide protective systems for an existing floating bridge or river-crossing site. Protect the bridge or site from waterborne demolition teams, floating mines, or floating debris. The three types of floating protective systems are anti-mine booms, impact booms, and anti-swimmer nets. (FM 5-34) (USAES)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	The use of bridge protective equipment preserved the functionality of the bridge for current and future missions.
02	Time	To conduct an area reconnaissance of the river approaches to the bridge including environmental considerations.

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No.	Scale	Measure
03	Time	To plan or revise the plan to employ bridge protective equipment to account for the existing factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations.
04	Time	To establish the degree of local security for installation or construction of the bridge protective equipment.
05	Time	To employ bridge protective equipment.
06	Time	To widen the bridge or remove interior bridge bays to account for flood condition or heavy debris (for floating bridges).
07	Time	To obtain the bridge protective equipment and systems through the supply system or by local procurement.
08	Percent	Of personnel trained to use bridge protective equipment.
09	Percent	Of on-hand bridge protective equipment and supplies.
10	Percent	Of bridge protective equipment employed to standard.
11	Percent	Of mission-capable bridge protective equipment or systems.
12	Percent	Of bridges damaged due to improperly used bridge protective equipment.
13	Number	Of bridges protected by the proper protective device for the situation.
14	Number	Of mission-capable bridge protective equipment systems.
15	Number	Of friendly casualties due to improperly used protective equipment.
16	Number	Of casualties due to accidents while installing bridge protective equipment.

ART 6.7.1.4.2 Install or Remove Protective Obstacles

6-92. Provide friendly forces close-in protection with protective obstacles as part of their force protection plan. ART 6.7.1.4.2 includes employing temporary or permanent protective obstacles and removal or turnover of obstacles to relieving units. (FM 3-34.210) (USAES)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	The use of protective obstacles preserved unit personnel, equipment, and supplies for future missions.
02	Yes/No	The protective obstacles were properly turned over to the relieving unit. This includes transfer of intelligence; maneuver; fires; and mobility, countermobility, and survivability information such as local enemy, friendly, and civilian situations; direct and indirect fire control measures; minefield composition; marking; and layout.
03	Time	To conduct an area reconnaissance including environmental considerations.
04	Time	To plan or revise the plan to employ protective obstacles to account for existing factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations.
05	Time	To establish the degree of local security necessary for installation or construction of the protective obstacles.
06	Time	To install or remove protective obstacles to include proper marking with engineer support.
07	Time	To install or remove protective obstacles to include proper marking without engineer support.
08	Time	To turn over protective obstacles.
09	Time	To properly record and report protective obstacles.
10	Time	To obtain obstacle emplacing equipment and class IV and class V to install protective obstacles.
11	Percent	Of personnel, systems, unit positions, and facilities protected by protective obstacles.
12	Percent	Of personnel trained to install, maintain, and remove protective obstacles.
13	Percent	Of on-hand protective obstacle installation and removal equipment and class IV and class V.

No.	Scale	Measure
14	Percent	Of protective obstacles installed and removed to standard.
15	Percent	Of protective obstacles properly turned over.
16	Percent	Of friendly casualties due to improperly installed, marked, and removed protective obstacles.
17	Number	Of mission-capable protective obstacle installation and removal systems.
18	Number	Of friendly casualties due to improperly installed, marked, and removed protective obstacles.

ART 6.7.1.5 REACT TO ENEMY DIRECT FIRES

6-93. Return fire at known or suspected enemy positions and take evasive action upon detecting enemy direct fires. (FM 3-21.75) (USAIS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit reaction to enemy direct fire allowed the unit to complete its mission.
02	Yes/No	Unit retained its cohesion.
03	Yes/No	Collateral damage due to friendly response to enemy direct fires did not result from violations of the law of war or rules of engagement.
04	Time	That unit was delayed from accomplishing its mission due to enemy direct fire.
05	Time	That unit stayed within the enemy's engagement area before it can suppress the enemy's weapon systems, find cover from which to engage the enemy, or extract itself from the engagement area.
06	Percent	Of enemy casualties inflicted.
07	Percent	Of friendly casualties.
08	Number	Of friendly and noncombatant casualties.
09	Number	And types of friendly systems rendered non-mission capable by enemy direct fires.

ART 6.7.1.6 REACT TO ENEMY INDIRECT FIRES

6-94. Seek protection under the overhead cover of fighting or protective positions or move rapidly out of the impact area in the direction the unit commander orders. If armored vehicles are available, personnel mount, and the vehicles move out of the impact area in the direction and designated distance ordered by the unit commander. (FM 3-21.75) (USAIS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit reaction to enemy indirect fires allowed the unit to complete its mission.
02	Yes/No	Unit retained its cohesion.
03	Yes/No	Collateral damage due to the friendly response to enemy direct fires did not result from violations of the law of war or rules of engagement.
04	Time	To report contact to the higher commander.
05	Time	For personnel to either close hatches on the combat vehicles in which they are riding, seek shelter in positions with suitable overhead cover, or seek shelter offered by the terrain immediately around them.
06	Time	For vehicles to move out of the impact area.
07	Time	For dismounted individuals caught without suitable shelter in the impact area to improve their chances of surviving by digging in using resources immediately available to them.
08	Time	To conduct counterbattery or countermortar fires.
09	Percent	Of Soldiers performing immediate action drill correctly.
10	Percent	Of enemy casualties due to friendly counterbattery or countermortar fires.
11	Percent	Of friendly casualties.

No.	Scale	Measure
12	Number	Of friendly and noncombatant casualties.
13	Number	And types of friendly systems rendered non-mission capable by enemy indirect fires.

***ART 6.7.1.7 CONDUCT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT OPERATIONS**

6-95. ART 6.7.1.7 (Conduct Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Operations) and ART 6.7.1.7.1 (Plan for Possible Improvised Explosive Device Threats) has moved to ART 6.12.3.1 and ART 6.12.3.2. ARTs 6.7.1.7.2, 6.7.1.7.3, and 6.7.1.7.4 are rescinded.

***ART 6.7.1.7 PROVIDE FIRE AND EMERGENCY SERVICES**

6-96. Provide fire and emergency services (F&ES) in an area of operations (AO) including fire prevention and fire suppression of facilities, equipment, munitions and aviation firefighting/aircraft crash rescue services. Specific capabilities include provide fire prevention programs, inspections, tactical firefighting, technical rescue and first aid capabilities. A fire protection program can protect logistics support areas, intermediate staging bases, forward operating bases, and major facilities. Facilities can include petroleum tank farms, petroleum distribution sites, open and closed warehouse facilities, general warehouses, detainee facilities, and civilian resettlement sites. ART 6.7.1.7 includes initial hazardous material response, aviation firefighting, extrication of personnel and equipment from crashed aircraft, rescuing sick or entrapped personnel from buildings, equipment, vehicles, water, ice, confined space, and high angles. This also includes firefighting protection against grass or brush fires within assigned area when augmented with combat or construction engineer Soldiers or units. (FM 5-415) (USAES)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	F&ES limited the damage caused by fires in the area of operations (AO) so that fires do not disrupt, cancel, or require the modification of the unit's course of action.
02	Yes/No	F&ES provided first-responder level medical response and assistance to victims.
03	Yes/No	F&ES provided an initial response to hazardous material incidents with environmental considerations.
04	Yes/No	F&ES used command and control of nonfirefighting assets when supporting brush firefighting operations.
05	Yes/No	Environmental considerations planning and procedures were present and being followed.
06	Yes/No	F&ES limited the damage caused by aircraft fires and provided aircraft crash rescue services to protect the lives of aviation crewmembers.
07	Yes/No	Assist in training of host nation firefighting assets.
08	Time	To develop a firefighting plan for the AO.
09	Time	To develop mutual aid agreements.
10	Time	To respond to reports of fires, medical emergencies, and hazardous material incidents.
11	Time	To establish and maintain 24/7 fire department communications network.
12	Time	To reconnoiter water-supply points.
13	Time	To provide water resupply to firefighting teams.
14	Time	To establish local security from external assets for firefighting operations.
15	Time	To provide additional manpower support to firefighting teams from supported units.
16	Time	To train personnel so they remain qualified to fight fires and respond to medical emergencies and hazardous materials incidents.
17	Time	To practice fire drills by units in the AO.
18	Time	To complete fire prevention measures, such as inspections and preventive maintenance checks and services on firefighting equipment.
19	Time	To procure necessary personal protective equipment, firefighting equipment, and fire trucks to protect the AO.

No.	Scale	Measure
20	Time	To investigate fires.
21	Time	To implement aircraft crash rescue services and to respond to aircraft emergencies.
22	Percent	Of firefighting operations that are petroleum, oils, and lubricants fires.
23	Percent	Of high-value assets protected by firefighting teams.
24	Percent	Of difference between planned level of firefighting support and the required level.
25	Percent	Of qualified personnel assigned to firefighting teams in the AO.
26	Percent	Of firefighting support provided by host nation.
27	Number	Of firefighting teams found in the AO.
28	Number	And types of mission capable fire trucks in the AO.
29	Number	Of crash or rescue operations conducted within a given time.
30	Number	Of normal flight and maintenance operations supported within a given time.
31	Number	Of medical evacuation operations supported within a given time.
32	Number	Of fire prevention inspections performed in a given time.
33	Number	Of emergency water-supply points maintained.

*ART 6.7.1.7.1 Provide General Firefighting

6-97. Provide response to fires with the AO. Provide crash rescue support to medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) and normal flight operations. Provide initial response for hazardous material (HAZMAT) and medical assistance. Provide fire prevention measures, such as, inspections, fire drills, and training. (FM 5-415) (USAES)

No.	Scale	Measure
1	Yes/No	Provide crash-rescue support for MEDEVAC and normal flight or stand-by operations
2	Yes/No	Firefighting team provided first-responder level medical response and assistance to victims.
3	Yes/No	Firefighting team provided an initial response to HAZMAT incidents with environmental considerations.
4	Time	To respond to reports of fires, medical emergencies, and HAZMAT incidents.
5	Time	To reconnoiter water-supply points.
6	Time	To provide water resupply to firefighting teams.
7	Time	To provide additional manpower support to firefighting teams from supported units.
8	Time	To practice fire drills with other units in the AO.
9	Time	To complete fire prevention measures, such as inspections and preventive maintenance checks and services on firefighting equipment.
10	Time	To investigate fires.
11	Number	Of emergency water-supply points maintained.

*ART 6.7.1.7.2 Provide Technical Rescue Services

6-98. Provide technical rescue support and extrication of personnel and equipment from crashed aircraft, rescuing sick or entrapped personnel from buildings, equipment, vehicles, water, ice, confined space, and high angles. Provide emergency lifesaving care for victims of accident or sudden illness. (FM 5-415) (USAES)

No.	Scale	Measure
1	Yes/No	Provide initial first aid.
2	Yes/No	Provide initial response to hazardous material.
3	Yes/No	Rescue entrapped, sick, and injured personnel from buildings.

No.	Scale	Measure
4	Yes/No	Rescue entrapped, sick, and injured personnel from equipment.
5	Yes/No	Rescue entrapped, sick, and injured personnel from vehicles.
6	Yes/No	Rescue entrapped, sick, and injured personnel from water.
7	Yes/No	Rescue entrapped, sick, and injured personnel from confined space.
8	Yes/No	Rescue entrapped, sick, and injured personnel from high angles.

ART 6.7.2 DISPERSE TACTICAL FORCES

6-99. Relocate forces and spread or separate troops, materiel, or activities following concentration and maneuver to enhance survivability. The lethality of modern weaponry significantly increases the threat to concentrated formations. Attacking commanders manipulate their own and the enemy's concentration of forces by a combination of dispersion, concentration, deception, and attack. Dispersion stretches the enemy's defenses and denies lucrative targets to enemy long-range fires. (FM 3-90) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit accomplished mission while tactically dispersed.
02	Time	To refine operation plan or order to reflect risk management assessment.
03	Time	To relocate friendly forces to minimize risks from battlefield hazards.
04	Percent	Of friendly casualties due to failure to disperse.
05	Percent	Of friendly casualties due to an enemy inability to mass combat power because assets are too dispersed.

ART 6.7.3 CONDUCT SECURITY OPERATIONS

6-100. Security operations are those operations undertaken by a commander to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow the commander to effectively use the protected forces. Commanders continually conduct some form of security operations. (FM 3-90) (USACAC)

Note: The information obtained on the enemy in conducting this task also pertains to ART 2.0 (The Intelligence Warfighting Function).

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	The operations of the security force provided the protected force or installation with sufficient reaction time and maneuver space to conduct defensive operations.
02	Yes/No	Security force was in place not later than time specified in operation order.
03	Yes/No	Security force prevented enemy ground observation of protected force or installation.
04	Yes/No	Collateral damage from security operation was within acceptable limits.
05	Yes/No	Security force provided early and accurate warning of enemy approach.
06	Yes/No	Security force oriented its operations of the force or facility to be secured.
07	Yes/No	Security force performed continuous reconnaissance.
08	Yes/No	Security force maintained contact with enemy forces.
09	Yes/No	Commander developed criteria for ending the security operation.
10	Yes/No	Commander directed that contingency plans be developed for security operations.
11	Time	To conduct reconnaissance of the area surrounding the secured force or installation.
12	Time	To plan security operations.
13	Time	To prepare for the security operations including movement into security area.
14	Time	To execute security operations.

No.	Scale	Measure
15	Time	To report enemy activities to appropriate headquarters.
16	Time	That the secured force or installation has to prepare prior to its encounter with the enemy.
17	Time	To integrate host-nation or third-nation security forces and means into friendly security operations.
18	Percent	Of security force casualties during the security operation.
19	Percent	Of secured force or installation casualties during the security operation.
20	Percent	Of unit combat power used to provide desired degree of security.
21	Percent	Of decreased support capability of sustainment units due to the requirement to provide security forces from internal assets.
22	Percent	Of increased availability of combat forces through use of host-nation or third-nation security forces.
23	Percent	Of enemy reconnaissance elements within security force capabilities destroyed or repelled.
24	Percent	Of friendly operations judged as not compromised prior to or during execution.
25	Percent	Of operations not compromised (based on enemy prisoner of war interrogations or captured documents).
26	Percent	Of critical facilities hardened or protected by security forces.
27	Percent	Of the AO or security area that can be observed by visual observation or covered by sensors at any given time.
28	Number	Of incidents where enemy forces affect the security of friendly units and facilities.
29	Number	Of incidents where enemy reconnaissance forces compromise friendly course of action causing them to be delayed, disrupted, canceled, or modified.
30	Number	Of security force casualties during the security operation.
31	Number	Of secured force or installation casualties during the security operation.
32	Number	Of mobility corridors or avenues of approach that can be observed by the security force.
33	Number	Of observation posts that can be established by the security force.
34	Number	Of enemy reconnaissance elements destroyed during security operation.
35	Square Kilometers	Size of security area or area of operation.


ART 6.7.4 CONDUCT ACTIONS TO CONTROL POLLUTION AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

6-101. Develop actions to prevent pollution generation and hazardous substance releases to avoid exposing friendly personnel to human health hazards, disrupting operations, adversely affecting indigenous or refugee populations and local economies; and to avoid damaging the natural or cultural environment. Conduct the environmental compliance program while appropriately considering the effect on the environment per applicable U.S. and host-nation agreements, environmental laws, policies, and regulations. Promptly report and clean up hazardous substance releases while avoiding tactical interference and ensuring adequate protection of the environment. Manage hazardous wastes correctly prior to transporting them to a permitted treatment, storage, or disposal facility. (FM 3-100.4) (USAES)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Time	To provide the commander with the technical expertise relating to releases of hazardous materials or petroleum, oils, and lubricants.
02	Time	Of delay in the operation.
03	Time	River closed as a source of drinking water.
04	Time	River closed to traffic.
05	Time	To provide training guidance to the field as required.
06	Time	Of training lost due to release.

No.	Scale	Measure
07	Percent	Of operations cancelled or delayed.
08	Percent	Of population with newly polluted drinking water.
09	Percent	Of wildlife killed as a result of pollution or a release.
10	Number	Of people with newly polluted drinking water.
11	Number	Of spills reported per week.
12	Number	Of wildlife killed as a result of pollution or a release.
13	Number	Of personnel injured or sickened as a result of pollution or a release.
14	Cost	For hazardous material removal or disposal.
15	Cost	To complete release recovery.
16	Cubic Yards	Of earth cleaned, removed, or replaced.
17	Pounds	Of hazardous materials released.

