

Executive Summary

Climate change is already affecting the American people. Certain types of weather events have become more frequent and/or intense, including heat waves, heavy downpours, and, in some regions, floods and droughts. Sea level is rising, oceans are becoming more acidic, and glaciers and arctic sea ice are melting. These changes are part of the pattern of global climate change, which is primarily driven by human activity.

Many impacts associated with these changes are important to Americans' health and livelihoods and the ecosystems that sustain us. These impacts are the subject of this report. The impacts are often most significant for communities that already face economic or health-related challenges, and for species and habitats that are already facing other pressures. While some changes will bring potential benefits, such as longer growing seasons, many will be disruptive to society because our institutions and infrastructure have been designed for the relatively stable climate of the past, not the changing one of the present and future. Similarly, the natural ecosystems that sustain us will be challenged by changing conditions. Using scientific information to prepare for these changes in advance provides economic opportunities, and proactively managing the risks will reduce costs over time.

Evidence for climate change abounds, from the top of the atmosphere to the depths of the oceans. This evidence has been compiled by scientists and engineers from around the world, using satellites, weather balloons, thermometers, buoys, and other observing systems. The sum total of this evidence tells an unambiguous story: the planet is warming.

U.S. average temperature has increased by about 1.5°F since 1895; more than 80% of this increase has occurred since 1980. The most recent decade was the nation's hottest on record. Though most regions of the U.S. are experiencing warming, the changes in temperature are not uniform. In general, temperatures are rising more quickly at higher latitudes, but there is considerable observed variability across the regions of the U.S.

U.S. temperatures will continue to rise, with the next few decades projected to see another 2°F to 4°F of warming in most areas. The amount of warming by the end of the century is projected to correspond closely to the cumulative global emissions of greenhouse gases up to that time: roughly 3°F to 5°F under a lower emissions scenario involving substantial reductions in emissions after 2050 (referred to as the "B1 scenario"), and 5°F to 10°F for a higher emissions scenario assuming continued increases in emissions (referred to as the "A2 scenario") (Ch. 2).

The chances of record-breaking high temperature extremes will continue to increase as the climate continues to change. There has been an increasing trend in persistently high nighttime temperatures, which have widespread impacts because people and livestock get no respite from the heat. In other places, prolonged periods of record high temperatures associated with droughts contribute to conditions that are driving larger and more frequent wildfires. There is strong evidence to indicate that human influence on the climate has already roughly doubled the probability of extreme heat events like the record-breaking summer of 2011 in Texas and Oklahoma (Ch. 2,3,6,9,20).

1 Human-induced climate change means much more than just hotter weather. Increases in ocean
2 and freshwater temperatures, frost-free days, and heavy downpours have all been documented.
3 Sea level has risen, and there have been large reductions in snow-cover extent, glaciers,
4 permafrost, and sea ice. Winter storms along the west coast and the coast of New England have
5 increased slightly in frequency and intensity. These changes and other climatic changes have
6 affected and will continue to affect human health, water supply, agriculture, transportation,
7 energy, and many other aspects of society (Ch. 2,3,4,5,6,10,12,16,20,24,25).

8 Some of the changes discussed in this report are common to many regions. For example, very
9 heavy precipitation has increased over the past century in many parts of the country. The largest
10 increases have occurred in the Northeast, Midwest, and Great Plains, where heavy downpours
11 have exceeded the capacity of infrastructure such as storm drains, and have led to flooding
12 events and accelerated erosion. Other impacts, such as those associated with the rapid thawing of
13 permafrost in Alaska, are unique to one U.S. region (Ch. 2,16,18,19,20,21,22,23).

14 Some impacts that occur in one region have more wide-ranging effects. For example, the
15 dramatic decline of summer sea ice in the Arctic – a loss of ice cover roughly equal to half of the
16 continental U.S. – exacerbates global warming by reducing the reflectivity of Earth’s surface and
17 increasing the amount of heat the Arctic absorbs. There is some evidence that this affects
18 weather patterns farther south in the United States. Similarly, wildfires in one region can trigger
19 poor air quality in far-away regions, and new evidence suggests the particulate matter in the
20 atmosphere affects global circulation, leading to more persistent periods of anomalous weather.
21 Major storms that hit the Gulf Coast affect the entire country through their cascading effects on
22 oil and gas production and distribution (Ch. 2,4,16,17,18,19,20,22).

23 Sea level rise, combined with coastal storms, has increased the risk of erosion, storm-surge
24 damage, and flooding for coastal communities, especially along the Gulf of Mexico, the Atlantic
25 seaboard, and Alaska. In the Southeast, coastal infrastructure including roads, rail lines, energy
26 infrastructure, and port facilities including naval bases, are at risk from storm surge that is
27 exacerbated by rising sea level. Over the past century, global sea level has risen by about 8
28 inches. Since 1992, the rate of global sea level rise measured by satellites has been roughly twice
29 the rate observed over the last century. Sea level is projected to rise by another 1 to 4 feet in this
30 century. A wider range of scenarios, ranging from 8 inches to 6.6 feet of rise by 2100, has been
31 suggested for use in risk-based analyses. In general, higher emissions scenarios that lead to more
32 warming would be expected to lead to sea level rise toward the upper end of the projected range.
33 The stakes are high, as nearly five million Americans live within four feet of the local high-tide
34 level (Ch. 2,4,10,16,17,20, 22,25).

