A guest blog post by Major Arnel P. David, CGSOC 13-01 Scholars Seminar on the “Local Dynamics of War”
In our final lesson before the winter break, our group of scholarly-warriors continues firing on all cylinders. The focus of this lesson was to clear up any ambiguity regarding Craig Parsons’s four core logics of explanation for human action. The lesson concluded with an exercise where student’s leveraged these logical explanations to gain better fidelity with the new concepts. The lessons continue to build cumulatively and support our collective approach for examining complex problems.
Our instructor, LTC Celestino Perez, invested some time to ensure that everyone equally understood Parsons’s four logics: structural, institutional, psychological, and ideational. By understanding the core logic of an argument, scholars and practitioners can formulate clear and distinct claims that contribute to the field of study.[i] Despite the challenges of articulating an incontestable claim for human action, greater integrity is obtainable through an increased understanding of the core logic behind arguments.[ii]
Using an article by Douglas A. Ollivant, “Reinterpreting Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” the class broke down into groups of pairs to analyze the various arguments and causal mechanisms reflected in his argument.[iii] Mr. Ollivant, a retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel, humbly reassesses the perceived success of the Baghdad “Surge”. This interesting reflection argues that the US troop surge, although an important factor, may not have been the central ingredient for decreased violence in Iraq after 2008. He offers a new narrative that suggests that the popular military-centric analysis is limited in scope when examining the problem. The military-centric analysis alone cannot fully account for the deep social and political forces present within the environment during that time.[iv]
Mr. Ollivant’s narrative suggests four factors that better explain the decrease in violence in Iraq:
1) the Sunnis’ high casualty rate became a demographic issue forcing them to change course and partner with US forces to eradicate Al Qaeda elements in Iraq, 2) Shi’a elites, given their successful cleansing operations, consolidated their equities and pursued conflict settlement, 3) the Iraqi Security Forces (army, federal police, police) grew effective, 4) US leadership made it explicitly clear that the commitment to improve Iraq was genuine, in which provided “political space” for Iraqi leaders to operate.[v]
Introspectively, the exercise demonstrated everyone’s ability to map out the interactions and causal mechanisms at play within the study. In discussion, several students highlighted their new critical “lenses” in analyzing complex problems. Collectively, we learned to exercise caution with the use of “categorizing” mental devices – PMESII-PT, DIME, & ASCOPE—and rather carefully examine key interactions that may illuminate important connections. This critical outlook on problems is commensurate with the Local Dynamics of War program focus. Greater appreciation for academic rigor will yield more precision with military planning and decision-making.
Studies of this nature are crucial. As the lead planner during the Baghdad “Surge”, Mr. Ollivant’s critical assessment of the perceived success of the troop surge influences future policy and planning. The troop factor and its impact on the political crisis is a relevant debate and deserve our attention. As military leaders, we have an incredible responsibility and duty to challenge our convictions. The decision to employ additional troopers is always serious business.
[i]Craig Parsons, “How to Map Arguments in Political Science,” (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2007), 172.
[ii] Ibid.
[iii] Douglas A. Ollivant, “Countering the New Orthodoxy: Reinterpreting Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” New American Foundation Website. Accessed on 19DEC12. http://www.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net
/files/policydocs/Ollivant_Reinterpreting_Counterinsurgency.pdf.
[iv]Ibid.
[v]Ibid.