***SECTION VIII – ART 6.8: PROVIDE FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION**



6-102. Force health protection encompasses measures to promote, improve, or conserve the mental and physical well-being of Soldiers. These measures enable a healthy and fit force, prevent injury and illness, and protect the force from health hazards and include the prevention aspects of a number of Army Medical Department functions such as preventive medicine, including medical surveillance and occupational and environmental health (OEH) surveillance; veterinary, services, including the food inspection and animal care missions, and the prevention of zoonotic disease transmissible to man; combat and operational stress control (COSC); dental services (preventive dentistry); and laboratory services (area medical laboratory support). (FM 4-02) (USAMEDDC&S)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Force health protection programs established in the area of operations (AO) kept casualty rates from disease and nonbattle injuries; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear exposures; OEH hazards; and combat operational stress below established thresholds.
02	Time	To refine force health protection in the AO after receipt of warning order.
03	Time	To establish force health protection on activation of the AO.
04	Percent	Of difference between force health protection requirements and actual requirements in the AO.
05	Percent	Of difference between planned area medical laboratory support requirements and actual requirements in the AO.

No.	Scale	Measure
06	Percent	Of difference between planned preventive medicine services requirements and actual requirements in the AO.
07	Percent	Of difference between planned veterinary services requirements and actual requirements in the AO.
08	Percent	Of planned force health protection support achieved in the AO.
09	Percent	Of difference between planned COSC prevention support requirements and actual requirements in the AO.
10	Percent	Of difference between planned preventive dentistry support requirements and actual requirements in the AO.

***ART 6.8.1 PROVIDE PREVENTIVE MEDICINE SUPPORT**

6-103. Prevent disease and nonbattle injuries by establishing preventive medicine programs such as, field hygiene and sanitation, disease surveillance, immunizations, chemoprophylaxis, and education in personal protective measures. (FM 4-02.17) (USAMEDDC&S)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Preventive medicine programs established in the area of operations (AO) kept disease and nonbattle injury rates below established thresholds.
02	Yes/No	Units communicated the health risks to the at risk population.
03	Yes/No	Units conducted health hazard assessments.
04	Yes/No	Unit implemented the Vision Conservation Program.
05	Time	To refine preventive medicine program for AO after receipt of warning order.
06	Time	To establish preventive medicine plan (to include immunizations, pretreatment, chemoprophylaxis, and barrier creams) in the AO.
07	Time	Required to provide 100-percent immunizations to all Soldiers in the AO.
08	Percent	Of Soldiers who have all of the prescribed predeployment immunizations.
09	Percent	Of planned preventive medicine support achieved in AO.
10	Percent	Of personnel who received all required immunizations.
11	Percent	Of personnel who received required chemoprophylaxis.
12	Percent	Of personnel in AO briefed on health threats and trained in personal and unit-level protective measures and preventive medicine measures.
13	Percent	Of water points inspected for potability.
14	Percent	Of unit field sanitation teams trained.
15	Percent	Of personnel in the AO who have required and serviceable optical devices (such as spectacles, mask inserts, and protective devices).
16	Percent	Of bivouac sites inspected for disease and occupational and environmental health hazards.
17	Number	Of units with all required field sanitation team equipment and supplies.
18	Number	Of aerial spray missions conducted.
19	Number	Of Soldiers not available for duty due to hearing loss.
20	Number	Of consultations provided on preventive medicine measures.
21	Number	Of food service facilities inspected requiring immediate corrective actions.

***ART 6.8.1.1 PERFORM MEDICAL SURVEILLANCE**

6-104. Perform medical surveillance, to include the collection and analysis of health status and health threat information before, during, and following deployment. Ensure common awareness of potential health threats and monitor implementation of preventive medicine measures. (FM 4-02.17) (USAMEDDC&S)

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No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit performed health threat assessment was for all areas of the area of operations (AO) and briefed to all personnel.
02	Yes/No	Unit conducted all required epidemiological investigations appropriately and completed them in a timely manner.
03	Yes/No	Unit collected disease and nonbattle injury data daily and categorized it correctly per Joint Chiefs of Staff and theater-specific standards.
04	Yes/No	All personnel completed pre- and postdeployment health assessments within required timeframes.
05	Yes/No	Unit analyzed disease and nonbattle injury data weekly for trends.
06	Time	To refine medical surveillance programs for AO after receipt of warning order.
07	Time	To survey operational environment to detect and identify health threats and formulate means for minimizing effects.
08	Percent	Of difference between planned medical surveillance requirements and actual requirements in AO.
09	Percent	Of planned medical surveillance support achieved in AO.
10	Percent	Of Soldiers identified with a measured environmental or occupational exposure that have the exposure noted in their individual health records.
11	Percent	Of recorded medical treatment episodes in individual health records and/or electronic medical records.
12	Percent	Of disease and nonbattle injury reports submitted on time per theater policy.
13	Percent	Of personnel compliant with required personal protective measures.
14	Number	Of epidemiological investigations conducted in AO.
15	Number	Of health threats to the deployed force not identified in the predeployment medical threat assessment.

***ART 6.8.1.2 PERFORM OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH SURVEILLANCE**

6-105. Perform occupational and environmental health (OEH) surveillance. Develop and update the environmental health site assessment. (FM 4-02.17) (USAMEDDC&S)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Occupational and environmental health surveillance established in the area of operations (AO) prevented or reduced the number and percent of personnel who became exposed to OEH hazards.
02	Yes/No	Significant OEH hazards were identified in the AO.
03	Time	To refine OEH hazard surveillance program for AO after receipt of warning order.
04	Time	To detect, identify, quantify, and evaluate OEH hazards; develop controls and communicate risk to minimize health risks.
05	Percent	Of difference between planned OEH surveillance requirements and actual requirements in the AO.
06	Percent	Of personnel in AO without health threat education and training provided.
07	Percent	Of personnel in AO without appropriate personal protective equipment or engineering controls to minimize health risks of identified OEH hazards.
08	Percent	Of identified OEH hazards in the AO evaluated using risk assessment.
09	Number	Of identified OEH exposures recorded in individual health records and/or electronic medical records.

***ART 6.8.2 PROVIDE VETERINARY SERVICES**

6-106. Serve as the Department of Defense (DOD) executive agent for veterinary services for all services with the exception of the food inspection mission on U.S. Air Force installations. Perform food safety and bottled water surveillance—which includes food hygiene and quality assurance, inspection of class I sources, microbial analysis of food, and temperature monitoring of transported and stored food supplies—and assess potential health hazards in the area of operations (AO); identify, evaluate, and assess animal diseases of military significance; and provide complete veterinary health care to DOD military working dogs and any other government-owned animals in the AO. (FM 4-02.18) (USAMEDDC&S)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Nonavailability of veterinary services did not degrade, delay, or disrupt unit operations.
02	Time	To refine veterinary services program for AO after receipt of warning order.
03	Time	To establish comprehensive veterinary plan on activation of the AO.
04	Percent	Of difference between planned veterinary service requirements and actual requirements in AO.
05	Percent	Of planned veterinary support achieved in AO.
06	Percent	Of required food inspections meeting food safety standards in the AO.
07	Percent	Of government-owned animals treated and returned to duty in the AO.
08	Percent	Of veterinary capacity in use per day in AO.
09	Number	Of local food procurement establishment inspections performed in AO per month.
10	Number	Of animal diseases of military significance in the AO.
11	Number	Of military working dogs and other government-owned animals in AO requiring periodic veterinary support.
12	Number	Of approved bottled water and ice plants.
13	Percent	Of animals exposed to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear or toxic industrial materials.
14	Yes/No	Published food and beverage procurement source list.
15	Number	Of animals requiring evacuation for additional treatment in theater.

***ART 6.8.3 PROVIDE COMBAT AND OPERATIONAL STRESS CONTROL PREVENTION**

6-107. Provide combat and operational stress control (COSC) prevention by establishing behavioral health prevention programs, conducting traumatic event management, and providing consultation and educational services. (FM 4-02.51) (USAMEDDC&S)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Absence of command personnel from stress-related causes did not degrade, delay, or disrupt unit operations.
02	Time	To refine COSC prevention program for the area of operations (AO) after receipt of warning order.
03	Percent	Of critical incident debriefings planned and actual requirements.
04	Percent	Of required COSC personnel at activation in AO.
05	Percent	Of decrease in number of stress-related casualties after establishing and implementing COSC prevention plan or program in AO.
06	Number	Of consultations on COSC prevention techniques with Soldiers or groups.
07	Number	Of consultations on COSC prevention techniques with unit leaders.
08	Number	Of education and training events on COSC prevention techniques.
09	Number	Of combat and operational stress control cases requiring evacuation from AO.
10	Percent	Of personnel that have received Warrior resilience training.

***ART 6.8.4 PROVIDE PREVENTIVE DENTISTRY SUPPORT**

6-108. Military preventive dentistry incorporates primary, secondary, and tertiary preventive measures taken to reduce or eliminate oral conditions that decrease a Soldier's fitness to perform the mission and cause absence from duty. (FM 4-02.19) (USAMEDDC&S)


No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Preventive dentistry programs established in the area of operations (AO) prevented or reduced the number and percent of command personnel who became casualties as a result of dental disease and injury.
02	Time	To establish dental combat effectiveness program upon activation of the AO.
03	Time	To refine preventive dentistry plan after receipt of warning order.
04	Percent	Of difference between planned preventive dentistry requirements and actual requirements within the AO.
05	Percent	Of Soldiers receiving prophylaxis treatment.
06	Percent	Of Soldiers receiving fluoride varnish treatments.
07	Percent	Of Soldiers receiving prescriptions for fluoride supplement tablets.
08	Percent	Of Soldiers receiving training or education in field oral hygiene information program.
03	Time	To refine preventive dentistry plan after receipt of warning order.
04	Percent	Of difference between planned preventive dentistry requirements and actual requirements within the AO.
05	Percent	Of Soldiers receiving prophylaxis treatment.
06	Percent	Of Soldiers receiving fluoride varnish treatments.
07	Percent	Of Soldiers receiving prescriptions for fluoride supplement tablets.
08	Percent	Of Soldiers receiving training or education in field oral hygiene information program.

***ART 6.8.5 PROVIDE AREA MEDICAL LABORATORY SERVICES**

6-109. Identify, evaluate, and assess health hazards in the area of operations (AO). This task includes providing chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) laboratory services, endemic disease laboratory services, and environmental laboratory services. (FM 4-02) (USAMEDDC&S)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Nonavailability of laboratory services did not degrade, delay, or disrupt unit operations or endanger the health of unit personnel.
02	Time	To refine area medical laboratory services program for AO after receipt of warning order.
03	Time	To establish comprehensive area medical laboratory service plan on activation of the AO.
04	Time	Of turnaround for technical laboratory testing results.
05	Percent	Of difference between planned area medical laboratory requirements and actual requirements in AO.
06	Percent	Of planned laboratory support achieved in AO.
07	Percent	Of required laboratories at activation of AO.
08	Percent	Of required laboratory personnel available at activation of AO.
09	Percent	Of laboratory capacity in use per day in AO.
10	Number	Of toxic industrial materials identified or confirmed through laboratory testing in the AO.
11	Number	Of CBRN warfare agents identified or confirmed through laboratory testing in the AO.
12	Number	Of endemic diseases identified through laboratory testing in AO in support of diagnostic treatment at medical treatment facilities .

#SECTION IX – ART 6.9: CONDUCT CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR OPERATIONS



6-110. The employment of tactical capabilities that counter the entire range of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats and hazards through weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation prevention, WMD counterforce, CBRN defense, and CBRN consequence management activities in support of operational and strategic objectives to combat WMD and operate safely in CBRN environments. (FM 3-11) (USACBRNS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit could continue its mission when attacked by enemy CBRN weapons.
02	Time	To conduct area or route reconnaissance to identify the limits of CBRN weapons effects.
03	Time	To refine annex E to the operation order.
04	Time	To deploy and employ CBRN monitoring equipment.
05	Time	To identify the CBRN hazard.
06	Time	To detect the use of CBRN weapons in the area of operations (AO).
07	Time	To issue downwind hazard warnings of a CBRN attack in the AO.
08	Time	To conduct area damage control after using CBRN weapons.
09	Time	To recover unit operational capability after a CBRN attack.
10	Time	To give and understand CBRN contamination alarms and signals.
11	Time	To assume appropriate mission-oriented protective posture after warning of the use of CBRN weapons in the AO.
12	Time	To reconstitute unit to designated level of combat power after exposure to the effects of CBRN weapons.
13	Time	To coordinate for additional CBRN reconnaissance, monitoring, and decontamination assets.

No.	Scale	Measure
14	Time	To administer chemoprophylaxis, immunizations, pretreatments, and barrier creams for protection against CBRN warfare agents.
15	Percent	Of incidents of the use of CBRN weapons detected.
16	Percent	Of enemy delivery systems for CBRN weapons in AO identified, targeted, and destroyed.
17	Percent	Of CBRN contaminated sites in the AO that have decontamination operations initiated or completed.
18	Percent	Of friendly units in the AO that have CBRN monitoring, protective, and decontamination equipment.
19	Percent	Of on-hand CBRN equipment, necessary to protect the unit against hazards, that is mission-capable.
20	Percent	Of CBRN monitoring, protective and decontamination equipment positioned and operated correctly.
21	Percent	Of CBRN hazards correctly identified.
22	Percent	Of friendly units in the AO without adequate supplies of individual and collective monitoring and protective equipment, and decontamination materials.
23	Percent	Of reduced unit combat power from the need to defend against the use of CBRN weapons.
24	Percent	Of friendly and civilian casualties in AO from the use of CBRN weapons.
25	Number	Of instances where CBRN weapons are employed.
26	Number	And types of on-hand CBRN monitoring, protective, and decontamination equipment.
27	Number	And types of friendly systems destroyed, damaged, or rendered inoperable resulting from the use of CBRN weapons.
28	Number	Of instances where units and facilities are affected by using CBRN weapons without warning of their use.
29	Number	Of false alarms relating to using CBRN weapons.

ART 6.9.1 SUPPORT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION PREVENTION

6-111. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation prevention employs tactical level capabilities to support operational and strategic non-proliferation objectives for combating WMD. Proliferation prevention includes military engagements and security cooperation and deterrence. (FM 3-11) (USACBRNS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	The forces were trained.
02	Yes/No	The forces were equipped.
03	Yes/No	The forces were available to conduct essential tasks that meet the nonproliferation objectives.
04	Yes/No	The forces have conducted rehearsals for tactical-level operations.
05	Yes/No	The commander and staff conducted rehearsals within the headquarters of the essential tasks.

ART 6.9.1.1 SUPPORT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION SECURITY COOPERATION AND PARTNER ACTIVITIES

6-112. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) security cooperation and partner (SC&P) activities improve or promote defense relationships and capacity of allied and partner nations to execute or support the other military mission areas to combat WMD through military-to-military contact, burden sharing arrangements, combined military activities and support to international activities. (FM 3-11) (USACBRNS)

Note: Activities include developing chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) contacts and establishing programs for various senior official visits. These visits include foreign military CBRN sites visits, counterpart staff exchange visits, and sponsorship of or attendance at WMD-related conferences, military-to-military talks, and bilateral exercise programs that establish and develop military-to-military contacts with targeted nations.

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	The forces provided support to SC&P in pursuit of counter WMD.
02	Yes/No	The forces developed counter WMD programs that integrate Department of Defense security cooperation activities.
03	Yes/No	The forces participated in a multinational exercise(s).
04	Yes/No	Organizations participated in student, liaison, and equipment exchange programs.
05	Percent	Of personnel that conducted multinational counterproliferation, counterterrorism and new equipment training.

≠ART 6.9.1.2 SUPPORT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION THREAT REDUCTION COOPERATION

6-113. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat reduction cooperation includes activities undertaken with the consent and cooperation of host-nation authorities in a permissive environment. These activities enhance physical security and reduce, dismantle, redirect, and/or improve protection of a state's existing WMD program, stockpiles, and capabilities. (FM 3-11) (USACBRNS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit provided security for current WMD, related materials, and systems from theft, sabotage, or unauthorized use.
02	Yes/No	Unit supported efforts to ensure the safety of WMD and delivery systems from accidental or inadvertent release.
03	Yes/No	Unit maintained situational awareness of WMD safety and security issues, and communicated concerns to senior leaders.
04	Yes/No	Unit integrated commander's safety concerns, security concerns, and threat prioritization with operational-level guidance.
05	Yes/No	Unit assigned responsibilities for threat reduction cooperation and coordinated efforts with other commands.
06	Yes/No	Unit emplaced appropriate sensors.
07	Yes/No	Unit conducted monitoring operations.
08	Yes/No	Unit conducted detection operations.
09	Yes/No	Unit conducted security operations.

≠ART 6.9.2 CONDUCT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION COUNTERFORCE OPERATIONS

6-114. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) counterforce is a tactical objective to defeat the full range of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats before they can be employed as weapons. (FM 3-11) (USACBRNS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit utilized weapon systems designed to destroy, disrupt, or deny access to CBRN weapon targets while minimizing negative collateral effects.
02	Yes/No	Unit able to model and predict collateral effects prior to a strike on CBRN weapon targets.
03	Yes/No	Unit trained on sampling process.