35 In addition to changing climate, carbon dioxide from fossil fuel burning has a direct effect on the
36 world’s oceans. Carbon dioxide interacts with ocean water to form carbonic acid, lowering the
37 ocean’s pH. Ocean surface waters have become 30% more acidic as they have absorbed large
38 amounts of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. This ocean acidification reduces the capacity of
39 marine organisms with shells or skeletons made of calcium carbonate (such as corals, krill,
40 oysters, clams, and crabs) to survive, grow, and reproduce, which in turn will affect the entire
41 marine food chain (Ch. 2,8,23,24,25).

1 Climate change produces a variety of stresses on society, affecting human health, natural
2 ecosystems, built environments, and existing social, institutional, and legal agreements. These
3 stresses interact with each other and with other non-climate stresses, such as habitat
4 fragmentation, pollution, increased consumption patterns, and biodiversity loss. Addressing these
5 multiple stresses requires the assessment of composite threats as well as tradeoffs among the
6 costs, benefits, and risks of available response options (Ch.
7 3,5,8,9,10,11,14,16,19,20,25,26,27,28).

8 Climate change will influence human health in many ways; some existing health threats will
9 intensify, and new health threats will emerge. Some of the key drivers of health impacts include:
10 increasingly frequent and intense extreme heat, which causes heat-related illnesses and deaths
11 and over time, worsens drought and wildfire risks, and intensifies air pollution; increasingly
12 frequent extreme precipitation and associated flooding that can lead to injuries and increases in
13 marine and freshwater-borne disease; and rising sea levels that intensify coastal flooding and
14 storm surge. Certain groups of people are more vulnerable to the range of climate change-related
15 health impacts, including the elderly, children, the poor, and the sick. Others are vulnerable
16 because of where they live, including those in floodplains, coastal zones, and some urban areas.
17 In fact, U.S. population growth has been greatest in coastal zones and in the arid Southwest,
18 areas that already have been affected by increased risks from climate change. Just as some
19 choices can make us more vulnerable, other choices can make us more resilient. Maintaining a
20 robust public health infrastructure will be critical to managing the potential health impacts of
21 climate change (Ch. 2,7,9,11,12,13,16,18,20,25).

22 Climate change affects the entire living world, including people, through changes in ecosystems
23 and biodiversity. Ecosystems provide a rich array of benefits to humanity, including fisheries,
24 drinking water, fertile soils for growing crops, buffering from climate impacts, and aesthetic and
25 cultural values. These benefits are not always easy to quantify, but they translate into jobs,
26 economic growth, health, and human well-being. Climate change-driven perturbations to
27 ecosystems that have direct human impacts include reduced water supply and quality, the loss of
28 iconic species and landscapes, distorted rhythms of nature, and the potential for extreme events
29 to eliminate the capacity of ecosystems to provide benefits (Ch. 3, 6, 8, 12, 14, 23, 24).

30 Climate change and other human modifications of ecosystems and landscapes often increase
31 their vulnerability to damage from extreme events while at the same time reducing their natural
32 capacity to modulate the impacts of such events. Salt marshes, reefs, mangrove forests, and
33 barrier islands defend coastal ecosystems and infrastructure, including roads and buildings,
34 against storm surges; their losses from coastal development, erosion, and sea level rise increase
35 the risk of catastrophic damage during or after extreme weather events. Floodplain wetlands,
36 although greatly reduced from their historical extent, absorb floodwaters and reduce the effects
37 of high flows on river-margin lands. Extreme weather events that produce sudden increases in
38 water flow, often carrying debris and pollutants, can decrease the natural capacity of ecosystems
39 to process pollutants (Ch. 3, 7, 8, 25).

40 As climate change and its impacts are becoming more prevalent, Americans face choices. As a
41 result of past emissions of heat-trapping gases, some amount of additional climate change and
42 related impacts is now unavoidable. This is due to the long-lived nature of many of these gases,

1 the amount of heat absorbed and retained by the oceans, and other responses within the climate
2 system. However, beyond the next few decades, the amount of climate change will still largely
3 be determined by choices society makes about emissions. Lower emissions mean less future
4 warming and less severe impacts; higher emissions would mean more warming and more severe
5 impacts. The choices about emissions pathway fall into a category of response options usually
6 referred to as “mitigation” – ways to reduce the amount and speed of future climate change by
7 reducing emissions of heat-trapping gases (Ch. 2, 26, 27).

8 The other major category of response options is known as “adaptation” and refers to changes
9 made to better respond to new conditions, thereby reducing harm or taking advantage of
10 opportunity. Mitigation and adaptation are linked, in that effective mitigation reduces the need
11 for adaptation. Both are essential parts of a comprehensive response strategy. The threat of
12 irreversible impacts makes the timing of mitigation efforts particularly critical. This report
13 includes chapters on Mitigation, Adaptation, and Decision Support that offer an overview of the
14 kinds of options and activities being planned or implemented around the country as governments
15 at local, state, federal, and tribal levels, businesses, other organizations, and individuals begin to
16 respond to climate change (Ch. 26, 27, 28).

17 Large reductions in global emissions, similar to the lower emissions scenario (B1) analyzed in
18 this assessment, would be necessary to avoid some of the worst impacts and risks of climate
19 change. The targets called for in international agreements would require even larger reductions
20 than those outlined in scenario B1 (Figure 1). Meanwhile, global emissions are still rising, and
21 are on track to be even higher than the high emissions scenario (A2) analyzed in this report. The
22 current U.S. contribution to global emissions is about 20%. Voluntary efforts, the recent shift
23 from coal to natural gas for electricity generation, and governmental actions in city, state,
24 regional, and federal programs under way and have contributed to reducing U.S. emissions in
25 the last few years. Some of these actions are motivated by climate concerns, sometimes with
26 non-climate co-benefits, while others are motivated primarily by non-climate objectives. These
27 U.S. actions and others that might be undertaken in the future are described in the Mitigation
28 chapter of this report; at present they are not sufficient to reduce total U.S. emissions to a level
29 that would be consistent with scenario B1 or the targets in international agreements (Ch. 2, 4,
30 27).

