PIT 9: From "Black Eye" to Part of DOE Cleanup Success
There was a time back in the late 1990s and early 2000s
when the words “Pit 9” were synonymous with failure. Failure
on the part of a large company to execute its contract to
clean up Pit 9. Failure on the part of the Federal
government to meet the deadlines to clean up nuclear waste.
And failure of a new approach to government contracting –
“privatization” – that was supposed to make contractors more
results-oriented and accountable.
Now, as we head toward the end of 2010, you’ll probably
be hearing about Pit 9 again, but in a much different
context. Sometime near the end of this year, CWI, our
cleanup contractor, will begin digging up buried radioactive
and hazardous waste from Pit 9. This will be the beginning
of the end of the Pit 9 saga, and offers a good time to
reflect on what went wrong with the contracting approach
that made “Pit 9” code words for failure; it’s also a good
time to put Pit 9 into the context of all the things that
have gone right with cleanup at DOE’s Idaho Site since.
|
The original Pit 9 project included a retrieval building constructed
on rails. It was designed to roll over the pit and remotely excavate
buried waste. The retrieval facility was never used, and the contractor
was ordered by the courts to pay for its removal. |
|
|
It all started back in the mid-1990s, when the Department
of Energy was beginning the robust task of cleaning up what
was then the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL),
which had been placed on EPA’s National Priority List in
1989 for environmental remediation. The federal government
was facing huge bills and big technical challenges in
cleaning up Department of Energy sites like the INEL, which
had become contaminated with radioactive and hazardous
materials during the Cold War nuclear weapons build-up from
the 1950s through the 1980s. At the INEL, for example, tons
of radioactive and hazardous waste, generated during nuclear
bomb-making at the Rocky Flats Plant in Colorado, had been
disposed in unlined pits and trenches from 1954 to 1970. The
waste was disposed of above the Snake River Plain Aquifer, a
primary drinking and irrigation water source for much of
southern Idaho.
The Department of Energy signed an agreement in 1991 with
the Environmental Protection Agency and the state of Idaho,
which included a commitment to remediate this buried waste.
But no one was exactly sure how to go about the process, and
the bill for such an undertaking was sure to be a
significant one. Recognizing that the cleanup process was
going to be extremely costly around the DOE complex, private
industry began to step forward with a plan. Instead of using
the current management and operations contractors that were
already on board to run DOE’s national laboratories under
“cost-plus-award fee contracts” to conduct this cleanup,
some private companies had other ideas. Specifically, they
suggested to DOE that several “off-the-shelf” cleanup
technologies were already available, and that the Department
could “privatize” the cleanup task by simply bidding out the
work to companies that already possessed such technologies.
Under this approach, private industry would agree to a fixed
price for a specific cleanup activity, and some of the risk
for completing the work would shift from the taxpayer to the
private sector.
The idea, at least in theory, made sense, and DOE decided
one of the first major “privatization” demonstrations would
take place in Idaho. The agency carved out a one-acre area
where radioactive and hazardous waste had been buried at the
INEL from 1967 to 1969. Identified as “Pit 9,” it contained
waste that included radioactive contaminants like plutonium
and americium, and volatile organic chemicals like carbon
tetrachloride. The Department’s M&O contractor at the INEL
at that time, EG&G Idaho, then put out a request for
proposals to clean up Pit 9 under a fixed price,
pay-for-performance subcontract. Three companies submitted
proposals; two were selected for technical demonstrations of
their technologies, and ultimately Lockheed Environmental
Systems and Technology (LESAT) was selected to clean up the
waste. A fixed-price contract ($179 million) with a
corporate guarantee of performance was negotiated, and LESAT
began work designing an impressive waste retrieval,
characterization, treatment and transportation system.
Unfortunately, for a wide range of reasons, LESAT and its
successor company, Lockheed Martin Advanced Environmental
Systems (LMAES), never got to the point of operating the
system, even though it began construction on both the waste
retrieval and treatment facilities. DOE made “progress
payments” to LMAES as it met pre-designated milestones in
the project, but the “Pit 9” project continued to fall
farther and farther behind schedule, and the state of Idaho
and EPA began assessing fines against DOE for the failure of
the project to meet regulatory commitments.