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No.	Scale	Measure
04	Yes/No	Unit had WMD materials properly labeled, double bagged and prepared for transfer.
05	Yes/No	Unit prepared WMD materials being shipped to contential United States with the correct paperwork required for entry into the country.
06	Yes/No	Unit established sample priority.
07	Yes/No	Unit maintained a strict chain of custody for every sample or specimen collected.
08	Yes/No	Unit strictly adhered to sample protocols in the laboratory.
09	Yes/No	Unit properly stored materials within the laboratory.
10	Yes/No	Unit disinfected incoming materials before entering them in the laboratory.
11	Yes/No	The laboratory recorded pertinent data about the material in the laboratory records.
12	Yes/No	The laboratory used the proper standard safety practices and service-specific directives.
13	Yes/No	The laboratory properly disposed of all hazardous waste and materials.
14	Time	To acquire, positively identify, select, and prioritize CBRN weapon targets as well as other high-value targets.
15	Time	To apportion resources to attack CBRN weapon targets as well as other high-value targets in either a deliberate or adaptive planning mode.
16	Percent	Of targets reviewed for collateral damage or effects, damage expectancy, casualties, and political ramifications or sensitivities.
17	Percent	Of targets that exceed attack guidance.
18	Percent	Of planned targets hit on time.
19	Percent	Of friendly, neutral forces, or noncombatants influenced by collateral effects from friendly attacks on CBRN-weapon targets.
20	Percent	Of known or suspected enemy CBRN targets with the preplanned using the joint targeting cycle process.

ART 6.9.2.1 CONDUCT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTERDICTION OPERATIONS

6-115. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) interdiction includes operations to track, intercept, search, divert, seize, or otherwise stop the transit of WMD, its delivery systems, or related materials, technologies, and expertise. (FM 3-11) (USACBRNS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit had capability to track, intercept, search, divert, seize or stops the transit of WMD materials, delivery systems, technologies and expertise.
02	Yes/No	Element supported the disruption and dismantlement of proliferation networks.
03	Yes/No	Element supported activities to include interception, identification, securing, disposing of, or rendering safe materials suspected to be WMD-related.
04	Yes/No	Element exercised command and control (C2) in preparation for and conduct of WMD interdiction operations.
05	Time	To coordinate joint, multinational, and interagency support.
06	Time	To develop synchronization plan for joint sea, air, and land interdiction.
07	Time	To conduct WMD interdiction target analysis.
08	Time	To issue planning guidance to subordinate component forces.
09	Time	To develop tactical intelligence for WMD interdiction requirements.
10	Time	To integrate defense capabilities (sampling, monitoring, identification, or reconnaissance).
11	Time	To conduct tactical-level risk assessment to support WMD interdiction operations.
12	Time	To establish CBRN defense information integration and connectivity.

≠ART 6.9.2.2 CONDUCT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

6-116. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) offensive operations include actions to disrupt, neutralize, or destroy a WMD threat before it can be used, or to deter subsequent use of such weapons. (FM 3-11) (USACBRNS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit had available weapon systems designed to destroy, disrupt, or deny access to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapon targets while minimizing negative collateral effects.
02	Yes/No	Unit had capability to model and predict collateral effects prior to a strike on CBRN weapon targets.
03	Time	To acquire positively identified, selected, and prioritized CBRN weapon targets as well as other high-value targets.
04	Time	To apportion resources to attack CBRN weapon targets as well as other high-value targets in either a deliberate or adaptive planning mode.
05	Percent	Of targets reviewed for collateral damage or effects, damage expectancy, casualties, and political ramifications or sensitivities.
06	Percent	Of targets exceeding guidance.
07	Percent	Of planned targets hit on time.
08	Percent	Of friendly or neutral forces or noncombatants by collateral effects from friendly attacks on CBRN-weapon targets.
09	Percent	Of known or suspected enemy CBRN targets that have been preplanned with the joint targeting cycle process.

≠ART 6.9.2.3 CONDUCT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ELIMINATION OPERATIONS

6-117. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) elimination includes actions undertaken in a hostile or uncertain environment to systematically locate, characterize, secure, disable, or destroy WMD programs and related capabilities. (FM 3-11) (USACBRNS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Forces were properly trained, equipped, and available to conduct WMD elimination missions.
02	Yes/No	Staff processes and expertise were in place to coordinate WMD elimination mission elements.
03	Yes/No	Unit coordinated with proper security force to provide overwatch protection in a hostile environment.
04	Yes/No	Unit established WMD elimination specific rules of engagement.
05	Yes/No	Unit established WMD elimination specific rules for the use of force in a hostile situation.

≠ART 6.9.2.3.1 Isolate Weapons of Mass Destruction Sites

6-118. Isolate suspected weapons of mass destruction (WMD) sites, material, equipment, and personnel. The objective is to ensure suspected sites and materials are secure to prevent possible proliferation, pilfering, or destruction of potential forensic evidence, to avoid detaining personnel, and to prevent dispersion, contamination, or collateral effects of the release of dangerous WMD materials or agents. These actions ensure the safety of US and multinational forces and the surrounding civilian population. Forces must establish and maintain the conditions for elimination operations by securing sensitive sites. (ATTP 3-11.23) (USACBRNS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit identified capabilities required.
02	Yes/No	Unit identified number of enemy forces located at the site.

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No.	Scale	Measure
03	Yes/No	Unit tied mission orders to a purpose or intent.
04	Yes/No	Unit selected the general location of the work zones and the command post.
05	Yes/No	Unit selected a general area for the decontamination station.
06	Yes/No	Teams worked in buddy teams.
07	Yes/No	Teams conducted all operations within a timeframe agreed upon with the supported unit and higher headquarters.
08	Yes/No	Unit established access to hot and warm zones to ensure that only authorized personnel were permitted in those areas.
09	Yes/No	Unit established physical control of the WMD site.
10	Yes/No	When the objective was secured, the element consolidated and reorganized to support the site exploitation teams.
11	Yes/No	Unit identified and selected additional rally points.
12	Yes/No	All unit members cleaned and serviced individual protective equipment and personal protective equipment (PPE) after use.
13	Yes/No	Unit inspected all PPE.
14	Time	To develop a detailed standing operating procedures and determine key participants.
15	Time	To immediately report the discovery of a potential sensitive site.
16	Time	To conduct thorough pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections of all unit and personnel equipment.
17	Time	To calibrate any detection equipment prior to departure.
18	Time	To conduct chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear passive defense measures.
19	Time	To conduct leaders reconnaissance.
20	Time	To erect barriers and the establishment of perimeters.
21	Time	To coordinate for additional support.
22	Time	To identify the associated hazards and determine hazard control zones.

≠ART 6.9.2.3.2 Exploit Weapons of Mass Destruction Sites

6-119. *Exploitation* at the tactical level includes actions to preserve, characterize, exploit, disable/neutralize or render safe the adversary's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) weapons, material, equipment, personnel, and infrastructure. A secondary purpose is to collect appropriate forensic evidence and intelligence. Specialized teams conduct a technical assessment of a site to determine if it contains evidence of WMD activity. A more explicit and detailed exploitation of the site (documents, personnel, sampling, and such) is then conducted if evidence of WMD activity is obtained. Exploitation may include separate operations to render safe WMD devices, material or missiles that present an immediate threat to friendly forces. (ATTP 3-11.23) (USACBRNS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit coordinated sample analysis support.
02	Yes/No	Unit coordinated with Department of Defense responders such as chemical reconnaissance detachment chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response team and hazard response teams.
03	Yes/No	Subject matter experts and teams carefully entered and exploited every structure, facility, and vehicle on the site.
04	Yes/No	Unit secured documents, electronic media, personnel, materials, weapons, devices, and equipment.
05	Yes/No	Unit identified forensic evidence leading to attribution, prosecution, or both.
06	Yes/No	Leaders maintained situational awareness throughout the operation.
07	Time	To conduct thorough pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections of all unit and personnel equipment.

No.	Scale	Measure
08	Time	To conduct rehearsals of exploitation activities.
09	Time	To conduct leaders reconnaissance.
10	Time	To conduct collection and initial characterization of WMD material (weapons, equipment, personnel, data, and infrastructure).
11	Time	To coordinate for additional support.
12	Time	To conduct reach back with technical experts or bring specialized personnel forward.
13	Number	Of explosive ordnance disposal units to render safe booby traps and other explosive ordnance that prevents access and exploitation.
14	Number	Of personnel found in the site.
15	Number	Of trained personnel to identify items and facilities found at the site.
16	Number	Of trained personnel who can interrogate site personnel.

≠ART 6.9.2.3.3 Perform Weapons of Mass Destruction Program Destruction Activities

6-120. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program destruction activities include actions at the tactical level to destroy, dismantle, remove, transfer, or otherwise dispose of the adversary's WMD weapons, material, equipment, personnel, and infrastructure. (ATTP 3-11.23) (USACBRNS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit identified WMD system to be defeated.
02	Yes/No	Unit neutralized suspect WMD-related agent or material.
03	Yes/No	Unit maintained control of material related to WMD elimination mission.
04	Yes/No	Unit contained WMD-related material for final disposition to include defeat, neutralization, storage, or transport.
05	Yes/No	Unit coordinated security support for the WMD elimination mission.
06	Time	To plan for the disposition phase of elimination operations.
07	Time	To conduct thorough pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections of all unit and personnel equipment.
08	Time	To conduct rehearsals of exploitation activities.
09	Time	To conduct leaders reconnaissance.
10	Time	To coordinate for additional support.
11	Time	To identify forensic evidence in support of elimination mission.

≠ART 6.9.2.3.4 Support Weapons of Mass Destruction Monitoring and Redirection Activities

6-121. Monitoring and redirection includes actions to convert weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, personnel, sites, and facilities to prevent transfer, reconstitution, and misuse of residual dual-use capabilities. (ATTP 3-11.23) (USACBRNS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit facilitated and maintained positive surveillance of former or potential WMD programs.
02	Yes/No	Unit provided support to U.S. and host-nation (HN) government agencies that conduct monitoring and redirection activities.
03	Yes/No	Unit facilitated the receiving and sustainment of specialist and expert personnel.
04	Yes/No	Unit used protective packaging for the safe containment and transportation of WMD materials.
05	Yes/No	Unit continued maintenance of perimeters and barriers to control interaction with the WMD site.
06	Yes/No	Unit converted WMD programs, personnel, sites, and facilities to prevent transfer, reconstitution, and misuse of residual dual-use capabilities.

No.	Scale	Measure
07	Yes/No	Unit identified HN requirements in support of the threat reduction cooperation mission.
08	Yes/No	Unit identified logistic support for the new operation.

≠ART 6.9.3 CONDUCT CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR (CBRN) DEFENSE

6-122. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense includes measures taken to minimize or negate the vulnerabilities and/or effects of a CBRN incident. (FM 3-11) (USACBRNS)

Note: ART 6.9.3 employs both active and passive CBRNE capabilities.

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Element integrated CBRN active and passive defense measures in mission planning.
02	Yes/No	For CBRN defense procedures, unit planned and coordinated with other defense operations.
03	Yes/No	All individuals who participated in CBRN defense trained in the concept.
04	Time	To issued threat warning after launch of CBRN weapons.
05	Percent	Of attacked targets by enemy CBRN-weapon.
06	Percent	Of CBRN enemy attacks intercepted.
07	Number	Of U.S. casualties both combatant and noncombatant.
08	Number	Of classified false alarms.

≠ART 6.9.3.1 CONDUCT CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR (CBRN) ACTIVE DEFENSE

6-123. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) active defense includes measures to defeat an attack with CBRN weapons by employing actions to divert, neutralize, or destroy those weapons or their means of delivery while en route to their target. (FM 3-11) (USACBRNS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit detected planned CBRN terrorist actions and neutralized their effects.
02	Time	To issue threat warning after launch of CBRN weapons.
03	Percent	Of enemy CBRN-weapon attacks that reached target.
04	Percent	Of enemy CBRN attacks unit intercepted.
05	Percent	Of destroyed CBRN-capable artillery.
06	Number	Of identified as U.S. casualties, both combatant and noncombatant.
07	Number	Of classified false alarms.

≠ART 6.9.3.2 CONDUCT CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR (CBRN) PASSIVE DEFENSE

6-124. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) passive defense includes measures taken to minimize or negate the vulnerability to, and effects of, CBRN attacks. This mission area focuses on maintaining the ability to continue military operations in a CBRN environment. (FM 3-11) (USACBRNS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Element continued the mission after CBRN attack.
02	Yes/No	Element mitigated the immediate effects of a CBRN attack.
03	Yes/No	Element detected and reported CBRN Contamination.

No.	Scale	Measure
04	Yes/No	Unit provided CBRN threat, hazard, and intelligence to support the common operational picture.
05	Yes/No	Unit implemented measures to protect personnel equipment, critical assets, and facilities.
06	Yes/No	Unit implemented protective measures to anticipated terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, and CBRN hazards.
07	Yes/No	Element decontaminated what was necessary only.
08	Time	To provide CBRN decontamination to restore operational capability.
09	Time	To prepare for CBRN attack.
10	Time	To move element or system(s) to the minimum safe distance from a predicted nuclear strike.
11	Time	To prepare and transmitted effective downwind message chemical downwind message.
12	Time	To conduct CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance.
13	Time	To implement chemoprophylaxis.
14	Percent	Of casualties due to the effects of CBRN attack.
15	Percent	Of combat power needed to prepare for a CBRN attack.
16	Percent	Of trained personnel on hand to prepare for a CBRN attack.
17	Percent	Of inoperable system(s) due to CBRN attack.
18	Percent	Of casualties, equipment, and supplies lost due to the nonavailability of CBRN protective equipment.
19	Percent	Of collective protection assets available.
20	Percent	Of decontamination assets available.

≠ART 6.9.3.2.1 Avoid Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Contamination

6-125. Contamination avoidance includes individual and/or unit measures taken to reduce the effects of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) hazards. (FM 3-11) (USACBRNS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit continued its mission when following an attack by enemy CBRN weapons.
02	Time	To detect the use of CBRN weapons in the area of operation (AO).
03	Time	To conduct route reconnaissance to determine locations where effects of CBRN weapons are present and to determine the degree of contamination along selected routes.
04	Time	To conduct area reconnaissance to determine limits of the effects of CBRN weapons.
05	Time	To refine the operations order to avoid or limit contact with contaminated areas.
06	Time	To utilize the CBRN warning and reporting system to send reports of CBRN attacks.
07	Time	To employ CBRN monitoring equipment.
08	Time	To identify CBRN hazards.
09	Time	To mark likely entry points into contaminated areas.
10	Time	To conduct contamination control, such as bypassing, exposing only the absolute minimum number of personnel and equipment, encapsulating personnel and equipment, covering equipment and supplies, and relocating.
11	Time	To obtain medical specimens for suspected biological or chemical hazards.
12	Time	To identify CBRN warfare agents from medical specimens.
13	Percent	Of detected and identified CBRN contamination in the AO.
14	Percent	Of identified friendly units in the AO that have CBRN Monitoring equipment.
15	Percent	Of identified on-hand CBRN equipment required to protect the unit against hazards, which is mission-capable.

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No.	Scale	Measure
16	Percent	Of positioned and operated CBRN monitoring equipment.
17	Percent	Of modified courses of action due to the presence of CBRN contamination.
18	Percent	Of recorded number of instances in which a CBRN hazard is correctly identified.
19	Percent	Of recorded number of instances in which a CBRN hazard is incorrectly identified as harmless.
20	Percent	Of recorded number of instances in which a harmless sample is incorrectly identified as a CBRN hazard.
21	Number	Of identified quantity and types of on-hand CBRN monitoring equipment.
22	Number	Of identified quantity and types of friendly systems destroyed, damaged, or rendered inoperable due to contact with CBRN contamination.
23	Number	Of identified friendly or civilian casualties in AO resulting from contact with CBRN contamination.
24	Number	Of identified casualties due to incorrect identification of CBRN hazards.