31 With regard to adaptation, the pace and magnitude of observed and projected changes emphasize
32 the need for being prepared for a wide variety and intensity of climate impacts. Because of the
33 influence of human activities, the past climate is no longer a sufficient indicator of future
34 conditions. Planning and managing based on the climate of the last century means that tolerances
35 of some infrastructure and species will be exceeded. For example, building codes and
36 landscaping ordinances will likely need to be updated not only for energy efficiency, but also to
37 conserve water supplies, protect against insects that spread disease, reduce susceptibility to heat
38 stress, and improve protection against extreme events. The knowledge that climate change is real
39 and accelerating points to the need to develop and refine approaches that enable decision-
40 making and increase flexibility, robustness, and resilience in the face of ongoing and future
41 impacts. Being prepared for such events paves the way for economic opportunities (Ch. 2, 3, 5,
42 9, 11, 13, 26, 27, 28).

1 Adaptation considerations include local, state, regional, national, and international jurisdictional
2 issues. For example, in managing water supplies to adapt to a changing climate, the implications
3 of international treaties should be considered in the context of managing the Great Lakes, the
4 Columbia River, and the Colorado River to deal with increased drought risk. Both “bottom up”
5 community planning and “top down” national strategies may help regions deal with impacts such
6 as increases in electrical brownouts, heat stress, floods, and wildfires. Such a mix of approaches
7 will require cross-boundary coordination at multiple levels as operational agencies integrate
8 adaptation planning into their programs (Ch. 3, 7, 9, 10, 18, 20, 21, 26, 28).

9 Proactively preparing for climate change can reduce impacts, while also facilitating a more rapid
10 and efficient response to changes as they happen. The Adaptation chapter in this report
11 highlights efforts at the federal, regional, state, tribal, and local levels, as well as initiatives in the
12 corporate and non-governmental sectors to build adaptive capacity and resilience towards
13 climate change (Ch. 28).

14 This report identifies a number of areas for which improved scientific information or
15 understanding would enhance the capacity to estimate future climate change impacts. For
16 example, knowledge of the mechanisms controlling the rate of ice loss in Greenland and
17 Antarctica is limited, making it difficult for scientists to narrow the range of future sea level rise.
18 Research on ecological responses to climate change is limited, as is understanding of social
19 responses and how ecological and social responses will interact (Ch. 29).

20 There is also a section on creating a sustained climate assessment process to more efficiently
21 collect and synthesize the rapidly evolving science and to help supply timely and relevant
22 information to decision-makers. Results from all of these efforts will continue to build our
23 understanding of the interactions of human and natural systems in the context of a changing
24 climate (Ch. 30).

1 Report Findings

2 1. **Global climate is changing, and this is apparent across the U.S. in a wide range of** 3 **observations. The climate change of the past 50 years is due primarily to human activities,** 4 **predominantly the burning of fossil fuels.**

5 U.S. average temperature has increased by about 1.5°F since 1895, with more than 80% of
6 this increase occurring since 1980. The most recent decade was the nation’s warmest on
7 record. Because human-induced warming is superimposed on a naturally varying climate,
8 rising temperatures are not evenly distributed across the country or over time (Ch. 2).

9 2. **Some extreme weather and climate events have increased in recent decades, and there is** 10 **new and stronger evidence that many of these increases are related to human activities.**

11 Changes in extreme events are the primary way in which most people experience climate
12 change. Human-induced climate change has already increased the frequency and intensity of
13 some extremes. Over the last 50 years, much of the U.S. has seen an increase in prolonged
14 stretches of excessively high temperatures, more heavy downpours, and in some regions
15 more severe droughts (Ch. 2, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23).

16 3. **Human-induced climate change is projected to continue and accelerate significantly if** 17 **emissions of heat-trapping gases continue to increase.**

18 Heat-trapping gases already in the atmosphere have committed us to a hotter future with
19 more climate-related impacts over the next few decades. The magnitude of climate change
20 beyond the next few decades depends primarily on the amount of heat-trapping gases emitted
21 globally, now and in the future (Ch. 2, 27).

22 4. **Impacts related to climate change are already evident in many sectors and are expected** 23 **to become increasingly challenging across the nation throughout this century and beyond.**

24 Climate change is already affecting human health, infrastructure, water resources,
25 agriculture, energy, the natural environment, and other factors – locally, nationally, and
26 internationally. Climate change interacts with other environmental and societal factors in a
27 variety of ways that either moderate or exacerbate the ultimate impacts. The types and
28 magnitudes of these effects vary across the nation and through time. Several populations –
29 including children, the elderly, the sick, the poor, tribes and other indigenous people – are
30 especially vulnerable to one or more aspects of climate change. There is mounting evidence
31 that the costs to the nation are already high and will increase very substantially in the future,
32 unless global emissions of heat-trapping gases are strongly reduced (Ch. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
33 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25).

34 5. **Climate change threatens human health and well-being in many ways, including impacts** 35 **from increased extreme weather events, wildfire, decreased air quality, diseases** 36 **transmitted by insects, food, and water, and threats to mental health.**

37 Climate change is increasing the risks of heat stress, respiratory stress from poor air quality,
38 and the spread of waterborne diseases. Food security is emerging as an issue of concern, both
39 within the U.S. and across the globe, and is affected by climate change. Large-scale changes
40 in the environment due to climate change and extreme weather events are also increasing the
41 risk of the emergence or reemergence of unfamiliar health threats (Ch. 2, 6, 9, 11, 12, 16, 19,

1 20, 22, 23).