LMAES began to submit claims for more money for the
project, claiming DOE presented inadequate information about
the contents of the pit, and claiming that DOE and its new
M&O contractor, Lockheed Martin Idaho Technologies Co., were
inappropriately interfering with the design and construction
of the 37,500-square-foot, skid-mounted retrieval facility
and the 84,600-square feet treatment facility, and the
systems that went in those facilities. DOE and LMITCO denied
the claims, which would have more than doubled the original
contract price.
Ultimately, LMITCO terminated the Pit 9 contract with its
sister company, LMAES, for non-performance, and began
litigation against Lockheed to enforce its “corporate
guarantee” of performance. Ultimately, a federal judge ruled
in the favor of LMITCO and the federal government, ordering
Lockheed corporate to repay the progress payments it
received, to cover the cost of tearing down and removing the
never-completed retrieval and treatment facilities, and to
pay attorneys fees and court costs.
A lot of agencies scrutinized the Pit 9 project to try to
determine what contributed to the project’s failure. The
Government Accountability Office, for one, concluded that
fixed price contracting and full private financing, the two
main underpinnings to “privatization,” do not necessarily
work effectively for all cleanup projects – especially
complicated, “first of a kind,” or technically challenging
projects. Rather, a complex matrix of decision factors must
be analyzed before deciding how to contract for, and finance
a specific cleanup project. These factors include how much
is known about the characteristics of the waste, the number
of contractors willing to compete, the financing options,
and the risks posed by the project and the entity that is
best prepared to assume them.
|
After the initial Pit 9 failure, meanwhile, The current
approach to buried waste retrieval involves using specially-fitted backhoes inside
temporary containment facilities to dig up the targeted
waste |
|
|
DOE and its cleanup contractors took a different approach to buried
waste cleanup in Idaho. The Department initially went back
to its prime contractor to demonstrate a much more simple
approach to buried waste retrieval, using specially designed
backhoes to dig up the waste and remote glovebox technology
to sort and characterize it, all housed under temporary
containment structures built over the waste pits and
trenches. When that approach was proven safe and effective
on a small scale at Pit 9 under the GEM (Glovebox Excavator
Method) Project, it was expanded to larger-scale operations,
initially by BBWI, and then eventually managed by CWI, who
was hired specifically to run the major portion of the
cleanup activities at DOE’s Idaho Site. But when CWI
competed for the Idaho Cleanup Project contract, they had a
much better technical understanding of the work they were
bidding for, and the risk they were assuming.
Certainly, the initial “Pit 9 approach” was a learning
experience for just about everyone involved. It left the
Department of Energy with a black eye and a loss of
credibility, and it left Idahoans with the worry that
cleanup of buried waste at what is now the Idaho National
Laboratory Site might not be completed. The good news,
however, is DOE and its contractors got past the stumbling
blocks that led to the initial Pit 9 failure, and cleanup of
buried waste at the Idaho Site is progressing nicely.
Through the end of October of 2010, CWI has exhumed and
packaged 4,313 cubic meters of targeted buried waste from
Pits 4, 6 and 5. So far, 3,637 cubic meters of that waste
has been characterized and shipped to licensed facilities
off site for disposal. And come late this year the buried
waste cleanup efforts will extend to the targeted waste
remaining in Pit 9.
While the initial Pit 9 project failed, it laid the
foundation for the much more successful approach CWI is
using today. That, in turn, has resulted in the buried waste
remediation effort keeping up with the regulatory
commitments DOE has made to the state of Idaho and EPA. It
has allowed CWI to remove the largest sources of radioactive
and hazardous chemical contamination from above the aquifer
– and to do so safely and efficiently. It has allowed the
taxpayers to get their money’s worth in cleanup, and it has
allowed a responsible, effective contractor in CWI to earn a
profit while delivering to the government what they
promised.
So when you hear the term “Pit 9” again in the next month
or so, it’s okay to remember the many problems it signified
a decade ago – as long as you’re aware of the successful
cleanup effort it’s about to become a part of today.
Editorial Date November 30, 2010
By Brad Bugger
|