≠ART 6.9.3.2.1.1 Conduct Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Reconnaissance

6-126. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) reconnaissance detects the presence of and identifies the type and extent of CBRN hazards in the area of operations (AO) which restrict unprotected maneuver. Reconnaissance assists commanders with decisions that aid in the preservation of combat power, enable continued combat operations, and enable control of CBRN material. (FM 3-11.19) (USACBRNS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Element continues its mission following an attack by enemy CBRN weapons.
02	Time	To conduct area reconnaissance to determine limits of the effects of the use of CBRN weapons.
03	Time	To refine annex E to the operation order.
04	Time	To detect the use of CBRN weapons in the AO.
05	Time	To issue downwind hazard warnings of a CBRN attack in the AO.
06	Time	To conduct area damage control after the use of CBRN weapons.
07	Time	To recover unit operational capability after a CBRN attack.
08	Time	To assume appropriate mission-oriented protective posture after warning of use of CBRN weapons in the AO.
09	Percent	Of identified, targeted, and destroyed enemy CBRN weapons delivery systems in AO.
10	Percent	Of identified CBRN-contaminated sites in the AO that have decontamination operations initiated or completed.
11	Percent	Of identified units in the AO that have CBRN monitoring equipment.
12	Percent	Of identified on-hand CBRN equipment, necessary to protect the unit against hazards, that is mission-capable.
13	Percent	Of identified CBRN monitoring equipment positioned and operated correctly.
14	Percent	Of identified friendly units in the AO lacking supplies of individual and collective protective equipment and decontamination materials.
15	Percent	Of identified friendly and civilian casualties in AO as a result of the use of CBRN weapons.
16	Number	Of determined types of friendly systems destroyed, damaged, or rendered inoperable as a result of the use of CBRN weapons.

≠ART 6.9.3.2.1.2 Conduct Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Surveillance

6-127. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) surveillance is the systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons or things, by visual, aural, electronic,

photographic or other means. CBRN surveillance facilitates situational awareness and maintenance of an accurate, high fidelity, real-time picture of the operational environment as changes occur. CBRN surveillance involves standoff or point (including those remotely dispersed, unmanned and unattended) means to detect the presence or absence of hazards. (FM 3-11.19) (USACBRNS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit included CBRN surveillance priority intelligence requirements in the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance plan.
02	Yes/No	CBRN surveillance assets were employed based on the intelligence preparation of the battlefield and vulnerability planning.
03	Yes/No	CBRN assets were available against the number of CBRN specific named areas of interest.
04	Yes/No	Unit established the CBRN warning and reporting system.
05	Yes/No	Biological surveillance plan contained the following: meteorological assessment, duration of operation for detectors and/or collectors, detector array employment, number of detectors required, and distance between detectors and/or collectors.
06	Yes/No	Unit occupied observation posts to over watch the designated area.
07	Yes/No	Unit detected and located contamination from an attack that could impact on location or upwind units.
08	Time	To determine when the hazard has diminished to enough to allow mission oriented protective posture level reduction.

≠ART 6.9.3.2.1.3 Conduct Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Sample Management

6-128. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) sample management is the process that includes the collection, packaging, transport, storage, transfer, accountability, and reporting associated with environmental samples and medical specimens related to CBRN hazards in order to inform military decisionmaking for operations, medical support, and potential exploitation. (FM 3-11) (USACBRNS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit handled and processed contaminated and infectious equipment, samples, residues, animal remains, and waste.
02	Yes/No	Unit contained contaminated and infectious equipment, samples, residues, animal remains, and waste.
03	Yes/No	Unit safely stored contaminated and infectious equipment, samples, residues, animal remains, and waste.
04	Yes/No	Unit safely transported contaminated and infectious equipment, samples, residues, animal remains, and waste.
05	Yes/No	Unit outlined procedures of the chain of actions and associated processes from collection or identification (through processing and storage) to disposition actions.
06	Yes/No	Unit outlined procedures on how to gather samples and adhered to chain of custody of contaminated and infectious evidence.
07	Yes/No	Unit addressed procedures on how to transfer custody of contaminated and infectious evidence.
08	Yes/No	Unit identified personnel to wear personal protective equipment.
09	Yes/No	Unit ensured personnel wore appropriate personal protective equipment.
10	Yes/No	Unit appointed a safety officer to monitor operations in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) environments.
11	Yes/No	Unit identified and used appropriately contaminated and noncontaminated transportation routes.
12	Yes/No	Unit followed procedures to prevent secondary exposure and threats of WMD.

ART 6.9.3.2.2 Protect Friendly Forces Against Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Hazards

6-129. Measures that are taken to keep chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats and hazards from having an adverse effect on personnel, equipment, or critical assets and facilities. (FM 3-11) (USACBRNS)

Note: ART 6.9.3.2.2 employs protective measures included hardening of systems and facilities, preventing or reducing individual and collective exposures and applying chemoprophylaxis.

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Element implements protective measures to all anticipated threats to include terrorists and the use of weapons of mass destruction or other CBRN hazards.
02	Yes/No	Element or installation detected and identified CBRN incidents.
03	Yes/No	Element or installation ensured that all emergency response personnel received necessary training to respond to a terrorist CBRN attack.
04	Yes/No	Unit employed protective measures included hardening of systems and facilities, preventing or reducing individual and collective exposures, and applying chemoprophylaxis.
05	Yes/No	Unit trained a number of unit individuals in proper use of personal protective equipment (PPE).
06	Yes/No	Unit issued individual Soldiers PPE.
07	Time	To protect personnel, maintain critical military missions, and resume essential operations.
08	Time	To warn and report a CBRN attack and the presence of contamination.
09	Time	To provide appropriate medical protection, diagnosis, and treatment for CBRN effects.
10	Percent	Of individual and collective protection equipment assets available to the unit.

ART 6.9.3.2.3 Perform Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Decontamination

6-130. Decontamination is the process of making any person, object or area safe by absorbing, destroying, neutralizing, making harmless or removing chemical or biological agents or by removing radioactive material clinging to or around it. (FM 3-11) (USACBRNS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit continued its mission after decontaminating its personnel and systems.
02	Time	To delay execution of the unit concept of operations by decontamination procedures.
03	Time	To determine an appropriate decontamination site incorporating environmental considerations.
04	Time	To determine the extent of contamination.
05	Time	To move the required decontamination equipment to the decontamination site and obtain the necessary decontamination supplies.
06	Time	To decontaminate individuals, equipment, and systems.
07	Percent	Of identified unit personnel and equipment requiring decontamination.
08	Percent	Of identified unit personnel proficient in conducting decontamination operations.
09	Percent	Of identified on-hand decontamination equipment and supplies.
10	Percent	Of identified mission-capable, on-hand decontamination equipment.
11	Percent	Of identified personnel and equipment requiring decontamination.
12	Percent	Of identified types of mission-capable and on-hand decontamination equipment.
13	Percent	Of identified casualties due to improper and incomplete decontamination.

ART 6.9.4 CONDUCT CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

6-131. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) consequence management (CM) comprises those CM actions taken to plan, prepare for, respond to, and recover from CBRN incidents that require force and resource allocation beyond passive defense capabilities. (FM 3-11.21) (USACBRNS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit ensured Department of Defense plans and policies for CM operations were in place.
02	Time	To coordinate emergency response plan with civil authorities.
03	Time	To identify relevant participants and determine roles and responsibilities via approved exercise.
04	Time	To develop options for decision makers.
05	Time	To assess consequences and facilitate follow-on support.
06	Time	To deploy reaction teams.
07	Time	To establish plans to distribute medicines and medical supplies when protectively isolated, fearful of the public, or concerned for security.
08	Time	To develop specific entry and exit plans in concert with local, state, and federal response plans.
09	Time	To establish coordination, communication, and contingency plans for joint and government or industry via approved exercises.
10	Time	To establish mechanisms and processes for sharing information on stockpiles and surge capacities via approved exercises.
11	Time	To establish alert and notification mechanisms via approved exercises.
12	Percent	Of forwarded actions, with developed protections against failure.
13	Percent	Of medical CM teams were available.

ART 6.9.4.1 RESPOND TO CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR INCIDENTS

6-132. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) response addresses the short-term, direct effects of a CBRN incident. The major functions performed by response units are safeguarding lives, preserving health and safety, securing and eliminating the hazard, protecting property, preventing further damage to the environment, and maintaining public confidence in the government's ability to respond to a CBRN incident. (FM 3-11.21) (USACBRNS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit provided command and control (C2) of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) consequence management operations for Department of Defense (DOD) and non-DOD forces.
02	Yes/No	Unit provided guidance and procedures for WMD consequence management operations.
03	Yes/No	Unit synchronized C2 activities with other WMD C2 operations and higher headquarters for information sharing and decision support.
04	Yes/No	Unit ensured processes existed to integrate networked detectors to monitor the WMD incident zone.
05	Yes/No	Unit ensured procedures existed to establish and operate a WMD consequence management response C2 structure.
06	Yes/No	Unit ensured WMD consequence management C2 operations and activities were interoperable with participating forces.
07	Yes/No	Unit ensured C2 structure was established for WMD consequence management response.

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No.	Scale	Measure
08	Yes/No	Unit provided accurate WMD consequence management information to decision makers.
09	Yes/No	Unit provided appropriate WMD consequence management recommendations to decision makers.
10	Yes/No	Unit ensured mechanism existed to capture lessons learned.
11	Yes/No	Unit managed effectively the WMD incident information at the tactical level.
12	Yes/No	Unit ensured standardized WMD hazard alarm, warning, and reporting formats and procedures were interoperable with interagency partners.
13	Yes/No	Unit integrated WMD incident data into the common operational picture.
14	Yes/No	Unit ensured mechanism existed to rapidly disseminate WMD incident threat intelligence.
15	Yes/No	Unit ensured information on the operational impact of WMD events was integrated into the common operational picture.
16	Yes/No	Unit operated and supported the CBRN warning and reporting system.
17	Yes/No	Unit briefed participating forces on risks, hazards, and appropriate safety measures.
18	Yes/No	Unit debriefed participants upon leaving the hazard zone to collect information and identify potential secondary hazards.
19	Yes/No	Unit ensured procedures existed to conduct communications regarding the WMD incident and identified and projected hazards.
20	Yes/No	Unit ensured procedures existed to establish mutually supporting tactical- and field-level WMD reporting system that disseminates appropriate WMD consequence management intelligence and information, including potential and secondary hazards.
21	Yes/No	Unit communicated hazards that developed during the operational cycle to all key personnel at the hazard site.
22	Yes/No	Unit ensured procedures existed to contain and control contamination.
23	Yes/No	Unit ensured procedures existed to standardize the marking of hazard areas.
24	Yes/No	Unit ensured procedures existed to direct the identifying of hazard areas.
25	Yes/No	Unit ensured procedures existed to direct uncontaminated access to the incident site.
26	Yes/No	Unit ensured procedures existed to control access to and from the hazard areas.
27	Yes/No	Unit ensured procedures existed to provide movement control of the affected population.
28	Yes/No	Unit ensured measures existed to enforce isolation and quarantine events.
29	Yes/No	Unit conducted crowd control.

≠ART 6.9.4.1.1 Assess Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Incidents

6-133. Assessment activities provide the ability to predict future requirements to make necessary planning and operational adjustments. Assessment activities include threat, readiness, plans, and associated tactics, techniques, and procedures, detection and analysis, and surveillance. (FM 3-11.21) (USACBRNS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit conducted deliberate assessments of sites within its area of operations (AO).
02	Yes/No	Unit prepared to conduct consequence management operations against potential existing sites, if needed.
03	Yes/No	Unit identified specified and implied mission task for CBRN response units.
04	Time	To gather as much information and intelligence as possible on the site. Information may include the following: background information on the site, imagery, maps and site sketches, routes in and out, and potential staging areas.
05	Time	To identify sample information such as the types of CBRN agents or materials that may be present.

No.	Scale	Measure
06	Number	Of identified potential CBRN hazards and sites within the AO.
07	Number	Of identified personnel who work on the site.

≠ART 6.9.4.1.2 Conduct Victim and Casualty Search, Rescue and Extraction

6-134. Conduct chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) victim and casualty search, rescue, and extraction operations using established procedures while operating in a potential contaminated environment. Evacuating casualties to hot-zone egress points and into decontamination site, and evacuating non-contaminated victims to appropriate medical or mass care facilities. (FM 3-11.21) (USACBRNS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Procedures existed to locate, rescue, and extract victims and casualties in a hazardous environment.
02	Yes/No	Unit established command and control element.
03	Yes/No	Unit established hazard zone control and zone operations in support of search, rescue, and extraction.
04	Yes/No	Search and rescue processing centers were established and operational.
05	Yes/No	Unit established proper personal protective equipment guidelines.
06	Yes/No	Measures existed to protect weapons of mass destruction victims and casualties from the effects of weapons of mass destruction and secondary hazards while in the hazardous zone.
07	Yes/No	Unit determined and established search routes.
08	Yes/No	Personnel protected victims and casualties from further contamination, exposure, or injury.
09	Yes/No	Unit coordinated, prepared, and staged search and rescue with extraction equipment.
10	Yes/No	Unit established communications.
11	Yes/No	Unit sent status reports.
12	Yes/No	Units marked buildings in accordance with established search protocols.
13	Yes/No	Unit performed CBRN casualty assessment.
14	Yes/No	Units conducted buddy aid.

≠ART 6.9.4.2 SUPPORT CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR INCIDENT RECOVERY

6-135. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) recovery operations occur within the context of consequence management and include those actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate the consequences resulting from a CBRN incident, to include the treatment and decontamination of mass casualties, as well as processing contaminated remains. (FM 3-11.21) (USACBRNS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit took action to manage and mitigate the consequences resulting from a CBRN incident.
02	Yes/No	Unit revised the mission-recovery plan prior to and during the recovery phase.
03	Yes/No	Unit coordinated to ensure the transfer of tasks between civil authorities and military support commanders is understood and completed.
04	Yes/No	Unit mission recovery plan addressed logistic support and resupply, protection, documentation, and reporting requirements.
05	Yes/No	Unit identified resource expenditures, losses, and environmental exposure data necessary to estimate long- and short-term health effects.

No.	Scale	Measure
06	Yes/No	Unit provided force health protection and health service support to include personal protection, casualty-handling operations, medical screening and documentation, and critical-incident stress management.
07	Yes/No	Unit provided liaison with federal, state, local, host-nation officials on health services support activities.
08	Time	To reestablish full mission capability, develop the short- and long-term recovery requirements.
09	Time	To decontaminate equipment, infrastructure, and terrain.
10	Time	To assist with segregating and isolating contaminated areas or materials, monitoring operations, and securing the contaminated area.
11	Time	To conduct redeployment planning and operations.
12	Number	Of military support requested to transport affected population; assist with decontamination efforts.

≠ART 6.9.4.2.1 Conduct Emergency Medical Treatment of Contaminated Personnel

6-136. To evaluate and properly treat contaminated personnel, they must be triaged, decontaminated, and classified to the type and seriousness of illness or injury. Medical management of contaminated casualties includes triage, basic medical treatment, decontamination, emergency medical treatment, advanced trauma management, evacuation, and continually protect them from the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear elements. (FM 4-02.7) (USACBRNS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit established a patient decontamination site.
02	Yes/No	Unit accomplished initial triage, emergency medical treatment, and decontamination on the dirty side of the hot line.
03	Yes/No	Unit rendered life-sustaining care, as required, without regard to contamination.
04	Yes/No	Unit accomplished secondary triage, advanced trauma management, and patient disposition on the clean side of the hot line.
05	Yes/No	When applicable, unit implemented isolation and quarantine plans and procedures.
06	Percent	Of patients requiring decontamination before receiving medical treatment.
07	Percent	Of medical treatments degraded, delayed, or modified due to the inability to perform patient decontamination.

≠ART 6.9.4.2.2 Conduct Mass Casualty Decontamination Operations

6-137. Mass casualty decontamination (MCD) is required when a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) incident results in a large number of casualties that require support from external forces. Personnel processing through a MCD operation may not have personal protective equipment and will require a fast, efficient, and effective decontamination process. In addition to a rapid response, MCD operations require large numbers of response personnel, equipment, and supplies. (FM 3-11.21) (USACBRNS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit prioritized the decontamination process if number of victims exceed capability of responding unit.
02	Yes/No	Unit selected correct decontamination method.
03	Yes/No	Unit determined the need for personnel protection.
04	Yes/No	Unit properly received and accounted for personal property and determined its decontamination priority.
05	Yes/No	Unit controlled contaminated waste and runoff.
06	Yes/No	Unit continued to assess the effectiveness of decontamination method throughout the decontamination operation.

No.	Scale	Measure
07	Time	To identified substance to set up hazard control zone.
08	Time	To establish site control measures.
09	Time	To establish triage.
10	Time	To process casualties from arrival at triage to departure from decontamination station.
11	Number	Of casualties decontaminated.