2 **6. Infrastructure across the U.S. is being adversely affected by phenomena associated with**
3 **climate change, including sea level rise, storm surge, heavy downpours, and extreme**
4 **heat.**

5 Sea level rise and storm surges, in combination with the pattern of heavy development in
6 coastal areas, are already resulting in damage to infrastructure such as roads, buildings, ports,
7 and energy facilities. Infrastructure associated with military installations is also at risk from
8 climate change impacts. Floods along the nation’s rivers, inside cities, and on lakes following
9 heavy downpours, prolonged rains, and rapid melting of snowpack are damaging
10 infrastructure in towns and cities, farmlands, and a variety of other places across the nation.
11 Extreme heat is damaging transportation infrastructure such as roads, rail lines, and airport
12 runways. Rapid warming in Alaska has resulted in infrastructure impacts due to thawing of
13 permafrost and the loss of coastal sea ice that once protected shorelines from storms and
14 wave-driven coastal erosion (Ch. 2, 3, 5, 6, 11, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25).

15 **7. Reliability of water supplies is being reduced by climate change in a variety of ways that**
16 **affect ecosystems and livelihoods in many regions, particularly the Southwest, the Great**
17 **Plains, the Southeast, and the islands of the Caribbean and the Pacific, including the state**
18 **of Hawai‘i.**

19 Surface and groundwater supplies in many regions are already stressed by increasing demand
20 for water as well as declining runoff and groundwater recharge. In many regions, climate
21 change increases the likelihood of water shortages and competition for water among
22 agricultural, municipal, and environmental uses. The western U.S. relies heavily on mountain
23 snowpack for water storage, and spring snowpack is declining in most of the West. There is
24 an increasing risk of seasonal water shortages in many parts of the U.S., even where total
25 precipitation is projected to increase. Water quality challenges are also increasing,
26 particularly sediment and contaminant concentrations after heavy downpours (Ch. 2, 3, 12,
27 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23).

28 **8. Adverse impacts to crops and livestock over the next 100 years are expected. Over the**
29 **next 25 years or so, the agriculture sector is projected to be relatively resilient, even**
30 **though there will be increasing disruptions from extreme heat, drought, and heavy**
31 **downpours. U.S. food security and farm incomes will also depend on how agricultural**
32 **systems adapt to climate changes in other regions of the world.**

33 Near-term resilience of U.S. agriculture is enhanced by adaptive actions, including expansion
34 of irrigated acreage in response to drought, regional shifts in crops and cropped acreage,
35 continued technological advancements, and other adjustments. By mid-century, however,
36 when temperature increases and precipitation extremes are further intensified, yields of major
37 U.S. crops are expected to decline, threatening both U.S. and international food security. The
38 U.S. food system also depends on imports, so food security and commodity pricing will be
39 affected by agricultural adaptation to climate changes and other conditions around the world
40 (Ch. 2, 6, 12, 13, 14, 18, 19).

1 **9. Natural ecosystems are being directly affected by climate change, including changes in**
2 **biodiversity and location of species. As a result, the capacity of ecosystems to moderate**
3 **the consequences of disturbances such as droughts, floods, and severe storms is being**
4 **diminished.**

5 In addition to climate changes that directly affect habitats, events such as droughts, floods,
6 wildfires, and pest outbreaks associated with climate change are already disrupting
7 ecosystem structures and functions in a variety of direct and indirect ways. These changes
8 limit the capacity of ecosystems such as forests, barrier beaches, and coastal- and freshwater-
9 wetlands to adapt and continue to play important roles in reducing the impacts of these
10 extreme events on infrastructure, human communities, and other valued resources (Ch. 2, 3,
11 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 19, 25).

12 **10. Life in the oceans is changing as ocean waters become warmer and more acidic.**

13 Warming ocean waters and ocean acidification across the globe and within U.S. marine
14 territories are broadly affecting marine life. Warmer and more acidic waters are changing the
15 distribution of fish and other mobile sea life, and stressing those, such as corals, that cannot
16 move. Warmer and more acidic ocean waters combine with other stresses, such as
17 overfishing and coastal and marine pollution, to negatively affect marine-based food
18 production and fishing communities (Ch. 2, 23, 24, 25).

19 **11. Planning for adaptation (to address and prepare for impacts) and mitigation (to reduce**
20 **emissions) is increasing, but progress with implementation is limited.**

21 In recent years, climate adaptation and mitigation activities have begun to emerge in many
22 sectors and at all levels of government; however barriers to implementation of these activities
23 are significant. The level of current efforts is insufficient to avoid increasingly serious
24 impacts of climate change that have large social, environmental, and economic
25 consequences. Well-planned and implemented actions to limit emissions and increase
26 resilience to impacts that are unavoidable can improve public health, economic development
27 opportunities, natural system protection, and overall quality of life (Ch. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 15,
28 26, 27, 28).