≠ART 6.9.4.2.3 Process Contaminated Remains

6-138. Contaminated human remains of US personnel must be effectively decontaminated. These procedures minimize the risk of personnel who come into contact with the human remains. This process begins at determination of contamination of the remains through decontamination of the remains. Special attention should be paid to safety and sanitation. (FM 4-20.64) (USACBRNS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit established mass mortuary operations in a weapons of mass destruction environment.
02	Yes/No	Unit collected contaminated human remains.
03	Yes/No	Unit ensured procedures existed for chain of actions associated with contaminated human remains processing.
04	Yes/No	Unit ensured procedures adequately addressed the safe recovery and handling, packaging, marking, decontamination, processing, storage, and preparation for transport of remains and personal effects.
05	Yes/No	Unit handled, processed, stored, and transported safely human remains contaminated with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials.
06	Yes/No	Personnel qualified to wear personal protective equipment.
07	Yes/No	Personnel wore appropriate personal protective equipment.
08	Yes/No	Unit decontaminated human remains.
09	Yes/No	Unit ensured adequate rest cycles for personnel conducting decontamination of human remains.
10	Yes/No	Unit ensured compliance with procedures for contaminated material and wastewater disposal.

≠ART 6.9.5 PROVIDE TECHNICAL CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR EXPERTISE

6-139. Technical chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) expertise allows commanders to make informed decisions regarding the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) counterforce, CBRN defense, and CBRN consequence management capabilities. These tasks include CBRN threat assessments, CBRN vulnerability assessments, CBRN hazard modeling, CBRN warning and reporting, providing WMD forensic analysis, as well as integration with medical and health surveillance, casualty management, mortuary affairs, laboratory analysis, and preventive medicine. (ATTP 3-11.36) (USACBRNS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit ensured tactical intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination processes were in place.
02	Yes/No	Unit collaborated and shared tactical situational awareness.
03	Yes/No	Unit disseminated information in near real time.
04	Yes/No	Unit assessed support levels of selected tactical activities.
05	Yes/No	Unit identified information requirements and processes from tactical WMD intelligence guidance.
06	Yes/No	Unit assessed the WMD operations environment.

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
No.	Scale	Measure
07	Yes/No	Unit ensured WMD hazard predictive modeling information was available to the commander.
08	Yes/No	Unit assessed and characterized the impact of WMD hazard on tactical consequence management operations.
09	Yes/No	Unit ensured staff intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance asset assessed WMD and secondary hazards.
10	Yes/No	Unit processed WMD threat intelligence rapidly to meet needs of commanders.
11	Yes/No	Unit disseminated WMD information in near real time.
12	Yes/No	Unit ensured WMD information was available to all units and teams in the operational area.
13	Yes/No	Unit checked the atmosphere for WMD hazards.
14	Yes/No	Unit checked surfaces for WMD hazards.
15	Yes/No	Unit checked water for WMD hazards.
16	Yes/No	Unit checked the presence WMD hazards on humans, animals, and human remains.
17	Yes/No	Unit ensured dual-purpose units were trained and prepared to conduct WMD reconnaissance missions.
18	Time	To assess and characterize the WMD threat in the operational area.
19	Time	To assess potential implications and impacts to support of WMD consequence management in the operational area.
20	Time	To conduct CBRN vulnerability assessment.

≠ART 6.9.5.1 CONDUCT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION FORENSIC EVIDENCE COLLECTION

6-140. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) forensic evidence collection is conducted after a WMD incident to establish facts for attribution. The analysis of WMD forensic evidence has produced emerging needs and capabilities in support of intelligence functions, operational activities, protection, host-nation legal support, personnel recovery, and identification of superiority in different environments. (ATTP 3-11.23) (USACBRNS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit collected WMD material in accordance with applicable law, policies, and regulation that govern WMD operations.
02	Yes/No	Unit obtained legal coordination and authorization with appropriate government agency prior to WMD forensic evidence collection.
03	Yes/No	Unit conducted appropriate collection and handling procedures.
04	Yes/No	Force included personnel trained in collection and handling procedures for WMD forensic evidence.
05	Yes/No	Unit had protective packages and containers available to safely package and transport materials.
06	Yes/No	Unit located and safeguarded key witnesses documents and other forensic evidence related to key ongoing or potential investigations.
07	Yes/No	Unit processed items of evidence for forensics analysis.
08	Yes/No	Unit maintained chain of custody.

SECTION X – ART 6.10: EMPLOY SAFETY TECHNIQUES



6-141. Safety in the protection warfighting function identifies and assesses hazards to the force and makes recommendations on ways to mitigate those hazards. Responsibility for safety starts with the commander and continues through the chain of command to individuals. All staffs understand and factor into their analysis how their execution recommendations could adversely affect Soldiers. (FM 5-19) (CRC)

ART 6.10.1 CONDUCT COMPOSITE RISK MANAGEMENT

6-142. Identify and control hazards to protect the force and increase the chance of mission accomplishment. Use risk management throughout the conduct (planning, preparing, executing, and assessing) of missions to recommend how to reduce tactical and accidental risk. ART 6.10.1 includes the requirement to establish, communicate, and enforce controls that reduce the risk of tactical and accident hazards. (FM 5-19) (CRC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit established, communicated, and enforced tactical and accident hazard controls.
02	Yes/No	Probability of successful mission accomplishment increased because of risk management.
03	Yes/No	Casualties and vehicle or building damage reduced because of the use of risk management techniques.
04	Yes/No	Environmental considerations planning and procedures were present and being followed.
05	Time	To employ risk management.
06	Time	To communicate controls or changes to force.
07	Percent	Of identified significant risks to mission accomplishment and force protection.
08	Percent	Of identified risks that are determined to be acceptable by the commander.
09	Percent	Of force affected by identified accident hazards.
10	Percent	Of hazards identified and mitigated to include environmental hazards.
11	Percent	Of residual risk accepted.
12	Percent	Of force affected by unidentified accident hazards.
13	Number	And types of hazards not identified affecting operation or casualties.
14	Number	Of controls averting identified accident hazards.
15	Number	Of controls averting unidentified accident hazards.

ART 6.10.2 DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT COMMAND SAFETY PROGRAM

6-143. Develop and implement command safety and occupational health, risk management, and accident prevention programs. (FM 5-19) (CRC)


No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	The command's published safety program incorporated the commander's safety philosophy and had realistic safety goals, objectives, and priorities.
02	Time	To modify command safety program to include new safety hazards.
03	Number	Of measures introduced to mitigate risk as a result of the risk assessment.
04	Number	Of violations of command safety program occurring within a given time.
05	Number	Of safety hazards not covered initially by command safety program.

ART 6.10.3 MINIMIZE SAFETY RISKS

6-144. Ensure that programs are in place to identify potential safety threats, to apply risk management, and to take action to abate such risks. (FM 5-19) (CRC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Time	To complete accident investigation and report.
02	Percent	Of accidents attributed to human error in last 12 months.
03	Number	Of fatalities in last 12 months.
04	Number	Of man-hours lost because of accidents in last 6 months.
05	Number	Of people with lost time because of contact with hazardous materials.
06	Number	Of people with lost time because of nonwork-related accidents.
07	Number	Of people with lost time because of work-related accidents

SECTION XI – ART 6.11: IMPLEMENT OPERATIONS SECURITY



6-145. Operations security is a process of identifying essential elements of friendly information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; determine indicators that hostile

intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. (FM 3-13) (USACAC)

ART 6.11.1 CONDUCT OPERATIONS SECURITY

6-146. Identify essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) and subsequently analyze friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities. ART 6.11.1 identifies actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems and determines indicators adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive EEFI in time to be useful to adversaries. ART 6.11.1 also involves selecting and executing measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. (FM 3-13) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Operations security (OPSEC) compromised degraded, delayed, or modified unit operation.
02	Time	To refine OPSEC appendix to the operation order.
03	Time	To complete OPSEC assessment in the area of operations (AO).
04	Time	To identify possible compromises of EEFI in AO.
05	Time	To identify EEFI for an operation.
06	Percent	Of increased or decreased number of security violations on combat net radios in the AO within a given period.
07	Percent	Of enemy sensor coverage in AO known to friendly forces.
08	Percent	Of successful enemy attempted penetration of friendly information systems.
09	Percent	Of information systems administrators and operators who have current OPSEC training.
10	Percent	Of identified friendly vulnerabilities in AO exploited by enemy actions.
11	Percent	Of friendly troop movements conducted without the possibility of enemy overhead surveillance (satellite and manned and unmanned aerial reconnaissance platforms).
12	Percent	Of units, facilities, and installations protected from enemy observation or surveillance.
13	Percent	Of electronic communications in AO encrypted or secured.
14	Percent	Of message traffic in AO exploited by enemy.
15	Percent	Of friendly emitters in AO exploited by enemy.
16	Percent	Of EEFI items covered by two or more measures.
17	Percent	Of enemy capabilities not covered by OPSEC measures covered by other elements such as deception, and electronic warfare.
18	Percent	Of friendly plan determined from self-monitoring of EEFI.
19	Percent	Of OPSEC measures previously assessed unsatisfactory that have improved based on assessment.
20	Percent	Of OPSEC measures selected tied to vulnerability analysis.
21	Percent	Of OPSEC planners who accommodate measures required to protect trusted agent planning such as given access.
22	Percent	Of OPSEC planners who have access to compartmented planning efforts.
23	Percent	Of OPSEC planners who have input to and receive guidance and results from higher headquarters OPSEC plans and surveys.
24	Percent	Of OPSEC surveys reflected in OPSEC plans.
25	Percent	Of routine actions with timing or location changed at least weekly.
26	Percent	Of units equipped with antisurveillance sensor and sensor jamming devices.
27	Percent	Of vulnerabilities tied to specific enemy capabilities by planners.
28	Number	And types of information needed by the commander to make decisions listed as EEFI.

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No.	Scale	Measure
29	Number	Of security violations on combat net radios in the AO.
30	Number	Of instances of friendly force operational patterns repeated in the AO.

ART 6.11.1.1 IDENTIFY ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION

6-147. Identify friendly vulnerabilities that are exploitable by enemies and potential adversaries. Include recommendations concerning countermeasures and corrective action. (FM 3-13) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Commander and staff identified friendly vulnerabilities that can be exploited by an enemy.
02	Time	To develop essential elements of friendly information (EEFI).
03	Time	To disseminate initial and subsequent EEFI requirements to subordinate elements of the force.
04	Time	Between updates of priority information requirements.
05	Time	To disseminate to all force elements and agencies information obtained due to the answering of EEFI.
06	Time	In advance of collection that EEFI are identified.
07	Time	Since most current information regarding EEFI was last collected.
08	Time	Of turnaround to process new EEFI.
09	Percent	Of friendly activities and resource expenditures accurately predicted by friendly reference materials, checklists, and other previously prepared documents and databases.
10	Percent	Of total EEFI identified only during execution.
11	Percent	Of EEFI collected in time to meet current operational needs.
12	Percent	Of EEFI included in collection plan.
13	Number	Of EEFI not identified during planning.

ART 6.11.1.2 APPLY APPROPRIATE OPERATIONS SECURITY MEASURES

6-148. Deny adversaries information about friendly capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting indicators associated with planning and conducting military operations. (FM 3-13) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit application of operations security (OPSEC) measures prevented the enemy from detecting the correct indicators of friendly operations until it was too late for the enemy to react.
02	Yes/No	Units changed patterns of operation on an irregular basis.
03	Time	To apply appropriate OPSEC measures.
04	Time	To brief unit information engagement cell and unit plans cell on OPSEC requirements.
05	Time	To identify target sets and desired effect, by priority.
06	Percent	Of OPSEC surveys reflected in OPSEC plans.
07	Percent	Of routine actions with timing or location changed at least weekly.
08	Percent	Of favorable signal security assessments.
09	Number	Of public media disclosures.
10	Number	Of critical essential elements of friendly information that must be concealed from the enemy.

ART 6.11.1.3 PERFORM EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION OF CLASSIFIED AND SENSITIVE MATERIALS

6-149. Establish and execute procedures for the emergency destruction of classified materials. (AR 380-5) (USAIC&FH)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Emergency destruction of classified and sensitive documents and other materials was accomplished without compromising classified and sensitive information.
02	Time	To identify classified and sensitive materials for destruction.
03	Time	To destroy classified and sensitive materials.
04	Time	To develop and rehearse emergency destruction procedures.
05	Percent	Of identified classified and sensitive s identified for destruction that is actually destroyed.
06	Percent	Of classified and sensitive materials accountability procedures followed during the emergency destruction process.
07	Percent	Of mission-capable, on-hand equipment to perform emergency destruction of classified and sensitive materials.
08	Number	And types of paper shredders, thermal grenades, burn barrels, and magnets used to perform emergency destruction of classified and sensitive materials.
09	Number	And types of classified and sensitive documents and other materials destroyed.

ART 6.11.2 IMPLEMENT PHYSICAL SECURITY PROCEDURES

6-150. Protect personnel, information, and critical resources in all locations and situations against various threats by developing and implementing effective security policies and procedures. This total system approach is based on the continuing analysis and employment of protective measures, to include physical barriers, clear zones, lighting, access and key control, intrusion detection devices, defensive positions, and nonlethal capabilities. (FM 3-19.30) (USAMPS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit, base, and installation physical security program protected personnel, information, and critical resources from unauthorized access.
02	Time	To review and refine unit physical security standing operating procedures in accordance with the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations.
03	Time	To refine physical security regulations for installations and major combat formation in an area of operations.
04	Time	To complete a threat analysis.
05	Time	To design, procure, emplace and activate protective measures, such as physical barriers, clear zones, exterior lighting, access and key control, intrusion detection devices, defensive positions, and nonlethal capabilities.
06	Percent	Of units, bases, and installations in the area of operations that have active integrated physical security programs.
07	Percent	Of guidance in unit and base physical security programs actually followed.
08	Percent	Of decreased crime rate.
09	Percent	Of increased reported crimes cleared.
10	Percent	Of perpetrators arrested or killed.
11	Percent	Of decreased serious crimes reported.
12	Percent	Of decreased fear of crime by unit personnel.
13	Percent	Of planned physical barriers, clear zones, exterior lighting, access and key control, intrusion detection devices, defensive positions and nonlethal capabilities operational.
14	Number	Of successful attempts to gain unauthorized access to friendly forces, installations, information, equipment, and supplies.

ART 6.11.2.1 EMPLOY CAMOUFLAGE, CONCEALMENT, AND DECOY TECHNIQUES

6-151. Protect friendly forces, personnel, materiel, equipment, and information system nodes from observation and surveillance by using natural or artificial materials. Employ an imitation in any sense of a person, object, or phenomenon with the intentions of deceiving enemy surveillance devices or misleading enemy evaluation. (FM 20-3) (USAES)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	The unit's use of camouflage, concealment, and decoy techniques enhanced unit survivability.
02	Time	To employ camouflage, concealment, and decoy techniques.
03	Time	To conduct a preliminary assessment of camouflage, concealment, and decoy effort in the area of operations.
04	Time	To obtain additional operational camouflage and decoy systems as required by the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations.
05	Percent	Of unit concealed from enemy observation and sensor detection.
06	Percent	Of unit personnel trained to correctly employ camouflage and concealment and to use decoys.
07	Percent	Of casualties due to improper use of camouflage and concealment and decoys.
08	Percent	Of on-hand camouflage and decoy systems that are serviceable against enemy observation and sensors.
09	Number	And types of on-hand, serviceable camouflage and decoy systems.

ART 6.11.2.2 EMPLOY NOISE, LIGHT, THERMAL, AND PHYSICAL EVIDENCE CONTROLS

6-152. Reduce friendly indicators by controlling personnel and equipment sounds, light emissions, and physical evidence of occupying a position. (FM 3-21.75) (USAIS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit personnel did not compromise unit course of action by violations of noise, light, thermal, and physical evidence controls.
02	Time	To assess unit noise, light, thermal, and physical evidence controls.
03	Time	To employ noise, light, thermal, and physical evidence controls.
04	Percent	Of increased time to conduct operations required by the need to maintain noise, light, thermal, and physical evidence controls.
05	Percent	Of unit maintaining noise, light, thermal, and physical evidence controls.
06	Percent	Of unit personnel trained in noise, light, thermal, and physical evidence controls.
07	Percent	Of units, installations, and facilities that have recorded violations of noise, light, thermal, and physical evidence controls.
08	Number	Of friendly casualties due to violations of unit noise, light, thermal, and physical evidence controls.

ART 6.11.3 COUNTER THE THREAT

6-153. The task of providing the commander information and intelligence support for targeting the threat forces through lethal and nonlethal fires including electronic warfare and information engagement. Intelligence support to force protection and counterintelligence including the tactics, techniques, and procedures to deny or degrade threat intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to access and collect information and intelligence on friendly forces. (FM 2-0) (USAIC&FH)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit identified threat capabilities and limitations.
02	Yes/No	Unit identified friendly force vulnerabilities to threat forces.

No.	Scale	Measure
03	Yes/No	Unit developed countermeasures to deny or degrade threat capabilities.
04	Yes/No	Unit developed countermeasures to mitigate friendly force vulnerability.
05	Yes/No	Unit identified threat capabilities and friendly forces countermeasures in sufficient time to integrate into the plan, prepare, execute, and assess operations process.
06	Yes/No	Unit disseminated countermeasures to friendly forces.
07	Time	To develop threat databases and templates.
08	Time	To develop countermeasures.
09	Percent	Of threat capabilities correctly identified.
10	Percent	Of countermeasures that effectively denied or degraded threat's ability.