1 **Table 1.1: Regional Observations of Climate Change**

Regional Observations of Climate Change	
Northeast	Heat waves, coastal flooding due to sea level rise and storm surge, and river flooding due to more extreme precipitation events are affecting communities in the region.
Southeast	Decreased water availability, exacerbated by population growth and land-use change, is causing increased competition for water; risks associated with extreme events like hurricanes are increasing.
Midwest	Longer growing seasons and rising carbon dioxide levels are increasing yields of some crops, although these benefits have already been offset in some instances by occurrence of extreme events such as heat waves, droughts, and floods.
Great Plains	Rising temperatures are leading to increased demand for water and energy and impacts on agricultural practices.
Southwest	Drought and increased warming have fostered wildfires and increased competition for scarce water resources for people and ecosystems.
Northwest	Changes in the timing of streamflow related to earlier snowmelt have already been observed and are reducing the supply of water in summer, causing far-reaching ecological and socioeconomic consequences.
Alaska	Summer sea ice is receding rapidly, glaciers are shrinking, and permafrost is thawing, causing damage to infrastructure and major changes to ecosystems; impacts to Alaska native communities are increasing.
Hawaii	Increasingly constrained freshwater supplies, coupled with increased temperatures, are stressing both people and ecosystems, and decreasing food and water security.
Coasts	Coastal lifelines, such as water supply infrastructure and evacuation routes, are increasingly vulnerable to higher sea levels and storm surges, inland flooding, and other climate-related changes.
Oceans	The oceans are currently absorbing about a quarter of human-caused carbon dioxide emissions to the atmosphere and over 90% of the heat associated with global warming, leading to ocean acidification and the alteration of marine ecosystems.

2

3

1 **Crosscutting Themes and Issues**

2 There are several themes that run throughout the assessment. These include: the “multiple
3 stresses context” in which climate change impacts must be interpreted; the effects of
4 socioeconomic and cultural decisions on vulnerabilities to climate change; and the importance of
5 considering climate-change impacts on the U.S. in an international context.

6 **1. Climate change should be considered in the context of multiple factors**

7 Climate change and its impacts cannot be adequately assessed in isolation. Rather, they are part
8 of a broader context including many other factors such as: land-use change, local economies, air
9 and water pollution, and rates of consumption of resources. This perspective has implications for
10 assessments of climate change impacts and the design of research questions at the national,
11 regional, and local scales. This assessment begins to explore the consequences of interacting
12 factors by focusing on sets of crosscutting issues in a series of six chapters: Water, Energy, and
13 Land Use; Biogeochemical Cycles; Impacts of Climate Change on Tribal Lands and Resources;
14 Urban Infrastructure and Vulnerability; Land Use and Land Cover Change; and Impacts on Rural
15 Communities. This Assessment also includes discussions of cascading impacts in several
16 chapters (particularly in the Urban Infrastructure and Vulnerability Chapter and the Water,
17 Energy, and Land Use Chapter), and emphasizes that many of the impacts identified in the
18 Assessment will occur in parallel, not in isolation from one another. As illustrated by recent
19 events, this greatly stresses the capacity to respond to a series of climate-related crises that occur
20 simultaneously or soon after one another.

21 **2. Societal choices affect vulnerability to climate change impacts.**

22 Because environmental, cultural and socioeconomic systems are tightly coupled, climate change
23 impacts can either be amplified or reduced by cultural and/or socioeconomic decisions. In the
24 context of the “risk-based framing” for their chapters, the authors of this report were asked to
25 focus on attributes of regions and sectors most likely to experience significant impacts. In many
26 chapters, it is clear that societal decisions have the greatest impact on valued resources. For
27 example, rapid population growth and development in areas that are particularly susceptible to
28 climate change impacts can amplify those impacts. Recognition of these couplings, together with
29 recognition of the multiple-stresses perspective, helps identify the information needs of decision-
30 makers as they manage risk.

31 **3. Importance of the international context**

32 Climate change is a global phenomenon; the causes and the impacts involve energy-use and risk-
33 management decisions across the globe. Impacts, vulnerabilities, and opportunities in the U.S.
34 are related in complex and interactive ways with changes outside the U.S., and vice versa. In
35 order for U.S. concerns related to climate change to be addressed comprehensively, the
36 international context must be considered. U.S. security, foreign assistance, and economic
37 interests are affected by climate changes experienced in other parts of the world. Although there
38 is significantly more work to be done in this area, this report does identify some initial
39 implications of global and international trends that can be more fully investigated in future
40 assessments.

1 **4. Thresholds, Tipping Points, and Surprises**

2 A significant issue in studying and preparing for global climate change is the fact that changes in
3 human, social, and physical systems do not always occur gradually. Some changes may occur in
4 a relatively predictable way, while others involve unexpected break-points or thresholds beyond
5 which there are irreversible changes or changes of higher magnitudes than expected based on
6 previous experience. These “tipping points” are very hard to predict, as there are many
7 uncertainties associated with understanding future conditions. These uncertainties come from a
8 number of sources, including insufficient data associated with low probability/high consequence
9 events, models that are not yet able to represent the interactions of multiple stresses, incomplete
10 understanding of physical climate mechanisms related to tipping points, and a multitude of issues
11 associated with human behavior, risk management, and decision-making.

12 **5. Weather and Climate Extremes**

13 Understanding how climate is changing requires consideration of changes in the average climate
14 as well as changes in “extremes” – weather and climate events like hot spells, heavy rains,
15 periods of drought and flooding, and severe storms. The climate change impacts expected to
16 have the greatest consequences are those involving extremes: changes in the frequency, intensity,
17 timing, duration, and spatial extent of such extremes, as well as through the occurrence of
18 unprecedented extremes.

19 Terms like “weather-extremes,” “climate extremes,” “heat waves,” and “heavy downpours” need
20 to be defined when used in a scientific context. Researchers use different definitions depending
21 on which characteristics of extremes they are choosing to explore at any one time, in the context
22 of the particular issue they are studying. Nevertheless, most of the scientific literature on
23 extremes uses definitions that fall roughly into two categories (IPCC 2012): those related to the
24 probability of occurrence of a certain type of event, and those related to exceeding a particular
25 threshold.

26 For example, common measures of extremes include the number, percentage, or fraction of days
27 in a month, season, or year with maximum (or minimum) temperature above the 90th, 95th, or
28 99th percentile compared to a reference time period (for example, 1961-1990) – or alternatively,
29 how often a threshold temperature (for example, 32°F or 90°F) is exceeded during a given
30 decade. Alternative definitions refer to how often, on average, an event of a specific magnitude
31 occurs (sometimes called the “return period”) – for example, how frequently we might expect to
32 see daily rainfall exceeding two inches in a given region.

33 In addition, extremes occur over different time periods, ranging from events lasting a few days to
34 a few weeks, like a heat wave or cold snap, to those that happen over longer timescales, such as a
35 period of drought or an unusually hot summer.

36 Changes in extremes are often more difficult to study than changes in the average climate
37 because of the smaller data sample for particularly rare events. This is less of an issue for so-
38 called “moderate extremes,” such as those occurring as often as 5% to 10% of the time. For more
39 “extreme extremes,” statistical methods are often used to overcome these sampling issues.

40 For any given aspect of climate, such as temperature or precipitation, it is important to look at a
41 variety of measures to get an overall picture of the changes in extremes. For the several types of

1 extremes discussed in Chapter 2: Our Changing Climate under Key Messages 6, 7, and 8, for
2 example, the cited studies address different, complementary aspects of each of these phenomena.
3 In the impact studies cited in other chapters, the word “extreme” is often defined differently
4 within different sectors, such as water or health. However, collectively, these studies paint a
5 consistent picture of changes in average climate as well as changes across a range of weather and
6 climate extremes in the United States.

DRAFT

1 **About This Report**

2 The development of this draft National Climate Assessment (NCA) report was overseen by the
3 60-member National Climate Assessment and Development Advisory Committee (NCADAC), a
4 Federal Advisory Committee (FAC) appointed by the Secretary of Commerce at the request of
5 the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC). The NSTC is required, under the 1990
6 Global Change Research Act (GCRA, Title 15 USC Sec 2921 2012), to provide such reports
7 periodically to the President and the Congress. The report, which assesses current scientific
8 findings about the observed and projected impacts of climate change on the United States, relies
9 heavily on the findings of the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) (USGCRP
10 2012). USGCRP activities include observations, monitoring, modeling, process research, and
11 data management focused on discerning global change impacts and informing response options
12 such as adaptation and mitigation. After government review, this report is expected to become
13 the third National Climate Assessment (Karl et al. 2009; USGCRP 2000).

14 As required by Section 106 of the GCRA, the NCA integrates, evaluates, and synthesizes the
15 science of climate and global change and the observed and projected impacts of climate change
16 on the U.S. The assessment integrates the findings of USGCRP with climate-change research
17 and scientific observations from around the world. Major topics in the assessment include
18 evaluating current understanding of climate change science as well as related impacts on various
19 societal and environmental sectors and regions across the nation. The goal of this assessment
20 report is to establish a scientific and credible foundation of information that is useful for a variety
21 of science and policy applications related to managing risk and maximizing opportunities in a
22 changing climate. The report also documents some societal responses to climate changes, and
23 gives public and private decision-makers a better understanding of how climate change is
24 affecting us now and what is in store for the future.

25 **Authorship and Review and Approval Process**

26 A team of more than 240 experts operating under the authority of the NCADAC wrote this
27 document. The NCADAC was assisted by the staff of the USGCRP National Coordination
28 Office, a Technical Support Unit located at the NOAA National Climatic Data Center, and
29 communication specialists in development of this draft report. The report will be extensively
30 reviewed and revised based on comments from the National Research Council of the National
31 Academies of Science and the public. It will then be submitted for review and approval by the
32 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, other agencies of the Subcommittee on
33 Global Change Research, the Committee on the Environment and Natural Resources of the
34 NSTC, and the NSTC itself. Upon approval, the report will be transmitted to Congress and the
35 President. The entire process is designed to ensure that the report meets all federal requirements
36 associated with the Information Quality Act, including those pertaining to public comment and
37 transparency (OMB 2012).

38 **Stakeholder Engagement**

39 This third National Climate Assessment effort has included extensive involvement of
40 stakeholders in providing inputs to the structure and substance of the report. Teams of regional
41 and sectoral experts, decision-makers, and stakeholders were formed to provide technical input
42 and data to the Assessment process. Stakeholder and expert groups participated in more than 70

1 workshops and listening sessions. Participants included public and private decision-makers,
2 resource and environmental managers, researchers, non-governmental organizations, and the
3 general public (USGCRP 2012). Stakeholders from various regions and sectors identified
4 climate-change issues and information they asked to be considered in the assessment. In
5 addition, a number of stakeholder groups submitted data and written reports related to their
6 knowledge about specific climate change issues in response to a request for such input through
7 the Federal Register. A communications and engagement workgroup of the FAC provided
8 oversight and advice regarding the events and engagement processes that led to this report.

9 **Sources of Information**

10 The report draws from a large body of scientific peer-reviewed research published or in press by
11 July 31, 2012. This new work was carefully reviewed by the author teams to ensure a reliable
12 assessment of the state of scientific understanding. Another important source of information for
13 this report was a set of technical input reports produced by federal agencies and other interested
14 parties in response to a request for information by the Assessment’s federal advisory committee
15 (USGCRP 2012). In addition, other peer-reviewed scientific assessments were used, including
16 those of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the U.S. National Assessment’s 2009
17 report, *Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States* (Karl et al. 2009), the National
18 Academy of Science’s *America’s Climate Choices* reports (NRC 2011), and a variety of regional
19 climate impact assessments. These assessments were augmented with government statistics as
20 necessary (such as population census and energy usage) as well as publicly available
21 observations. The final version of this report will be deployed electronically as an “e-book,”
22 allowing for linkages across and within topics and chapters as well as transparent, clickable
23 access to the data and references behind each of the conclusions.