ART 6.11.3.1 CONDUCT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

6-154. Counterintelligence is designed to defeat or degrade threat intelligence collection capabilities. The intelligence staff provides counterintelligence to the commander outlining the capabilities and limitations of threat intelligence services to limit or eliminate these capabilities. (FM 34-60) (USAIC&FH)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Enemy intelligence operations directed against the unit and its personnel degraded, delayed, or modified unit operations.
02	Yes/No	Control element provided counterintelligence guidance.
03	Time	To conduct an area reconnaissance to identify hazards.
04	Time	To review counterintelligence plans for major tactical formations in the area of operations (AO).
05	Time	To conduct counterintelligence collection, operations, and investigations; create and maintain counterintelligence databases; analyze, assess counterintelligence information; and publish, disseminate, and technically support counterintelligence products and reports.
06	Time	To conduct counterintelligence screening and collection at enemy prisoner of war collection points or dislocated civilian checkpoints.
07	Time	To conduct counterintelligence liaison with host-nation agencies and multinational forces.
08	Time	To conduct the counterintelligence portion of a vulnerability assessment and recommend countermeasures.
09	Percent	Of friendly force operations in the AO degraded, delayed, or modified due to successful enemy intelligence activities.
10	Percent	Of friendly force units in the AO that have current counterintelligence training.
11	Percent	Of friendly force action designed to mislead or prevent enemy intelligence efforts.
12	Percent	Of units in the AO that have active counterintelligence plans.
13	Number	Of enemy intelligence efforts detected by counterintelligence activities.
14	Number	Of counterintelligence teams available for use in the AO.
15	Number	And quality of sources developed in the AO.

ART 6.11.3.2 CONDUCT COUNTERDECEPTION OPERATIONS

6-155. Conduct activities that preclude the commander from being deceived by enemy deception operations. (FM 3-13) (USACAC)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Friendly course of action was not affected by enemy deception except as desired to deceive the enemy when the friendly force accepted the enemy deception story.
02	Time	To identify adversary attempts to deceive friendly forces.

No.	Scale	Measure
03	Time	To develop counterdeception operations options as required.
04	Percent	Of enemy deception activities detected.
05	Percent	Of enemy deception activities using multiple sources to transmit deception story.

ART 6.11.3.3 PERFORM COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

6-156. Gather information and conduct activities to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. (FM 34-60) (USAIC&FH)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit identified threat intelligence collection capabilities and limitations.
02	Yes/No	Unit identified friendly forces vulnerabilities to threat intelligence collection.
03	Yes/No	Unit developed countermeasures to deny or degrade threat's ability to collect on friendly forces.
04	Yes/No	Unit developed countermeasures to mitigate friendly forces vulnerability to threat collection.
05	Yes/No	Unit identified threat capabilities and friendly forces countermeasures in sufficient time for implementation.
06	Time	To develop threat databases and templates.
07	Time	To develop countermeasures.
08	Percent	Of threat intelligence collection capabilities correctly identified.
09	Percent	Of countermeasures that effectively denied or degraded threat's ability to collect on friendly forces.

ART 6.11.3.4 DETER IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE

6-157. Defeat or degrade threat imagery intelligence collection capabilities. The intelligence staff will provide counterintelligence to the commander outlining the capabilities and limitation of threat imagery intelligence services to limit or eliminate these imagery capabilities. (FM 2-0) (USAIC&FH)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit identified threat imagery intelligence collection capabilities and limitations.
02	Yes/No	Unit identified friendly forces vulnerabilities to threat imagery intelligence collection.
03	Yes/No	Unit developed countermeasures to deny or degrade threat's ability to collect on friendly forces with imagery assets.
04	Yes/No	Unit developed countermeasures to mitigate friendly forces vulnerability to threat collection.
05	Yes/No	Unit identified threat capabilities and friendly forces countermeasures in sufficient time for implementation.
06	Time	To develop threat databases and templates.
07	Time	To develop countermeasures.
08	Percent	Of threat imagery intelligence collection capabilities correctly identified.
09	Percent	Of countermeasures that effectively denied or degraded threat's ability to collect on friendly forces with imagery assets.

ART 6.11.3.5 DETER HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

6-158. Defeat or degrade threat human intelligence collection capabilities. The intelligence staff will provide counterintelligence to the commander outlining the capabilities and limitation of threat human intelligence services to limit or eliminate these human intelligence capabilities. (FM 2-0) (USAIC&FH)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit identified threat human intelligence collection capabilities and limitations.
02	Yes/No	Unit identified friendly force vulnerabilities to threat human intelligence collection.
03	Yes/No	Unit developed countermeasures to deny or degrade threat's ability to collect on friendly forces.
04	Yes/No	Unit developed countermeasures to mitigate friendly forces vulnerability to threat human collection.
05	Yes/No	Unit identified threat capabilities and friendly forces countermeasures in sufficient time for implementation.
06	Time	To develop threat databases and templates.
07	Time	To develop countermeasures.
08	Percent	Of threat human intelligence collection capabilities correctly identified.
09	Percent	Of countermeasures that effectively denied or degraded threat's ability to collect on friendly forces using human intelligence.

ART 6.11.3.6 DETER SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE

6-159. Defeat or degrade threat signal intelligence collection capabilities. The intelligence staff will provide counterintelligence to the commander outlining the capabilities and limitation of threat signal intelligence services to limit or eliminate these signal intelligence capabilities. (FM 2-0) (USAIC&FH)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit identified threat signal intelligence collection capabilities and limitations.
02	Yes/No	Unit identified friendly forces vulnerabilities to threat signal intelligence collection.
03	Yes/No	Unit developed countermeasures to deny or degrade threat's ability to collect on friendly force use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
04	Yes/No	Unit developed countermeasures to mitigate friendly force vulnerability to threat signal collection.
05	Yes/No	Unit identified threat capabilities and friendly force countermeasures in sufficient time for implementation.
06	Time	To develop threat databases and templates.
07	Time	To develop counter measures.
08	Percent	Of threat signals intelligence collection capabilities correctly identified.
09	Percent	Of countermeasures that effectively denied or degraded threat's ability to collect on friendly force using signals intelligence.

ART 6.11.3.7 DETER MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURE INTELLIGENCE

6-160. Defeat or degrade threat measurement and signature intelligence collection capabilities. The intelligence staff will provide counterintelligence to the commander outlining the capabilities and limitation of threat measurement and signature intelligence services to limit or eliminate these measurement and signature intelligence capabilities. (FM 2-0) (USAIC&FH)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit identified threat measurement and signature intelligence collection capabilities and limitations.
02	Yes/No	Unit identified friendly force vulnerabilities to threat measurement and signature intelligence collection.
03	Yes/No	Unit developed countermeasures to deny or degrade threat's ability to collect on friendly force.
04	Yes/No	Unit developed countermeasures to mitigate friendly force vulnerability to threat measurement and signature collection.
05	Yes/No	Unit identified threat capabilities and friendly force countermeasures in sufficient time for implementation.

No.	Scale	Measure
06	Time	To develop threat databases and templates.
07	Time	To develop countermeasures.
08	Percent	Of threat measurement and signature intelligence collection capabilities correctly identified.
09	Percent	Of countermeasures that effectively denied or degraded threat's ability to collect on friendly forces using measurement and signature intelligence.

≠ART 6.11.4 CONDUCT LOGISTICS SECURITY OPERATIONS


6-161. Logistics security (LOGSEC) operations is a function primarily performed by the Army Criminal Investigation Command. The LOGSEC function protects the Army's supply pipeline against criminal activities from the manufacturer, through logistics channels, all the way to the frontline Soldier. It involves preventing, detecting, and investigating criminal and terrorist activities such as supply diversion, destruction, and sabotage or product substitution. (FM 3-39) (USAMPS)

≠ART 6.11.4.1 PERFORM LOGISTICS SECURITY ASSESSMENTS

6-162. The Army Criminal Investigation Command assesses logistics security (LOGSEC) to identify weaknesses and provide a prioritization of threats so that commanders can implement preventive measures to reduce the vulnerability of the logistics pipeline. Whenever possible, the Army Criminal Investigation Command will initiate actions to recover logistical losses and return them to Army control. (FM 3-39) (USAMPS)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Law enforcement agency personnel coordinate with higher headquarters for criminal intelligence data.
02	Yes/No	Law enforcement agency personnel coordinate with host nation for intelligence reports and sources.
03	Yes/No	Law enforcement agency personnel identify units and activities in area of responsibility.
04	Yes/No	Law enforcement agency personnel determine critical assets as established by the supported commanders.
05	Yes/No	Law enforcement agency personnel develop prioritized listing of targets.
06	Yes/No	Law enforcement agency personnel interview relevant persons in targeted units and activities to identify weaknesses in the supply pipeline.
07	Yes/No	Law enforcement agency personnel select supply items and examine pipeline steps from manufacturer to the frontline Soldier to identify weaknesses.
08	Yes/No	Law enforcement agency personnel examine contract specifications for select products to determine if the suppliers are adhering to the contract.
09	Yes/No	Law enforcement agency personnel examine consumer use merchandise being sold by street vendors near military facilities to determine if it may have been stolen from the supply pipeline for black marketing.
10	Yes/No	Law enforcement agency personnel develop sources and informants to uncover security threats in the logistics system and indicators of bribery and contract fraud offenses.
11	Yes/No	Law enforcement agency personnel consider undercover operations to possibly embed with military organizations.
12	Yes/No	Law enforcement agency personnel consider using technical listening equipment.
13	Yes/No	Law enforcement agency personnel reports discovered criminal information to higher headquarters for further investigation in accordance with AR 195-2.
14	Yes/No	Law enforcement agency personnel prepares a LOGSEC threat assessment.
15	Yes/No	Law enforcement agency personnel provides the LOGSEC threat assessment to higher headquarters, supported commanders, and police intelligence agencies.

***SECTION XII – ART 6.12: PROVIDE EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL PROTECTION SUPPORT**



6-163. Eliminate or reduce the effects of unexploded explosive ordnance (UXO), improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) hazards to protect the commander’s combat power. Explosive ordnance hazards limit battlefield mobility, deny use of critical assets, and threaten to reduce the commander’s combat power significantly. Neutralize domestic or foreign conventional, chemical, biological, and nuclear munitions; enhanced explosive devices; and IEDs that present a threat to civilian facilities, materiel, and personnel, regardless of location. The Departments of

Justice, State, and Energy may receive this support per current agreements and directives. (FM 3-34.214) (CASCOM)

Note: ART 6.12.8.6 includes conducting bomb and sabotage device recognition and safety precaution training. ART 6.12.8.7 includes providing explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) support to the U.S. Secret Service, Department of State, and the Department of Defense to protect the President and other designated persons.

Tasks identified in ART 6.12 are tasks that can be provided in support of stability operations as well as in civil support operations.

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	EOD support allowed the unit to accomplish its mission.
02	Yes/No	Collateral damage incurred during the EOD operation was within acceptable limits.
03	Yes/No	Unit safeguarded classified materials and publications during the EOD operation.
04	Yes/No	Unit forwarded items and components of technical intelligence value to appropriate headquarters or agency.
05	Time	To provide EOD input to annex I to the operation plan or order.
06	Time	To respond to a request for EOD support.
07	Time	Delay in executing the concept of operations due to the presence of UXOs and IEDs.
08	Time	To gather intelligence information (what, when, where, how delivered, and type) regarding munitions.
09	Time	To identify safety requirements and considerations.
10	Time	To identify personnel, equipment, procedures, and additional support requirements.
11	Time	To coordinate with reporting agency for site support assistance, such as engineer, medical, security, and transportation.
12	Time	To clear munitions and improvised devices.
13	Time	To document render-safe procedures, as conducted, for unknown ordnance, if technical intelligence data does not exist.
14	Percent	Of safety precautions enforced during EOD operations.
15	Percent	Of reported munitions and improvised devices rendered safe.
16	Percent	Of reported munitions and improvised devices rendered safe per commander's intent.
17	Percent	Of available EOD support expended on conducting bomb and sabotage device recognition and safety training.
18	Percent	Of patients received at medical treatment facilities with UXO in their wounds.
19	Number	Of casualties during the EOD operation.
20	Number	And types of ordnance located and destroyed by EOD personnel.
21	Number	Of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives incidents responded to within a given period.

ART 6.12.1 CONDUCT UNEXPLODED EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE AND EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR OPERATIONS

6-164. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units identify, render safe, recover, evaluate, dispose of, mitigate the threat of, and report (EOD and intelligence) U.S. and foreign unexploded explosive ordnance (UXO) to eliminate or reduce hazards and to protect the commander's combat power. EOD units maintain the capability to render safe, identify, destroy, and move UXO hazards to safe holding or disposal areas within the limitations of their organic transportation assets, perform technical intelligence on new or first seen ordnance items, and perform postblast forensic analysis. EOD performs initial assessment of explosive remnants of war sites, eliminates immediate hazards, conducts technical intelligence procedures, and recommends disposition to capturing unit. (FM 3-34.214) (CASCOM)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	EOD support allowed the requesting unit to accomplish its mission.
02	Yes/No	Collateral damage incurred during the conduct of the EOD operation was in acceptable limits.
03	Yes/No	Unit safeguarded classified materials and publications during EOD operations.
04	Yes/No	Unit forwarded items and components of technical intelligence value to appropriate headquarters or agency.
05	Time	To respond to a request for EOD support to conduct UXO and explosive remnants of war operations.
06	Time	Delay to execute operations due to the presence of UXO and explosive remnants of war.
07	Time	To gather intelligence information (what, when, where, how delivered, and type) regarding UXO and explosive remnants of war.
08	Time	To identify safety requirements and considerations concerned with the destruction or elimination of UXO or rendering safe explosive remnants of war.
09	Time	To identify personnel, equipment, procedures, and additional support requirements.
10	Time	To coordinate with the reporting agency for site support assistance such as engineer, medical, security, and transportation.
11	Time	To clear UXO and explosive remnants of war.
12	Time	Time to move UXOs to safe holding or dispersal areas.
13	Time	To document render-safe procedures, as conducted, for unknown UXO or explosive remnants of war if technical intelligence data does not exist.
14	Time	To provide disposition instructions of explosive remnants of war to capturing unit.
15	Percent	Of safety precautions enforced during the EOD operation.
16	Percent	Of reported UXO and explosive remnants of war rendered safe.
17	Percent	Of reported UXO and explosive remnants of war destroyed or rendered safe per the commander's priorities.
18	Number	Of casualties during the conduct of the EOD operation.
19	Number	And types of UXO and explosive remnants of war destroyed by EOD personnel.

ART 6.12.2 REMOVE STUCK ROUNDS AND DOWNLOAD MISFIRED MUNITIONS IN WEAPON SYSTEMS

6-165. Removal of stuck rounds is a routine explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operation. In a removal of stuck rounds mission, the EOD unit removes stuck rounds in mortars, artillery tubes, and other weapon systems; inspects possible unsafe ammunition removed during EOD or operator procedures to determine if it is safe for storage or transport; and destroys ammunition that EOD personnel determine to be unsafe for storage or transport. A battle damaged vehicle with ammunition on board requires EOD to download munitions and clear the vehicle before it can be repaired. EOD also supports the postblast investigation and performs technical intelligence on enemy weapons effects on U.S. vehicles through appropriate channels. (FM 3-34.214) (CASCOM)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	EOD support allowed the unit to accomplish its mission.
02	Yes/No	Collateral damage incurred during the conduct of the EOD operation was in acceptable limits.
03	Yes/No	Unit safeguarded classified materials and publications during EOD operations.
04	Yes/No	Unit forwarded items and components of technical intelligence value to appropriate headquarters or agency.
05	Time	To identify safety requirements and considerations concerned with removal of stuck rounds or download misfired munitions.
06	Time	To identify personnel, equipment, procedures, and additional support requirements.

No.	Scale	Measure
07	Time	To move from the current location to the work site.
08	Time	To coordinate with the requesting agency for site support assistance in areas such as engineer, medical, security, and transportation.
09	Time	To remove the stuck rounds or download misfired munitions.
10	Time	To gather intelligence information (what, when, where, how delivered, and type) regarding munitions.
11	Time	To coordinate with reporting agency for site support assistance such as engineer, medical, security, and transportation.
12	Time	To develop and attempt render-safe procedures or conduct analysis for forensic evidence.
13	Percent	Of available EOD support assets expended on developing render-safe procedures or conducting postblast analysis.
14	Percent	Of safety precautions enforced during the EOD operation.
15	Percent	Of stuck rounds or misfired munitions identified as safe for storage or transport.
16	Percent	Of stuck rounds or misfired munitions identified as unsafe for storage or transport and destroyed.
17	Number	Of casualties during the conduct of the EOD operation.
18	Number	And types of stuck rounds removed or misfired munitions downloaded.
19	Number	And types of appropriate intelligence reports prepared within a given period.

***ART 6.12.3 CONDUCT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE OPERATIONS**

6-166. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams identify, render safe, and dispose of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and conduct postblast analysis and intelligence reporting. EOD teams maintain capabilities for remote investigation, identification, and movement of IEDs and emplacement or operation of disruption tools and disposal methods. IEDs with potential chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives may require additional EOD personnel and equipment to augment the initial EOD response team. (FM 3-34.214) (CASCOM)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	EOD support allowed the requesting unit to accomplish its mission.
02	Yes/No	Collateral damage incurred during the conduct of the EOD operation was in acceptable limits.
03	Yes/No	Unit safeguarded classified materials and publications during EOD operations.
04	Yes/No	Unit forwarded items and components of technical intelligence value to appropriate headquarters or agency.
05	Time	To respond to a request for EOD support to conduct counter-IED operations.
06	Time	Delay in executing the concept of operations due to the presence of IEDs.
07	Time	To gather intelligence information (what, when, where, how delivered, and type) regarding IEDs.
08	Time	To identify safety requirements and considerations concerned with the destruction or elimination of IEDs.
09	Time	To identify personnel, equipment, procedures, and additional support requirements.
10	Time	To coordinate with the reporting agency for site support assistance such as engineer, medical, security, decontamination, and transportation.
11	Time	To gain access to and identify IEDs.
12	Time	To emplace or operate disruption tools.
13	Time	To render safe and or dispose of IEDs.
14	Time	To conduct postblast analysis

No.	Scale	Measure
15	Percent	Of safety precautions enforced during the EOD operation.
16	Percent	Of IEDs destroyed or rendered safe.
17	Number	Of casualties while disposing of explosive ordnance.
18	Number	And types of IEDs destroyed by EOD personnel.
19	Number	Of IED components retrieved by EOD personnel for exploitation.

***ART 6.12.3.1 PLAN TO COUNTER IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES**

6-167. Conduct improvised explosive device (IED) defeat operations to defeat asymmetric attacks against U.S. forces. (FM 3-90.119) (USAES)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit planned for possible IED threats in a counterinsurgency environment.
02	Yes/No	Unit prepared for IED defeat using the tenets of IED defeat (predict, detect, prevent, neutralize, and mitigate).
03	Yes/No	Element prepared for a suspected vehicle borne, suicide vehicle borne, and person borne IED attack against static positions.
04	Yes/No	Element reacted to a possible IED, vehicle borne, suicide vehicle borne or person borne IED by using the 5Cs (confirm, clear, cordon, check, and control).

***ART 6.12.3.2 REACT TO IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES**

6-168. Planning elements are proactive actions taken by friendly forces to predict, detect, prevent, avoid, neutralize, and protect against improvised explosive device events. The process and the products of mission analysis help the commander and staffs develop and refine their situational understanding and develop effective plans. By having a thorough understanding of the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations factors, the commander and staff are better equipped to develop effective plans to accomplish the mission. (FM 3-90.119) (USAES)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Unit predicted actions and circumstances that could affect the ability of the force to maintain movement and maneuver.
02	Yes/No	Unit prevented potential impediments to movement and maneuver from affecting the mobility of the force by acting early.
03	Yes/No	Unit detected early indicators of impediments to battlefield mobility and identify solutions through the use of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets.
04	Yes/No	Unit avoided detected impediments to movement and maneuver if prevention fails.
05	Yes/No	Unit neutralized, reduced, or overcame impediments to movement and maneuver that could not be prevented or avoided.
06	Yes/No	Unit protected against enemy countermobility efforts.

ART 6.12.4 CONDUCT EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL CHEMICAL OPERATIONS

6-169. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units respond to U.S. and foreign chemical weapons incidents to identify, render safe, perform preliminary packaging, and limit the spread of chemical contamination. EOD units maintain the capability to presume identification of chemical agents, perform preliminary packaging of chemical munitions, perform emergency personnel decontamination station operations (EOD personnel and limited equipment only), mark and perform hasty decontamination of the immediate chemical incident site, perform render-safe procedures, collect samples for additional identification and testing, and dispose of chemical munitions. (FM 3-34.214) (CASCOM)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	EOD support allowed the unit to accomplish its mission.
02	Yes/No	Collateral damage incurred during EOD operation was within acceptable limits.
03	Yes/No	Unit safeguarded classified materials and publications during the EOD operation.
04	Yes/No	Unit forwarded items and components of technical intelligence value to appropriate headquarters or agency.
05	Time	To provide EOD input to annex I to the operation plan or order.
06	Time	To respond to a request for EOD support.
07	Time	Delay in executing the concept of operations due to the presence of unexploded explosive ordnance and improvised explosive device.
08	Time	To gather intelligence information (what, when, where, how delivered, and type) regarding munitions.
09	Time	To identify safety requirements and considerations.
10	Time	To identify personnel, equipment, procedures, and additional support requirements.
11	Time	To coordinate with reporting agency for site support assistance, such as engineer, medical, security, and transportation.
12	Time	To clear munitions and improvised devices.
13	Time	To document render-safe procedures, as conducted, for unknown ordnance, if technical intelligence data does not exist.
14	Percent	Of safety precautions enforced during EOD operations.
15	Percent	Of reported munitions and improvised devices rendered safe.
16	Percent	Of reported munitions and improvised devices rendered safe per commander's intent.
17	Percent	Of available EOD support expended on conducting bomb and sabotage device recognition and safety training.
18	Percent	Of patients received at medical treatment facilities with unexploded explosive ordnance in their wounds.
19	Percent	Of casualties during the EOD operation.
20	Number	And types of ordnance located and destroyed by EOD personnel.
21	Number	Of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives incidents responded to within a given period.

ART 6.12.5 PROVIDE EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL SUPPORT TO WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OPERATIONS

6-170. Reduce the threat of arms and weapons of mass destruction to regional security; conduct disposal operations of hazardous U.S. and foreign munitions; conduct clearance and destruction operations of ammunition storage areas and caches that may have hazardous munitions or booby traps; assist with weapons or ammunition storage site inspections to satisfy treaty obligations or agreements and policies enforcement; and detect, identify, and respond to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives threat. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units have the capability to presume identification of biological agents, perform preliminary packaging of biological munitions and agents, perform emergency personnel decontamination station operations (EOD personnel only), mark and perform limited decontamination of incident site, perform render-safe procedures, and collect samples for additional identification and testing. (FM 3-34.214) (CASCOM)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	EOD support allowed the requesting unit to accomplish its mission.
02	Yes/No	Collateral damage incurred during the conduct of the EOD operation was in acceptable limits.
03	Yes/No	Unit safeguarded classified materials and publications during EOD operations.

No.	Scale	Measure
04	Yes/No	Unit forwarded items and components of technical intelligence value to appropriate headquarters or agency.
05	Time	To move from current location to the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) site.
06	Time	To locate WMD.
07	Time	To gain access to WMD
08	Time	To conduct advanced diagnostics on WMD.
09	Time	To gather intelligence information (what, when, where, how delivered, and type) regarding WMD.
10	Time	To identify safety requirements and considerations concerned with the destruction or elimination of WMD.
11	Time	To identify personnel, equipment, procedures, and additional support requirements.
12	Time	To coordinate with the reporting agency for site support assistance such as engineer, medical, security, decontamination, and transportation.
13	Time	To conduct clearance and destruction operations of ammunition storage areas and caches that may contain WMD.
14	Time	To document render-safe procedures, as conducted, for unknown ordnance, if technical intelligence data does not exist.
15	Percent	Of safety precautions enforced during the EOD operation.
16	Percent	Of reported munitions rendered safe.
17	Number	Of casualties during the conduct of the EOD operation.
18	Number	And types of ordnance or WMD destroyed by EOD personnel.

ART 6.12.6 CONDUCT IMPROVED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE AND UNEXPLODED EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE PROTECTION OPERATIONS

6-171. Assist commanders with protection of the force. This includes reviewing base defense plans and bomb threat or search procedures, assisting in facility explosive hazard site surveys, and developing and implementing explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) emergency response plans and the antiterrorism or force protection plan. Provide training to emergency preparedness personnel on bomb threat search, improvised explosive device (IED) defeat techniques, unexploded explosive ordnance (UXO) identification, and marking procedures. Provide chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives emergency response plans and facility site surveys to commanders. Provide EOD support to weapon storage site inspections. Provide EOD support to amnesty and weapon buyback programs. (FM 3-34.214) (CASCOM)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	EOD support allowed the requesting unit to accomplish its mission.
02	Yes/No	Collateral damage incurred during the conduct of the EOD operation was in acceptable limits.
03	Yes/No	Unit safeguarded classified materials and publications during EOD operations.
04	Yes/No	Unit forwarded items and components of technical intelligence value to appropriate headquarters or agency.
05	Time	To move from current location to the work site.
06	Time	To gather intelligence information (what, when, where, how delivered, and type) regarding munitions.
07	Time	To identify safety requirements and considerations concerned with force protection operations.
08	Time	To identify personnel, equipment, procedures, and additional support requirements.

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No.	Scale	Measure
09	Time	To coordinate with the reporting agency for site support assistance such as engineer, medical, security, and transportation.
10	Time	To document training, response preparedness, and review of defense plans, UXO identification and marking procedures, site surveys, and bomb threat or search procedures conducted to assist commanders with force protection.
11	Time	To clear munitions and improvised devices found during the conduct of force protection operations.
12	Percent	Of safety precautions enforced during the EOD operation.
13	Percent	Of reported munitions and IEDs rendered safe.
14	Percent	Of available EOD support expended on conducting bomb threat or search procedures, device recognition, and safety training.
15	Number	Of casualties during EOD operations.
16	Number	And types of ordnance located and destroyed by EOD personnel.
17	Number	Of force protection requests responded to within a given period.

ART 6.12.6.1 PROVIDE CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR, AND HIGH-YIELD EXPLOSIVES SITE SURVEYS

6-172. Assist commanders with protection of the force by providing explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) support to review base defense plans and bomb threat or search procedures, develop and implement base defense plans, and assist in facility site surveys. (FM 3-34.214) (CASCOM)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	EOD support allowed the unit to accomplish its mission.
02	Yes/No	Collateral damage incurred during the conduct of the EOD operation was in acceptable limits.
03	Yes/No	Unit safeguarded classified materials and publications during EOD operations.
04	Time	To identify safety requirements and considerations concerned with emergency response plans and facility explosive hazard site surveys.
05	Time	To identify personnel, equipment, procedures, and additional support requirements.
06	Time	To move from the current location to the work site.
07	Time	To coordinate with the requesting agency for site support assistance in areas such as engineer, medical, security, and transportation.
08	Time	To document render-safe procedures that relate to emergency response plans and facility site surveys.
09	Percent	Of safety precautions enforced during the EOD operation.
10	Percent	Of reported munitions rendered safe.
11	Percent	Of reported munitions rendered safe per the requesting agency's priorities.
12	Number	Of casualties during the conduct of the EOD operation.
13	Number	Of requests for assistance responded to in a given period.

ART 6.12.6.2 PROVIDE EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL SUPPORT TO WEAPON STORAGE SITE INSPECTIONS

6-173. Sensitive site exploitation operations focus on locating, characterizing, seizing, securing, and searching facilities, supplies, weapons, equipment, personnel, and infrastructures. Exploitation operations may additionally include disablement operations to render chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) materiel, systems, and equipment ineffective for use against the joint, interagency, and multinational forces. Disablement operations include neutralization, incineration, destruction, confiscation, and evacuation of CBRNE and associated materials. (FM 3-34.214) (CASCOM)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) support allowed the unit to accomplish its mission.
02	Yes/No	Collateral damage incurred during the conduct of the EOD operation was in acceptable limits.
03	Yes/No	Unit safeguarded classified materials and publications during EOD operations.
04	Time	To identify safety requirements and considerations concerned with weapon storage site inspections.
05	Time	To identify personnel, equipment, procedures, and additional support requirements.
06	Time	To move from the current location to the work site.
07	Time	To coordinate with the requesting agency for site support assistance in areas such as engineer, medical, security, decontamination, and transportation.
08	Time	To document render-safe procedures related to weapon storage site inspections.
09	Percent	Of safety precautions enforced during the EOD operation.
10	Percent	Of reported munitions rendered harmless.
11	Percent	Of reported munitions cleared per the requesting agency's priorities.
12	Number	Of casualties during the conduct of the EOD operation.
13	Number	Of requests for assistance responded to in a given period.

ART 6.12.6.3 PROVIDE EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL SUPPORT TO AMNESTY AND WEAPON BUYBACK PROGRAMS

6-174. Assist with and respond to amnesty collection points to ensure armed or unsafe ordnance items are disposed of properly. (FM 3-34.214) (CASCOM)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) support allowed the unit to accomplish its mission.
02	Yes/No	Collateral damage incurred during the conduct of the EOD operation was in acceptable limits.
03	Yes/No	Unit safeguarded classified materials and publications during EOD operations.
04	Time	To identify safety requirements and considerations concerned with amnesty and weapon buyback programs.
05	Time	To identify personnel, equipment, procedures, and additional support requirements.
06	Time	To move from the current location to the work site.
07	Time	To coordinate with the requesting agency for site support assistance in areas such as engineer, medical, security, and transportation.
08	Time	To document render-safe procedures related to amnesty and weapon buyback programs.
09	Percent	Of safety precautions enforced during the EOD operation.
10	Percent	Of reported munitions rendered harmless.
11	Percent	Of reported munitions cleared per the requesting agency's priorities.
12	Percent	Of munitions destroyed.
13	Number	Of casualties during the conduct of the EOD operation.
14	Number	Of requests for assistance responded to in a given period.

ART 6.12.6.4 PROVIDE EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL SUPPORT TO MORTUARY AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

6-175. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) involvement in recovery and processing of deceased personnel supports the immediate recovery and clearance of deceased persons, an Army priority. (FM 3-34.214) (CASCOM)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	EOD support allowed the unit to accomplish its mission.
02	Yes/No	Collateral damage incurred during the conduct of the EOD operation was in acceptable limits.
03	Yes/No	Unit safeguarded classified materials and publications during EOD operations.
04	Time	To identify safety requirements and considerations concerned with recovery and clearance of deceased persons.
05	Time	To identify personnel, equipment, procedures, and additional support requirements.
06	Time	To move from the current location to the work site.
07	Time	To coordinate with the requesting agency for site support assistance in areas such as engineer, medical, security, and transportation.
08	Time	To document render-safe procedures related to recovery and clearance of deceased persons.
09	Percent	Of safety precautions enforced during the EOD operation.
10	Percent	Of reported munitions rendered safe.
11	Percent	Of reported munitions rendered safe per the requesting agency's priorities.
12	Number	Of casualties during the conduct of the EOD operation.
13	Number	Of requests for assistance responded to in a given period.

ART 6.12.6.5 CONDUCT TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE ON UNEXPLODED EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE; IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES; AND CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR, AND HIGH-YIELD EXPLOSIVES HAZARDS

6-176. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel provide technical intelligence support to maneuver units by identifying and requesting disposition of first seen ordnance and explosive remnants of war, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) hazards of intelligence value. EOD personnel also prepare and submit an appropriate intelligence report based upon type of ordnance and type of function. They determine if items are safe for shipment and storage. EOD personnel develop and attempt render-safe procedures. EOD personnel conduct postblast analysis for forensic evidence, and if the need exists, EOD personnel can collect chemical and biological samples for analysis. EOD personnel can recognize and test for CBRNE hazards. (FM 3-34.214) (CASCOM)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	EOD support allowed the unit to accomplish its mission.
02	Yes/No	Collateral damage incurred during EOD operation was within acceptable limits.
03	Yes/No	Unit safeguarded classified materials and publications during the EOD operation.
04	Yes/No	Unit forwarded items and components of technical intelligence value to appropriate headquarters or agency.
05	Time	To respond to a request for EOD support.
06	Time	Delay to execute operations due to the conduct of technical intelligence procedures on unexploded explosive ordnance, IEDs, and CBRNE hazards.
07	Time	To gather intelligence information (what, when, where, how delivered, and type) regarding munitions.
08	Time	To identify personnel, equipment, procedures, and additional support requirements.
09	Time	To coordinate with reporting agency for site support assistance such as engineer, medical, security, and transportation.
10	Time	To develop and attempt render-safe procedures or conduct postblast analysis for forensic evidence.
11	Time	To document render-safe procedures, as conducted, for unknown ordnance if technical intelligence data does not exist.