24 **Responding to Climate Change**

25 While the primary focus of this report is on the impacts of climate change in the U.S., it also
26 documents some of the actions society is already taking or can take to respond to the climate
27 challenge. Responses to climate change fall into two broad categories. The first involves
28 “mitigation” measures to reduce climate change by reducing emissions of heat-trapping gases
29 and particles, or increasing removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. The second involves
30 “adaptation” measures to improve society’s ability to cope with or avoid harmful impacts and
31 take advantage of beneficial ones, now and in the future. At this point, both of these response
32 activities are necessary to limit the magnitude and impact of global climate change on the United
33 States. More effective mitigation measures can reduce the amount of climate change, and
34 therefore the need for adaptation in the future.

35 This report underscores the effect of mitigation by comparing impacts resulting from higher
36 versus lower emissions scenarios. This shows that choices made about emissions in the next few
37 decades will have far-reaching consequences for climate change impacts in the middle to latter
38 part of this century. Over the long term, lower emissions will lessen both the magnitude of
39 climate change impacts and the rate at which they appear.

40 While the report underscores the importance of mitigation as an essential part of the nation’s
41 climate change strategy, it does not evaluate mitigation technologies or undertake an analysis of
42 the effectiveness of various approaches. These issues are the subject of ongoing studies by the

1 U.S. Government’s Climate Change Technology Program and several federal agencies including
2 the Department of Energy, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Transportation, and
3 Department of Agriculture. The range of mitigation responses being studied by these agencies
4 includes, but is not limited to, more efficient production and use of energy, increased use of non-
5 carbon-emitting energy sources, and carbon capture and storage.

6 Adaptation actions are complementary to mitigation options. They are focused on moderating
7 harmful impacts of current and future climate variability and change, and taking advantage of
8 possible beneficial opportunities arising from climate change. While this report does assess the
9 current state of adaptation actions and planning across the country, the implementation of
10 adaptive actions is still nascent, and a comprehensive assessment of actions taken, and of their
11 effectiveness, is not yet possible. This report documents actions currently being pursued to
12 address impacts such as increased urban heat extremes and air pollution, and describes the
13 challenges decision makers face in planning for and implementing adaptation responses.

14 **Risk-Based Framing**

15 Authors of this assessment were asked to approach it from the perspective of a decision-maker
16 trying to limit risk to valued systems, resources, and communities (and to consider opportunities
17 as well). For each chapter, they were asked to frame a number of key questions or issues that
18 address the most important information needs of stakeholders, and consider the decisions
19 stakeholders are facing. The criteria provided for identifying key vulnerabilities in their sector or
20 region included: magnitude, timing, persistence/reversibility, distributional aspects, likelihood,
21 and importance of impacts (based on the perceptions of relevant parties) as well as the potential
22 for adaptation. For the purposes of this assessment, risk was defined as the product of likelihood
23 and consequence, and authors were encouraged to think about these topics from both a
24 quantitative and qualitative perspective, and to consider the influence of multiple stresses if
25 possible.

26 **Assessing Confidence**

27 The level of confidence the chapter authors have in the key findings they report is given in
28 “traceable accounts” that accompany each chapter. A traceable account is intended to: 1)
29 document the process the authors used to come to the conclusions in their key messages; 2)
30 provide additional information to reviewers about the quality of the information used; and 3)
31 allow traceability to data and resources. The authors have assessed a wide range of information
32 in the scientific literature and previous technical reports. In assessing confidence, they have
33 considered the strength and consistency of the observed evidence, the skill, range, and
34 consistency of model projections, and insights about processes and climate from peer-reviewed
35 sources.

36 **Assessing Likelihood**

37 When it is considered scientifically justified to report the likelihood of particular impacts within
38 the range of possible outcomes, this report takes a plain-language approach to expressing the
39 expert judgment of the author team based on the best available evidence. For example, an
40 outcome termed “likely” has at least a two-thirds chance of occurring; an outcome termed “very
41 likely,” at least a 90% chance. Key sources of information used to develop these
42 characterizations of uncertainty are referenced.

1 **Addressing Incomplete Scientific Understanding**

2 Within each traceable account, the authors identify areas where a lack of information and/or
3 scientific uncertainty limits their ability to estimate future climate change and its impacts. The
4 section on “An Agenda for Climate Impacts Science” at the end of this report highlights some of
5 the areas suggested for additional research.

6 **Scenarios**

7 Scenarios are ways to help understand what future conditions might be, with each scenario an
8 example of what might happen under particular assumptions. Scenarios are not predictions or
9 forecasts. Instead, scenarios provide a starting point for examining questions about an uncertain
10 future and help us to visualize alternative futures in concrete and human terms. The military and
11 businesses frequently use these powerful tools for future planning in high-stakes situations. We
12 use scenarios to help identify future vulnerabilities as well as to support decision-makers who are
13 focused on limiting risk and maximizing opportunities. Three types of scenarios are used in this
14 assessment – emissions scenarios (including population and land use components), climate
15 scenarios, and sea level rise scenarios.

16 **Emissions Scenarios**

17 Emissions scenarios quantitatively illustrate potential additions to the atmosphere of substances
18 that alter natural climate patterns. Emissions result from essential human activities, including
19 energy production and use, agriculture, and other activities that change land use. These scenarios
20 are developed using a wide range of assumptions about population growth, economic
21 development, the evolution of technology, and decisions about environmental protection, among
22 other factors. A wide range of assumptions is used because future trends are uncertain and
23 depend on unpredictable human choices. These assumptions about the future include a wide
24 array of considerations – not only emissions, but also the extent to which changes in climate will
25 have impacts on society and natural resources, and capacity for adaptation.