<i>No.</i>	<i>Scale</i>	<i>Measure</i>
12	Time	To determine if items are safe for shipment or storage.
13	Time	To collect chemical and biological samples for analysis.
14	Percent	Of safety precautions enforced during EOD operations.
15	Percent	Of available EOD personnel expended on developing render-safe procedures or conducting postblast analysis.
16	Number	And types of appropriate intelligence reports prepared within a given period.
17	Number	Of battle damaged vehicles, buildings, or the like analyzed for postblast damage.

ART 6.12.6.6 CONDUCT CRATER, FRAGMENTATION, AND POSTBLAST ANALYSIS

6-177. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units conduct postblast analysis for forensic evidence. And, if the need exists, EOD personnel can collect chemical and biological samples for analysis. (FM 3-34.214) (CASCOM)

<i>No.</i>	<i>Scale</i>	<i>Measure</i>
01	Yes/No	EOD support allowed the unit to accomplish its mission.
02	Yes/No	Collateral damage incurred during the conduct of the EOD operation was in acceptable limits.
03	Yes/No	Unit safeguarded classified materials and publications during EOD operations.
04	Yes/No	Unit forwarded items and components of technical intelligence value to appropriate headquarters or agency.
05	Time	To respond to a request for EOD support.
06	Time	Delay to execute operations due to the conduct of technical intelligence procedures on unexploded explosive ordnance, improvised explosive devices, and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives hazards.
07	Time	To gather intelligence information (what, when, where, how delivered, and type) regarding munitions.
08	Time	To identify personnel, equipment, procedures, and additional support requirements.
09	Time	To coordinate with reporting agency for site support assistance such as engineer, medical, security, and transportation.
10	Time	To develop and attempt render-safe procedures and conduct postblast analysis for forensic evidence.
11	Time	To document render-safe procedures, as conducted, for unknown ordnance if technical intelligence data does not exist.
12	Time	To determine if items are safe for shipment or storage.
13	Time	To collect chemical and biological samples for analysis.
14	Percent	Of safety precautions enforced during EOD operations.
15	Percent	Of available EOD support expended on developing render-safe procedures and postblast analysis.
16	Number	And types of appropriate intelligence reports prepared within a given period.

ART 6.12.7 RESPOND TO ACCIDENTS OR INCIDENTS INVOLVING MILITARY CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR MUNITIONS

6-178. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units respond to U.S. and foreign chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons incidents to identify, render safe, perform preliminary packaging, and limit the spread of CBRN contamination. Three identifiable operational responses to a CBRN accident or event are initial response, emergency actions, and site remediation. (FM 3-34.214) (CASCOM)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	EOD support accomplished the purpose of the requesting agency.
02	Yes/No	Collateral damage incurred during the EOD operation was within acceptable limits.
03	Yes/No	Unit safeguarded classified materials and publications during the EOD operation.
04	Yes/No	Unit forwarded items and components of technical intelligence value to appropriate headquarters or agency.
05	Yes/No	Spread of contamination was within acceptable limits.
06	Time	To move from the current location to the work site.
07	Time	To identify safety requirements and considerations concerned with destruction of the CBRN materiel.
08	Time	To gather information about the CBRN munitions (what, when, where, how delivered, and type).
09	Time	To perform initial response, emergency actions, and site remediation.
10	Time	To coordinate with the reporting agency for site support assistance in areas such as engineer, medial, security and transportation.
11	Time	To identify personnel, equipment, procedures, and additional support requirements.
12	Time	To identify, render safe, package, and limit the spread of CBRN contamination.
13	Percent	Of safety precautions enforced during the EOD operation.
14	Percent	Of CBRN munitions destroyed or rendered safe.
15	Number	Of casualties during the conduct of the EOD operation.
16	Number	And types of CBRN munitions destroyed or rendered harmless.

ART 6.12.8 PROVIDE EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL SUSTAINMENT SUPPORT

6-179. Neutralize domestic or foreign munitions and improvised devices that present a threat to military operations and military and civilian facilities, materiel, and personnel, regardless of location. The Departments of Justice, State, and Energy may receive this support per current agreements and directives. ART 6.12.8 includes providing explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) support to the U.S. Secret Service, Department of State, and Department of Defense to protect the President and other designated persons. ART 6.12.8 also includes performing bomb and sabotage device recognition and safety precaution training. (FM 3-34.214) (CASCOM)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	EOD support allowed the unit to accomplish its mission
02	Yes/No	Collateral damage incurred during the EOD operation was within the acceptable limits.
03	Yes/No	Unit safeguarded classified materials and publications during the EOD operation.
04	Yes/No	Unit forwarded items and components of technical intelligence value to appropriate headquarters or agency.
05	Time	To respond to a request for EOD support
06	Time	To identify safety requirements and considerations
07	Time	To identify personnel, equipment, procedures, and additional support requirements.
08	Time	To coordinate with reporting agency for site support assistance, such as engineer, medical, security, and transportation.
09	Time	To clear domestic or foreign munitions and improvised devices that present a threat to military operations and military and civilian facilities, materiel, and personnel.
10	Time	To document render-safe procedures, as conducted, for unknown ordnance, if technical intelligence data does not exist.
11	Percent	Of safety precautions enforced during EOD operations.
12	Percent	Of reported munitions and improvised devices rendered safe.

No.	Scale	Measure
13	Percent	Of available EOD support expended on conducting bomb and sabotage device recognition and safety training.
14	Number	Of casualties during the EOD operation.
15	Number	And types of ordnance located and destroyed by EOD personnel.

ART 6.12.8.1 PROVIDE EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL SUPPORT TO RANGE CLEARANCE OPERATIONS

6-180. Range clearance operations require long-range planning. Range clearance operations are complex, have specific requirements, and vary for each range and installation. Range clearance operations and planning considerations should be covered in local plans and directives. (FM 3-34.214) (CASCOM)

No	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) support met the aim of the requesting agency.
02	Yes/No	Collateral damage incurred during the EOD operation was within acceptable limits.
03	Yes/No	Unit safeguarded classified materials and publications during the EOD operation.
04	Yes/No	Unit forwarded items and components of technical intelligence value to appropriate headquarters or agency.
05	Time	To move from the current location to the work site.
06	Time	To identify safety requirements and considerations concerned with ordnance found during range clearance.
07	Time	To identify personnel, equipment, procedures, and additional support requirements.
08	Time	To clear ordnance from the range clearance site.
09	Time	To coordinate with the reporting agency for site support assistance in areas such as engineer, medial, security, and transportation.
10	Time	To document render-safe procedures, as completed, for unknown ordnance if technical intelligence data does not exist.
11	Percent	Of safety precautions enforced during the EOD operation.
12	Percent	Of reported munitions destroyed or rendered safe.
13	Percent	Of reported munitions rendered safe per the requesting agency's priorities.
14	Number	Of casualties during the conduct of the EOD operation.
15	Number	And types of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear munitions destroyed or rendered harmless.
16	Number	Of requests for assistance responded to in a given period.

ART 6.12.8.2 DESTROY UNSERVICEABLE AMMUNITION

6-181. Supervise or assist in the routine destruction of unserviceable or surplus ammunition upon the request of an accountable agency. (FM 3-34.214) (CASCOM)

No.	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) support accomplishes the intent of the requesting agency.
02	Yes/No	Collateral damage incurred during the conduct of the EOD operation was in acceptable limits.
03	Yes/No	Unit safeguarded classified materials and publications during EOD operation.
04	Time	To identify safety requirements and considerations concerned with destruction of the unserviceable or surplus ordnance.
05	Time	To identify personnel, equipment, procedures, and additional support requirements.
06	Time	To move from the current location to the work site.

No.	Scale	Measure
07	Time	To coordinate with the reporting agency for site support assistance, in areas such as engineer, medical, security, and transportation.
08	Time	To destroy the unserviceable and surplus ordnance.
09	Percent	Of safety precautions enforced during the EOD operation.
10	Percent	Of nominated ordnance destroyed or rendered safe.
11	Number	Of nominated ordnance destroyed or rendered safe per the requesting agencies priorities.
12	Number	Of casualties during the execution of the EOD operation.
13	Number	And types of ordnance destroyed by EOD personnel.

ART 6.12.8.3 PROVIDE EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL SUPPORT TO THE DEFENSE ENVIRONMENT RESTORATION PROGRAM

6-182. Provide explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) support to agencies restoring the environment at military installations. (FM 3-34.214) (CASCOM)

No	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	EOD support met the aim of the requesting authorities.
02	Yes/No	Collateral damage incurred during the conduct of the EOD operation was in acceptable limits.
03	Yes/No	Unit safeguarded classified materials and publications during EOD operation.
04	Yes/No	Unit forwarded items and components of technical intelligence value to appropriate headquarters or agency.
05	Time	To move from the current location to the work site.
06	Time	To identify safety requirements and considerations concerned with the ordnance found during environment restoration projects.
07	Time	To identify personnel, equipment, procedures, and additional support requirements.
08	Time	To clear ordnance from the environmental restoration project site.
09	Time	To coordinate with the reporting agency for site support assistance, such as engineer, medical, security, and transportation.
10	Time	To document render-safe procedures, as completed, for unknown ordnance if technical intelligence data does not exist.
11	Percent	Of safety precautions enforced during the EOD operation.
12	Percent	Of reported munitions rendered safe.
13	Number	Of casualties during the conduct of the EOD operation.
14	Number	And types of ordnance located and destroyed by EOD personnel.
15	Number	Of requests for assistance responded to in a given period.

ART 6.12.8.4 PROVIDE EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL SUPPORT TO HOMELAND SECURITY OPERATIONS

6-183. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) supports homeland security operations by protecting its citizens and infrastructure from conventional and unconventional threats. Homeland security has two components. The first component is homeland defense. If the United States comes under direct attack or is threatened by hostile armed forces, Army forces under joint command conduct offensive and defensive missions as part of homeland defense. The second component is civil support. Army EOD forces conduct civil support operations, when requested, providing EOD expertise and capabilities to lead agency authorities. (FM 3-34.214) (CASCOM)

No	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	EOD support allowed the unit to accomplish its mission.
02	Yes/No	Collateral damage incurred during the EOD operation was within acceptable limits.
03	Yes/No	Unit safeguarded classified materials and publications during the EOD operation.
04	Yes/No	Unit forwarded items and components of technical intelligence value to appropriate headquarters or agency.
05	Time	To respond to a request for EOD support.
06	Time	Delay in executing the concept of operations due to the presence of unexploded ordnance and improvised devices.
07	Time	To gather intelligence information (what, when, where, how delivered, and type) regarding munitions.
08	Time	To identify safety requirements and considerations.
9	Time	To identify personnel, equipment, procedures, as completed, for unknown ordnance if technical intelligence data does not exist.
10	Time	To coordinate with reporting agency for site support assistance, such as engineer, medical, security, and transportation.
11	Time	To clear explosive ordnance and improvised devices.
12	Time	To document render-safe procedures, as completed, for unknown ordnance if technical intelligence data does not exist.
13	Percent	Of safety precautions enforced during the EOD operation.
14	Percent	Of reported munitions and improvised devices rendered safe.
15	Percent	Of available EOD support expended on performing bomb and sabotage device recognition and safety training.
16	Percent	Of patients received at medical treatment facilities who have unexploded ordnance with unexploded explosive ordnance in the wound.
17	Number	Of casualties during the EOD operation.
18	Number	And types of ordnance located and destroyed by EOD personnel.
19	Number	Of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives incidents responded to within a given period.

ART 6.12.8.5 PROVIDE EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES

6-184. Provide assistance to include training to public safety and law enforcement agencies to address improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Provide explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) service when requested by local, state, or federal authorities in the interest of public safety. ART 6.12.8.5 includes assisting law enforcement personnel with war souvenir collection campaigns and the disposition of the explosive ordnance collected. (FM 3-34.214) (CASCOM)

No	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	The EOD support met the aim of the requesting civil authorities.
02	Yes/No	Collateral damage during the EOD operation was within acceptable limits.
03	Yes/No	Unit safeguarded classified materials and publications during the EOD operation.
04	Yes/No	Unit forwarded items and components of technical intelligence value to the appropriate headquarters or agency.
05	Time	To determine whether the EOD support requested by a civil authority is authorized under current laws and regulations.
06	Time	To move from the current location to the work site.
07	Time	To gather information about munitions (what, when, where, how delivered, and type).
08	Time	To identify safety requirements and considerations.
09	Time	To identify personnel, equipment, procedures, and additional support requirements.

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No	Scale	Measure
10	Time	To coordinate with the reporting agency for site support assistance such as engineer, medical, security, and transportation.
11	Time	To clear munitions and IEDs.
12	Time	To document render-safe procedures, as completed, for unknown ordnance if technical intelligence data does not exist.
13	Time	Spent in developing and coordinating public or Department of Defense awareness campaigns on the dangers that war souvenirs pose to civilians.
14	Percent	Of safety precautions enforced during the EOD operation.
15	Percent	Of reported munitions and IEDs rendered harmless.
16	Percent	Of reported munitions and IEDs cleared per the requesting agencies priorities.
17	Percent	Of available EOD support expended on public safety training, including mine recognition training.
18	Number	Of casualties during the EOD operation.
19	Number	And types of ordnance located and destroyed by EOD personnel.
20	Number	Of requests for assistance from civil authorities responded to within a given period.

ART 6.12.8.6 PROVIDE SPECIFIC TRAINING TO PERSONNEL ON EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL

6-185. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units provide training for military personnel, federal agencies, and public officials involved with civil emergency preparedness, law enforcement, and fire protection as requested. EOD units also provide training to Department of Defense, law enforcement, nongovernmental organizations, and emergency preparedness personnel on bomb threat search, improvised explosive devices defeat techniques, and unexploded explosive ordnance identification and marking procedures. (FM 3-34.214) (CASCOM)

No	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	EOD support met the aim of the requesting agency.
02	Yes/No	Unit safeguarded classified materials and publications during the EOD operation.
03	Time	To determine if current laws and regulations authorize the provision of the requested EOD support.
04	Time	To move from the current location to the work site.
05	Time	To gather intelligence information (what, when, where, how delivered, and type) regarding requested training.
06	Time	To identify safety requirements and considerations.
07	Time	To identify personnel, equipment, procedures, and additional support requirements.
08	Time	To coordinate with the reporting agency for site support assistance in areas such as engineer, medial, security, and transportation.
09	Time	To document render-safe procedures, as completed, for unknown ordnance if technical intelligence data does not exist.
10	Time	Spent in training personnel on recognizing and practicing immediate action drills when confronted by conventional or improvised explosive devices.
11	Percent	Of safety precautions enforced during the EOD operation.
12	Percent	Of available EOD support personnel expended on training.
13	Number	Of requests for assistance from civil authorities responded to within a given period.

ART 6.12.8.7 PROVIDE EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL SUPPORT TO THE SECRET SERVICE

6-186. Provide support to the U.S. Secret Service, Department of State, and Department of Defense to protect the President and other designated high-risk personnel. (FM 3-34.214) (CASCOM)

No	Scale	Measure
01	Yes/No	Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) support met the aim of the requesting authorities.
02	Yes/No	Collateral damage incurred during the conduct of the EOD operation was in acceptable limits.
03	Yes/No	Unit safeguarded classified materials and publications during the EOD operation.
04	Yes/No	Unit forwarded items and components of technical intelligence value to appropriate headquarters or agency.
05	Time	To move from the current location to the work site.
06	Time	To identify safety requirements and considerations concerned with the ordnance found during environment restoration projects.
07	Time	To gather intelligence information (what, when, where, how delivered, and type) regarding munitions and improvised explosive devices.
08	Time	To identify safety requirements and considerations.
09	Time	To identify personnel, equipment, procedures, and additional support requirements.
10	Time	To coordinate with reporting and other agencies for additional site support assistance such as engineer, medical, security, and transportation.
11	Time	To clear munitions and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
12	Time	To document render-safe procedures, as completed, for unknown ordnance if technical intelligence data does not exist.
13	Time	To train personnel providing executive protection services on recognizing and practicing immediate action drills when confronted by conventional or IEDs.
14	Percent	Of safety precautions enforce during EOD operations.
15	Percent	Of reported munitions and IEDs rendered safe.
16	Percent	Of reported munitions and IEDs rendered safe per the requesting agencies priorities.
17	Percent	Of available EOD support expended on training executive protection services personnel.
18	Percent	Of available EOD support expended on assisting the U.S. Secret Service and other government agencies that provide executive protection services.
19	Number	Of casualties during the conduct of the EOD operation.
20	Number	And types of ordnance located and destroyed by EOD personnel.
21	Number	Of requests for assistance from civil authorities responded to within a given period.

References

Field manuals and selected joint publications are listed by new number followed by old number

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS

These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.

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JP 3-0. *Joint Operations*. 17 September 2006. (Incorporating change 1, 13 February 2008.)

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