26 Perspectives on “plausible” emissions scenarios evolve over time. The Intergovernmental Panel
27 on Climate Change (IPCC) has been a leader in developing scenarios and has released three
28 different sets since 1990. In 2000, the IPCC released a Special Report on Emission Scenarios
29 (Nakicenovic et al. 2000) that provided its most recent set of scenarios (known as SRES) that
30 described a wide range of socioeconomic futures and resulting emissions. In the higher end of
31 the range, the SRES A2 scenario represents a divided world with high population growth, low
32 economic growth, slower technology improvements and diffusion, and other factors that
33 contribute to high emissions and lower adaptive capacity (for example, low per capita wealth).
34 At the lower end of the range, the B1 scenario represents a world with lower population growth,
35 higher economic development, a shift to low-emitting efficient energy technologies that are
36 diffused rapidly around the world through free trade, and other conditions that reduce the rate
37 and magnitude of changes in climate averages and extremes as well as increased capacity for
38 adaptation. Recently, a new set of scenarios (Representative Concentration Pathways – RCPs)
39 has been prepared and released by scientists who study emissions, climate, and potential impacts
40 (Moss et al. 2010). This new set incorporates recent observations and research and includes a
41 wider range of future conditions and emissions. Because climate model results are just now
42 being prepared using the new scenarios, and there are few impacts studies that employ them,

1 when scenarios are needed, the report uses the SRES B1 and A2 to span a range of potential
2 futures.

3 Scientists cannot predict which of these scenarios is most likely because the future emissions
4 pathway is a function of human choices. A wide range of societal decisions and policy choices
5 will ultimately influence how the world's emissions evolve, and ultimately, the composition of
6 the atmosphere and the state of the climate system.


7 **Climate Scenarios**

8 Global models that simulate the Earth's climate system are used, among other things, to evaluate
9 the effects of human activities on climate. Since the second U.S. National Climate Assessment
10 report in 2009, a new set of model simulations has been introduced that include more Earth
11 system physics and chemistry and have higher resolution.

12 These models use emissions scenarios to project expected climate change given different
13 assumptions about how human activities and/or associated emissions levels might change.

14 The range of potential increases in global average temperature in the newest climate model
15 simulations is wider because a wider range of options for future human behavior is considered.
16 For example, one of the new RCP scenarios assumes rapid emission reductions that would limit
17 the global temperature increase to about 3.7°F, a much lower level than in previous scenarios.
18 However, it is noteworthy that the emissions trajectory in RCP 8.5 is similar to SRES A2 and
19 RCP 4.5 is roughly comparable to SRES B1 (see figure comparing SRES and RCP scenarios
20 below).

21



1

2 **Figure 1.1:** U.S. Average Temperature Projections

3 **Caption:** Projected average annual temperature changes (°F) over the contiguous U.S. for
 4 multiple future emissions scenarios, relative to the 1901-1960 average temperature. The
 5 dashed lines are results from the SRES scenarios and the previous simulations. The solid
 6 lines are results from RCPs and the most recent simulations. (Figure source: Michael
 7 Wehner, LBNL. Data from CMIP3, CMIP5, and NOAA.)

8 **Box: Emissions Scenarios**

9 In this report, the two SRES emissions scenarios recommended for use in impact studies are a
 10 higher emissions scenario (the A2 scenario from SRES) and a lower emissions scenario (the B1
 11 scenario from SRES). These two scenarios do not encompass the full range of possible futures:
 12 emissions can change less than those scenarios imply, or they can change even more. Recent
 13 carbon dioxide emissions are, in fact, above the A2 scenario. Whether this will continue is
 14 unknown.

15 -- end box --


16 **Sea Level Rise Scenarios**

17 After at least two thousand years of little change, sea level rose by roughly 8 inches over the last
 18 century, and satellite data provide evidence that the rate of rise over the past 20 years has roughly
 19 doubled. In the U.S., millions of people and many of the nation's assets related to military
 20 readiness, energy, transportation, commerce, and ecosystems are located in areas at risk of
 21 coastal flooding because of sea level rise and storm surge.

22 Sea level is rising because ocean water expands as it heats up and because water is added to the
 23 oceans from melting glaciers and ice sheets. Sea level is projected to rise an additional 1 to 4 feet

1 in this century. Scientists are unable to narrow this range at present because the processes
 2 affecting the loss of ice mass from the large ice sheets are dynamic and still the subject of intense
 3 study. Some impact assessments in this report use a set of sea level rise scenarios within this
 4 range, while others consider sea level rise as high as 6.6 feet.

Sea Level Rise: Past, Present, Future



5
 6 **Figure 1.2:** Sea Level Rise: Past, Present, and Future

7 **Caption:** Historical, observed, and possible future amounts of global sea level rise from
 8 1800 to 2100. Historical estimates (Kemp et al. 2012) (based on sediment records and
 9 other proxies) are shown in red (pink band shows uncertainty range), tide gauge
 10 measurements in blue (Church and White 2011), and satellite observations are shown in
 11 green (Nerem et al. 2010). The future scenarios range from 0.66 feet to 6.6 feet in 2100
 12 (Parris et al. 2012). Higher or lower amounts of sea level rise are considered implausible
 13 by 2100, as represented by the gray shading. The orange line at right shows the currently
 14 projected range of sea level rise of 1 to 4 feet by 2100, which falls within the larger risk-
 15 based scenario range. The large projected range of scenarios reflects uncertainty about
 16 how ice sheets will respond to the warming ocean and atmosphere, and to changing
 17 winds and currents. Figure source: Josh Willis, NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory, based
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